U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

AUGUST 15, 2006

Subject: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

FOIPA No. 0977600- 000

Dear Requester:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552		**Section 552a**
☒(b)(1)	□(b)(7)(A)	□(d)(5)
☒(b)(2)	□(b)(7)(B)	□(j)(2)
☒(b)(3) 50 USC Section 403	☒(b)(7)(C)	□(k)(1)
_____	☒(b)(7)(D)	□(k)(2)
_____	☒(b)(7)(E)	□(k)(3)
_____	□(b)(7)(F)	□(k)(4)
□(b)(4)	□(b)(8)	□(k)(5)
□(b)(5)	□(b)(9)	□(k)(6)
☒(b)(6)		□(k)(7)

2112 **page(s)** were reviewed and 844 **page(s)** are being released.

☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- ☒ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- □ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice,1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

☐ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s) (2)

Please be advised that this is the final release of material responsive to this request. This release consists of the following files: 100-93216 Sections 4, 8, 15-16 and 18-21.

Material reviewed for this request contained an extensive amount of documents and information originating with other Government agencies, that referral information will be sent to the proper agencies upon receipt of the final payment.

To expedite your request, the enclosed material is being sent in advance of payment. Pursuant to Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.11 and 16.49, there is a fee of ten cents per page for duplication. This release consists of 844 pages. Please remit a check or money order, payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the amount of $84.40. The FOIPA number assigned to this request should be placed on your payment to insure proper crediting of your payment. Payment should be received within 45 days from the date of this letter.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

COPY:AJH

SAC, Indianapolis

May 8, 1948

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

SOURCE OF INFORMATION

The following information is being supplied to the Indianapolis Field Division and to those offices receiving copies of this letter in order that such offices may be cognizant of the availability of [redacted]

[redacted]

EHH:esb:dbb

DATE 9-21-91 BY SP7 mcs

SAC, Indianapolis

So that all offices receiving this letter will be cognizant of the character of the information received at the Bureau from [redacted] there is attached a summary of the information supplied by [redacted] Obviously, the information contained in this letter, as well as in the attachment, should be regarded as highly confidential and under no circumstances should it be made available to outside agencies.

b6
b7C
b7D

Enclosure

cc - Baltimore (with enclosure)
Boston "
Chicago "
New York "
San Francisco "

COPY:AJH

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 7, 1948

INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY [redacted] TO THE BUREAU

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] has advised that bacteriological warfare if used properly can be an effective sabotage instrument. He pointed out that the haphazard unplanned use of it, in his opinion, would not be nearly as effective as a coordinated master plan of sabotage. He offered a plan strictly of a hypothetical nature which he said is one which could be used most effectively. He said he based his observations on two things: (1) The potentialities of the use of bacteriological warfare, and (2) the potential ability of enemy agents to use it effectively.

The plan as outlined envisages two aspects: (1) The psychological or fear or mass hysteria aspect, and (2) the actual physical weakening of the population.

With regard to the psychological aspect, Dr. Reyniers, to support his point, cited the almost mass hysteria created in New York City when the nine cases of smallpox broke out. He pointed out that almost three million people lined up to be vaccinated.

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

EHW:esb

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted] SP1 MAS...
ON 9/21/81

ENCLOSURE

[redacted] He pointed out that he has, of course, no proof and secondly that he does not desire to creat the impression that he is pointing his finger at anyone when he makes the statement that there are certain individuals in the American Association of Scientific Workers who are at the present time making public appearances explaining bacteriological warfare. This same group has been instrumental in resolutions to have bacteriological warfare brought before the United Nations. Furthermore, he cited an incident which occurred in Chicago in December, 1947, when Dr. Theodor Rosebury of this organization addressed a meeting of the Illinois Society of Interns and Medical Students. At this time Rosebury publicly explained bacteriological warfare. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] it was elicited from him that he is suspicious of several scientists, who are affiliated with the American Association of Scientific Workers and who have during the past year and a half exhibited considerable interest in bacteriological warfare. This interest has been manifested in their attempt to publicize widely the potential dangers of bacteriological warfare; to have as fully as possible classified information concerning bacteriological warfare made public, and finally to urge enjoining the United Nations to outlaw bacteriological warfare. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

Mr. Ladd 4-28-48

F. J. Baumgardner

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE AS A SABOTAGE MEDIUM

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] it was elicited from him that he is suspicious of several scientists, who are affiliated with the captioned organization and who have during the past year and a half exhibited considerable interest in bacteriological warfare. This interest has been manifested in their attempt to publicize widely the potential dangers of bacteriological warfare; to have as fully as possible classified information concerning BW made public, and finally to urge enjoining the United Nations to outlaw bacteriological warfare. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

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Mr. T
Mr. E
Mr. C
Mr. O
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

KHW:aop

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Rep 9-21-81 sgt Mack

EX-49

48 MAY 18 1948

F B

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd

DATE: 4/15/48

FROM : [redacted] b6 b7C

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFERENCE AT OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DURING WEEK OF APRIL 19, 1948

b6 b7C

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss [redacted]

b6 b7C

Reference is made to the letter to [redacted] dated April 12, 1948, advising that Special Agents [redacted] will participate in this conference as representatives of this Bureau.

[redacted] of ONI telephonically advised on the morning of April 15th that ONI had received this letter and scheduled the conference for 10:00 a.m., April 19, 1948, in the office of [redacted] Navy Department Building, Constitution Avenue, Washington, D. C. [redacted] was informed the Bureau's representatives would be advised as to the date of the conference.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to [redacted] for their information.

b6 b7C

cc [redacted]

b6 b7C

JFD:md

62 MAY 4 1948

EX-49 100-93216 G.I.R.-9

F B I
3 APR 21 1948

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : The Director

DATE: April 19, 1948

FROM : Mr. D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFERENCE AT OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DURING WEEK OF APRIL 19, 1948

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Today, April 19, 1948, Special Agents [redacted] attended a conference at Room 1827 of the Navy Department, at which [redacted] of the University of Notre Dame spoke to the following representatives of intelligence agencies, along with the above-named Special Agents: b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 7.29.2029 uc/nlw/bjd/paw 11.1.2004

The primary objective of [redacted] who, according to ONI, voluntarily offered to discuss bacteriological warfare and prevention thereof, was that he was most concerned about the establishment of a type of planning board made up of the representatives of appropriate government agencies or departments which would work along two lines: b6 b7C

1. The counterintelligence or "sabotage" line.
2. The planning and the initiative in educating the public in the matter of preventing or counteracting bacteriological warfare.

[redacted] visualized that such a board would coordinate Federal Government activity through such agencies as Public Health Service and also institute a well planned educational program which would involve education of representatives of the medical field as well as health and public engineering authorities of local and state governments. b6 b7C

The general problem of who would be represented on such a board, as well as the responsibility in taking the initiative for the establishment of such a board, was presented before the various intelligence agencies present. The matter of jurisdiction was only generally touched upon, but it appeared that Army and Navy representatives felt that as far as the counterintelligence and sabotage angle is concerned within the United States, that this primarily is an FBI matter.

