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(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an OSWALD/Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

(17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject?

(18) What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they?

*Authored by
Russell Holmes*

From a review of the Agency's file on Lee Harvey OSWALD, it becomes apparent that the Agency and its field stations, particularly in Mexico City and Miami, were not unmindful of the possibility that OSWALD did not act alone. During the first few weeks after the assassination, Headquarters, upon at least three occasions, exhorted the Mexico City Station to continue "all your coverage of the Cuban and Soviet installations . . .". On 28 November 1963, the Chief, WH/3, told the Mexico City Station that "there should be no let down in your efforts to follow all leads and investigate all facts which bear on this case. We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role." (Emphasis added.) [DIR 85655, 28 November 1963] On 30 November, Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to follow all leads and tips. "The question of whether OSWALD acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved." (Emphasis added.) [DIR 86064, 30 November 1963] And on the 12th of December 1963, Chief, WH/3, again asked the Mexico City Station to "continue to watch for Soviet and Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence of their complicity, signs they putting out propaganda about case." (Emphasis added.) "FYI only, Soviet intelligence in India had letters sent to . . . (US) leaders demanding full investigation of case." [DIR 88680, 12 December 1963]

The Mexico City Station, however, had already initiated a thorough review of its holdings in an attempt ascertain what information was available on Lee Harvey OSWALD, his presence and his activities in Mexico City. This review turned up the fact that Silvia DURAN, a Mexican national employed by the Cuban Consulate, had dealt with OSWALD during his known visits to the Consulate on 27 and 28 September. In response to a suggestion from the Station, the Ministry of Gobernacion arrested Silvia DURAN and her husband, Horacio, on 23 November 1963. [MEXI-7037 (IN), 23 November 1963] Later the same day, an official of the Ministry informed

the Station that Silvia DURAN was completely cooperative and had given a written statement attesting to two visits by OSWALD to the Consulate. [MEXI-7046 (IN), 23 November 1963]. Although her testimony was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Government authorities, Silvia DURAN was the only live witness on record regarding OSWALD's activities in Mexico City. It is from her statements that it was learned that OSWALD became engaged in a personal altercation on 27 September 1963 with Eusebio AZCUE, the Cuban Consul and a member of the Cuban intelligence unit in Mexico City. He left Mexico on 19 November 1963 after being replaced by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz.

There is no evidence in the OSWALD file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitative interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD, known or confirmed by intercept, with the data held on the Cuban DGI (Direccion General de Inteligencia), its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck like AZCUE whose slot had been taken by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, they were not asked at the time. And there remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story as it stands, could it have happened without the knowledge and participation of DGI personnel in the Consulate? This seems unlikely especially because Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez* later cited by a Cuban DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD had made several visits to the Cuban Consulate. It is clear CASTRO's overseas intelligence and security service could have more in its files than was surfaced in the DURAN statements.

[CI Staff Review, dated 23 May 1975, pp. 16-19.]

* Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez, were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Annstasio SOMOZA.

As of September 1964, Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967, Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that she had gone out with OSWALD during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him. [Ibid, pp. 19-20.]

Almost immediately after the President's assassination, Agency field stations began receiving information from various sources of undetermined reliability relating to the alleged assassination of President Kennedy.

As the Warren Commission reported on pages 305 and 307 of its report, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated" The authors of the Report go on to state that

"Among the claims made were allegations that OSWALD had made a previous trip to Mexico City in early September to receive money and orders for the assassination [567], that he had flown to a secret airfield somewhere in or near the Yucatan Peninsula [568], that he might have made contacts in Mexico City with a communist from the United States shortly before the assassination [569], and that OSWALD assassinated the President at the direction of a particular Cuban who met with him in the United States and paid him \$7,000 [570]. A letter received from someone in Cuba alleging the writer had attended a meeting where the assassination had been discussed as part of a plan which would soon include the death of other non-communist leaders in the Americas [571]. The charge was made in a Cuban expatriate publication that in a speech he delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under the influence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said, "The first time OSWALD was in Cuba", thereby giving away the fact that OSWALD had made one or more surreptitious trips to that country [572].

"Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who allegedly were engaged in obtaining illicit firearms in the United States, one such claim being that these groups killed the President as part of a bargain with some illicit organizations who would then supply them with firearms as payment [573]. Other rumors placed OSWALD in Miami, Fla., at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban activities there [574]. The assassination was claimed to have been carried out by Chinese Communists operating jointly with the Cubans [575]. OSWALD was also alleged to have met with the Cuban Ambassador in a Mexico City restaurant and to have driven off in the Ambassador's car for a private talk [576]. Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after the assassination called for the files relating to Oswald's dealings with two members of the Cuban diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union; the inference drawn was that the 'dealings' had occurred and had established a secret subversive relationship which continued through OSWALD's life [577]. Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, in some cases the product of mistaken identification."

The Warren Report makes reference (bracketed numbers in the above text) to Commission Exhibits (see Attachment I for list of Commission Exhibits) most of which had been furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Only the first reference - the ALVARADO interrogation - was furnished by the Agency. The Agency did, however, provide assistance and information to the FBI in the latter's investigation of three ~~of the~~ allegations (see asterisked Exhibits). The results of the Agency's investigation of other rumors and allegations relating to OSWALD and the possible involvement of the Cubans and Soviets in the assassination, were disseminated to the FBI, primarily, and to the Warren Commission (see attachment II for a list of disseminations to the FBI, and attachment III for a list of memoranda to the Warren Commission).

Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of man-hours in Headquarters and abroad - and similarly the FBI in the United States and Mexico City - was the Nicaraguan, Gilberto ALVARADO, who contacted the United States Embassy in Mexico City on 25 November 1963.

The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission, in its report, under the cryptograph "D" as being illustrative of the attention given to the most serious allegations.

On 25 November 1963, a young Nicaraguan, Gilberto Nolasco ALVARADO Ugarte

telephoned the United States Embassy in Mexico City. Later that day he met with the Embassy security officer and a Station officer at which time he claimed he had been in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963. While in the Consulate he saw a man whom he later recognized as Lee Harvey OSWALD receive \$6,500 in cash to kill an important person in the United States.

ALVARADO described the circumstances as follows: While standing by a bathroom door about noon he saw a group of three persons conversing on a patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English. He had prominent cheek bones and a noticeable scar on the lower right side of his chin. The second was a white person whom ALVARADO had seen previously in a waiting room carrying a Canadian passport. The white person had green eyes, blondish hair, with a pompadour hairdo, and dark eyeglasses. The third person allegedly was Lee Harvey OSWALD. ALVARADO was convinced of this from published photographs of OSWALD following the assassination. OSWALD was wearing a black sport coat, buttoned-up white shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, dark gray pants, and clear eyeglasses. He had a green passport in his pocket wore a wrist watch with a yellow band, and appeared to have a pistol in a shoulder holster. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed American currency to the Negro. The Negro then allegedly said to OSWALD in English, "I want to kill the man." OSWALD replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you. I have a lot to do." OSWALD replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The Negro then gave OSWALD \$6,500 in large denomination U. S. bills, saying, "This isn't much." After hearing this conversation, ALVARADO said that he telephoned the U. S. Embassy in Mexico City several times on 20 September before the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed, but was finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

ALVARADO was known to this Agency as a former informant of Nicaraguan security service. His reliability was considered questionable by American authorities although he had not been wholly discredited. ALVARADO claimed he was in Mexico City working against the Cuban communists for his service. The service, however, has denied that he was acting on its behalf. While investigation in the United States showed that OSWALD could not possibly have been in Mexico City on 18 September (he was known to have been in New Orleans on both 17 and 19 September), intensive interrogation failed to shake ALVARADO's story.

