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(44 USC 2107 Note)  
NW 53217 6/20/17

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25 April 1977

SUBJECT: AMTRUNK Operation

1. Description:

The proposal for this operation was presented to CIA by Tad SZULC, via Mr. Hurwitch, the State Department Cuban Coordinator, in February 1963. It allegedly originated with Serge VOLSKY and Dr. Nestor MORENO who referred to it as the "Leonardo Plan." Its objective was to overthrow the Cuban Government by means of a conspiracy among high-level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which would oust both CASTRO and the Communists from power. The CIA supported this activity and encrypted it AMTRUNK. The AMTRUNK cryptonym was changed to AMSTEAMER in the Spring of 1965, several additional infiltration/exfiltration missions were attempted or completed, and the project was terminated in late 1966 due to security problems. In retrospect, the activity appears to have been insecure and doomed to failure from its inception primarily for lack of compartmentation, and loose talk on the part of its principals.

2. Findings:

a. UFGA 11375, dated 30 September 1963:

The wife of AMLEO-3 (Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez, a JMWAVE Station asset directly involved in the AMTRUNK Operation), reportedly made direct contact with Fidel CASTRO on 7 September 1963 at Santa Maria Beach, Cuba, in which she asked CASTRO's permission for her and her children to leave Cuba to join AMLEO-3 in the U.S. Mrs. AMLEO-3 reportedly expressed fear that AMLEO-3 would find another woman if she didn't join him. CASTRO replied by asking "do you consider yourself a burden to your husband?" Mrs.

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AMLEO-3 said "it is possible," and CASTRO then asked "but he calls you every day." This information, according to AMLEO-3, was included in a letter from his wife which he received on 14 September 1963. There is no copy of the letter either in the AMTRUNK Operational file or in AMLEO-3's dossier to confirm that statement. /Comment: AMLEO-3 defected to the U.S. in December 1962, immediately became a JMWAVE Station asset, and was used to screen names for the AMTRUNK Operation. He was terminated in July 1964, reportedly due to conflict with JMWAVE Station for not having exfiltrated his wife and children. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, allegedly to exfiltrate his wife and children, was arrested, sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, served two years, and was set free in July or August 1967. There are two firm accusations that he was a CASTRO agent as early as July 1963. /Comment: if true, it appears that AMLEO-3 could have been providing CASTRO information on the AMTRUNK operation from its inception. Also, it perhaps could account for CASTRO's statement that AMLEO-3 called his wife in Cuba every day.7

b. UFGA 11829, dated 18 October 1963:

A newspaper article on changing trends among high-level personnel within the CASTRO Government, written by Tad SZULC, appeared in a major daily newspaper. SZULC reportedly told a high-level U.S. Government official that Dr. MORENO, the AMTRUNK team leader, was the source of his information. A debriefing of MORENO produced information at considerable variance to that in SZULC's article. Confronted with the article, MORENO admitted talking to SZULC but denied that most of the information in the article was based on anything which MORENO had said. The article created considerable furor in Washington, D.C. /Comment: specifics concerning the content of the article and name of the paper in which it appeared were not cited in the dispatch. There is no copy of the article either in the AMTRUNK operational file or in SZULC's dossier. If true, SZULC's article(s) could have been used as a channel for providing information to the Cuban Government, wittingly or unwittingly.7

c. WAVE Cable 7300 (IN 58037) dated 9 November 1963:

Transmission of a One Way Voice Link radio message #6 to the AMTRUNK's in Cuba on 9 November 1963, asked if they had developed any leads into the higher echelons of the Rebel Army, and who at higher levels appeared to be good prospects for recruitment. It cited rumors that persons

in top positions of the army were dissatisfied to the point that they may have been thinking of plotting against Fidel. /Comment: There is no proof that the message came to the attention of Fidel CASTRO. However, if the operation was penetrated, as it appears to have been, this information could have reached him.7

d. WAVE Cable 9630 (IN 87039) dated 25 December 1963, Report Number UFG 4313:

The following information was contained in a Secret Writing message from AMTRUNK-9 (Modesto OROZCO) dated 6 November, postmarked 22 November, and received on 2 December 1963. AMTRUNK-9 allegedly received the information from two other sources. AMTRUNK-9 reported that during the early part of November 1963 Fidel CASTRO Ruz, during the course of a private conversation, expressed fear of the possibility of "Commando Insurrections" which might take place on a large scale in Cuba, as the Cuban economy was such that he could not maintain a state of military alert for a long time. He indicated that any prolonged period of military alert might cause discontent among the troops, a situation which would be dangerous and create irreparable consequences. So as to negate this possibility, CASTRO was undertaking an intensive propaganda campaign to give confidence to his troops and to limit the occurrence of any internal uprising. /AMTRUNK-9 made an unauthorized trip to Cuba following his termination by JMWAVE Station. The files do not reflect his subsequent whereabouts.7

e. WAVE Cable 0952 (IN 03920) dated 23 January 1964:

