No. 6517

Copy No. 1 2-1 23-3-94 WAR DEPARTMENT

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

FOR

MAR 15 1937

ISSUED BY

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

GENERAL STAFF

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

This document contains information which is not to be communicated to the public or to the press. It should be safeguarded accordingly. Amercian flights over regularly scheduled routes to the British dominions was threshed out between representatives of the British, Australian, and New Zealand governments in September, 1936.

PALMYRA

Upon the return of the coastguard cutter Shoshone from Howland Island the navy aerologist assigned to aid Amelia Earhart Putnam in her contemplated flight made the following statement about Palmyra:

"I am suggesting upon our return that the navy establish a weather observation station at Palmyra. Such a station would be of great benefit in solution of weather problems over the Pacific.

"Palmyra is only seven hours by plane from Honolulu, and directly on the route to Samoa and New Zealand. A good seaplane landing base can be provided with only a little work on the coral heads in the reef surrounding the main island. Even now planes can land there at low tide. Building of a three foot dyke should provide the necessary facilities.

"In any emergency Kingman reef is only 30 miles to the northwest of Palmyra. Supplies and accommodations could be furnished easily.

"Eventually Palmyra will be used for aviation purposes. I can see no reason why it should not."

Palmyra is owned by E. Fullard-Leo of Honolulu, and has been the scene of extensive copra gathering activities.

So far as is known no further steps have been taken since that date to use Palmyra as an air base.

HOVLAND AND JARVIS ISLANDS

The recent projected flight of Miss Amelia Earhart which had planned to use Howland Island as a base focused attention upon this island and Jarvis Island. The landing field at Howland Island is ready for Miss Farhart's arrival and press reports state that Jarvis Island a thousand miles to the east is also being prepared by the Department of the Interior as a seaplane base.

There have been no further developments relative to these islands in the past month.

MIDWAY AND WAKE ISLANDS (See Chart II)

Press reports of March 23rd stated that the House Rivers and Earbors committee was expected to approve a bill authorizing the Army to spend \$1,041,000 to improve the harbor at Midway and \$1,000,000 on harbor work at Wake Island. No further reports are

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HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

FOR

SEF 1 1937

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

DIVIDIOIN

GENERAL STAFF

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

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
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
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(Much of the material included herein, including the 4 charts, has been furnished thru courtesy of the 14th Naval District.)

(Other material has been taken from official reports of Army Officers who accompanied the expedition to the American Equatorial Islands in connection with the Amelia Earhart flight.)

Miss Earhart probably achieved more distinction than any other woman aviator. Her outstanding accomplishments have been:

- 1921-Established an official woman's altitude record of 14,000 feet in California.
- 1928--June 17. Became the first woman to fly the Atlantic when she crossed with "limer Stutz and Louis Gordan from Harbor Grace, N. F., to Burry Port, "ales, in 15 hours 40 minutes, a distance of 2,026 miles.
- 1930--July. Established two international woman's speed records at Detroit, 174.9 miles an hour over 100 kilometer course and 181.18 miles an hour over a three-kilometer course.
- 1928--October. Made 1st solo transcontinental round trip by a woman pilot.
- 1931--April. Made 1st transcontinental round-trip in an autogyro, covering 1,100 miles in 15 hours flying time.
- 1932-- May. Took off from Harbor Grace and flow across the Atlantic, landing in Ireland. First woman to fly the North Atlantic alone.
- 1932-August. Became the only woman to fly non-stop from coast to coast and established a new cross-country distance record for women when she flew from Los Angeles to New-ark in 19 hours 5 minutes.
- 1935--May. Made the 1st non-stop solo flight from Mexico City to Newark, flying 1,125 miles in 14 hours 18 minutes.
- 1935 -- January 12. Only porson to fly from Hawaii to the mainlend unaccompanied.

Fobruary 11, 1937, Miss Earhart announced a round-the-world flight sponsored and financially aided by Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, with whose aeronautical department she was affiliated in an advisory capacity. After a long period of testing and preparation she took off from Oakland, California, March 17th, on the first leg of her journey for Hawaii, accompanied by Fred Noonan, her navigator, and Paul Mantz, her technical advisor. The flight was accomplished without incident and she landed at Theoler Field, Schofield Barracks, T. H., on March 18th, after a period of 15 hours 52 minutes in the air. Finding the length of the runway at Theoler Field insufficient, in her opinion, for the heavily leaded plane, she decided to take off on the next leg of her journey to Howland Island, from Luke Field. Accordingly she flew her plane to Luke Field where it was serviced and gassed; and at dawn, March 20th, attempted to take off.

