

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(13 February 1998) Terrorists seeking WMD capability

[REDACTED]

Usama bin Ladin and other Islamic extremists met [REDACTED] and agreed to procure unspecified chemical, biological, and nuclear substances from open markets, [REDACTED]

- Before 1995, bin Ladin and his followers were trying to develop [REDACTED] [REDACTED] allegedly to target US military installations in Saudi Arabia, [REDACTED]

Bin Ladin has legitimate companies, business relationships, and a financial empire that could assist his pursuit of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability.

- The types of substances reportedly under development in the past by bin Ladin are consistent with those previously considered by other terrorists and extremists.

Bin Ladin and his associates [REDACTED] also agreed to expand narcotics exports to Europe and the US using legitimate businesses as conduits. Bin Ladin's foray into narcotics trafficking may be an effort to help the Taliban augment its finances. As an exile in Afghanistan, bin Ladin is dependent upon the goodwill of the Taliban.

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IN BRIEF

(24 February 1998) Middle East

Usama bin Ladin and a coalition of Islamic groups in London each have issued a fatwa or religious ruling pegged to the situation in Iraq calling for all Muslims to attack US interests and civilians worldwide until the US "retreats" from Saudi Arabia and "Palestine." Leaders of other militant groups, including the Egyptian al- Gama'at al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian al-Jihad, and the Pakistan-based Harakat ul- Ansar, signed bin Ladin's fatwa.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~Top Secret~~

PDB MEMO

DATE: 03/05/98
SUBJECT: Islamic Threat to [REDACTED] Western Interests
BODY:

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This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED], and
[REDACTED] of the DCI Counterterrorist Center.
The authors can be reached on [REDACTED] secure.

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5 March 1998

SUBJECT: Islamic Threat to [REDACTED] Western
Interests

1. Islamic extremists called the "Three
Brothers Islamic Front" [REDACTED] threatened to
detonate [REDACTED] explosive devices--

--in the Montreal [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

threatened similar action in New York,
and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] however, the
extremists provided limited details on
the [REDACTED] bomb [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]

The threat could be in reaction to a fatwa issued on 23 February by a new group that includes Usama bin Ladin and leaders of several Islamic extremist groups; the fatwa calls for unspecified attacks against Americans and their allies anywhere in the world and could be regarded as a directive to other Islamic extremists.

--- In addition, known terrorist groups and unidentified individuals levied anti-Western threats during the recent US-Iraq tensions.

[REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 04/29/98
SUBJECT: No Evidence Taliban Plans To Hand Over Bin Ladin
BODY:

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This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED]
of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and
African Analysis. The author can be reached on
[REDACTED] secure.

~~TOP SECRET~~

29 April 1998

SUBJECT: No Evidence Taliban Plans To Hand Over
Bin Ladin

1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the group is willing to continue acting
as host to Usama bin Ladin. In the meeting [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], Taliban
officials stuck to their line that the Saudi
financier is a guest but would not be permitted
to engage in acts of terrorism from Afghan soil,
[REDACTED]

--- The Taliban has acknowledged in the
past [REDACTED] that bin Ladin's
presence carries diplomatic costs, but
its wish to preserve his financial
support and its gratitude for his
assistance during the Soviet occupation
make the group reluctant to alienate him
by monitoring or controlling his
activities. [REDACTED]

2. Before [REDACTED] visit to
Afghanistan, speculation arose in Pakistan's
Urdu press as well as in the London-based Arabic
daily Al-Quds al-Arabi about a possible trade of
bin Ladin for US recognition of the Taliban
government. These reports appeared following
increased US involvement in the search for peace
in Afghanistan-- [REDACTED]

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Central Intelligence Agency

PDB Memorandum

23 June 1998

This memorandum should not be reproduced.

SUBJECT: Potential Targets for Anti-US Attacks by Bin Ladin

1. Usama Bin Ladin in March called on "ulema, notables, merchants, and tribal chiefs" to form military units in preparation for a jihad in Saudi Arabia and last month said the results would be known "in a few weeks." Bin Ladin in a press conference last month said he intends to "destroy" US or allied military installations at 23 locations, including seven in Saudi Arabia.

— [redacted] indicates Bin Ladin is targeting these [redacted] installations, as well as civilian oil-related facilities and the royal palace in Jeddah.

— Bin Ladin may try multiple attacks, as he did in 1992, when he and Yemeni allies attempted three simultaneous attacks against US forces in Aden. [redacted]

2. US troops work in, pay port calls to, or are planning exercises at most of the locations listed by Bin Ladin; in addition, [redacted] have an airbase in [redacted] and [redacted] military equipment is used in [redacted]. Some of the [redacted] targets have been the objects of surveillance or planned attacks by [redacted] opposition elements, [redacted]

— [redacted] Bin Ladin is planning attacks on US personnel at a [redacted] hotel frequented by Americans, the US naval presence on [redacted] and the [redacted] port facility at [redacted]

— [redacted] Bin Ladin in the past year planned to attack US personnel in [redacted] but abandoned the effort [redacted]

3. [redacted] Bin Ladin is planning attacks in Pakistan, where he has a large concentration of followers, but recent arrests there may interfere with his plans. For the past four months, we have worked [redacted] to identify and arrest Bin Ladin supporters plotting to attack our Embassy [redacted].


4. Bin Ladin's target list includes [redacted] —four locations in [redacted], two islands in [redacted] and the [redacted] Bin Ladin has operatives in [redacted] and [redacted] it has operatives in eastern Africa. Bin Ladin may be able to call on Egyptian extremists—who are among his closest allies—to undertake attacks in [redacted]

5. Bin Ladin at his May press conference talked about "bringing the war home to America," possibly a call for attacks in the US. [redacted] claimed Bin Ladin was planning an attack in the US or Saudi Arabia [redacted] June, but we have no information indicating that Bin Ladin has a terrorist network in the US [redacted]

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] author can be reached on [redacted] secure.

[redacted] of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The

Bin Ladin Targets [REDACTED]



Secret [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Reports That Bin Ladin is Planning Attacks Inside the US

We have received four reports from highly questionable sources suggesting Usama Bin Ladin is making plans to conduct an attack in the United States.

- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin is considering mounting an attack in Washington, probably at a shopping mall [REDACTED].
- [REDACTED] three weeks ago, teams sent by Bin Ladin had planned to kidnap [REDACTED], but the plot probably was aborted.
- [REDACTED] that Bin Ladin threatened to carry out an attack in the US or Saudi Arabia [REDACTED] June.
- [REDACTED] in April said Bin Ladin was planning possible attacks in Pakistan, New York, or Washington [REDACTED]

Although we have significant concerns about these sources, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin may be planning an operation soon, possibly in the US.

- On 11 June, Bin Ladin's lieutenant said they would be "in the news soon."
- On 1 June, an Arab in [REDACTED] linked to Arab extremists in Pakistan said he was "preparing the [REDACTED] sacrifices" in terms suggesting that he himself might be the sacrifice.

It is plausible that Bin Ladin places a high priority on conducting attacks in the United States. In May he made a reference to "bringing the war to the US." Some of his followers have indicated that they would like to avenge the imprisonment of Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Wali Khan Amin Shah.

We have little information on Bin Ladin's operatives in the US. He may have ties to Arabs in Boston where an international Islamic charity that he funds has a branch office. Employees of the charity's New York branch were involved in the World Trade Center bombing. Other groups with members who work with Bin Ladin, such as the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, also have a presence in the US and may, because of their close association with Bin Ladin, be willing to conduct attacks on his behalf.

For the President Only
3 July 1998

[REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 07/16/98
SUBJECT: Bin Ladin's Prospects for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Attacks
BODY:

[REDACTED]

This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The authors can be reached on [REDACTED] secure.

[REDACTED]

16 July 1998

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin's Prospects for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Attacks

1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] that Bin Ladin is interested in publicity and would not involve himself in [REDACTED]. One of the [REDACTED] indicated Bin Ladin is seeking a "Hiroshima."

--- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Bin Ladin or companies associated with him have tried to buy highly enriched uranium; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2. Bin Ladin has expressed an interest in conducting attacks with chemical and biological agents and has sought some dual-use materials and expertise, [REDACTED]. A recent Italian press report alleged Bin Ladin and his associates are preparing chemical warfare agents, toxins to poison water supplies, and fungi to destroy crops.

--- Before 1995, Bin Ladin and his followers were trying to develop cyanide gas bombs allegedly to target US military installations in Saudi Arabia, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 07/30/98
SUBJECT: Status of Usama Bin Ladin
BODY:

[REDACTED]

This memorandum was prepared by
of the DCI Counterterrorist Center.

The author can be reached on [REDACTED] secure.

[REDACTED]

30 July 1998

SUBJECT: Status of Usama Bin Ladin

1. Usama Bin Ladin remains in Afghanistan.
[REDACTED] he changes his location frequently, dividing his time among Kandahar, two sites in Khowst, camps in Lowgar and Nangarhar Provinces, and Kabul. [REDACTED]
2. Recently he has spent most of his time at one site in Khowst, which offers better defenses than his compound at Kandahar and which has an extensive array of tunnels and caves. [REDACTED] many of his supporters, including members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, may have moved to Khowst.

--- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin moved his family to Kabul early this month and plans to move them to Khowst or Nangarhar. [REDACTED]
3. Bin Ladin remains on good terms with the Taliban, and [REDACTED] his frequent moves are to hide from the US and not from the Taliban. [REDACTED] he is concerned that the US will kidnap or assassinate him.

--- [REDACTED] the Taliban,

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responding to outside pressure, is urging Bin Ladin to maintain a low profile. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin continues to plan terrorist attacks against the US and Saudi Arabia with help from elements of the EIJ and al-Gama'at. Bin Ladin's supporters are urging him to mount an attack soon, reminding him of his promise on 26 May to mount operations "within a few weeks," and [REDACTED] he may be planning an attack involving unconventional weapons, possibly against civilians.

--- We are reviewing available information for operational leads and tactical indicators of such an attack. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5. As of last month, Bin Ladin was still infiltrating operatives into Saudi Arabia from Yemen to attack US and Saudi targets, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin was considering conducting attacks in the US.

--- Arrests of operatives and allies in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Pakistan, and Albania over the past four months may have delayed his plans. [REDACTED]

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PDB

(28 August 1998) Bin Ladin Terrorist Network Still a Threat

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin and other terrorist leaders based in Afghanistan survived the US strikes and their communications network remains intact. [REDACTED] training had resumed in some camps, and other camps were being moved, [REDACTED]

- Bin Ladin can call on a network of individuals and allied groups in at least 60 countries to conduct attacks.

Hours before the US missile strikes, Bin Ladin [REDACTED] was looking at options for further attacks against the US as well as the UK [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin did not indicate precise targets or timing.

- US officials recently assisted in the arrest of Bin Ladin operatives preparing attacks in Tirana and possibly Baku, but [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin intends to conduct attacks in Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula--especially Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen--India, Pakistan, Uganda, and possibly Nigeria.

Bin Ladin's well-established infrastructure in North America, Europe, and East Asia lends credibility to reports that he also will target US interests in these regions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin authorized him to explore attacks in the US.

- [REDACTED] earlier this year reported that Bin Ladin was considering attacks in the US.

- [REDACTED] our Embassy in [REDACTED] is a possible target, and [REDACTED] Bin Ladin-related threats against US facilities in [REDACTED]

Muslim extremist sympathizers, like the South African group suspected of the bombing in Cape Town on Tuesday, could attack of their own initiative. More than 80 threats to various US interests worldwide have been reported since the missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan.

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 09/01/98
SUBJECT: Bin Ladin's Infrastructure in North America
BODY:

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This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED] of the Counterterrorism Center. The author can be reached on [REDACTED] secure.

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1 September
1998

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin's Infrastructure in North America

1. [REDACTED] several members of Bin Ladin's organization live in the US but appear to be loosely connected rather than organized as a cell. These members include Wadi' al-Hajj--a US citizen--who was the Bin Ladin cell leader in Nairobi before his arrest in Kenya in 1997. He now lives in Dallas where FBI officials monitor his activities. His current role in Bin Ladin's organization is unclear, but his high-level position in Kenya and previous mujahidin experience could give him a role in terrorist-related operations here.

--- Another Bin Ladin associate in Sacramento has extensive paramilitary experience, served with the mujahidin in Afghanistan, and claims to have trained Bin Ladin's bodyguards in Sudan. He has had contact with al-Hajj and Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya members in the US.