In a debriefing of AMTRUNK-9 (Modesto OROZCO) on 17 January 1964, he provided rather sensational statements that the Government of Cuba was ready to fall at any moment, that enormous quantities of weapons were in Cuba, and that the Soviets were out to get Fidel. However, AMTRUNK-9 was unable to substantiate such stories with sources, dates and facts. It was learned that Dr. MORENO planned to introduce AMTRUNK-9 to VOLSKY. It was pointed out that SZULC, personally or through VOLSKY, may obtain information for a sensational-type article such as he wrote last September /1963/ following the MORENO interview.

Chris Hopkins  
LAD/JFK Task Force

Attachment: Addendum/References

## ADDENDUM

- a. UFGA 11375, dated 30 September 1963, Operational Progress Report on AMLEO-3, from Station JMWAVE to Headquarters, Special Affairs Staff. Filed in AMTRUNK Operational folder 19-6-84/3, Folder 2, Job # 68-496/16.
- b. UFGA 11829, dated 18 October 1963, Progress Report AMTRUNK Team, Period 1-30 September 1963, from Station JMWAVE to Headquarters Special Affairs Staff. Filed in AMTRUNK Operational folder 19-6-84/3, Folder 2, Job # 68-496/16.
- c. WAVE Cable 7300 (IN 58037) dated 9 November 1963, to Headquarters. CIA radio message to AMTRUNK agent in Cuba. Filed in AMTRUNK Project 19-6-84/3, Folder 3, Job # 68-179/40.
- d. WAVE Cable 9630 (IN 87039) dated 25 December 1963, Report No. UFG 4313, from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters. Filed in AMTRUNK Reports folder 19-6-84/4, Folder 3, Job # 68-179/40.
- e. WAVE Cable 0952 (IN 03920) dated 23 January 1964, from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters. Operational cable concerning the debriefing of AMTRUNK-9. Filed in AMTRUNK Operational folder 19-6-84/3, Folder 3, Job # 68-496/16.

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INDEXED	INDEXED	
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TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMLEO  
Operational Progress Report AMLEO-3

*File: [unclear]*

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

REFERENCES: A. UFGA-10496, 6 August 1963  
B. WAVE-4024, 8 September 1963  
C. UFGA-2379, 6 August 1963  
D. UFGA-7858, 25 February 1963

### OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. This report will cover the period 30 July 1963 through 15 September 1963 and is a follow-up report to reference A.

### EFFORTS TO LEGALLY EXFILTRATE AMLEO-3 FAMILY FROM CUBA

2. Since transmission of reference A to Headquarters several developments occurred which effectively eliminated several alternate solutions to the problem of the AMLEO-3 family in Cuba. The alternate solutions that were eliminated, as found in paragraph 3 of reference A, were (a) "Maintain Status Quo as a Family attempting Leave Cuba via Offices of Swiss Embassy as Part of the American Repatriation Program"; (b) "Have AMLEO-3 Family Withdraw Papers From the Swiss Embassy and American Repatriation Program and Attempt Leave Cuba as Normal Refugees via Mexico Or Spain"; and (e) "Have the AMLEO3 Family Case Taken up With the GOC Through the 'Donovan' Channel for Possible Legal Exfiltration". Elimination of the above alternates left only two solutions that were at all feasible; (c) "Have the AMLEO-3 Family Take Asylum in either the Uruguayan or Mexican Embassies in Havana", or (d) "Have the AMLEO-3 Family Exfiltrated black in a Maritime Operation by either a KUBARK or Independent Maritime Team." Because of the inherent risk involved in a black exfiltration, it was decided that the AMLEO-3 family should be put into asylum in either the Uruguayan or Mexican embassies with all possible speed.