On 28 November 1963, the Mexican police interviewed him. At first ALVARADO persisted in his story but on 30 November he admitted in a signed statement that his whole account about OSWALD was false. He admitted he had not seen Lee OSWALD at all and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted he had not tried repeatedly to phone a warning to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 20 September as he had previously claimed. Instead he had first contacted the U. S. Embassy after the assassination. ALVARADO said that his motive in telling this false story was to help get himself admitted into the United States so that he could participate in action against Fidel CASTRO. He said that he hated CASTRO and thought that his story about OSWALD, if believed, would help cause the United States to take action against CASTRO.

Following the above interrogation, ALVARADO retracted the confession he had made to the Mexican authorities asserting that it had been extorted from him under pressure. He was then questioned by U. S. authorities using a polygraph machine. ALVARADO voluntarily consented to the use of this equipment. During the questioning it was pointed out to him that he was not being truthful, according to the polygraph, in identifying photographs of OSWALD as the person he saw in the Cuban Consulate. He replied that he had full faith in the polygraph, that he would not attempt to refute the results, and that he "must have been mistaken". In addition, he

he changed his story regarding the day he visited the Cuban Consulate, finally deciding it took place on Tuesday, 17 September. It was concluded from the results of the polygraph test that ALVARADO had fabricated his story from whole cloth.

[Memorandum to J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel, dated 4 June 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans.]

(Comment: Some idea of the time and effort expended by the Agency in breaking ALVARADO's story may be gained from a review of the Chronological Summary of the Gilberto ALVARADO interrogation under attachment IV.)

Although the Warren Report had used the ALVARADO case to demonstrate the type of allegation the Agency had had to contend with, the Schweiker Report took the Agency to task for not having become more suspicious of possible Cuban involvement in the assassination. To some extent, the authors of the Schweiker Report are right. There were other rumors and allegations indicating that OSWALD may not have acted entirely on his own; however, none of these rumors and allegations stood up under intensive investigation. Moreover, each rumor or allegation was treated as a separate and unrelated case - the only common denominator being OSWALD. There appears to have been no suspicion on the part of the Agency that these rumors and allegations might have been part of a larger deception plan orchestrated by a foreign counterintelligence service. Only a thorough investigation of all available information including overt comments by responsible communist officials could have allayed these suspicions or generated additional requirements to be levied on Agency assets world-wide. Obviously such an investigation would have required an enormous quantity of patience, time, and personnel. None of these prerequisites was available, especially in light of the tremendous political pressures under which the Agency, the FBI, the Warren Commission, and others were working precluded the initiation of such an investigation.

It was not until eleven years later that the Agency was

asked to prepare a review of allegations of Cuban involvement in the John F. Kennedy assassination. On 15 April 1975, David W.

BELIN, Executive Director of the Rockefeller Commission, addressed a letter to the Agency in which he stated

"As you know, there have been allegations that the CIA was involved in a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. For the purposes of this letter, we will assume that these allegations are correct, and based upon this assumption I would like to know the answers to the following questions:

"1. Did anyone with the CIA tell any member of the Warren Commission or any lawyer serving on the Warren Commission staff that such plans had been underway? If the answer is yes, we would like to know what person or persons with the Agency delivered said information, to whom it was delivered, when it was delivered, what specifically was told or said, what documents there are to support the answers to the foregoing questions, and what response, if any, was received from the Warren Commission. If the Commission was not told about this, why was it not told and who made the decision not to deliver such information to the Warren Commission?

"2. There is evidence that Castro, prior to November 22, 1963, knew about the existence of such plans and the possible involvement of the U. S. Government. Did the CIA at any time prior to the completion of the Warren Commission investigation have any documents or other information indicating that Castro may have known about such plans? If the answer is yes, would you please furnish us with copies of all such documents and details of any such information.

"3. Several months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy there is evidence of a public speech by Castro that was reported by the Associated Press whereby Castro alluded to possible assassination attempts on his life and possible retaliation. Would you please advise us if there is any evidence that this Associated Press report may have appeared in any newspapers in the United States, including specifically any newspapers in Dallas or New Orleans. Would you also advise us of you have any other information of public statements of any Cuban leader prior to November 22, 1963 indicating any awareness of possible assassination plots on the lives of Cuban leaders.

"4. Would you please advise us if there is any information in CIA records to indicate that at any time prior to November 22, 1963 any foreign government or any foreign group was considering a possible assassination of any American leader. If so, would you please advise us of all details and also advise us who in the United States Government outside the CIA was advised of these plans or possibilities.

"5. Prior to his death Lyndon Johnson supposedly stated that he believed that although there was no doubt that Oswald killed Kennedy and Tippitt, nevertheless Oswald might have been a part of a conspiracy in retaliation to possible United States assassination attempts in Cuba. Would you please advise us of any information in Agency files showing whether or not there was any communication to President Johnson of any possible plans involving the attempted assassinations of any Cuban leader and if the answer is yes, also give us all details involving this matter."

[Letter to Mr. E. Henry KNOCHE, Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, dated 15 April 1975, from David W. BELIN, Executive Director, Commission on CIA Activities within the United States.]

In its response to the above letter, the Agency noted that the results of its review "add nuance, not evidence, to what the Warren Commission and its staff had laid before them in 1964 in this subject".

As to CASTRO's remarks during an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent, Daniel HARKER, the Agency commented that "There can be no question from the facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States." (Emphasis added.) The Agency commented further that "There is no evidence in the files on the KENNEDY assassination that this CASTRO interview was considered in following up leads or in dealings with the Warren Commission and its staff although Mexico Station specifically directed Headquarters attention to the AP story very shortly after the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears to have been forgotten in the contemporary political consideration of relations with CASTRO's Cuba. There is no evidence in Agency records, either, that the Warren Commission staff itself pursued the implication of the CASTRO interview in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There is no evidence in the files that anything along these lines was stated by any other Cuban leader before the assassination."

the purpose
According to the author of the review, was to reconsider Lee Harvey OSWALD's activity on the assumption that as an avid newspaper reader - which is known from testimony of Marina OSWALD and others - he read the CASTRO warning and threat which appeared New Orleans' principal morning paper, the Times-Picayune, on Monday, 9 September 1963. The results of the review, admittedly ~~heavily~~ using 20-20 hindsight, may be set out in summary:

"a. There is no increment of credible evidence, applying this phrase strictly, of Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement in the assassination to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff. The Commission's finding that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPITT and did them in alone and of his own determination stands.

"b. 'Credible evidence' that would upset or significantly modify this judgment did (and does) not exist in Washington. But such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity and quality, designed to cover up any admissions of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD which might be related directly or indirectly with the assassination. Therefore, the belief that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist and grow until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay and in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider 'window' for this contingency. That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level, particularly in the counterintelligence component in the CIA in 1964. As was indicated by Mr. HELMS in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would continue to regard this aspect of the OSWALD case as still open.

"c. In the absence of additional or new elements of 'credible evidence', there are 'nuances' in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item by item*

"d. CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963 - if OSWALD did indeed read it in New Orleans - must be considered of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution of OSWALD's passive/aggressive makeup after his attempt to kill General

WALKER early in April 1963 and his identification with Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban Revolution which is directly traceable as far back as his Marine Corps service in El Toro, California. CASTRO's warning and threat, given to AP correspondent HARKER, irrespective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the Russians - was an act of singular irresponsibility and under no circumstances was excusable as retorsion for what the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963."

[Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding Allegations of CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the John F. KENNEDY Assassination. Cover Memorandum to DC/OPS dated 23 May 1975.]

[* These items are to be found on pages 7 - 27 of the review, a complete copy of which is attached.] See attachment V.]

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY:

Gilberto Nolasco ALVARADO Ugarte

ALVARADO Ugarte, Gilberto Nolasco

In the following are cited those portions (including footnotes) of the SCHWEIKER Report pertaining to Gilberto ALVARADO. Comments relating to these portions are in roman characters.

