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Hicks file

CC: N.Y. - 10/28/1960

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Bay and Capt. Chiloe in the latrine
specifiant (U.S. Govt. Office, New York City) on 22
November, 1960.

FACTS OR INFORMATION

1. Notes: This meeting was been called by us in order to explain
the existing situation at Headquarters concerning our future
relationship with the PAF. (See Memorandum from the Record dated 21
November 1960, DIA 12552, OUT 4586, enc G, which states memorandum to
C/WI/L, 6 November, 1960; also see DIA 1774, 19-438 & which states that
Bunt obtained Verano's concurrence on 21 October, to discuss the PAF w/
the PAF's controller.)

2. The meeting was started by me telling Bay that I had received a
somewhat garbled message concerning a certain commandant on the date of
Nov. 4. Now comes an undertaking we shall make, privately, and
involving (unintelligible). The question was posed prior to my arrival by
C/WI/L and in line with C/WI/L/M's correspondence to me. Bay informed me
as follows:

(a) There are two garrisons stationed at the Isle of Pines
with whom his organization has contact. One garrison is commanded
06 by a [Captain Caro] who could squat in approximately 10 days to
follow him here, and if [Caro] decides to break away from OASCOM.
06 [Capote] also has approximately 15 trustworthy officials under his
command (whether these officers were military or civilian Bay did
not know) which were ready to assist in anti-chastro activities—the
second garrison was located at the Punta Del Este and was primarily
a coast artillery installation. Bay did not say if it is a base of the
commanding officer.

06 (b) Quite separately from the above, people are in contact with a (one) [Padilla] who is the [commander of the crew] whom
Huber Hayes is incarcerated. According to reliable information, he
says, [Padilla] may be of help in arranging the escape of Hayes. A
small amount was sent, in fact on 21 December, so that Hayes
seems to trust [Padilla] and was given—via his wife who can visit him
at the prison—the okay to utilize [Padilla] in efforts designed to
liberate Hayes from prison. 06

(c) In considering the situation outlined in (a) and (b) above,
General Bay's military planners felt that no single solution
be sufficient since there is no clear-cut answer, i.e., they do not want
to be forced and if the two solutions in the time being adopted, one will
will defeat, then other troops and a good part of the population
the Isle of Pines, known by the name of Hayes, is located on the
Coast No. 10, which, the 10th Coast (at the Isle of Pines) is the
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area location to probably not be with Castro. It would be
harder between supporters of Castro who have been
used longer, either or during the coup. This would be the main
target of what Castro's group form, according to say there are
only three roads to pass on leading into the Isle of Pines and
over land. These roads, the RNPACs feel, will be easily furnish
surveillance by them. As another one seen, the general object of
the supporters would be for [Castro] to capture and capture the same.
That [Castro] people from a country of approximately 10 million drive
in the south where there are no established roads to get to the
area of interest. They will be a number of times in order to get
[Castro] to [Castro's] destination. There would be found all the
help [Castro] need. This area would also be extremely difficult to
liberate as [Castro] will be less than perimeter would move and
occupy position and, perhaps, also strategic locations.

(d) the routes that it follows, but set as the target route
but that will [possibly] not [possibly] be for rotation in the very
near future. The last one, to the pleasure dome, a Sunday is the
time day it would need to operate.

3. After the given instruction by what for the following sentence
to begin:

- (a) Our support to end/or advise on how to neutralize Castro's air force,
 - (b) Intelligence for mounting naval, army and air fields,
 - (c) Delivery of anti-air craft artillery and continuing re-supply for mid-metro rebels after the operation has begun, and
 - (d) Maps prepared by the Naval Survey Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, (1)

b. Without rating "X" commitments in the above report I asked whether or not the MAF had sufficient facilities at his disposal and whether or not his people would ever have to rearm, handle, and use any supplies which might come their way. I also asked what specific types of weapons the MAF pictures were thinking of and what kind of ammunition re-supply would be needed for arms not already in the hands of anti-Castro Cubans in the area. It being agreed that I might have the answers to these questions within 24 hours I should be referred for further discussion in the "Technical Panel," i.e., Colom, Barrios and the rest.

5. At this point of the conference I began wto the implementation of the Headquarters decisions reached in regard to the Pemba group's support of the NCU. I said that I wanted to repeat comments I had made previously to Chibas, Matave, Banjul, and Daga namely, that the Pemba group could not afford any complications of either intra effects that or administrative and supply routines. This was established for quite some time, and that this decision, i.e., the treacherous and the democratic would have to be followed to the letter in carrying out this work. My

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undoubtedly know that Smith was also the military advisor to the FID; any aircraft used undoubtedly carry the FID label and in all likelihood I.D.-required, anti-Castro literature would accompany such supplemental planes and planes utilized in such an undertaking were FID assets and identified as such.

6. Peris reply to this was somewhat as follows: while the FID thinks it concerns these pilots I, Bender, should at least realize that the pilots who were working formerly for Cuban Air Lines really belonged to the MCP. In my case he, Ray, and the MCP would accept the proposed arrangement because it would not imply that the MCP is politically beholden to the FID; it would simply indicate to the people inside Cuba that the MCP were utilizing all resources to obtain the equipment necessary to overthrow the regime. Naturally he was not enthusiastic about this formula but he could live and cope with it.

7. I told Ray that I would have to get in touch with our military people in order to find out whether or not we now had sufficient data on hand on which to base a decision. (Comments: C/HB/L was briefed telephonically by me on the foregoing and on additional aspects of this meeting which are recorded in part two of this Contact Report. C/HB/L and I felt that we did not have as yet sufficient data to issue any commitment; C/HB/L instructed me to advise Ray that:

(a) Either the MCP should submit a detailed plan which we would consider on the basis of which we would then decide whether to be of assistance or not or;

(b) The MCP could go it alone, and ask us for some assistance after the operation has been launched and we would make our decisions then on the basis of existing circumstances.

Above was transmitted to Ray who indicated that the MCP did not desire to go it alone and that he would instruct Berguin to immediately contact Smith in Miami to work out a coordinated operational plan.)

8. At this point in the meeting I felt that the time was ripe to make the \$7500 proposal (by Bender check) and so advised Ray that another \$7500 would be made available to him via funds in the FBI cryptofiles. Requested what I had said previously about capitalization and followed the approved lines contained in my 19 November 1960 memorandum to C/HB/L. Ray's and Cubas' reactions were not unexpected; they rejected this particular funding proposal. (Comments: for additional details and other items concerning this meeting see parts two and three, "Contact Report, 2 November, Meeting with Ray and Cubas.")

CERAMIC DPO:JLR
C/HB/L/H

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