--- A Bin Ladin associate in Tampa procures hi-tech communications and surveillance equipment for Bin Ladin and may provide technical support to

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the organization. He has ties to HAMAS and the US branch of a [REDACTED] NGO [REDACTED]

--- FBI officials are pursuing another Bin Ladin associate, who was last seen in the US a year ago and may be Bin Ladin's chief weapons procurement official, explosives expert, and a member of his Shura council. [REDACTED]

2. Bin Ladin uses NGOs to fund his organization and provide cover for its activities worldwide and has longstanding links to several Islamic NGOs with US branches. Mercy International Relief Agency (MIRA) maintains offices in Michigan and California. [REDACTED] MIRA offices abroad have provided cover and logistic support to Bin Ladin associates.

-- [REDACTED] According to a pamphlet published by MIRA, the organization has an affiliated group in Canada called Mercy for International Relief Agency.

-- [REDACTED]

--- Bin Ladin helped found the Pakistani-based NGO Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), which has offices in New York and Boston. The office in New York, the al-Khifah Center, was linked to the World Trade Center bombing.

[REDACTED] MAK officials and Bin Ladin in January discussed expanding narcotics exports to the US and Europe. [REDACTED]

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3. Bin Ladin has ties to Egyptian extremist groups with a longstanding presence in the US and Canada, which could collaborate in terrorist operations. Gama'at leader Mustapha Hamza [REDACTED] that the group "will not stay quiet after the US attacks" in Sudan and Afghanistan.

--- Gama'at members are scattered throughout the US--including New York, California, and Florida--and have a presence in Vancouver and Toronto, Canada, according to FBI information.
[REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 09/04/98
SUBJECT: Americans Face Increased Terrorist Threat in US and Europe
BODY:

[REDACTED]

This memorandum was prepared by
of the DCI Counterterrorist Center [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The author can be
reached on [REDACTED] secure.

[REDACTED]

4 September
1998

SUBJECT: Americans Face Increased Terrorist
Threat in US and Europe

1. The most serious threat comes from Usama Bin Ladin, but affiliated extremist groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, which have a presence in North America and Europe, could conduct independent attacks or collaborate in terrorist operations against US interests.

--- The members of al-Gama'at who tried to assassinate Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995 received safehaven at a Bin Ladin camp in [REDACTED]

2. In addition to seeking retaliation for the missile strikes and the US role, Bin Ladin and the EIJ might seek revenge for the recent arrests of senior EIJ operatives in [REDACTED]. Bin Ladin has threatened to "cut off the head of the snake," and a faction of the EIJ just prior to the Embassy bombings publicly threatened to target US interests.

--- [REDACTED] during the past

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three months, [REDACTED] Bin Ladin has considered conducting attacks in the US.

--- Bin Ladin has associates in the US, but the network appears less structured than his cells in other countries, and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3. The near-term threat to Americans is greater in Europe, where Bin Ladin's infrastructure is better established. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin has plans to attack US interests in Europe.

-- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin is cutting his dependence on his European network for financing and access to high-tech equipment. Without such contacts to lose, he might be more willing to risk the fallout from attacks in Europe. [REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 09/10/98
SUBJECT: Bin Ladin's Location and Intentions
BODY:

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This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED] of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The author can be reached on [REDACTED] secure.

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10 September 1998

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin's Location and Intentions

1. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin moves among various locations in eastern Afghanistan--including Khowst, Jalalabad, Kabul, and Khandahar-- [REDACTED] he also has gone to Herat in western Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

2. Intelligence provides no conclusive information on Bin Ladin's intentions for future attacks. Based on his past actions, he and his allies may focus on places they have surveilled in the past, where their operatives can work relatively freely, and where security at US facilities is less stringent.

--- He had networks in [REDACTED] and neither was generally perceived as a high threat area. Suspects in those bombings say Bin Ladin also was planning attacks in Uganda, Egypt, Yemen, and Lebanon.

--- [REDACTED] he is considering attacks in Bangladesh, [REDACTED] Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. [REDACTED]

3. We suspect several recent walk-ins to our Embassies [REDACTED] [REDACTED] --may be part of an effort by Bin Ladin to case US facilities.

--- [REDACTED] the Kashmiri militant group Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM) is coordinating with Bin Ladin to attack US, British, and French interests in [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin late last month said his

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preferred option is to strike the US on its own soil in Washington. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the same group responsible for the bombings in Africa
may fly an explosive-packed airplane into a US city.

--- The HUM publicly claims the US used chemical weapons in
attacking Khovst and vows to give a "matching reply." [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 09/11/98
SUBJECT: Threat Environment Heightened Against US Interests Worldwide
BODY:

[REDACTED]

This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED] of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The author can be reached on [REDACTED] secure.

[REDACTED]

11 September 1998

SUBJECT: Threat Environment Heightened Against US Interests Worldwide

1. We have documented nearly 300 threats worldwide since the East Africa bombings on 7 August. Threats peaked one week after the US strikes and now are approaching prestrike levels. Official US diplomatic facilities and personnel were the targets in [REDACTED] cases, and [REDACTED] threats were aimed at US commercial, tourist, cultural, and nongovernment entities.

--- US interests in Africa have received [REDACTED] threats--the most of any region--including threatened bomb attacks against US Embassies.

--- Facilities and personnel in Western Europe received the second-highest number of threats, with the Middle East and Southeast Asia close behind. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] but many of those threats did not identify specific targets.

--- Other types of threats since 20 August include warnings of hijacking, kidnapping, rocket and chemical attacks, and assassination.

-- [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

3. In addition to Bin Ladin, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, groups posing [REDACTED] threats include People Against Gangsterism and Drugs--implicated in the 25 August Cape Town bombing--and Qibla. Both are [REDACTED] Islamic groups that have called for retaliatory attacks against the US.

--- [REDACTED] early this month warned our Embassy that [REDACTED] are planning to attack US citizens in [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

--- [REDACTED]

--- US facilities worldwide are taking heightened security precautions [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(20 October 1998) Afghanistan: Implications of a Taliban Government for the US

The Taliban lacks a coherent plan for running the country. The Taliban's limited efforts to revive government institutions, such as the Central Bank, have been stymied by a lack of bureaucratic savvy and economic planning, [REDACTED]

- The Taliban's exclusionary approach to governing suggests it will continue to resist a broad-based coalition government despite diplomatic efforts to press a political settlement.
- Taliban officials say the government will be based on Islamic law and that spiritual leader Mullah Omar will remain the ultimate religious and political authority.

Seeking International Respect

The top foreign policy priority for the Taliban is to gain recognition as the legitimate government, but only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have done so. The rigid policies espoused by the Taliban pose hurdles to its effort to gain recognition.

- Omar vigorously defends Saudi dissident Usama Bin Ladin's continued stay in Afghanistan, although Omar is under increasing pressure from subordinates to rein in Bin Ladin.
- The importance of narcotics trafficking to the economy, the clout of traffickers, and the involvement by some Taliban members in the drug trade will stymie counternarcotics efforts.

Differences in the Leadership

The Taliban leadership has several ideological currents, including dogmatic and pragmatic elements. More dogmatic hardliners--led by Omar--worry less about gaining international recognition, favor political asylum for Bin Ladin, and shun compromise on Omar's edicts regarding domestic issues. More pragmatic moderates--represented by Mullah Rabbani--

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

attempt to abide by international norms of political behavior and may support more flexible internal policies. As the Taliban's position becomes secure, more moderate views may gain strength and provide an opening for progress on counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and human rights.

- Last month in Kandahar--the Taliban's stronghold--aid workers reported signs of relaxation of Taliban strictures on education for girls and employment for women, according to press reports.

- Differences in the leadership so far have had little effect on group unity and decisionmaking, but political differences may solidify into internal factions as the Taliban gains complete control of Afghanistan.

Isolation of the Taliban could strengthen the group's stricter adherents to its brand of Islam while increasing the Taliban's dependence on narcotics profits and the largesse of backers like Bin Ladin.

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4 December 1998

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks

1. Reporting [REDACTED] suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad Sadiq 'Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) saying that, as of late October, the IG had completed planning for an operation in the US on behalf of Bin Ladin but that the operation was on hold. A senior Bin Ladin operative from Saudi Arabia was to visit IG counterparts in the US soon thereafter to discuss options—perhaps including an aircraft hijacking.

- IG leader Islambuli in late September was planning to hijack a US airliner during the "next couple of weeks" to free 'Abd al-Rahman and the other prisoners, according to what may be a different source.
- The same source late last month said that Bin Ladin might implement plans to hijack a US aircraft before the beginning of Ramadan on 20 December and that two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport. [REDACTED]

2. Some members of the Bin Ladin network have received hijack training, according to various sources, but no group directly tied to Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization has ever carried out an aircraft hijacking. Bin Ladin could be weighing other types of operations against US aircraft. According to [REDACTED] the IG in October obtained SA-7 missiles and intended to move them from Yemen into Saudi Arabia to shoot down an Egyptian plane or, if unsuccessful, a US military or civilian aircraft.

- A [REDACTED] in October told us that unspecified "extremist elements" in Yemen had acquired SA-7s. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] indicate the Bin Ladin organization or its allies are moving closer to implementing anti-US attacks at unspecified locations, but we do not know whether they are related to attacks on aircraft. A Bin Ladin associate in Sudan late last month told a colleague in Kandahar that he had shipped a group of containers to Afghanistan. Bin Ladin associates also talked about the movement of containers to Afghanistan before the East Africa bombings.

- In other [REDACTED], Bin Ladin associates last month discussed picking up a package in Malaysia. One told his colleague in Malaysia that "they" were in the "ninth month [of pregnancy]."
- An alleged Bin Ladin supporter in Yemen late last month remarked to his mother that he planned to work in "commerce" from abroad and said his impending "marriage," which would take place soon, would be a "surprise." "Commerce" and "marriage" often are codewords for terrorist attacks. [REDACTED]

This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED]
can be reached on [REDACTED] secure.

of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The author

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 12/11/98
SUBJECT: Significant Near-Term Threat of Bin Ladin Attacks
BODY:

11 December 1998

SUBJECT: Significant Near-Term Threat of Bin Ladin Attacks

1. [REDACTED] over the past two months suggest Bin Ladin's group is preparing one or more terrorist attacks in the near future. Individuals in Malaysia tied to a senior operative of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad--a group closely allied with Bin Ladin--last month said "they" were "in the ninth month" of pregnancy, and a Bin Ladin associate in Yemen late last month told his mother he would soon be involved in "commerce" and a "wedding"--terms often used as codewords for terrorist planning.

--- In late October, Bin Ladin's most senior lieutenant in Khartoum discussed a shipment of "containers," [REDACTED] before the East Africa bombings [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] several reports of impending anti-US terrorist operations. [REDACTED] and planning to hijack aircraft before Ramadan, [REDACTED] Bin Ladin last month was planning an "imminent" terrorist operation against a US facility in [REDACTED] and was frustrated that an attack in [REDACTED] had not been carried out. [REDACTED]

3. Bin Ladin may view the coming weeks as propitious for terrorist operations because he may anticipate security at US installations will relax during the Christmas and New Year's holiday period. Similarly, security forces in Muslim countries will be spread thin and be less vigilant during Ramadan, which lasts from 20 December to 18 January. In addition, Ramadan commemorates the Prophet Muhammad's victories over his enemies. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] and Bin Ladin's ideological motivations suggest he assigns the highest priority to attacks against official US facilities in the Persian Gulf. We have strong indications that he would like to attack the US and allies such as the UK and Israel on their own soil. If Bin Ladin judges these venues are too well defended, however, he will target US and allied interests in other areas of the world accessible to his network.

--- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin may seek to conduct terrorist operations in areas where allied extremists have extensive networks, such as Pakistan and Egypt. [REDACTED]

5. Bin Ladin and his allies are most capable of conducting assassinations and bombings similar to the attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, but they could employ other means to defeat security measures at US targets. [REDACTED] the al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya in October obtained SA-7 missiles and intended to shoot down an Egyptian or US aircraft. Many Bin Ladin operatives used man-portable antiaircraft missiles against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and [REDACTED] others

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have received training in aircraft hijacking.

--- [REDACTED] efforts by Bin Ladin to acquire unconventional weapons, including CW agents such as the nerve agent VX, [REDACTED] he has considered using these materials [REDACTED] [REDACTED]



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PDB

(19 January 1999) Strains surface between Taliban and Bin Ladin

Usama Bin Ladin's public call late last month for violence against Americans has prompted Taliban [REDACTED] to accuse Bin Ladin of breaking his promise not to support terrorist activities while on Afghan soil, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] had asked Bin Ladin to renounce terrorism publicly, but Bin Ladin instead called for more attacks.

