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**UNIT INDEX** 

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- Department. [FOLA 34-538]

  4. Memorandum for the Graph dated 25 November 1964;
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- CSCI 3/779,814, dated 30 January 1964; Subject: Jack L. RUBY - Lee Harvey OSWALD.
- 7. PARI-1731 (IN 73050), 4 December 1963 [FOIA No. 298-697]
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- Memorandum of Conversation, dated 16 January 1964;
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- 10. CSCI-3/779,135 to FBI, dated 16 December 1963; Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on the Kennedy Assassination. [FOIA No. 413-76A]
- Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 5 June 1964;
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- 12. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31 March 1964; Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD. [FOIA No. 627-821]
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- 16. Memorandum for Chief, CI/RIA, dated 20 February 1964; Subject: Documents Available in OSWALD's 201 File. [FOIA No. 563-810]
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- 18. CSCI-3/778,881 to FBI, dated 27 November 1963; Subject: Lee H. OSWALD/Soviet Activities in Mexico City, 13 - 24 November 1963. [FOIA No. 187-622]
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- 21. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31 January 1964; Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September -3 October 1963. [FOIA No. 509-803]
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- 26. Memorandum for ROCCA, dated 12 May 1964. [XAAZ-22809 FOIA No. 689-298]
- 27. Letter to E. Henry KNOCHE, dated 15 April 1975.
- 28. Memorandum to Chief, CI/R&A, dated 19 June 1964; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD [XAAZ-27166 - FOIA No. 739-319]
- 29. Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, dated 11 May 1964; Subject: AMMUG/1 Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. [XAAZ-27213 FOIA Np. 687-295]
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with David W. BELIN, 1 April 1975

- Q: What was the line of reporting in Claduring the period I served as working level point-of-contact with the Warren Commission Staff?
- A: It was a multiple leveled thing (a) from the Commission and AWD personally via McCone to Dick Helms; (b) from Helms to the two or three components primarily concerned (SE, then SB, Dave Murphy; LA, then WH; and CD). In practice the substantive SB input worked up by one of its research components headed by Lee Wigren--Minsk photo for example, et all passed via CI. CI had own defector input. In addition, on sensitive matters of concern to the investigation, Dick Helms and Murphy also dealt directly with the Commission.

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Did you hear: ? ? [two crypts, one sounded by "Jackenet" ?].

I had not. Belin recalled that Castro had made a speech in which
he had charged assassination intent by emigres and had promised
retribution in kind if there was official support.

- Q: Had any thought been given to the assumption that an anti-Castro assassination plot might have been underway, and fact it was known to Helms and to Castro? [Mr. Belin said he now knew that Helms was, in fact, aware of something underway regarding Castro. He had no evidence to show that I (RGR) had been informed about it.] Would that change any of the thinking re Oswald's Mexican trip and contacts?
- A: Yes, I said, though I intended to give more notential importance to Oswald's KGB contacts and related that I and others—though recognizing the wisdom of the Warren Commission's handling—had felt there had been more to the Soviet aspect that should have been pursued:
  - a. Fact that his two Sowiet consular contacts in Mexico City had been identified as KGB and at least one (both 2) had been traced organizationally to the 13th Department (assassinations).

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SUBJECT: Conversation with David W. BELTN, 1 April 1975

b. Our defector information strongly insists that all Western military defectors—Tike Oswald--were screened by the 13th Department.

c. Thinness of file turned over by Soviets in view of b.

I acknowledged in retrospect that Cuban hypothesis was worth reconsidering, though it would appear that period of solid inter-service (KGB-UGI) relations began later (i.e. after 1967-68, Venceremos, etc.).

Q: Why did Oswald's lies include a denial to Dallas police that he had made the Mexican trip unless there was something important to hide about it? All his other lies concerned key factual elements of his cover story. Why also did Marina deny she knew anything about the Mexican trip in her first story to the FBI-which she later rectified before the Warren Commission? No Belin noted that he had left the hypothesis of Castro/Cuban involvement open in his book. He added that it would have been important to have known the facts about the anti-Castro plot at the the least he would have done would have been to have insisted on the polygraphing of Marina Oswald's Mexican trip.

Raymond G. Rocca Counter Intelligence Operations

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Chronology of RCR Meetings with Members of the Warren Commission

CELUIC

14 January 1964

RANKIN, WILLINS

12 March 1964

RANKIN

27 March 1964

WILLINS ET AL (LIEBLER)

26 May 1964

"LIEBLAND" re DeMohrenschild

28 August 1964\*

"Commission" (Slauson)

12 October 1964

"Commission" (S

Goldens)

\*Believe Mr. Rocca was at the Commission at least one other day

(probably Saturday, the 29th) reviewing proofs.

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5 HAY 1964

Subject- General:

Debriefing of Fail Specific: OSWALD CASE

THE SCURCE DOES NOT HAVE DIRECT KNOWEDOWN OF LEE HARVEY CONALD OR HIS ACTIVITIES but has able to provide ither of received based on complaint of cuban intellicence OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE DIRECCION MENERAL DE INTELIGENCIA, OF WHICH THE SOURCE HIDSHLF WAS A STAFF OFFICER. THE INFORMATION APPEARING BELOW WAS FURNISHED BY THE SOURCE AND IS KEYED TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY KUDESK.

I. Prior to October 1963, CSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Nexico City on two or three occasions.) Before, during and after these visits, OSWALD was in contact with the DIRECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION (PGI), specifically with Luisa CAIDERCH, Manuel VHA Perez and Rogaldo RODRIGUEZ Lopez.


VEGA whose Cuban intelligence psendonym is MARCOS is the current Cuban IS chief in Mexico. He recently has had a tour of duty in Habana, prior to which he held the same post as from as Cuban IS chief in Fexico.

RODFIGUEZ is a Cuban IS start of ficer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Ethands, Castairo and Jose Antonio.

The precise relationship of Luisa CALDERON to the DGI is not clear. She event about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba carly in 1964.

CCHART: WH/SA/CI has the following references concerning Luisa CALDERON Carralero: She was assigned to the commercial office of the Cuban Embessy in Mexico City, and she had arrived in Mexico on 16 January 1963 and on 11 December 1963 made a reservation to return to Cuba on Cubana Airlines "MEXI 7371, 13 December 1963 IN-20351, HEM-8153." She left Hexico City for Havana on 15 December 1963 using passport E/63/7 "MEXI 7423, 17 December 1963, EI-82692. Another reference "HMMA-20971, 25 Harch 1963," said that her date of arrival in Hexico was 19 January 1963 and that she had replaced Resarlo VAZCUEZ, a Harican secretary in the commercial office. Other references apparently concarning the subject are in 6913 and MEXI 3205 IN-56591 dated 25 January 1963 which do not appear to add anything of interest to that given above.

- 2. The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used OSMAID in any agent capacity or other manners
- 3. A. When news of the assaugination of President Kennedy reached the MI, it caused much coment concerning the fact OSWAID had been in the Cuban



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Escussy in Marico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and field officers of the DUI to sort and package all documents according to thether they were "hey secreto" (very secret), "decreto" (secret), and "importante" (important). The material once packaged was to so held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DUI officers and all DUI pouches were suspended temporarily.

- B. When the news that CAMMD was the assassin reached the IXI, there was no immediate comment but, when Fidel CAMMRO spoke on television to demy Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning GAMALD's visit to the Cuban Amicassy in Mexico. At this time VAGA, who has been mentioned previously, was in Cuba and commented to a group of DGI staff officers that CSMAID had come to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VAGA did not give any details and the subject was not pursued.
- 4. It is not known whether information on OSWAID's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban service.
- 5. It is not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
- 6. The only Molina who is recalled is "The Hook", the Cuban who was convicted in New York City for the marder of a young girl during a clash between two Cuban groups. The DOI staff officer who had been in the United Nations in New York, SANTIESTABAN traveled to Cuba with "The Book" and with another Cuban named CRIMIEIA and upon arrival in Cuba tried to obtain employment for both individuals. The names Pedro Charles and Peter have no known significance.
- 7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services is not known.
- $\delta_{\bullet}$  Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President Kennedy's assassination.
- ? > 9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned,
  - 10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBEISTERN aka Jack RUM.
  - II. The name Gilberte LOPEZ is not familiar but, if he visited BGI head-quarters, a photograph of him possibly could be identified.
  - 12. OMAID's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is known about him other than that appeared in the press.

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#### Proposed Questions on Cavald Case

- 1. Was Lee Harvey OSWAID known to the Cuban intelligence services before 23 November 19632 If so which service?
- 2. Were the Cuben services using CSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 townser 1953?
- 3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin?
- 4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuben Consulate in Mexico City in September 1963, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken?
- 5. Was there any contact between the Cuben intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play For Cuba Committee?
- 6. Has subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Melina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter"?
- 7. How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuben intelligence services react to news of the assassination?
- 8. Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination?
- 9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuben services or others and sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the CSWALD case?
- 10. Was Jack RUBENSTEIN ake Jack RUBY known to the Cuben intelligence services? If so, in what way?
- 11. Does subject know a Gilberto LOPEZ who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Neuvo Laredo, Texes and four days later proceded to Havana by special plane. He was 23 years old and carried a U.S. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual.
- 12. Attached is a photograph of OSWALD, and a letter from Havena which is self-explanatory for guidance of the case officer. Under no circumstances should the contents of the letter be made known to the subject. This information came from the Secret Service and FRI.

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#D 2555



**ゆ**XAAZ-27213 11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT:

 AMMUG/1 Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD

1. This memorandum is for information and for action. The proposed lines of action are indicated in paragraph 4.

- 2. AMMUG/L the Cuban Intelligence Service defector, has produced information of theerest to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. CI Staff learned of AMMUGA on 30 April. A questionnaire was submitted by the Staff on 1 May (Attachment A). Mr. Swenson, who is handling the AMMUG/1 debriefing, provided a reply on 5 May (Attachment B). It was clear from Mr. Swenson's summary that AMMUG/1 had information bearing on the OSWALD relationship with the Cuban Embassy and Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City, albiet his knowledge was not that of a direct participant in matters affecting OSWALD. A follow-up questionnaire was submitted to AMMUG/1 on 6 May (Attachment C). Mr. Swenson's reply was dated 8 May (Attachment D). Attention is directed particularly to the content of paragraph two of Attachment D.
- 3. We have the problem of reconciling the operational exploitation of AMMUG/1 and satisfying the responsibilities we have undertaken with Mr. Rankin. AMMUG/l is such an operational gold mine that Mr. Swenson wants, at a maximum, two months to work fully. It is palpable, however, that we must furnish to the Commission the substance of AMMUG/1's

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information on OSWALD before that. On the previous record of our association with the Commission, particularly with Mr. Rankin, it seems possible for the Agency to work out an arrangement with Mr. Rankin personally that would take care of their needs and ours after a frank discussion of the equities.

4. It is recommended that the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing.

Raymond G. Rocca Chief, CI Research and Analysis

#### Attachments

cc: C/CI
C/WH/6 (without att)
C/WH/SA/CI (without att)



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#### Proposed Cuestions on Oswald Case

#### REFERENCE: Debriefing of AMUG-1, dated 5 hay 1954

- I. The source says that prior to October 1944. Countd visited the Colors Embesoy in Mexico City on two or three occursions. It is public inoutables he was to Mexico during the period 9-25-63 to Mexico.
  - A) When did source learn of those visits before or allor the assessmation? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the possess involved.
  - poriod or is the source referring to provious visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the exigin of the source's information.
- The source states that before, during, and after these violize Council was in contact with the DGI, specifically Luisa CALDERGI, biamed VEGA Peres and Rogelle RCDRIGUEZ Lopea.

  This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Council returned to the United States i. e., between 19-3-43 and il-22-63.
  - A) What does source mean by contact?
  - 2) Can be break down those contacts by the specific individual semed, place and type of contact, and date of commence?
  - G) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelli-
    - DA What was the purpose of these contacts?

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- E) If Coweld did not know the intelligence additions of these individuals, what pretents, if any, were employed in contacting him?
- 7) Did nouses over too any documentary material on any of these contacts, or any convenience initiated by or addressed to Covald?
- C) Did the DCI ever employ physical surveillances, technical devices or camora equipment to cover these contacts.
- In The source says he does not know phother the Cohon services used Cowald in any agent capacity or otherwise.
  This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one.
- L. Did the DGI over initiate an investigation of Countil?
- A. What was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters.

  and field offices after news of the assassination was received?
- 5. Source was asked whether any provessive majorial was daliberately fabricated by the Cahase (Casetion 9) to confine the investigation of Cavalid. The apply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known in the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.

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07 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff Attention: Mr. Roca

SUBJECT General

Debriefing of AMMUG-1

Specific

The Oswald Case

REFERENCE

Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964

1. Reference is made to a telephone conversation yesterday with Chief, CI Staff concerning this matter.

- 2. Because I am not aware of the information already available to the Commission investigating the Oswald Case or furnished by the Agency, my debriefing of the Source has been based on the questions prepared by the CI Staff and on what the Source answers have suggested. I shall be glad to pursue any other topics suggested by CI Staff.
- 3. The Following information in addition to that in the reference might be of interest.
- a. Luisa CALDERON, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source has known CALDERON for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the #Empresa Transimport". Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.
- c. Luisa CALDERON was transferred directly from her position in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce to a post in Mexico. a matter of surprize to the Source.

d. Rogelio RODRIGUE Z Lopez (DGI pseudo MORCOS), shortly before he left Cuba for Mexico on or about 16 April 1964,

saw CALDERON.

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4. As explained to CI Staff any publicity which would reveal the identity of the Source, his defection to KUBARK, or the extent of his knowledge of DGI activities might prejudice the operational use of the Source himself and of information which he has provided. Accordingly, it might be appropriate to point out to the Commission (as agreed by DC/WH/SA) that KUBARK hopes, by using the Source, to obtain access to DGI personnel including those mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

Harold F. Swenson Chief, WH/SA/CI



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6 May 1964

Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

#### REFERENCE: Debriefing of AMUG-1, dated 5 May 1964

- 1. The source says that prior to October 1963. Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Maries City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge has was in Maries during the period 9-26-63 to 10-3-63.
  - A) When did source learn of these visits before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.
  - B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to provious visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the source's information.
- 2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits
  Oswald was in contact with the DGL specifically Luisa
  CALDERON, Manuel VECA Peres and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez.
  This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were
  made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between
  10-3-63 and 11-22-63.
  - A) What does source mean by contact?
  - B) Can he break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurence?
  - C) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?
    - D) What was the purpose of these contacts?

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- E) If Oswald did not know the intelligence affiliations of these individuals, what pretexts, if any, were employed in contacting him?
- F) Did source ever see any documentary material on any of these contacts, or any correspondence initiated by or addressed to Oswald?
- G) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillances, technical devices or camera equipment to cover these contacts.
- H) The source says he does not know whether the Guban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one.
- 3. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?
- 4. What was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?
- 5. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 9) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.

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08 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attention: Mr. Rocca

SUBJECT General

Debriefing of AMMUG-1

Specific : The Oswald Case

REFERENCE

A. Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964 >
B. Blind Memorandum dated 07 May 1964

C. Conversations between CI Staff and C/WH/SA/CI

1. When the Oswald Case first was discussed with the Source the specific questions prepared by CI Staff were posed. The answers given by the Source were reported in Reference A. That memorandum which I dictated to a CI Staff stenographer appears accurate except for sentence #9 which should have said that the only possible "fabrication" known by Source was the specific denial by Fidel CASTRO, on a television program, of any Cuban knowledge of Oswald.