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SECRET

[redacted] presented his knowledge of bacteriological warfare and accomplishments in such field in such a way as to show bacteriological warfare to be a potential effective sabotage instrument. It was brought out that the matter of sabotage is covered, of course, by the Delimitations Agreement of the various intelligence agencies. b6 b7C

As regards the matter of planning and instituting an educational program to acquaint appropriate segments of the people with the potentialities of bacteriological warfare, no commitments were made by any representative present. It was decided that the group would meet again at 2 o'clock on April 20, 1948, at which time the official position of the agencies represented would be outlined.

It is the purpose of this memorandum to point out the two problems presented and request advice as to the official position the Bureau should follow, particularly as regards the planning and educational program. It is observed that such a program should be established on a cabinet level in that it involves coordination of certain non-intelligence agencies. Secondly, it involves a matter of appropriation of funds and the centering of responsibility. The Bureau is of course in no position to serve in an educational medium in this field or, it might be said, as a propaganda agency. Another serious question is the matter of declassification of top secret information concerning bacteriological warfare. This is, of course, in the hands of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is consequently recommended that the Bureau's position with regard to such a central board be that it can voice no opinion one way or another and that it is felt the consideration to be given to such a board, or the actual planning for it, is a matter of cabinet level.

Undoubtedly the question will arise tomorrow whether the FBI is in favor of the creation of such a board and, secondly, if we would care to participate in it. It is felt, of course, that we should state that we would be guided by any cabinet level decision on the matter, but that if a board is created, we should have the benefit of information which would have a bearing on the work in our jurisdiction.

With regard to the counterintelligence or counter-sabotage aspects of this field, it is felt that our position should be that there should be no conflict with the present Delimitations Agreement.

A separate memorandum is being submitted to incorporate the technical aspects of [redacted] preliminary discussions in this matter for record purposes. b6 b7C

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: April 20, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: Bacteriological Warfare Conference at the Office of Naval Intelligence During the week of April 19, 1948

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Today, April 20, 1948, Special Agents [redacted] attended the second meeting of the captioned conference, which was addressed again by [redacted] and which consisted of the following representatives of various intelligence agencies: [redacted] outlined a hypothetical case of sabotage through the use of bacteriological warfare for those present in order to not only bring out intelligence and counterintelligence problems, but also problems of prevention and education. The details of this hypothetical case as well as other observations of a technical nature made by [redacted] will be incorporated in a separate memorandum. b6 b7C

[redacted] purpose was to discuss this hypothetical case in such a way as to show the need of the establishment of a coordinated planning board or committee to be made up of representatives of appropriate Government agencies. b6 b7C

It was generally agreed by those present at the conference that [redacted] presented the potentialities of bacteriological warfare and problems relative thereto in such a manner as to warrant consideration. However, it was the consensus of particularly the representatives of G-2, ONI, and the Army Air Force that the planning for such a committee or board would have to be done most carefully and that the ultimate determination as to its establishment would rest in the hands of officials of the Government on a high policy plan. [redacted] intimated that possibly the National Security Council might be the one to decide. [redacted] while not expressing full agreement with [redacted] intimated that the ultimate decision on such a board would rest in the hands of possibly the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Cabinet. [redacted] also offered as a possible authority the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee. b6 b7C

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FBI

JUN 7 1948

It was pointed out by the representatives of the FBI that the establishment of such a board as generally outlined would involve some very serious considerations and that these, of course, should be enumerated as fully as possible. It was also pointed out that prior to any commitments being made that, of course, these considerations would have to be studied fully.

It was agreed that it would be advantageous for [redacted] to submit a paper or a statement of his objectives and his analysis of the situation which could in turn be presented to the officials of the various agencies represented. b6 b7C

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[redacted] b6 b7C

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Along with this paper which [redacted] has agreed to write and make available by Friday, April 23, will be a consolidation of the considerations which the various representatives of the intelligence agencies have to offer in this matter. b6 b7C

Consequently, it has been decided that the conference will be re-convened the morning of April 23, 1948, in the offices of [redacted] at 10:00 A.M. b6 b7C

It is observed that particularly [redacted] and [redacted] felt that [redacted] observations as well as the consensus of observations and suggestions of the conference be in turn presented individually to the officials of the intelligence agencies represented for their consideration. Thus it appears that the conference is one to obtain ideas from [redacted] and to in turn formulate observations and suggestions without making the final determination or decision as to the establishment of a planning board or committee. b6 b7C

It might be further observed that the general feeling as expressed particularly by [redacted] is that any attempted use of bacteriological warfare as a sabotage medium at the present time would be within the jurisdiction of the FBI. b6 b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

DATE: May 11, 1948

FROM : [redacted] b6 b7C

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE AS A SABOTAGE WEAPON

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Attached is a proposed letter for all Special Agents in Charge setting forth information which was outlined at the Bacteriological Warfare Conference held by the Office of Naval Intelligence during the week of April 19, 1948. This describes for the field the potential use of B. W. as a sabotage instrument.

It will be noted that in the attachment to the cover letter there is set forth information pertaining to this as well as to the hypothetical master plan of sabotage in which bacteria is used and which was outlined by [redacted] b6 b7C at the above-named Conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this SAC letter be presented to the Executive Conference for approval.

Attachment

G.I.R.-9

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71 JUN 24 1948

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC LETTER NO. 81
Series 1948

May 25, 1948

SAC

ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
ANCHORAGE	DETROIT	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
ATLANTA	EL PASO	NEWARK	ST. PAUL
BALTIMORE	HONOLULU	NEW HAVEN	SALT LAKE CITY
BIRMINGHAM	HOUSTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN ANTONIO
BOSTON	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN DIEGO
BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

RE: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

This letter is being submitted to all Special Agents in Charge for informational purposes, reflecting that bacteriological warfare has a potential use as a sabotage weapon. It is desired that the information contained herein be regarded as strictly confidential and not be disseminated to or discussed with any person outside the FBI. Information contained herein should be brought to the attention of all Special Agents who are assigned to the investigation of individuals or organizations inimical to the security of the United States.

Recently, a conference was held in Washington, D. C., which involved representatives of various intelligence agencies and which was addressed by a scientist who has done considerable experimental work with bacteriological warfare. [redacted] b6 b7C b7D [redacted] should be carefully noted by those Special Agents who are assigned to the investigation of Soviet or satellite agents as well as those cases involving Communists and Communist controlled or infiltrated organizations working in the scientific field. With proper training, guidance, and planning it is conceivable that Soviet or Communist agents might, in the event of an extreme international emergency or war, utilize

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such a plan or one similar thereto. Consequently, any information which is developed during the course of current investigations which has a logical bearing on the use of bacteriological warfare should be brought to the attention of the Bureau immediately by letter captioned as above. Such information should, of course, be also incorporated in the substantive case file.