At noon on November 25, "D", a Latin American, appeared at the American Embassy in Mexico City.³⁵ (FN: This incident is discussed in the Warren Report, pp. 308, 309; Cable from Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters, 11/25/63.) [Comment: The first cable in the file announcing ALVARADO's claim is MEXI-7067 (IN 68291), 26 November 1963. ALVARADO at no time appeared at the American Embassy - some of our own reporting is in error, e.g., DIR 85089, 26 November 1963, a dissemination to FBI, State, and the White House, states: "On 26 November 1963, Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan . . . came to the American Embassy in Mexico and made a statement about Lee OSWALD." According to ALVARADO's interrogation by Mexican authorities, he called the American Embassy on 25 November and "succeeded in speaking to a high official with whom he made an appointment for that same day at 5:30 p.m. near the Hotel Maria Isabel. Two individuals appeared for the appointment." According to a note in the Mexico Station file, signed by the Embassy Security Officer, A. C. PLAMBECK - dated 25 November - these two men were SNIGHT and PLAMBECK; both were Embassy security officers.] *He told Embassy personnel that he was in the Cuban consulate on September 17 and saw Cubans who discussed assassination pay OSWALD a sum of money.* [Comment: During his first meeting with Embassy officials, ALVARADO claimed he had been at the Cuban Consulate on the 18th of September, not the 17th. In fact, at no time, did he refer to the date 17 September. Later, during his interrogation in connection with the polygraph examination on 6 December 1963, ALVARADO revealed he was "unsure of the day of week allegedly saw OSWALD. Thinks that it was on Tuesday" which would have been 17 September. (MEXI-7289 (IN 75588), 7 December 1963).] *He later repeated his story to the CIA Mexico Station*

Chief. [Comment: At no time, at least there is no mention in the files, did ALVARADO repeat his story to the "CIA Mexico Station Chief". ALVARADO first told his story, as indicated above, to two officers from the Embassy Security Office. The next morning, he met with PLAMBECK from the Embassy Security Office, and a Station officer. During another meeting that evening (26 November), ALVARADO was interrogated by two officers from the Station. (Note for the Record, dated 25 November 1963, signed by PLAMBECK; Memorandum for Clark ANDERSON, Legal Attache, dated 29 November 1963, from Winston M. SCOTT.)] The CIA and the Warren Commission later concluded that the story was a fabrication, but the Agency was clearly concerned with "D"'s story at the time.³⁶ (FN: "D" later admitted that the story about OSWALD had been fabricated. Cable from Mexico City to CIA Headquarters, 11/30/63. It had also been determined by the FBI that OSWALD was probably in New Orleans on September 17. Cable from CIA Headquarters to Mexico Station, 11/28/63.) [Comment: There were actually two cables, DIR 85258, 27 November 1963, and DIR 85653, 28 November 1963, which indicated OSWALD was in New Orleans on 17 and 19 September 1963.]

Later in that day [26 November 1963], the Mexico Station cabled Headquarters on the details of its interrogation of "D".³⁹ (FN: Cable from Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters, 11/26/63.) [MEXI-7069 (IN 68376), 26 November 1963.] It also reported other information from a sensitive and reliable source which tended to confirm "D"'s story that OSWALD may have been paid by the Cubans to assassinate President Kennedy. [Comment: It would appear from this statement, the authors of the report were referring to MEXI-7069 (IN 68376); however, this cable does not contain any remarks alluding to information which "tended to confirm 'D's' story". This information appears in MEXI-7072 (IN 68406), 26 November 1963, which contains Ambassador MANN's message to RUSK, McCONE, and HOOVER. MANN's statement reads as follows: "While we recognize lack of established reliability of Nicaraguan and danger of reaching

hasty conclusions, we suggest that DORTICOS' preoccupation with money angle of interrogation of Silvia DURAN tends to corroborate to some extent authenticity of the Nicaraguan's statement. Thus, there appears to be a strong possibility that a down payment was made to OSWALD in the Cuban Embassy there, presumably with promise of a subsequent payment after assassination." The Ambassador was reading somewhat more into the situation than was the case. The reference to DORTICOS - the Cuban President - relates to two telephone conversation between DORTICOS and HERNANDEZ, the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, on 26 November 1963. The first conversation, which took place at 0924, was forwarded, in resume, to Headquarters on 26 November 1963 (MEXI-7068 IN); the second conversation, which took place at 1839, was forwarded, in resume, to Headquarters on 27 November 1963 (MEXI-7097 IN). In the first conversation DORTICOS asks (if) "the Federals of that country wanted Senora DURAN to say something, that they had some interest in, and had offered some money to the American?" To which HERNANDEZ answers that there was nothing about money. In the second conversation, DORTICOS is quoted as saying: "I was referring as to whether they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate had given money to the man - that American." HERNANDEZ answered that "nothing absolutely was given her" [sic]. It would not appear from a close reading of these two conversations that they contain information "which tended to confirm 'D's' story . . .".] *This report has never been satisfactorily explained, although it was made available to the Warren Commission Staff. In any event, these reports certainly must have fueled suspicions of Cuban involvement in the assassination. Based on the evidence it reviewed, the Warren Commission later determined that "D"'s story was a fabrication.* [Comment: This statement appears to be gratuitous - the Warren Commission did not ask about the ALVARADO case until 21 April 1964. On that date RANKIN addressed a letter to Richard HELMS in which he stated inter alia "We are aware, of course, from previous reports that the allegations made by ALVARADO were

thoroughly investigated by Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives in Mexico City in liaison with the responsible Mexican law-enforcement authorities. Reference is made to the discussion of these allegations in your memorandum dated January 31, 1964, at pages 11 - 14.

"Upon review of our complete file on this matter, we find that we lack full documentation of the investigation conducted of these allegations. It would be helpful if our records could be supplemented by a report from your Agency supplying more details regarding the investigation undertaken by your Agency and other concerned Agencies into this matter and your evaluation as to the truth of ALVARADO's assertions. In particular, it would be helpful if a report could be submitted by the expert who conducted the polygraph examination which emphasizes the specific conclusions which he made based on the responses by ALVARADO in answering key questions on this matter." (Letter to Richard HELMS, DDP, dated 21 April 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.) The Agency responded on 1 June 1964. (Memorandum to J. Lee RANKIN, dated 1 June 1964, from Richard HELMS, DDP; Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.)]

The American Ambassador in Mexico later sent a cable [MEXI-7072 (IN 68406), 26 November 1963] to State Department through CIA channels. In that cable he gave his opinion that the Cubans were involved in the assassination, and recommended certain investigative steps which should be taken in Mexico.⁴⁰ (FN: Cable from Mexico Station to CIA Headquarters, 11/26/63.)

By November 27, the Mexico Station and CIA Headquarters were also beginning to question the accuracy of "D"'s story. The cables between the Mexico Station and Headquarters indicate the possibility that the story was a fabrication. Nevertheless, on November 28, Headquarters cabled a reminder to the Mexico Station to "follow all leads". The Station was instructed to continue investigating the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, because Headquarters had not excluded the possibility that other persons

were involved with OSWALD.⁴⁴ (FN: A cable from CIA Headquarters to Mexico Station, 11/28/63.) [DIR 85655, 28 November 1963]

Later that day [27 November] Headquarters learned that Mexican authorities planned to arrest Silvia DURAN again and warned the Station that the Mexicans must take responsibility for the arrest. After learning that the U.S. Ambassador was continuing to press for a vigorous investigation into Cuban involvement, Headquarters also warned the Station Chief that the Ambassador was pushing the case too hard and his proposals could lead to a "flap" with the Cubans.⁴⁶ (FN: A cable from CIA Headquarters to Mexico Station, 11/28/63.) [DIR 85655, 28 November 1963] Finally, the Agency concluded that "D"'s story was a fabrication and terminated its interest in him.⁴⁷ (FN: Ibid.)

On November 30, Director McCONE met with the President at 11 a.m. . . . While there was a discussion of the allegations made by "D" the memorandum records no action was required on the "OSWALD situation".⁴⁹ (FN: Memo-andum for the Record by Director McCone, 12/2/63) [Comment: Memorandum not available in the file.]