Bin Ladin's presence has caused fissures between senior Taliban officials, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] last month went to [REDACTED]
after an argument with [REDACTED] over whether to continue to give Bin Ladin safehaven,
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] frustration with Bin Ladin could lead to a rapprochement with [REDACTED] and to greater restrictions on Bin Ladin's activities.

[REDACTED] previously has expressed dissatisfaction with Bin Ladin's high visibility, but the Taliban to date has given no indication it plans to expel the terrorist financier.

- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin is offering to send a [REDACTED] unit to fight alongside the Taliban against opposition forces, possibly to demonstrate to [REDACTED] his continued utility to the Taliban.

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1 February 1999

SUBJECT: Usama Bin Ladin's Unconventional Weapons Capability

1. [REDACTED] on unconventional weapons training at Bin Ladin-affiliated camps, attack scenarios [REDACTED] the moderate technical skill required, [REDACTED] suggest that Bin Ladin could conduct crude chemical attacks or poisonings using biological toxins but that such attacks would not cause more casualties than a large conventional bomb. [REDACTED] training at a Bin Ladin-affiliated camp includes instruction on making and using poisons and poisonous gases.

— [REDACTED] Bin Ladin operatives last year agreed to concentrate on obtaining chemical and biological weapons, [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin may have succeeded in acquiring a military-grade unconventional weapon from parts of the former USSR. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin [REDACTED] obtained a "chemical bomb" from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Bin Ladin's network [REDACTED] celebrated the acquisition of a chemical weapon [REDACTED]

— [REDACTED] criminal groups and some government officials are selling CW agents, but CW scams exist elsewhere, and Bin Ladin has been taken in by similar scams in the past. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin during the past three years has tried to obtain nuclear weapons and related materials, primarily from the former USSR, but we judge he does not have a weapon, the necessary weapons material, or infrastructure to conduct an attack. [REDACTED] his organization has some radioactive material that could be used in a dispersion device—a so-called "dirty" bomb—or in poisonings, but they would not cause mass casualties.

— [REDACTED]

— [REDACTED] Bin Ladin accelerated his search for CW and BW weapons in part because he failed to obtain enough uranium or plutonium. [REDACTED]

4. Bin Ladin might switch from the use of large conventional bombs if he found a way to introduce chemical or biological weapons into targets such as US military bases or embassies. If Bin Ladin succeeded in buying a chemical or biological weapon, his past behavior and statements indicate he would have no reservations about using it and he would begin searching for a suitable target.

— In interviews in December, Bin Ladin said it is a religious duty to seek such weapons to defend Muslims. [REDACTED]

This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED]
can be reached on [REDACTED] secure.

of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The author

5. Recent disruptions of suspected terrorist cells of other organizations have had a major impact. [REDACTED] authorities last month arrested [REDACTED] Egyptian extremists, including Abu Khalid, a top operative in the EIJ's Vanguard of Conquest faction led by Ahmad Husayn Agiza and the key outside contact for Agiza, who is in Iran.

- Joint operations [REDACTED] disrupted terrorist support activities in the triborder region of [REDACTED]

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Bin Ladin Still Planning Attacks Despite Pressure

Bin Ladin associate last week said that a terrorist operation on the Arabian Peninsula would take place the possibility of Bin Ladin-sponsored attacks this month.

- Bin Ladin operatives over the past month moved from Pakistan to conduct attacks.
- Bin Ladin's network this month was planning a terrorist operation.
- Bin Ladin last month dispatched terrorist teams

Network Under Pressure

Planning continues despite rising concern among members of Bin Ladin's network about crackdowns in several countries. a Bin Ladin lieutenant--who since December has been directing preparations for possible terrorist operations--expressed concern about the fate of associates

the Bin Ladin-allied Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is urging its cadre in to leave,

- The dismantling of the EIJ's operational hub in would be a significant blow to Bin Ladin's network.

the Taliban's fear of US airstrikes have led it in the past month to increase pressure on Bin Ladin to act more discreetly. The Taliban has not

3/23/1999

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constrained his operations, but [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- The Pakistan-based Harakat ul-Mujahedin--which signed Bin Ladin's anti-US fatwa last year and publicly has threatened to retaliate for the US missile strikes that killed several of its members--might act [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya was willing to cooperate on attacks with Bin Ladin, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Disagreements have surfaced within the group over whether to continue armed struggle.

- The group's leaders [REDACTED] planned to ask Bin Ladin to let them resolve their own differences. [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(30 March 1999) Gama'at claims cease-fire

The Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya on Friday publicly renounced terrorist operations, reversing its call in December for a jihad against the US. The group, however, may be concealing terrorism plans-- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]. A cease-fire would reduce the number of Egyptian extremists that Bin Ladin could use and limit his access to Gama'at hubs [REDACTED]

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(07 May 1999) Usama Bin Ladin: Vexing Taliban but Still Able To Mount Attacks

Taliban leader Mullah Omar is increasingly uncomfortable with Bin Ladin's presence and is considering ways to remove him from Afghanistan, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Taliban, however, has not imposed new restrictions on Bin Ladin's operations or made specific plans to expel him.

- Taliban foreign relations director Jalil on Tuesday defended Bin Ladin and rebuffed demands for his expulsion [REDACTED]

The Taliban allows Bin Ladin to meet with his lieutenants and members of other extremist groups--contacts that enable him to continue directing terrorist operations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin late last month met with Egyptian extremists.

- [REDACTED]

(07 May 1999) Bin Ladin Helping Taliban War Effort

Recent opposition gains increase the value to the Taliban of foreign mujahidin sponsored by Bin Ladin and make a Taliban move against him less likely in the near term. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] more non-Afghan volunteers arrived in Afghanistan [REDACTED] for training and deployment to a Bin Ladin-affiliated frontline unit [REDACTED]

- Shia Hizbi Wahdat and Harakat-i-Islami fighters of the Northern Alliance last month recaptured the provincial capital of Bamian, and Northern Alliance commander Masood's forces early this week made strategic gains in Kondo Province, according to [REDACTED] press reports.

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PDB Memorandum

25 May 1999

This memorandum should not be reproduced.

SUBJECT: New Information on Bin Ladin's Unconventional Weapons Capability

1. [REDACTED] Usama Bin Ladin is pursuing a variety of options for developing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities. The information on chemical and biological agents, [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED] rough diagrams [REDACTED] of potential chemical weapons such as mortar or artillery rounds ranging from a simple WWI design to a crude binary weapon, [REDACTED]
The organization could manufacture and use the simplest weapon design with a reasonable chance of success. [REDACTED] the students experimented with explosive dispersion of chemical agents.
 - [REDACTED] claimed to have manufactured and tested sarin and had small stocks of it and VX.
 - These nerve agents were not used during the training, which focused on poisons, biological toxins, and first-generation CW agents such as phosgene, chlorine, and hydrogen cyanide, [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED] scientists are developing a "nuclear weapon" at a facility in Heart, and Bin Ladin believes it could be ready in one to two months. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin has acquired plutonium or uranium, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He has fallen victim to nuclear scams in the past.
 - His network may have some radioactive material that could be used in a radiological dispersal device or "dirty" bomb that could cause contamination. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED] work is under way in Afghanistan to enhance the explosive power of conventional weapons. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] scientists are working at a new facility in [REDACTED] to enhance explosives [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
 - The addition of uranium or a radioactive material would contaminate an area, but would not increase the power of an explosive.
 - Bin Ladin's network might be trying to build or use thermobaric munitions, which combine a propellant and metal particles to produce blast waves several times stronger than ones produced by conventional bombs of a similar size. The Soviets used thermobaric munitions in rocket-propelled grenade launchers during the war in Afghanistan and left some there. [REDACTED]

PDB Memorandum

This memorandum should not be reproduced.

2 June 1999

SUBJECT: Implications of New Information on UBL's Unconventional Weapons Capability

1. [REDACTED] trainees at the camp have produced and tested dozens of toxic chemicals and biological toxins—[REDACTED] None of the [REDACTED] since 1996 has had the [REDACTED] to conduct attacks with them, [REDACTED]

- Phosphide, arsenic, carbon monoxide gas, and toxins from a variety of plants and animals were among the toxic agents [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] UBL operatives have experimented with adding small quantities of radioactive materials to explosives to increase their energy output. [REDACTED]

- Terrorists could discover the proper recipes through trial-and-error, but outside assistance—[REDACTED]—could shorten the development timeline.

3. The use of radioactive materials in an attack could instill lasting fear in the public and contaminate an area for an indefinite period. [REDACTED]

- Terrorists could use remote-controlled detonations [REDACTED] to reduce their chances of injury or capture and could more easily initiate simultaneous attacks. [REDACTED]

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This memorandum should not be reproduced.

7 June 1999

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Attempts to Enhance Explosives

1. [REDACTED] Usama Bin Ladin supporters at two camps in Afghanistan are experimenting with enhancing explosives by adding radioactive material. [REDACTED] a substance—possibly of uranium—added to an explosive and [REDACTED] the subsequent explosion seemed larger than normal. [REDACTED] the group believed the addition of uranium would increase the power of explosives by a factor of 50. [REDACTED]

2.

3. [REDACTED] the effort is consistent with our assessment of Bin Ladin's pursuit of unconventional weapons. [REDACTED]

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted]
the Office of Transnational Issues, and
Center. The authors can be reached on [redacted] secure.

of the Counterterrorism



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PDB MEMO

DATE: 06/18/99
SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Leaks Mirror Interagency Threat Advisory
BODY:

18 June 1999

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Leaks Mirror Interagency Threat Advisory

1. US news reports on Wednesday describing terrorist planning by Usama Bin Ladin and attributed to "intelligence sources" and "US officials" [REDACTED] an interagency Terrorist Threat Advisory [REDACTED]
The advisory warned that Bin Ladin's "operational planning may be in an advanced stage" [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- [REDACTED]

--- One news report said Bin Ladin's organization is positioning bombmakers and bombmaking materials-- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2. The news reports [REDACTED] mentioned incidents of possible surveillance at our Embassies in Mozambique, Senegal, and Ghana, and the possibility of attacks in the US and in the Middle East. The news reports mentioned Bin Ladin's attempts to acquire chemical or biological materials for use in attacks-- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] which also has appeared repeatedly in the international press since last fall. [REDACTED]

3. One news report said Bin Ladin has established unconventional weapons laboratories near Khowst and Jalalabad-- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

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(21 July 1999) Bin Ladin

Usama Bin Ladin last week said his group made a dry run of a bombing of the FBI headquarters and indicated the operation would take place "soon," [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Bin Ladin also expressed optimism about his group's ability to attack a US target in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] have expressed reservations about the source [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin--anticipating a US attack--has postponed his operations and instead plans to use local extremist groups to target US facilities in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The targets are consistent with other reporting [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 07/26/99
SUBJECT: Bin Ladin's "No First Strike" Policy Probably Disinformation
BODY:

26 July 1999

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin's "No First Strike" Policy Probably Disinformation

1. Bin Ladin's claim to the Taliban that he will conduct anti-US attacks only in response to missile strikes in Afghanistan may not reflect his intentions. Bin Ladin previously told the Taliban that he had suspended planning for terrorist operations against the US, but [REDACTED] that preparations for attacks advanced steadily.

--- [REDACTED] said Taliban leaders were skeptical of Bin Ladin's denials and remained concerned that he would conduct attacks. [REDACTED]

2. Bin Ladin may hope [REDACTED] [REDACTED] will lead his hosts to reduce their scrutiny of his operations. If the Taliban react positively [REDACTED] he could portray his current terrorist preparations as contingency plans for a US strike and not a violation of the Taliban's request that he not conduct an unprovoked attack. [REDACTED]

3. Bin Ladin's "no first strike" statement may be an attempt to get word to the US of the consequences of strikes against Afghanistan, which several Pakistani press articles last week said are imminent. [REDACTED] reported on Bin Ladin's claim, suggesting his organization is spreading rumors intended for US consumption.

--- A Taliban prohibition on contacts with reporters earlier this year has limited Bin Ladin's ability to send messages to the West through overt channels. [REDACTED]

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(03 August 1999) Bin Ladin: Determined and Capable Despite Setbacks

Bin Ladin for the past several weeks has changed location daily and eschewed media contacts to avoid being captured or killed and because of his--and the Taliban's--concerns about US missile strikes.

slowled communications with field

His organization's capabilities have suffered from the arrest of key operatives. Bin Ladin in interviews last year expressed anger over the arrests of his senior procurement officer and the chief of his organization in the UK.