The Bureau is also taking this opportunity to point out that Communist scientists and Soviet or satellite nationals who could possibly engage in the activity of a character described in the attachment should be considered for immediate apprehension in the event of sudden difficulty with the Soviet Union.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 19, 1948

DIRECTOR, FBI

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLOW OF COMMERCIAL, ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL INTELLIGENCE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

~~SALE OF PENICILLIN PLANT TO THE USSR~~
~~INFORMATION CONCERNING~~

Reference is made to my memorandum of March 31, 1948, concerning the flow of commercial, economic and industrial intelligence to foreign governments.

[redacted] b1 (S)

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] b1 (S)

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
cc: Bacteriological Warfare

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51 JUN 21 1948

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Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy



The files of this Bureau reflect the following information concerning Nikolai Mikhaelovich Borodin, an employee of Amtorg Trading Corporation who is believed to be identical with the Professor Borodin referred to above. A visa application for Nikolai Mikhaelovich Borodin reflected that he held Soviet Foreign Passport #36174 Nr. 005867 and was granted a non-immigrant visa on July 22, 1947. This application reflected that Borodin was born December 14, 1905, at Kempak, Rostov District. He gave his home address as Hotel Savoy in Moscow and indicated that he was assigned to the Amtorg Trading Corporation for a temporary assignment of six months. (161-5381-2905)

It is known that Borodin accompanied by two other Soviets visited the Schenley Penicillin Plant, Lawrenceburg, Indiana, on October 14, 1947, and observed at that plant the installation of podbielniak extractors, a machine vital to the penicillin recovery step. It was further reported that Nikolai Borodin accompanied by two Soviet scientists visited the Central Scientific Company in Chicago, Illinois, during October of 1947 and that they were shown certain unclassified areas of the plant. Borodin and his companions made inquiry concerning biological apparatus such as centrifuges, incubators, and water baths. (100-351608-1)

It has also been reported that Dr. Nikolai Mikhailovich Borodin of the Amtorg Trading Corporation was one of the 32 American representatives who visited the Instrument Conference in Chicago, Illinois, during October, 1947. During the fall of 1947, Dr. Borodin visited the Engineering and Industrial Experiment Staff at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. (61-5381-2896)


In connection with the [redacted] the following information is set forth. It has been determined that in 1947 Technical Enterprises, Incorporated, 31 South Street, New York City, was negotiating with the Amtorg Trading Corporation for the sale of a penicillin plant to the USSR. Professor Borodin was sent by the Russian Government from England to work with Technical Enterprises, Incorporated, in order to arrive at an agreeable estimate in price. In September, 1947, this company offered a bid to the Amtorg Trading Corporation to design and supervise the operation of a penicillin plant in Russia for a fee of $1,575,000. Subsequently, Technical Enterprises, Incorporated, wrote to the Commerce Department asking if an export license would be furnished to them if the contract referred to above was completed. The Commerce Department advised that a guarantee of an export license could not be given and negotiations between Technical Enterprises, Incorporated, and Amtorg Trading Corporation came to an end. (100-355226) (5) b1

An inquiry was also made relative to this matter at the Merck Company, 161 6th Avenue, New York City. It was determined that the Amtorg Trading Corporation in July, 1946, wrote to the Merck Company expressing an interest in purchasing a penicillin plant to be erected in the USSR. A similar request was reported by this company in September, 1947, from Amtorg Trading Corporation. Both requests were turned down by the Merck Company.

Information was obtained from the Hayden Chemical Company, 393 7th Avenue, New York City, that the Amtorg Trading Corporation had negotiated with their company during the summer of 1947 for the purchase of bulk penicillin in large quantitites. The negotiations collapsed when Amtorg stated that the Russian Government was really interested in purchasing a penicillin plant with complete "know-how" for its supervision and operation in Russia. In November of 1947, a Dr. Borodin, 210 Madison Avenue, New York City, was informed by the Hayden Chemical Company following a similar inquiry made by him that such a purchase would be impossible as the Hayden Company could not possibly retain an equity interest in any plant erected in Russia. It has been reported that the Hayden Chemical Company reported Amtorg's solicitation referred to above to the State Department. (100-355226)

An official of Squibb International, New York City, advised this Bureau in May, 1945, that his organization would under no circumstances consider doing business with the Asterg Trading Corporation in penicillin matters. It was also learned that the Chemical Solvent Company, Birmingham, Alabama, is not a manufacturer of penicillin and is not engaged in the drug business in any manner.

I thought you might desire to bring the above information to the attention of the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Coordinating Committee through your representative. I have already furnished the above information to the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army.



SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

THE SOVIET UNION'S BW DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

Because of Retaliation Hazards, U. S. S. R. Not Expected To Precipitate Large-Scale Offensive Effort in This Field in Next 5 to 10 Years, Except Under Unusual Circumstances

(SECRET)

The Soviet Union's decision to initiate large-scale biological warfare in the event of a future war may be determined to a large extent by her ability to withstand retaliatory large-scale biological warfare attacks. To withstand large-scale attacks with biological agents, the U. S. S. R. would require much improvement in her present epidemiological control and sanitation methods, because these measures would be vital to a defensive program.

The Soviet Union probably would require more than five years to make any noticeable improvement in her medical services and disease-control measures. *Owing to the defensive hazards alone, in the event of retaliation, the U. S. S. R. could not afford to precipitate large-scale biological warfare*

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EX-13

Clipped from: Intelligence Review May 6, 1948 - No. 11 Pg. 58.

during the next 5 to 10 years, except under unusual circumstances, it is believed. At the present time, or in the near future, however, the U. S. S. R. should be able to support an extensive sabotage biological warfare operation within the United States. Such an operation could be conducted with little chance of its being definitely identified with the U. S. S. R.; and, consequently, it would not be cause for retaliation.

The Soviets' status in scientific research connected with biological warfare is excellent. The Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences has approximately 40 principal institutes, laboratories, stations, and several commissions, all devoted to biological and chemical research. Several of them could participate in biological warfare research. The new Academy of Medical Sciences, established in 1944 under the Ministry of Health—which has 25 research institutions and a scientific staff of over 800—also could contribute to the Soviets' biological warfare potential. The efforts of the Academy of Medical Sciences, however, would be largely in the defensive aspects, it is believed. The achievements of Russian scientists in the fields of microbiology, biochemistry, biophysics, and other related fields have ranked with those of the other great nations' scientists for many years. Institutes working under the Academy of Sciences or the Ministry of Health have vast funds at their disposal, and can draw on other resources and facilities to improve their work. The Soviets have worked on biological warfare problems since the early 1930's, it is believed. In view of the additional knowledge in techniques acquired from the Germans, it would indeed be misleading to assume that the U. S. S. R. is not familiar with the potentialities of biological warfare and has not devised reasonably effective means of disseminating biological agents on a large scale.

The Germans apparently had evidence which caused them to believe that the Soviets were preparing for extensive bio-

logical warfare. The Germans maintained that the Soviets had conducted research and field tests at several installations within the U. S. S. R.

The Japanese Army also was firmly convinced, during World War II, that the U. S. S. R. was well advanced in the research and development of techniques for large-scale biological warfare. The Japanese believed there was a large number of scientific workers in the Far Eastern Soviet laboratories and experimental stations.

