

# File #:

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Assassination Records Collection Act of  
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW  
65994 Date: 11-01-2021

66-51-2921

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# Serial Scope:

1 thru 14

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NR046 WA CODE

8:06PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENTS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

END

DJK

FBI-ST

NO action  
Ttl A.M.  
JX

make

66-2921-1

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FBI-SPRINGFIELD	
JR	

Agent

Class.

% of Time

① Carlson	105	8%
"	134	1%
		<u>9%</u>

② Civitano	105	11%
"	100	9%
"	170	7%
		<u>27%</u>

③ Dean	170	5%
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④ DiFranco	170	5%
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⑤ Downum	157	7%
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⑥ Dueker	157	10%
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⑦ Dunphy	105	1%
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⑧ Flanagan	157	
"	170	

⑨ Goergen	157	2%
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supv. Berthom  
5% on I. Sec.  
5% on C. I.  
supv. Callan  
15% C. I.

Klaepfer  
The Canby  
on C. I.  
only

66-2921-2

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 25 1975	
FBI-SPRINGFIELD	

fbz

(10) Graper 105  
" 134

8%  
12%  
20%

(11) Grimes 157

1%

X

(12) Groh 157

8%

X

(13) Haines 100

2%

X

(14) Hanson 125

3%

X

(15) Harms 170  
" 157

1%  
1%  
2%

X

(16) Kloefer 134  
" 105

14%  
24%  
38%

(17) Lee 105

12%

(18) Louderman 100  
" 105

870  
870  
1670

(19) Lucas 170  
" 157

270  
470  
670  
170  
770

" 134

(20) Mc Canley 134  
" 105  
" 100

3770  
1570  
1870  
7070

(21) Mearns 170  
" 157

1170  
370  
1470

(22) Medina 105  
" 170

170  
470  
570

(23) Osgood 105

170 X

(24) Quattrocchi 170 370 X

(25) Rabideau 157 2170  
" 170 270  
2370

(26) Reis 100 470 X

(27) Polen 105 1270  
" 134 670  
" 157 1670  
3470

(28) Saucier 105 670

(29) Schofer 170 570

(30) Schuler 100 970

(31) Scott 105 270 X

(32)	Smith	157	470
	"	100	370
	"	105	170
	"	134	270
			<u>1070</u>

(33)	Stephens	157	570
	"	134	370
			<u>870</u>

(34)	Stokes	157	370	X
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(35)	Tisdale	105	770
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(36)	Weatherall	100	2670
		134	2570
		157	170
		105	870
			<u>6070</u>



F B I

Date: 3/26/75

Transmit the following in CODE  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE NITEL  
(Priority)

NR 013

TO: DIRECTOR  
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM: SPRINGFIELD (66- )

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME SPENT BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD  
DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS  
IS AS FOLLOWS:

THIRTY-SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THEIR  
TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. <sup>of the above</sup> ONE SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY  
25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND ONE  
<sup>Other</sup> SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTER-  
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY  
25 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT ON  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHILE ANOTHER SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY  
15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

①-Springfield (66- )  
JLB/mab  
(1)  
mab

66-2921-3

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 27 1975	
FBI - SPRINGFIELD	

13

Approved: 3Sent 10<sup>22</sup> M Per [Signature]

Special Agent in Charge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

SI 66-

PAGE TWO

THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SQUADS OF AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE MATTERS AND THE ABOVE ESTIMATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED FROM THE UTILIZATION OF TIMES SPENT DURING A TWO-WEEK PERIOD ON MATTERS BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

TO: SAC:

☐ Albany  
☐ Albuquerque  
☐ Alexandria  
☐ Anchorage  
☐ Atlanta  
☐ Baltimore  
☐ Birmingham  
☐ Boston  
☐ Buffalo  
☐ Butte  
☐ Charlotte  
☐ Chicago  
☐ Cincinnati  
☐ Cleveland  
☐ Columbia  
☐ Dallas  
☐ Denver  
☐ Detroit  
☐ El Paso  
☐ Honolulu

☐ Houston  
☐ Indianapolis  
☐ Jackson  
☐ Jacksonville  
☐ Kansas City  
☐ Knoxville  
☐ Las Vegas  
☐ Little Rock  
☐ Los Angeles  
☐ Louisville  
☐ Memphis  
☐ Miami  
☐ Milwaukee  
☐ Minneapolis  
☐ Mobile  
☐ Newark  
☐ New Haven  
☐ New Orleans  
☐ New York City  
☐ Norfolk

☐ Oklahoma City  
☐ Omaha  
☐ Philadelphia  
☐ Phoenix  
☐ Pittsburgh  
☐ Portland  
☐ Richmond  
☐ Sacramento  
☐ St. Louis  
☐ Salt Lake City  
☐ San Antonio  
☐ San Diego  
☐ San Francisco  
☐ San Juan  
☐ Savannah  
☐ Seattle  
☐ Springfield  
☐ Tampa  
☐ Washington Field  
☐ Quantico

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☐ Ottawa  
☐ Paris  
☐ Rome  
☐ Singapore  
☐ Tel Aviv  
☐ Tokyo

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Date 11/21/75

66-2921\*

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by \_\_\_\_\_  
☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.  
☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr. Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the November 20, 1975, issue of "The New York Times."

CCO-Xerox 1 copy  
each bulletin board  
x1 each SRA Donel

66-2921-4

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
NOV 24 1975	
FBI - NEW YORK	

Maynard

Enc. *BB*  
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# Mr. Church's Cover-Up

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Nov. 19—On Oct. 10, 1963, the then-Attorney General of the United States put his personal signature on a document that launched and legitimized one of the most horrendous abuses of Federal police power in this century.

In Senator Frank Church's subcommittee hearing room this week, the authorized wiretapping and subsequent unauthorized bugging and attempted blackmailing of Martin Luther King Jr. is being gingerly examined, with the "investigation" conducted in such a way as not to unduly embarrass officials of the Kennedy or Johnson Administrations.

With great care, the committee has focused on the F.B.I. Yesterday, when the committee counsel first set forth the result of shuffling through press clips, it seemed as if no Justice Department had existed in 1962; today, an F.B.I. witness pointed out that it was Robert Kennedy who authorized the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the President of the United States and the Attorney General specifically discussed their concern of Communist influence with Dr. King."

But the Church committee showed no zest for getting further to the Kennedy root of this precedent to Watergate eavesdropping. If Senator Church were willing to let the chips fall where they may, he would call some knowledgeable witnesses into the glare of the camera lights and ask them some questions that have gone unasked for thirteen years.

For example, he could call Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General Kennedy's deputy and successor, and ask what he knows of the Kennedy decision to wiretap Dr. King. Who at Justice concurred in the recommendation? How does the F.B.I. know the President was consulted or informed?

After Mr. Katzenbach assumed office, and the wiretapping continued, he was told by angry newsmen that the F.B.I. was leaking scurrilous information about Dr. King. Why did he wait for four months, and for a thousand telephonic interceptions, to discontinue the officially approved tap?

Of course, this sort of testimony would erode Senator Church's political base. That is why we do not see former Assistant F.B.I. director Cartha (Dcke) DeLoach, Lyndon Johnson's personal contact with the F.B.I. in the witness chair. What did President Johnson know about the character-assassination plot and when did he know it? What conversations took place between Mr. DeLoach and President Johnson on the tapping of Dr. King, or about the use of the F.B.I. in any other intrusions into the lives of political figures?

The committee is not asking embarrassing questions even when answers are readily available. A couple of weeks ago, at an open hearing, an F.B.I. man inadvertently started to blurt out an episode about newsmen who were wiretapping in 1962 with the apparent knowledge of Attorney General Kennedy. The too-willing witness was promptly shooshed into silence, and told that such information would be developed only in executive session. Nobody raised an eyebrow.

That pattern of containment by the Church committee is vividly shown by the handling of the buggings at the 1964 Republican and Democratic con-

## ESSAY

ventions which were ordered by Lyndon Johnson. Such invasions of political headquarters were worse than the crime committed at Watergate, since they involved the use of the F.B.I., but the Church investigators seem to be determined not to probe too deeply.


If F.B.I. documents say that reports were made to specific Johnson aides, why are those men not given the same opportunity to publicly tell their story so avidly given the next President's men? If Lyndon Johnson committed this impeachable high crime of using the F.B.I. to spy on political opponents, who can be brought forward to tell us all about it?

But that would cause embarrassment to Democrats, and Senator Church wants to embarrass professional employees of investigatory agencies only. A new sense of Congressional decorum exists, far from the sense of outrage expressed in the Senate Watergate committee's hearing room. When it is revealed that the management of NBC News gave press credentials to L.B.J.'s spies at the 1964 convention, everybody blushes demurely—and nobody demands to know which network executive made what decision under what pressure.

I have been haranguing patient readers for years about the double standard applied to Democratic and Republican political crimes, and had hoped the day would come when the hardball precedents set by the Kennedy and Johnson men would be laid before the public in damning detail.

Obviously, Democrat Frank Church is not the man to do it. His jowl-shaking indignation is all too selective; the trail of high-level responsibility for the crimes committed against Dr. King and others is evidently going to be allowed to cool.

Pity. You'd think that after all the nation has been through in the past few years, our political leaders would have learned that the one thing that brings you down is the act of covering up.



THE NEW YORK TIMES  
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20th, 1975  
PAGE C-41

NR050 WA PLAIN

1100PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN  
SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A  
SYNOPSISIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S  
QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED  
WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF  
INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE  
WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS  
ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING  
WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER  
PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE  
INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING  
THE AGENTS' WORK THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

*6.7 month  
per handle.*

*① CCO  
Handle as  
an SAC mem.*

*no action  
T.M.*

*See Reverse Side  
for Distribution*

66-2921-5

SEARCHED <i>JS</i>	INDEXED <i>JS</i>
SERIALIZED <i>JS</i>	FILED <i>JS</i>
DEC 10 1975	
FBI - SPRINGFIELD	

*JS*

*② ABAC JMR*

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#5	#6 SUPV. AND SQUAD	2-25-76	gm
#6	SCHULER	2-25-76	gm
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#11	KLOEPFER	2-25-76	gm
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#14	LUCAS	2-25-76	gm
#15	WILLIAMS	2-25-76	gm
#16	DAVIS E.	2-25-76	gm
#17	SMITH	2-25-76	gm

PAGE TWO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT; THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL, INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY.

PAGE THREE

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION



PAGE FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

DES FBI SPRINGFIELD CLR

NR050 WA PLAIN

1100PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

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66-2921-5

SEARCHED <i>[initials]</i>	INDEXED <i>[initials]</i>
SERIALIZED <i>[initials]</i>	FILED <i>[initials]</i>
DEC 10 1975	
FBI - SPRINGFIELD	

*[signature]*

PAGE TWO

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ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

DES FBI SPRINGFIELD CLR

TO: SAC:

<input type="checkbox"/> Albany	<input type="checkbox"/> Houston
<input type="checkbox"/> Albuquerque	<input type="checkbox"/> Indianapolis
<input type="checkbox"/> Alexandria	<input type="checkbox"/> Jackson
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<input type="checkbox"/> Columbia	<input type="checkbox"/> Mobile
<input type="checkbox"/> Dallas	<input type="checkbox"/> Newark
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<input type="checkbox"/> San Diego
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<input type="checkbox"/> San Juan
<input type="checkbox"/> Savannah
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<input type="checkbox"/> Springfield
<input type="checkbox"/> Tampa
<input type="checkbox"/> Washington Field
<input type="checkbox"/> Quantico

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<input type="checkbox"/> Hong Kong
<input type="checkbox"/> London
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<input type="checkbox"/> Ottawa
<input type="checkbox"/> Paris
<input type="checkbox"/> Rome
<input type="checkbox"/> Singapore
<input type="checkbox"/> Tel Aviv
<input type="checkbox"/> Tokyo

RE:

Date 12/30/75

DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,  
DECEMBER 10, 1975

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by \_\_\_\_\_

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

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Remarks:

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is one copy of the transcript of questions which were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance, along with Mr. Kelley's answers to those questions.

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# The United States Senate

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## Report of Proceedings

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### Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities

### INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

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Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

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WARD & PAUL

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C O N T E N T

STATEMENT OF:

PAGE

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

2451



## 1 INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

2 - - -

3 Wednesday, December 10, 1975

4 - - -

5 United States Senate,

6 Select Committee to Study Governmental

7 Operations with Respect to

8 Intelligence Activities,

9 Washington, D. C.

10 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10  
11 o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,  
12 the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)  
13 presiding.

14 Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,  
15 Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and  
16 Mathias.

17 Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick  
18 A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority  
19 Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick  
20 Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles  
21 Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob  
22 Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,  
23 Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.

24 - - -

25 The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

1 the Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, the Director of the Federal  
2 Bureau of Investigation.

3 Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a  
4 troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative  
5 law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City  
6 Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as  
7 a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified  
8 to lead the Bureau.