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Distribution:  
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Attachment: USC  
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CUBA  
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DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
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UFGA-11375	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
19-6-75/3	

19-6-84/3  
Folder 2

3. To this end steps were initiated in on 24 July 1963 to put the AMLEO-3 family and AMLEO-2 into asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Havana. The AMLEO-3 family and AMLEO-2 were advised via the AMWEE-1 OWVL channel on 4 August 1963 to prepare themselves for asylum and to await further orders via the same channel. KUDARE Station in Mexico City, meanwhile, took urgent action through its Mexican liaison channels to have the Mexican Foreign Ministry obtain visas for the AMLEO-3 family and AMLEO-2; and then send word to the Mexican Embassy in Havana, Cuba that the AMLEO-3 family and AMLEO-2 should be granted asylum when they appeared at the Mexican Consulate under cover of obtaining their visas. The visa portion of the operation was satisfactorily completed and notification of same was sent into the Mexican Embassy in Havana; but word re asylum for the AMLEO-3 family and AMLEO-2 was not sent to the Mexican embassy due to insecure commo channels and lack of trusted couriers, and to date no secure method has yet been found to notify the Mexican Embassy in Havana that asylum should be granted to the AMLEOs.

4. As a result of the above, word was sent to AMWEE-1 via OWVL on 11 September requesting he determine whether or not Identity A would be willing to act as intermediary to receive the AMLEO-3 family and AMLEO-2 into asylum at a specific time and date at the Mexican consulate. AMWEE-1 asked for clarification on the manner of approaching Identity A on the case on 13 September via pouch, and more detailed guidance on the matter was sent to him via OWVL on 14 September. A final reply re possibilities for action via this channel is expected from AMWEE-1 momentarily. If the AMWEE-1 reply is favorable, then he will be told to arrange the meeting at the Mexican consulate between the AMLEOs and Identity A so that they can be taken into asylum by the Mexicans.

5. As noted in reference B, if the AMWEE-1 report is a negative one, then consideration will be given to having the AMLEOs take asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana. The test case utilizing AMCANOR-3, mentioned in paragraph 5 A of reference B, is to be attempted on or about 21 August 1963, and if this attempt at asylum is successful then arrangements will be made to have the AMLEOs enter the Uruguayan Embassy in the same manner.

6. As noted in paragraph 1 of reference B, the wife of AMLEO-3 finally made a direct contact with AMTHUG-1 on 7 September 1963, while he was at his Santa Maria beach house, and appealed to him for permission to leave Cuba with her children and rejoin her husband AMLEO-3 in the United States. On 14 September 1963 AMLEO-3 received a letter from his wife giving more details on the above meeting. The wife of AMLEO-3 had been visiting the beach home of a family friend, situated next to that of AMTHUG-1 on Santa Maria beach, on a daily basis hoping to see AMTHUG-1. Finally, on 7 September 1963, she saw him swimming alone in the ocean and promptly went into the water, introduced herself, and requested permission to talk to him. AMTHUG-1 granted this permission, and during their conversation AMTHUG-1 made it clear he would not grant Mrs. AMLEO-3 permission to depart Cuba at this time, stating that the time was not propitious due to the attacks and raids being carried out against Cuba, and that Mrs. AMLEO-3 would just have to wait. Mrs. AMLEO-3 then told him she did not see why he was holding her and her children responsible for what her husband did; that she feared her husband might forget her and their children completely if the separation continued, and that if AMLEO-3 was left much longer alone he would find a woman to replace her. AMTHUG-1 replied by asking her "Do you consider yourself a burden to your husband?" The wife replied "It is possible", and AMTHUG-1 then asked "But he calls you every day."

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 Mrs. AMLEO-3 was contacted in Mexico City.

7. Later during the conversation AMTHUG-1 asked Mrs. AMLEO-3 if her husband still had the presentation Soviet pistol that he had given him in 1961, and Mrs. AMLEO-3 informed him that her husband had taken it with him when he defected and asked AMTHUG-1 if he wanted it returned to him. AMTHUG-1 did not reply to the question. Later on, while discussing her conversation with AMTHUG-1 with Identity B, Identity B suggested to Mrs. AMLEO-3 that she request AMLEO-3 to send the pistol back to AMTHUG-1 via Ambassador LECIUGA at the United Nations, NYC. Identity B added that the return of the pistol might help matters since the loss of the pistol had been one of the things that bothered AMTHUG-1 most when AMLEO-3 defected. (i.e. AMLEO-3 has noted that these special presentation Soviet pistols were given by AMTHUG-1 to probably less than ten people in Cuba, and their presentation had a very special meaning for AMTHUG-1 since the recipients were supposed to be his very personal and close friends. AMLEO-3 claims that not even AMLOUT-1 had received one of these special presentation pistols from AMTHUG-1.) Consideration is being given to AMTHUG-1's request, if it would assist Mrs. AMLEO-3 in her efforts to leave Cuba, but for the time being the pistol will be held by KUBARK.