The Soviet Government has set a goal of not only overtaking, but of surpassing, the scientific achievements of other nations. It may be expected, therefore, that the Soviets will direct their efforts to include biological warfare for offensive use if necessary or practicable.

Epidemic and Sanitary Control in the U. S. S. R.

Nearly 4,000 stations [1] in the U. S. S. R. are now engaged in epidemic control work and in the improvement of sanitation. The measures which have been established are designed for operation during normal times and are not specifically designed for defense against possible biological warfare. It is believed, however, that the best defensive measures against biological warfare in any country are in some strict form of disease control and sanitation in the public health system. The Soviets probably have specific plans for special disease control measures during an emergency.

The epidemic control measures in the U. S. S. R. during the current Five-Year Plan period of 1946–1950 are administered by: (1) The Ministry of Health of the U. S. S. R.; (2) counterpart Ministries in the constituent and autonomous republics; and (3) province and city health departments. Only those agencies which have an all-Union importance are

[1] These stations are roughly equivalent to a first aid station equipped with certain laboratory facilities and personnel.

conducted directly by the Ministry of Health of the U. S. S. R. The Ministry of Health, however, can take over the control of anti-epidemic work of a local administration, if the situation is very dangerous or if the local authorities fail in their task. This fact suggests that a rigid and centralized control is exercised by the All-Union Ministry of Health over all anti-epidemic work throughout the U. S. S. R.

Several other Ministries participate in the epidemic and sanitary control system. Foremost of these are: the veterinary control of the Ministry of Agriculture; its counterpart in the Ministry of the State Farms; and the special sanitary departments of the Ministry of National Defense and Ministries dealing with transportation (Railway, Air, River, and Marine transport).

Specific control measures are handled by various sanitary-epidemic control stations for epidemic and certain non-epidemic diseases.

The current Five-Year Plan provides for a sanitary-epidemic control station in every *raion*,[1] with eight professional workers in every station located in a city and two professional workers in every station located in a village. The former group is to include four public health officers, called "sanitary physicians", and one epidemiologist.

In late 1947 the Council of Ministries of the U. S. S. R. confirmed a new administrative reorganization of the Ministry of Health which united the separate divisions of sanitary and epidemic control into the Department of Sanitary Epidemic Control. This consolidation was intended to eliminate jurisdictional confusion within local agencies and shifting of responsibility between agencies.

Weaknesses of the Defensive Program

The epidemic control system which is described as having been established in the U. S. S. R. would lead to the belief

[1] *Raion*—Basic administrative unit for local functions in the U. S. S. R. in matters pertaining to health, social welfare, roads, agriculture, etc.

that an effective and efficient program is in operation. This description appears to be far from true, however, although Soviet public health officials are aware of the defects of the epidemic control system and are not indifferent to them. Attempts are being made to improve conditions. However, largely because of the bureaucratic administration of this system, progress is very slow.

The number of trained medical personnel in the control agencies and stations not only is inadequate for the normal expected health problems, but also may be expected to be far from adequate to cope with emergencies. Facilities at the hospitals and at the various control stations are fairly good as to quantity, although the quality of such facilities is still inferior. Apparently, very slow progress is being made both in the public health agencies' prophylaxis measures and in improving sanitary conditions generally, owing to scarcity of materials, including drugs, and to shortage of manpower.

The various weaknesses of the agencies responsible for public health and medicine have been emphasized by E. I. Smirnov, Minister of Health, in articles appearing in various Soviet publications. Other confirming information of the inadequacies of medical services in the U. S. S. R. have been noted in papers delivered at the All-Union Conferences of Hygienists, Epidemiologists, Micro-biologists, and Infectionists, held in Moscow last October.

Conclusions

The epidemic and sanitary control system in the U. S. S. R., which includes nearly 4,000 stations, is designed for operation during normal times to control epidemic and certain non-epidemic infectious diseases. Although the system, so far as known, is not specifically designed for defense against biological warfare, this strict form of disease control and

sanitation in the public health system would be the first line of Soviet defense against BW.

The control system suggests a rigid centralized control, by the Ministry of Health, of all anti-epidemic work throughout the U. S. S. R. However, there are many inadequacies in the numbers and quality of personnel, methods, facilities, and the supply of many medicinals.

Owing to the bureaucratic system and the many deficiencies to be corrected in the public health program, it is estimated that at least five years will be required to make much improvement over present standards.

In order to have a defensive control system which would be effective in open biological warfare, very rapid and efficient detection, identification, reporting, protection (immunization, isolation, decontamination, etc.) and treatment of epidemic and non-epidemic diseases must be provided. Such a system appears to be far from realization in the U. S. S. R.

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No. 1949 Friday, May 28, 1948

Soviet Consumers' Co-ops.

THIRD U.S.S.R. CO-OPERATIVE CONGRESS

From an article in " Izvestia " :—

THE Third U.S.S.R. Congress of Consumers' Co-operatives opened on May 21 in the Central House of the Red Army in Moscow, with more than 500 delegates in attendance. A. N. Kosygin, Vice-Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, A. A. Kuznetsov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and M. I. Rodionov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, took part in the work of the Congress.

The Congress marks an important stage in the development of the Soviet co-operative movement. On the basis of Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism it is examining the work of the co-operatives during the past year and laying down new militant tasks.

★

Our consumers' co-operative movement is the largest economic and social mass organisation in the U.S.S.R.; 28,000 village consumers' societies unite about 32,000,000 members. It has a trading network of 170,000 co-operative stores. The co-operative retail trade turnover grows year by year, and its share in the country's general trade turnover continually increases. All of this indicates the great significance of the consumers' co-operative movement, which is devoted to satisfying the growing demand of the collective farmers and working people for the goods they require, and thus assists the further advance of socialist agriculture.

The Party and Government devote much attention to the consumers' co-operatives and render them serious assistance. In November, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., on the initiative of J. V. Stalin, issued a decree on the Development of Co-operative Trade in Towns and Workers' Settlements. By this decree the role of the consumers' co-operatives considerably increased.

After the currency reform and the abolition of rationing of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, the consumers' co-operatives enjoyed exceptionally favourable opportunities for the development of trade in the villages and towns, and achieved considerable successes. The co-operatives' retail turnover in 1947 increased one-and-a-half times compared with the previous year, and was double that of 1945. Recently many of the co-operative stores in the villages have improved their trade, both internally and externally. They have become more attractive and have a wide variety of goods.

By January 1, 1948, there were opened in towns and workers' settlements, about 10,000 co-operative stores, and over 6,000 communal feeding enterprises, which during the year supplied the population with over 14,000,000,000 roubles worth of foodstuffs. In 1947 manufacturing enterprises of the consumers' co-operatives produced more than twice the amount of consumers' goods that they did in 1946.

During recent years the Government has rendered the consumers' co-operatives great financial assistance. The funds accumulated by the consumers' co-operatives belonging to the Central Union of Consumers' Co-operative Societies amounted to more than 2,300 million roubles. More than 700 million roubles were collected in deposits on shares from members of consumers' co-operative societies.