9 The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation  
10 extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over  
11 the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the  
12 openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and  
13 their willingness to consider the need for legislation to  
14 clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

15 It is important to remember from the outset that this  
16 Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's  
17 activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic  
18 intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our  
19 admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative  
20 and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance  
21 of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic  
22 intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

23 The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather  
24 than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light  
25 in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

1 Kelley took charge.

2 The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director  
3 Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous  
4 policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The  
5 FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-  
6 gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.  
7 The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in  
8 developing policies and standards for intelligence. These  
9 are welcome developments.

10 Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.  
11 Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the  
12 Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress  
13 should take into account in thinking about the future of  
14 FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-  
15 lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons  
16 likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be  
17 outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain  
18 types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;  
19 whether foreign related intelligence activities should be  
20 strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement  
21 functions, and what should be done to the information already  
22 in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in  
23 the future.

24 The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange  
25 of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney

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1 General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice  
2 Department in the next months as the Committee considers  
3 recommendations that will strengthen the American people's  
4 confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That  
5 confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal  
6 law and for the security of the nation against foreign  
7 espionage.

8 Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if  
9 you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off  
10 with, please proceed.

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1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,  
2 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
3 Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and  
4 gentlemen.

5 I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in  
6 the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-  
7 gence and internal security fields.

8 I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the  
9 Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my  
10 35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-  
11 tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs  
12 of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with  
13 law.

14 I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative  
15 oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of  
16 the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary  
17 Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of  
18 that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

19 This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study  
20 of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been  
21 undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present  
22 Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest  
23 cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as  
24 possible in responding to your questions and complying with your  
25 requests.

1 I believe we have lived up to those promises.

2 The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-  
3 dented access to FBI information.

4 You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type  
5 investigations and who are personally involved in every facet  
6 of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

7 You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who  
8 have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with  
9 all major areas of our activities and operations in the national  
10 security and intelligence fields.

11 In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these  
12 matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the  
13 Congress.

14 As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of  
15 necessity, focused largely on certain errors and abuses. I  
16 credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the  
17 hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's  
18 record of performance.

19 It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus  
20 on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the  
21 organization.

22 The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the  
23 lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted  
24 an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

25 A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

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1 to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence  
2 Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found  
3 3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI  
4 Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,  
5 less than three fourths, were approved.

6 I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were  
7 being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era  
8 when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative  
9 matters per year.

10 Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed  
11 regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate  
12 and understandable.

13 The question might well be asked what I had in mind when  
14 I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it  
15 did under the circumstances then existing would have been an  
16 abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

17 What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is  
18 that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they  
19 felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,  
20 the Congress, and the people of the United States.

21 Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and  
22 buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige  
23 to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and  
24 killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such  
25 acts of violence from New England to California.

1           The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,  
2           and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or  
3           perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and  
4           appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement  
5           agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their  
6           rights.

7           There were many calls for action from Members of Congress  
8           and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other  
9           law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient  
10          demands, for immediate action.

11          FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a  
12          responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions  
13          designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed  
14          revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

15          In the development and execution of these programs,  
16          mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

17          Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-  
18          intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones,  
19          should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

20          We must recognize that situations have occurred in the  
21          past and will arise in the future where the Government may well  
22          be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's  
23          case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering  
24          agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet  
25          an imminent threat to human life or property.



1 In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried  
2 out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating  
3 only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the  
4 ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is  
5 a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to  
6 human life.

7 Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,  
8 the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such  
9 preventive action should be available to the FBI.

10 These matters are currently being addressed by a task  
11 force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,  
12 and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can  
13 be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress  
14 to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible  
15 manner.

16 Probably the most important question here today is what  
17 assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose  
18 under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

19 First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-  
20 stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's  
21 methods of operations since I took the oath of office as  
22 Director on July 9, 1973.

23 Today we place a high premium on openness, openness  
24 both within and without the service.

25 I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion

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1 in the decision-making process which insures that no future  
2 program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a  
3 full and critical review of its propriety.

4 Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

5 I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and  
6 Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of  
7 position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts  
8 and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or  
9 reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

10 The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take  
11 full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum  
12 critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner  
13 weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

14 The results of this program have been most beneficial, to  
15 me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to  
16 the morale of our employees.

17 In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past  
18 were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside  
19 the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's  
20 guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his  
21 own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

22 Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi  
23 instructed that I immediately report to him any requests  
24 or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,  
25 considering the context of the request, I believed presented

1 the appearances of impropriety.

2 I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the  
3 Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as  
4 Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no  
5 one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,  
6 to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper  
7 purposes.

8 I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider  
9 honoring any such request.

10 I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI  
11 I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and  
12 the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including  
13 those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and  
14 practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order  
15 that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities  
16 over the FBI.

17 I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today  
18 is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity  
19 can be assured only through institutional means.

20 Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the  
21 character of the person who occupies the office of the  
22 Director and every member of the FBI under him.

23 I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is  
24 my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,  
25 their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

1 demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the  
2 nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct  
3 at all times by the FBI.

4 The Congress and the members of this Committee in  
5 particular have gained a great insight into the problems  
6 confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,  
7 problems which all too often we have left to resolve without  
8 sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress  
9 itself.

10 As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been  
11 made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our  
12 failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even  
13 to the Executive Branch.

14 The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for  
15 FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

16 An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the  
17 Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI  
18 Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully  
19 committed to maximum participation with the members of that  
20 Subcommittee.

21 I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very  
22 recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

23 One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee  
24 has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex  
25 problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

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1 those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step,  
2 a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative  
3 charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence  
4 jurisdiction for the FBI.

5 Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the  
6 security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it  
7 must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress  
8 nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to  
9 the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in  
10 the past.

11 This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role  
12 not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of  
13 our performance.

14 I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the  
15 courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that  
16 have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role  
17 of the courts into the early stages of the investigative  
18 process and, thereby, would take over what historically have  
19 been Executive Branch decisions.

20 I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would  
21 seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast  
22 them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our  
23 Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con-  
24 gressional oversight or Executive decision.

25 The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

1 of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional  
2 statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both  
3 the will and the needs of the American people.

4 Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a  
5 career police officer. In my police experience, the most  
6 frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing  
7 law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is  
8 when demands are made of them to perform their traditional  
9 role as protector of life and property without clear and  
10 understandable legal bases to do so.

11 I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative  
12 charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

13 It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle  
14 the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence  
15 of crime and violence across the United States. That charter  
16 must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;  
17 yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and  
18 so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive  
19 challenges.

20 The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced  
21 the formulation of operational guidelines governing our  
22 intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need  
23 for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-  
24 diction resides with the Congress.

25 In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

1 question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that  
2 information needed for the prevention of violence can be  
3 acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

4 As a practical matter, the line between intelligence  
5 work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult  
6 to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may  
7 well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there  
8 are some fundamental differences between these investigations  
9 that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective  
10 and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a  
11 crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to  
12 identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence  
13 for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows  
14 the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is  
15 limited and fairly well defined.

16 By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of  
17 information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be  
18 not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the  
19 Government has enough information to meet any future crisis  
20 or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it  
21 must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether  
22 the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the  
23 means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability  
24 of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on  
25 our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

1 in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-  
2 gence.

3 Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.  
4 Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need  
5 for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction  
6 of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not  
7 the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every  
8 citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution  
9 of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful  
10 deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the  
11 complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or  
12 its successors in this important task.

13 In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as  
14 Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit  
15 of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

16 That is the substance of my prepared statement.

17 I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note  
18 that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary  
19 Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented  
20 to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time  
21 I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result  
22 in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.  
23 I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that  
24 time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of  
25 the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take



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1     them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I  
2     have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this  
3     not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might  
4     place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek  
5     sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the  
6     period these things occurred I was with the local police  
7     department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,  
8     however, I was in the FBI.

9             During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I  
10    was with the police department, I continued throughout that  
11    period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for  
12    the FBI.

13            I only want to point out that based on those years, based  
14    on those observations, we have here a very fine and very  
15    sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there  
16    is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without  
17    fault. I know that from those experiences I have had. We  
18    will not be completely without fault in the future. But I  
19    assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any  
20    mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at --  
21    this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want  
22    to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a  
23    matchless organization, one which I continue to say was  
24    not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of  
25    them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

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1 best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am  
2 only putting in your thinking my objective observations as  
3 a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this  
4 organization. It is too precious for us to have it in  
5 a condition of jeopardy.

6 Thank you very much.

7 The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

8 I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able  
9 to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one  
end t. 1 10 question he would like to ask.

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1 Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

3 Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be  
4 covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of  
5 reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and  
6 it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the  
7 top of 11.

8 There you are indicating that you caution us about  
9 extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations  
10 suggesting that this might take us beyond the role contemplated  
11 for the courts under the Constutution.

12 Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national  
13 security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions  
14 and concern has been on the possibility requiring court  
15 approval for the use of informants, informants directed to  
16 penetrate and report on some group.

17 And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,  
18 pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive  
19 type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's  
20 really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy  
21 than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He  
22 can ask me questions to get information the government would  
23 like to have.

24 Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the  
25 wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters

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1 of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate  
2 screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the  
3 informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a  
4 general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval  
5 would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

6 And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to  
7 my feelings.

8 Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the  
9 informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.  
10 It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant,  
11 by numerous court decisions.

12 Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use  
13 of the informant.

14 I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.  
15 You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have  
16 basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection  
17 of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within  
18 the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary  
19 circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and  
20 seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none-  
21 theless, you have the right.

22 I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,  
23 we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our  
24 job.

25 Now I'm not arguing with you, Senator, that it is not an

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1 unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not  
2 an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think  
3 that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

4 We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that  
5 are attendant. We take great care.

6 Now you say about the court having possibility taking  
7 jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we  
8 could present the matter to the court but what are they going  
9 to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to  
10 have to follow it all the way through?

11 Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts.  
12 Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court  
13 given for each contact?

14 There are a great many problems insofar as administration  
15 of it.

16 I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my  
17 idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over  
18 the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are  
19 going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this  
20 is going to happen no matter what you do.

21 Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your  
22 reaction.

23 I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to  
24 prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and  
25 hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

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1 you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a  
2 third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is  
3 warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand  
4 your position.

5 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

7 (Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

8 The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

9 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

10 Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your  
11 organization and I personally regret that the organization is  
12 in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that  
13 it is, along with other agencies and departments of the  
14 government.

15 I think you probably would agree with me that even though  
16 that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects  
17 unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives  
18 us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,  
19 at least, to improve the level of competency and service of  
20 the government itself.

21 With that hopeful note, would you be agreeable then to  
22 volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve  
23 the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or  
24 indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,  
25 to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and

gsh

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1 beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on  
2 how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents,  
3 the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its  
4 essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to  
5 see that these functions, these delicate functions are being  
6 undertaken properly?

7 And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things  
8 I am concerned about.

9 It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not  
10 even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe  
11 you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the  
12 United States. I think that is a movement in the right  
13 direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an  
14 additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision  
15 and scrutiny by us.

16 At the same time I rather doubt that we can become  
17 involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney  
18 General.

19 Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General  
20 needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the  
21 FBI.

22 I would appreciate any comments on that.

23 Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the  
24 intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so  
25 that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

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1 look at these decisions and the process by which they were  
2 made to decide that you are or you are not performing your  
3 services diligently.

4 I don't think you can have oversight unless you have  
5 access to records, and in many cases records don't exist  
6 and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now  
7 departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

8 How would you suggest then that you improve the quality  
9 of service of your agency? How would you propose that you  
10 increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the  
11 United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving  
12 the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that  
13 is required?

14 Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering  
15 this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling  
16 what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,  
17 one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very  
18 important is that the position of Director, the one to which  
19 great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will  
20 properly acquit himself.

21 I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going  
22 over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most  
23 necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means  
24 of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency  
25 toward consulting with other members of the official family,



1 that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with  
2 no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very  
3 carefully.

4 I think further that he should be responsible for those  
5 matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

6 Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who  
7 does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for  
8 the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,  
9 for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

10 Who does the executive of the FBI, the Director of the  
11 FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

12 Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,  
13 but I think this is such an important field of influence that  
14 it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the  
15 judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the  
16 Attorney General.

17 Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea  
18 of the President of the United States calling the Director of  
19 the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

20 Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that  
21 the relationship between the FBI Director and the President  
22 is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited  
23 through the Attorney General?

24 Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority  
25 of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There

1 has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if  
2 the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he  
3 may do so, call him directly.

4 It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter  
5 report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I  
6 have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this  
7 was revealed in full to them.

8 Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that  
9 says the President has to go through the Attorney General,  
10 although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

11 But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary  
12 for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the  
13 Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least  
14 some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of  
15 the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

16 Do you think that these things need to be handled in  
17 a more formal way?

18 Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in  
19 the event I receive such an order, to request that it be  
20 documented. This is a protection as well as a clarification  
21 as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation.  
22 I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-  
23 tion.