2. On 07 and 08 May 1964 I further discussed the Oswald Case with the Source in order to clarify exactly what he knew and what he had heard. In the light of the explanation given by him, I believe that a clearer understanding of what he knows can be reached if I record his knowledge without using the question and answer format. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs I shall report all the information given by the Source paraphrasing his explanations and comments.

" I have no personal knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities and I do not know that OSWALD was an agent of the Direction General de Inteligencia (DGI) or any other directorate or department of the Cuban Government.

I first heard of OSWALD after the assassination of President Kennedy when news media carried the name of OSWALD. Personnel in the DGI first commented about the case, so far as I can recall, one day after lunch when a group of officers, of whom I was one, were chatting. The officers present were about ten including Roberto SANTIESTEBAN, Norberto HERNANDEZ de Curbelo, Andres ARMONA, Pedro FARINAS Diaz and

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Manuel VEGA Perez. Manuel VEGA Perez previously had been assigned to Mexico in the Cuban Consulate where he was the principal intelligence officer of the DGI. VEGA mentioned that OSWALD had gone to the Cuban Consulate two or three times in connection with a visa application during the time that WEGA w as in Mexico. I gathered, although I do not know that VEGA made any specific statement to this effect, that VEGA personally had seen OSWALD. I well could have reached this conclusion because normally VEGA and his assistant in Mexico for the DGI, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, would see persons applying for a visa to go to Cuba. This is because DGI officers are charged with expediting the granting of visas of agents of the DGI. Such agents on appearing at the Consulate use a special phrase to indicate their relationship with the DGI. (I do not know the particular phrase used in every case. I do know that agents from El Salvador in requesting visas always made mention of the name "Mauricio" ) The DGI officers at a Consulate interview visa applicants to find out if they are agents. If the visa applicant does not use one of the indicated phrases, the DGI officers instead of granting the visa immediately, tell the applicant to return in a few days. The officer then notifies Habana and requests authority for the visa. I cannot recall if VEGA even made the statement that he had requested permission to issue a visa to OSWALD, but I feel sure that he would have done so because VEGA had said that OSWALD had returned several times and this would be the usual procedure.

I believe that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez also would have seen OSWALD because he worked with VEGA and also would have screened visa applicants.

I thought that Luisa CALDERON might have had contact with OSWALD because I learned about I March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico. that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer named Norberto HERNANDEZ de Curbelo. (I remember the conversation with HERNANDEZ

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because he gave me \$40.00 to buy some shoes and other items during my trip to Mexico.) I had commented to HERNANDEZ that it seemed strange that Luisa CALDERON was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service CHERNANDEZ told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel PINEIRO, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As Nrecall, HERNANDEZ had investigated Luisa CALDERON. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name as OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by HERNANDEZ should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understood the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestineprofessional relationship between the writer and Luisa CALDERON. Calso understood from HERNANDEZ that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been OSWALD. I, myself, considered the case of Luisa CALDERON unusual because I had known her before she went to Mexico when she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the Empresa Transimport Department where she was Secretary General of Communist Youth. She was transferred directly from that position to a post in Mexico which seemed strange.

The only other person about whom you asked me in connection with this, whom I recall, is Sylvia DURAN and I know very little about her. What happened was that I was in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico on 23 March 1964 about 1230 in the afternoon preparing to return to Habana the same day. I was talking to some other Cubans including Rogello RODRIGUEZ Lopez and fnu BUENAVENTURA of the Cuban Embassy; a courier named "Enio", a courier named "Tato"; and one other Cuban whom I cannot recall. We saw a pretty girl standing at the end of the reception room, and someone asked who she was, and one of the group said it was Sylvia DURAN



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I recall that, after the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGL orders were issued for all offics of the DGL, at Headquarters and in the field, to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), or "importante" (important). The material, once packaged, was to be held pending further instructions. All travel by DGI officers and all DGI pouches were suspended temporarily. In addition, I recall that DGI Headquarters personnel were instructed either to remain in the DGI Headquarters offices or to keep the DGI aware of their whereabouts so that they could be reached immediately. I do not know the reason for these measures but I believe it logical that they were issued because of the possibility that the United State might take some type of action against Cuba and the DGI offices. As nearly as I can recall, we were able to unpackage DGI files and use them normally about the 3rd of December 1963."

3. In brief, the Source does not claim to have any significant information concerning the assassination of President Kennedy or about the activities of OSWALD. If the paraphrased comments of the Source are considered to nee further clarification, I suggest that Mr. Rocca, who is most familiar with the details of the OSWALD Case, talk to the Source. This can be arranged at any time. Meanwhile, I shall have a question assatth a forthcoming LCFLUTTER to determine whether or not the Source seems to have concealed any information on this matter.

Harold F. Swenson Chief, WH/SA/CI

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
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Chief, CI/R&A				June 1964	
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I. DDP	OFF			I think you will be particularly interested in para-	
2.		610		graph 3 of Mr. Dooley's memo of record, attached. Art went	
3. Chief, CI/R&A			<b>/</b>	over to wind up loose end we had with regard to the AMMUG information we had previously	
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#### SOURCE EVALUATION:

The Source is believed to be very reliable. We have established through independent evidence and cross-checking that the major part of the intelligence information furnished by him is inquestionably true. For example, we know independent of this Source that Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUE & Lopes were Cuban intelligence officers in Mexico.



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**DEMIL!** 

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CARA MENO VE AMMUG

with related documents.

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19 June 1964

Chief, CI/R&A

Mr. Raymond Co Rocca

FROM : CI/REA/Mr.

: Lee Harvey CSUALD

(201.-289.248)

1. On 15 May 1964, we provided the President's Commission with a summary of our debriefing of Cuban defector AMMUG 1 who had no personal knowledge of Oswald and no information linking him to the Cuban intelligence services in any manner. As a follow-up, Mr. Howard P. Willans of the Commission asked if he could see the questions used in the interrogation.

2. On 18 June, I took the questions and source's responses to the Commission and showed them to Mr. Willens. He studied them and returned the questions to me with the observation that they were very thorough and fully satisfied his requirements. He said that he saw no need to pursue this angle any further. The questions and enswers exhibited to Mr. Willens are attached. At no time during our contacts with the Commission did we disclose the source's Identity or cryptonym.

3. (1. Willens indicated that the Commission was winding up its investigation. He was highly complimentary of CIA, referring to the agency personnel he encountered here and in Mexico as "real professionals." Mr. Willens asked that Toonvey his best regards to you.

for FOIA Review of JUN 1976

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
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6 May 1964

Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Debriefing of Suban Source dated 9 May 1964

- 1. The source says that prior to october 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-26-63 to 10-3-63.
  - A) Muen did source learn of these visits before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this paromation and identities of the persons involved.
  - B) Did these visits the place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the source's information.
- 2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits Oswald was in contact with the DGI, specifically Luisa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogello RODRIGUEZ Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-53 and 11-22-63.
  - A) That does source mean by contact?
  - B) Can be break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?
  - c) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?
    - D) What was the purpose of these contacts?
  - E) If Oswald did not know the intelligence affiliations of these individuals, what pretexts, if any, were employed in contacting him?
  - P) Did source ever see any documentary material on any or these contacts, or ony correspondence initiated by or addressed to Oswald?

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
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- G) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillances, technical devices or camera equipment to gover these contacts?
- II) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it most important to check out what the source meant in question on
- 3. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?
- 4. (Met was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?
- 5. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 9) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.

Addendum 18 June with reference to #5;

The only possible fabrication known by source was the specific denial by Fidel CASTRO on a TV program of any Cuban knowledge of Oswald.


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5 May 1964

Subject - General: Debriefing of Cuban Source

Specific: OSWALD Case

The source does not have direct knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based on Cuban intelligence officers assigned to the Direction General De Inteligencia. The information appearing below was furnished by the source and is keyed to questions submitted.

1. Prior to October 1963, OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, OSWALD was in contact with the Direction General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Lussa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez.

VEGA whose Cuban intelligence pseudonym is MARCOS is the current Cuban IS chief in Mexico. He recently has had a tour of duty in Habana, prior to which he held the same post as now as Cuban IS chief in Mexico.

RODRIGUEZ is a Cuban IS staff officer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Eduardo, Casimiro and Jose Antonio.

The precise relationship of Luisa CALDERON to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964.

- The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used OSWALD in any agent capacity or other manner.
- 3. A. When news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, it caused much comment concerning the fact OSWALD had been in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and field officers of the DGI to sort and package all documents according to whether they

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were "Muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), and "importante" (important). The material once packaged was to be held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DGI officers and all DGI pour were suspended temporarily.


- B. When the news that OSWALD was the assassin reached the DGI, there was no immediate comment but, when Fidel CASTRO spoke on television to deny Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. At this time VEGA, who has been mentioned previously, was in Cuba and commented to a group of DGI staff officers that OSWALD had come to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VEGA did not give any details and the subject was not pursued.
- 4. It is not known whether information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban service.
- 5. It is not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
- 6. The only Molina who is recalled in "The Hook", the Cuban who was convicted in New York City for the murder of a young girl during a clash between two Cuban groups. The DGI staff officer who had been in the United Nations in New York, SANTIESTABAN traveled to Cuba with "The Hook" and with another Cuban named ORIHUELA and upon arrival in Cuba tried to obtain employment for both individuals. The names Pedro Charles and Peter have no known significance.
- 7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services is not known.
- 8. Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President Kennedy's assassination.
- 9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned.
  - 10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY.
- 11. The name Gilberto LOPEZ is not familiar but, if he visited DGI headquarters, a photograph of him possibly could be identified.
- 12. OSWALD's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is known about him other than what appeared in the press.

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1 MAY 1964

Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

- 1. Was Lee Harvey QSWALD known to the Cuban intelligence services before 23 November 1963? If so which service?
- 2. Were the Cuban services using OSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 November 1963?
- 3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin?
- 4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in September 1963, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken?
- 5. Was there any contact between the Cuban intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee?
- 6. Has subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Molina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter"?
- 7. How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services react to news of the assassination?
- 8. Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination?
- 9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuban services or other and sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the OSWALD case?
- 10. Was Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY known to the Cuban intelligence services? If so, in what way?
- 11. Does subject know a Gilberto LOPEZ who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Neuvo Laredo, Texas and four days later proceded to Havana by special plane. He was 23 years old and carried a U.S. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual. 24-284248

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12. Attached is a photograph of OSWALD, and a letter from Havana which is self-explanatory for guidance of the case officer. Under no circumstances should the contents of the letter be made known to the subject. This information came from the Secret Service and FBI.

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Washington, DC 20500

April 15, 1975

Neison A. Rockefeller,

Chairman

David W. Belin, **Executive Director** 

John T. Connor C. Douglas Dillon Erwin N. Griswold Lane Kirkland Lyman L. Lemnitzer Ronald Reagan Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

Mr. E. Henry Knoche Assistant to the Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Knoche:

As you know, there have been allegations that the CIA was involved in a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. For the purposes of this letter, we will assume that these allegations are correct, and based upon this assumption I would like to know the answers to the following questions:

- 1. Did anyone with the CIA tell any member of the Warren Commission or any lawyer serving on the Warren Commission staff that such plans had been underway? If the answer is yes, we would like to know what person or persons with the Agency delivered said information, to whom it was delivered, when it was delivered, what specifically was told or said, what documents there are to support the answers to the fore-going questions, and what response, if any, was received from the Warren Commission. If the Commission was not told about this, why was it not told and who made the decision not to deliver such information to the Warren Commission?
- 2. There is evidence that Castro, prior to November 22, 1963, knew about the existence of such plans and the possible involvement of the U.S. Government. Did the CIA at any time prior to the completion of the Warren Commission investigation have any documents or other information indicating that Castro may have known about such plans? If the answer is yes, would you please fornish us with copies of all such documents and details of any such information.
- Several months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy there is evidence of a public speech by Castro that was reported by the Associated Press whereby Castro alluded

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to possible assassination attempts on his life and possible retaliation. Would you please advise us if there is any evidence that this associated Press report may have appeared in any newspapers in the United States, including specifically any newspapers in Dallas or New Orleans. Would you also advise us of you have any other information of public statements of any Cuban leader prior to November 22, 1963 indicating any awareness of possible assassination plots on the lives of Cuban leaders.

- 4. Would you please advise us if there is any information in CIA records to indicate that at any time prior to November 22, 1963 any foreign government or any foreign group was considering a possible assassination of any American leader. If so, would you please advise us of all details and also advise us who in the United States Government outside the CIA was advised of these plans or possibilities.
- 5. Prior to his death Lyndon Johnson supposedly stated that he believed that although there was no doubt that Oswald killed Kennedy and Tippitt, nevertheless Oswald might have been a part of a conspiracy in retaliation to possible United States assassination attempts in Cuba. Would you please advise us of any information in Agency files showing whether or not there was any communication to President Johnson of any possible plans involving the attempted assassinations of any Cuban leader and if the answer is yes, also give us all details involving this matter.

Sincerely yours,

David W. Belin Executive Director

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XAAZ-22809 12 May 1964 1745

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rocca

"Internal Marie Regarding Agency's Position in Dualine

The DDP called me this afternoon, 12 May, to state that the Director has received a telephone call from RANKIN regarding the Commission's desire to interview him at 1030 AM, Thursday. Mr. HOOVER is scheduled to appear at 9:00 on that

morning.

with

The DDP wishes to have from you a short but comprehensive memorandum which highlights the basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency in its dealings with the Commission. For example, RANKIN indicated that the Commission would wish to hear the Director's views as to how improvements might be made in protecting the President's life. Further, they will probably ask questions regarding the possibilities that a conspiracy existed. Such general questioning certainly necessitates that the DCI be made aware of the positions taken during previous interviews. I raised with Mr. HELMS the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the sensitive WH source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of its implications since it could well serve The DDP stated that he would as the basis for detailed questioning. review this carefully and made a decision as to the question of timing.

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 Given the schedule, you will appreciate that the DDP will need a paper covering the above points as soon as possible.

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14 May 1964

Brief for Presentation to

President's Commission on the Assassination

of Fresident Kennedy

14 May 1964

Document Number <u>695-3</u>02 A

for FOIA Review on

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#### Summary Outline

This brief is concerned with five topics which, it is anticipated, will arise in the course of the Director's appearance before the President's Commission. These are:

a. Formal and imqualified negation by the DCI of any contact or association, direct or indirect, between the Central Intelligence Agency and Lee Harvey Oswald. This should be accompanied by the tabling of an affidavit signed by the Director and notarized. (TAB A)

b. A formal assurance by the Director that all information in the possession of the Agency regarding Oswald's activities and associations outside of the United States has been made available to the Commission through its staff, with which there has been close and frequent contacts since the inception of the Commission's activities. (TAB B)

c. An interim pronouncement by the DCI on the problem of conspiratorial responsibility for Oswald's

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activity. It is suggested that the DCI take the position that at this time there is no conclusive evidence of

information bearing on this problem has been furnished to the Commission for evaluation and consideration in the framework of its total knowledge of the facts. The Agency, at the present time, is lacking any knowledge of recent information or documentation furnished by the Soviet Government to the Commission with respect to Oswald's activity in the Soviet Union. (TAB C)

d. The DCI's suggestions for improving policy and organization with respect to the personal security of the President. Certain steps relating strictly to the Agency's jurisdiction have already been suggested by memorandum. It is proposed that the Director now make specific suggestions involving legislation which would treat information bearing on the personal security of the President and, advisedly, other Federal officials directly related to national security affairs in a manner similar to what currently exists by statute for special

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nuclear material or weapons introduced to the United States or manufactured therein (The Atomic Weapons Awards Act of 15 July 1955). (TAB D)

e. Oswald's activity in Mexico and his possible relationship to the Cuban Intelligence Service.