(03 August 1999) Allies Watching Their Backs

Bin Ladin's closest ally, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), is reeling from the arrests of some members since June of last year. With its chain of command weakened, the group has had increasing difficulty contacting colleagues and moving men, money, and materiel.

- members are preoccupied with living expenses and obtaining documentation needed to leave countries where they fear arrest.
- The EIJ disruptions may have influenced the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya's decision to declare a unilateral cease-fire last March, possibly costing Bin Ladin a surrogate for terrorist operations.

(03 August 1999) Organization Still Dangerous

The ongoing activity of Bin Ladin operatives reflects the resilience of his organization in the face of setbacks. his personnel still are planning attacks in widely scattered locations such as Washington, Uzbekistan, and several African countries.

- The Taliban has imposed token constraints on Bin Ladin's activities in Afghanistan but continues to grant him access to his organization.
- Bin Ladin's organization despite disruptions has maintained worldwide resources-- EIJ members in are involved with Bin Ladin associates in preparations for operations and that other EIJ personnel recently discussed potential operations with colleagues in

The extent of Bin Ladin's reach and the variety of targets make anticipating attacks difficult. US forces in the Arabian Peninsula are Bin Ladin's most desired target, but he continues to consider targeting more vulnerable facilities elsewhere.

- The diverse targets mentioned in the reporting, combined with a high incidence of Bin Ladin-related walk-ins, suggest a deliberate effort to mislead us.

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(27 September 1999) Bin Ladin: Exporting Jihad and Still Planning Terrorist Attacks

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin has assigned several senior lieutenants to coordinate the deployment of hundreds of mujahidin to the North Caucasus and Central Asia from units fighting in northern Afghanistan. Unrest in the Caucasus and Central Asia offers Bin Ladin an opportunity to help local extremists carve out enclaves where his organization can operate freely and to which he could relocate if forced to leave Afghanistan.

- Bin Ladin is willing to shift manpower and resources used to support the Taliban's war effort in part because Afghanistan's summer fighting season is almost over.

Bin Ladin for years has provided more modest levels of money, materiel, training, and some fighters to extremists [REDACTED] veteran of Afghanistan [REDACTED] and operates his own terrorist training camps, is a key recipient.

(27 September 1999) Still Targeting US and Its Allies

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin's increased support for Islamic insurgencies has not distracted his organization from planning retaliatory or preemptive terrorist attacks against US targets. Bin Ladin has sent teams to Peshawar and Quetta to locate and kill US "commandos" who, according to Pakistani press reports, intend to capture or kill him.

- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin operatives in Pakistan plan to retaliate for future US strikes against Afghanistan by car-bombing our Embassy.

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which functions as part of Bin Ladin's organization, in the past two months [REDACTED] suggest the group is preparing attacks [REDACTED] US citizens and facilities remain Bin Ladin's principal targets, but [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin's operatives in 1994 cased Israeli facilities in eastern Africa.

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(18 October 1999) Bin Ladin's involvement in narcotics deepening

The terrorist chief has made a substantial investment in 57 narcotics laboratories associated with Taliban leader Omar, [REDACTED] In addition, Bin Ladin has ordered a senior associate to establish two heroin labs [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- With Taliban consent, Bin Ladin has assembled a group of narcotics processing experts to develop more addictive drugs--possibly ecstasy or methamphetamine-- [REDACTED]

Bin Ladin's increasing involvement in the production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan provides him various options for earning money--he also has a connection to traffickers' money-laundering networks--as well as an alternative infrastructure to facilitate his activities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin was collecting a tax on narcotics he was shipping out of Afghanistan on behalf of Arab businessmen in the Gulf region, [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin in August may have commissioned narcotics traffickers to move explosives--he previously has used his own personnel for terrorist activities--from southern Afghanistan [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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PDB Memorandum

This memorandum should not be reproduced.

8 December 1999

SUBJECT: Implications of Foiled Terrorist Plot in Jordan

1. Jordanian authorities on Tuesday arrested a sixteen-man team of terrorists who planned New Year's Eve attacks on pilgrims at the John the Baptist shrine on the River Jordan and tourists at a hotel in Amman. The terrorists—of various nationalities—planned to use poisons and improvised explosive devices and intended to maximize US and Israeli casualties.

- [REDACTED] individuals on the team have direct links to Bin Ladin's al-Qa`ida organization, to mujahidin supporters in Pakistan, including Abu Zubaida and Khalil Deek—key figures in the world mujahidin movement—and to Abu Khabab al-Masri, a Bin Ladin-associated trainer in chemical and biological materials use. [REDACTED]

2. Details of the plot match Bin Ladin's terrorist methods in several ways—the preference for soft targets, efforts to minimize Muslim casualties, and a growing confidence in the use of chemical agents. Bin Ladin's 1998 fatwa authorizing attacks against "Americans and their allies" draws no distinction between civilian and military targets, and [REDACTED] his organization sees individual US citizens as valid targets if Embassies or other fixed installations are too well-protected. [REDACTED]

- The targeting of tourists and Christian pilgrims and the timing indicate that avoiding harm to Muslims remains important to Bin Ladin. Planning for the East Africa bombings included similar measures, such as conducting the attacks on a Friday.

- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Bin Ladin's organization has trained operatives in the use of toxic chemical and biological toxins for several years but has not used them in an attack.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3. Bin Ladin has shown he can mount multiple attacks, and he and his allies presumably have other operations under way. An al-Qa`ida terrorist planner this year shipped more than 10 "containers"—possibly targeting studies or operational proposals—to Afghanistan, [REDACTED] suggesting the group has contingency plans for attacks against numerous targets.

- Some interpretations of Islamic tradition view warfare on nonbelievers as particularly appropriate during Ramadan—this year from 9 December to 7 January—and security in Muslim countries may be relaxed during the fast. Extremists may expect similar unpreparedness and large crowds at US and other Western targets around Christmas and New Year's. [REDACTED]

For further information, please contact the Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, at [REDACTED] secure.

[REDACTED]

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(23 December 1999) Terrorism: Diverse Groups Planning Anti-US Attacks

We are monitoring threats against US interests in various locations around the world. Of greatest concern are those posed by Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization and allied groups.

- [REDACTED] at least three operatives remain at large and recently completed training in Afghanistan for a separate operation. [REDACTED] the lengthy training--six months--suggests they plan an [REDACTED] operation of high magnitude.

- The [REDACTED] extremist arrested last week while attempting to smuggle bomb components into the US may have been accompanied by another individual who was trying to cross the border.

[REDACTED] says two-man terrorist teams trained in Bin Ladin's camps were to leave Pakistan this weekend for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, [REDACTED] say extremists associated with Bin Ladin or the Taliban plan anti-US terrorist operations in Pakistan.

- [REDACTED] members of the Bin Ladin ally Egyptian Islamic Jihad in [REDACTED] are planning attacks, including the kidnapping for ransom of an official in [REDACTED]--presumably a US, [REDACTED] official--to avenge the arrest there last year of EIJ operatives.

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(30 December 1999) Terrorism: Near-Term Threat Undiminished

US interests at home and abroad face a heightened risk of attack in the coming weeks, particularly from extremists associated with Bin Ladin, who are continuing preparations for operations despite crackdowns.

North African extremists in [REDACTED] continue to prepare for attacking targets in the US. [REDACTED] cell members [REDACTED] finished fabricating bomb components, and an associate delivered unspecified goods to [REDACTED] the next day.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] described plans for attacks on tourist targets in [REDACTED] throughout next year. [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] a cell member still at large--an explosives expert trained in Afghanistan--said he planned to go to the US before returning to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] an Arab in Afghanistan associated with Bin Ladin last Friday mentioned the shipment of a "gift" and told an associate to watch for a "surprise from us in the news, like the first one."

- [REDACTED] extremists associated with Bin Ladin and the Islamic Movement of [REDACTED] are planning to car-bomb our Embassy in [REDACTED] next month or in February, when they expect less security.

Reporting on terrorist preparations has not revealed plans to use chemical, biological, or radiological materials, but growing interest in such materials, especially among millennial cults, increases the threat of unconventional attacks.

(30 December 1999) Heightened Threat From Hizballah, [REDACTED]

Five alleged Hizballah members detained last week in the [REDACTED] were trying to acquire false travel documents and airline tickets for entry into the US before the New Year, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(30 December 1999) Threat From Cults and Millennial Groups

[REDACTED] that any cult or millennial group is planning to attack specific millennium celebrations. Aside from a few Christian sects trying to enter Israel for what they believe will be Armageddon next year, those cults and millennial groups with violent tendencies are keeping a low-profile.

Computer degradations due to Y2K glitches are likely to facilitate opportunistic attacks by groups or individuals, including hackers who may be affiliated with terrorist organizations. Bin Ladin affiliates arrested this month in Pakistan, for instance, are linked to the extremist Muslim Hackers Club.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(03 January 2000) Taliban's ties to Bin Ladin remain strong

The Taliban Council of Ministers last month decided unanimously against expelling Bin Ladin from Afghanistan [REDACTED]. The Council's decision follows Saudi and UAE requests the previous week for the Taliban to extradite the terrorist, [REDACTED].

- Council chairman Rabbani, who has opposed Bin Ladin's presence in Afghanistan, was absent [REDACTED].

- Taliban [REDACTED] last week warned Bin Ladin to step up his security in case the hostage crisis in Qandahar was used by [REDACTED] or "other governments" to send in [REDACTED] against Bin Ladin, [REDACTED] suggesting [REDACTED] remains a key supporter of Bin Ladin.

The Taliban would deny Bin Ladin's involvement in a new terrorist attack, but the possibility of US retaliation would unnerve many Taliban members and bolster those-- [REDACTED] -- who question the terrorist's presence in Afghanistan. Pakistani Chief Executive Musharraf's concerns about terrorism spillover into Pakistan and international suspicions of Islamabad's role in the hijacking suggest he would react by increasing pressure on the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin.

- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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14 January 2000) New strains between Taliban and Bin Ladin

Taliban leader Mullah Omar imposed new restrictions on Bin Ladin's ability to relocate or distribute money

[REDACTED] without Omar's approval [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Omar expressed no concern about Bin Ladin's anti-US activities, however, and took no measures that would interfere with his terrorist planning.

[REDACTED]

- Omar in the past year has rebuked Bin Ladin several times [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 02/11/2000
SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Promoting Global Drug Trafficking
BODY:

11 February 2000

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Promoting Global Drug Trafficking

1. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin is encouraging trafficking in narcotics to further his anti-West campaign. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin uses secret and commercial networks to smuggle narcotics to Central Asia, Russia, Europe, the Far East, and possibly the US. Bin Ladin presumably benefits from Afghanistan's burgeoning narcotics industry, which is supported by the Taliban.

[REDACTED]

--- The [REDACTED] shipments are flown to various international destinations, [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin also is using commercial shipping companies [REDACTED] to move narcotics to international markets. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin last month encouraged [REDACTED] to smuggle narcotics to Central Asia, where Bin Ladin [REDACTED] has a narcotics trafficking apparatus in place that can ship the drugs to Europe and the US.

--- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin cooperated with [REDACTED] narcotics syndicate, to transport [REDACTED] of heroin and opium [REDACTED]

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(09 March 2000) Disruptions illuminate Bin Ladin support network in the Levant

[REDACTED] at least one two- to three-person Bin Ladin cell is active within Israel and planning terrorist acts against Israeli interests abroad, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] they were linked to the [REDACTED] network and acted as a support cell that focused on procuring and shipping weapons and channeling financial support. [REDACTED] cell leader Muhammad 'Itani has close ties to Bin Ladin's headquarters in Afghanistan.

The arrest last December of an Islamic extremist cell in [REDACTED] plotting to attack tourists at millennial celebrations and subsequent discoveries of Bin Ladin-affiliated cells [REDACTED] reveal a larger and more active Bin Ladin-affiliated support network in the Levant [REDACTED] to US, other Western, or Israeli interests beyond the [REDACTED] cell leader's remark that Americans should "be careful in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait."

- A manifesto was seized from [REDACTED] recommending that [REDACTED] target facilities--such as the Statue of Liberty or the Eiffel Tower--to create an uproar without loss of life or, alternately, attack population targets, such as skyscrapers, airports, or nuclear power plants.

- [REDACTED] and the recommendations to avoid loss of life are inconsistent with Bin Ladin's focus on maximizing US casualties.

[REDACTED] arrested a [REDACTED] cell linked to Bin Ladin and confiscated plastic explosives, hand grenades, automatic weapons, and other contraband materials. [REDACTED] they recruited and trained Syrians and other Islamic extremists in Syria to support unspecified Bin Ladin-related activities in [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] the compromised cells in [REDACTED] were almost identical in size, function, and in how they compartmentalized their activities--only one senior member in each cell had contact with the UBL leadership.