24 I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it  
25 can be worked very easily.

gs 9  
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1 Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I  
2 believe, has already established some sort of agency or  
3 function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,  
4 I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,  
5 including the FBI.

6 Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has  
7 taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of  
8 Professional Responsibility.

9 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

10 Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will  
11 you give us any observations as to whether you think that  
12 will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or  
13 helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your  
14 relationship to it in the future?

15 Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some  
16 extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the  
17 Attorney General.

18 Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it  
19 completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely  
20 subscribe.

21 Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that  
22 concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector  
23 General who is involved with an oversight of all of the  
24 agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally  
25 protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care

gsh 10

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1 to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

2 Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

3 Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about  
4 it and let us know what you think about it?

5 Mr. Kelley. I will..

6 Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very  
7 much.

8 The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

9 Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that  
11 existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during  
12 this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the  
13 Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them  
14 by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and  
15 the people of the United States.

16 Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction  
17 there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the  
18 country because of certain circumstances rather than any  
19 clear and specific direct instructions that might have been  
20 received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,  
21 is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,  
22 to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

23 Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can  
24 logically be incorporated and that --

25 Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing

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1 danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the  
2 attitudes may be at a specific time in this country because --

3 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I don't contemplate it might be  
4 a continuing danger, but it certainly would be a very acceptable  
5 guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems  
6 to arise, know what we can do.

7 Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which  
8 Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can  
9 provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the  
10 court in determining what action might be proper and specific-  
11 ally in protecting individual's rights, can't we also  
12 provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various  
13 techniques that might be used?

14 For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as  
15 has already been done, that informants are necessary and  
16 desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the  
17 proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual  
18 rights?

19 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must  
20 be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure  
21 that there is no infringement of rights.

22 Senator Huddleston. But this is an aware we've gotten  
23 into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the  
24 particular action was necessary, that there was a present  
25 threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but

h 12

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1 in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been  
2 necessary to have addressed the original threat.

3 How do we keep within the proper balance there?

4 Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any  
5 other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's  
6 right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.  
7 There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

8 This is one which I think might flow if he counsels  
9 the informant.

10 Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,  
11 I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is  
12 still supervisory control over that agent and over that  
13 informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing  
14 basis.

15 Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point  
16 as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be  
17 very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone  
18 else.

19 If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do  
20 something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to  
21 whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported  
22 by the FBI.

23 Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to  
24 our attention should either be handled by us or the proper  
25 authority.

gsh 13

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1 Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the  
2 past.

3 Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring  
4 to but I would think your statement is proper.

5 Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence  
6 of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that  
7 have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to  
8 light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

9 The question that I'm really concerned about is as  
10 we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give  
11 the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide  
12 range of threats, how do we control what happens within each  
13 of those actions to keep them from going beyond what  
14 was intended to begin with?

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1 Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

2 Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents  
3 themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever  
4 intelligence gathering techniques.

5 The original thrust of my question was, even though we  
6 may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do  
7 we control the techniques that might be used, that in themselves  
8 might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation  
9 of the rights.

10 Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's  
11 germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed  
12 out that the association to, the relationship between the  
13 informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,  
14 and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-  
15 lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here  
16 because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.  
17 Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others  
18 which may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of  
19 violations of the law on the part of informants, and either  
20 prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the  
21 United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.  
22 We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar  
23 as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the  
24 Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and  
25 if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would



1 pursue it to the point of prosecution.

2 Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic  
3 review.

4 Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the  
5 activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection  
6 Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well  
7 as other matters.

8 Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed out the  
9 difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in  
10 gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

11 Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to  
12 attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the  
13 departments, for instance, with not having a mixing of  
14 gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques  
15 definable and different?

16 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I  
17 see no objection to the way that they are now being handled  
18 on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fact, it is  
19 a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as  
20 it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

21 Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes  
22 information to numerous government agencies.

23 Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present  
24 time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for  
25 information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

1 who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him  
2 to do specific things?

3 Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether  
4 or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such  
5 project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

6 Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must  
7 come from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,  
8 wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with  
9 a letter so requesting.

10 This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as  
11 I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in  
12 take care that you just don't follow the request of some  
13 underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

14 Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about  
15 techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad  
16 projects undertaken.

17 Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional  
18 oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department,  
19 with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have  
20 some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent  
21 with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent  
22 with the very protections?

23 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to the  
24 oversight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now  
25 see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

1 probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put  
2 on the use of that information once it has been supplied by  
3 the FBI?

4 Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

5 Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions  
6 now?

7 Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge  
8 in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason  
9 for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a  
10 very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're  
11 going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules  
12 that at least to us we are satisfied.

13 Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information  
14 your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment  
15 of the rights of any individuals.

16 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I  
17 do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

18 Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some  
19 inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to  
20 who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed  
21 on what the request, and what they can do with it after they  
22 get it.

23 Mr. Kelley. Yes.

24 Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact  
25 that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

1 bound to gather a great deal of information about some  
2 individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-  
3 gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarrass-  
4 ing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any  
5 effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's  
6 file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific  
7 purpose unrelated to this information.

8 Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to  
9 doing that?

10 Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the  
11 guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which  
12 is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-  
13 able.

14 Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time  
15 that these files are kept in the agency?

16 Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,  
17 too.

18 Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

19 Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to  
20 speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the  
21 President of the United States from calling up the head of  
22 the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement  
23 problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction  
24 to the agency.

25 But how about that? What about White House personnel

1 informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our  
2 present activities. I think this is the only way that we can  
3 exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to  
4 accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

5 Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect  
6 of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad  
7 direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects  
8 that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such  
9 things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence  
10 is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this  
11 type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap  
12 again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction  
13 and total permission to move in a certain direction and go  
14 beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

15 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

16 The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

17 Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI  
18 electronic surveillance of Dr. King, several tapes of  
19 specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were  
20 produced.

21 Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

22 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

23 Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

24 Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

25 Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

1 staff, to your knowledge?

2 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.  
3 I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of  
4 this particular section. There has been no review of them  
5 since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

6 Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to  
7 the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear  
8 them?

9 Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is  
10 of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to  
11 be a discussion of this in an executive session.

12 The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the  
13 Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and  
14 decided that it would compound the original error for the  
15 staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still  
16 further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from  
17 insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was  
18 unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at  
19 what we needed to know about the King case.

20 So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue  
21 never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information  
22 before the Senator.

23 Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of  
24 the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,  
25 and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to

1 ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase  
2 or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am  
3 not advocating it, I am merely asking a question. They would  
4 be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and  
5 decided on it.

6 Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-  
7 diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the  
8 Attorney General.

9 Senator Goldwater. I see.

10 Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance  
11 routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a  
12 target of inquiry?

13 Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

14 Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

15 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

16 Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any,  
17 to the Bureau of retaining such information?

18 Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a  
19 destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those  
20 occasions where we think that matters might come up within  
21 that period of time which may need the retention of them, we  
22 will express our opinion at that time, but other than that  
23 we would be guided by guidelines.

24 Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate  
25 law enforcement needs should outweigh privacy considerations

1 with respect to retention of such information, or do we need  
2 the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials  
3 when the investigation purposes for which they were collected  
4 have been served?

5 Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close  
6 look at the retention of material, and we would of course like  
7 to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

8 Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank  
9 you very much.

10 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

11 Senator Mondale?

12 Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the  
13 most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the  
14 invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,  
15 limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can  
16 and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,  
17 and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

18 As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and  
19 Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at  
20 criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we  
21 go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political  
22 ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

23 Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to  
24 draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are  
25 restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of



1 crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather  
2 than to leave this very difficult to define and control area  
3 of political ideas?

4 Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last  
5 statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that  
6 I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue  
7 in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory  
8 objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based  
9 on statutes in the so-called security field, national or  
10 foreign.

11 These are criminal violations. I feel that they should  
12 be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this  
13 atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have  
14 more personnel working together, covering the same fields..  
15 I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence  
16 matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows  
17 from the investigation of the security matters and the  
18 criminal.

19 Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr. Stone said was  
20 this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned  
21 with political or other opinions of individuals. It is  
22 concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws  
23 of the United States.. When the police system goes beyond  
24 these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of  
25 justice and human liberty.

1 Do you object to that definition?

2 Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more  
3 sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's  
4 area of concern some matters which were probably not as important  
5 at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in  
6 touch with the security investigations and the gathering of  
7 intelligence is something which has proved to be at times  
8 troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,  
9 productive procedure.

10 I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely  
11 of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today.

12 Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if  
13 that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that  
14 at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in  
15 fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't  
16 see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in  
17 the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of  
18 meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one  
19 you've just defined.

20 If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate  
21 ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's  
22 security, particularly in the light of the record that we have  
23 seen how that definition can be stretched to include practi-  
24 cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,  
25 war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed

1 that would provide any basis for oversight?

2 How can you, from among other things, be protected from  
3 criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't  
4 do something that some politician tried to pressure you into  
5 doing?

6 Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years  
7 from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be  
8 criticized for doing that which today is construed as very  
9 acceptable.

10 Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy  
11 for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

12 Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

13 Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is  
14 why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines  
15 as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured  
16 to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20  
17 hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say  
18 well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-  
19 ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by  
20 the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me  
21 that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's  
22 possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to  
23 be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what  
24 you should have done.

25 Don't you fear that?

1 Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a  
2 great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have  
3 come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact  
4 that I think that we have a different type of spirit today  
5 in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,  
6 that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they  
7 are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact  
8 that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the  
9 organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we  
10 had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in  
11 the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

12 We may not be able to project this on all occasions,  
13 because we must equate this with the need and with our  
14 experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're  
15 going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a  
16 flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those  
17 guidelines.

18 Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think  
19 there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified  
20 law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I  
21 think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,  
22 from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of  
23 enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you  
24 are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you  
25 get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the

1 great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably  
2 going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no  
3 matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get  
4 into trouble.

5 Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost  
6 every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter  
7 of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate  
8 from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is  
9 less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working  
10 with you we can at least make some achievements that will be  
11 significant.

12 Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I  
13 think we've made a good start.

14 Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August  
15 9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure  
16 of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

17 Which liberties did you have in mind?

18 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis-  
19 understood many, many times.

20 Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to  
21 clear it up.

22 Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement  
23 of the approach which the courts historically have used in  
24 resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its  
25 recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

1 protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth  
2 Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it  
3 does not prohibit searches and seizures. I mention, it only  
4 refers to those that are unreasonable.

5 I came from the police field. What is more restrictive  
6 to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be  
7 more chaotic is if you did not have traffic regulation. We  
8 do have to , in order to live in the complexities and  
9 intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our  
10 rights.

11 Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it  
12 is so, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there  
13 has to be a balance.

14 Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give  
15 up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you  
16 mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch that and ask again, you  
17 have to give up some rights. Which rights would you have us  
18 give up?

19 Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would  
20 have the right for search and seizure.

21 Senator Mondale. You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-  
22 ment right.

23 Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

24 Senator Mondale. What right do you have in mind?

25 Mr. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

1 Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the Consti-  
2 tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,  
3 under court warrant.

4 Did you mean to go beyond that?

5 Mr. Kelley. That's right.

6 Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond  
7 that?

8 Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever  
9 go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

10 Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that  
11 that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

12 Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I  
13 made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which --  
14 yes, it was inartful.

15 Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in  
16 law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were  
17 saying something different, that it was taken to mean something  
18 different than I think you intended.

19 What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law  
20 enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined  
21 by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling  
22 of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

23 That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

24 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my  
25 speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

1 understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.  
2 I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

3 Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that  
4 in effect, the rights of the American people can be determined  
5 not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the  
6 law.

7 You meant that.

8 Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

9 Senator Mondale. All right.

10 Thank you.

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1           The Chairman. Senator Hart.  
2           Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to  
3 a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about  
4 laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was  
5 we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the  
6 Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably  
7 hamper you from investigations of crime control in the  
8 country.

9           But I think implicit in his question was also an area  
10 that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind  
11 of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau  
12 from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political  
13 figures, particularly in the White House?

14          And we've had indications that at least two of your  
15 predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.  
16 Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use  
17 the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish  
18 some plititcal end.

19          Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer  
20 restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is  
21 not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

22          What kind of restrictions can we lay down to protect you  
23 from political pressures? I'd be interested in that sign of the  
24 coin, if you would.

25          Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

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1 protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think  
2 that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines  
3 as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might  
4 be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any  
5 consideration of such directives.

6 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

7 Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

8 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been  
9 a problem for the people that preceded you?

10 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

11 Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the  
12 Congress ought to address?

13 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

14 Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a  
15 letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the  
16 Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying  
17 out the investigation or their efforts to review the investi-  
18 gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther  
19 King, Jr., in order to determine whether that investigation  
20 should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked  
21 for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all  
22 material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates  
23 to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

24 I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-  
25 ment asking this Committee for FBI files?

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1 Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.  
2 I think they're asking for what testimony was given by  
3 witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

4 Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all  
5 material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates  
6 to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

7 I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department  
8 asking this Committee for material provided to us by the  
9 FBI?