Due to unexplained circumstances a tire blew cut and the plane was damaged to the extent that the projected flight had to be abandoned. The plane was shipped by liner to the Douglas factory in California for repair.

The repair of the plane having been accomplished, Miss Harhart announced that with her navigator Mr. Fred Noonan she would resume her flight, this time reversing her route and traveling from west to east. The pair met with success in their flights and at 5:30 PM, Honolulu time, on the afternoon of July 1, 1937, left Lac, New Guinea for Howland Island (Lat. 0°49' N; Long. 176°43' W) a distance of 2,550 miles.

The U. S. Coast Cuard Cutter Itasca under the command of Commander W. K. Thompson was detailed to assist Miss Earhart in her flight to Howland Island and thence to the Hawaiian Islands, and for this purpose arrived off Howland Island at 7:45 P.M., June 23, 1937, with the normal crew augmented by representatives of the Department of Interior, the U. S. Army, the U. S. Navy and the Press.

Howland Island is approximately two miles long in a North-South direction, about one half mile in an East-Vest direction, rises to a maximum elevation of twenty fect and is surrounded by a platform reef varying in width from 250 to 400 feet. The temperature varies from 76 degrees to 86 degrees Fahrenheit, with prevailing winds coming from the East. As there generally is a heavy surf with no anchorage, the Itasea stood off to the lee of the island alternately drifting out with the wind and current, and steaming slowly back. There is no fresh vater on the island except light rainfall and the only vegetation is grass, weeds and a few Kou thickets. Guano workers operated on the island many years ago under the Guano Act of 1858, but this lonely spot is now uninhabited except for the colony of eight Hawaiian boys placed there recently by the Department of Interior. Multitudes of rats and mice and tens of thousands of booby birds, frigate birds, terms and a few tropic and love birds for variety are the only permanent inhabitants.

The Itasca landed drums containing fresh water and gasoline towing them thru the reef by means of a power boat and drawing them ashore on a long rope in the hands of men on the beach. The landing field for air-planes can be classed only as an emergency field and consists of three runways, a North-South, Northeast-Southwest and an East-West. The Itasca personnel with the Hawaiian boys worked on the runways for two days, smoothing them and placing red flags to mark the safety limits.

THE FLICHT

During the afternoon of July 1st, the Itasea received word that Miss Earhart had left Lae, New Guinea for Howland Island at 10:00 A.M., and figured that she should reach Howland at about 7:30 the morning of July 2nd. Previously prepared plans were put into operation, plane attendants, fire group, medical attendants, beach patrol, off shore patrol, communications group and commissary group were alerted and posted. All had assigned tasks pertaining to the arrival of Miss Earhart's plane, involving such duties as "to cover, protect and assist, (and) if necessary to rescue her and her companion." Every possible contingency was anticipated. In addition to the detailed lookouts, all personnel on ship and shore who were not otherwise occupied, spent their spare time observing for the plane. A message was received that Miss Earhart was 200 miles from the island and later that she was 100 miles away. Everyone felt assured that she would arrive on schedule, but when 7:30 passed, 8:00 o'clock came, and 8:30 with no word from her, anxiety grew.

At 9:00 A.M., a man ran from the radio building on shore and shouted, "Earhart plane down north-west of the Island! Liveryone back on the ship". With the exception of a radio operator and the Hawaiian boys, everyone loaded into the life boats and were quickly aboard the cutter. Nothing definite was known. Miss Marhart had reported that she was running low on gasoline, was circling but could not see the island, that she was on a line of position 1570-3370 (presumably through Howland Island) and that she was flying north and south. Her failure to give her position at anytime during the flight made the situation extremely difficult for the Itasca. The latter sailed to the northwest at high speed at 10:40 A.M., on a quest in which it was felt chance played a leading role. It was realized that the plane's fuel was exhausted but what point landing had been forced, a hazy intuition was the only guide. That she had missed the island was certain, and that her known gasoline supply should have carried her beyond, was also fairly certain, but beyond that all was conjecture.

THE SEARCH.

For sixteen days the Itasca sailed over the route indicated on the attached map covering a distance of over 4,000 miles. The course followed is shown on enclosure "1. During the search the Itasca was directed to visit certain of the Gilbert Islands. Shore parties visited Arorai, Tamana and Tarawa and natives were spoken to off Nanouki and Kuria. No evidence of any sort regarding the lost plane could be discovered. The crowsnest and the radio were manned by double shifts throughout the search. On two nights it was thought that flashos from flares were seen but when the ship changed its course and investigated, it was found that the lookouts had been confused by stars low on the horizon, or by meteors.