Substantive information of grave concern to the security of sources and methods have been developed on both of these topics. The information and, in certain instances, knowledge with respect to acquisition has been made available on a highly restricted basis to

Mr. Rankin and to certain elements of his staff. It is recommended that the DCI not respond on the record to queries on these topics. He should suggest that all such "technical questions" be worked out in detail through the channels and procedures that have functioned very well—we believe—between the Commission and particular CIA components. (TAB E)

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TAB A

Formal Disclaimer of any Relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald

There have been rumors and allegations which began immediately after the assassination which branded Oswald as a U.S. Government agent. In many instances, CIA has been named as his sponsor. The authorship, geographical dispersion throughout the world, the identity of themes and the timing lend strong support to the conclusion that these charges are elements of a world-wide, Soviet-sponsored propaganda and misinformation program.

As DCI, Mr. McCose welcomes this appearance before the Commission to make a categorical and unqualified denial of these unprincipled distortions of the historical and personal responsibilities for what was a dastardly and heinous act. In witness of this, the DCI submits to the Commission an affidavit which formalizes this statement. The affidavit is attached.

It is recommended that the DCI state concurrently with this action that he desires to draw the Commission's attention to the fact that the irresponsible charges that have been made, sponsored

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and replayed by Soviet bloc and Communist individuals and organs since the assassination of the President, recall the methods and the purposes of the broader campaign against American intelligence and security components which has built up momentum over the past six years. We have traced the sponsorship of that campaign directly to individuals and components within the Soviet police state apparatus. Their unscrupulous treatment of the Oswald case was neither new as a method nor a surprise as an occurrence.

If the DCI is challenged by anyone on the Commission
about the substance or implication of his affidavit, it is recommended that response be along the following lines:

CIA is a democratic institution. The DCI has incorporated in his affidavit the results of detailed and painstaking examination. If any qualification is raised with respect to the affidavit, he willingly undertakes the extraordinary step of releasing any individual in CIA to appear before the Commission and to testify with respect to any knowledge bearing on the Commission's task.

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AFEIDAVIT OF JOHN A. McCONE

STATE OF VIRGINIA

COUNTY OF FAIRFAX

JOHN A. McCONE, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the Director of Central Intelligence, and that based on his personal knowledge of the affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency and on detailed inquiries he caused to be made by the officers within the Central Intelligence Agency who would have knowledge about any relationship Lee Harvey Oswald may have had with that Agency, he certifies that:

Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency:

the Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or received or galicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him, directly or indirectly, in any other manner;

the Agency never furnished him any funds or money, or compensated him, directly or indirectly, in any fashion; and

Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected, directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever with the Agency.

JOHN A. McCONE

Notary Public

My commission expires

(Seal)

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TAB B

Dissemination of Information to the Commission

The DCI should make the general statement that CIA has supplied all the information in its possession regarding the activities, affiliations and associations of Oswald. Copies of the reports and access to original data, in specific instances, has been given to Commission representatives in accordance with the DCI's expressed instruction from the inception that the Agency place itself completely at the Commission's disposition.

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C

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EXE

TAB C

#### The Problem of Conspiracy

The DCI should note that from the start he had given specific indications to Agency personnel working on the Commission's problems that all information bearing on Oswald's possible relationships with foreign sponsors be made available to the Commission. The DCI may state that he is gratified that his instructions have been carried out diligently and promptly. Among the items of information provided the Commission have been studies on the organization and functions of components of the Soviet police state which are known to include individuals and units charged with the performance of what is euphemistically referred to as "executive action" -- but is, in fact, charged with assassination and sabotage.

The DCI should state that no firm evidence has thus far developed abroad linking known Soviet, Soviet bloc or Guban intelligence and assassination personnel or organizations with the act committed by Lea Harvey Oswald in Dallas on 22 November 1963.

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It is recommended that the DCT handle any questions

from the Commission with respect to the apparently favorable treatment afforded Oswald in the USSR, the withdrawal of his wife, his possible contact there with Soviet State Security (the KGB), and related questions which would tend to establish Oswald's associational link with Soviet intelligence as "technical questions" and, therefore, beyond the scope of present testimony. It is suggested that he rest on the fact that the Commission has taken up these points item-by-item with the technical levels of the Agency and that the ultimate findings and evaluation can only be determined by the Commission.

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TAB D

#### Suggestions for Improving Policy and Organization Regarding Presidential Security

Mr. Rankin raised this question directly by letter. In its response, the Agency confined itself to elements relating to its statutory mission. Specifically, it was suggested that:

- a. The Secret Service, or Treasury, record with the Office of Central Reference a formal requirement for information relating to Presidential security.
- b. It was suggested that, if the Secret Service intended to expand its intelligence coverage of possible threats to the President's security, our experience showed that it would need a specialized organizational component to handle that task within the Secret Service itself.
- c. The CIA reply also noted that the Agency was in direct touch with the Secret Service regarding the possible utilization by that agency of our experience in machine data processing. On the public record, it is suggested that the DCI not repeat this detail.

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In his presentation to the Commission after referring to these earlier suggestions, the DCI should state that he desires to take the opportunity to offer a suggestion which he has not tabled heretofore.

The Commission's major problem has been the assessment of personal motive and the relationship of an individual act to possible conspiratorial guidance. Because conspiracy is the core of the problem, the DCI should point out the possibility of legislative action which might be an assistance in preventing recurrence of the national calamity it is investigating. There is an analogy at close hand between the problem of developing in advance information relating to Presidential security and the problem faced by the country a few years ago regarding the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the U.S. of special nuclear material or atomic weapons. The remedy devised at that time was embodied in the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 (29 Stat 365, PL. 165, 84th Congress). In essence, the Act established a substantial reward (\$500,000) for information bearing on the Act provided by any person, and in certain instances privileged treatment for such persons -- for example, asylum if they were

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foreigners, was assured. Finally, a Reward Board was created to administer the purposes of the Act.

recommendation for original legislative action designed to induce individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering a substantial reward and preferential treatment. The DCI should assure the Commission that he is convinced that the substantial award, the special treatment, and the publicity which would attend the implementing legislation in this matter could represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel of secret associations and state security organs abroad whose functions include assassination and sabotage. It is these individuals who would be privy to plans of executive action. The reward would constitute additional inducement for such individuals to take the risk of making important disclosures.

The suggestion does not rest on the material elements of reward and special treatment. The DCI can assure the Commission that we are aware that personnel in police state apparatuses charged with the assassination and sabotage functions have repeatedly expressed and, in many cases, acted upon their repugnance for

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such work and for the system which calls upon them to do it.

There are specific cases in the past ten years which document this assertion. Trusted personnel charged with assassination missions have abandoned the mission even without the assurance or the inducement which the DCI is here proposing.

In making this suggestion, the DCI may go one step further in advising the Commission to suggest that the Commission examine the advisability of legislation making it a Federal offense to conspire and to kill the Chief Executive. 3) The DCI could also indicate that the Commission might desire to suggest that any legislation along these lines should be enlarged to include conspiracy to kill any Federal official in the President's personal circle of official associates directly concerned with national security affairs. (The Agency's Legal Counsel states that draft bills have been considered on the Hill.)

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SENATE AL SECURITY MANUAL

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86th Congress 2nd Session

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pp 275-277

ATOMIC WEAPONS REWARDS ACT

Act of July 15, 1955 (69 Stat. 365, P.L. 165, Stth Cong.)—Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Expresentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955'. "Sic. 2. Any person who finnishes original information to the

United States—

"(a) leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United States, or

"(b) with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States,

shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed \$500,000.

"Sec. 3. An Awards Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (who shall be the Chairman), the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one member of the Atomic Energy Commission designated by that Commission, shall determine whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to any award and the amount thereof to be paid pursuant to section 2. In determining whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to an award and the amount of such award, the Board shall take into considerables. eration

"(a) whether or not the information is of the type specified

in section 2, and

"(b) whether the person furnishing the information was an officer or employee of the United States and, if so, whether the furnishing of such information was in the line of duty of that person

"Any reward of \$50,000 or more shall be approved by the

President.
"Sec. 4. If the information leading to an award under section 3 is furnished by an-alien, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, acting jointly,

may determine that the entry of such alien into the United States is in the public interest and, in that event, such alien and the members of his immediate family may receive immigrant visas and may be admitted to the United States for permanent residence, notwithstanding the requirements of the Immigration and Na-

"Sec. 5. The Board established under section 3 is authorized to hold such hearings and make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out

the purposes of this Act.
"Sec. 6. Any awards granted under section 3 of this Act shall "Sec. 6. Any awards granted under section 3 of this Act shall be certified by the Awards Board and, together with the approval of the President in those cases where such approval is required, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for payment out of funds appropriated or available for the administration of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

"Sec. 7. As used in this Act—

"(a) The term 'atomic energy' means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.

"(b) The term 'atomic weapon' means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon

or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon

or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

"(c) The term 'special nuclear material' means plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or any other material which is found to be special nuclear material pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

"(d) The term 'United States,' when used in a geographical

sense, includes Puerto Rico, all Territories and possessions of the United States and the Canal Zone; except that in section 4, the term 'United States' when so used shall have the meaning given to it in the Immigration and Nationality Act."

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TAB E

#### Mexican and Cuban Phases of Oswald's Activity

Extensive information has been made available to the Commission by CIA on the working level regarding Oswald's activity in Mexico City in September and October 1963. The Commission Staff has been in detailed communication and conversation with the Agency working levels both in head-quarters and in Mexico City. Within the past week, significant information has been developed by CIA regarding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban aspect.

It is suggested that the DCI handle any question on the Mexican and Cuban phases of Oswald's activity as "technical questions" which members of the Commission can develop from or through their own staff with the appropriate component of the Agency. This would be entirely consistent with the DCI's overall assurance that he has instructed his personnel to place their information completely at the Commission's disposition.

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10 April 1964

MATERIAL FROM P-8593 PASSED TO WARREN COMMISSION:


- 1. English translations of calls made by OSWALD to Russian Embassy: 27 Sep 63 (1037); 27 Sep 63 (1626); 27 Sep 63 (1605); 28 Sep 63 (1151); 1 Oct 63 (1031); 1 Oct 63 (2); 3 Oct 63 (3).
- 2. English translation of conversation between President Dorticos in Havana and Cuban Amb Joaquin Hernandez Armas in Mexico on 26 Nov 63.
- 3. English translation of conversation between Cuban Am to Mexico and President Dorticos in Havana on 26 Nov 63.

Document Number 53-828

for FOIA Review on

JUN 1976

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XAHZ-36307

15 MAY 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

General Counsel

President's Commission on the Absassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT:

Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy

1. Within the very recent period, this Agency has established contact with a well-placed individual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direction General de Intelligencia (Directorate General of Intelligence - DGI). His knowledge of DGI activities, techniques and personalities is direct and prefound. This Agency has queried him in detail on possible contacts between Lee Harvey CSWALD and the DGI prior, to the assassination of President Kennedy. A report on the information thus obtained is attached to this memorandum.

2. This source is highly againtive and of great, immediate operational significance to this Agency. The national counterintelligence interest abread requires, therefore, that access to the attached report, as knowledge of the saistence of this source be restricted, for the present at least, to yourself and a minimum number of your staff.

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- 3. An appropriate sensitivity indicator has been affixed to this memorandum and the attached report.
- 4. A copy of this memorandum with its attachment has been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of investigation.

(Signed) Richard dates

Richard Heims Deputy Director for Plans

#### Attachment

Distribution:

Orig. & 2 - Addressee

2 - DDP

2 - C/CI/RAA

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
1 - CI/R&A/20N

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
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Attachmens

SUBJECT: Las Harvey OSWALD

The source has no personal knowledge of Lee Harry OSWALD or his activities and does not know restler OSWALD was an agent of the Direction Comeral is intelligenced (DGI) or any other directorate or department of the Cuban government.

He first hears of CSWALD nitor the assassination of President Rousely when saws modils carried OSWALD's name. Dell personnel first commented about the tase in his presence one day after lunch, when a group of officers were chatting. Among them was Manuel VEGA Person who previously had been assigned to the Cuban Consulate in Manico City, where he was the principal Dell officer. VEGA mentioned that CSWALD had gone to the Cuban Consulate two or three times in connection with a visa application during the time that VEGA was in Menico.

Whether OSWALD had any contact with VEGA on these occasions is not known to the source. However DGI officers stationed in consulates customarily interview rise applicants to determine if they are DGI agents. If applicants are identified as agents, their travel is expedited. Otherwise, they are usually told to come back in a few days. During the interim applicants' names are relamified to Havana for further checking and instructions. According to the source, OSWALD may have been interviewed by VEGA or his assistant, Ropelie RODREGUEZ Lopes, but this is strictly conjecture on his part. The source does not know Silvia DURAM or crything portinent about her except that she was present in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico in March 1964.

After the news of the assessmation of President Econody reached the DGI, orders were issued for all DGI components in the country to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "may secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), or

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
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"importants" (important). The material, once consolidated, was to be hald pending further instructions. All travel by Od officers was suspended temporarily. In addition, Dd Headquarters' personnel were instructed to remain in their offices or to keep the Dd aware of their whoreabouts so that they could be reached immediately. The source does not know the reason for these measures but believes it logical that they were bessed because of the possibility that the United States might have inken some type of action against Cuba and the Ddi inself. As marry so be recalls, the Ddi illes were restored to regular use about 1 December 1963.



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23 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/OPS

SUBJECT

Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding Allegations of the CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the John F. KENNEDY Assassination

- 1. The attached review and summary was written at the express request of Mr. David W. Belin as a followup to Question 3 of his letter to the Agency of 15 April 1975.
- 2. The results as I have already told him add nuance, not evidence, to what the Warren Commission and its staff had laid before them in 1964 on this subject. The results of the review are stipulated in paragraph 8 of the Attachment. There seemed to be no reason to attach copies of the case reports from the file to this summary. These can be made available promptly, however, on request. This summary does not deal with press, magazine and books that dealt with the subject during the period after the assassination.
- 3. My recommendation is to do with this paper as we did with the earlier one requested by Mr. Belin on the unidentified man: let him read the entire summary and then decide how much of it, if any, is pertinent

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to his and the Commission's needs and then decide how much will go into the classified record.

Raymond G. Rocca

Attachment

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SUBJECT

Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding Allegations of CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the

John F. KENNEDY Assassination

REFERENCE :

Letter by David W. Belin to Mr. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April 1975, paragraph 3 (Regarding Public Statement by CASTRO, (Ex.), attached

#### BACKGROUND

- 1. On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963,

  Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in

  Havana; even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to an informal

  interview by the Associated Press correspondent,

  Daniel HARKER.
- 2. HARKER's interview reached New York on Sunday,
  8 September, and was in print throughout the country on
  Monday, 9 September. There can be no question from the
  facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been
  expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this
  event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a
  message on the record in the United States.