10 Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I  
11 just ask --

12 (Pause)

13 Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.  
14 Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did  
15 they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I  
16 don't know why.

17 Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you  
18 provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

19 Mr. Kelley. That's right.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why  
21 an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee  
22 for your records?

23 Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. You released a statement on  
25 November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's counter-intelligence

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1 program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO  
2 activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

3 "The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was  
4 to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against  
5 individuals, organizations and institutions both public  
6 and private across the United States."

7 Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this  
8 Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of  
9 occasions he planned violent acts against black people in  
10 groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the  
11 FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

12 How does his testimony square with your statement that  
13 I have quoted?

14 Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of  
15 his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth.  
16 We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it  
17 and we know of no instances where, for example, 15 minutes  
18 and that type of thing has been substantiated.

19 Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony  
20 he gave us under oath was not accurate?

21 Mr. Kelley. Right.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,  
23 and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did  
24 not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI  
25 was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

1 revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

2 Now the Committee has received testimony that the New  
3 Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher  
4 authorities, the Attorney General and Congress.

5 Do you have any information in this regard?

6 I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,  
7 but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record  
8 seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic  
9 information flowing upward through the chain of command to  
10 Director Hoover's superiors?

11 Mr. Kelley: May I ask that I be given the opportunity  
12 to substantiate that with documentation?

13 Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

14 Mr. Kelley: Or respond to it.

15 Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in  
16 passing, do you agree with the statement made by President  
17 Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy  
18 Dr. King should be brought to justice.

19 Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whcse orders  
20 the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say  
21 that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar  
22 as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said  
23 to do it and those who are responsible.

24 I took the responsibility for any such program and I  
25 don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

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1 accordance with what they think is proper and may even have  
2 some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that  
3 responsibility.

4 I think that it should rest on those who instructed that  
5 that be done.

6 Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people  
7 who give the orders should be brought to justice.

8 Mr. Kelley. I do.

9 The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

10 Mr. Kelley. No.

11 The Chairman. Not quite?

12 Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

13 Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

14 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

15 Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the  
16 COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the  
17 FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three  
18 basic questions.

19 Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee  
20 is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for  
21 the future, what I would think would be our constructive  
22 legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what  
23 we learned in that investigation.

24 And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of  
25 the United States have from time to time ordered the FBI to

1 obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the  
2 necessary surveillance to obtain and to have a purely  
3 political character, that they simply wanted to have for their  
4 own personal purposes.

5 I think that you would agree that that is not a proper  
6 function of the FBI, and you agree.

7 Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,  
8 including the Director, to turn down a President of the United  
9 States if he receives a direct order from the President. It  
10 is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,  
11 I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man  
12 serving in your position, particularly if the President puts  
13 a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or  
14 even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say,  
15 you know, I am considering Senator White for an important  
16 position in my administration, and I need to know more about  
17 his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause  
18 for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in  
19 his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you  
20 to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's  
21 been doing lately.

22 It's difficult for you to say back to the President, Mr.  
23 President, that's a very questionable activity for the FBI,  
24 and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real  
25 reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

1 to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and  
2 you want to get something on him.

3 I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that  
4 way, and I'm wondering what we could do in the way of protecting  
5 your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this  
6 basic charter that we write.

7 Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one  
8 or two of mine. I would like your response.

9 If we were to write into the law that any order given you  
10 either by the President or by the Attorney General should be  
11 transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective  
12 and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain  
13 those written orders and that furthermore they would be  
14 available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the  
15 joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee  
16 would have access to such a file.

17 So that the committee itself would be satisfied that  
18 orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or  
19 unlawful.

20 What would you think of writing a provision of that kind  
21 into a charter for the FBI?

22 Mr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order  
23 issued by the President that is a request for action by the  
24 Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my  
25 opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in



1 contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes  
2 or some that will say no, but I think we could define an  
3 area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could  
4 do that.

5 Now as to the availability to any oversight committee  
6 of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have  
7 no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request  
8 for something of high confidentiality that the President might  
9 put in writing such as some national or foreign security  
10 matter.

11 I would like to have such a consideration be given a  
12 great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review  
13 be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would  
14 present a problem.

15 I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-  
16 thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight  
17 committee. I welcome that.

18 The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we  
19 proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well,  
20 I think.

21 Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the  
22 Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

23 If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs  
24 to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since  
25 Dr. King has long since been violently removed from the scene,

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10 1 why are they preserved? Why aren't they simply destroyed?  
2 Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable  
3 the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information  
4 that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never  
5 have connected the person with any criminal activity? And  
6 yet, all of that information just stays there in the files  
7 year after year.

8 What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's  
9 not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down  
10 there at the FBI?

11 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, we do have the rule that  
12 they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your  
13 question and why right now are they maintained? Since we  
14 do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until  
15 that's lifted, we can't destroy anything.

16 I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines  
17 or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be  
18 some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there  
19 might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation  
20 himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

21 I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but  
22 it can be done and we are willing to be guided by those  
23 rules.

24 The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting  
25 thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees

1 to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I  
2 ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his  
3 badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.  
4 so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.  
5 And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that  
6 as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that  
7 is about the extent of it.

8 Then when this file is completed and the person involved  
9 is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that  
10 file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is  
11 in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old  
12 neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

13 What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

14 Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some  
15 files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We  
16 have some archival rules which govern the retention of material  
17 and is developed in cases involving certain members of the  
18 Executive Branch of the government.

19 I see no reason why this would not be a proper area  
20 for consideration of legislation.

21 The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much --  
22 do you have records that would tell us how much time and money  
23 is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands  
24 of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments  
25 to Federal offices?

1 Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not  
2 have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost  
3 for the investigation of Federal appointees --

4 The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other  
5 information that would indicate to us what proportion of the  
6 time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of  
7 activity.

8 Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but  
9 I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the  
10 approximate expense.

11 The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is  
12 a matter we need more information about. And when you supply  
13 that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number  
14 of such investigations each year?

15 You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,  
16 but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example,  
17 enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the  
18 reach of these investigations may be.

19 Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

20 The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

21 The other matter that is connected to this same subject  
22 that I would like your best judgment on is whether these  
23 investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity.  
24 That is to say where legitimate national security interest might  
25 be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on

1 past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

2 I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate  
3 routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive  
4 in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI  
5 checks.

6 And so when you respond to the series of questions, I  
7 wish you would include the offices that are now covered by  
8 such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the  
9 Federal bureaucracy this extends.

10 Could you do that?

11 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman. Fine.

13 Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at  
14 the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional  
15 questions for the record, and there may be other questions,  
16 too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask  
17 Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going  
18 to be tied up on the floor with votes.

19 But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,  
20 Mr. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the  
21 way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of  
22 its investigation during the past months.

23 Mr. Kelley. Thank you.

24 The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result  
25 of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for

the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll  
encounter in the future.

Thank you.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

2 On page 5 of your statement --

3 Mr. Kelley. What?

4 Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third  
5 full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then  
6 to question about what you said. "We must recognize that  
7 situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the  
8 future where the Government may well be expected to depart from  
9 its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative  
10 and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps  
11 which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or  
12 property."

13 Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what  
14 kind of situation?

15 And can you give some concrete examples under your general  
16 principles statement?

17 Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to  
18 that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an  
19 employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's  
20 going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you  
21 have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and  
22 so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent  
23 threat to human life or property.

24 Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the  
25 principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going

Page 2

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1 to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and  
2 he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

3 Is that the presumption?

4 Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you  
5 can extent it.

6 Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the  
7 traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

8 Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not  
9 gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had  
10 not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,  
12 are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of  
13 human life or property?

14 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

15 Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act  
16 to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there  
17 is not by definition any threat to life or property.

18 Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business  
19 a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,  
20 and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think --  
21 take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times  
22 they have been acted upon.

23 I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to  
24 kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's  
25 not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to



1 kill me, that just means one thing.

2 Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

3 Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying  
4 on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible  
5 threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where  
6 we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't  
7 say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to  
8 the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that  
9 we should act independently because maybe we don't have the  
10 judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do  
11 think that we should report it and thereafter see what can  
12 be done.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of  
14 our discussion the standard on page 5.

15 On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

16 Mr. Kelley. Yes.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible  
18 threat.

19 Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

20 Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

21 Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than  
22 arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to  
23 prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other  
24 than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have  
25 in mind?

1 Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever  
2 is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as  
3 impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

4 Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

5 Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

7 Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening  
9 an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with  
10 a standard which said you would have to have an immediate  
11 threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal  
12 crime involving violence?

13 Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out  
14 so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

15 Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit  
16 you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from  
17 what you think would be an acceptable standard.

18 Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might  
19 be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to  
20 do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for  
21 you to, not with the presence or the possibility, not able  
22 to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

24 And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

25 Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening  
2 of an investigation into a domestic group.

3 Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the  
4 test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving  
5 violence?

6 Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

8 Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist  
9 activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities  
10 under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where  
12 it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic  
13 group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious  
14 federal crime involving violence?

15 Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and  
16 they have been well defined as to what is the possible  
17 opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been  
18 discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,  
19 but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

20 Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

21 Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations  
22 over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the  
23 most used of the basis, and then you have, of course, some  
24 intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of  
25 short duration. If there is no showing of this into action

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1 or a viable intent.

2 Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the  
3 intelligence investigation?

4 Mr. Kelley. By intelligence investigation, yes, you  
5 are looking to prevent.

6 Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and  
7 what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined  
8 with an intent to take an issue?

9 Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

11 All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and  
12 I appreciate very much your time.

13 Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has  
15 been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-  
16 mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that  
17 relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood  
18 of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to  
19 collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning  
20 let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the  
21 political views of a person on the other?

22 Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what  
23 many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define  
24 this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that  
25 within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

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1 lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say  
2 ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I  
3 think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or  
4 some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the  
5 government.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political  
7 views?

8 Mr. Kelley. What?

9 Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political  
10 views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence  
11 or advocants of overthrow?

12 Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat  
13 or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,  
14 but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's  
15 a member of some other organization.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of  
17 sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything  
18 might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of  
19 balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's  
20 justifiable to collect that kind of information on American  
21 citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

22 Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been  
23 included in some reports as a result of the requirement that  
24 that is what is required by our rules, that when a person  
25 reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar

1 as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,  
2 I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether  
3 or not this is something we should retain, and we would not  
4 object to anything reasonable in that regard.

5 Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

6 Taking the current manual and trying to understand its  
7 applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King  
8 case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to  
9 open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive  
10 groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is  
11 received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to  
12 systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group  
13 or organization, an investigation can be opened."

14 Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used  
15 in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership  
16 Conference in the 1960s, so that investigation could still be  
17 open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

18 Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of  
19 clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch  
20 as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-  
21 trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered  
22 organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the  
23 benefit of the country.

24 Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that  
25 under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be

1 opened today?

2 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

3 Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.

4 Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only  
5 of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a  
6 group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-  
7 gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals  
8 or people who come into contact with it?

9 Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely. If  
10 you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we  
11 then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the  
12 infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation  
13 of them without any basis for doing so other than that they  
14 are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but  
15 off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

17 Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of  
18 inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

19 I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was  
20 raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you  
21 talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between  
22 intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions.  
23 Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort,  
24 indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects an effort  
25 to distinguish some of this has been made.

1 Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage  
2 effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the  
3 Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of  
4 this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's  
5 law enforcement position?

6 Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does  
7 a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background  
8 of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which  
9 all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help-  
10 ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also  
11 enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding  
12 of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that  
13 spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type  
14 of an operation.

15 I subscribe to the present system heartily.

16 Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission  
17 if within the Bureau guidelines were established that  
18 effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of  
19 the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a  
20 situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist  
21 the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question  
22 that there should be access to it.

23 Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that  
24 intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing  
25 of lines there with the information legitimately needed for



1 law enforcement?

2 Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide  
3 dissemination, because that just numerically increases the  
4 possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything  
5 of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile  
6 to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to  
7 close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

8 Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

9 We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about  
10 the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department  
11 regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the  
12 King case in particular.

13 As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel,  
14 I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some  
15 insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

16 What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that  
17 an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved  
18 improperly?

19 Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it  
20 routinely referred to the Justice Department?

21 Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of  
22 procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for  
23 Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the  
24 great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative  
25 Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

1 occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up,  
2 perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is  
3 handled internally at present.

4 Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be  
5 reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary  
6 step?

7 I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,  
8 I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the  
9 Bureau police itself, and then secondly, is the Department of  
10 Justice involved in the police determinations?

11 For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with  
12 the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered  
13 the action against King should be the subject of investigation  
14 and maybe prosecution?

15 How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

16 Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those  
17 activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal.  
18 There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised  
19 of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own  
20 investigating, and this is something that we feel is a  
21 decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we  
22 have within our own organization sufficient capability to  
23 handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled  
24 independently of us.