Thanks to the great assistance rendered by the Government, tremendous work has been carried out in the restoration of the co-operatives in the districts which were under enemy occupation during the war.

The work of the co-operative wholesale departments has become of great importance in the development of trade. Special attention must now be paid to supplying goods to the village co-operatives in outlying districts. One of the most important tasks is that of the decentralisation of the purchase of goods by consumers' co-operatives.

Recently much work has been done in the direction of strengthening democracy in the co-operative societies. Shareholders' and delegates' meetings were held everywhere to discuss the annual reports of the management committees and regional, territorial, and republican co-operative congresses were held. As a result of the annual meetings, about one-third of the chairmen of the management committees were replaced by new people. It is necessary that the newly elected management committees of the co-operative organisations should maintain close contact with the broad masses of shareholders, draw them into everyday participation in the management of their co-operatives, observe co-operative democracy, and pay close attention to criticisms of the shortcomings in the work of the co-operatives.

★

The All-Union Congress of Consumers' Co-operatives will undoubtedly be a turning point in the work of all units of the co-operative movement—from the village consumers' societies to the management committee of the Central Union of Consumers' Co-operative Societies which will be elected at the Congress.

The thousands of workers of the consumers' co-operatives must exert all their energy and initiative to improve their work, for the rapid development of trade, the more complete satisfaction of the demand of the population for goods, more efficient co-operative trade in villages and towns. In this way the co-operative workers will assist in the successful solution of the tasks facing the Soviet people—to fulfill the post-war Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule.

CONSTRUCTION ON THE IRTYSH RIVER

A huge hydro-electric station is being built in Siberia, on the Irtysh River in the vicinity of Ust-Kamenogorsk. Work is now going ahead on the dam and the rock foundations on which it will rest. With part of the river's water diverted, a 30,000 square metre hollow has been formed in the river's bed, where the main section of the dam is to be built.

Before starting construction builders have to pump out huge quantities of water. To tame the waters, the soil under the body of the dam is being artificially frozen.

A new city is rising on the Irtysh along with the hydro-electric station.

Bacterial Warfare

file under Bacteriological Warfare

file 5-24

RECORDED - 40 100-93216-154

EX-136

62 JUL 9 1948

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RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS' CONTRIBUTION TO ANTIBIOTICS

By Pavel Yakimov, of the Penicillin and Antibiotics Laboratory, Leningrad State University

IT is usually claimed that the history of penicillin begins with that summer morning in 1928 when Alexander Fleming, British scientist, noticed and described the inhibiting influence exercised by a spore of green mould *Penicillium Notatum* on the development of the yellow staphylococci, bacteria which cause suppurative inflammations.

We pay due tribute to the researches of Fleming, who observed and described this phenomenon in 1928. We, however, are in duty bound to regard with the same respect similar investigations conducted by Russian scientists nearly sixty years before Fleming, at the dawn of the development of microbiology in Russia.

Studies of Green Mould

In 1870-1871 two Russian physicians, V. Manassein and A. Polotebnov, established and described in detail the bacterial and curative properties of green mould. A large 72-page monograph with 22 drawings of microscopic preparations entitled: " Relation of Bacteria to the *Penicillium Glaukum* Green Mould and the Influence of Certain Means for the Development of the Latter," written by Dr. Manassein, was carried in several issues of the *Military Medical Journal* in 1871.

In his extensive experimental study, Manassein for the first time established—this is repeatedly proved by drawings of microscope preparations—the full disappearance and absence of microbes under the green mould surface. Manassein also drew attention to the fact that the green mould is very unpretentious as regards nutritive media, can oust other types of mould and develop even in solutions of morphia and quinine, which are lethal for most bacteria—which facts are also confirmed by the contemporary investigations of Fleming and other scientists.

Several issues of another Russian medical journal, *Meditsinsky Vestnik*, in 1872, carried a large monograph by Dr. A. Polotebnov entitled, " Pathological Significance of Green Mould." In the concluding part of his study Dr. Polotebnov cites data from a number of experiments he made, treating with green mould various types of suppurative ulcers, furuncles and even syphilis ulcers. The treatment was so effective that he demonstrated his patients to senior students at lectures, as well as during visits to the wards.

Ahead of Their Times

The discovery of the antibacterial and curative properties of green mould by Russian scientists in the 70s of last century outstripped by far the development of science and medicine of that time. At that period the foundations of scientific microbiology were still being laid and developed by Louis Pasteur. The famous dispute between Pasteur, who advanced the microbe theory of fermentation, and Liebig who maintained that fermentation was a purely chemical process caused by the disintegration of proteins, was still not settled.

In that period, when science still had no clear conception of the significance and biological role of bacteria, the investigations of the properties of green mould conducted by Russian scientists were so much in advance of general development in these fields that they could not then be developed further. Even though Dr. Polotebnov clearly demonstrated the importance of green mould as a curative means, the primitive technique of pharmacology in those days made it impossible properly to develop the findings of the Russian scientists. It was precisely for these reasons that the initial work of Russian scientists, who pioneered in new branches of learning, found no further application.

It should be noted that Russian scientists resumed time and again the study of green mould. For example, Dr. Lebedinsky noted, in 1877, that though gastric juices reduced substantially the antibacterial properties of green mould, at the same time the number and types of bacteria in the intestinal tract sharply diminished. In 1904 M. Tartakovsky, a veterinary doctor, published in the *Archive of Veterinary Science* a lengthy article on exudative typhus and chicken cholera in which he described the swift perishing of the bacteria of exudative typhus under the influence of green mould which develops on the surface of infected blood. These facts prove the undisputed priority of Russian scientists in the discovery of the anti-bacterial and curative properties of green mould, subsequently discovered again in Britain in 1928-1940.

Mechnikov's Doctrines

These separate facts represent only isolated instances in the history of the modern science of antibiotics, which has developed on the foundations of the doctrine of antagonism and struggle among different species of unicellular organisms put forward by Ilya Mechnikov, great Russian scientist.

This is how Louis Pasteur described in 1887 the significance of the work of Ilya Mechnikov, then still a young scientist: " When all my collaborators were sceptical about your theory, I at once sided with you, because I myself have for a long time been amazed by the spectacle of struggle between various microscopic organisms which I have had occasion to observe. I think you have got on the right track . . . ."

We now are witnessing the triumph of Mechnikov's ideas. The science of antibiotics, which is swiftly developing on the foundations of Mechnikov's theory, is yielding splendid results.

Nearly seventy years ago Mechnikov established the highly significant fact of intra-cellular digestion of some microbes by others. He discovered and proved that the living unicellular organisms, which are always present in our blood, the leucocytes, can be swiftly mobilised by the human body and sent along the blood stream in vast masses to inflamed parts of the body affected by microbes which have penetrated there. The leucocytes envelop the invaders and then swiftly digest them. Most of the microbes which penetrate into our organism are destroyed by leucocytes. This property of the leucocytes of digesting microbes Mechnikov named phagocytosis, i.e. digestion of cells. And the leucocytes he renamed phagocytes.