Below is a copy of the radio log pertaining to the period of Miss Earhart's expected arrival.

0345-- "Vill listen on hour and half hour on 3105"--- (very faint S-1).

0400--ltasen to Earhart. Transmitted weather data on 3105 K.C. 0430--ltasen to Earhart. Transmitted weather data on 3105 K.C.

0453--"Partly cloudy---"(very faint S-1)

0500--Itasca to Earhart. Transmitted weather data and asked position.

0530 -- Itasca to Earhart. Transmitted weather data and asked position.

0600 -- "About 200 miles out" --- (fair volume) S-3.

0605--Itasen to Earhart. Transmitted weather data.
0630--Itasen to Earhart. Transmitted weather data and asked position.

0646--"About 100 miles out"-- (good volume S-4)

0700 -- Itasea to Earhart. Transmitted weather data and maintained schedule on 500 K.C. for "homing".

0715-- Itasca to Earhart. Cannot take bearing on 3105, please send on 500 K. C. or do you wish to take bearing on us. No answer. Having broadcast on 500 K.C. resumed.

0730--Itasca to Earhart. Transmitted weather data and asked position. Faving broadcast on 500 K. C. continued. 0741--Earhart. ""e must be on you but cannot see you; but

gas is running low-been unable to reach you by radio, we are flying at 1,000 feet. (very loud S-5)

0750 -- Marhart. "We are circling but cannot hear you. Go ahead on 7500 with a long count, either now or on the scheduled time or half hour". (very loud and rapid. S-5)

0753--Itasca to Earhart on 7500K.C. and 3105K.C. "What is your position long count". Continue transmission on 500 K.C. for "homing".

0758-Earhart. "We received your signals but are unable to get a minimum (on her direction finder presumably on 500 K.C.) Please take a bearing on us and answer on 5105 with voice". (very loud and too fast for accurate reception. S-5)

0805-Itasca to Earhart. Your signals received G.K. It is impractical for us to take a bearing on 3105 K.C. on your voice. Please transmit on 500 K.C. and we will take a bearing. (The operator on Howland with emergency direction finder had heard all conversation on 3105 K.C. after 0600 but was unable to take any bearings due to the general difficulty and unreliability of bearings on this frequency and due to the fact that she was on the air seven or eight seconds only. In the meantime a continuous watch on the ship direction finder (500 K.C.) had been maintained-

but at no time was there any transmission on this frequency. 0807-Itasca on 3105 K.C., 500 K.C. Go ahead on 3105 K.C. so that we may take a bearing on you. It is impossible to take a bearing on 3105 K.C., Please acknowledge. No answer. (The operator on Howland had just notified the Itasca that he was unable to get a bearing on 3105 K.C.

0843-Earhart. "We are on the line 157-337 will repeat message we are on the line 157-337. (very loud and too rapid for

accurate reception. S-5.

0645--Farhart. We are running on line North and South. (very loud S-5, and far too rapid for accurate reception. Farhart sounded as if she was very excited and did not talk distinctly.)

0854--Itasca. Your signals received. Go ahead with position on 3105 K.C. or 500 K.C. No answer.

The following general facts from our hir Officer's report bearing on the unfortunate outcome of the flight.

(a) Miss E-rhart did not attempt to come to an agreement with the covering ship before her departure from Lac, New Gainea, on the technical details of communication to be followed during the flight. Instead of making such arrangements she issued instructions, which were fully carried out.

(b) She used voice instead of key in all of her radio transmissions, thereby reducing the range of her set.

(c) She did not respond to repeated requests from the covering ship for her position nor did she at any time broadcast on 500 K.C., as requested so that a bearing could be taken on

her plane during the flight.

- (d) Except for weather reports, she did not ask for any assistance from the ship, except at 6:12 A.M., 6:45 A.M. and 8:03 A.M., July 2nd, when she requested that bearings be taken on her on 3105 K.C., despite the fact that she had been advised that the direction finder on the ship operated on 500 K.C. An attempt was made to cut her in with an emergency high frequency direction finder, which could operate on 3105 K.C. and which had been installed on shore, without her request or knowledge, but she was on the air for such brief periods (8 or 10 sec.) that the direction finder could not cut her in.
- (e) There was no meeting of minds during the flight. Miss Earhart remained on the air for but brief periods of time, did not attempt to find out if her messages had been received, and acknowledged the receipt of but one message from the Itasea, despite the fact that the ship was heard at San Francisco, in Samea and by H.M.S. "Achilles", enroute from New Zealand to Hawaii. She came on the air for a few seconds, speke a few words, and then cut off.