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(25 March 2000) Taliban forces clash over Bin Ladin

[REDACTED] Taliban leader Mullah Omar executed a commander and some of his senior lieutenants earlier this month because they opposed the Taliban's policy of giving sanctuary to Bin Ladin.

The executed commander was involved in a dispute over Bin Ladin with another commander at a Taliban Supreme Council meeting that resulted in armed clashes, [REDACTED]

(25 March 2000) Bin Ladin evading UN financial sanctions on Taliban

Bin Ladin's money movers in response to the sanctions have established new offices, routed currency shipments through Pakistan, and practiced greater security. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(25 March 2000) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ARTICLES

(15 April 2000) Terrorism: Bin Ladin Extremists Planning Attacks

[REDACTED] extremists associated with Bin Ladin are planning terrorist attacks, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Egyptian Islamic Jihad members are planning to attack Israelis at tourist sites in Jordan, despite authorities' success in disrupting the Jordan cell in December.

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin's network also is planning attacks in other locations. The EIJ's leader last week dispatched an operative to coordinate preparations in [REDACTED] where the group late last year was planning a kidnapping to finance operations.

- A Bin Ladin associate in [REDACTED] is planning to make an unspecified delivery to the [REDACTED]

(15 April 2000) Taliban Restrictions Ineffective

[REDACTED] the Taliban since January has restricted the movements of Bin Ladin's followers in Afghanistan, but the constraints have not interfered with his terrorist planning. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin still meets with his lieutenants and other extremist leaders, and that the Taliban often has no information on his activities for days at a time.

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(13 May 2000) Saudis, Gulf authorities worried about terrorist threats

[REDACTED] Saudi authorities have placed their security organs on alert in response to terrorist threats, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Authorities last month discovered a terrorist group in Medina called the "Army to Free al-Aqsa Mosque and Expel the American and British Forces from the Gulf Region."

- Kuwaiti authorities this month also have increased security patrols around local British and American schools, possibly as a precaution after a radical Sunni group last month attacked a young female student.

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 06/23/2000
SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Threat To Attack US, Israeli, and Jordanian Interests in Jordan
BODY:

23 June 2000

SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Threat To Attack US, Israeli, and Jordanian Interests in Jordan

1. [REDACTED] five al-Qa'ida members arrived in [REDACTED] in March to target the US Embassy in [REDACTED] as the first of [REDACTED] attacks in different countries the group planned to carry out next month and in August. [REDACTED] operatives have left Afghanistan since April, several of them traveling [REDACTED] and at least three destined for Europe. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin trained [REDACTED] operatives to infiltrate [REDACTED] conduct targeting studies, and begin operations against the US [REDACTED] Embassies [REDACTED] in the disruption last December of the Bin Ladin cell there. [REDACTED] the operatives have not yet infiltrated [REDACTED] and are, in any case, to lie dormant for a year.

--- [REDACTED] the cell probably knows its plans have been compromised and may switch targets. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin's previous attempts to target US interests in [REDACTED] and Bin Ladin's extensive infrastructure in the region lend credibility to the threat. Bin Ladin, however, previously has shown a preference for softer targets, such as the tourist sites identified by the disrupted cell last December and more vulnerable embassies.

--- The recent relocation of [REDACTED] al-Qa'ida members, including senior personnel, within Afghanistan is consistent with activity [REDACTED] and may indicate impending attacks. [REDACTED] a number of [REDACTED] extremists recently moved their families back to Afghanistan.

--- In addition to the threat in [REDACTED] we are concerned that Bin Ladin may be planning attacks in other locations [REDACTED] such as Europe, the US, and [REDACTED]

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Israel. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] that Bin Ladin had ordered him to conduct
operations in Europe. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] of the discovery of a Bin Ladin cell in the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. We are working closely with [REDACTED] to counter
this threat. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(27 June 2000) Pakistan pressing Bin Ladin network

A Bin Ladin lieutenant this month imposed a moratorium on the movement of "students" to Afghanistan, [REDACTED]. The action may have come in response to Pakistani pressure or may relate to planning for a terrorist operation.

Islamabad, concerned as much by the fear that Islamic radicals could destabilize Pakistan as by international pressure, in recent weeks has curbed the activities of militants associated with Bin Ladin's network in South Asia. [REDACTED] members of Bin Ladin's group in Afghanistan last month complained that Islamabad was making it difficult to send Arabs to other countries, presumably by curtailing travel through Pakistan.

- North African extremists associated with Bin Ladin this month expressed concern about the arrest of six colleagues by Pakistani authorities during a raid on a refugee camp near Peshawar, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Taliban authorities also have complained that Islamabad has not delivered promised ammunition, [REDACTED]

Islamabad launched short-lived crackdowns on Arabs in Pakistan in 1993, 1994, and 1997. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ARTICLES

(30 June 2000) Bin Ladin: Resurgent Threat From Network in Levant

Bin Ladin operatives based in the Levant are rebuilding an infrastructure that could facilitate attacks against US and Israeli interests in the Middle East and Europe. They remain undaunted despite arrests and security crackdowns over the past six months that disrupted their activities in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

- The resilience of Bin Ladin's network in the Levant mirrors what occurred in East Africa, where Bin Ladin's followers were able to attack two Embassies less than a year after his Kenyan cell was disrupted.

Two senior Bin Ladin associates involved in previous operational planning in Lebanon and Jordan--
--remain at large and presumably are positioned to have key roles in terrorist planning in these countries. Bin Ladin's operatives in were behind the threat to our Embassy in Jordan.

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08/11/2000
PWR081100-06

Afghanistan:

Poppy Ban a Propaganda Ploy

Mullah Omar's ban late last month on opium poppy cultivation for the 2000-01 season is an effort to shift the onus for narcotics eradication onto the international community.

most Taliban leaders, some of whom are involved in the narcotics business, do not view Omar's decree as serious,

-- Omar announced the ban because he was concerned that Pakistan might close the border.

-- *Previous Taliban efforts to shut down the drug trade have been deceptions designed to bring in foreign aid funds.*

The Taliban would be hard pressed to replace the lost tax income—estimated at over \$74 million last year—and would risk losing political support among traffickers who provide the government with financial and material backing for the war with the Northern Alliance. Traffickers holding the Taliban responsible for economic losses suffered as a result of the decree,

-- Iran has offered financial help to offset Afghan farmers' losses from giving up poppy cultivation,

-- Taliban representatives in Islamabad last week that it is up to the international community to provide assistance to Afghan farmers.

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08/17/2000
PWR081700-01

Terrorism: Omar Sees Bin Ladin as Problem but Balks at Surrendering Him [REDACTED]

1. Taliban leader Mullah Omar last week agreed with some senior Taliban members that Bin Ladin and his organization increasingly are a liability for the Taliban but rejected the officials' recommendation to expel Bin Ladin, [REDACTED]. Omar said that Bin Ladin and his followers were becoming too radical, noting that Al-Qa'ida Arabs had become more fundamentalist than the Taliban and had evolved into a "Muslim Brotherhood"-style organization that might pose a threat to the Taliban or to him in the near future.

— Omar reacts strongly to perceived threats to his leadership. In January, he rejected Bin Ladin's offer to pay Taliban fighters \$100 a month, possibly fearing that the money would reduce their loyalty to Omar. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] Omar assesses that giving up Bin Ladin would prompt the US to make additional demands for human rights and representative government, gaining the Taliban nothing in return. [REDACTED] Omar also wants to protect the Taliban's stature in the Islamic world, which might be diminished if Bin Ladin were forced to leave Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

3. Bin Ladin's wealth and influence over foreign militants, some of whom fight for the Taliban, also will discourage Omar from giving up Bin Ladin, particularly at a time when the Taliban is battling the Northern Alliance. Bin Ladin's contributions of ammunition, fuel, and Arab fighters were important in the Taliban's offensive in [REDACTED] Province in July and this month, [REDACTED]

— An end to the war in Afghanistan might diminish the Taliban's reliance on Bin Ladin.

— If the Taliban were securely in power, it might rethink its decision to harbor the terrorist, particularly if doing so advanced its aim of gaining international recognition. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

27 September 2000

SUBJECT: Millennium Plots Reveal Refinements to Bin Ladin's Methods

1. [REDACTED]

Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization has reacted to political pressure and security crackdowns by reaching out to other Sunni extremists and simplifying preoperational planning. [REDACTED] the al-Qa'ida leadership approved the broad outlines of the terrorist plotting in Jordan and allowed local cell members to choose the targets and timing of the attacks.

- In contrast, [REDACTED] before the East Africa bombings in 1998 suggested a more direct leadership role in terrorist planning, and [REDACTED] Bin Ladin and his lieutenants oversaw target selection.
- The [REDACTED] cell's plans to attack US and Israeli tourists suggest a shift to attacking soft civilian targets, possibly because of heightened US attention to embassy security and military force protection. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during the past two years indicate that al-Qa'ida operatives are increasingly aware of operational security. [REDACTED]

2. Bin Ladin is utilizing sympathizers outside al-Qa'ida to respond to the Taliban's insistence that he act more discreetly and to bolster his claim that he only provides ideological justification for anti-US attacks and has no role in their execution. Al-Qa'ida members led the cells in [REDACTED] but most of their subordinates did not have formal ties to the group and had not previously targeted US interests.

- [REDACTED] instructors at al-Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan point to Bin Ladin as a model Islamic fighter, but they no longer ask new *mujahidin* to join al-Qa'ida. [REDACTED]

For further information, contact the Chief, DCI Counterterrorist Center Assessments Group, at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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3. Egyptian terrorists close to [redacted] also could be responsible. [redacted] EIJ extremist Yusuf al-Badri early this month was planning a terrorist operation against unidentified US and Jewish targets. [redacted]

or the group may have changed the target. Asbat al-Ansar has mounted no previous attacks outside Lebanon or against a US target. [redacted]

--- The Cole is attached to the Fifth Fleet, [redacted]

2. The Lebanon-based Palestinian group 'Asbat al-Ansar proposed a plan to [redacted] and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) to attack the US Sixth Fleet, [redacted]

--- Former IAA leader Abu Hasan had ties to [redacted] network and the remnants of his group would have required outside assistance to carry out this attack. Next Tuesday is the first anniversary of Abu Hasan's execution for his role in the kidnapping. [redacted]

1. The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) has claimed responsibility for the blast, according to press reports, [redacted] and other groups have the motivation and the capability to have mounted the operation. The IAA, a splinter group of the now-defunct Yemeni Islamic Jihad, in 1998 kidnapped 16 Westerners in Yemen, prompting a Yemeni security forces rescue attempt in which four tourists died.

SUBJECT: Possible Perpetrators of the Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole

13 October
2000

DATE: 10/13/2000
SUBJECT: Possible Perpetrators of the Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole
BODY:

PDB MEMO

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4. Rogue al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya leader Rifa'i Taha Musa late last month threatened publicly to hit US interests in the Middle East. He had, traveled to Yemen in mid-April to rally support for returning the Gama'at to terrorist operations, and recently appeared in a video with ~~Bin Laden~~ and former EIJ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri calling for attacks to liberate jailed Gama'at leader Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman.

5. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), HAMAS, and Lebanese Hizballah have received amphibious assault training that could have prepared them for yesterday's attack.

--- Hizballah terrorist wing members discussed attacking US warships in southeast Asia using explosive-laden boats

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(14 October 2000) Bin Ladin: Terrorist Network Active Despite Disruptions

Usama Bin Ladin remains committed to striking US targets and is working to overcome disruptions of his network by the US and others in the past year. [REDACTED] he continues terrorist planning, but [REDACTED] cannot pinpoint targets or timing.

- Bin Ladin is capable of mounting multiple operations with no warning using his own al-Qa'ida personnel, allied Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) members, and other surrogates worldwide.

(14 October 2000) Bin Ladin Facing New Obstacles

To strike now, Bin Ladin would have to overcome increased pressure from his Taliban hosts to forgo attacks and Pakistan's tightened border controls, which have resulted in the detention of some foreign Islamic extremists affiliated with him. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin has told a key operative that Taliban pressure recently forced him to postpone bombings [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin fears there are plots against him, [REDACTED] and is more carefully monitoring his staff in Afghanistan.

(14 October 2000) Operational Planning Continues

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin has planned or considered attacks in several locations that would use surrogates to expand his reach and to maintain deniability. [REDACTED]

- The [REDACTED] organizations was not previously associated with Bin Ladin.