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- 3. CASTRO's statements to HARKER covered a range of topics but dealt principally with American political leadership, in particular President KENNEDY, whom he excoriated in extraordinarily provocative fashion

  (" ... KENNEDY is a cretini " ... the BATISTA of his times ... the most opportunistic American President of all time ... ").
- 4. The interview also contained an uncomplimentary reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in the replay by United States newspapers like the <a href="New York Times">New York Times</a> and Washington papers, with a result that CASTRO's "message" was significantly modulated.
- 5. In New Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided until the middle of September 1963, the HARKER story appeared in the principal morning paper, the Times-Picayune, on Monday, 9 September, page 7, under a three-column head-line: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." The story followed under the HARKER by-line:

"Havana (AP) - Prime Minister
Fidel Castro said Saturday night: 'U.S.
leaders would be in danger if they helped
in any attempt to do away with leaders of
Cuba.'

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"Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Castro said: "We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

• ... World affairs ... seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ago, but now this trend has changed with attacks.

"The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.

"'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's ...'"

6. The New York Times, in its coverage on 9 September, used a UPI wire service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat which gave the interview its real significance. The Washington Post did an abbreviated rewrite (9 September, page A-7) which, similarly, omitted any reference to the main thrust of CASTRO's remarks.

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The Evening Star of Washington, D. C., printed\_the HARKER story nearly in its entirety in the second section of the paper (9 September 1963, page B-4) and reworded the content of the HARKER interview, placing the emphasis on the political aspects - in particular, highlighting the GOLDWATER elements and burying CASTRO's warning to the United States leadership in the middle of the piece.

- assassination that this CASTRO interview was considered in following up leads or in dealings with the Warren Commission and its staff although Mexico Station specifically directed Headquarters attention to the AP story very shortly after the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears to have been forgotten in the contemporary political consideration of relations with CASTRO's Cuba. There is no evidence in the Agency records, either, that the Warren Commission staff itself pursued the implication of the CASTRO interview in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There is no evidence in the files that anything along these lines was stated by any other Cuban leader before the assassination.
- 8. The purpose of this review, undertaken at Mr. Belin's request, is to reconsider Lee Harvey OSWALD's activity on the assumption that as an avid newspaper reader which we know from testimony of Marina OSWALD and others he read the CASTRO warning and threat as reported above. The results

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of the review, admittedly heavily using the 20 — 20 quality of hindsight, may be stigulated in summary:

evidence, applying this phrase strictly, of Soviet and or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement in the assassination to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff. The Commission's finding that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did them in alone and of his own determination stands.

b. "Credible evidence" that would upset or significantly modify this judgement did (and does) not exist in Washington. But such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity and quality, designed to cover up any admissions of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD which might be related directly or indirectly with the assassination. Therefore, the belief that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist and

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by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency. That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level, particularly in the counterintelligence component in the CIA in 1964. As was indicated by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would continue to regard this aspect of the OSWALD case as still open. 1

- c. In the absence of additional of new elements of "credible" evidence, there are "nuances" in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of other conclusions.

  These are reviewed and summarized below, itemby-item.
- d. CASTRO's warning and threat of7 September 1963 if OSWALD did indeed read

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Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Hearings, Vol. V., pp. 120 - 129. See especially p. 124 - "Mr. Helms: 'Yes. I would assume the case could never be closed.'"

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it in New Orleans frust be considered of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution of OSWALD's passive/ aggressive makeup after his attempt to kill General WALKER early in April 1963 and his identification with Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban revolution which is directly traceable as far back as his Marine Corps service in El Toro, California. CASTRO's warning and threat, given to AP correspondent HARKER, irrespective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the Russians - was an act of singular irresponsibility and under no circumstances was excusable as retorsion for what the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963.

CUBAN CONTACT WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, EARLY 1959 (?)

9. The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion of germinal significance to any review of the background of Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group

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member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine Corps Base December 1958 - September 1959.

The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country, which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed.'"<sup>2</sup>

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report, and its implications do not appear to have been run down or developed by investigation. Thus, the record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with the Cubans starts with a question mark.



11. The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particularly keen about how to get to the island. DELGADO testified:

" ... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to

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Report to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Report, p. 687.

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get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know.

But at that time that I told him this - we
were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know,
so this wasn't no subversion or malintent,
you know. I didn't know what to answer him.
I told him to see them.

"After a while he told me he was in contact with them ...

- locker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling ma there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters you see, he would never go out, but stay near the post all the time ...
- receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down

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there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours, talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

"Mr. LIEBELER: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?

"Mr. DELGADO: About an hour and half, two hours ...

"Mr. LIEBELER: You never asked OSWALD who this fellow was that he talked to?

"Mr. DELGADO: No. No .X

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you connect this visit that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. DELGADO: I did; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date - time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, after he started to get in contact with

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these Cuban people, ne started getting letter pamphlets and newspapers ...

"... and he also started receiving letters, you know, and no books, maybe pamphlets, you know, Nittle Dike church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Were they written to Spanish, any of them, do you know?"

"Mr. DELGADO: Not that I can recall,

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you have any reason to believe that these things came to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. DELGADO: Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope, you know... something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive seal, you know. They had different colors on it, red and white; almost looked like our colors, you know. But I can't recall the seal I just knew it was in Latin, United, something that I couldn't understand. It was Latin.

"Mr. LIEBELER: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?

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"Mr. DELGADO No. But he had told me prior, just before I found that envelope in his wall locker, that he was receiving mail from them, and one time he offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested because at the time we had work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did he tell you what his correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about?

"Mr. DELGADO : No, he didn to

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversations that you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. DELGADO: No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to - once he got out of the service - he was going to Switzerland ... "3

12. OSWALD's application to Albert Schweitzer College, Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, OSWALD

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Hearings, Volume VIII, pp. 241 - 243.

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accelerated his exit on grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On 27 September 1969 he was issued a U.S. passport wallid for travel - among other places to Cuba and the USER. He entered the Soviet Union from Finland on 35 October 1959.

13. DELGADO'S testimony has the cast of credibility.

Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contacted OSWALD at El Toro Camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours.

The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, and actually there is nothing like it - on the record - in everything else we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States before or after his return to the United States. The record reflects no identification of the El Toro contact. DELGADO's presumption is that he was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles.

Assuming that, the questions are: Who was it, and was there reporting from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana that could, in effect, represent the opening of a Cuban file on OSWALD?

\*PREDICTION OF ERESIDENT KENNEDY'S DEMISE BY COMMUNIST PARTY CELL LEADER MORSE BENITEZ ZABOLA, 1962

14. Guatemala Station forwarded to Headquarters on9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a

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U.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.

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penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party in Guatamala should form a single new party; "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President KENNEDY because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present year, 1962."

15. This report apparently had been discounted when it was received and was not forwarded until the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no follow-up or formal dissemination of the report.

ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY IN THE HAUGE, 7 NOVEMBER 1963

- 16. A sensitive liaison source, reporting after the KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: "... Just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."
- 17. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was reported to have

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a history of medical instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966.

INTERCEPTED CONVERSATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE, LUISA CALDERON, AFTERNOON OF 22 NOVEMBER 1963

- 18. At kill Mexico City time, about five hours after the KENNEDY assassination, a Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an unidentified male outside.
- 19. The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. "Luisa" jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before KENNEDY ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three [she laughs], what barbarians! ..."
- 20. Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at Silvia DURAN's had been called off so it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she said she planned to move that night into the house of a doctor (a woman friend.
- 21. Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation.

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- 22. The tenuous, enignmatic character of the conversation is sharply highlighted by the following facts:
  - a. "Luisa" was probably identical with
    Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban
    Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI).

    She returned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported
    to be working in DGI Headquarters.
  - b. The DGI element in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally as the replacement of the Consul Eusebio AZCUE (departed 19 November 1963). The deputy DGI chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez.
  - c. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who dealt with OSWALD during his known visits on 27 and 28 September to the Cuban installations in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit.

    Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness on the record regarding OSWALD's activity in Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its entirety was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct

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confrontation with her was requested by the Warren Commission staff but rejected by the Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia DURAN's statements that it was learned that OSWALD became engaged in a personal altercation on 27 September with Eusebio AZCUE.

d. Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez, were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Annstasio SOMOZA. VEGA, it is established, was on post in Mexico City during OSWALD's stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took fifteen days. 5

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For example, VEGA would have handled the details of the visa action and facilitation of the trip to Cuba via Mexico City from 28 December 1962 - 21 January 1963 that

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There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitative interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWAND, known or confirmed by intercept, with the data held on the Capan DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck like AZCUE whose slot had been taken by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, they were not asked at the time. And there remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it have happened without the knowledge and participation of the DGI personnel above cited? This seems unlikely especially because VEGA is later gited by a Cuban DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD made several visits to the Cuban Consulate. It is clear CASTRO's overseas intelligence and security service could have more in its files than was surfaced in the DURAN

was taken by Vincent Theodore LEE, the organizer of the Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which OSWALD established relations from Dallas during the period 19 April - 2 November 1963. There is an overlap between LEE's and VEGA's travels to Havana during that period: VEGA departed Mexico City on 6 January for Havana and returned on 13 February 1963.

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statements. Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" Luisa CALDERON - as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City Gould very well have known something that would make what
she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of
boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at the time.

SILVIA DURAN, SUBSTANTIAL AMPLIFICATION OF ADMISSION OF ALLEGED PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, 1967

- 24. The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. (In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquim Hernandez ARMAS, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the question whether Silvia DURAN had been asked about [or been offered?] money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)
- 25. As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail; that

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she had gone out with OSWALD during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him.

ALLEGATIONS OF CONSPIRATORIAL CONTACT BETWEEN OSWALD AND CUBAN GOVERNMENT AGENTS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ALLEGATIONS OF (A) ELENA GARRO DE PRAZ AND (B) OSCAR CONTRERAS

26 As the Warren Commission reported, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated ..." Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad and similarly the FBI in the United States was the Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City, 26 November 1963, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

27. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "D." ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money some time in mid-September 1963 in a meeting in a patio of the Cuban Consulate in

See Report, p. 305 ff. Some of the others were the cases of Ylario ROJAS Villenueve in Cozumel and Guadaloupe, the allegations of Enrique Ruedolo GONGORA in New York City, the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT, Santa Clara Prison Farm, California, and the allegations of Ray DOBKIN's.

See Report, pp. 307 - 308.

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Mexico city. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the use of the polygraph, on which ALVARADO showed evidences of deception, and by bringing ALVARADO's former Nicaraguan security service control into the case.

- 28. The ALVARADO story is a particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. ALVARADO, whose account did not become public until the release of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of the presence in the Cuban Consulate transaction of a Negro with red-dyed hair.
- 29. Elena GARRO de Paz is a mecurial, articulate and socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is also the cousin of Horacio DURAN, the husband of Silvia DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women descending from Elena GARRO's trenchant anti-Communism.
- 30. From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1969, a U.S. Embassy officer. Charles THOMAS, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting GARRO's account of what had actually gone on between OSWALD, the Cubans and in particular Silvia DURAN in September 1963, including a repeated reference to a Negro with red-dyed hair.

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31. The first reference to the GARRO story was noted in a Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

"Elena GARRO [said] that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that OSWALD was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the GARRO family [Horacio DURAN]. At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a They were so obviously out of place that she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three Gringos stood out she took a good look at them as did her daughter. When the assassination occurred and OSWALD's picture was spread into the newspapers, both Elena and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos 'without a doubt' at the party."

32. GARRO repeated her story to Mr. Charles William THOMAS, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965:

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In September 1963 after her return from abroad, she went to a party, accompanied by her daughter, at the home of Ruben DURAN [emphasis added]. Ruben is one of the two brothers of Horacio DURAN, who married her cousin. met OSWALD and two other young Americans. At the party she was discouraged from talking with him. Other guests were the Cuban Consul AZCUE, General Clark FLORES, Silvia DURAN, who she later learned was OSWALD's mistress while he was here, Emilio CARBALLIDO and a Latin American Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. In November 1963 when the identity of the assassin became known, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted "assassins" and other insults at the staff there. B Shortly afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend, Manuel CARVILLO [or CALWELLO], then an official in the Secretariat of the Gobernation and were told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for eight days under pretext that they were meanger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain what she knew of OSWALD, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies.

33. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further interviews with THOMAS, GARRO and her daughter elaborated and

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These particulars were not confirmed by independent observers at the time.

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in certain particulars significantly modified her earlier account. She also acknowledged that she and her daughter had been interviewed by Embassy officers to whom she claimed they did not give a very complete story because the Embassy officers did not appear to give much credence to anything they said.

- 34. It developed that GARRO and daughter had been interviewed by the Legal Attache on 17 and 24 November 1964. Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her account to THOMAS but had not been substantiated by inquiries. The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA Chief of Station on 27 December 1964 and to the Ambassador on 25 February 1965.
- 35. The Embassy Political Officer, however, persisted in his interviews and reporting. In a memorandum of conversation, 13 July 1966, GARRO identified the place to which she had been taken by CALVILLO as the Hotel Vermont. (This detail checked out affirmatively. GARRO was at the Hotel 23 24, 25 27 and 28 30 November 1963.) In another, on 7 February 1967, GARRO's continuing vicissitudes with the Cubans are set out. And finally upon THOMAS's retirement from U.S. Government service, the Department of State, at his request, 28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of his reporting of the Elena GARRO interviews.

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- 36. There the matter rests. GARRO's chronology of the events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital in September 1963 never coincided with the confirmed data of OSWALD's presence there. Her story, however, had two points congruent with allegations by others regarding OSWALD:
  - a. ARWARADO's allegations regarding the
    Negro with the red-dyed hair [this detail could,
    however, have been gleaned from the
    Warren Commission's published account of the
    "D" case] and
  - b. Silvia DURAN's later claim of intimate personal contacts with OSWALD.
- 37. Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the American Consul, Benjamin J. RUYLE, in Tampico developed a contact with a local Mexican journalist,

  Oscar CONTRERAS Lartigue, who claimed to have encountered OSWALD with other pro-CASTRO students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963.
- 38. In June 1969 CONTRERAS was interviewed by a CIA officer:

He studied law at the University of Mexico for three years, approximately 1960 - 1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro-CASTRO revolutionary group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD

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case he was extremely cautious and although he was not able of willing to give dates and names, he said OSWALD visited the University of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. OSWALD made inquiries regarding pro-Cuban revolutionary groups at the University and was directed to CONTRERAS and his friend. OSWALD met CONTRERAS and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy OSWALD told the group it was urgent that he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy had denied him a visa. He requested aid from CONTRERAS' group. CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of the day, that night and part of the next day. OSWALD was very introverted and appeared to be slightly crazy. OSWALD made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

39. At this point with FBI knowledge, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that CONTRERAS was indeed at the University of Mexico but only

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for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publicly associated in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased functioning as such in the middle of 1962, and Oscar contreras was never one of its leaders. No further work is reflected in the files on the CONTRERAS allegations. Apart from the unsustained claims made by CONTRERAS about his own presence at the University, there is an additional element that undermines the credibility of his account: OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals near the hotel, seems hardly likely to have permitted him to carry on for an extended period with a University student group.

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XAAZ-22594 31 January 1964

MEMCRANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Leak Rapkin

SUBJECT:

Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963

as Transmitted to Warren Commission

l. I am enclosing a presentation of the information developed by CIA on or about Lee Harvey CSWALD in Mexico City. We have included in this paper only hard, substantive information. Any judgments that are made represent professional evaluations by individuals who have worked over the years as specialists in their fields. Speculation, rumor, and vague detail not directly related to CSWALD's activity

2. Pursuant to our discussion on 14 January 1764, I have given the enclosure an appropriate classification. The compromise of this material in its present form would lead directly to the destruction of current sources and methods of this Agency in Mexico and elsewhere.