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Except for supplying weather reports from Pearl Harbor and making available the services of the tenders "Swan" and "Optario," which were on station to guard the flight - the "Swan" standing by midway between Honolulu and Howland and the "Optario" about helf-way between Now Guinea and Howland - the U.S. Navy had no connection with the flight.

After failure of the flight became a practical certainty, Neval authorities at Pearl Herbor conferred on measures to be taken. It was agreed that no Naval vessel regularly stationed in Heraiian waters was suitable for search operations in the distant area but that a patrol scaplane could reach Howland Island and, providing conditions were favorable, carry out limited operations, basing on the "Itasca!" Meanwhile, Rear admiral Orin S. Marfin, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, had been directed by the Navy Department to use all available Naval facilities in the search. It was then decided to dispatch a scaplane to Howland and at 7:23 P.M., July 2nd, patrol plane 6-P-3, with a crew of eight, commanded by Lt. V. W. Harvey, left Pearl Harbor for Howland. The "Itasca" was directed to stand by at Howland to tend the plane, and the "Swan" to proceed toward Howland.

Admiral Murfin was authorized by Washington to divert the "Colorado," then in Hawaiian waters, from her R.O.T.C. cruise to join the search, and at 9:15 P.M., July 2nd, the "Colorado" was ordered to proceed when fueled. She left for Howland the next morning, July 3rd, with directions to search first the southeast quadrant from Howland and the Phoenix Islands.

At 7:10 A.M., July 3rd, the patrol plane 6-P-3 reported that it had encountered a severe storm and was returning to Pearl Harbor. Available surface craft were dispatched from Pearl Harbor to cover the return flight of the plane in case of fuel shortage, but those precautions proved unnecessary and the plane reached Pearl Harbor at 7:26 P.M., July 3rd, 24 hours and five minutes from the time of its departure; after flying 2,570 miles non-stop, under very trying conditions.

The possibility of search operations by scaplanes basing on Johnston Island was considered but rejected as impracticable because of the 2,200 mile turn-around between Howland and Johnston Islands. It was then decided that an airplane carrier would be the most practicable and efficient unit. Accordingly, on July 4th, the "Loxington Group" was organized on the Pacific coast, consisting of the carrier "Lexington" and the destroyers "Lemson," "Drayton," "Cushing," and "Perkins." The latter vessel was later withdrawn from the group because of machinery trouble. Under command of Captain J.S. Dowell, this group was assembled and departed for Hawaii July 4th, for fueling, arriving at Henelulu and Lahaina, July 8th, and departing July 9th.

On July 6, Rear Admiral Murfin assumed command of all Naval forces engaged in the search, and on that date the "Itasca" was ordered under Naval jurisdiction, continuing in that status until July 16. Captain W.L. Friedell, commanding the "Colorado," which was then nearing its objective point, was directed to take charge of all vessels in the search area until the arrival of the commander of Destroyer Squadron 2, (Commanding the "Lexington Group,") when the latter would take over command. To effect the release of the "Colorado" at the earliest practicable date, it was decided that she should search the Phoenix Islands and vicinity, then proceed to rendezvous with and fuel the "Lexington Group" destroyers. This was accomplished, July 12, and the "Colorado" released from further duty in connection with the search. Captain J.S. Dowell, commanding Destroyer Squadron 2, took over command of all units upon his arrival in the search area, July 11.

The initial phase of the search covered the area north of and fairly near Howland Island, July 2-3. Then, on the strength of radio intercepts which appeared at the time to be reliable but worked later discredited, the search shifted to the westward and then 231 miles to northward of Howland. The second phase of the search moved to the southenatern quadrant on the basis of radio intercepts and bearings and other considerations which indicated the plane was on land and probably in the Phoenix Islands. With this assumption eliminated, the third phase was based on the assumption that the plane and landed the third phase was based on the assumption that the plane and the water probably within 200 miles of Howland and that the subsequent drift would have moved it to the westward and northwestward in the 11-day interval prior to arrival of the "Lexington." The "Lexington Group" covered an area approximately 300 miles square to the west and northwest of Howland. As an additional possibility, the Gilbort Islands were searched.