On December 1, McCONE met with the President and BUNDY. McCONE's memorandum of the meeting indicates they again discussed "D"'s story. Later that day, Headquarters cabled the Mexico Station and stated that the White House had been told the story was a fabrication.

. . . . Later that day [2 December], the Mexico Station reported it had reason to doubt its earlier conclusion that "D" was fabricating. [Comment: The authors of the Report give no source for this statement. Moreover, they leave the reader in the air as to what was the outcome of further investigation to determine whether the earlier conclusion that ALVARADO was fabricating was an accurate conclusion. The facts are as follows:

On 2 December, Captain WHEELOCK* saw ALVARADO during the
* Captain Franklin Anthony WHEELOCK Garcia, chief of the Anti-Communist Section of the Nicaraguan Office of National Security,

On 2 December, Captain WHEELLOCK saw ALVARADO during the afternoon for the first time. In a brief interview, which lasted only seven minutes, in the company of two Mexican officials, ALVARADO reverted to his previous story. He claimed he did see OSWALD and that he did call the Embassy to report. (Latter statement not supported by Embassy investigation.) ALVARADO went on to say that he told the Mexicans he was fabricating because he was "mentally mistreated", specifically because he was threatened that he would be hanged by the testicles. Actually he was not physically mistreated. WHEELLOCK said he was unable to come to any definite conclusion as to ALVARADO's veracity; however, he would be able to do so once he returned to Managua and had a chance to complete the interrogation. (MEXI-7023 IN 71702, 2 December 1963)

On 3 December 1963, Headquarters tells the Mexico Station that although Headquarters is confident that ALVARADO is a fabricator and that his retraction of his confession is false, it has been decided that he should be placed on the polygraph. Headquarters asks that the Station arrange to have ALVARADO released to CIA custody for several days and ask WHEELLOCK to remain in Mexico to assist.

A polygraph operator from the Office of Security will arrive on 4 December. He will be incharge of the polygraph interview, but will be assisted by Clark ANDERSON (Legal Attache), who has been selected as an interpreter. The FBI will notify ANDERSON of this. (DIR 86563, 3 December 1963)

* Captain Franklin Anthony WHEELLOCK Garcia, Chief of the Anti-Communist Section of the Nicaraguan Office of National Security, arrived in Mexico City on 29 November 1963. WHEELLOCK went to Mexico in response to Mexico Station's request for assistance in interrogating ALVARADO. For further details see accompanying chronological summary on Gilberto ALVARADO.

ECHEVARRIA, the Acting Minister of Gobernacion, agreed to permit CIA to "borrow" ALVARADO. The plan was to pick up ALVARADO on 5 December and return him that evening. (MEXI-7229 IN 72877, 3 December 1963) ALVARADO was picked up as planned and underwent preliminary questioning on 5 December. The next day he underwent a polygraph interview. The results of this interview indicated that ALVARADO was fabricating his story. Interrogation revealed that he was unsure as to the exact day of the week he allegedly saw OSWALD. He thought it was on a Tuesday which would have been the 17th of September. When ALVARADO was shown a series of photographs during the testing, deception patterns became evident. When he was confronted with this he answered that he had the utmost confidence in the polygraph and that it must be correct. The interrogation was concluded with ALVARADO admitting he must have made an "honest mistake" in relating the original story in his identification of OSWALD. (MEXI-7289 IN 75588, 7 December)

Following the receipt of the results of the above interview with ALVARADO, Headquarters disseminated the results to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"The re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO, Nicaraguan informant who claimed to have seen Lee OSWALD receive money to assassinate Kennedy, has been concluded. Our Mexico City Station advises us that ALVARADO admitted he must have been mistaken in saying that he saw OSWALD in the Cuban Embassy. Also, he was uncertain of the date on which he might have seen someone like OSWALD and thought it must have been on a Tuesday, which would have made it 17 September 1963. Although the final report of the polygraph interview is not yet available, the preliminary finding is that ALVARADO evidenced deception reactions when talking about OSWALD.

"It is expected that ALVARADO will be deported to Nicaragua on 9 December 1963.

"A representative of your Bureau participated in the interrogation of ALVARADO."

(DIR 87667, 7 December 1963)

Except for forwarding to the Warren Commission various reported material on ALVARADO, the Agency had completed its investigation of the allegation that the Cuban Consulate had given

OSWALD six thousand five hundred dollars to assassinate an unnamed target.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY: Gilberto Nolasco ALVARADO Ugarte

18 September 1963

According to ALVARADO's statements made during an interview conducted in the morning of 26 November 1963 by an American Embassy security officer and a member of the Mexico Station in Mexico City, ALVARADO went at noon on 18 September to the Cuban Consulate to turn over passport photographs to the Cuban Consul Eusebio AZCUE. . . . While standing by a rest room off a passageway leading to a patio, ALVARADO saw a group of three persons conversing on the patio a few feet away. One man was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously dyed. He had prominent cheek bones, and a noticeable scar on the lower right side of his chin. He spoke rapidly with a Cuban accent and did speak some English. Another member of the group was a white person whom ALVARADO had seen previously, in the waiting room, carrying a Canadian passport. The Canadian had green eyes, blondish hair combed in an "existentialist" manner with a pompadour. He was wearing dark eyeglasses of a type with a mirror-like reflection on the outer surface. The third member of the group was Lee Harvey OSWALD. He was wearing a black sport coat, a buttoned up white shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, gray pants, and clear eyeglasses.

ALVARADO saw a tall Cuban join the group momentarily and pass American currency to the Negro. This unidentified Cuban apparently came out of AZCUE's office onto the patio. ALVARADO described the Cuban as a tall, solidly built mulatto, with curly hair, who appeared to be about 37 years old. He was wearing a brown suit and a red-striped tie. ALVARADO never saw this man again after 18 September.

ALVARADO claimed he overheard the following conversation between the Negro and OSWALD:

Negro (in English): "I want to kill the man".

OSWALD : "You're not man enough. I can do it."

Negro (in Spanish): "I can't go with you. I have a lot to do."

OSWALD : "The people are waiting for me back there."

The Negro gave OSWALD six thousand five hundred dollars in large denomination US bills saying: "This isn't much." Of the sum, one thousand five hundred dollars was for extra expenses. The Negro also gave him about 200 Mexican pesos.

Later, ALVARADO saw a pretty girl, whom he believed to be a Cuban employee of the Consulate, give OSWALD an abrazo embrace and tell him she was living at Calle Juarez number 407 where he could find her. The girl appeared to about 20 years old and had manners which reminded ALVARADO of a prostitute. OSWALD, the Negro and the Canadian then went upstairs.

ALVARADO left the building momentarily to buy popsicle on the corner; he saw the above three men leave by the Embassy gate near the corner of Tacubaya where they entered a parked black car, possibly a Chevrolet.

At the end of September, ALVARADO telephoned the American Embassy several times to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed.

When ALVARADO saw OSWALD's photograph in the newspaper, he again contacted the Embassy on 25 November.

[MEXI-7069 (IN 68376), 26 November 1963]

25 November 1963

ALVARADO called the United States Embassy. That same evening he met with the Embassy security officer.

[MEXI-7168 (IN 70860), 30 November 1963]

[Comment: According to the Mexican police report of the interrogation of ALVARADO, the latter called the American Embassy and "succeeded in speaking to a high official with whom he made an appointment for that same day at 5:30 p.m. near the Hotel Maria Isabel.]

Two individuals appeared for the 5:30 p.m. appointment. They identified themselves and were carrying the credentials of FBI agents.* ALVARADO told about his seeing OSWALD, etc. Another appointment was made for 9:15 the next morning at the Jena Restaurant.

[HMMA-22561, 5 December 1963; CSCI-3/779,136, 13 December 1963]

[*Comment: The two individuals were SNIGHT, the Embassy security officer, and A. C. PLAMBECK (P), Mexican Station officer. ALVARADO may have mistaken Embassy identification documents for FBI credentials.]