Document Number 509-803

(signed)

for FOLA Review on JUN 1975

have not been included.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

To 4th 1964

Enclosure

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CI/RGRocca:dc/ 31 January 1964

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
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31 January 1964

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Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of
Lee Harvey CSWALD in Accidence City
23 September - 3 October 1963

#### L OSWALD's Activity in Mexico City

1. On 9 October the CIA Station in Mexico City received the following information from a reliable and proven source:

An American named Lee OSWALD had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on Tuesday, 1 October 1963. He had spoken in halting Russian to the Soviet Embassy guard, Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, to whom he said he had visited the Embassy two days earlier, Saturday, 28 September. He asked whether there had been a reply to a telegram that the Consul with whom he had spoken, but whose name he could not recall, had promised to send to Washington. OBYEDKOV had attempted to establish the mentity of the Consul with whom OSWALD had talkedry if a had been a dark person, then it had probably been MCSTIKOV. OBYEDKOV,

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after a check with Soviet Consular personnel, assured OSWALD the telegram had been sent to Washington but no answer had been received.

The information was forwarded by cable to CIA Headquarters the same day it was received.


- 2. A file check in Washington which is routine in these matters revealed the possibility of an identity between the Lee OSWALD who had spoken with OBYEDKOV, and presumably with KOSTIKOV, and the defector returnee, Lee Harvey OSWALD.\*
- 3. On 10 October 1963 CIA Headquarters disseminated by cable the report in substantially the form and in the detail indicated above, in paragraph 1, to the Federal agencies whose jurisdictional interests had been established by a review of OSWALD's file; the Federal Burcau of Investigation, the Depart-

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<sup>\*</sup> The CIA file on Lee Harvey CSWALD was opened on 9 Decomber 1960 to accommodate biographic information developed by CIA in response to an inquiry from the Department of State on a list of American defectors in Soviet Elec countries. OSWALD's was among the names in the list. The Department of State inquiry was dated 25 October 1960. An interim reply was given by CIA on 3 November 1960; a final reply, on 21 November 1960. Until early October 1963 the contents of the OSWALD file held by CIA consisted entirely of press materials and disseminations received from the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Navy Department.



Mont of State, the Navy Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A comment was included in the report noting the likelihood that the subject, Lee OSWALD, was probably identical with the former Marine who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. (The report disseminated by CIA in Washington on 10 October also included a physical description of an individual who was believed to have been the OSWALD who had contacted the Soviets in Mexico City. It was subsequently established by investigation that the description did not pertain to OSWALD.)

sent a lengthy cable summary to the Mexico City Station of the background information held in the Meadquarters' file on OSWALD. An instruction was included for the Mexico City Station to pass the substance of its 9 Cotober report to the local representatives of the same Federal departments and agencies that had been given the information in Washington. This instruction was immediately carried out. In this manner the information on OSWALD's contact with the Soviets on 1 Cotober was passed in Mexico City to the Embassy, the FBI representative, the Naval Attache, and to the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. There were no requests from recipients of the report for further information or for follow-up investigation.

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- 5. After the assassination of President Kennedy and the arrest of Lee Harvey OSWALD, an intensive review of all available sources was undertaken in Mexico City to determine the purpose of CSWALD's visite. It was learned that CSWALD had also visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and had talked there with a clerk, a Mexican national, named Silvia DURAN. After the assassination and the publicity about Lee OSWALD, Silvia DURAN had told a number of relatives and friends that she had talked to OSWALD about a Cuban visa.

  Silvia DURAN and her husband, Horazio DURAN Navarro, were detained and questioned by the Mexican police from 23 to 25 November 1963.
- 6. After giving some of the details of her own personal background she is an admitted Leitist sympathizer and had formerly worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations Silvia DURAN said that when she first heard of the death of President Kennedy and had been depressed and thought the assassin must have been a maniac. When she learned that he was associated with the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" she did not believe it:
- 7. She talked about the case to her husband and when she heard the name of Lee OSWALD mentioned, she recognized it as

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the man who had come to the Consulate about two months before to get a visa to transit Cana his way to the USSR. She realized that he had said he was married to a Russian and that he had followed to the "Fair Play for Cuba" group. She checked her file on him in the Consular archives and from the descriptive data, she was sure it was the same man. He was short, blond, poorly dressed and his face got red when he talked. He was denied a Cuban transit visa because he did not yet have a Soviet visa, and he was told to get the Soviet visa first, but it was noted that this would take about four months. She had asked the Cuban Consul himself, Euseblo AZCUE, to talk to OSWALD and they had an argument when AZCUE urged OSWALD to leave Mexico instead of waiting there. The Consul had phoned the Soviet Consulate and talked to the person handling OSWALD's case, who had said it would take about four months to hear from Moscow about the Soviet visa. The same afternoon, OSWALD had come back again and she had told him the same thing. She gave OSWALD a slip of paper with her name and telephone number on it in case Hower got his Soviet visa. He did not call back, she said,

8. Silvia DURAN's husband, Horaclo DURAN Navarro, gave essentially the same story, as he had previously heard it from his wife after the assassination. He had never had any personal contact with OSWALD.

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
- 9. Silvia DURAN was reinterrogated by the Mexican police from 27 to 29 November But she did not change or add materially to her story about OSWALD.
- Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armae, reported on the detainment and interrogation of Silvia DHEAN by the Monicen authorities. The Cuban Government sent the Mexican Government a stiff note of protest, which the Mexicans rejected.
- day after DURAN's release, Cuban President DORTICOS cueried HERNANDEZ about his report. HERNANDEZ confirmed that there had been an altercation between CSWALD and Consul AZCUE. DORTICOS made a persistent but unsuccessful effort to determine from HERNANDEZ whether the Mexican authorities had questioned Mrs. DURAN about money, or thought that the Cubans had paid OSWALD money.
- 12. The CIA follow-up investigation produced the following confirmed results which have a bearing on Mrs. DURAN's account:
  - a. 27 September. In mid-afternoon, Silvia DURAN informed the Soviet Embassy that a male American citizen had requested a visa to transit Cuba on his way to the



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
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Soviet Union. She desired to know who the American had talked with at the Soviet Consulate. Also, she indicated that the Cuban Consulate could grant him the visa and arrange immigration details if the concession of a Soviet visa were assured.


DURAN received a confirmation from the Soviet Embassy that the American had been to the USSR installation. He had shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that he had been long awaiting a visa for himself and his wife to go to the USSR. No answer had come from Washington; however, the waiting period was sometimes four or five months. The American also had a letter attesting that he was a member of a pro-Cuban organization but he had claimed that the Cubana would not give him a visa unless he had already received a Russian visa.

Although the American was still at the Cuban Consulate, Stivia Directly repeated that she dould not give him a transit visa unless a Soviet visa was forthcoming, notwithstanding the American's wish to go to Cuba to wast



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there for his Soviet visa. According to DURAN, the
American knew no one in Cuba and she intended to
appropriately annotate the American's card. The Soviet
official echoed her statement that the American was not

c. 28 September. Silvin DURAN was again visited at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City by the American secking a Cuban transit visa. Mrs. DURAN contacted at least two members of the Soviet Embassy and facilitated a direct conversation between one of the Soviets and the American. Conversing in poor Russian, the American stated that he already had been to the Soviet Consulate and had left an address. The Soviet official replied that he was aware of that. The American suggested that he had not known his address then, and he had gone to the Cuban Embassy to ask for the address, because they had it. The American then acceded to the Soviet official's invitation to come by and give them the address.

d. 1 October. In mid-morning an unidentified individual, speaking broken Russian, contacted the Soviet Military Attacho in Mexico City. He said he had been to



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the Embassy the previous Saturday (28 September) and had talked with a Consul who had said they would send a telegram to Washingtons had there been a reply? He was referred to the Consulate for the information.

These additional materials were promptly discominated in Washington by the CIA to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Eureau of Investigation.

e. 1 October. See paragraph I shove for Lee
OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Consulate.

#### II. Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

OSWALD dealt in Mexico City was Consular Attache Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born in Moscow, 17 March 1933.

A photograph of KOSTIKOV is attached. In his letter of 9 November to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD wrote about his "meetings with Comrade KOSTIN (sic) of the Soviet Union in Mexico City Mexico." There is no official of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with a name resembling "KOSTIN", other than Consul KOSTINOV.

14. KOSTIKOV is the senior officer of five Soviet

Consular representatives who deal with visus and related



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PAGE 143 of 212

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PAGE 144 of 212

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

IN 67281 PAGE 2

TALKS FAMILIARLY WITH SUBJ AND INVITES HIM TO PRESS CONFERENCE-LEG-TURE AT HOTEL REFORMA WHERE A CUBAN TO SPEAK. 3 MAY WITH GUADALINE PEREZ MACIA OF GOBERNACION RE OBTAINING (UNDETERMINED) VISA. JUNE AND 6 JULY WITH OSCAR SANTAELLA, FORD SALESMAN. JUAN GARCIAS AND FNU PEREZ OROZCO, DODGE SALESMEN. 2 AUG CALLS ROGER OR ROBERT KATZ OF "FRANCE PRESSE" TO INVITE TO SOVEMB PRESS CONFERENCE. MAY AND 16 JUNE 1962 CALLS EDMUNDO JARDON OF PRENSA LATINA TO GET TOGETHER. 14 JUNE ASKS SPEAK WITH DR. GUILLERMO MONTANO ISLAS, PROMINENT MEXICAN PRO COMMIE LEADER WELL KNOWN Hes. 22 June HE AND TASS REP ANATOLIY PAVLENKO INVITED TO LUNCHEON BY MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S PRESS SEC HUMSERTO ROMERO. 25 SEP IS INVITED TO LUNCHEON WITH DR. IGNACIO CHAVEZ, RECTOR AT UNAM. 3 DEC ACCEPTS INVITE ATTEND BUFFET FOR PRESS ON BEHALF CARL J. WIEDAIL, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. 23 JAN 63 HORACIO CHANCACLINI OF UNITED NATIONS POSTPONES HIS APPOINTMENT WITH SUBJ. 19 FEB FNU SABINO CAERERA OF INSURANCE FIRM RE PAYMENTS. 8 MAR INVITES CANADIAN NEW SPAPERMAN JOHN ALIUS TO STAN DINNER. 30 APR REQUESTS APPOINTMENT WITH RICARD O POERY CERVANTES, PROMINENT LEFFIST JOURNALIST IN -CLOSE FREQUENT CONTACT SOVS. 15 AND 17 KAY TALKS WIT A NEW YORK TIMES REP PAUL KENNEDY WHO INVITES SUBJ DINNER 26 MAY. DIRECTOR OF VOZ DE MEXICO AND PCM CENTRAL COMMITTEEMAN MANUEL TERRAZAS GUERRERO, ASKS SUBJ FOR SOV FINANCIAL SUBSIDY 23 MAY SUBJ CALLS JOHN RETTIE (SEE MEXI 4743). 14 JUNE CALLS WELL KNOWN LEFTIST CLEMENTINA BASSOLS TO INTERVIEW HER. ENGIQUE LOUBET OF EXCELSION TO SOVENE RECEPTION BEHALF COSMONAUTS

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14 CCT INVITES JAVIER SANTOS LORENT OF NOVEDADES TO SAME RESTRICT 30 CCT UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIES CONTACT CLEMENTINA BASSOLS. 14 TRIES CONTACT RICARDO POERY GERVANTES. 14 AND 15 NOV ARRANGES WIR GINIA GOMEZ RIETO, LEFTIST AND PARAMOUR OF POERY.

SECRE

C/S COMMENT: \* REQUESTED INFO RE TRAVEL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV.

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The state of the s	ROUTING
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CH 26 NOWSERPER JER JOHN GUILLERMO AGUIRRE OF MEXICO TOL	D SING TATEOUT
CH 25 NOW SHARES OF SERVICE	THE SOUTONING
DEPORTABLES TO PRIES MORAGA, UNITED STATES INFORMATION/OFFIC	ER IN MEXICO CITY: .
	-A
SARIA RODRIGUEZ DE LOPEZ, SAID A SON IN LAW OF HER	ARMESTO REDRIGUEZ,
NEW DEVES IN NEW CHEZARS WAS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH	LEE OSWALD. SON
IN LAW IS A CUBAN WEO LIVES AS 212 JEFFERSON PARRI	SH, NEW ORLZANS,
TEL: VERMON 5-9658. ARMESTO RODRIGUEZ RUMS A SPAN	ISH LANGUAGE SCHOOL
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TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

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nave bein in contact 10sumes )

ed as Attachment A-is a resume of the observed 1. Forwarded as Attacment A 13 a resume of the observed

201-23616 petivities of Valerty Vladimirovich TOSTIETY and Ivan Cavrilo
201-23616 petivities of Valerty Vladimirovich TOSTIETY and Ivan Cavrilo
201-23616 petivities of Valerty as reported by a reliable source in Maxico City.

Attention was given to MOSTIETY because of the indication

that he is the consul Van interviewed OSTALD on 28 Captember

1063 (see CECI-3/773,826, 25 November 1963). ALFERIEY trav
21 petivities of Valerty to Morthern Mexico during the early part

1064 with MOSTIETY to Morthern Mexico during the early part of September 1983. Source reported that during the period under review the observed activities of ACCITIENT and ALFERIEV appeared to be normal, as did the activities of the entire Soviet Dabasey complement.

- 2. Forwarded as Attachment B is a resume of telephone calls placed to and from the Soylet Embassy on the afternoon Analysis of calls made the morning of of 22 November. 22 Movember and the morning and afternoon of 23 November rerealed no pertinent information.
- 3. Technical surveillance of the homes of several known and suspected Soviet intelligence officers produced no pertinent information.
- Forwarded as Attachment C is a list identifying the Soviets whose mames appear in Attachments A and B.
- Because of the extreme sensitivity of the enclosed information, we urge that the source data and the information be given the most secure handling possible. This information is for background use only and may not be disseminated without permission from this Agency.

Document Number 187-622 RECORD COPY for FOIA Review on APR 1976

CSCI-3/778,891

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 197 IMPDET CL BY C12 2

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1 - WH/R

27 November 1963

BASICS:

MEXI-7050 (IN-67292)

MEXI-7038 (IN-67253)

MEXI-7036 (IN-67237)

MEXI-7034 (IN-67231)

MEXI-7032 (IN-67198)

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Enclosure A

#### 18 November

0857 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone (Departure not noted)

1556 - Kostikov entera slone

1629 - Kostikov departs alone

1656 - Tostikov enters alone

1711 - Rostikov departs alone

1759 - Koatikov enters alone

#### 19 November

1210 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone

1312 - Alferiev departs with Garmaschev

1352 - Alferiev and Carmaschev return

1415 - Kostikov departs alone

1533 - Alferiev enters Blone (prior departure not noted)

1653 - Kostikov enters alone

#### 20 November

No coverage

#### 21 November

0852 - Alferiev enters Embassy with wife

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0916 - Kostikov enters alone

0317 - Alferiev departs alone

0949 - Alferiev enters alone

1133 - Kostikov departs with Shubin

1206 - Alferiev departs alone

1240 - Kostikov enters with Shubin

1310 - Kostikov departs in car driven by KGB chauffeur Kalinin

1341 - Kostikov enters with Kalinin

1353 - Alfertev enters alone

1427 - Kostikov departs alone

1630 - Kostikov enters alone

#### 22 November

0853 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone

0904 - Kostikov enters alone

1005 - Kostikov has discussion with Shubin

1016 - Kostikov departs with Shubin

1028 - Kostikov enters with Shubin

1030 - Kostikov departs with wite and Shubin

1250 - Kostikov, wife and Shabin return

1302-1312 - Kosříkov speaks in garden with Kazantsev

1336 - Kostikov departs with Shubin, Shpakevich, Turygin, driven by Kalinin


1402 - All above return

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1403 - Kestikov talking in garden with Alferiev, Andreyev, and Turygin

1402 - Kestikov departs in car with family

1432 - Alferiev departs alone

1436 - Alferfev enters alone

1503 Mileriev departs Alone

1517 - Alferiev enters alone

1539 - Kostikov enters alone

#### 23 November

1130 - Eostikov speaks with Kazantsev and Shubin

1133 - Kostikov departs with Mazantsev and Shubin

1200 - Alferiev enters alone

1240 - Kostikov, Kazantsev and Shubin enter

1410 - Kostikov plays volleyball with Yatskov, Shubin, Kazantsev, Forkhunov, and Streganov

1425 - Mostikov speaks to Shubin and Slavnov

1430 - Kostikov departs with Shubin and Romanchenko

1440 - Alferiev departs alone

#### 24 November

1100 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone

1207 - Kostikov enters with mife and Shubin

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
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1326 - Alferiev departs with Shengalev

1410 - Alferiev enters with Shengalev

1440 - Alierley, Kostikov, Kazantsev and 2 unidentified

Soviet visitors depart (A's car)



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Inclosure B

AM 22 November coverage of Soviet Embassy normal.