New Methods of Cure

Mechnikov's further studies established the ability of a great many diverse types of micro-organisms to produce toxic substances, which act harmfully on other microbes. Mechnikov was the first after Polotebnov to prove the possibility of utilising for curative purposes this antagonism among different bacteria, by employing those which cause no harm to the human body to combat those which carry infection. Mechnikov proved that by introducing into the intestinal tract *lactobacillus acidophilus*, which is harmless to man, many of the infection-carrying bacteria present in the tract were destroyed. Mechnikov's discoveries charted the path for further investigations to scientists the world over.

The cardinal task of modern antibiotics is the comprehensive study, separation, purification and investigation of the properties and chemical composition of the various toxic substances or antibiotics produced by various micro-organisms. The main aim of modern investigation is to find micro-organisms which, like penicillium, can produce effective antibiotics.

Particular efforts are now being devoted to the search of antibiotics against the bacteria of tuberculosis, typhoid fever and typhus, which are immune to penicillin.

The ideas and investigations of Mechnikov and his Russian collaborators—the microbiologists Bezredko, Tarasevich, Zabolotny and Gamaleya — have been extended and developed by scientists in the Soviet period—N. Krasilnikov, A. Imshenetsky, Z. Yermolyeva, G. Gause, M. Brazhnikov, P. Kashkin, M. Fisher and others.

Russian biologists have always been in the front ranks of world biological science. To-day Soviet scientists are successfully developing the ideas first propounded nearly eighty years ago and are perfecting the technology for obtaining penicillin and other antibiotics.

Director, FBI

May 27, 1948

SAC, Boston

[redacted] b6 b7C

INTERNAL SECURITY (R)

AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

Rebulet May 26, 1948.

The Boston file indicates that not only is there no basis for believing that the subject is engaged in activities inimical to the interests of the United States but also that he is loyal to the United States.

Earlier correspondence under this caption as well as the correspondence captioned [redacted] reflects that [redacted] and the named organization have been engaged in certain propaganda work concerning bacteriological warfare. The methods followed by these appear to coincide well with those which [redacted] suggested to the Bureau as being the best plan from the Communist or Russian viewpoint. b6 b7C

The Boston file further reflects that [redacted] b6 b7C

The purpose of the interview is to ascertain the extent of [redacted] knowledge concerning the activities of the [redacted] The Bureau has earlier instructed that a report be submitted in the very near future in this case. Time becomes now of the essence because Harvard will shortly be closed for the summer and it is desired to interview [redacted] before next September. b6 b7C

BSG:
100-21199

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100-93216-155

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EX-16

45 JUL 8 1948

FBI

SAC, Boston

June 5, 1948

Director, FBI

[redacted] b6 b7C

INTERNAL SECURITY - R

(Bureau File No. 100-353654)

AIR MAIL
SPECIAL DELIVERY

100-93216-155

Reurlet May 27, 1948.

RECORDED - 78
EX 16

Pursuant to your request you are granted authority to interview [redacted] concerning [redacted] b6 b7C

I want to point out that your interview in this matter should be handled in a careful and well thought out manner and should be confined to the purpose set forth in your referenced letter.

You are instructed to conduct this interview as soon as possible and include the results thereof in the investigative report previously requested of you in this matter.

EHM:mcm:rmb

CC - Bacteriological Warfare File

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51 JUN 28 1948

COPY:RMB

OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd DATE: June 5, 1948

From : [redacted] b6 b7C

Subject: [redacted] b6 b7C
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 uc/NLW/bja/PKM ON 7-29-2004

You will recall that in December of 1947 through a technical surveillance on [redacted] it was ascertained that [redacted]

b6 b7C b7D [redacted]

During this conversation and prior to our investigation of [redacted] he informed [redacted] that he possessed some strictly confidential information about bacteriological warfare and that he believed someone associated with the AASW should be told about it [redacted] (100-353654-2)

b6 b7C

[redacted]

b2 b6 b7C b7D

-5)

EHM;mcm

CLASSIFIED PER EO 12958 AS AMENDED BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) DATE: 9-11-03

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45 JUL 8 1948

INITIALS OF

EX-16

copy filed in 100-353654

CONFIDENTIAL

The Military Intelligence Division subsequently advised that [redacted] was considered by them a leading scientist in the field of bacteriology, and that during World War II he was engaged in highly confidential research concerning bacteriological warfare. b6 b7C per Army letter dtd. 10-30-50

You will recall further that during the recent discussions on the topic of bacteriological warfare by representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence Division, Military Intelligence Division, Air Corps Intelligence Division and this Bureau, [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

The Boston Field Office has advised that their files reflect that [redacted] b6 b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the Boston Office authorizing this interview.

Attachment.

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 15, 1948

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE

Confidential Informant [redacted]

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

It has not been possible to identify [redacted] from the indices of the New York office.

In the event further information is received on this matter, the Bureau will be promptly advised.

cc-Washington Field
NY File-100-86033

G.I.R.-7

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FBI

19 JUL 16 1948

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21 JUL 23 1948

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DATE: 7-29-04
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b0267 uc/NLS/bjelpare 11-1-2004

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date: August 12, 1948

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: [redacted]

b6
b7C

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SALE OF PENICILLIN PLANT TO THE USSR
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

[redacted]

b6
b7C

INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Bacterial Warfare

Reference is made to the memorandum entitled [redacted] (S)

[redacted] furnished to Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau on April 14, 1948, and to your memorandum dated June 7, 1948, [redacted] (S) 100-355226-8, 100-354420-3)

b1
b6
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It has been determined by this Bureau that in 1947 Technical Enterprises, Inc., 31 South Street, New York City, was negotiating with the Amtorg Trading Corporation for the sale of a penicillin plant to the USSR. A [redacted] believed to be identical with the captioned subject, was sent by the Russian government from England to work with Technical Enterprises, Inc. in order to arrive at an agreeable estimate in price. In September, 1947, this company offered a bid to the Amtorg Trading Corporation to design and supervise the operation of a penicillin plant in Russia for a fee of $1,575,000. Subsequently, Technical Enterprises, Inc. wrote to the United States Department of Commerce asking if an export license would be furnished to them if the contract referred to above was completed. The Commerce Department advised that a guaranty of an export license could not be given and negotiations between the Technical Enterprises, Inc. and Amtorg Corporation came to an end.

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(100-355226-6)

RECORDED - 1 100-93216-
AUG 18

An inquiry was also made relative to this matter at the Merck Company, 161 Sixth Avenue, New York City. It was determined that the Amtorg Trading Corporation in July, 1946, wrote to the Merck Company expressing an interest in purchasing a penicillin plant to be erected in the USSR. A similar

EHM/de (for enclosures see file "Sale of Penicillin Plant to the USSR)

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-354120

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

SECRET

request was reported by this company in September, 1947 from Amtorg Trading Corporation. Both requests were turned down by the Merck Company.