25 Mr. Smothers. Thank you.

1

That is all I have.

2

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

3

4

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed  
subject to the call of the Chair.)

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RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE

Date 1/5/76

BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DECEMBER 10, 1975

66-2921-6

66-2921-7  
SEARCHED INDEXED  
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Remarks: By routing slip dated 12/30/75 and captioned as above, all SACs and Legats were furnished a copy of the transcript of Mr. Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Although the data contained in the transcript may be made available to news media representatives, used in answering questions received from citizens, and otherwise treated as being of a public-source nature, the transcript itself should not be reproduced for, or given to, anyone outside the FBI.

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RE: TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR--  
Date December 5, 1975

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS  
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
12/2/75

62-2479\*

66-2921\*

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Remarks:

Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony.

Attached for your information and assistance, is the complete transcript of above-referenced testimony.

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Vol. 15

# The United States Senate

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## Report of Proceedings

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### Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

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Tuesday, December 2, 1975

Washington, D. C.

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11 Senator Tower. The next witnesses to appear before the  
12 Committee are Mr. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-  
13 Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all  
14 investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant  
15 Director, Intelligence Division, responsible for internal  
16 security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr.  
17 John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division;  
18 Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations;  
19 Mr. Robert L. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive  
20 investigations; Mr. Homer A. Newman, Jr., Assistant to Section  
21 Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigaluk,  
22 Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Kelley,  
23 Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, General Investi-  
24 gative Division.

25 Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.

1 Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give  
2 before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing  
3 but the truth, so help you God?

4 Mr. Adams. I do.

5 Mr. Wannall. I do.

6 Mr. Mintz. I do.

7 Mr. Deegan. I do.

8 Mr. Schackelford. I do.

9 Mr. Newman. I do.

10 Mr. Grigalus. I do.

11 Mr. Kelley. I do.

12 Senator Tower. It is intended that Mr. Wannall will be  
13 the principal witness, and we will call on others as questioning  
14 might require, and I would direct each of you when you do  
15 respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record.

16 I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow  
17 the members of the Committee to return from the floor.

18 (A brief recess was taken.)

19 Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order.

20 Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide '83  
21 percent of your intelligence information.

22 Now, will you provide the Committee with some information  
23 on the criteria for the selection of informants?

24  
25



1 TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,  
2 INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
3 ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE  
4 DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION);  
5 JOHN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL  
6 DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L.  
7 SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR.,  
8 ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT  
9 CHIEF; AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF,  
10 CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION  
11 Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you

12 have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting  
13 Office.

14 Senator Tower. That is GAO.

15 Mr. Wannall. Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.

16 Senator Tower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate  
17 figure.

18 Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI  
19 itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that  
20 we do get the principal portion of our information from live  
21 sources.

22 Senator Tower. It would be a relatively high percentage  
23 then?

24 Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your question is  
25 criteria?

1 Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection  
2 of informants?

3 Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In  
4 our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get  
5 an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a  
6 criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set  
7 of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security  
8 matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require  
9 that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist  
10 principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field  
11 office indices, checks with other informants who are operating  
12 in the same area, and in various established sources such as  
13 local police departments.

14 Following this, if it appears that the person is the type  
15 who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we  
16 would interview the individual in order to make a determination  
17 as to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI  
18 in discharging its responsibilities in that field.

19 Following that, assuming that the answer is positive, we  
20 would conduct a rather in depth investigation for the purpose  
21 of further attempting to establish credibility and reliability.

22 Senator Tower. How does the Bureau distinguish between  
23 the use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to  
24 intelligence collection?

25 Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what?

1 Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address  
2 the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over  
3 the operational division on that.

4 Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact  
5 that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you  
6 are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in  
7 court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant  
8 alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be  
9 just for purposes of pure intelligence.

10 The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality  
11 of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to,  
12 through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be  
13 used independently of the testimony of the informant so that  
14 he can continue operating as a criminal informant.

15 Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to  
16 function as provocateurs?

17 Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula-  
18 tions against using informants as provocateurs. This gets  
19 into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed  
20 by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the  
21 courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage  
22 in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the  
23 opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don't  
24 occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to  
25 avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can

1 engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that,  
2 especially the Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that  
3 the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that  
4 an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but  
5 because there is lacking this criminal intent to violate a  
6 law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that.

7 If we have a situation where we felt that an informant  
8 has to become involved in some activity in order to protect  
9 or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United  
10 States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure  
11 we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our  
12 informants.

13 Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do  
14 instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that  
15 they are informing on, do you not?

16 Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs,  
17 which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably  
18 one of the best examples of a situation where the law was  
19 in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used  
20 much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little  
21 Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending  
22 in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law  
23 enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the  
24 troops only as a last resort.

25 And then you have a situation like this where you do try

smn 21

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1 to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement. You have  
2 historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had  
3 situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost  
4 powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in  
5 some areas participating in Klan violence.

6 The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those,  
7 he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't  
8 see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed  
9 out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was  
10 reported to the police departments in every instance. We  
11 also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being  
12 received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated  
13 simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department  
14 of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a  
15 position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction  
16 from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.

17 Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have  
18 evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in  
19 a situation where the Department called in United States  
20 Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement  
21 officials.

22 So, historically, in those days, we were just as frus-  
23 trated as anyone else was, and when we got information from  
24 someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information,  
25 and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to

1 do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he  
2 indicated.

3 Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was  
4 adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to  
5 act?

6 Mr. Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and still  
7 require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.  
8 Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You  
9 can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites  
10 belting each other, but unless you can show that those that  
11 initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have  
12 no violation.

13 Congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968  
14 that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights  
15 statute, which added punitive measures against an individual  
16 that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem  
17 that the whole country was grappling with: the President of  
18 the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation  
19 where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from  
20 a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General.  
21 The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing  
22 violence, and in neutralizing the Klan -- and that was one  
23 of the reasons.

24 Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in con-  
25 tinuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam

smn 23

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1 Veterans Against the War?

2 Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the  
3 intent to halt political expression?

4 Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans  
5 Against the War that indicated that there were subversive  
6 groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting  
7 with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending  
8 meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the  
9 International Communist Party. We feel that we had a very valid  
10 basis to direct our attention to the VVAW.

11 It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was  
12 head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made,  
13 and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it  
14 split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maoist  
15 group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point  
16 factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed  
17 those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow  
18 the national organization.

19 But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we  
20 investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation  
21 and subservience to the national office.

22 Senator Tower. Mr. Hart?

23 Senator Hart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing  
24 after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information  
25 that clearly has no relationship to any Federal criminal

1 statute.

2 Mr. Adams. I agree, Senator.

3 Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that  
4 stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?

5 Mr. Adams. Here is the problem that you have with that.  
6 When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the  
7 violent statements made by the group or do you also show that  
8 you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have  
9 some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others,  
10 that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the  
11 statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along  
12 with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with  
13 information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum  
14 cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the  
15 real purpose of an organization, do you only report the  
16 violent statements made and the fact that it is by a small  
17 minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization  
18 and what it really is?

19 And within that is where we have to have the guidelines  
20 we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because  
21 we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in  
22 our files.

23 Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process,  
24 you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people  
25 who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment



1 exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up.

2 Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I  
3 imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, either  
4 asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator  
5 being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter-  
6 viewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.

7 Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the  
8 FBI?

9 Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that  
10 this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our  
11 files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree.  
12 It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our  
13 files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because  
14 of considering a man for the Supreme Court of the United  
15 States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't  
16 see where any harm is served by having that in our files.

17 Senator Hart of Michigan. But if I am Reverend Smith  
18 and the vacuum cleaner picked up the fact that I was helping  
19 the veterans, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and two years  
20 later a name check is asked on Reverend Smith and all your  
21 file shows is that he was associated two years ago with a group  
22 that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful patriotism  
23 to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on  
24 them --

25 Mr. Adams. This is a problem.

1 Senator Hart of Michigan. This is what should require  
2 us to rethink this whole business.

3 Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

4 And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well  
5 as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to.

6 Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range  
7 of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetration  
8 and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition  
9 of when an extremist or security investigation may be under-  
10 taken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation  
11 of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation  
12 of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then  
13 informants may be used.

14 Another guideline says that domestic intelligence  
15 investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations.  
16 The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation  
17 relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved,  
18 upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back  
19 again in a world of possible violations or activities which  
20 may result in illegal acts.

21 Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the  
22 right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition,  
23 conceivably may result in violence or disruption of a local  
24 town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result  
25 in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holding



1 the meeting.

2 Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all  
3 groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because  
4 they may result in violence, disruption?

5 Mr. Adams. No, sir.

6 Senator Hart of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify  
7 spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

8 Mr. Adams. No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we  
9 monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the  
10 demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an  
11 investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in,  
12 or where members of one of these groups are participating where  
13 there is a potential that they might change the peaceful  
14 nature of the demonstration.

15 But this is our closest question of trying to draw  
16 guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the  
17 First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being  
18 aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the  
19 past than we do at the present time. But we have had periods  
20 where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the  
21 courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty,  
22 to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission  
23 of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be  
24 too late for prevention.

25 And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut

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end 5

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1 case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have  
2 to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly  
3 fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities, and  
4 that's where I think most of our disagreements fall.

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1 Senator Hart of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule  
2 for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The  
3 Bureau manual states that informants investigating a subversive  
4 organization should not only report on what that group is  
5 doing but should look at and report on activities in which  
6 the group is participating.

7 There is a Section 87B3 dealing with reporting on  
8 connections with other groups. That section says that the  
9 field office shall "determine and report on any significant  
10 connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any  
11 significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive  
12 groups.

13 Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of  
14 1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the  
15 installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us  
16 remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential  
17 sources reported on the plan's participants and activities  
18 of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM,  
19 particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium,  
20 which included speakers from the Defense Department for the  
21 ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.

22 The informants reported on the planning for the meeting,  
23 the distribution of materials to churches and schools,  
24 participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on the  
25 ABM from nearby town councils. There was also information on

1 plans for a subsequent town meeting in Washington with the  
2 names of local political leaders who would attend.

3 Now the information, the informant information came as  
4 part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive group  
5 participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt  
6 with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the  
7 plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated  
8 to the State Department, to military intelligence, and to the  
9 White House.

10 How do we get into all of that?

11 Mr. Adams. Well --

12 Senator Hart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it,  
13 would you do it again?

14 Mr. Adams. Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969  
15 was. The problem we had at the time was where we had an  
16 informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was  
17 going to take place and it was going to be the Daily World,  
18 which was the east coast communist newspaper that made comments  
19 about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took  
20 a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May 28,  
21 1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this  
22 organization.

23 Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick look  
24 and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have  
25 stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security it is like

1 Soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country  
2 and they supported him with total resources of the Soviet  
3 Union, false identification, all the money he needs, communi-  
4 cations networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and  
5 you're working with a paucity of information.

6 The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic  
7 security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations.  
8 So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take  
9 a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's  
10 what they did.

11 Senator Hart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let  
12 me bring you up to date, closer to current, a current place  
13 on the calendar.

14 This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President  
15 Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as  
16 he described it, for draft resisters. Following that there  
17 were several national conferences involving all the groups  
18 and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.

19 Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is  
20 not against -- while unconditional amnesty is not yet the law,  
21 we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.

22 Mr. Adams. That's right.

23 Senator Hart of Michigan. Some of the sponsors were  
24 umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse groups around  
25 the country. FBI informants provided advance information on



1 plans for the meeting and apparently attended and reported on  
2 the conference. The Bureau's own reports described the  
3 participants as having represented diverse perspectives on  
4 the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human  
5 rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of men killed  
6 in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft  
7 counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues,  
8 delegates from student organizations, and aides of House and  
9 Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.

10 The informant apparently was attending in his role as  
11 a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive  
12 and it described the topics of the workshop.

13 Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted  
14 that in view of the location of the conference at a theological  
15 seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage  
16 to informant reports.

17 Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last  
18 fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point  
19 of view that I share, that the sooner we have unconditional  
20 amnesty, the better for the soul of the country.

21 Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on  
22 a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad  
23 informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups  
24 in that setting having contact with other groups, all and  
25 everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the

1 Bureau files.

2 Is this what we want?

3 Mr. Adams. I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this.

4 He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.

5 Mr. Wannall. Senator Hart, that was a case that was  
6 opened on November 14 and closed November 20, and the information  
7 which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular  
8 items. One was that a member of the steering committee there,  
9 was a three man steering committee, and one of those members  
10 of the national conference was in fact a national officer  
11 of the VVAW in whom we had suggested before we did have a  
12 legitimate investigative interest.

13 Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I would almost say so what  
14 at that point.

15 Mr. Wannall. The second report we had was that the  
16 VVAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the  
17 conference to take it over. And the third report we had --

18 Senator Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the  
19 information that your Buffalo informant had given you with  
20 respect to the goals and aims of the VVAW gave you a list of  
21 goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected  
22 objectives. There wasn't a single item out of that VVAW that  
23 jeopardizes the security of this country at all.