FM 22 November coverage follows:

1250 - Cuban Consul Alfredo Birabal Diaz asks to speak with Yatskov. Latter apparently unavailable and Koatikov comes on line with following conversation ensuing familiar form "tu"

MS: Forgive as for arriving late.

MIR: Did you recover the suitcase?

XCS: Yes

MIR: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

KOS: Yes

MIR: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Charultepec Park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

KOS: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you.

HIR: I'd like to talk to Pavel Yatskov.

NOS: Wait a minute, he'll come nog

HIR: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the heat half hour at telephone Ho. 11-28-47.

KOS: O. K.

1334 - Reporter requests statement. Unidentified Soviet male refuses.

1333 - Female implies to Kukharenko that the Soviet Ambassador has said to make no statement.

1445 - Yugoslav Ambassador Viahov calls and speaks with Soviet Ambassador Pazarov in Russian. Talk briefly about assassination telling each other what they know, which

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appears to be only what they got from the radio.

- 1550 Unidentified woman advises Soviets of assassination.
- 1844 Unidentified reporter asks for Mazantsev, advised that Engantsev motion, will be back Monday, 0939-1400.
- 1645 Unicentified male waks for Mukharenko, told he isn't
- 1652 Unidentified female reporter told Soviet Embassy not working today, Saturday or Sunday.
- 1716 Reporter calls for statement. Mone given.
  - Kazantsev calls his residence, personal call.
- 1744 Reporter told to call back Bonday.
- 1750 Unidentified male asks for Leonov. Not in.
- 1755 above calls again
  - Reporter told call back bonday.

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ATTACHMENT C TO CSCI-3/773,881

1.	Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERIEV	-	Prayda Correspondent
2.	Valeriy Vladiairovich KOSTIKOV	-	Attache Consular Offi
3.	Aleksey Ivanovich GARNASCHEV	~	Consul
4.	Vitaliz Borisovich SHUBIN	-	Attache
5.	Yurly Omitripowich MALININ	_	Chauffeur
6.	Boris Alessandrovich KAZANTSIV	_	Counselor
7.	Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH	_	Third Secretary
8.	Vladimir Ivanovich ANDREYAV	-	First Secretary
9.	Vladimir Vasilysvich TURYGIN	_	Third Secretary
10.	Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV	<b>-</b>	Attache
11.	Vladimir PORZHUNOV	_	Code Clerk
12.	Gennadly STROGANOV	-	Radio Operator
13.	Nikolay Petrovich SLAVNOV	-	Code Clerk
14.	Vladimir ROMANCHENKO	_	Second Secretary
15.	Lev Pedorovich SHENGALEY	-	Employee, Commercial Office
16.	Oleg Habsimovich NECHIPORENEO	=	Vice Consul
17.	Sergey Semyonovich KUKHAREMEO	-	Second Secretary; So- viet Information
18.	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV		Eulletin

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Enclosure B

1.4

22 November coverage of Soviet Embrasy normal.

22 Rovember coverage follows:

1250 - Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal Diaz saks to apeak with Yatekov. Letter apparently unavailable and Kostikov Conses on line with following conversation ensuling familiar form "tu"

MOS: Forgive me for arriving late.

MIR: Did you recover the suitcase?

KOS: Yes

MIR: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

203: Yes

MIR: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec Park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

ACC: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you.

HIR: I'd like to talk to Pavel Yatakov.

RCS: Wait a minute, he'll come now.

MIR: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next half hour at telephone No. 11-28-47.

XOS: O. K.

1334 - Deporter requests statement. Unicentified Soviet male refuses.

1333 - Female implies to Kukhurenko that the Soviet Ambassador has said to make no statement.

1445 - Yugoslav Antassador Vlahov calls and speaks with Soviet Antassador Fazarov in Russian. Talk briefly about assassination talling each other what they know, which

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appears to be only what they got from the radio.

- 1550 Unidentified woman advises Soviets of assassination.
- 1644 Unidentified reporter asks for Kazantsev, advised that Kazantsev not in, will be back Monday, 0930-1400.
- 1645 Unidentiffed male asks for Kukharenko, told he isn't
- 1652 Unidentified female reporter told Soviet Embassy not working today, Saturday or Sunday.
- 1716 Reporter calls for statement. Mone given.
  - Kazantsev calls his residence, personal call.
- 1744 Reporter told to call back Monday.
- 1750 Unidentified male asks for Leonov. Not in.
- 1755 above calls again
  - Reporter told call back Wonday.

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#### SESSET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ATTACEMENT C TO CSCI-3/773,881

	•	-
1,-	Ivan Gavrilovich ALPERIEV	- Prayda Correspondent
3.	Yaleriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV	- Attache Consular Office
з.	Aleksey Ivanovich GARRASCHSV	- Consul
4.	Vitalix Borisovich SHUSIN	- Attache
3.	Yuriy Daitalyorich anlique	- Chauffour
6.	Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV	- Counselor
7.	Vindinir Ivanovich SEPAREVICE	- Third Secretary
8.	Yladinir Ivanovich ANDREYEY	- First Secretary
9.	Vladinir Vasilyevich TURIGIE	- Third Secretary
20.	Pavel Antonovich YATSEUV	- Attache
u.	Vladimir PORSHUNOV	- Code Clerk
13.	Gennadly STROGARCY	- Radio Operator
L3.	Nikolay Petrovich SLAVSOV	- Code Clerk
14.	Vladimir RCHANCHESED	- Second Secretary
l5.	Lev ?edorovich SHEECHLZV	Employee, Commercial
16.	Oleg linksimovich MECHEOREMED	
17.	Sergey Semyonovich KUKAMBERSO	Second Secretary; So- viet Information


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Mikolay Sergeyevich LECHOY

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23 JUL 1.1.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Log Rankin

Mr. J. Loc Rankin General Counsel President's Commission on the

President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT:

Lee Harvey Oswald

- 1. Mr. James W. Liebeler of your staff phoned me last Friday and requested that CIM furnish the Commission with an affidavit respecting the origin and circumstances of a photograph of an uninown individual which was furnished by this Agency to the Federal Bursay of Investigation on November 22, 1963.
- 2. I am forwarding an affidavit with this memorandum which I trust will satisfy your needs. Because of the extremo consitivity of the source involved, I have refrained from adding further details.
- 3. The Central Intelligence Agency recommends that this photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report, because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individual involved who as far as this Agency is aware, had no connection with Lee Harvey Oswald or the assessmation of President Kennedy.
- 4. In view of the above, a sensitivity indicator has been affixed to this communication.

(First Billing Selection Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plana

Attachment - a/s

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22 July 1964

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20 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/R&A

SUBJECT:

Documents Available in OSWALD's 201 File

1. A machine listing of documents officially recorded as being in OSWALD's 201 file was nequested and is attached. The actual machine work of this type was begun in 1963, but a few items of previous dates were also recorded.

- 2. A comparison of the documents physically available in the 201 file and those recorded as being in the 201 file has shown that 37 documents which should be in the 201 file are not available in it. This total is made up of:
  - \_ 2 dispatches
    - 7 memoranda from the FBI

    - 2 State Department documents
    - 25 cables.

3. Machine inquiries for the location of these documents have

not been made.

for FOIA Review on

JUN 1976

GCC2C35

Holden Son

Mr. J. Lee Rankin

Michalanis &

Would you please be good enough to telephone me on Monday, 9 March, by which time I assume you will have had an opportunity to plance at this material.

(Signed) Fisher Colored Richard Helms

Attachment

6 Karch 1964



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PAGE 163 of 212

D2572

4-1224

XAAZ-22595

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT:

Information in CIA's Possession Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD Prior to November 22, 1963 as

Transmitted

This refers to your letter of February 12, 1964 addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence which has been passed to me for reply.

- 2. Paragraph three of your letter requested the Agency to supply the Commission with a report on information in the Agency's possession regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD prior to Movember 22, 1963. The request was predicated upon the footnote on page two of CIA's report to the Commission dated 31 January 1964, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey CSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963".
- There is attached an exact reproduction of the Agency's official dossier on Lee Harvey OSWALD beginning with the opening sheet dated 9 December 1960. The entire dossier carries the security classification of Secret and consists of thirty documents arranged in chronological order. On the basis of clearances from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of Mavy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Services who were queried by us after the receipt of your letter, wa are able to make available exact copies of all materials in the file up to early October 1963. These include:

Document Number 590 - 256

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0002037 PAGE 164 of212

- a. Seven documents received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- b. Ten documents received from the Department of State.
- c. Two documents received from the Department of Navy
- One document (a name check request) from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
  - e. Four newspaper clippings.
  - f. Five internal CIA notes.
- g. CIA report dated 31 January 1964 to the Commission which covers all substantive developments affecting CIA in the matter of Lee Harvey OSWALD from 9 October to 22 November 1963. The report indicated the disseminations of information developed by CIA that were made to other Federal agencies during that period. This item, as was pointed out at the time, is particularly sensitive and bears appropriate sensitivity indicators.
- 4. You will note that almost all of the documents carry markings required for CIA's internal records processing. A few of the papers contained the names of our employees or identifications of specific organizational components. We have taken the liberty of blocking out these items as they do not bear on the substance of the Commission's request.

Richard Helms Deputy Director for Plans

#### Attachment

Original & 2 - Addressee

2 - Addressee 1 - C/CI/SIG 1 - DDP Subject 1 - C/CI/R&A

1 - DDP Chrono COPY 1 - C/WH/3

1 - C/CI

CI:RGRocca:dc/7468/4 March 1964 (Inventory of documents contained in file attached for all but addressee) 201-259245

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#### Inventory of Documents Contained in OSWALD Dossier Forwarded to the Commission

- 1. State Telegram No. 1304, October 31, 1959 (Confidential)
- ~ 12. Newspaper Article from the Washington Post, November 1, 1959
- November 1959 (oral FBI name check request) and NR reply dated 4 November 1959 (Confidential)
- 4. Foreign Service Despatch 234, November 2, 1959 (Confidential)
- . 15. State Telegram 1358, November 9, 1959 (Confidential)
- .. . 6. State Telegram 1448, November 9, 1959 (Confidential)
- . . 1959 Newspaper Clipping from Washington Post, November 16, 1959
- , 9. DBF 49478, 25 May 1960 (Confidential)
- . 10. Internal CIA Biographic Profile dated circa May 1960 (Confidential)
- → ✓11. Letter from the Department of State (Gumming) to DDP (Bissell)

  dated October 25, 1960 (DD/P 0-5679 Secret)
- 22. DDP Response to State, dated 21 November 1960 (DD/P 0-6003 Secret)
- ./ \sqrt{13. Internal CIA Request for Opening of 201 file, 9 December 1960 (Secret)
- x/14. State Memorandum of Conversation dated January 26, 1961 (OUO)
- 7 15. State Instruction A-273, April 13, 1961 (OUO)
- 16. Foreign Service Despatch 806, May 26, 1961 (OUO)
- Jy. Foreign Service Despatch 29, July 11, 1961 (OUO)
- 18. DFB \$2181, July 13, 1961 (Confidential)

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XAAZ-22575 6 Mar 64

- >/19. Internal CIA Memoriar the Record, 28 September 1961 (Secret)
- v /20. Fereign Service Despatch 317, October 12, 1961 (OUO)
- 11. ILNS Name Check Request, December 5, 1961
  - /22. Navy Message 20197/RB/3, 3 March 1962 (Confidential)
- > /23. DNA 1624, 26 April 1962
- ✓ ∠24. Newspaper Clipping from Washington Post, June 9, 1962.
- 4 -25. DBA 20883, September 7, 1962 (Confidential)
- ~26. DBA 51407, 10 September 1963
- 27. DBA 52355, 24 September 1963, 8 Hnambar 1965 \* Ana water
- 28. DBA 55715 (number unclear), November 7, 1963
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- 30. CIA Summary Report on Activities of OSWALD in Mexico City, dated 31 January 1964

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PAGE 167 of 212 COPY NO.

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4-16-55

XAAZ- 22661

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT:

Reports on Activities and Travel

of Lee Harvey OSWALD and

Mantha Nikolovna CSWALD as Transmitted

1. Reference is made to the second paragraph of your memorandum dated 12 February 1964, and the second paragraph of your memorandum of 16 March 1964, relative to disseminations of information made by CIA to the Secret Service.

- 2. Immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy CIA undertook to assemble through its stations in Europe all available data, including information in the files of other governments and intelligence services, on the travels and activities of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna CSWALD. This information, as it was collected, was made available to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Copies of these messages were also sent to the Secret Service.
- 3. Attached to this memorandum are exact copies of two teletyped messages relative to the travels and activities of the CSWALDE (Attachments A and B). Paragraphs g and h of Attachment C are paraphrased. In Attachment C, OUT Teletype No. 85715, are found references to two other teletyped messages (OUT No. 85182 and OUT No. 85665) which describe one Richard Thomas GISSON, a negro journalist

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now residing in Switzerland who has been active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Paraphrases of No. 35132 and No. 85665 are included as Attachments D and E. Access to original texts of paraphrased items will be provided when members of your staff visit Langley. The information on which paragraphs g and h of Attachment C are based was received at CIA Headquarters on 27 November and dissemirated on 28 November.

4. This memorandum and the attachments contain very sensitive information which has a direct bearing on sources and methods. An appropriate sensitivity indicator has therefore been affixed.

> Richard Helma Deputy Director for Flans

Attachmentsas stated

Distribution:

Original & 2 - Addressee w/atts

1 - DDP Chrono w/atts

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Attachment A

Teletype message, OUT No. 86702, dated 4 December 1963, filed at 1411 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Records of the foreigners records office of the German

Federal Republic in Gologos. Germany, show that Marina

Nikolinyevna Pusakova CSWALD crossed West Germany from

East Germany to Holland on 3 June 1962. She traveled by rail,

crossing into West Germany at Helmstedt on 3 June and entering Holland by rail at the Bentheim crossing point. She had

West German visa 694/62 issued at the West Germany Embassy

in Moscow. She listed her final destination as U.S.A. Comment:

This confirms information from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow

to the effect that the CSWALD family traveled from Moscow to

Rotterdam by rail around 3 June 1962. Helmstedt and Bentheim

are on the main rail route from Russia to Rotterdam. While

Lee CSWALD himself and their infant daughter are not recorded

in German records this is probably because little attention is

paid to U.S. citizens and to infants in keeping travel records.