Information was obtained from the Hayden Chemical Company, 393 Seventh Avenue, New York City, that the Amtorg Trading Corporation had negotiated with their company during the summer of 1947 for the purchase of bulk penicillin in large quantities. The negotiations collapsed when Amtorg stated that the Russian government was really interested in purchasing a penicillin plant with complete "know-how" for its supervision and operation in Russia. In November of 1947 a [redacted] address b6
of the Amtorg Trading Corporation) New York City, was informed by the Hayden -b7C
Chemical Company, following a similar inquiry made by Borodin, that such a purchase would be impossible as the Hayden Company could not possibly retain an equity interest in any plant erected in Russia. It has been reported that the Hayden Chemical Company reported Amtorg's solicitation, referred to above, to the State Department. (100-355226)

An official of the Squibb International, of New York City, advised this Bureau in May, 1948, that his organization would under no circumstances consider doing business with the Amtorg Trading Corporation in penicillin matters. It was also learned that the Chemical Solvent Company, Birmingham, Alabama, was not a manufacturer of penicillin and was not engaged in the drug business in any manner.

(100-355226-5)

On July 30, 1948, an official of the Panel on Petroleum of the Research and Development Board, T4 Building, Washington, D. C., furnished the following information.

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

SECRET

7/29/04
CLASSIFIED BY NCNIS/GJA/CG Court AAC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1)(6) 7/29/2029
By 1, Pg, OGA 10125 04 Court the NIS/GJA/CG
(FOR STOTT (S)

~~SECRET~~

August 12, 1948

RE: SALE OF PENCILLIN PLANT TO THE USSR
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH BORODIN, WITH ALIAS:
NICHOLAS MICHAELOVITCH BORODIN

6833

Reference is made to my memorandum dated January 30, 1948, [redacted] There is (S) set forth below additional information concerning this subject and his connection (S) b1
b1 with an attempted purchase from this country of information and equipment for the erection of a pencillin plant in the USSR.

[redacted]

[redacted] (S) b1

It has been determined that in 1947 Technical Enterprises, Inc., 31 South Street, New York City, was negotiating with the Amtorg Trading Corporation for the sale of a pencillin plant to the USSR. A Professor Borodin, believed to be identica with the captioned subject, was sent by the Russian government from England to work with Technical Enterprises, Inc. in order to arrive at an agreeable estimate in price In September, 1947, this company offered a bid to the Amtorg Trading Corporation to design and supervise the operation of a pencillin plant in Russia for a fee of $1,575,000. Subsequently, Technical Enterprises, Inc. wrote to the United States Department of Commerce asking if an export license would be furnished to them if the contract referred to above was completed. The Commerce Department advised that a guaranty of an export license could not be given and negotiations between the Technical Enterprises, Inc. and Amtorg Corporation came to an end. (100-355226-6)

An inquiry was also made relative to this matter at the Merck Company, 161 Sixth Avenue, New York City. It was determined that the Amtorg Trading Corporation in July, 1946, wrote to the Merck Company expressing an interest in purchasing a pencillin plant to be erected in the USSR. A similar request was reported by this company in September, 1947 from Amtorg Trading Corporation. Both requests were turned down by the Merck Company.

RECORDED - 92 | 100-93216-161

Information was obtained from the Hayden Chemical Company, 398 Seventh Avenue, New York City, that the Amtorg Trading Corporation had negotiated with their company during the summer of 1947 for the purchase of bulk pencillin in large quantities. The negotiations collapsed when Amtorg stated that the Russian government was really interested in purchasing a pencillin plant with complete "know how" for its supervision and operation in Russia. In November of 1947 a Mr. Borodin, 210 Madison Avenue, (address of the Amtorg Trading Corporation) New York City, was informed by the Hayden Chemical Company, following a similar inquiry made by Borodin, that such a purchase would be impossible as the Hayden Company

EX-41 51 AUG 19 1948

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

MAILED FROM DIVISION FIVE
AUG 13 1948

EHM/da (for encl. see file "Sale of Penicillin Plant to USSR)

~~SECRET~~

could not possibly retain an equity interest in any plant erected in Russia. It has been reported that the Mayden Chemical Company reported Amtorg's solicitation, referred to above, to the State Department. (100-355226)

An official of the Squibb International, of New York City, advised this Bureau in May, 1948, that his organization would under no circumstances consider doing business with the Amtorg Trading Corporation in penicillin matters. It was also learned that the Chemical Solvent Company, Birmingham, Alabama, was not a manufacturer of penicillin and was not engaged in the drug business in any manner. (100-355226-5)

On July 30, 1948, an official of the Panel on Petroleum of the Research and Development Board, T4 Building, Washington, D. C., furnished the following information.

b6
b7C
b7D

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: September 24, 1948 1-1

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE

Reurlet 7/27/48 which refers to New York letter of 7/7/48 concerning the captioned matter.

DEFERRED RECORDING

New York letter of 7/7/48, in substance, sets forth the results of an interview had with [redacted] concerning a hypothetical case involving contamination of the water supply of a large city by means of forcing bacteria into the water mains. b6 b7C

RECORDED - 61

100-93216-162

Inadvertently, New York letter of 7/7/48 has been misfiled and cannot be located. The Bureau is requested to furnish this Office with a copy of the New York letter of 7/7/48.

32 OCT 4 1948

JMS:MH
100-91131

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-29-2004 BY 60267 uc/sms/bja/Pmw

SAC, New York

9-30-48

DIRECTOR, FBI

100-93326-16

RECORDED - 61

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE
(NY 100-91131)

Reurlet dated 9-24-48.

Pursuant to your request, there is attached hereto one copy of New York letter dated 7-7-48.

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-29-2004 BY 60267 uc/nwe/bja/rca

EFL:wma

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 8
☆ SEP 30 1948 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

b6
b7C

7 OCT 8 1948

Bacteriological Warfare

RECORDED - 51 100-23216-283
EX-76
52 OCT 28 1948
56 NOV 30 1948 CV 283
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AJM

b1

SECRET

[redacted] (S)

b1

OCTOBER 26, 1948

RE: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

b6
b7C

[redacted] (S)

b1

Pursuant to your request, I am returning herewith the "First Interrogation Report" on the captioned subject which you furnished to me as an enclosure to your reference memorandum.

I want to thank you for making this material available to me.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DATE: 7-29-2004
CLASSIFIED BY: UC/NSIS/C.A/PAM 60267 AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3 (6) 7-29-2029

cc: Legal Attache
London, England

Enclosure

EHM/de

RECORDED - 82 100-93216-164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SECRET

61 APR 11 1949

SECRET

S/9129

September 16, 1948

b1 (S)

"X"

Re: Nikolai Mihailovich BORODIN ;
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Reference is made to your memorandum #6833 dated August 12, 1948 about the above-named individual.

Enclosed is the first Interrogation Report on Nikolai Mihailovich BORODIN, which we think you will agree is of considerable interest. Any comments you may have to make will be much appreciated.

We regret that we have only one copy of this report in our possession, and should be grateful if you will return it when you have finished with it.