[REDACTED] was ordered to acquire explosives for an unspecified objective in Europe. [REDACTED] this summer detained members of a Bin Ladin surrogate group planning new attacks in [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] last June arrested an al-Qa'ida-trained Palestinian preparing attacks in Israel.

Aspects of these plots may remain viable, and several suspects are still being sought by various security organizations. [REDACTED]

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- An unnamed Bin Ladin operative [REDACTED] and who had received training in explosives in Afghanistan left Pakistan [REDACTED] to conduct unspecified activities, [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] a Bin Ladin lieutenant has ordered [REDACTED] Arabs to Europe to conduct terrorist operations against unknown targets. (17 August 2000) Recruits for Chechnya Swelling Bin Ladin's Ranks

Worldwide recruitment of fighters for the struggle in Chechnya has created a surplus of Islamic militants that Bin Ladin and other extremists are drawing on to promote terrorism abroad. Mujahidin supporters recruit young Muslims in the UK, Pakistan, Turkey, the Arabian Peninsula, and elsewhere for training at camps affiliated with Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, [REDACTED]

- Fueling the recruiting are Islamic extremist Internet sites that glorify the mujahidin in Chechnya, highlight Russian brutality, and stress that fighting in a jihad is every Muslim's religious duty.

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 10/14/2000
SUBJECT: Islamic Army of Aden's Capabilities and Links
BODY:

14 October
2000

SUBJECT: Islamic Army of Aden's Capabilities and Links

1. The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) has carried out at least one confirmed terrorist act--a kidnapping in 1998 of 16 Westerners that left four tourists dead--but nothing previously on the scale of Thursday's attack on the USS Cole.

Several past IAA claims of responsibility for incidents in Yemen have proved false,

2. The IAA has strong links to UK-based Islamists, to the broader mujahidin movement, and possibly to Usama ~~Bin-Laden~~. In exchange for its Western hostages, the group in 1998 demanded the release of six imprisoned Arab terrorists associated with the Supporters of Sharia--a London-based Islamist propaganda outlet--demanded an end to Sanaa's alleged persecution of mujahidin elements, and expressed opposition to the UN sanctions on Iraq.

--- The IAA is an offshoot of the now-defunct Yemen Islamic Jihad, which was linked to ~~Bin-Laden~~, and previous IAA communiques claimed allegiance to him.

3. Soon after former IAA leader Abu Hassan was executed last year for the kidnapping incident, the Yemeni Interior Minister announced the arrest of his alleged successors--Abu al-Muhsin and Abu Bassam--and claimed the group no longer existed. Yemeni authorities remain concerned about the group and its terrorist capabilities.

and Arab media in May carried a

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statement threatening the Yemeni Government that was attributed to Abu Hassan's followers. [REDACTED]

4. Recent conciliatory gestures suggest Yemeni authorities feared the group might pose a renewed threat. In the past two weeks, a Yemeni court had handed down a light sentence against Abu Hassan's accused successor, and the Interior Minister hinted at the possible release of the incarcerated Supporters of Sharia associates. [REDACTED]

Two additional groups have claimed responsibility for the USS Cole attack. The Muhammad's Army organization was active in Jordan and Pakistan in the 1990s, and individuals linked to the Jordanian group were implicated in the millennium plot in Jordan. A group using this name also has claimed credit for the explosion at the British Embassy in Sanaa yesterday, and [REDACTED] the blast may have resulted from a small bomb. [REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 10/20/2000
SUBJECT: Multiple Suspects for Attack on USS Cole
BODY:

20 October
2000

SUBJECT: Multiple Suspects for Attack on USS Cole

1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Some suspect groups are trying to distance themselves from the attack, anticipating US retaliatory strikes.

--- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ~~Bin-Ladin~~ knew before the attack that the team that carried it out had left Afghanistan, and he is keeping a low profile in hope of avoiding blame.
[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] however, blame other Islamic extremist groups. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan, which has ties to ~~Bin-Ladin~~, was responsible.


--- [REDACTED] the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group carried out the attack in coordination with ~~Bin-Ladin~~.

--- [REDACTED] the bombing is the first of a series against US interests in the Middle East and Europe. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] ~~Bin-Ladin~~ lieutenant Abu Zubaydah told an associate that ~~Bin-Ladin~~ "may have" carried out the attack but that a Yemeni group also may have been responsible.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(07 December 2000) Masood still viable going into Afghan winter

UN and NGO officials are concerned that humanitarian workers might be held hostage in Afghanistan in the event of a US strike against Bin Ladin-related targets or of a new round of sanctions against the Taliban, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Taliban leaders--who last week were convinced US strikes were imminent--temporarily suspended UN and NGO flights and now require foreigners to seek permission before leaving Afghanistan.

Commander Masood enters the winter lull in a reasonably secure position, even after losing the Northern Alliance's political headquarters at Taloqan. He has reversed some of the Taliban gains, but winter weather may prevent him from retaking Taloqan.

- [REDACTED] Masood's forces have encircled Taloqan from three sides and hold many of the surrounding heights--a good position for retaking the city next spring.

- The continued ability of the Alliance to fight, even after the Taliban cut its most direct supply route, shows Masood has successfully used more circuitous routes to the east for resupply.

By regrouping after the loss of Taloqan, Masood has helped reassure his key suppliers, [REDACTED] that he is still worth supporting. [REDACTED] doubted that Masood could prevent a Taliban victory, [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] [REDACTED] have agreed to supply Masood with the capability to mount sustained offensive operations by the spring, and [REDACTED] some equipment--including tanks and ammunition--already is en route.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Masood's backers will require him to make gains before they make further aid commitments.

[REDACTED]

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PDB MEMO

DATE: 12/21/2000
SUBJECT: Potential for Significant Terrorist Acts Through Next Month
BODY:

21 December
2000

SUBJECT: Potential for Significant Terrorist Acts Through Next Month

1. Within the next month, Islamic extremist groups, Iraq, and guerrillas in Colombia are the most likely actors to conduct significant terrorist attacks. Progress in Middle East peace talks, the Israeli elections, Ramadan, the transition to a new US administration, and [REDACTED] provide motives. [REDACTED]

2. Usama Bin-Ladin's al-Qa'ida and sympathetic groups are determined to carry out spectacular terrorist attacks against the US before yearend, [REDACTED] threats in Europe and the Middle East, but attacks in other regions, including the US, are possible.

--- Al-Qa'ida can conduct large car-bombings and crude chemical or biological attacks and has demonstrated an ability to launch simultaneous attacks. [REDACTED]

3. The risk is growing that Palestinian rejectionists will mount mass-casualty attacks in Israel and the occupied territories. The Palestine Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, Hizballah, and possibly new groups may carry out more sophisticated attacks than they have in recent months if, [REDACTED] and Hizballah's terrorist wing are becoming more directly involved. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] may try to take advantage of the cover afforded by increased tension in the Middle East to conduct an anti-US terrorist attack to embarrass the new US administration. If [REDACTED] role in such terrorist activity were uncovered, however, it would undermine [REDACTED] efforts to regain a key role in the Arab world and to further erode sanctions.

--- [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

--- [REDACTED] this spring
formed a new terrorist unit, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to strike US, British, Kuwaiti, and Israeli
targets in the Persian Gulf states and countries
neighboring Israel. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] has threatened to retaliate against the US for
its role in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] members have discussed shooting
down [REDACTED] helicopters [REDACTED] but [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] plans
to conduct a major terrorist attack against US targets within
the next month [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Bin Ladin Links to USS Cole Bombing



Preliminary results of the joint US-Yemeni investigation indicate that individuals with varying degrees of association with Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization were involved in the attack against the USS Cole.

Planning

At least two of the key planners are known al-Qa'ida operatives—one, **Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri**, has been implicated in previous Bin Ladin attack planning.

- Another suspect, Tawfiq Bin Attash, is an al-Qa'ida member allegedly close to Bin Ladin who [REDACTED] directed the operation from Afghanistan or Pakistan—[REDACTED]

Intelligence reporting and the criminal investigation do not yet provide explicit confirmation that Bin Ladin or one of his lieutenants personally masterminded or authorized the attack. Most of the principal suspects in the attack still are at large. US investigators have had only limited access to those in Yemeni custody, none of whom has provided details on outside assistance or direction.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Execution

[REDACTED] have identified five key operatives and arrested several suspects, *but only one key player*—Jamal al-Badawi—*is in custody.* [REDACTED] al-Badawi—a former *mujahidin* fighter—confessed to purchasing the attack boat and aiding al-Nashiri, who was the operation's local manager.

continued...



- The group attempted unsuccessfully to attack a US warship visiting Aden harbor last January. The group refitted the boat, leased a new observation site, and conducted a test run last August.

Highlights al-Qa'ida Involvement

— [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] "Shaykh Usama" planned the attack three years ago.
[REDACTED]

— [REDACTED] Bin Ladin operative [REDACTED] told a confidant in November that the *USS Cole* attack was a [REDACTED] al-Qa'ida operation.

— [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] clearly was privy to the failed attack last year.

26 January 2001

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] *Bin Ladin's roots in Afghanistan:*

Bin Ladin during the latter half of the decade of the 1980s became associated with the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Reports of his personal involvement in combat appear exaggerated. [REDACTED] 01

By early 1990, Bin Ladin was linked to [REDACTED] a nongovernmental organization that recruited foreign Muslims to fight in Afghanistan, [REDACTED] Bin Ladin [REDACTED] forged ties to the leaders of the two most radical Afghan mujahidin parties, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar of Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin) and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Hikmatyar and Sayyaf—who were not part of the Taliban—set up some of the training camps for foreign militants now operating in Taliban-controlled areas.

- Hikmatyar—[REDACTED]—was driven from his stronghold by the Taliban in 1996, allied briefly with a rival, then fled to Iran later that year after Kabul fell.
- Sayyaf remains in Afghanistan as part of the opposition, [REDACTED] Sayyaf maintains occasional contact with Bin Ladin's organization. [REDACTED] 01

Most of the Taliban's current leaders were commanders or fighters with two of the mujahidin factions fighting the Soviets, Hizbi Islami (Khalis) (HIK) and Harakat-l-Inqilab-Islami. Yunis Khalis, chief of the HIK, knew Bin Ladin during the anti-Soviet jihad. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- The Taliban in August 1996 swept through eastern Afghanistan, where Bin Ladin was headquartered. [REDACTED] the Taliban, [REDACTED] had assumed responsibility for Bin Ladin's protection [REDACTED] 01

For further information, contact the Chief, DCI Counterterrorist Center Assessment Group on [REDACTED] secure.

Bin Ladin Pursuing Unconventional Weapons

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin is actively trying to extend his capability to target US interests with more sophisticated unconventional means than the crude attacks with toxic chemicals and biological materials already at his disposal. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin has an extensive program to develop or acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials. [REDACTED] he now is working to put chemicals on rockets or possibly mortars.

— **[REDACTED] Bin Ladin has had chemical experts [REDACTED] for a year exploring the use of unspecified chemical weapons against our military forces in the region.**

— **[REDACTED] Bin Ladin's associates [REDACTED] were working to make more powerful bombs.**

[REDACTED]

— **[REDACTED] he has recruited foreign experts, has labs and storage sites in Afghanistan, and wants to use a fertilizer plant there to make chemical agents.**

— **[REDACTED] Bin Ladin has tried to acquire military-grade weapons and materials, primarily from countries of the former Soviet Union.**

Bin Ladin wants to drive US forces from the Gulf and could try unconventional attacks to advance this goal, including infiltrating secure facilities. [REDACTED]

— **[REDACTED] Bin Ladin's operatives and other extremists are trained to make and use small amounts of toxic substances and poisonous gases—methods that would not kill large numbers of people but would have a psychological impact, especially if directed at civilians.**

13 February 2001

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] **Bin Ladin's unconventional capabilities:**

[REDACTED]
Bin Ladin operatives could conduct crude chemical and biological (CB) attacks using poisonous gases or biological toxins that would carry heavy psychological impact but inflict no more casualties than a large vehicle bomb. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- Students training at a Bin Ladin-affiliated camp in Afghanistan use commercially available chemicals with little sophisticated equipment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] several improvised CB weapons—including improvised mortar or artillery shells—with instructions for assembling them. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] several possibilities exist.

- The least probable scenario is that Bin Ladin's organization is designing or testing an actual nuclear device.
 - Uranium might be used to produce a brighter or more visually impressive display that makes an explosion appear larger, but it would cause only a small increase in the explosive's performance.
 - Natural uranium would not significantly increase the lethality of a radiation dispersal device because it carries only a slight radiation hazard, but the use of uranium might be calculated to create panic and disruption. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

continued . . .