24 Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, we did not rely entirely  
25 on the Buffalo informant, but even there we did recei-

1 from that informant information which I considered to be  
2 significant.

3 The Buffalo chapter of the VVAW was the regional office  
4 covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the  
5 five most active VVAW chapters in the country and at a  
6 national conference, or at the regional conference, this  
7 informant reported information back to us that an attendee  
8 at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba  
9 prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during  
10 the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour surveillance. There  
11 was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the  
12 VVAW to the revolutionary union. There were some individuals  
13 in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in  
14 agreement with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the  
15 interest of the revolutionary union.

16 So all of the information that we had on the VVAW did  
17 not come from that source but even that particular source did  
18 give us information which we considered to be of some  
19 significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the  
20 investigation of that particular chapter of the VVAW.

21 Senator Hart of Michigan. But does it give you the  
22 right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even  
23 if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VVAW  
24 when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we  
25 seek to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?

1 Mr. Wannall. Our interest, of course, was the VVAW  
2 influence on a particular meeting, if you ever happened to be  
3 holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was.

4 Senator Hart of Michigan. What if it was a meeting to  
5 seek to make more effective the food stamp system in this  
6 country?

7 Mr. Wannall. Well, of course there had been some  
8 organizations.

9 Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the same logic follow?

10 Mr. Wannall. I think that if we found that if the  
11 Communist Party USA was going to take over the meeting and  
12 use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic  
13 in doing that. You have a whole scope here and it's a matter  
14 of where you do and where you don't, and hopefully, as we've  
15 said before, we will have some guidance, not only from this  
16 committee but from the guidelines that are being developed.  
17 But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was  
18 explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and  
19 not gathering everything there was about it.

20 In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us,  
21 and that was the person who had, who was not developed for  
22 this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other  
23 matters for some period of time.

24 And as soon as we got the report of the outcome of the  
25 meeting and the fact that in the period of some time we

1 discontinued any further interest.

2 Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, my time has expired  
3 but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we  
4 really want to control the dangers to our society of using  
5 informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have  
6 to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And  
7 that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when  
8 my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants,  
9 obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged  
10 informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or  
11 individuals.

12 I know you have objections to that and I would like to  
13 review that with you.

14 Senator Mondale. pursue that question.

15 Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an  
16 obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn loose a full-  
17 fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run  
18 into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources.  
19 The Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the  
20 Committee. The Bureau argues that such a warrant requirement  
21 might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First  
22 Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their  
23 government.

24 Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that  
25 ought to hearten all the civil libertarians.

1 But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement  
2 raise a serious constitutional question?

3 Mr. Adams. Well, for one thing it's the practicability  
4 of it or the impacticability of getting a warrant which:  
5 ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has  
6 been or is about to be committed.

7 In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily  
8 with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities  
9 such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have  
10 discussed before, where they say publicly we're not to engage  
11 in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still  
12 subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time  
13 is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United  
14 States.

15 Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about  
16 to do it because they're telling you they're not going to do it  
17 and you know they're not going to do it at this particular  
18 moment.

19 It's just the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a  
20 criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and  
21 we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particular  
22 organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs  
23 to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organization:  
24 and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist  
25 Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations.

1 We don't have probable cause for him to target against  
2 that organization, but yet we should be able to receive informa-  
3 tion from him that he as a Communist Party member, even  
4 though in an informant status, is going to that organization  
5 and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it.  
6 It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants,  
7 the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not  
8 violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have  
9 recognized the necessity that the government has to have  
10 individuals who will assist them in carrying out their  
11 governmental duties.

12 Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything  
13 yet in response to the constitutional question, the very  
14 practical question that you addressed.

15 Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the  
16 use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional  
17 rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress  
18 can prescribe some safeguards, some rules and some standards,  
19 just as we have with respect to your use of electronic  
20 surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants.

21 That's quite different from saying that the warrant  
22 procedure itself would be unconstitutional.

23 But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show  
24 probable cause, and therefore, you couldn't get a warrant,  
25 therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a

1 warrant. It seems to beg the question.

2 Assuming that you say that since we use informants and  
3 investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities  
4 but which might engage in activities that can result in  
5 violence or illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but  
6 Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to  
7 such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity,  
8 including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss  
9 the anti-ballistic missile system, and we don't want you to  
10 use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or  
11 unless you present your request to a magistrate in the same  
12 fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most  
13 cases, to wiretap.

14 This is an option available to Congress.

15 Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker.

16 Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

17 Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential  
18 security informant and a security informant?

19 Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker,  
20 that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on  
21 him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth  
22 background check.

23 A potential security informant is someone who is under  
24 consideration before he is approved by headquarters for use as  
25 an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.

End Tape 6

Begin Tape 7



1 On some occasions that person will have been developed to a  
2 point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are  
3 engaged in checking upon his reliability.

4 In some instances he may be paid for information furnished,  
5 but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied  
6 ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does,  
7 the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and  
8 headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an  
9 approved FBI informant.

10 Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of  
11 being an informant, I guess.

12 Mr. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of the  
13 preliminary steps.

14 Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in the Rowe  
15 testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again  
16 for not intervening when violence was known?

17 I know we asked you several times but I'm still having  
18 trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was  
19 in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was  
20 known.

21 Mr. Wannall. Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address  
22 himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to  
23 answer that.

24 Senator Schweiker. All right.

25 Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's the

1 problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not  
2 have police powers like the United States marshalls do.  
3 About 1795, I guess, or some period like that, marshalls have  
4 had the authority that almost borders on what a sheriff has.  
5 We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice  
6 and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain  
7 the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on  
8 activities to furnish the information to the local police,  
9 who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department  
10 of Justice.

11 In those areas where the local police did not act, it  
12 resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United  
13 States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who  
14 were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

15 This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a  
16 time of civil rights versus federal rights, and yet there was  
17 a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.

18 This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies  
19 in itself at the time either because many of them did act  
20 upon the information that was furnished to them. But we  
21 have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we  
22 would not have had evidence that there was a conspiracy  
23 available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.

24 In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that  
25 if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and

1 next to the Army, the United States marshalls should make them,  
2 not the FBI, even though we developed the violations.  
3 And over the years, as you know, at the time there were many  
4 questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't  
5 you do something about it?

6 Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed  
7 the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course  
8 we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

9 Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following  
10 up your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program  
11 since it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to  
12 have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.S. marshalls on some  
13 kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence?

14 Mr. Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection  
15 with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations  
16 under the Civil Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston,  
17 they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this  
18 is the approach, that the Federal government finally recognized,  
19 was the solution to the problem where you had to have added  
20 Federal import.

21 Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it  
22 gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced  
23 confrontation, shouldn't we have somewhere a coordinated program  
24 that when you go up the ladder of command in the FBI, that  
25 on an immediate and fairly contemporary basis, that kind of

1 help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it  
2 gets to a Boston state?

3 I realize it's a departure from the past. I'm not  
4 saying it isn't. But it seems to me we need a better remedy  
5 than we have.

6 Mr. Adams. Well, fortunately, we're at a time where  
7 conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s  
8 and the '70s and periods -- or '50s and '60s. We report to the  
9 Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the  
10 country as we learn of them so that the Department will be  
11 aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took  
12 place a year in advance with state officials, city officials,  
13 the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together  
14 saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?

15 I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the  
16 early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protected  
17 people at that time.

18 Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the  
19 Robert Hardy case. I know he is not a witness but he  
20 was a witness before the House. But since this affects my  
21 state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was  
22 the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized  
23 a raid on the Camden draft board. And according to Mr. Hardy's  
24 testimony before our Committee, he said that in advance of the  
25 raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact

1 that they had all the information they needed to clamp down  
2 on the conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time,  
3 and yet no arrests were made.

4 Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true?

5 Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the  
6 material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not  
7 a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your  
8 question.

9 There was, in fact, a representative of the Department  
10 of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously  
11 as that case progressed as to what point the arrest should be  
12 made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the  
13 ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort.

14 So I think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that  
15 there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.

16 Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who  
17 under your procedures?

18 Mr. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests,  
19 when they should be made, and decisions with regard to  
20 prosecutions are made either by the United States attorneys  
21 or by Federals in the Department.

22 Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have  
23 a departmental attorney on the scene because there are questions  
24 of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a tough violation to prove and  
25 sometimes a question of do you have the added value of catching

1 someone in the commission of the crime as further proof,  
2 rather than relying on one informant and some circumstantial  
3 evidence to prove the violation.

4 Senator Schweiker. Well, in this case, though, they  
5 even had a dry run. They could have arrested them on the  
6 dry run.

7 That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to  
8 me. They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on  
9 the dry run.

10 I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry  
11 run. Who was this Department of Justice official who made  
12 that decision?

13 Mr. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.

14 Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965,  
15 during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you  
16 put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released  
17 figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some  
18 kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000  
19 estimated membership.

20 I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates.  
21 That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan  
22 at that point was an informant paid by the government.

23 And I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70  
24 percent of the new members of the Klan that year were FBI  
25 informants.

1           Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people  
2 to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that  
3 you shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what's  
4 going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the  
5 tail wagging the dog.

6           For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 total  
7 informants for both domestic informants and potential informants  
8 and that here we had 2,000 just in the Klan alone.

9           Mr. Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all  
10 racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I  
11 think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual  
12 number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was around  
13 6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the testimony.

14           Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a  
15 group called the Action Group. This was the group that you  
16 remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left af-  
17 ter the meeting. He attended the open meetings and heard  
18 all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information,  
19 but he never knew what was going on because each one had an  
20 action group that went out and considered themselves in the  
21 missionary field.

22           Theirs was the violence.

23           In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct  
24 as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in  
25 mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress and

1 everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights  
2 workers, the Linió Kent case, the Viola Liuzzo case, the  
3 bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one  
4 tremendous problem at that time.

5 Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that.

6 Mr. Adams. Our only approach was through informants  
7 and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the  
8 ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have  
9 never solved. They are extremely difficult.

10 These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and  
11 as we told the President, that we had moved informants like  
12 Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the  
13 head man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us  
14 of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and  
15 yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever  
16 unless we can create enough disruption that these members will  
17 realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers,  
18 even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are  
19 in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was  
20 the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and  
21 that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure  
22 and just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of  
23 their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't  
24 dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they  
25 couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.



1 Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have  
2 one quick question..

3 Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500  
4 informers for black ghetto situations?

5 Mr. Adams. I'm not sure if that's the year. We did  
6 have one year where we had a number like that which probably  
7 had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities  
8 were being burned, Detroit, Washington, areas like this. We  
9 were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is  
10 violence going to break out, what next?

11 They weren't informants like an individual penetrating  
12 an organization. They were listening posts in the community  
13 that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting  
14 ready to start another fire-fight or something.

15 Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more  
16 Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get  
17 everything in in the first round, we will not have a second  
18 round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can go  
19 on and terminate the proceedings.

20 However, If anyone feels that they have another question  
21 that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.

22 Senator Mondale?

23 Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the  
24 record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the  
25 field of crime investigating, it may be the best professional

1 organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts  
2 in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it  
3 has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the  
4 last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped  
5 shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of  
6 the crucial public confidence in an essential law enforcement  
7 agency of this country.

8 In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it  
9 was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI  
10 in 1924.

11 In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from  
12 its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and  
13 protector of political ideas. And through the interference  
14 of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public  
15 became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and  
16 Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement  
17 by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department  
18 get involved in political ideas.

19 And yet here we are again looking at a record where with  
20 Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with -- we even  
21 had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of  
22 Churches. Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined,  
23 impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.

24 It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people  
25 can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the

1 tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive  
2 or dangerous ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly  
3 at odds with the philosophy of American government.

4 I started in politics years ago and the first thing we  
5 had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out  
6 of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and  
7 I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help  
8 from the FBI or the CIA. We just rammed them out of the meetings  
9 on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't  
10 good union leaders when we didn't want anything to do with them.  
11 And yet, we see time and time again that we're going to  
12 protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's  
13 dangerous, that we're going to protect veterans from whatever  
14 it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches  
15 from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy and  
16 confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree  
17 with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that  
18 precisely what is expected of the FBI is known by you, by the  
19 public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask  
20 you?

21 Mr. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like  
22 to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement  
23 Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we followed that policy for about  
24 ten years until the President of the United States said that  
25 we should investigate the Nazi Party.

1 I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party.  
2 I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in  
3 the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I,  
4 there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage  
5 which took place in the United States.

6 Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could  
7 have investigated these issues of sabotage.

8 Isn't sabotage a crime?

9 Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime.

10 Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that?

11 Mr. Adams. After it happened.

12 Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved  
13 in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of  
14 crimes that could have been committed. It's very interesting.

15 In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to  
16 continue what you're now doing and as I understand it, you  
17 still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam  
18 Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of  
19 Churches, and this can still go on. This can still go on under  
20 your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to  
21 justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activities  
22 in terms of criminal matters.