25 November 1963

ALVARADO claimed inter alia that two persons were in the Cuban Embassy the morning of 25 November 1963 at 1100 who are involved in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. He described them as one being a white person with a large cleft nose. The other had closed cropped hair with a copote [sic].*

ALVARADO claims that on the 18th of September, he was in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive \$6,500. OSWALD was speaking with a Negro, about 29 years of age, who had a scar on his jaw, and had reddish hair which is probably tinted. The Negro spoke English well and might be a North American. OSWALD was speaking of eliminating someone. The Negro then said he was sorry that he could accompany OSWALD, saying: "You understand my situation." To which OSWALD replied: "That's all right, I can do this myself."

The "source" (ALVARADO ?) was of the opinion that OSWALD had come from Havana. When OSWALD entered (the Consulate ?) he was affectionately greeted by a female employee of the Cuban Embassy, who has blue eyes and lives at Calle Juarez 407.

The "source" also stated that OSWALD was given \$1,500 for extra expenses. Source stated that when he went to the bathroom he saw OSWALD counting the money, in American dollars, on the patio which is adjacent.

[Blind memorandum dated 25 November 1963]

[*Comment: There is no indication in the file that any follow-up was made on the information given in this paragraph. This particular information appears no where else in ALVARADO's interrogations.]

26 November 1963

ALVARADO meets the same two men from the Embassy whom he had the evening before, at the Jena Restaurant on the Avenida Morelos and the Paseo de la Reforma. The two men were accompanied by a third man named Rodolfo GAVALDON. ALVARADO went with these three men to the cafeteria of the Hotel Francis after which they drove up and down a few streets. ALVARADO told them again what he had observed in the Cuban Consulate and they gave him 100 pesos and told him they would call him at the number 41-07-31, which is the telephone number of the place where ALVARADO was living. ALVARADO was called the same day at 8:45 p.m. and was told to meet the three men later in front of the Juarez monument.

[Blind memorandum, dated 25 November 1963; Memorandum to Clark ANDERSON, Legal Attache, dated 29 November 1963; and HMMA-22561, 5 December 1963, and CSCI-3/779,136, 13 December 1963.]

26 November 1963

Station officer and local security officer are interviewing a Nicaraguan who claims that on 18 September he saw Lee OSWALD received six thousand five hundred dollars during a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

[MEXI-7067 (IN 68291), 26 November 1963]

[Comment: This cable was the first report to Headquarters on the allegations made by ALVARADO.]

26 November 1963

At the appointed place and time the evening of 26 November, Rodolfo GAVALDON meets ALVARADO. They take a cab to the corner of the Hotel Maria Isabel where another American is waiting

for them; together they cross the street and enter an apartment in a building at the corner of Oxford and Reforma. After talking with these men, ALVARADO received 500 pesos and was told to move to a hotel and to tell them which hotel he moved into.

[HMMA-22561, 5 December 1963; CSCI-3/779,136, 13 December 1963]

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26 November 1963 (date of cable)

Managua Station reports on identity of ALVARADO and suggests that "Should case develop to point where Mexico and Headquarters believe it desirable to break ALVARADO, the Station could probably arrange to have NIC officer who handled him come to Mexico to question him."

[MANA 4609 (IN 68452), 26 November 1963]

(Comment: NIC = Nicaraguan Security Service.)

26 November 1963 (date of dissemination)

Dissemination by cable to the FBI, State, and the White House reporting preliminary results of ALVARADO interrogation and results of Headquarters name trace.

"1. On 26 November 1963 Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan born 31 January 1940 in Ciudad Rama, Zelaya, Nicaragua, came to the American Embassy in Mexico and made a statement about Lee OSWALD. He said that on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

"2. About himself, ALVARADO said he in Mexico City awaiting false documentation so he could go to Cuba for sabotage training. He named three other members of his organization in Nicaragua as Juan LORILLO, Rolan ALVARADO, and Carlos FONSECA Amador. Questioning of ALVARADO is continuing.

"3. (Comment: Gilberto ALVARADO is a well-known Nicaraguan communist underground member who is also a regular informant of the Nicaraguan Security Service and officer of which has provided this Agency with his reports for over a year. We consider his reliability to be questionable although he has not been wholly discredited. The other men he names are well-known Nicaraguan communists. A check of the files of this Agency does not show where Lee OSWALD actually was on 18 September 1963, when ALVARADO says he saw OSWALD in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, but based on the information available to this Agency as of this date OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico for the first time after 25 September 1963.)"

[DIR 85089, 26 November 1963]

27 November 1963

Headquarters suggests to Mexico Station that "In your investigation, suggest you contact ALVARADO's NIC case officer

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in Mexico City and ask him whether ALVARADO has ever told him this story or anything like it."

[DIR 85178, 27 November 1963]

27 November 1963

Headquarters tells Mexico Station that "After consideration by BRENT and KNIGHT, we feel that investigation and analysis of ALVARADO's story should be pursued further before more executive action is taken."

[DIR 85198, 27 November 1963]

27 November 1963 (date of dissemination)

Headquarters makes dissemination to FBI, State, and the White House incorporating information forwarded to Headquarters in MEXI-7069 (IN 68376, 26 November 1963 (q.v.))

[DIR 85199, 27 November 1963]

27 November 1963

ALVARADO's story being checked as thoroughly as Station assets make possible. He also being re-interviewed in much greater detail. ALVARADO is being moved to safe address.

[MEXI-7093 (IN 68530), 27 November 1963]

27 November 1963 (date of cable)

Two Station officers interviewed ALVARADO in safehouse again night of 26 November. ALVARADO's story remained substantially the same. ALVARADO says he has been to Cuban Consulate on 2 or 3 September, 15 or 16 September, 18 September, 26 September and 25 November. The Station comments that "Station photographic coverage of the Cuban Embassy did not include consulate gate until October." ALVARADO did not appear in photographs of persons using Embassy gate. He admits visiting the Soviet Embassy 6 or 7 times; however, he has not been identified in photographic coverage of Soviet Embassy.

[MEXI-7098 (IN 69127), 27 November 1963]

27 November 1963

Ambassador MANN send message via CIA channels to RUSK, McCONE, and HOOVER in which he suggest inter alia that Washington "should urgently consider feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio AZCUE, Luisa CALDERON, and Alfredo MIRABAL."

[MEXI-7104 (IN 69225), 27 November 1963]

27 November 1963 (date of cable)

FBI says OSWALD applied for unemployment insurance in New Orleans on 17 September, one day before ALVARADO says he saw him in Cuban Embassy, Mexico. FBI checking all airlines to see if he could have flown to Mexico by 18 September. He was in New Orleans on 25 September and left that day for Texas without paying his rent. He is believed to have been without funds during this period. FBI says his New Orleans landlady believes he was there continuously between 17 and 25 September.

[DIR 85258, 27 November 1963]

27 November 1963 (date of cable)

According to Mexico Station, ALVARADO story after two installments tends prove only that he has been in Cuban Embassy and knows some of employees by sight, name or both. To resolve doubt only effective way is to have cooperation of Major JEREZ directed by his headquarters in interrogating ALVARADO. If HQ agrees suggest he be cabled urgently to cooperate without question with American officer who will contact him morning 28 November. Station wishes JEREZ be present during interrogation to throw all Nicaragua official weight behind it, but not to participate except in portion relative ALVARADO's alleged mission for JEREZ.

[MEXI-7107 (IN 69310), 27 November 1963]

27 November 1963

di Headquarters states that "in the face of mounting evidence that ALVARADO is fabricating his story of seeing OSWALD take money in the Cuban Embassy, urge you follow up with his local NIC case officer and avail yourself

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of the help of the NIC service, which can send (WHEELLOCK),* a good CIA asset, to help in the interrogation. We find it incredible that the Cubans would brief and pay an assassin in front of a NIC interloper. We think it possible or even likely that he has been in and out of the Cuban Embassy as a NIC agent trying to infiltrate Cuba and has picked up the names and faces there in so doing. All he has said about OSWALD he could have gotten from the newspapers, except for certain incorrect items such as his statement that OSWALD wore glasses.