ATT. 1 t. XAAZ-22601

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Attachment B

Teletype message, OUT No. 87520, dated 6 December 1953, filed at 1829 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey CSWALD

Reference is made to our CUT telegram No. 36702 of A December 1763 which gave information on the travel of Marina CSWALD (and presumably also Lee Harvey OSWALD and their daughter) across West Germany on their return from the Soviet Union. Information now available from Dutch authorities seems to confirm this. On 3 June 1762 one M. OSWALD, listed as a male Russian citizen, entered The Netherlands by train at the Oldenzaal border point.

Comment: It is believed that the listing of this person as a male instead of female was just an error of the border officials. Note that Oldersaal is poposite Bentheim, the German border point where Marina CSWALD left Germany.

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ATT. 2 t. (XAHZ-22601)

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Attachment G

51

Teletype message No. 85715, dated 29 November 1963, filed at 1340 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Travel of Lee Harvey CSWALD

I. The following information has been gathered from reliable sources regarding the travel of Lee Harvey CSWALD and his wife:

a. 9 October 1959: According to official
Exitish travel records CSWALD arrived in
Southampton this date claiming on his landing card
that he had no fixed address but planned to remain
in the United Kingdom one week for vacation before
going on to "some school" in Switzerland. (Headquarters comment: Probably referring to the
Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland with which
he is known to have been in correspondence.)

b. 10 October 1959: According to the same official British travel records CSWALD left London this date by air for Helsinki.

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ATT. 3 to XAAZ - 22661

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c. October 1959: Stockholm newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, of 25 November 1763 states Lee CSWALD passed through Sweden during October 1959. Article also adds that CSWALD was unsuccessful in obtaining visa to the USSR in Helsinki which resulted in his returning to Stockholm. Two days after he arrived in ? Stockholm OSWALD traveled directly to Moscow, Concluding sentence of article states "This indicates that the Russian Embassy (Stockholm) gave him a visa, According to a reliable source there was ne record that there was any request for a USSR visa processed through normal channels for CSWALD at any time during 1959, and source indicated it was difficult to explain how CSWALD might have received his visa in two days without going through normal channels. The only conclusion which can be drawn is that OSWALD must have received his visa directly from the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm which occasionally is done in special cases, but the source had no evidence to confirm this assumption.

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d. 10 to 15 October 1959: According to a very reliable but extremely sensitive source CSWALD stayed at the Torni Hotel in Holsinki from 10 to 11 October and then moved to the Klaus Kurki Hotel where he stayed until 15 October, apparently waiting for a visa to be issued him by the Soviet Consulate in Helsinki. He traveled to the USSR by train, crossing at Vainikhala on 15 October.

- e. 13 May 1962: According to a Dutch official source, the Dutch Charge in Moscow issued a transit visa to OSWALD's wife on 13 May 1962. Their records reveal his wife was born on 17 July 1941 instead of 19 July 1941 and in Severodvinsk instead of Minsk. There is no record of her having actually transited. The Notherlands.
- f. 1962: Official British records do not reflect that CSWALD returned to the United States from the USSR through the United Kingdom. However, if he were merely transiting, it would not have been necessary for him to fill out a landing card, and therefore there would be no record of his travel in the official traffic index.

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g. 1963: According to an extremely sensitive and reliable source, on 23 November Maria SNETHLAGE, head of the !"Werkgroup Informatic Cuba!" (Werkgroup Information Cuba), told an employee of the Cuban Embassy in The Hague that she was sure she had met 'that Mr. LEE is Havara, who did the murder". She described him as a man of violence and entirely full of hate and indicated that it was possible that this man had been misused by a group. She said she had written to 'GIBSON" about the bad impression she had bad of this LEE, (Headquarters comment: Please refer to our teletype Nos. 85182 and 85665 for additional information on GIBSON.) Later, SNETHLAGE told Castro Cubans in The Hague that "Mr. LEE of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee" had been slandered and that it was another person named Lee CSWALD who had done it. SNETHLAGE seemed to be glad to have heard this "correct" version. (Headquarters comment: Mr. LEE may be identical with Vincent Theodore LEE who replaced Richard GIBSON as Head of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.)

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b. According to reliable information, SNETHLAGE was in Cuba in Jamary 1963, and according to an official Dutch source, she again traveled to Cuba for the May Day celebrations in 1963.

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Teletype No. 85182, dated 2Z November 1963, filed at 1932 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. (paraphrase)

SUBJECTO Les Harvey CSWALD

COSTRUCTOR THAT

Switzerland, on 23 November 1963, Richard Thomas GIBSON remarked that OSWALD is "one of us". CSWALD and GIBSON had corresponded two years previously, and CSWALD had joined the Committee. (Comment: Reference is presumably to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.) GIBSON added that he had destroyed all his latters from CSWALD. OSWALD is crazy. GIBSON then remarked that he is happy that he was

1. In conversation with a close friend in Bern

 The information given above was supplied by an extremely sensitive source who is usually reliable.

not in New York. He felt sorry for "LEE" in New York and

3. According to other information that was available,
Richard Thomas GIBSON, born 13 May 1931 in Los Angeles,
California, is a negro journalist who has been active in the

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Fair Play for Cuba Committee since 1760. He has resided since April 1763 at Lausanne, Switzerland. In this latter country GIBSOM has participated in the publication of La Revolution Africaine.

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Attachment E

26

Teletype message, CUT No. 35665, 28 November 1763, filed at 1826 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. (paraphrased)

1. Our station in The Hague has reported that on
23 November 1963, a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE
told Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy in
The Hague that she knew the "Mr. LEE" (sic) who murdered
President Kennedy. She described "LEE" as a man full of hate
and violence, and speculated that he had been "misused by a
group". She said she had written to GESON (undoubtedly
Richard GIBSON, A.S. citizen of Lausanne, Switzerland, born
13 May 1935, a Castro sympathmen, who had visited The
Netherlands recently and had been in contact both with the
Soviet Ambassador and the Cuban Embassy).

2. Later that same day Maria ENETHLAGE told Secretary SANTCS that "Mr. LEE of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee" and been slandered. The assassin had been another person, Leo CSWALD. SNETHLAGE is reported to have been in Cuba in January and again in May 1963.

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ATT. 5 to XAA2 - 22601 63 COPY

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PAGE 180 or 212

- 3. According to Dutch authorities on 7 November 1963, in talking about attacks by Cuban refugees against the Suban mainland, SANTOS had replied 'just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon, "Asked to be more precise, SANTOS had replied 'just wait, just wait'. SANTOS is reported to have a pro-Castro brother in the U.S.A.
- 4. A very sensitive source reports that after his conversations with SNETHLAGE, SANTOS was very argry because she had contacted him.

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PAGE 181 or 212

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METHODS INVOLVED

XAAZ-17620

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

General Comesi

President's Commission on the Assessination of President Remady

SULLICITE OF

Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training School in Minck, USSR as transmitted to

Warren Commission

- 1. Allegations of the existence of a Soviet intelligence and/or subchage training school in Minsk, USSE, have come to the attention of the Agency from press reviews. Also, there has been an informal inquiry from a member of the Commission, hir. Indies, very recently on this detail. I date this opportunity to familia to the Commission the information exist the Agency has on this topic.
- 2. A careful review of GLA files has produced no hard information regarding Soviet intolligence or substage training in Minck since 1947. One item of information applied by a Soviet defector in 1949 reported the existence, as of 1947, of an intelligence training school in Minck. No additional details, however, were available regarding its carriculum or location in Minck. Information developed from our sources since 1949 has not mentioned, confirmed, or corroborated the continued existence of the installation.
- 3. Another reference in CLA files to training in Minsk relates to the existence of a schoolage school which functioned in Minsk until the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, after which the school was moved to Louisgrad.

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
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4. These two items of information are the only ones in the possession of this Agency ruleting to intelligence and sabotage training in Mines. They are formished to the Commission in order to complete its records. Because of the sansitive sources involved, it has been processary to affix a sensitivity indicator to this memoratory.

Richard Helms Deputy Director for Flans

#### Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addresses

2 - DDP

1 - SR/CI/R

1 - 0/01/510

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1 - CI/R&A/TRHall

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CSC# -3/779,135

TO

Director

Federal Buresu of Investigation Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM

Deputy Director (Plons)

SUBJECT Poter DERYABIN's Comments:on the Kennedy Assassination

1. Attached for your perusal are the written comments of KGB defector Peter DENYABLE on some aspects of the assassination of President Jenn P. Kennedy. As you know, DERYABIN defected from the KUB about tempers ago, and his personal knowledge is not my to date, but he has stayed in touch with Soviet intelligence developments to the best of his ability. His comments on how Lee CSWALD and his wife must have been handled by Soviet intelliigence authorities while they were inside the Soviet Union are particularly interesting and his suggestions for the-questioning of Mrs. Marina CHWALD are equally provocative.

2. We have decided to pass on his views without editing, and this Agency does not specifically endorse his conclusions or recommendations.

CECI-3/779,135

Enclosures: Per paragraph l

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12 December 1963

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SUBJECT

Peter DETYABLI's Comments on President Kennedy's

Assessimation

- 1. We should understand that my comments which follow are not breed solely on the thesis that CSWAID was specifically dispatched to mander our President. Athe very real possibility also exists that CSWAID was sent here on mosther mission by the list and subsequently accomplished the deed on his own initiative. However, such a possibility does not take the KGB less culpable as the seeds for CSWAID's art must have been planted while he was being trained in the USSH for his other mission. We might first commination quantum upperment in the minds of most hearicans, which did the USSH have to gain by killing the President?" I believe we can make a good case as to the precise gains accompling to the USSH and most specifically accompling to IERESHIEV. The associatetim of President Termady would accomplish the following for KWESHIEV personally:
- a. Festern presence behind the leadership of the USA would automatically case up. Witness President Johnson's insediate conciliatory telegram to KHAMMICHT, after the number. We might mention that the USA was the chief proponent for not extending long range credits to the USSR. Extension of long range credits is vital to the USSR at this juncture.
- b. This leads as into the most pressing problem within the USSR. The West persistently underrotes the extent of the Soviet internal situation. It was my prediction that as a result of the missenegment of the 1963 barvest and the CHICH arguments that MERISHCHY would resign during the upcoming December planua of the Communist Party of the USSR. Our President's death thus effectively diverts the Soviets' extention from their internal problems. It directly affects MERISHCHY's longevity.
- c. In the Cuben situation any USA or Cuben expairiate actions against Cube will not be tainted by the fact that these are vengeful cuts against Cube because of CSGALD's "Fair Play for Cube" essociations. Covicuely the Soviets properly interpret our situation in that President JUNECS will restrain any planned interventions in Cube for a long time.
- d. A more exemple America will strengthen KERSHCHEY's hand in his running bettle with the CHICOMS. He will thus have enother reason to say his form of peaceful coexistence is superior to that of the CHICOMS.

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e. Conceivably may of President MEMMEY's planned actions to got even some firm with the Soviets during the preelection year are time sabotaged by the President's number.

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- f. The Soviets covicusly understood that the death of President MERICON would result in the energence of DeCAULIE as a strong Western Leader. DeCAULIE of course says "what's good for France is not necessarily bad for the USER."
- g. The death of President KINEDY resoves a popular rallying point for our allies. Furthermore, and more pertinent, his death removes a symbol for Soviet intellectuals who have theritably made invidious comparisons between their oan intellectual desert and the flowering of the arts under the KINEDYS. The problem of the intellectuals in the USE should not be interrested as the least of Amisanthia's internal problems. We must recall that beginning with faith, intellectuals have provided the injectual for revolution in the USE and they expures one of the three balls HINESTHEV must constantly places.
- h. If the USER has any ambitious aims in manipulating U. S. public opinion their nurses of President MIREOF would serve to exacerbate the present differences between the radical last and right in America. In fact the USER propaganda machine begun to say the marker was consisted by the radical right as soon as the deed was done and before CSHAD was captured.
- 1. Finally, the death of President Karliny, thether a planned operation of not, will serve the most obvious propose of providing proof of the power and contactence of the Man. This application of cheer terror could be interpreted as a warning to busish own citizens, as the Soviet intelligence services have suffered some very real reverses recently with PERNOVSKI, COLUMNIA's defection, their ignorabless expulsion from the Congo, etc. I have long predicted that the USSM would take some direction to main the rapid excellent of their security.
- 2. Can we briefly view the CSWALD operation as a mounted MA operation to kill the President? What are the essential ingredients?
- a. The KHS had some three rears to easess CSEALD in the HSS. Layren will deprecate the value that the KHS attaches to such on the spot essessment. They may also say that CSUALD was a but and puroperly would not be entrusted with such an operation by the EHS. However, the KHS properly knows that historically most essessing have been maked and an indicated types.

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- b. In such an operation the KCB could not use a Soviet citizen though the very real possibility exists that CSWAID was usuated by a Soviet illegal of the KCB 13th Department. Sticking to essentials—It was a good plan that did succeed.
  - c. CENAID did escape from the book building.
- d. He did get to a theater which could have been his point of contact with his illegal case officer. Certainly we know the NEB's penchant for using theaters for meeting places.
- e. After his errest, which was only due to his unfortunate encounter with Policesen TIPMET, CSHALD did remain silent. How like the behavior of Col. ASELwas his behavior in this report.
- 3. Also the very real possibility exists that the KEB intended to liquidate CNAID after be did the job. His posting in the theorem was probably for just such a liquidation or represent the besides. In AMEY's part in the operation we must recognize the possibility that AMEY was also a KEB batchet man-looking at the bare essentials of his part in the operation we see the following:
- a. RENT had access to the police station. Reports say he personally knew most policemen.
  - b. He excessfully ellenced CSWALD.
  - c. EUSY remains silent and his cover is holding up-
  - d. So has a good legend of temporary instantly.
  - e. Es has a reasonable chance to escape the desta sentence.
- 4. The undersigned might be better qualified to exceent on the CEMALD aspects of this case if we know the following about his activities prior to his departure to the USSR: (a., b., and c. below offer three possible asswers to the question, "May did be go to Massow!"
- a. First, CHAID was a salf-ends Marrist or Communitation decided to got on his cas; that is, he made this decision by himself and prompted by no one. He possibly was looking for a better life without knowing what the Soviet Union really is.
- b. Second, after CSWALD's discharge as an "undesirable" from the Marines, he found bicself in a difficult and unpleasant situation: in it possible that in this situation he was noticed by a spotter decreasiter for the Illegals or some other department and was considered as a possible condidate for use or

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recruitment? The full information about GTVALD was sent to Toucow, and on Moscow's order on investigation of GTVALD was made and there followed a decision to "invite" him to Moscow. Using the sond "invite", the universigned has in mind that same agents or recruitment through consequentions with GTVALD, but without actually suggesting the trip itself. Implied GTVALD to travel to the trip, in this case, it is possible that screen gave him some financial assistance and some advice on how to do this.