(See Charts of Operations)

The following recapitulation indicates the extent of the search operations:

Miles flown by planesPlane hours in air	
Square miles searched: By vessels By aircraft	


In addition to the "Itasca," the sea and aerial search ultimately involved nine neval vessels and about 66 planes, including the landplanes of the carrier "Lexington", three observation seaplanes of the "Colorado," and the naval patrol seaplane 6-P-3, with total personnel of about 3,000. The British cruiser HMS "Achilles," then en-route to Honolulu for a visit, the British Freighter "Moorby," and certain elements of the Japanese Navy and Air Force then in Japan's mandated territory, also entered the search.


In connection with the search, it is interesting to note that 66 Newy planes flow more than 1,500 hours and 150,000 miles, but all over water without loss of life or property damage. One of the outstanding performances of the search was the flight of the Newy patrol scaplane from Poarl Harbor mentioned previously.

The Paradise of the Pacific, monthly magazine published at Honolulu, ably sums up the probable benefits to be derived from this extensive search operation, as follows:

".... Those operations, receiving national publicity, made Americans more Pacific-Air conscious; may result in the elimination of many air hazards of Over-Pacific aviation and make the American Pacific safer for air commerce; may encourage Congress to give the Navy what it needs in the way of supplementing the patrol bombing planes with adequate surface craft and other essentials; may attract constructive attention to the tremendous air efforts being made by other countries in the Pacific area; may result in America securing national possession of certain Pacific Islands; and may speed up Pacific air matters in general."

SIDNEY V. BINGHAM, J Lieut. Colonol, G. S. C., A. C. of S., G-2.





(Summaries of Intelligence Nos. 657 to 666, inclusive, April 1, 1937, to August 15, 1937, will not issue)

NOTE: With this issue of the Hawaiian Department Summary of Intelligence is inaugurated the system of classifying the material contained therein to accord with the "Index Guide for Military Information" of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, which is employed in this office for the classification of material to be used in the Intelligence Digest of Information.

Articles are indexed according to the basic section number and title. Sub-classification numbers and captions are also used to further indicate the character of the information.

INDEX

Index Number	Title and Caption
2140	 Population and Social Conditions Local Reaction to Sino-Japanese Crisis Labor Organization in Hawaii British-Japanese-American Shipping Competition in Offing
8500	Amelia Forbart Sutnam.

Population Statistics

The annual estimate of the Territorial Commissioner of Public Health, places the population of the Territory of Hawaii at 396,715, as of June 30, 1937; an increase of 3,438 during the past year, and of 28,379 since the census of 1930, Distribution of population in 1936 and 1937 follows:

	June 30. 1936	June 30, 1937.
City of Honolulu	145,875	147,450
City & County of Monolulu (cx-		
clusive of Honolulu City)	70,986	71,357
City of Hilo	15,895	16,015
County of Hawali (emclusive of		
Hilo)	61,948	62,474
*County of Kalawao	517	524
County of Kauai	37,965	38,295
County of Maui	_60.081_	60,500
Total	395,277	396,715

*(The leper settlement on Holakai)

The following table shows racial descent and citizenship of the population, 1936 and 1937.

	RACIAI DUSCRUT		JUNESO.	1937.
J	unc 30, 1956	1937	Citizens	Aliens.
Hawaiian	21,594	21,389	21,389	
Caucasian-Hawaiian	19,391	19,890	19,890	
isiatic-Hawailan	18,217	19,267	19,267	
Postugese	29,853	30,130	28,507	1,623
Puerto Rican	7,470	7,529	7,529	
Spanish	1,261	1,233	1,051	182
Other Caucasian	57,069	57,830*	56,398	1,492
Chineso	27,495	27,657	23,246	4,411
Japanese	149,886	151,141	113,289	37,852
Korcan	6,682	6,678	4,269	2,409
Filipino	53,50	55,035	15,322	37,713
Others	799	876	799	77
Total	393,277	396,715	310,956	85,759
*(Incluses approximately	30,000 imp	and Navy	personnel	and do-
pendental.			a to die	

Sourse: Burcau of Schitation, Territorial Board of Health.

Utterances in local Chinese and Japanese newspapers, inspired by the situation in the Orient, are expressive of the racial differences and national jealousies of these two great nations. Chinese and Japanese residents of the Hawaiian Islands, though they may be Island-born and American citizens, nevertheless give vent through the language press to their historic racial animosities. No present allegiance seems to evercome this inbred antipathy one for the other; no interest in local problems of livelihood and government seems to temper enthusiasm for the land of their fathers and pride in the accomplishments of its sens. The American "Melting Pot," it is belowed, will require the fires of another generation at least before it's product can be expected to look with detachment upon such a scene as is now being enacted in North China. Blood ties are difficult to weaken.