2. The fact that ALVARADO is a calm, nice, and intelligent young man does not mean he is not a fabricator. FYI we and other agencies are being flooded by fabrications on the OSWALD case from several continents, some originating with people on the fringes of the intelligence business. Such fabrication are not usually done for money, but out of sickly fancy and a desire to get into the intelligence game.

3. We do not think it a remarkable coincidence that both DORTICOS and ALVARADO talk about money paid to OSWALD. For one thing, pay for an assassin is a factor which immediately rises in the mind of expert and layman alike. Secondly, DORTICOS may have heard through some Russian or Cuban source in the Mexican Government that DURAN was asked whether the Cubans paid OSWALD for the alleged assignment."

4. ~~While we do not insist that ALVARADO's story is beyond all belief, we do urge that MEXI place it and ALVARADO under the most searching scrutiny. His interrogators must probe deeply into his make-up and lead him back through the~~

[DIR 85616, 27 November 1963]

[* Captain Franklin Anthony WHEELLOCK Garcia. (Name encrypted in text.)

28 November 1963 (date of cable)

FBI says their follow-up investigation of OSWALD's activities has produced "reasonable indications" that he was in New Orleans on 19 September 1963. This, coupled with earlier evidence that he was in New Orleans applying for unemployment insurance on 17 September 1963, means OSWALD would have had to fly to Mexico and back between 17 and 19 September in order to be at the Cuban Embassy getting his pay-off, as ALVARADO claims, on 18 September. With this added information, believe Mexico can confidently regard ALVARADO as fabricator and tailor interrogation accordingly.

[DIR 85653, 28 November 1963]

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28 November 1963

Headquarters informs Mexico that

"1. We have just heard by phone from KINGMAN, who is at home, that MEXI evaluation of ALVARADO story may have been seriously warped by a piece of misinformation which has crept into this case. From conversation with your officers, KINGMAN has the impression that they believe there is other evidence that Lee OSWALD made a bank deposit of five thousand dollars in the United States after he got back from Mexico on 3 October 1963. This would tend, if true, to corroborate ALVARADO's story that he saw OSWALD get five thousand for the job and fifteen hundred for expenses. KINGMAN thinks he heard that CURTIS (Winston SCOTT) got the information about the bank deposit from an FBI man named Clark.

"2. We know of no such bank deposit and have never heard of one. FBI here has just affirmed they never heard this story. The story of the deposit of five thousand dollars is therefore almost certainly erroneous. Please check it with FBI there. We have advised FBI that this rumor exists in Mexico.

"3.

"4. FBI has just levied on us, official request for full information on source and origin of rumor about a five thousand dollar bank deposit."

[DIR 85654, 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963

Headquarters stresses to Mexico that "there should be no let down in your effort to follow all leads and investigate all facts which bear on this case. We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations and your liaison with Mexicans."

[DIR 85655, 28 November 1963]

[Comment: This remark by Headquarters was in support of its position in response to Ambassador MANN's earlier message, in which Headquarters expressed its distinct feeling that "the Ambassador is pushing this case too hard, and . . . might well create flap with Cubans which could have serious repercussions."]

28 November 1963

Mexico Station requests OPIM authorization turn ALVARADO over to Mexican authorities with a brief explanation he claims to be witness to payoff to OSWALD in Cuban consulate 18 September, admits is in Mexico illegally, admits Communist Party membership, admits visits to Soviet Embassy, claims that Cuban consulate now involved in documenting him with false Mexican papers for travel to Cuba. Latter point alone would give Mexican authorities good reason to subject him to detailed interrogation.

[MEXI-7113 (IN), 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963

Headquarters responded to the Station's request (see above) by saying not to turn ALVARADO over to the Mexicans. "We have officially asked the FBI for their position on this move, and pending the FBI's answer and our final consideration, ALVARADO should not be surfaced to the Mexicans or turned over to them.

"2. Advise us if the FBI in Mexico attempts to get you to act one way or the other on the question of turning ALVARADO over to the Mexicans."

Headquarters concludes its message to Mexico by commenting that Larry KEENAN, an FBI agent, is now in Mexico. He was sent especially to follow up leads on the entire assassination. Headquarters asks that the Station cooperate with him fully.

[DIR 85661, 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963 (date of dissemination)

Headquarters disseminates by cable to the FBI, State, and the White House, the information obtained from ALVARADO during night of 26 November 1963. Information obtained from ALVARADO on the latter date was forwarded to Headquarters in MEXI-7098 (IN 69127), 27 November 1963. (See appropriate entry above.)

[DIR 85662, 28 November 1963]

~~28 November 1963~~

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28 November 1963

Mexico Station reports that

"1. Mr. Clark ANDERSON, Legal Attache, told the COS and Ambassador MANN of rumor that 'OSWALD had deposited five thousand dollars in a bank in the United States'.

"2. On 27 November Ambassador in presence of COS asked ANDERSON about this again and ANDERSON said rumor was on television and radio in Mexico. ANDERSON said he had no information from his Headquarters to confirm or deny this. He said he would check his Headquarters.

"3. COS has not heard rumor regarding five thousand dollar deposit on television or radio, but feels sure ANDERSON or some of his office did hear this. This Station had no additional information concerning this; but assume ALVARADO may have heard same radio or television report and thus have had 'basis' for five thousand dollar payment."

[MEXI-7114 (IN 69621), 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963

The Managua Station in Nicaragua stated that it had

"1. . . . requested (General Gustavo MONTIEL)* cooperation Mexico through Major JEREZ and if possible by sending Captain WHEELLOCK)* to Mexico. MONTIEL said ALVARADO in Mexico without (Service's) authority and passed off suggestion use JEREZ but agreed immediately to send WHEELLOCK. . . . He (WHEELLOCK) now in process getting visa and plane reservations and will probably be in Mexico today unless Headquarters and Mexico wish to cancel.

"2. Even though his story regarding OSWALD may be false it possible he has been working other angle to penetrate Cubans and (WHEELLOCK) will be able to assist in getting facts straight."

[MANA-4613 (IN 69629), 28 November 1963]

[* General Gustavo MONTIEL, Chief of Intelligence Service, Nicaraguan Army. (Name encrypted in text.)

Major Roger JEREZ Alfaro, Military Attache, Nicaraguan Embassy, Mexico City.

Captain Franklin Anthony WHEELLOCK Garcia, Chief of Anti-Communist Section of the Office of National Security. (name encrypted in text.)

over to Mexican authorities and that the Agency request Mexican authorities to interrogate ALVARADO in detail.

"2. The FBI reports that it understands that Mexican authorities have a capability of polygraphing and requests that the Agency request Mexican authorities that he be polygraphed.

"3. The FBI expressed a desire to have the results of the interrogation as soon as possible and that the Legal Attache be kept advised of developments.

"4. The FBI takes the position that inasmuch as Silvia DURAN may be released some time today (28 November), according to information which the FBI has from the Legal Attache, ALVARADO should be turned over to the Mexican as soon as possible, so that their stories can be checked against each other.

"5. Mexico Station is instructed to carry out the FBI's requests set out above. Give full cooperation to the Legal Attache. . . ."

[DIR 85663, 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963

Managua Station reports that Franklin Anthony WHEELOCK Garcia, a Captain National, and chief of the Anti-Communist Section of the Office of National Security, will arrive in Mexico at 0945 on 29 November 1963.

[MANA-4614 (IN 68671), 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963 (date of dissemination)

Headquarters disseminates the following to the FBI, State Department, and White House:

"Acting on a request made to this Agency by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 28 November 1963, our Agency is instructing its office in Mexico City to turn over Gilberto ALVARADO, Nicaraguan informant who claims that he saw Lee OSWALD accept six thousand five hundred dollars in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 to assassinate President Kennedy, to officials of the Mexican Ministry of Government for further interrogation and investigation. On 28 November, ALVARADO had still not changed his story, despite increasing doubt that it was true. The Nicaraguan Intelligence Service, for which ALVARADO once worked, is dispatching a senior official to Mexico City to assist in the interrogation and investigation at the discretion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Notification of the appropriate

Mexican office for the turnover was effected at 1630 Washington time on 28 November 1963."