23 Mr. Adams. The law does not say we have to wait until  
24 we have been murdered before we can --

25 Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of

1 law again. You're trying to defend apples with oranges. That's  
2 the law. You can do that.

3 Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which  
4 of the 20,000 Bund members might have been a saboteur. You  
5 don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can  
6 direct an intelligence operation against the German-American  
7 Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said --

8 Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that?  
9 Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?.

10 Mr. Adams. Because we don't have probable cause to  
11 go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for  
12 probable cause to investigate an organization.

13 There were activities which did take place, like one time  
14 they outlined the Communist Party --

15 Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it  
16 wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority  
17 that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under  
18 court authority you can investigate where there is probable  
19 cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.

20 Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these  
21 decisions on your own?

22 Mr. Adams. We have expressed complete concurrence in  
23 that. We feel that we're going to go to death in the  
24 next 100 years, you're damned if you do, and damned if you  
25 don't if we don't have a delineation of our responsibility

1 in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we  
2 have bungled the intelligence operations in the United States.  
3 I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley  
4 has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the  
5 FBI in acknowledging mistakes that had been made, but I think  
6 that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and  
7 Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because  
8 of the necessity that we must concentrate on these areas of  
9 abuse. We must not lose sight of the  
10 overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I  
11 still feel that this is the freest country in the world.  
12 I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have  
13 made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United  
14 States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they  
15 are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the  
16 United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night  
17 and feel safe.

18 Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an  
19 argument then, Mr. Adams, for strengthening our powers to go  
20 after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or  
21 continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public  
22 confidence you need to do your job.

23 Mr. Adams. Absolutely. The mistakes we have made are  
24 what have brought on this embarrassment to us.

25 I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some

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1 mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But  
2 at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes  
3 out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity  
4 of zeroing in on abuses.

5 I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think  
6 the accomplishments in the Klan was the finest hour of the  
7 FBI and yet, I'm sure in dealing with the Klan that we made  
8 some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling.

End Tape 7

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1 Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but  
2 I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble  
3 over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we  
4 need to have new legal standards.

5 Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that.

6 Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.

7 Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at some  
9 length seems to have been an inclination on the part of  
10 the Bureau to establish a notion about an individual or a group  
11 which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In  
12 the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was  
13 being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi-  
14 gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating that  
15 this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out  
16 to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a  
17 willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.

18 Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar  
19 to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, that  
20 every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau  
21 seemed to indicate that the Bureau was not correct in its  
22 assumption that this organization planned to commit violence,  
23 or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist  
24 that this investigation go on, and this information was used  
25 against the individuals.



1 Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that  
2 its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their  
3 course?

4 Mr. Adams. We have admitted that. We have also shown  
5 from one of the cases that Senator Hart brought up, that after  
6 five days we closed the case. We were told something by an  
7 individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence  
8 in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King  
9 situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just  
10 dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and  
11 on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were  
12 all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin  
13 Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This  
14 wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that  
15 there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.

16 What I testified to was that we were improper in discrediting  
17 Dr. King, but it's just like --

18 Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memoranda  
19 written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the  
20 information they were receiving from the field, from these  
21 surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition  
22 was.

23 Mr. Adams. That memorandum was not on Dr. King. That  
24 was on another individual that I think somehow got mixed up  
25 in the discussion, one where the issue was can we make people

1 prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to  
2 investigate them.

3 But the young lady appearing this morning making the  
4 comment that she never knew of anything she told us that  
5 she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch  
6 as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and  
7 agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard-  
8 ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals  
9 from associating themselves with the VVAW-WSO. She is most  
10 concerned about efforts by the Revolutionary Union to take over  
11 the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..

12 I think that we have a basis for investigating the VVAW-  
13 WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped  
14 the investigation. They don't agree with these principles  
15 laid down by the --

16 Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your  
17 continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that  
18 information against members who certainly had not been involved  
19 in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job  
20 or whatever?

21 Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the  
22 criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to  
23 prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens.. The  
24 Attorney General has clearly spoken in that area, and even our  
25 statutory jurisdiction provides that we don't --

smn 4

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1 Senator Huddleston. Well, of course we've had considerable  
2 evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent  
3 crime, when you had information that it was going to occur.  
4 But I'm sure there are instances where you have.

5 Mr. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he  
6 reported to us.

7 Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you  
8 knew was an accomplice to the crime.

9 Mr. Adams. Not necessarily.

10 Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that,  
11 hadn't he?

12 Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have  
13 other informants, and we have other information.

14 Senator Huddleston. Yes, but you were aware that he  
15 had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in  
16 order to --

17 Mr. Adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also.

18 Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole  
19 lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were  
20 already part of it.

21 Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully  
22 do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that  
23 when the Department, agreeing that we had no further juris-  
24 diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform  
25 certain law enforcement functions.

1 Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee has received  
2 documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted  
3 an informant who had been established in a white hate group  
4 to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid  
5 his expenses in setting up this rival organization.

6 Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being  
7 responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might  
8 have undertaken?

9 Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen  
10 knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a  
11 specific group.

12 This is Joe Deegan.

13 Mr. Deegan. Senator, it's my understanding that the  
14 informant we're talking about decided to break off from the  
15 group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of  
16 the United Klans of America, and he decided to break off. This  
17 was in compliance with our regulations. His breaking off,  
18 we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it  
19 on his own. We paid him for the information he furnished  
20 us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organiza-  
21 tion.

22 Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that  
23 he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that  
24 organization?

25 Mr. Deegan. He continued to advise us of that organization

1 and other organizations. He would advise us of planned  
2 activities.

3 Senator Huddleston. The new organization that he formed,  
4 did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?

5 Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, and it did not last that  
6 long.

7 Senator Huddleston. There's also evidence of an FBI  
8 informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of  
9 responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his  
10 FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing  
11 them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the  
12 knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became -- came in contact  
13 with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici-  
14 pated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and  
15 this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with  
16 the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the  
17 knowledge of the FBI.

18 How does this square with your enforcement and crime  
19 prevention responsibilities.

20 Mr. Deegan. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular  
21 case. It does not square with our policy in all respects, and  
22 I would have to look at that particular case you're talking  
23 about to give you an answer.

24 Senator Huddleston. I don't have the documentation on that  
25 particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of

1 control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind  
2 of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to  
3 prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing  
4 that you are supposedly trying to prevent.

5 Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became  
6 active in an action group, and we told him to get out or  
7 we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the  
8 information he had furnished in the past.

9 We have had cases, Senator, where we have had --

10 Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participate  
11 in violent activities.

12 Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent  
13 activities.

14 Senator Huddleston. That's what he said.

15 Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But that's what  
16 lawsuits are all about, is that there are two sides to the  
17 issue, and our agents handling this have advised us, and I  
18 believe have advised your staff, that at no time did they  
19 advise him to engage in violence.

20 Senator Huddleston. Just to do what was necessary to  
21 get the information, I believe maybe might have been his  
22 instructions.

23 Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement  
24 to him along that line, and we have informants, we have  
25 informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law,

smn 8

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1 and we have immediately converted their status from an informant  
2 to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I  
3 can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for  
4 violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even  
5 to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence  
6 in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told  
7 me that they found one case where their agent had been working  
8 24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the  
9 information to the police department. No violence occurred,  
10 but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for  
11 his delay in properly notifying local authorities.

12 So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow  
13 reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic  
14 review of all informant files.

15 Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is  
16 substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the  
17 agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you  
18 happen to be with someone and they decide to do something, that  
19 he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent,  
20 and be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead, but the  
21 implication is that he would have to go along and would have  
22 to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.

23 Mr. Adams. There's no question but that an informant at  
24 times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots,  
25 fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was

1 to the effect that -- and I was sitting in the back of the  
2 room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were  
3 beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat  
4 someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did  
5 because it's one thing being present, and it's another thing  
6 taking an active part in criminal actions.

7 Senator Huddleston. He was close enough to get his  
8 throat cut.

9 How does the gathering of information --

10 Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that  
11 we probably should recess a few minutes.

12 Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should  
13 we convene this afternoon?

14 Senator Huddleston. I'm finished. I just had one more  
15 question.

16 Senator Tower. Go ahead.

17 Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of  
18 information about an individual's personal life, social, sex  
19 life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life  
20 is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

21 Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr.  
22 Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no  
23 such knowledge concerning it, and I can't see where it would  
24 be of any value whatsoever.

25 Senator Huddleston. You aren't aware of any case where



1 these instructions were given to an agent or an informant?

2 Mr. Adams. To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir.

3 Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Senator Tower. Senator Mathias.

5 Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth  
7 Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants  
8 and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one  
9 time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have  
10 a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you  
11 may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which  
12 there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying  
13 degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual  
14 will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when  
15 the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first  
16 test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like to explore  
17 with you is the difference between a one time search which  
18 requires a warrant, and which you get when you make that  
19 search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or  
20 the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover  
21 agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is in a  
22 slightly different category than an informant.

23 Mr. Adams. Well, we get there into the fact that the  
24 Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does  
25 not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, and

1 if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't  
2 protected by the Supreme Court.

3 An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected  
4 item, but information and the use of informants have been  
5 consistently held as not posing any constitutional problems.

6 Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about  
7 the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier,  
8 but is it true that under existing procedures informants are  
9 given background checks?

10 Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

11 Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period.

12 Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they  
13 are providing to us reliable information.

14 Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relation-  
15 ship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the  
16 handling agents.

17 Mr. Adams. That's true.

18 Senator Mathias. So in effect they can come in a very  
19 practical way agents themselves to the FBI.

20 Mr. Adams. They can do nothing --

21 Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use  
22 of the word.

23 Mr. Adams. That's right, they can do nothing, and we  
24 instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the  
25 agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into

smn 12

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1 an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and  
2 glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the  
3 Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem.

4 Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a member  
5 of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require  
6 a warrant?

7 Mr. Adams. No, sir, if a regular -- it depends on the  
8 purpose for which he is entering. If a regular agent by  
9 concealing his identity, by -- was admitted as a member of the  
10 Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he  
11 can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and there's  
12 no constitutionally invaded area there.

13 Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has  
14 a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a regular  
15 agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation  
16 as an undercover agent or as an informant. --

17 Mr. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.

18 Senator Mathias. Let me ask you why you feel that it is  
19 impractical to require a warrant since, as I understand it,  
20 headquarters must approve the use of an informant. Is that  
21 degree of formal action required?

22.

23

24

25

end

Tape 9

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1 Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity  
1 which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You  
2 have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify  
3 what you're going after, and an informant operates in an  
4 area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's  
5 going to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to  
6 blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the  
7 State Department building.

8 Senator Mathias. If it were a criminal investigation,  
9 you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't  
10 you?

11 Mr. Adams. We would have difficulty in a warrant to  
12 use someone as an informant in that area because the same  
13 difficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify.

14 Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's  
15 very similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection  
16 say wiretaps on a national security problem.

17 Mr. Adams. That's it, and there we face the problem of  
18 where the Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy  
19 in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy  
20 there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't  
21 show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that  
22 he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States,  
23 we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause requirements  
24 which have been discussed. If the good fairy didn't drop the  
25

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1 evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting  
2 espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's  
3 why we're still groping with it.

4 Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really,  
5 you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth  
6 Amendment.

7 Mr. Adams. That's right, except for the fact that the  
8 President, under this Constitutional powers, to protect this  
9 nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all  
10 national survival, and these are the areas that not only the  
11 President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're  
12 all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle  
13 ground in here.

14 Senator Mathias. Which we discussed in the other national  
15 security area as to curtailling a warrant to that particular  
16 need.

17 Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable  
18 cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some  
19 method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an  
20 ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties,  
21 we may get their yet.

22 Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that  
23 middle ground?

24 Mr. Adams. I don't because I think that today there's  
25 more of an open mind between Congress and the Executive Branch

1 and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these  
2 areas resolved.

3 Senator Mathias. And you believe that the Department,  
4 if we could come together, would support, would agree to that  
5 kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?

6 Mr. Adams. If we can work out problems and the Attorney  
7 General is personally interested in that also.

8 Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement might  
9 extend to some of those other areas that we talked about?

10 Mr. Adams. I think that that would be a much greater  
11 difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who  
12 reports on many different operations and different types of  
13 activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet  
14 espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a little  
15 more degree of specificity to deal with.

16 Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get  
17 together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the  
18 meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that  
19 would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney  
20 General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, and the  
21 same general process could be used for informants, since  
22 you come to headquarters any way.

23 Mr. Adams. That could be an alternative. I think it  
24 would be a very burdensome alternative and I think at some  
25 point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered

1 major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think  
2 we're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies  
3 have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency  
4 and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem up  
5 to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.

6 Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests  
7 itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally  
8 with one level of information in one sense of gathering  
9 information. You hear what you hear from the tap.

10 Mr. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number  
11 also.

12 Senator Mathias. Smaller number, but that's all the  
13 more reason. When an informant goes in, he has all of his  
14 senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being  
15 can acquire from a situation and has access to more information  
16 than the average wiretap.