For further information, contact the Chief, Assessments and Information Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, at [REDACTED] secure.

[REDACTED] Islamic mujahidin fighters are gaining access to crude CB production information and training through their international network based in Afghanistan. The network uses training camps, electronic media, and the Internet to disseminate CB data.

— [REDACTED] mujahidin of various nationalities— [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]—have received poison training at an Afghan terrorist training camp during the past four years. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some mujahidin, including those affiliated with Bin Ladin, are attempting to add unconventional weapons to their arsenal and are contemplating scenarios for their use. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] he received training in explosives and poison in Afghanistan, [REDACTED]

— [REDACTED] had received explosives and poison training in Afghanistan, where cadre discussed techniques for poisoning [REDACTED].

— [REDACTED]

CIA

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02/14/2001
SPWR021401-03

Afghanistan: Bin Ladin's Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons [REDACTED]

Bin Ladin and his associates have experimented by crude means to make and deploy biological agents. [REDACTED] unsophisticated methods to produce botulinum toxin, ricin, and other toxins from plants and animals, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] These recipes would yield quantities sufficient only for assassinations or small-scale poisonings, but [REDACTED] the recipes have been shared among extremists, including via the Internet. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin has sought to acquire military-grade biological agents or weapons. [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] several possibilities exist.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Bin Ladin's network might be experimenting with thermobaric munitions, which combine a propellant and metal particles—albeit not uranium—to produce blast waves significantly stronger than ones produced by conventional bombs of similar size.
- The least probable scenario is that Bin Ladin's organization is designing or testing an actual nuclear device. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

15 February 2001

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] *the type of CB training provided in Afghanistan:*

The international mujahidin network based in Afghanistan trains Islamic extremists on chemical and biological (CB) materials that are generally less toxic than military CB warfare agents such as sarin and VX but still could be effective in a terrorist attack.

[REDACTED] the chemical training focuses on [REDACTED] toxic [REDACTED] chemicals. The biological training centers on preparing crude toxins, including ricin and botulinum toxin. [REDACTED] the students learn how to produce the CB agents and then test the material on animals [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] more advanced agents, such as blister and nerve agents, but only offers a theoretical discussion. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which could limit advanced research and training. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED], the trainers also continue to develop new poisons and weapons designs. [REDACTED]

For further information, contact the DCI Counterterrorist Center Assessments and Information Group at [REDACTED] secure.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Taliban Will Hold Firm on Bin Ladin For Now

[REDACTED]

The Taliban leadership allows Bin Ladin to remain in Afghanistan despite UN sanctions aimed at persuading the group to give him up because it needs his money and fighters to wage its civil war and because it perceives a cultural obligation to shield a guest.

- Taliban leaders say they are beholden to an ethnic Pashtun tribal code requiring protection of guests.

Taliban leaders also [REDACTED] want us to offer diplomatic recognition to their regime. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

- **We judge that only after a Taliban victory would its leaders consider surrendering Bin Ladin [REDACTED] if they could plausibly deny that they had done so.** The Taliban would seek to avoid a backlash from its Afghan and Pakistani supporters and from Arabs sympathetic to Bin Ladin as well as to save face.

— [REDACTED]

Moderates such as the foreign minister may judge that a specific offer from us would strengthen their hand in internal debates after a victory.

- To protect the stature they perceive they have with fellow Muslim states, Taliban leaders are unlikely to accept additional conditions on the transfer that would create the appearance that it had succumbed to Western pressure or contravened its cultural obligations.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



Central Intelligence Agency

Senior Executive Memorandum

26 March 2001

This memorandum should not be reproduced.

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Afghanistan's Taliban and Bin Ladin [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Taliban is not likely to give up Bin Ladin for less than full diplomatic recognition and significant reconstruction aid. Even then, it would be difficult for the Taliban leadership to accept only assurances that the US would recognize the Taliban after it renders Bin Ladin.

— [REDACTED] the Taliban leadership is concerned that if the group gave up Bin Ladin, the US would demand more concessions, such as on human rights, before recognizing the group and delivering aid. [REDACTED]

The Taliban's heavy reliance on Bin Ladin's cash, materiel, and Arab fighters in its military effort against the Northern Alliance suggests it would be reluctant to render Bin Ladin before the war ends. Offers of international aid would not offset the Taliban's need for Bin Ladin's seasoned fighters or satisfy the Taliban's public requests for full diplomatic recognition.

— [REDACTED] but losing Bin Ladin's largesse and military aid before an end to the war would increase the odds that the Northern Alliance could hold out and prevent the Taliban from consolidating power. [REDACTED]

CIA

CIA

For further information, contact the South Asia Issue Manager at [REDACTED] secure.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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Central Intelligence Agency

03/27/01

Senior Executive Memorandum

27 March 2001

This memorandum should not be reproduced.

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Assessment of Hypothetical Taliban Crackdown Against Bin Ladin [REDACTED]

The expulsion of Bin Ladin from Afghanistan would not diminish his organization's ability to conduct and support terrorist operations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Without further interference from the Taliban, al-Qa'ida still would have access to most of its personnel and training facilities in Afghanistan, where it could use well-established channels for moving men, funding, and supplies.

- Al-Qa'ida cells conduct much of their terrorist planning without direction from the central leadership. [REDACTED]

Taliban sympathy for extremist causes would make the group unlikely to crack down against other al-Qa'ida leaders without provocation. If Bin Ladin's expulsion led to his rendition to the US, however, his followers would blame the Taliban, setting the stage for a disruptive confrontation that could endanger the network's safehaven. Many Sunni extremists sympathetic to Bin Ladin harbor doubts about the Taliban's religious legitimacy, and anger over his capture could prompt them to retaliate against Taliban officials.

- Bin Ladin's lieutenants lack his prominence and public support in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and their arrest or expulsion would produce little additional backlash against the Taliban. [REDACTED]

Without Afghanistan as a base, much of al-Qa'ida's membership would relocate to other areas where senior figures in the network reside, [REDACTED] Others would join the *mujahidin* fighting in Chechnya or seek asylum in the West. The network could establish small-scale training and coordination centers in these areas, but political constraints and law enforcement scrutiny would limit their activities.

- Bin Ladin's followers would face difficulty coordinating between disparate locations, and the task of relocating personnel and establishing new logistic channels would consume much of the network's resources for years. [REDACTED]

For further information, contact the Chief, DCI Counterterrorist Center Assessments Group, at [REDACTED] secure.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
Central Intelligence Agency

Senior Executive Memorandum

9 April 2001

This memorandum should not be reproduced.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] *Usama Bin Ladin and Ramzi Yousef:*

Usama Bin Ladin and Ramzi Yousef both emerged from the support infrastructure for *mujahidin* established during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yousef was a member of Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in Yousef's 1995 plot against US airlines in East Asia [REDACTED] several plotters had ties to Bin Ladin. [REDACTED]

- According to FBI information, Wali Khan in 1994 traveled to the Philippines on Bin Ladin's behalf to gather information for a plot to assassinate President Clinton during a planned November 1994 trip to the country.
- Yousef was in the Philippines during the same time period. According to FBI information, in addition to his plot to bomb US airlines, Yousef contemplated an assassination attempt on the President. [REDACTED] both Khan and Yousef contemplated using Philippine Muslims for their operations.

[REDACTED]

CIA

For further information, contact Chief, DCI Counterterrorist Center, Assessments Group, at [REDACTED] secure.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Captured Terrorist Details Hostage Plot



[REDACTED]
alleged plot with Usama Bin Ladin and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)
to kidnap Americans, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] *claims*
planning is under way for three separate operations in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to take US diplomats or civilians hostage.

- The conspirators, who want to force the release of "blind sheik"
'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other US-held prisoners, may hijack
an aircraft or storm a US Embassy.

Several factors suggest a joint terrorist operation is possible.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] may have won over Bin Ladin
as an ally for some type of terrorist operation.

- Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization and the two Egyptian groups
previously have considered taking hostages—possibly including
hijackings—to force concessions, and al-Qa'ida has trained
personnel in kidnapping techniques, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The timing of the alleged operation [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the casing and selection of targets
reportedly had not occurred [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Snapshot of Recent Middle East-Related Anti-US Terrorist Threats

Group	Location	Nature	Assessment
Usama Bin Ladin	Saudi Arabia, Bahrain	senior UBL lieutenant Abu Zubaydah is planning suicide car-bomb attacks against US military targets by the end of June.	
	Possibly Israel, outside Israel	Abu Zubaydah was planning operations probably against Israeli interests.	
	Possibly Jordan	that a UBL operative will travel to Jordan and martyr himself shortly.	
	Unknown	a Bin Ladin operative in Afghanistan coordinating plans for a near-term operation involving personnel in but target and exact timing are unknown.	
Yemeni Militants	Yemen	an extremist is planning multiple attacks, possibly in Aden. Operatives reportedly practiced for assaulting a fixed target—possibly a hotel or embassy.	
Egyptian al-Gama'at al Islamiyya		Taha Musa of the Egyptian Gama'at, UBL, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad are planning to take US diplomats or civilians hostage. Some operatives selected and trained as of mid-April, but no specific targets or time frame set.	
Sunni Extremists	Rome, Western Europe	Sunni extremists, reportedly assisted by a cell of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Italy, are planning a high-profile attack against the US Embassy in Rome or the Vatican. Other cells may be surveilling additional sites in Italy and elsewhere in Western Europe. The extremists reportedly have cased the targets.	
Lebanese Hizballah	Unknown	A Hizballah operative in early May requested religious authorization for what may be a terrorist operation. Key operatives left Iran in early May.	
Gaza Fatah Hawks	Gaza, Israel	Gaza Fatah Hawks held a US and a British journalist for several hours on 29 May as a "warning" to the US.	

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2 June 2001

Snapshot of Recent Usama Bin Ladin-Related Anti-US Terrorist Threats

Group	Location	Nature	Assessment
Al-Qa'ida	Unknown	[REDACTED] al-Qa'ida plans terrorist attacks against unknown locations. [REDACTED] Bin Ladin operative in Afghanistan coordinated plans for a near-term operation involving personnel [REDACTED] but the target and exact timing are unknown.	[REDACTED]
	Unknown	[REDACTED] as of mid-2000 Bin Ladin was planning an unspecified operation to free "blind shaykh" 'Abd al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad "al-Ukali".	
	Qatar, Yemen, Pakistan, and East Asia	[REDACTED] al-Qa'ida plans simultaneous terrorist attacks [REDACTED]	
	Saudi Arabia, Bahrain	[REDACTED]	
	Bahrain, Kuwait, Turkey	Al-Qa'ida possibly is considering anti-US attacks in Bahrain, Kuwait, or Turkey led by senior operative al-Nashiri, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Bin Ladin is focusing on targets in Kuwait. [REDACTED] and a public threat in June cite "Muhammad's Army Battalion."	

11 Jul 01

Snapshot of Recent Usama Bin Ladin-Related Anti-US Terrorist Threats (cont.)

Group	Location	Nature	Assessment
Al-Qa'ida	Yemen, Saudi Arabia	[REDACTED] a UBL associate in Yemen had a half-ton bomb as of 16 June. It originally was intended for an unspecified target [REDACTED]	
	Morocco	[REDACTED] three UBL operatives are to travel [REDACTED] to conduct attacks against US interests there.	
	Possibly Israel, Israeli interests abroad	[REDACTED], as of 22 May Abu Zubaydah was planning [REDACTED] operations, probably against Israeli interests.	
	Possibly Jordan	[REDACTED] a UBL operative was planning to go to Jordan to case the Israeli Embassy. [REDACTED] a UBL operative would travel to Jordan shortly and martyr himself.	
	G-8 Summit, Italy	[REDACTED] Bin Ladin intends to attack G-8 summit. No further information.	
	Mauritania	Two al-Qa'ida operatives left Lebanon early last month to conduct unspecified attacks against US and Israeli targets in [REDACTED]	
Unknown	Unknown	On 25 June, [REDACTED] praising the struggle against a formidable foe and bidding farewell to the recipients.	
Sunni Extremists	[REDACTED] elsewhere in Western Europe	[REDACTED] senior Bin Ladin operative left a camp in Afghanistan to attack the US Embassy [REDACTED] Sunni extremists, [REDACTED] and possibly linked to Bin Ladin, planning attacks against US interests in Europe, including our Embassy [REDACTED].	

Snapshot of Recent Usama Bin Ladin-Related Anti-US Terrorist Threats (cont.)