[DIR 85666, 28 November 1963]

[Comment: This cable is the first time that President Kennedy was mentioned as the target of OSWALD's alleged mission described by ALVARADO. The conversation between the red-haired Negro and OSWALD, as reported by ALVARADO, makes no mention of a specific person.]

28 November 1963

Mexico Station requests that a Spanish-speaking polygraph operator be made available for ALVARADO and possibly for others.

[MEXI-7120 (IN), 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963

Headquarters responds that there is no Spanish-speaking polygraph operator.

"2. For reasons of security and compartmentation, prefer not to have Agency operator double-tracked with Mexican operator. Would only confuse the case. Prefer to wait until all Mexican resources exhausted before we decide if we want to resume management of case, including polygraph.

"3. Seasoned operators available here on short notice."

[DIR 85667, 28 November 1963]

28 November 1963

Mexico Station reports that

"1. COS in contact with acting Minister of Gobernacion Luis ECHEVARRIA at 1430 hrs Mexico City time and ECHEVARRIA grateful that ALVARADO being turned over to Gobernacion.

"2. ECHEVARRIA was given ALVARADO's present address and alias under which he registered. Mexicans will pick him up and question him on basis of very brief story given ECHEVARRIA by COS."

[MEXI-7124 (IN), 28 November 1963]

29 November 1963

Mexico Station reports that the COS is handling the OSWALD case personally and that continuous liaison with the Ambassador and the Legal Attache is necessary. The COS wishes to control these contacts personally.

[MEXI-7126 (IN 70104), 29 November 1963]

29 November 1963

An official of the Ministry of Gobernacion reported to the Station that ALVARADO claims he present inside the Cuban Embassy when OSWALD given six thousand five hundred dollars. The Station comments that ALVARADO gave the Mexicans the same story he gave Station officers. One difference is that ALVARADO failed to identify Silvia DURAN from several photographs he was shown. ALVARADO had identified her when he was being questioned by the Station.

[MEXI-7127 (IN 70145), 29 November 1963]

29 November 1963

Headquarters asks Mexico Station "... (to) continue to keep us filled in on status of interrogation of Silvia DURAN, ALVARADO, and others implicated as fast as you can get information. We have no other ready source of information on these cases. Request you utilize capable officer for liaison with Gobernacion to skim off details and relay them to your office for cabling to us at regular intervals. Request status report, even negative, by 0900 Mexico time. Be sure to keep us informed of what information if any is leaked to public information media."

[DIR 85672, 29 November 1963]

29 November 1963

In the interest of speed, Headquarters wishes to be "sure that you are immediately giving the Legal Attache everything you get about ALVARADO and DURAN so the Legal Attache in Mexico City can cable the same data direct to FBI Headquarters. Please

satisfy yourself that the Legal Attache there has adequate commo facilities and secretarial staff to keep its Headquarters informed as fast as you keep us informed, and advise us on this.

"2. If you find that the Legal Attache there does not have adequate commo or staff and wants to rely on us to relay the material, they may of sourse send messages right through our channels, or you can rely on us to relay the information as we have been."

[DIR 85712, 29 November 1963]

29 November 1963

The Mexico Station responded to the above message by stating that

"1. The Legal Attache is locally being advised by COS personally of everything Station learns concerning OSWALD case and, now, on ALVARADO interrogation.

"2. Fell sure that Legal Attache's office, which almost same size as the Station, has adequate staff for reporting needs.

"3. Usual procedure here is that COS notifies Headquarters, reports to the Legal Attache and to the Ambassador orally then subsequently advises the Legal Attache by memorandum.

"4. Headquarters is assured that all information known to Station on these cases is being given to them and shortly after information obtained."

[MEXI 7128 (IN 70162), 29 November 1963]

29 November 1963 (date of dissemination)

Headquarters disseminates to the FBI, State department and the White House that "The first very sketchy report on the progress of the Mexican official interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO, . . . shows he is telling essentially the same story. . . . The Mexican official doing the interrogation of ALVARADO says he 'doubts' ALVARADO's story and will begin work to 'break' him."

[DIR 85744, 29 November 1963]

29 November 1963

Chief of Mexico Station forwards memorandum to Mr. Clark

D. ANDERSON, Legal Attache, containing the results of three interviews, conducted by the local security officer and members of the Mexican Station on 26 November 1963, of Gilberto Nolasco ALVARADO Ugarte. [See memorandum for complete text.]

29 November 1963

Official of Ministry of Gobernacion stated that after his first session with ALVARADO he believed ALVARADO's story to be a fantastic lie; after second session and all previous and interim interrogations, ALVARADO sticks to same story on OSWALD. Official stated "Although this still preliminary, either ALVARADO is telling the truth essentially or he is the best liar I have talked to in my many years and I have talked to some of the biggest." He is inclined to believe ALVARADO is telling the truth in general outline, but believes he is mixed up on dates.

[MEXI-7156 (IN), 29 November 1963]

29 November 1963

Mexico Station reports that Captain WHEELLOCK has arrived in Mexico City and is staying at the Geneve Hotel.

[Ibid.]

29 November 1963

Captain WHEELLOCK meets with official from Ministry of Gobernacion; he tells the official that ALVARADO has been 75% accurate in his reporting and had had access to and furnished good information on communism in the past. WHEELLOCK said, however, ALVARADO is inclined to "go off on his own" at times and impossible to control.

[MEXI-7168 (IN 70860), 30 November 1963]

30 November 1963

At 1030 hours (Mexico City time), official from Ministry of Gobernacion told the Chief of Station that "ALVARADO has signed a statement saying that story of seeing OSWALD inside the Cuban Embassy is completely false. He also stated that he had not

seen anyone handed money by Cuban consular officers. He said too he had not called the U. S. Embassy (as he had previously claimed) on 20 September to warn them. His first call to the Embassy was on 25 November, the evening he saw the U. S. Embassy security officer.

[MEXI-7168 (IN 70860), 30 November 1963]

30 November 1963

Mexico Station reports that the Legal Attache is being informed of the above information (as well as other information contained in MEXI-7168).

[MEXI-7168 (IN 70860), 30 November 1963]

30 November 1963 (date of dissemination)

Headquarters disseminates information to FBI, State Department, and the White House, that ALVARADO admitted his story was a fabrication.

[DIR 86063, 30 November 1963]

30 November 1963

Headquarters asks the Station obtain all details on ALVARADO's confession. The Station is asked to "continue to follow all leads and tips. The question of whether OSWALD acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved.

[DIR 86064, 30 November 1963]

2 December 1963

Captain WHEELOCK saw ALVARADO during afternoon for first time. Meeting lasted only seven minutes. In brief interview in company of two Mexican officials, ALVARADO reverted to his previous story. He claimed he did see OSWALD, did call the U. S. Embassy to report. (Embassy investigation does not support latter statement.) He went to say that he told the Mexicans he was fabricating because he was "mentally mistreated", i.e., threatened with physical harm, although he was not actually physically mistreated.

WHEELLOCK said he unable to come to any definite conclusion as to ALVARADO's veracity; however, he would be able to do so once he returned to Managua and had chance to complete the interrogation.

(NB: ALVARADO was to be deported to Nicaragua on 4 December.)

[MEXI 7203 (IN 71702), 2 December 1963]

3 December 1963

Headquarters tells Mexico Station that although we are confident that ALVARADO is a fabricator and that his retraction of his confession is false, it has been decided that he should be placed on the polygraph. Headquarters asks that Station arrange to have ALVARADO to be released to us for several days and ask WHEELLOCK to remain in Mexico to assist.