Bitterness of feeling is expressed by the editorials of the local language papers. Articles, purportedly authentic accounts of events in North China, are quite biased and are flavored to suit the tastes of the nationality of its readers, and apparently to keep alive that spirit of racial antagonism mentioned above.

The "Nippu Jiji," Japanese language nowspaper, in an editorial (July 14), insists that the present crisis was provoked by the Chinese. This editorial purposts to be a presentation of the official Japanese version of events in North China, and liberally intersperses the running account with quotations from efficials in the "Tokyo War Office," the "Japanese War Department" and the "Foreign Office." Editorial comment, as such, was confined to giving continuity to the series of purportedly "official" statements.

A few days later(July 17), the "Hawaii Hochi," Honolulu's other representative Japanese newspaper, through the medium of its English of iterial page, made a plea for teleration on the part of both Chinese and Japanese residents of the Hawaiian Islands. The basis for this plea was to the effect that as American citizens they should not let "a purely nationalistic war between two foreign countries lead them from their course of mutual telerance, friendliness and understanding." This particular editorial was patently for American consumption, as can be deduced from news items ampearing in the Japanese language section of the same paper (July 15-16), which acknowledged the receipt of donations to a Japanese "National Defense Fund" and stated that these contributions were being forwarded. The willingness of this paper to act as forwarding agent in a matter of this sort is hardly consonant with their expressed editorial policy of detached interest. So much for the local Japanese press.

The "United Chinose News," a tri-weekly Chinese language nowspaper with an English section on Saturdays, commenting editorial (July 17), charged Japan with purposely provoking the present crisis in order to wrost more concessions from China. They soundly score Japans policy of carrying on "undeclared war," citing as examples: Manchuria in 1931; Shanghai in 1932 and Jehol in 1933. They justify China's present stand by reference to Japan's alloged violations of the Boxer Protocol of 1902 in attempting to force its' will upon China. Commonly, the adjustral was decidedly partisan.

The local English language newspapers generally reflect a spirit of sympathy toward the Chinese, being led in that direction by a feeling that the "incident" which led to the present fighting had "all the carmarks of artificiality."

This attitude is resented editorially by the Hawaii Hochi (August 21), which calls Hawaiian Japanese to task not only for subscribing to these papers but also for running advertisements in them. They should follow the example of a former resident, Keibei Hamahata, says the Hochi, who when solicited by the agent of an English language papers for an ad during the Shanghai incident a few years back, "Gave the follow a good piece of his mind and chased him out of his house".

In scanning the Japanese sections of the two local papers indicated above, one is struck with the natural ness with which references made to Japanese Army and Navy enterprises are proceded by the pronoun "Our". For example: "Resident Japanese are forsaking picnics and other functions and are donating their funds to our Army and Navy:" Again; "Our Air Forces Attack Hankow"; "Our Here of Acrial Bettles Gives Thrilling Account"; "The daily raids of our air forces made us feel great"; "The spirit of loyalty shown by individuals and organizations is astounding. We are literally fleeded everyday with contributions" (for the war 2006)": "The spirit which metivates our soldiers in China is remarkable. We, being able to live peacefully in Hawaii, can not help but do something for our country." While these allusions may be attributed to a very natural racial pride which harkons back through generations of inbred patriotism, nevertheless the frank casualness with which they are made, is sufficient to cause one to stop and pender.

For many years the only organized labor in the Territory of Hawaii consisted of some 12 craft unions, which were linked with unions on the mainland under charters issued by affiliates of the American Federation of Labor. The activities of these unions were centered in the Hawaii Joint Labor Board, which in general followed the policies and practices of the American Federation of Labor.

The Pacific maritime strike introduced a new - militant and radical - type of labor unionism in the Islands. With the settlement of the maritime strike early this year, the newly-arrived labor organizers gained prestige and began a campaign of local organization, forming unions that had no charters and no apparent connections with national or international groups. Using the tactics of the Committee for Industrial Organization, they attempted to secure recognition from employers under the terms of the Wagner Act, which resulted in a hearing in Honolulu before representatives of the National Labor Relations Board on the local longshore situation.