- e. Third, CHAID went to Rescow, or was sent to Rescow, by some pro-Soviet, pro-Communist, pro-Cohen organization(s), having in mind that he would stay in the Soviet Union for a few years, learning more about the Soviet Union and receiving instructions for figure operations, activities, etc.
- 5. Knowing for sure that the Soviets pover give a visa without rading an importantion of the person rading the application, we have to make our orn investigation of the following questions:
- . a. When did CSWALD first begin to express his wish to go to the Scytet Union
- b. To whom did be talk, whom did be contact at this carly time, and how much time elapsed between these talks and contacts and his application?
- c. How, when and through whom did CSHAID got his Soviet visas
  - d. How long did it take for him to get the visa?
- e. Who personally gave the visa to CSVALD? We should know if the person at the Issuessy upo telled to USVALD was a the exployee.
- f. When and how did CSUALD travel to the USSA (air, sen; through which countries; in which countries, if any, did he make stops; how long were such stops)?
- 6. Together with the slove, it is very important to know of CHALD's circumstances before his trin to the Link. Who know in advance that he was going and who knew that he had gone:
  Nother, brother, relatives, friends, neighbors, girl friends, boy friends, old buildies, etc: To whom did CHALD say goolbys before he left for the USER: personally or by telephone, by mail? Bid he ever ask anyone my questions on traveling to the

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7. CSWAID in Moscow. Then CSWAID envived in Moscow, he was under observation, imperticulation and complete control by the MGS. In this particular case, under the Second Chief Directorate (CI). Being under the control of the MGS, at the same time he was under heavy investigation directed at massering the question of why this studid American had come to the USBR (it doesn't wake any difference whether they know in advance about CSWAID or not; enjoyey, they would conduct such an investigation). Every possible of information was taken from CSWAID about the USA, especially about his service in the Marine Corps, etc. At the same time, CSWAID was mader constant observation and study for possible fulfure use by the Soviet Intelligence and CI services.

- 8. It should be noted here that any foreigner, especially an American, the firityes in the USES for represent or prolonged stay always is exemined by the Seviet State Security as a possible condidate for frame use (special training and recruitment) within the USA or other countries (but against the USA). After a good study and investigation which continues about air months in Moscow, under normal financial support and minimum confort from the MES, the MES makes its conclusions: that CSMALD is clear and is who he civilia to be and that he might possibly be used or useful for Scriet Intelligence on CI Service. BOUS: the undersigned relieves that country and investigation of CSMALD was going on through the Seviet Imbassy in Meshington and through Seviet agents networks in the USA and possibly through pro-Seviet and pro-Communist organizations within the USA.
- 9. After being a few weeks or months in Moseow, CSHALD expressed a vish to stay forever in the Soviet Union and to be a Soviet citizen. Then the MIB said to him: "If you really went to be a Soviet citizen and serve the Communist cause, you must denounce American Experializa and Assertem citizenship." Therefore, somewhere in this period, CSHALD went to the U.S. Enbassy and renounced his U.S. citizenship. After this act. State Security decided to give CSHALD some kind of job in accordance with his knowledge and empedilities, at the same time continuing to study him as a potential agent.
- 10. Because to rate a good agent takes a long time and because (SVAID was important—and because he had not yet because liven Soviet citizenship—the last decided not to pass of him a good agent, but did not break relations with him and decided to use him in a more or less open way.
- 11. Then CSAND showed some dispatisfaction about the Soviet way of life (it is usual for Americans)—and by this time OSHAID had already not his girl friend (the KIB probably helped

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him to find har-to make him happy and to make mure that he would not leave the Soviet Union)—the KCB at the same time continued to train him, probably in the way of an old-frabioned Earrist, telling him that he would be a good fighter against imperialists erd against American millionaires, such as ROCKERLAN, KERNEDY end others. And somewhere here, while in this kind of training, a low level case officer of State Security told him that to have a better lare in the U. S. you have to fight very hard to bury capitalism, as our Blatta Sergejevich says; together with empitalism, you have to bury all the millionaires, including your first beest and block-seeker, KEESUI (NOTS: this is not a tall betory; it is the way in which State Security operates with the stupid Parxists and with naive followers of the Communist movement). If on a high level within the KIB it was decided that there is nothing good in CEVALD and that he is just a maive American and that he could not be relied upon fully, but that nonetholess he could be used because he is for our cause and is egainst capitalism in general been suggested—after (SIMI) already had eaked persisaion to return to the ISAL (SiAID was teld to be a good Fighter against capitalism and to secure your Soviet citizenship, you must show yourseld-as a gird Tighter for the Communist come inside the USA; then, we give you permission because we believe you are a strong Merciat to return to the USA and to do scrething for our common cause, such as to help my American pro-Bovist organizations or; for instance, become a member of a Free Cuba Constitue or in case of origin to do something outstending-that will be noticeable everywhere—that will prove that you are a real Communist. Then, acceptance here, if he was already a Soviet agent or not, the girl showed up, or she was there before, but by this time she was pregnent and CSVAID decided to go to the USA. Then be was told. After this talk, OSHALD shouted-where is your freedom? She is my wife, we have a child, and I would like to go. If he did mine a big notes, they decided to let him and her go; or if he already was a trained agent, then without mry kind of noise on his part, but with some difficulties, permission was granted for her to go with him.

12. Looking at the wife of CSMAID, we should have in mind that she was and still is an exemt or at locate localevel informant of the NIB. If the was not before she met CSMAID, she because so after the second day she met him. This is the regulation in State Security on how to handle foreigners—it makes no difference whether they are Communists or not.

13. Investigation of CSWAID's wife should be undertaken as soon as possible, with special attention being paid the questions to follow:

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a. First, who is she? For education, profession, ego, family background, Party affiliation (Kossosal membership). If she was a member of the Kossosal, then the Kossosal organization will take any steps possible against her traveling to the U.S. Also, she must be expelled from the Kossosal, and then she automatically would be considered a member of the Imperialist Comparatically would be considered a member of the Imperialist Comparation, if she was a member of the Kossosal and this action did not take place, it was because of Kid interference against such action. The same action would relate to any of her relatives—father, nother, brothers....if they were members of the CPSU or Kossosal.

- b. To which offices was she invited before and after their marriage? If she was invited to some official Soviet offices, and if these offices asked her not to marry a foreigner and not to go with him, then probably she was not a number of the Kossoval and she did it on her own will; but if she answers that no one invited her to such offices, then the whole job was done by the KUB—exceptly and quietly, with no talk going around about it.
- c. Who halped her and how many times to write papers for the Soviet Himstry of Foreign Affairs to say that she had married an American citizen and would like to 30 with him to the USA: If it was done a few times and with great difficulties, then probably it was done only with a little help from the MGD. If, however, the papers were prepared only ones and permission was granted efter only a few months' halt, then everything was done by the MGD. (According to the American newspapers, her application for permission to come to the U.S. was processed very sasily and quickly.)
- d. When and where did they register their carriage? How were the witnesses to that marriage? How many relatives and friends (of wife) were present at the wedding and calabration. Hust kind of gifts did they receive at the time of marriage and from whom? Where did they take up residence after marriage? Were they given an apartment, or a room! And in what neighborhood?
- e. Share did her husband, OSIALD, work? In what factory? Shar were his hours of work? How long did he spend in Moscow beform he went to Hinsk? Who chose Minsk-did he or did someone alse?
- f. Who were her hashend's friends? From what circles? Workers' Intellectuals?
- g. How many times were she and her husband—while they lived together—invited to the police stations or any other Goviet government offices, together or separately: (ROE: There is no other office than the ROS which would make such an invitation. It makes no difference if they were agents or not.)

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h. How ment (intelligent) is she: Door nise really apeak no English: In her English better than also shows or better than it should be after being here only two years: Or worse:

- i. What does she say about life in the Soviet Union?
- j. Did her husband have a gum while he was in the Soviet Union: If so, how does she linew about it? When did he get it: Did he have special permission to carry a gum: Did he bring this gum with him across the bordon? For your information, nobody carries a gum in the USSR without the KEB eventually learning of it. Least of all an Azerican.
- k. The gave finencial help to them before they left the Soviet Union? (BUTE: For a regular worker in the Soviet Union, it is impossible to save enough money to buy a ticket and make any kimi of preparations to go abroad.)
- 1. The gave instructions to GSWAID to eak for financial assistance at the American Embessy upon his return to the USA?

me Was their first child born in Russia-baptized in the USSR? If so, in that church? Whose idea was it? Did they begtize theirssecond child, born in the U. S.?

- n. If CEMAID never had a permanent job here in the USA, then who was going to finence his next trip to the USER: How much did his wife know about his plan to return to the USER via Cabar
- 14. The investigation of the wife should be made step by step, keeping in mind and never forgetting that CEKALD as wall as the herself were under constant conservation and with constant contacts with organs of the MHB. Fithout such observation and contacts with organs of the MHB, no foreigners can live within the Soviet Union.
- 15. In any investigation of this case we should not lose the initiative. In view of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding this case, the FBI, through the Department of State, could logically enough request that the USER provide all available into an CHALD's story in the USER and the impose of his visit to the Soviet Embassy in Maxico City. A friendly range can be expected to have such a request. We might learn abgreat deal from the Soviet reply.

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LOUISES RANGED, MALERY MERCHANDERS.

NEMCRANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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Chief, SR

SUBJECT:

CIA Work in Support of the Warren Commission

I. Below is a summary of the matters discussed in our meeting with Messrs. Angleton and Rocca on the evening of 15 January 1964. In turn, Mr. Angleton was reporting to us the substance of his meeting with Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. J. Lee Rankin, Chief Counsel, Mr. Wellins of the Justice Department, Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca, which took place on the afternoon of 14 January 1964.

Mr. Angleton said that Mr. Dulles, apparently provoked by press accusations that the Warren Commission has been dilatory, asked CIA for suggestions of questions or requests to be included in a letter to the Sowet Covernment. This letter, from the Warren Commission and to be transmitted through the Department of State, would seek additional evidence which is presumably available in Soviet files which could assist the Commission's deliberations. Mr. Dulles did not have a detailed idea of what he wanted to ask the Soviets for but did say that the questions should be "not too technical." Although Mr. Angleton thought that the letter should be written only after the CIA report and comments have been completed, in order to make the letter as effective as possible, Mr. Dulles felt it should go now, be phrased in generalities and allow the Soviets more flexibility in their handling of the matter than would a more pointed letter based on our concrete findings. Mr. Dulles asked CIA only for the questions and not for a draft letter. Mr. Murphy suggested that we ask only for certain records rather than put specific questions to the Soviets. Mr. Murphy suggested that these might include Soviet hospital records connected with Lee Oswald's attempted suicide, city visa and registration records for Moscow and Minsk, factory personnel records from Oswald's place of employment, etc. Also Oswald's diary noted that his case had passed through two commissions in the USSR; we might ask for the records of these commissions as well. Hr. Angleton said that in transmitting our suggestions to Mr. Dulles we can include any introductory paragraphs or explanatory comments that we

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felt necessary to explain to Mr. Dulles the direction of our thinking about these proposals.

(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigren to prepare a draft of suggested queries, using the assistance of DERYABIN and to have this ready, if possible, by the close of business today.)

3. Rankin stated that the Commission wants to account in detail, minute by minute and hour by hour, for Oswald's time outside the United States. Mr. Bagley suggested that the narrative chronology of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be converted to a chronology tabulation which would permit us more samply to insert added details and dates as we learned of them in other documentation which we can expect to receive shortly. This was agreed.

(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigren to begin recasting the narrative immediately into this form.)

4. Mr. Rankin said that the Commission has a waist-high stack of documents and reports received from the FBI and Secret Service which CIA has not yet received. These include Secret Service interviews with Marina Oswald, letters from Lee Oswald in the USSR and other material. He promised to send this material to Mr. Helms shortly.

(Note: We will pass appropriate parts of this material to DERYABIN for further analysis along the lines of his earlier work on documents already in our possession.)

5. Messrs. Angleton. Murphy and Rocca considered DERYA-BIN's initial analysts of Marina Oswald's documents, and the questions to which it gave rise, to be a Worthwhile and important contribution. CIA would be unable to make any serious analysis of even hypothesis until some of DERYABIN's questions had been answered. Mr. Rocca suggested that DERYABIN's paper be recast into more of a questionnaire form and Mr. Bagley agreed, pointing out that DERYABIN's comment and speculation could be put off to the side as explanatory comment on each question, as appropriate. Mr. Angleton and Mr. Murphy thought that it would be desirable to send this paper to the Warren Commission in advance of other CIA reports with a memorandum informing the Commission that we would need nnswers to this interim questionnaire in order to reconstruct a detailed chronology of Oswald's time in the USSR and to comment on his activity there. The Commission would be asked to procure the information from Marina through any Agency it might choose.

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(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigren to prepare the DERYABIN paper in this format urgently.)

6. Mr. Angleton reported that he had asked the Commission representatives certain questions pertaining to our use of defectors in analysing the Oswald papers:

a. Was the Commission formally requesting us to have defectors analyse the material?

Mr. Wellins thought that the answer to this question is yes. However, Mr. Angleton asked for a formal request from the Commission to this effect. The FBI has stated that its reports are not to be passed to AFLADLE, which may cause some complications.

b. Would the Commission be prepared to assume the burden of responsibility if such a defector should disagree with the Commission's opinious or come up with a radically different hypothesis or interpretation?

The persons present said that the Commission would.

c. If a defector who had contributed to the analysis of the documents should be unwilling to appear personally and formally before the Commission, would the Commission exercise its subpoena powers against him?

Mr. Rankin thought that if there was a risk involved for the defector, the Commission would not do so. However, Rankin promised to get a formal answer from the Commission on this point.

d. Will the classification we put on our correspondence to the Commission be honored?

The answer was that in principle our classification would be honored. However, he Ronkin warned those present that CIA should not hope to evade criticism or responsibility through classification of its material.

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- 6. Mr. Angleton reported that Mr. Richard Davis is representing the interests of the Department of State in this inquiry. Mr. Thompson had ruled himself out because he was Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time of the events in question.
- 7. One matter which had been brought to light by the Oswald case was the need for a mechanism in the United States Government to record and assimilate our knowledge of the Soviet handling of American defectors to the USSR. The Bureau is apparently in some danger of criticism for its failure to keep an eye on Oswald after his return. Similarly CIA has not systematically collected nor compiled information on Soviet defector handling. Berlin Base had kept a list of American defectors at one time, but these individuals have not been debriefed on their return to the West.
- 8. The Commission representatives at the 14 January 1964 meeting estimated that the Warren Commission would need from three to six months to complete its task.
- 9. Mr. Bagley raised the question of the desirability of having DERYABIN participate personally, representing the FBI as an interpreter perhaps, in a debriefing of Marina. Messrs. Angleton and Murphy were convinced that CIA must avoid direct involvement with this investigation. Although it is less efficient as a method, we will content ourselves with putting written questions to Marina to be surfaced by whatever Agency the Commission may choose to use.

Tennent H. Bagley Chief, SR/CI

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XAAZ-27169 23 March 1964

Talk with DULLES ON 21 March

Dick:

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Had a briefing at Allen Dulles! house on Saturday afternoon. (We were assembled to discuss his taping session with
Deryabin. Helen MacInnes, Donovan and Hanson-Baldwin in New
York tonight. None of the others were present.)

AWD showed me a letter he had received from Rankin recently expressing the desire to reach a modus vivendi in order to allay the story of CIA's possible sponeorship of Oswald's activity. The point of the communication to AWD was to suggest that he serve as a file reviewer for the Commission. The letter outlined alternative possibilities in this matter (affidavit from the DCI, etc.).

in my presence, AWD wrote the answer:

a. Declining the invitation to serve as file reviewer for good and sufficient reasons.

b. Stating his willingness to provide a statement or testimony to the Commission with respect to
his knowledge of Oswald during his tenure as DCI. He
noted in the tail-off of the letter that as far as he could
of Oswald
remember-he had never had any knowledge at any time
prior to the date of the assassination. 201289248

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