Calvin DAVIS of the Office of Security will arrive on 4 December. Polygraph should be administered in safehouse and all sessions should be recorded. DAVIS will be in charge of the polygraph interview; however, he will be assisted by Clark ANDERSON, who has been selected here as interpreter. The FBI will notify ANDERSON of this. The idea is that ANDERSON would be able to testify at any later hearing.

[DIR 86563, 3 December 1963]

3 December 1963

ECHEVARRIA, Acting Minister of Gobernacion, agrees to permit the COS to "borrow" ALVARADO. Station submits plan for handling LAVARADO:

- a. Clark ANDERSON and Joe GARCIA of Legal Attache office to pick up ALVARADO from Gobernacion.
- b. ALVARADO will be taken to safehouse or hotel suite.
- c. ANDERSON to GARCIA will act as interpreters.
- d. Plan to "borrow" ALVARADO early morning of 5 December and return him that evening.

[MEXI 7229 (IN 72877), 3 December 1963]

4 December 1963

Headquarters approves Station's plan and adds that the "exact role of the FBI men is up to their local chief"

The FBI has specified that Mr. ANDERSON act as their participant in the interrogation and any variance should have approval of Mr. ANDERSON.

[DIR-86621, 4 December 1963]

5 December 1963

More plans by Station for interrogation of ALVARADO.

[MEXI-7256 (IN 74273), 5 December 1963]

5 December 1963

Mexican Station forwards copies of Mexican interrogation report on Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Station notes that a copy of this report was handed to the Legal Attache.

[HMMA-22561, 5 December 1963]

5 December 1963

Preliminary questioning of ALVARADO took place. [REDACTED]

[MEXI 7267 (IN 74696), 6 December 1963]

6 December 1963

ALVARADO submitted to examination by polygraph. The results of this examination indicated that he was fabricating his story. Interrogation revealed that ALVARADO was unsure as to the day of the week he allegedly saw OSWALD. He thinks it was on Tuesday which would have been 17 September. When ALVARADO was shown a series of photographs during the testing, deception patterns became evident. When he was confronted with this he answered that he had the utmost confidence in the polygraph and that it must be correct. The interrogation was concluded with ALVARADO admitting he must have made "honest mistake" in relating original story in his identification of OSWALD.

ALVARADO to be held by the Mexicans until 9 December.

[MEXI-7289 (IN 75588), 7 December 1963]

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18

7 December 1963 (date of dissemination)

Headquarters cables a dissemination to the FBI on the results of the examination by polygraph of Gilberto ALVARADO.

"The re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO, Nicaraguan informant who claimed to have seen Lee OSWALD receive money to assassinate Kennedy, has been concluded. Our Mexico City Station advises us that ALVARADO admitted he must have been mistaken in saying that he saw OSWALD in the Cuban Embassy. Also, he was uncertain of the date on which he might have seen someone like OSWALD and thought it must have been on a Tuesday, which would have made it 17 September 1963. Although the final report of the polygraph interview is not yet available, the preliminary finding is that ALVARADO evidenced deception reactions when talking about OSWALD.

"It is expected that ALVARADO will be deported to Nicaragua on 9 December 1963.

"A representative of your Bureau participated in the interrogation of ALVARADO."

[DIR 87667, 7 December 1963]

7 December 1963

An official of the Ministry of Gobernacion advised the Chief of Station that ALVARADO will be returned to Managua by TACA flight no. 773 leaving Mexico at 0930 hours on 8 December.

[MEXI-7290 (IN 75835), 7 December 1963]

13 December 1963 (date of dissemination)

Headquarters forwards a translation of the Mexican police interrogation report on Gilberto ALVARADO to the FBI.

"1. Attached is a translation of the Mexican police interrogation report on Gilberto ALVARADO, Nicaraguan who claimed to have seen Lee OSWALD accept \$6500 in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to assassinate President Kennedy. The report states that ALVARADO retracted these assertions and admitted that he made them to induce the U. S. to take stronger action against Cuba.

"2. The two persons whom ALVARADO met and to whom he first told his story are undoubtedly officers of this Agency. His claim that they used FBI credentials is, of course, absolutely false. Our officers use no credentials in Mexico City.

"3. As you know, ALVARADO retracted the confession of fabrication which he made to the

Mexican police and had to be reinterrogated by representatives of this Agency and your Bureau. This later interrogation showed that he was probably lying."

[CSCI 3/779,136 13 December 1963. (Comment: Translation was made of the Mexican police report forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-22561, 5 December 1963.)]

31 January 1964

The Agency forwards a memorandum to the Warren Commission enclosing a presentation of the information developed by CIA on or about Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. A summary of the information relating to the monetary payment to OSWALD and the investigation of this allegation appears on pages 11 through 14 of the enclosure.

[Memorandum for Mr. J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31 January 1964; subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963.]

21 April 1964

The General Counsel, J. Lee RANKIN, of the Warren Commission forwards the following memorandum to the Deputy Director for Plans:

"On behalf of the Commission I would like to thank you and your representatives for the fine cooperation which was extended to representatives of the Commission during the course of their work in Mexico City from April 8 through April 13, 1964. I am informed that Mr. SCOTT, the Chief of your Station in Mexico City, was particularly generous with his time and advice and, in fact, contributed greatly to the success of our mission in Mexico.

"During their stay in Mexico City the Commission representatives discussed with Mr. SCOTT and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that portion of the Lee Harvey OSWALD investigation which concerned Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. We are aware, of course, from previous reports that the allegations made by ALVARADO were thoroughly investigated by Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives in Mexico City in liaison with the responsible law enforcement authorities. Reference is made to the discussion of these allegations in your memorandum dated January 31, 1964 at pages 11 - 14.

"Upon review of our complete file on this matter, we find that we lack full documentation of the investigation conducted of these allegations. It would be helpful if our records could be supplemented by a report from your Agency supplying more details regarding the investigation undertaken by your Agency and other concerned Agencies into this matter and your evaluation as to the truth of ALVARADO's assertions. In particular, it would be helpful if a report could be submitted by the expert who conducted the polygraph examination which emphasizes the specific conclusions which he made based on the responses by ALVARADO in answering key questions on this matter."

[Letter to Mr. Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 21 April 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.]

1 June 1964

In response to the above letter from the General Counsel of the Warren Commission, the Agency forwarded by memorandum the texts of the following disseminations relative to ALVARADO that were made to other U. S. Government agencies:

- a. OUT Teletype No. 85089, dated 26 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.
- b. OUT Teletype No. 85199, dated 27 November 1963, Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.
- c. OUT Teletype No. 85662, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.
- d. OUT Teletype No. 86068, dated 30 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.
- e. OUT Teletype No. 85666, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO.
- f. Memorandum, dated 12 [sic - 13] December 1963, Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.
- g. OUT Teletype No. 87667, dated 7 December 1963, Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

[Memorandum for Mr. J. Lee RANKIN, dated 1 June 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans; Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.]

13 October 1964

The General Counsel forwards the following letter to the Honorable John A. McCONE, DCI:

"We are enclosing a copy of your SECRET document

dated January 31, 1964, concerning information developed by CIA on the activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963.

"We have deleted all references to the Secret Agent by the marking, "D". Since this document was cited in our summary report, we are requesting your authority to publish it in this form. If this is not agreeable, may we have a synopsis of this document which may be published."

[Letter to John A. McCONE, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, dated 13 October 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel. Enclosures: Commission Documents 347 and 1084.]

20 October 1963

The Deputy Director for Plans forwards a memorandum to the General Counsel of the Warren Commission in response to the latter's letter of 13 October 1964.

"The Commission's Report (pages 307-308) contains information furnished by this Agency in memoranda dated 31 January and 1 June 1964. Since both include information relative to intelligence methods and operations which should not be placed in the public domain, I suggest the use of the revised and consolidated versions dated 4 June 1964 which is forwarded as an attachment."

[Memorandum for Mr. J. Lee RANKIN, dated 20 October 1964, from Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans.]