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NW 53295 6/15/17

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NW 53295
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COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. OO- [unclear]

SUBJECT Miro Cardona to Depart for Puerto Rico And to Withdraw From Political Activity/Conflicts Within the MRP

DATE DISTR. 22 December 1960

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DATE OF INFO. Oct - Dec 60

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, free-lance writer and part time sugar broker.

Source speaks Spanish, has resided at intervals in Cuba since youth, has had contacts for many years among Cubans in the sugar business, and knows personally many present and former Cuban political and administrative personalities. Source lived in Havana during the entire calendar year 1959, working with the Sugar Stabilization Institute and collecting material for an analysis of developments in Cuba since Fidel Castro's victory.

1. I have recently learned that Miro Cardona has accepted, effective in early Jan 61, a teaching position at a university in Puerto Rico and that he is withdrawing, at least for the foreseeable future, from all political activity. His anti-Castro sentiments remain as strong as ever, but he is disgusted with the bickering among anti-Castro Cubans and has made up his mind to sit on the sidelines for a time. Miro has a particular dislike for, distrust of, Manuel Ray and for his MRP group. He feels that Ray's program is much too collectivist, Marxist, and opportunist. He also resents what he terms Ray's affection for Communism and the USSR. He recently had a long and acrimonious discussion with Ray about all this and told him to his face what he thought of him. Miro is determined not to be tarred with the brush of association with Ray in any form, which is another important reason for his decision to withdraw to Puerto Rico. He does not want to compromise his own possible political future in Cuba by associating with the likes of Ray. Incidentally, Miro has also informed Antonio de Varona that he will have nothing further to do with him.

2. Conflicts have recently developed within the ranks of the MRP, both inside Cuba and elsewhere. Ramon Barquin became the "military chief" of the MRP during the Fall of 1960 and continues nominally to hold that position. One of my Cuban friends has just had a long talk with Barquin and reports that he intends to have nothing further to do with Ray. Of course, he has not yet told this to Ray. His reasons for his change of heart are basically the same as those cited by Miro. Some MRP adherents are attempting to oust Ray from his position in the MRP and to replace him as leader by Felipe Pazos. Jorge Beruff is said to be the mainspring of this anti-Ray movement. Of course, both Beruff and Pazos are extremely ambitious, which is one factor in their schemes. The other factor, so I am informed, is that many MRP adherents are now having second thoughts about Ray and fear that his character, personality, and program will serve to alienate more people, in the long run, than they will to attract new members and sympathizers. They also feel that Ray will eventually alienate the moderates and will also alienate popular and official US opinion. Therefore, they reason, Ray must go and must be replaced by somebody like Pazos, who, they feel, does not have Ray's liabilities. Some of the anti-Ray elements in the MRP hold this position for

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the sake of expediency (i.e., they wish to get rid of an albatross); others, however, genuinely think that Ray is fundamentally antagonistic to what they believe in. These people thus oppose him on principle, now that they have learned more about the details of his character and his program. In any event, Pazos seems perfectly willing to go along. The only trouble, so I am told, is that neither Pazos nor Beruff have any personal following inside Cuba. Faustino Pérez does have a personal following there, but he favors Ray and not Pazos. Now, Barquín is very much interested in Delio Soren-Ochoa, the old "comandante" during the Castro rebellion against Batista, and now in jail in the Dominican Republic. Barquín feels (as do many others) that Delio might well serve as a cohesive force within the MRP, to pull together the "rightists" (Beruff and Pazos) and the "leftists" (Ray and Pérez), because everyone holds him in such high esteem. Of course, the only trouble is that Delio is not currently "available".

3. One of my Cuban friends, who is well-versed in affairs in Oriente Province, has informed me that the "colonos" and others there feel pretty much the same about the MRP situation as I have described above. Thus, the conflicts outside of Cuba within the MRP are mirrored inside Cuba, or at least are so mirrored inside Oriente Province.

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