17 And it would seem to me that for that reason a parallel  
18 process might be useful and in order.

19 Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main  
20 distinction. to me which I had overlooked from our prior  
21 discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is  
22 more in the position of being a central monitor in that one  
23 of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like  
24 central monitoring of telephones and microphones and  
25 anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual

1 whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and there is,  
2 and neither of the two parties talking had agreed that their  
3 conversation could be monitored.

4 Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to accept.  
5 If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking  
6 place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived  
7 by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't  
8 consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent  
9 if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan  
10 of theirs.

11 But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for  
12 someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.

13 Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator Hart  
14 raised earlier, that the courts thus far have made this  
15 distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that  
16 there may not be some legislative compromise which might be  
17 addressed.

18 Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly appreciate your  
19 attitude in being willing to work on these problems because  
20 I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from  
21 these hearings, so that we can actually look at the Fourth  
22 Amendment as the standard that we have to achieve. But the  
23 way we get there is obviously going to be a lot easier if we  
24 can work toward them together.

25 I just have one final question, Mr. Chairman, and that



1 deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable  
2 cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling  
3 the use of informants and the kind of information that they  
4 collect.

5 Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?

6 Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

7 When I look at informants and I see that each year  
8 informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they  
9 provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover \$86 million  
10 in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective  
11 of what we give the local law enforcement and other Federal  
12 agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost  
13 reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much  
14 left. And in the intelligence field we still, I think when  
15 we carve all of the problems away, we still have to make sure  
16 that we have the means to gather information which will permit  
17 us to be aware of the identity of individuals and organizations  
18 that are acting to overthrow the government of the United  
19 States. And I think we still have some areas to look hard  
20 at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to  
21 stay. They are absolutely essential to law enforcement.  
22 Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress  
23 has informants, you have individuals in your community that  
24 you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know  
25 what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly,

1 am I carrying out this?

2 It's here to say. It's been here throughout history  
3 and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to  
4 avoid is abuses like provocateurs, criminal activities, and  
5 to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that.  
6 But we do need informants.

7 Senator Tower. Senator Hart, do you have any further  
8 questions?

9 Senator Hart of Michigan. Yes. I ask unanimous request  
10 perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the  
11 groups that we have discussed this morning into which the  
12 Bureau has put informants, in popular language, our liberal  
13 groups -- I would ask unanimous consent that be printed in  
14 the record, the summary of the opening of the headquarters  
15 file by the Bureau of Dr. Carl McIntyre when he announced  
16 that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil  
17 Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups,"  
18 is not a left only pre-occupation.

19 Senator Tower. Without objection, so ordered.

20 (The material referred to follows:)

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1 Senator Tower. Any more questions?

2 Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this  
3 afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and  
4 I hope everyone will be in attendance.

5 Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans,  
6 Cartha DeLoach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General  
7 Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.

8 The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00  
9 a.m. tomorrow morning.

10 (Whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the  
11 above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday  
12 December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.)

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7:00PM NITEL 3-10-76 VLN

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DEPARTMENTAL GUIDELINES FOR THE FBI

UNDER SEPARATE COVER YOU ARE BEING FURNISHED A COPY OF THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDELINES RELATING TO FBI INVESTIGATIONS OF DOMESTIC SECURITY MATTERS.

MY STATEMENT, THAT YOU MAY USE TO ANSWER ANY NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES RELATING TO THESE GUIDELINES, FOLLOWS:

"MR. KELLEY ADVISED THAT THE CURRENT GUIDELINES, WHICH HAVE BEEN RELEASED TODAY, ARE A PRODUCT OF MANY HOURS OF DELIBERATION ON THE PART OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINE COMMITTEE, OF WHICH THE FBI WAS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT. WE FEEL THESE GUIDELINES, AT THE PRESENT TIME, ARE WORKABLE. EXPERIENCE MAY INDICATE A NEED FOR ADJUSTMENTS OF THEM. IF SUCH BE INDICATED, WE HAVE CONFIDENCE WE CAN WORK TOGETHER WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN DELIBERATIONS TO CONSIDER THEM."

END

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FBI - SPRINGFIELD	

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RE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE

Date December 4, 1975

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by \_\_\_\_\_

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

For your assistance in responding to local press inquiries, attached is a copy of unedited excerpted remarks by Assistant to the Director--Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI allegations made by Gary Rowe, former FBI informant.

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EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY  
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --  
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS  
TESTIFYING BEFORE THE  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,  
GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND  
PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI  
TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

DECEMBER 2, 1975

QUESTION:

....You do use informants and do instruct them to spread dissention among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not?

MR. ADAMS:

We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best examples of a situation where the law was ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights used much more than we hear today. We saw with the Little Rock situation the President of the United States sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information as he pointed out during his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the information upon being received was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead

memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem. And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no authority in the absence of an instruction from the Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable information--and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something about it, it was not always acted upon as he indicated.

QUESTION: In none of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

MR. ADAMS: The Departmental rules at that time, and still do, require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you have no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an



individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

QUESTION: ....A local town meeting on a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such meetings because they may result in violent government disruption?

MR ADAMS: No sir, and we don't....

QUESTION: Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

MR. ADAMS: No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the 1st Amendment right, yet at the same time, being

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time. We have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe and the courts have said that the FBI has the right, and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut case.

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities. That's where I think most of our disagreements fall.

QUESTION: In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known about. I know we have asked this several times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was known.

MR. WANNALL: Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be the one to answer the question.

MR. ADAMS: The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals

since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice, and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the information to the local police who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those areas where the local police did not act. It resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in the South at the time either, because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that was a conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed the violations. We have over the years as you know at the

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

QUESTION:           What would be wrong, just following up on your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

MR. ADAMS:           We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same time and this is the approach that the Federal Government finally recognized.

QUESTION:           On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need a better remedy than we have.

MR ADAMS:           Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or 50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning

for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

QUESTION: Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership.

MR. ADAMS: That's right.

QUESTION: I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that 1 out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants, both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

MR. ADAMS: Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters and informants at that particular time and I think the figures

we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was around 6 percent, I think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone, was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time.

QUESTION: I acknowledge that.

MR. ADAMS: Our only approach was through informants. Through the use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved. They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could see that this could continue forever unless we could

create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

QUESTION: I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in 1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto situation?

MR ADAMS: I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington, areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have another group here that is getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

QUESTION: ... Without going into that subject further of course we have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime when you had information that it was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where you have.

MR. ADAMS: We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

QUESTION: To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime.

MR. ADAMS: Not necessarily knew.

QUESTION: Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

MR. ADAMS: The informant is on one level. We have other informants and we have other information.

QUESTION: You were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham Police in order...

MR. ADAMS: That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

QUESTION: So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

MR. ADAMS: We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.S. Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

QUESTION: ...This brings up the point as to what kind of control you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

MR. ADAMS: A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer using him as an informant in spite of the information he had furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

QUESTION: But you also told him to participate in violent activities



MR. ADAMS: We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

QUESTION: That's what he said.

MR. ADAMS: I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence.

QUESTION: Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

MR. ADAMS: I do not think they made any such statement to him along that line either and we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject and have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence in this case during the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a day and he was a little late in disseminating the information to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying local authorities. So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant files.

QUESTION: Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going

to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead but the implication is that he would have to go along or would have to be involved if he was going to maintain his liability as a ---

MR. ADAMS: There is no question that an informant at times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place but I believe his statement was to the effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is one thing being present, it is another thing taking an active part in a criminal action.

QUESTION: It's true. He was close enough to get his throat cut apparently.

QUESTION: How does the collection of information about an individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

MR. ADAMS: Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever.

QUESTION:           You don't know of any such case where these instructions  
were given to an Agent or an informant?

MR. ADAMS:           To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.

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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,  
SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE.

TO AID FBIHQ IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY  
CAPTIONED SUBCOMMITTEE, SUTEL BY SEPTEMBER 7, 1976, ATTENTION  
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION THE FOLLOWING: THE TOTAL  
NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS BEING SOUGHT CURRENTLY AS FUGITIVES  
BECAUSE OF THEIR FAILURE TO APPEAR OR WHO OTHERWISE DEFAULTED  
ON THE TERMS OF THEIR PRETRIAL RELEASE IN THOSE CRIMES OVER  
WHICH THE FBI HAS PRIMARY INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION.

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ATTENTION SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,  
SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, AUGUST 31, 1976.

SPRINGFIELD CURRENTLY SEEKING THREE FUGITIVES FOR FAILURE TO  
APPEAR OR BOND DEFAULT IN CRIMES OVER WHICH FBI HAS PRIMARY INVESTI-  
GATIVE JURISDICTION.

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ATTENTION SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,  
SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, AUGUST 31, 1976.

SPRINGFIELD CURRENTLY SEEKING THREE FUGITIVES FOR FAILURE TO  
APPEAR OR BOND DEFAULT IN CRIMES OVER WHICH FBI HAS PRIMARY INVESTI-  
GATIVE JURISDICTION.

BT

2471811 HQ 1

66-2921-12

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
SEP 3 1976	
FBI - SPRINGFIELD	

*Schmitt*

*MON*

NW 65994 DocId:32989835 Page 182

FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.1 (#546)

TEXT:  
VZCZCHQ0052

OO ASO

DE HQ #0052 3510053

ZNR UUUUU

O 172325Z DEC 86

FM DIRECTOR, FBI

TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES

ALL LEGAL ATTACHES

BT

UNCLAS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE SENT A LETTER  
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WHICH READS IN PERTINENT PART AS  
FOLLOWS: "TO ASSIST IT IN ITS CURRENT INVESTIGATION, THE  
COMMITTEE REQUIRES THE DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED BELOW:

"-- ANY AND ALL MATERIAL WHICH ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE  
DEPARTMENT, AS A RESULT OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OR OTHER  
ACTIVITIES, WHICH RELATE TO FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING  
ALBERT HAKIM WHICH INCLUDE USE OF BANK ACCOUNTS IN  
SWITZERLAND;

"-- ANY AND ALL MATERIALS WHICH ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE

66-2921-13

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 17 1986	
FBI - SPRINGFIELD	

J. Moore



PAGE TWO DE HQ 0052 UNCLAS

DEPARTMENT, AS A RESULT OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OR OTHER  
ACTIVITIES, WHICH RELATE TO TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING RICHARD V.  
SECORD IN WHICH IT IS BELIEVED THAT ILLEGAL PROFITS MIGHT HAVE  
BEEN MADE DUE TO THE SALE OR DELIVERY OF U. S. ARMS,  
MUNITIONS, OR MILITARY OR DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES TO  
FOREIGN NATIONS, GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS."

16712-522-1P.4

ALL OFFICES AND LEGATS IMMEDIATELY REVIEW THOROUGHLY ALL  
FILES AND THEREAFTER MAKE PHOTOCOPIES OF ALL DOCUMENTS  
RESPONSIVE TO THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST. SEND THESE PHOTOCOPIES  
TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION DENNIS MILLER, ROOM 5129. THIS REQUEST  
SHOULD RECEIVE TOP PRIORITY. A PROMPT AND THOROUGH RESPONSE  
IS ANTICIPATED.

BT

#0052

NNNN

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☒ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☒ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/18/86

005

1 FM SPRINGFIELD (66-2921) (RUC).

2 TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

3 BT

4 S E C R E T

5 ATTN: FBIHQ, SSA DENNIS MILLER, ROOM 5129

6 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

7 THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" WHERE NOTED.

8 RE BUTEL TO ALL FIELD OFFICE, DEC. 17, 1986.

9 A THOROUGH REVIEW OF SPRINGFIELD DIVISION GENERAL, ELSUR  
 10 AND CONFIDENTIAL INDICES NEGATIVE RE ALBERT HAKIN AND RICHARD V.  
 11 SECORD, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF REFERENCE TO SECORD IN WFO TEL TO  
 12 THE BUREAU AND ALL FIELD OFFICES, JULY 25, 1986, ENTITLED,  
 13 "JACK REYNOLDS TERRELL, AKA COLONEL FLACO; IT-NICARAGUA; OO: WFO  
 14 (WFO FILE 199C-4773)", IN WHICH SPRINGFIELD CONDUCTED NO INVESTI-  
 15 GATION. (S)

16 C. 10163; D. OADR.

17 BT

18 (1) - Springfield (66-2921)

19 JEM/nlb  
 20 (1)

66-2921-14  
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Approved: J/AD

Transmitted

(Number)

352/0005

(Time)

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PAGE TWO DE HQ 0052 UNCLAS

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BT

#0052

NNNN

FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

OUTBOX.1 (#579)

TEXT:

SI0005 3530055

PP HQ

DE SI

P 180055Z DEC 86

FM SPRINGFIELD (66-2921) (RUC).

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

BT

S E C R E T

ATTN: FBIHQ, SSA DENNIS MILLER, ROOM 5129

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