

Rosen

28 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation between AMWAIL and ~~██████████~~  
 27 October 1960

\* STATION OFFICER

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1. Some weeks back while still assigned to Headquarters ~~██████████~~ had received a request from AMWAIL for a meeting in New York, which ~~██████████~~ countered with the suggestion that the meeting be held instead in Miami on ~~██████████~~ next trip. Accordingly ~~██████████~~ called AMWAIL on 27 October and set up a meeting at the Congress Airport Inn.

2. AMWAIL said that he would be in Europe from approximately 9 to 29 November and that he would be seeing Victor Raul HAYA de la Torre during this trip. He proposed a meeting of Latin American non-Communist leftist parties to be organized by HAYA. This proposal has been presented to Headquarters in MASH-1314.

3. On his return from Europe AMWAIL intends to spend about thirty days overseeing the activities of three of the PRD committees; Intelligence and Information, Transportation, and one other. He is impatient with the progress of these committees and hopes to do something to accelerate their activities. ~~██████████~~ did not reveal the recently arranged close coordination between ZAMKA and AMWAIL-3 on I and I activities.) Regarding transportation, AMWAIL said that he had lined up a PT boat which he hopes to equip for commando operations against Cuban coastal sites.

4. AMWAIL's statements concerning the PRD and the MRP may help to clarify recent reports that he has been on the verge of deserting the former for the latter. About two weeks ago, or in mid-October, AMWAIL was invited by CHIBAS and ESTEVEZ to join the MRP. AMWAIL does feel that the MRP is in many ways more representative of the Cuban population than the PRD, but he nevertheless turned down the invitation on the grounds that he had been responsible for bringing a number of people into the PRD and that he could not now desert them.

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5. This explanation of his position was a part of a somewhat drawn out discussion of the current exile political situation. His views make good sense and bear repeating here:

"We tried to bring about unity too soon. As you recall I was the first of the anti-BATISTA people to leave Cuba and to declare myself in opposition to the CASTRO government. When we founded the PRD there were still only a few of us in this category. Both AMHAWK and AMEER were then and still are open to criticism that they are politicians and representatives of a political period that is best forgotten. Both AMBIDDY-1 and AMPALM-5 can be criticised on the grounds that they do not represent the generation that fought against BATISTA, and I was then and still remain pretty much of an unknown."

"Nevertheless, within 30 or 40 days of the formation of the PRD a number of things happened. MIRO Cardona went into asylum. 28 Cubans pilots defected. Miguel Angel QUEVEDO took asylum. Felipe PAZOS and Ramon BARQUIN quietly left the government. Raul CHIBAS quit and shortly afterward arrived in Miami. A number of bishops began to criticize the CASTRO government from the pulpit. There is no question in my mind but what the formation of the PRD was in large part responsible for the timing of most of these developments. It is also interesting that almost all of these people have at one time or another been extremely critical of the PRD."

"From the beginning I have supported the principle of expanding the Executive Committee continuously so that it can absorb the leadership material that has been coming out of Cuba. I proposed Abel MESTRE and MIRO Cardona for the Executive Committee, but the others were opposed. I have also tried to get Ramon BARQUIN, Manuel RAY and Raul CHIBAS into the Executive Committee without success. What this meant was that when we finally chose a coordinator he had to be one of the five of us. I was not really in favor of the choice we made because of the partisan political background of the new coordinator."

"What we need urgently to do now is to reach some form of amalgamation with the MRP, and to a lesser extent with the Alianza. There are two ways

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of doing this. One would be conceding to the MRP perhaps three seats on the Executive Committee, while possibly giving one to the Alianza. Another would be for the three groups to unite under a new name and with someone--probably MIRO Cardona--as the supreme coordinator. Either way would be all right, but the need is urgent since the MRP is growing in stature every day and we are losing to it."

6. The next part of AMWAIL's discussion had to do with economic philosophy. He remarked rather ironically that when the PRD was first formed it was attacked by RUBIO Padilla and others as standing for "Fidelismo sin Fidel." Now that the MRP has come into being the PRD is making the same charges against it, and in return the PRD has now been placed in the position of accepting BATISTA collaboration and of appearing to stand for a return to the type of economic system which existed under BATISTA. In truth, the PRD has never delineated its economic philosophy as it should have much earlier. There is a Planning Commission it is true, but about half of its twenty members are from a reactionary group which wishes to see the return of all confiscated lands to their original owners, a policy with which AMWAIL is not in sympathy and never has been.

7. Concerning military planning AMWAIL had this to say:

"We in the PRD are in the unfortunate position of not knowing the plans of either the CASTRO government or the United States government. We are sort of 'flying on instruments,' but of one thing I am very sure. Unless the United States has a number of very effective penetrations of the rebel army and the militia, we must be prepared to send in an invading force of no less than 5,000 men if we are to have any hope of success. I know that we have sent fewer than 500 men to the training camps. This force by itself will not be sufficient to overthrow the CASTRO government."

8. Pessimistic as his last statement may sound, AMWAIL still remains optimistic about the eventual outcome. He feels that even if nothing is done to speed the downfall of CASTRO, this will come about within the next ten or twelve months. His concern, therefore, is that the downfall take place much sooner than that. As he puts it, "President NIXON or President KENNEDY must not be forced to have Cuba on the agenda when he meets with KHRUSCHEV sometime next spring."

Chief, JMASH

Orig --C/JMARC