8. AMTHUG-1 also told Mrs. AMLEO-3 that her husband had stolen a light plane when he fled and implied (although she does not so state directly) that he would like to see it returned. The balance of Mrs. AMLEO-3's letter concerned her desire to leave Cuba, mentioned the necessity for alms by both she and her husband with no rash actions, and without giving any additional facts stated that her conversation with AMTHUG-1 had been a long one but that she could not get him to make any promises re her departure.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL LEADS TO DISAFFECTED CUBANS

9. During the operational period one of AMLEO-3's operational leads, whom he had written a report on for the AMTRUNK PM operation, was recruited via the recently successful AMTRUNK infiltration operation and given the crypt of AMTRUNK-10. AMLEO-3 also screened additional ANTRUNK leads and KUTUBE military leads during the period and was able to submit reports on some four individuals for these operations. All such leads were fed to him mixed in with many other Cuban names. AMLEO-3 is presently preparing reports on PHS target studies Major Felipe GUERRA Matos and Major Jorge SEGUERA, Cuban Ambassador to Algeria.

10. AMLEO-3 also assisted in the handling of AMLEO-5's wife during the period when she established direct telephonic communication with her husband in Cuba, and tried to convince him that she wanted to return to Cuba with her children, but stipulated to A-5 that he would have to meet her in a third country first and resolve their personal family problems. AMLEO-3 baby sat for the wife during these calls, since we only knew what day the calls would be coming in and never the hour. He also assisted Mrs. AMLEO-5 in recording the last telephonic conversation she had with her husband. In this same operation AMLEO-3 also assisted the Case Officer in the conversations held with the mother of AMLEO-5 while she was in the United States, although he was never allowed to establish direct contact with the mother. We had hoped that the mother of AMLEO-5 would attempt to establish contact on her own with AMLEO-3, but to WAVE Station knowledge she never attempted to do so. If she had, we would have allowed AMLEO-3 to respond to her contact efforts (maintaining his cover as being disassociated with ODYOKE).

11. During the period fragmentary information has been received from the wife of AMLEO-3 (utilizing nicknames or other

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code phrases for individuals) indicating that Identity B has continued to be very helpful to her by supplying her with blackmarket food, loaning her her automobile, and otherwise assisting her with her problems. Identity B may be carrying out such actions on a genuine friendship basis, (she has even been denounced by the neighborhood defense committee "as assisting gusanos") or she may be buying insurance for the future. The possibility also exists that she is remaining a confidant of Mrs. AMLEO-3 on orders of AMTHUG-1 and is reporting on all developments to AMTHUG-1. In early September 1963 Raul PRIMELLES (201-327902) arrived at Identity B's home for a visit while Mrs. AMLEO-3 was present. Mr and Mrs. PRIMELLES ignored the presence of Mrs. A-3 and did not speak to her while greeting Identity B. Because of this Identity B promptly turned her back on her visitors and did not answer them, continuing her conversation with Mrs. AMLEO-3. Mr. and Mrs. PRIMELLES were thrown into some confusion by this reception and departed from the area.

12. Mrs. AMLEO-3 has also mentioned that UNSNAFU-12 was most kind to her during her recent home leave in Cuba, and made it quite clear she was anxious to get in touch with AMLEO-3. During the latter part of August Mrs. A-3 again mentioned to her husband that UNSNAFU-12 had written Identity B from Paris stating she was surprised at not having heard from AMLEO-3.

#### ATTITUDE, MORALE, AND PERFORMANCE OF AMLEO-3

13. During the reporting period AMLEO-3 has consistently been cooperative with his C/O and has maintained a good attitude towards his work. During the latter part of August 1963 AMLEO-3 began to lose his patience with the slow progress in getting his wife into asylum, and began requesting permission to return to Cuba himself in order to exfiltrate his wife black. AMLEO-3 became quite demanding in this regard and claimed that KUBARK's time had run out, and since he had waited patiently for nine months he now felt it was his turn to try his luck. AMLEO-3 is extremely confident of his own ability in action situations and operations and extensive argumentation was needed to persuade him that such a course of action would be suicidal for his wife and children and that his wisest course of action would be to give us additional time to bring the asylum operation to a successful conclusion. Because of AMLEO-3's faith in higher authority, COS JMWAVE, Andrew K. REUTEMAN visited AMLEO-3 on 8 September 1963 for the purpose of convincing him that any unilateral action on his part would only be counterproductive and playing right into AMTHUG-1's hands. KUBARK's limited commitments to AMLEO-3 were also reviewed along with the history of our actions to help his wife and children leave Cuba legally. After some frank exchanges of facts AMLEO-3 was finally convinced that the only productive course of action left to him was to continue to sweat out the asylum proposition and hope for the best. Absolutely no further commitments were made to AMLEO-3 during these discussions and alternate courses of action if the asylum attempts fail were not discussed but instead left in abeyance.

#### OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND PLANNING

14. As previously mentioned in paragraph 13 of reference A, AMLEO 3 went to ZRHETAL during the period 26-30 July 1963 for the purpose of obtaining a French visa for his alias documentation. AMLEO-3 successfully obtained the French visa during this trip, and his alias passport now contains valid visas for travel to Spain and France.



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15. WAVE Station regrets that reference C has not been answered to date. In reply we can only state that AMLEO-3 was thoroughly briefed on the limitations of his alias documentation when said documentation was issued to him. He was told that the credit card documents could never be used for identification or credit purposes. He had also been warned to avoid situations where he would be asked for positive identification, such as renting a car, and by attempting to procure a rental car in ZRMETAL he was acting contrary to instructions given to him by his WAVE C/O. On AMLEO-3's return to WAVE he was castigated for his actions, and again briefed on the limitations of his alias documentation. In order to strengthen his alias documentation an I.D. card document identifying him as an employee of "Charles S. Wilson Associates" has been issued to him, as suggested by (Chester D. DAINOLD in conversations with AMLEO-3 in ZRMETAL. In regard to points a and b in paragraph 2 of reference C, the KURIOT representative in WAVE Station states that the Florida drivers license issued to Joseph A. Reese is a valid, backstopped drivers license for actual use by the Subject and the address a legitimate safehouse with backstopped rental cover. Subject's cover story was that he recently moved to the Miami area from New Orleans, Louisiana (which city the Subject lived in for several years and has relatives residing there). The Subject's documentation is therefore correct for his cover story. The spelling of "instalment" on the National Credit Card was correctly copied from the original document reproduced by KURIOT and we must point out that "instalment" is not only correct according to the dictionaries but is the spelling of the word which is now frequently preferred. (The Wall Street Journal invariably prints the word as "instalment" with one "I".) It would be appreciated if Headquarters would in the future coordinate with KURIOT in Headquarters on questions which deal with AQUATIC matters prior to querying WAVE.

COSTS

16. AMLEO-3 continues to receive a flat salary of five hundred dollars (\$500.00) per month, and also is paid approximately one hundred dollars (\$100.00) per month for purchase of foodstuffs since he is encouraged to eat his meals in the KUBARK safehouse and stay out of public places. We have also continued to pay the wife of AMLEO-5 the amount of one hundred and twenty five dollars (\$125.00) per month for subsistence for herself and her two children to supplement the \$120.00 per month she receives from the Cuban Refugee Center. The C/O has continued his efforts to find part-time employment for Mrs. AMLEO-5 so that KUBARK could be relieved of the necessity to support her, but to date we have been unsuccessful in our efforts primarily because Mrs. AMLEO-5 has never worked in her life and has no work skills whatsoever. No other financial expenditures of note were made during the period, and no financial assistance is presently contemplated for any other AMLEOs.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

17. During the reporting period no positive intelligence reports were disseminated by the AMLEO group since none of the active agents are located in the target area, nor do they circulate in Cuban exile circles.

18. We are continuing to utilize AMLEO-3 as a consultant on the MHAPRON program, and to this end are planning to have him expand his reporting of personality information on selected individuals and to utilize him to explain interconnections between various individuals and groups as they take shape in MHAPRON research.

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FUTURE PLANS

19. Future plans for operational exploitation of AMLEO-3 continue to remain the same as outlined in detail in reference D. The operational use of AMLEO-3 in defection/recruitment operations will not be permitted until his wife and children are successfully put into asylum in one of the Latin American Embassies in Havana.

20. WAVE Station will continue to work on AMLEO-3 developmental cases concentrating on MHLAPRON leads, and attempt to build two-way communications channels into such leads. AMLEO-6 is still considered to be the best qualified lead by AMLEO-3 to act as principal agent and recruiter of other disaffected military personnel in Cuba. Details on these developmental operations will be reported via separate dispatch.

END OF DISPATCH