The Honolulu Longshoremen's Association, which had hoped to receive a charter from the International Longshoremen's Association, an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor, took the lead in the new labor movement. After failing to secure a charter from the International Longshoremon's Association, the leaders of the various maritime unions indicated their receptiveness to affiliation with the Committee for Industrial Organization. There followed a mushroom development of union locals throughout the Territory in many widely different industries, sponsored by the leaders of the maritime groups represented here. Forming the spearhead of the movement was the Honolulu Longshoremon's Association, which sought recognition as the bargaining agency for such wholly unrelated groups as laundry workers, plantation employes, members of the caterors' union, tug and barge crows, etc. The frequent walkouts of plantation workers during the past year, culminating in the recent three-month strike of Filipino cone and pineapple laborers on the island of Maui, were attributed to the activities of this group. To lend force and unity to this campaign the Honolulu Longshoremen's Association leaders formed the "Hawaiian Islands Federation of Labor," after having been instrumental in bringing about the collapse of the former Hawaii Joint Labor Board.

Called under the auspices of the new Federation, a labor convention was held in Honolulu, July 3, 4, and 5. Some 24 delogates, claiming to represent 19 unions and approximately 7,000 workers in various lines of employment throughout the Territory, attended the convention and perfected organization of the Federation. Policies enunciated for the Federation at the convention are as follows:

- (1) Five Federation districts will be set up on the five islands as follows: Ochu District 1; Hawaii District 2; Maui District 3; Molokai District 4; Kauai District 5. Organizers will be sent to the five island districts, offices will be opened and organizational work of all the workers in all industries will begin immediately.
- (2) The executive board governing the five islands will maintain headquarters in Honolulu. All disputes of a major nature, involving strikes and lockouts must first be submitted to the executive board for consideration Disputes of a minor nature will be settled by the various districts.

- (3) All labor organizations, craft and industrial, regardless of mainland affiliation are to be included in the Federation. The aim and purpose of the Federation is to organize all the unorganized of the Mawaiian Islands, to eliminate jurisdictional disputes and other controversics between workers by building one big organization, one Federation that will govern all the workers.
- (4) The Federation will set up a defense fund that will be used to aid all workers and labor groups affiliated with it.
- (5) The Federation will adopt an educational program, will set up workers schools on all islands to educate all workers and their families so that they will be conscious of the great economic changes that are taking place and will be able to play their part in bringing about the new social cra.
- (6) The Federation has adopted The Voice of Labor as the organizational organ-the spokesman of the Federation. Each union affiliated with the Federation will elect a correspondent who will regularly contribute articles to the Voice on the activities and progress of his particular group.
- (7) The Federation will aid all affiliated groups in collective bargaining-in securing for affiliated workers contracts as to hours, wages and working conditions that will assure all the workers of these islands a decent American standard of living, decent working and living conditions, decent and humane hours of work.
- (8) The Federation has pledged itself to work for the abolishment of the degrading dual standard of living that exists in these islands. It will strive for equality and freedom for all the workers, regardless of race, color or creed."

It is noted that the Federation officials also comprise the editorial board of The Voice of Labor, which has been selected as the official organ of the Federation.

While it is stated as a policy of the Hawaiian Islands Federation of Labor "to include all organizations, craft and industrial, regardless of mainland affiliation," it is apparent that union labor in the Territory is split into factions along the same general lines as organized labor is divided on the mainland, i.e., on the issue of craft vorses the unionization of an industry which would include many crafts as represented by the American Federation of Labor and the Committee for Industrial Organization, respectively. As has already been noted, all of the officials of the Hawaiian Islands Federation of Labor are either associated with or subscribent to the maritime unions on the Pacific Coast, the organization of which under the Cormittee for Industrial Organization is now practically assured. Indeed, the local Federation is modeled after the Maritime Federation of the Pacific. Incorporated in the constitutions of the various unions affiliated with the Honolulu Longshoremen's Association is an article stating the aim of these various groups to unite themselves with the Committee for Industrial Organization.

On the other hand, the various craft unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor refuse to support the new labor setup. They are conservative and disfavor the type of unionism represented by the CIO, largely, it is said, because industrial unionism provides no place in its' system for the craft units, unless the latter sacrifice their identity and their competency. Many individual members of the trade unions, however, appear to be sympathetic to the CIO.

At first allied with the trade unions in opposition to the Honolulu Longshoremen's Association, the "Waterfront Workers Association", recently formed and constored as an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor and designed to unionize all vaterfront workers, including longshoremen, trudemen, etc., has just affiliated with the Havaiian Islands Federation of Labor, indicating that the Committee for Industrial Organization leaders have gained control of the new organization.