Group	Location	Nature	Assessment
Egyptian Extremists		Egyptian extremists associated with the Gama'at al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad plan to take US diplomats or civilians hostage, [REDACTED] Some operatives had been selected and trained as of mid-April, but there are no specific targets or timeframe set.	
'Asbat al-Ansar	Beirut, Lebanon	[REDACTED] 'Asbat al-Ansar is planning a Bin Ladin-funded attack on the US Embassy in Beirut at an unspecified time. [REDACTED] unspecified numbers of fundamentalist Palestinians in Lebanon were conducting surveillance and observation of the US Embassy there.	
Malaysian Islamic Extremists	Malaysia	Local Islamic extremists planned terrorist attacks against US military and civilian targets in Malaysia in response to Bin Ladin's 1998 fatwa, [REDACTED]	
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)		The ASG last week discussed sending an operative to Manila to help attack the US Embassy with Bin Ladin's support, [REDACTED]	
Al-Ittihad al-Islami		[REDACTED]	
Triborder Extremists Connected to Hizballah, HAMAS, and Possibly Gama'at.	Santiago, Chile	As of early this month, planning was under way for UBL-funded attack on US Embassy in Santiago, [REDACTED]	

Threat Remains After Arrest of Terrorists in Rome

Italian authorities in Rome yesterday disrupted a cell of international Islamic extremists by arresting 12 suspected terrorists, four of whom [REDACTED] were involved in anti-US terrorist planning.

- The cell's precise targets are unknown, but one of the three operatives traveled to [REDACTED] to case an unspecified site [REDACTED] in recent months, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] another operative was involved in casing a site in Rome and had offered to martyr himself.

Even with the [REDACTED] arrests, attacks may still be planned against the G-8 summit in Genoa, our Embassy in Rome, or US interests elsewhere in Europe, because others have been tasked to plan anti-US operations in Italy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Nevertheless, he continued to discuss efforts to attack US and British interests and has charged other cells to prepare attacks.

- [REDACTED]
- There are indications that the group may have contact with Bin Ladin's network, possibly through associates in South Asia, although the exact nature of the relationship remains unclear.

[REDACTED]

One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Continue


For the second time in two weeks [REDACTED] [REDACTED] indicates that an expected imminent Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operation has been postponed, but preparations for other near-term attacks may still be in train.

- [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that something they had expected to hear in the news is still planned but has been delayed a few months.
- Earlier this month, [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had passed up a specific opportunity to attack US interests but results still would be forthcoming, [REDACTED].

Suspicious activity continued late last week among individuals who in June had received a cryptic message praising their struggle against a well-armed foe and bidding them farewell. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
- An individual [REDACTED] [REDACTED] indicated last Thursday that two people had arrived and acknowledged that the phone of an unidentified "groom" had been turned off, [REDACTED].

Longer-term planning for likely terrorist operations against US and Israeli interests also continues, [REDACTED]. Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah last week [REDACTED] that preparations for operations inside Israel are continuing, and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a suspect in terrorist plotting last year against US, Israeli, and Jordanian targets in [REDACTED] last week consulted with a colleague about unspecified people traveling to [REDACTED]



Central Intelligence Agency

Senior Executive Memorandum

25 July 2001

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Bin Ladin's 1998 fatwa:

Usama Bin Ladin's most recent *fatwa*, published in two London-based Arabic newspapers on 23 February 1998, says all Muslims have a religious duty "to kill the Americans and their allies, whether civilian or military" worldwide until US forces withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula and Jerusalem is liberated. It was issued in the name of the "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" and listed Bin Ladin and the leaders of five Egyptian and South Asian extremist groups as signatories.

The 1998 pronouncement provided the ideological rationale for the East Africa bombings the following August and most subsequent terrorist planning by his al-Qa'ida organization. Bin Ladin's previous *fatwa*, publicized in August 1996, only authorized attacks against Western military targets on the Arabian Peninsula.

- Al-Qa'ida requires a *fatwa*, typically drafted by religious scholars within the group's leadership, as a prerequisite for all attacks,

Neither of Bin Ladin's *fatwas* carries formal weight outside his organization, and mainstream Muslims have rejected them. Nonetheless, they could inspire attacks by extremists who view Bin Ladin as a role model and believe the Islamic world must fend off an assault of Western military power and cultural values.

- A group of extremists planning anti-US attacks arrested in May in [redacted] said they were acting on Bin Ladin's *fatwa* but do not appear to have been members of his organization, [redacted]

For further information, contact the Chief, Assessments and Information Group, at [redacted] secure.

Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US



Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America."

- After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a [REDACTED] service.
- An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [REDACTED] service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

- Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa'ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa'ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

- A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh" Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.

continued . . .

-
- Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.
 - The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.

UBL Associate Planned To Attack US in Europe

_____ provide the most compelling evidence to date that the Bin Ladin organization is tasking members of a _____ network in Europe to conduct operations there.

_____ has declared that two senior Bin Ladin lieutenants directed him last spring to plan a suicide attack against US interests in France by next summer. _____

- _____ claims that Abu Zubaydah and Abu Zubair al Ha'ili told him to plan an attack against either our Embassy or the American Cultural Center in Paris. _____ already may have tapped a Tunisian suicide bomber in al-Qa'ida to conduct the operation.
- _____ says he also intended to recruit former Algerian Armed Islamic Group associates who had previously been jailed in France to assist in the attack.

_____ extensive training in South Asia and his ties to al-Qa'ida and North African extremists suggest he may know about other planned attacks. We are investigating possible connections between the Tunisian he selected and suspects in a plot to attack a marketplace in Strasbourg, France, last Christmas.

- _____ last month identified _____ as the "ringleader" of an international mujahidin plot against unspecified Western interests in Europe, which may have been a reference to the plan to attack US targets.
- _____ helped organize a training course for 20 Tunisian, Saudi, Pakistani, and Yemeni students last spring at the Derunta facility in Afghanistan, _____

The claim that two senior Bin Ladin lieutenants participated in _____ plot by assigning the target and the timing is consistent with other indications that al-Qa'ida's leadership is taking a more active role in directing mujahidin attacks, probably to prevent giving the appearance of making empty threats. In contrast, Bin Ladin lieutenants provided only training and encouragement to the millennial plotters in Jordan and Canada, leaving decisions on timing and targets to local cell leaders, _____

- _____ coincide with other reports during the past year that indicate a growing number of Bin Ladin associates are moving from South Asia to Europe to plan attacks there.

Bin Ladin Operations Are Expert and Flexible

Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization stresses careful planning, tight security practices, and flexibility throughout all stages of terrorist strikes—sound operational practices that allow it to pose a continuing threat to US interests even in a heightened security environment. Al-Qa'ida cells prepare for an attack well beforehand by conducting thorough surveillance of potential targets.

— [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Group members are expert in conducting different types of attacks and know how to protect their plans from discovery. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] al-Qa'ida's camps in Afghanistan provide training in the construction of improvised bombs of varying sizes from widely available materials. Operatives train for as long as several months in various forms of assassination, kidnapping, the use of rockets, mortars, and other longer-range weapons, as well as crude chemical and biological attacks.

— [REDACTED]

Al-Qa'ida's flexible operational decisionmaking and broad definition of acceptable targets enable the group to adjust plans to changing conditions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bin Ladin allows some cells to pick their own timing and targets, minimizing the need to communicate with his headquarters in Afghanistan.

— Nevertheless, [REDACTED] before the East Africa bombings and associated with anti-Israel plotting earlier this year [REDACTED] al-Qa'ida leaders sometimes make these decisions themselves, presumably because such attacks have higher priority.

Despite these strengths, al-Qa'ida operations are vulnerable to short-term delay or disruption. Because operatives often surveil a target until days before an attack, visible changes in security can force the cell to postpone an attack until it develops alternative plans or security returns to normal. Al-Qa'ida's farflung network also makes it subject to garbled communications and travel delays, and its emphasis on compartmentation means the arrest of a key leader could rob a local cell of direction.

— Inexperienced couriers or suicide bombers also make mistakes that expose plot details—such as occurred in 1998 in Nairobi.

Situation Report

12 September 2001, 0400 EDT

Bin Ladin's Tracks

Mounting evidence indicates Sunni extremists in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf recently were aware Usama Bin Ladin-directed attacks were imminent. A mujahidin facilitator in Afghanistan on Sunday claimed Bin Ladin had left Kandahar for Kabul in anticipation of a probable operation, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An individual [REDACTED] to a colleague in Afghanistan—before the US attacks—knowledge of something about to happen, [REDACTED].

- [REDACTED] the existence of a probable operation was widely known among extremists in Afghanistan and speculated Bin Ladin may have relocated to Kabul to avoid conflict over his activities with the Taliban leadership in Kandahar.

- [REDACTED] Bin Ladin and Taliban leader Mullah Omar late last month clashed over Bin Ladin's determination to mount terrorist attacks. Bin Ladin told Mullah Omar he had operations in progress that would cause great damage to the US.

A Kandahar-based Arab yesterday said the attacks were the result of two years' planning and were "the beginning of the wrath," [REDACTED] suggest the Capitol and the White House also may have been targets of the operations.

- [REDACTED] to an individual in Kuwait gave thanks for "the explosion in the Congress building." [REDACTED] in mid-June was one of three recipients of a possible go-ahead message for terrorist attacks.
- A member of a nongovernmental organization sympathetic to Bin Ladin initially claimed the White House had been destroyed before later correcting himself.

[REDACTED] indicates a possible terrorist operative—named al-Ghamdi—may have boarded United Airlines flight 175, one of the aircraft that struck the World Trade Center.

[REDACTED] an individual with a similar name would enter the US via Canada to carry out a terrorist attack in New York.

Taliban Under Pressure

Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar was on the move shortly after the attacks on the US, [REDACTED] Omar sought the assistance of Afghan Corps Commander Osmani in evacuating him and his family from their residence in Kandahar.

The overnight attacks on Kabul were conducted by Northern Alliance (NA) [REDACTED]. The NA appears eager to prove the 9 September assassination of NA leader Ahmad Shah Masood did not disrupt its military abilities.

- Several UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations are considering evacuating personnel from Afghanistan as early as today in anticipation of US retaliation, [REDACTED]. Evacuees most likely will travel by car, unsure whether the Taliban would let flights leave Afghanistan.

Allied Support

NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) convened last night to demonstrate solidarity with the US. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The NAC will meet again this morning to consider the crisis and security implications for NATO.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Defenses Up

Many countries are taking military precautions against terrorism directed at them or at US facilities. Russian air defense, naval, space, and internal security forces have been ordered to a heightened state of vigilance to guard against terrorist attacks, according to [REDACTED] press reports.

- [REDACTED]

- **Malaysian** officials this morning evacuated the Petronas Twin Towers—the world's tallest building—after receiving a phoned bomb threat, according to press reports.

- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Civil Air Travel

Closure of US and Canadian airports has affected world air travel and commerce, with cancellations mounting in Europe and Asia, according to press reports. Some carriers have suspended flights to the Middle East.

- The UK and **Belgium** have banned commercial flights over central London and Brussels, respectively, and [REDACTED] **Australia's** Qantas Airlines is diverting flights around Afghanistan, [REDACTED]

Financial Markets

US bond futures posted gains in overnight trading, helping the dollar stabilize against major currencies and recover most of its losses from early yesterday. Stock prices in major Asian markets were down sharply as of mid-afternoon Wednesday, however, with the South Korean and Hong Kong blue chip indices both down roughly 10 percent and averages declining by 5 percent or more in Japan, Australia, Singapore, and China.


- The Nikkei slid nearly 700 points, to 9,610—its first closing below 10,000 since 1984—and is now 75 percent below its 1989 peak.

Shares in the European aviation sector slumped yesterday, with Lufthansa and British Airways down 15 and 21 percent, respectively. The European Aeronautic Space and Defense Company (EADS)—parent company of Airbus—fell to a record low.

In **oil markets**, the European benchmark Brent crude closed at \$29.06 per barrel yesterday, up \$1.61 from Monday but down slightly after reaching more than \$31 per barrel during the day. Oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait were flowing normally today, according to industry reports.

Also In the Middle East

Intifadah-related violence continues at high levels. The terrorism in the US did not appear to influence that situation, although some Palestinians publicly celebrated the blow against the US.



- Six other Palestinians were reported killed overnight in clashes throughout the West Bank, according to a press report.
- In the Gaza Strip, Palestinians fired mortar rounds and rocket-propelled grenades at Israeli targets, and Israel responded with gun and tank fire towards a nearby Palestinian security facility, [REDACTED]