Another, and probably the most important, factor in the local labor novement is a group which opposes affiliation with any mainland organization. Strongest numerically but lacking organization and londership, the support of this group is being strongly solicited by the Hawaiian Islands Federation of Labor. However, the practical certainty that the Hawaiian Federation will sooner or later swing into line with the Committee for Industrial Organization renders ineffectual its attempts to enlist the advocates of purely local organization.

The trend of events at this time point to a bitter fight between the advocates of purely local unions and the Hawaiian Islands Federation of Labor for domination. It seems safe to predict that in such a struggle the advocates of local unionism will be aided by the local affiliates of the American Federation of Labor. Cortainly local employers will side with the advocates of local unionism. The Imperial Conference shipping committee on May 18 opened discussion of shipping subsidies which are expected to result in a British campaign to place its shipping on equal footing with subsidized United States and Japanese steamship lines in the Pacific, even if it results in a rates battle.

Future discussion will be based on a British recommendation that Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand spend \$12,500,000 to build two fast liners to compete with Matson's liners.

It was estimated by the Imperial Conference that the Matson lines, between 1932 and 1935, received subsidies of more than \$1,250,000, while the Japanese received more than \$3,350,000 since 1930.

As a result of the London discussions, orders probably will be placed soon for construction of two new 22,000 ton, 22 knot liners, to replace the Aorangi and the Niagara and to be ready for service for the winter of 1939-1940, it is indicated.

Sir Edward Beatty, president and chairman of the Canadian Pacific Railway Co., stated recently: "In a nutshell, the position is that we have either got to build new tonnage or else lose an essential and vital link in Empire trade and hand the business to foreigners."

The only factor at present delaying construction of the ships is lack of sufficient subsidy. However, the governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji are expected to declare themselves definitely in favor of financial guarantees which will allow the Canadian-Australasian line to compete on a more equal basis with Matson line vessels in the Pacific.

Meanwhile, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Japan's largest stoomship line, has announced that it will build two new de-luxe express liners within two years, and have them ready for service in 1940 at a cost of between \$12,000,000 and \$15,000,000 each. The contract for the two liners, which will be of approximately 27,000 tons gross with a speed of 24 knots, is to be let to the Mitsubishi company in Japan.

The NYK line may inaugurate steamship passenger service between Ensenada, Mexico and Honolulu to circumvent the Treasury Department ruling revoking 30-day stopover privileges at Honolulu for passengers traveling to or from American ports in foreign ships, it was reported, following definite announcement on August 5 of the stopover revocation.

Ensenada is a small port approximately 50 miles south of the Mexican border, within a few hours from rail, steamship and air terminals in San Diego or Los Angeles. A luxurious tourist hotel completed at Ensenada last year by Mexican Capital.

Arguments for establishment of a trans-Pacific service by NYK between Mexico and Hawaii point out that Canadian Pacific and Canadian Australasian lines are permitted to carry passengers from British Columbia to Hawaii.

The secret behind the phenomenal growth of Japan's mercantile marine, third largest afloat and boasting the world's most profitable fleet of Diesel meter ships, is her beening industries and the ability of her shipyards to construct vessels comparable with the best in the world for a fraction of the cost, British sources point out.

During the last few months Japanese ships have been driving many British shipowners frantic. Eighty percent of the freight carried from Bombay to Japan and 90 percent of the freight from Japan to Bombay have already been taken over by Japanese ships, it is claimed.

The British complain of Japanese encroachments, but from the Japanese standpoint it is argued that British shippers for years have enjoyed almost a monopoly in the Far East.

One of the most notoworthy events in Japanese shipping was the enforcement in 1932 of the ship improvement law, whereby the government presented shipowners with one ten in new ships for every two tens they scrapped. The idea was to replace 400,000 tens of obsolete craft with 200,000 tens of superior vessels, mostly fast Diesel meter ships between 5,000 and 10,000 tens.

Another angle in the Pacific shipping race, is the report, under a recent San Francisco date line that the Matson company was negotiating with Canadian shipping interests for a demarcation of the spheres of Pacific traffic, whereby they may arrange for a common call at Tahiti to anticipate a move by the French line to install the Tahiti-North American Service. Likewise, it is believed that plans are being discussed to anticipate the Japanese NYK's maneuvering, by which the NYK may obtain some Hawaiian and United States traffic by carrying passengers between Ensenada, Lower California, to Honolulu.