DATE: 7-29-2004
CLASSIFIED BY UC/NS/BSR/Pm60267 AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(6) 7-29-2029

Enclosure.

1-ENCL.

RECORDED - 8 93216-1

FBI

52 OCT 29 1948

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: Nov. 1, 1948

FROM : SAC, Atlanta

SUBJECT: "X" CATTLE DISEASE;
SECURITY MATTER.
BACTERIAL WARFARE

Transmitted herewith is an article appearing in the Atlanta Journal on October 27, 1948, datelined at Washington.

For the Bureau's information, [redacted] expressed the opinion to the writer that this disease was possibly the result of Russian bacterial warfare, pointing out that he understood that some of the diseased cattle had originally come from Mexico. b6 b7C

[redacted] could furnish absolutely no specific information and, as a matter of fact, stated that his theory and opinion on the question were purely "hunches." He stated, however, that Army veterinarians are looking into the matter. b6 b7C

It is felt that the above would be of interest to the Bureau.

EJF:CM

Enclosure (1)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-29-2004 BY 60267 uc/nwe/bja/pac

RECORDED - 165

INDEXED

[redacted] b6 b7C

64

NOV 2 1948

THE ATLANTA JOURNAL

October 27, 1948

UNKNOWN QUANTITY

'X' Disease Kills Cattle Over U. S., Doctor Says

By DR. FRANK THONE
Science Service Editor in Biology

WASHINGTON, Oct. 27.—"X" disease, so called because it is still a totally unknown quantity so far as its origin is concerned, is killing cattle in at least 32 of the states of the Union, declares Dr. H. W. Schoening, U. S. Department of Agriculture veterinarian in charge of pathological studies.

No section of the country is free from it, since the states where it has been reported are distributed all over the map. It is not at all unlikely, Dr. Schoening added, that it may be occurring in other states but has not yet been reported from them because it has not been recognized.

Symptoms are described as including loss of weight and appetite, decrease in milk yield, premature dropping of calves, fever, and a thickening and inflammation of the skin. No drug treatment thus far attempted has been successful. Of animals contracting the disease, nearly 60 per cent die. It is a long and lingering affair, with the poor beasts dragging themselves around in an emaciated state sometimes for weeks or even months before they die.

One particularly marked symptom of X disease has become the basis of a more technical name, hyperkeratosis. This combination of Greek roots mean "overgrowth of horn." It does not, however, refer to the animals' horns but to the enormous thickening of the horny outer layer of the skin, which is thrown into heavy wrinkles and folds.

How hard X disease can hit cattle owners was disclosed in a survey just concluded in five states of the Southeast, conducted by four outstanding research men. In 26 herds, totaling over 4,000 head, more than 30 per cent of the cattle were affected, and nearly 60 per cent of these died. Losses were estimated at more than $110,000, or over $4,200 per herd. Beef cattle were much more frequently affected than dairy types.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-29-2004 BY 60267 uc/sml/gal/rca

100-93216-16

ENCLOSURE

[redacted]es Department of
Federal Bureau of Investigation
New York, New York

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
[illegible]osen
[illegible]Tracy
[illegible]an
Gurnea
[illegible]Mohr
[illegible]. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

November 8, 1948

Director, FBI

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;
HASKINS LABORATORIES, INC.;
SABOTAGE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to page 8 of the attached report of SA [redacted] on which [redacted] is reported to have stated that, so far as he knows, no branch of the Federal Government is concerned with the control, regulation or registration of laboratories which are allowed to have deadly bacteria under their control. This statement is being called to the attention of the Bureau as a matter of general interest in connection with the subject of biological warfare.

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The attached report reflects that the following persons have been reported as the principal employees of the Haskins Laboratories, Inc.:

[redacted]

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As mentioned in the attached report, [redacted] was the subject of [redacted] at which time the Bureau advised that [redacted] name was known to have been in [redacted] who was possibly engaged in Russian atomic espionage. [redacted] is also known to have received a letter from the Haskins Laboratories, 305 East 43rd Street, New York City, postmarked August 29, 1944.

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5 ENCL 0 In view of the above-mentioned Atomic Energy Applicant investigation of [redacted] and in view of the fact that he was presumably investigated for his position with the Office of Scientific Research and Development which,

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SE 28
RECORDED 69 100-93216-10
INDEXED 69
DEC 4 NO

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b7C

BW:DM
100-91131

DEC 15 1948 67

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nlw/bjs/pass
ON 7-29-2004

Letter to Director
NY file 100-91131

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

as mentioned in the attached report, he held in 1943, it is believed that the Bureau may be in possession of sufficient facts concerning him to evaluate his loyalty. It is believed that the facts contained in the attached report indicate that, if [redacted] loyalty has been established, he should be interviewed concerning the activities of his Laboratory, and any connections between his personnel and [redacted] b7C b6

OK Accordingly, the Bureau is requested to advise this office as to whether [redacted] should be interviewed regarding the above-mentioned matters. It is requested that the Bureau also furnish any pertinent information in its files concerning the three other principal employees of the Laboratory, together with instructions as to whether it is desired that any of them also be interviewed. b6 b7C

Very truly yours,

Edward Scheidt
EDWARD SCHEIDT
Special Agent in Charge

Encs. 5

cc NY 100-63169

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT NEW YORK

NY FILE NO. 100-91131 DM

REPORT MADE AT	DATE WHEN MADE	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE	REPORT MADE BY
NEW YORK	NOV 8 1948	8/24-27/48	[redacted] b6 b7C

TITLE	CHARACTER OF CASE
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; HASKINS LABORATORIES, INC.	SABOTAGE

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc/sw/sr/sjp
ON 7-29-04

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

- P -

DETAILS: This investigation is predicated upon the fact that, as has previously been reported to the Bureau, on July 1, 1947, a highly reliable and confidential informant advised [redacted]

ENCLOSURE

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: Edward Scheidt SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

RECORDED - 69

INDEXED - 69

COPIES OF THIS REPORT

5 - Bureau
4 - New York (1-97-908)

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

The indices of this office reflect that on August 17, 1942, [redacted] advised this office by letter that Article XXIII of the State Public Health Law requires the registration of places where cultures of pathogenic microorganisms and viruses are handled. She further advised that in May, 1942, an application was received for the

b6
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registration of the Haskins Laboratories, Inc., 305 East 43rd Street, New York City, under the above provision, and that, in accordance with the usual procedure in such cases,

b6
b7C

"Since the object of such an investigation would be the character and loyalty of the individuals concerned, a type of investigation that we are not prepared to make, I have communicated with the F.B.I. giving all the information that I possess."

[redacted] concluded his letter by referring the office of [redacted] to the FBI, in the belief that this office would undertake a loyalty check on the personnel of the Haskins Laboratories. In [redacted] requested the advice of this office as to whether she should issue the registration. By letter dated September 1, 1942, [redacted] was advised that this office had no information which would assist her in the matter referred to. The letter from this office crossed a second letter from [redacted] in which she stated that in the absence of a reply to her first letter, she was assuming that this office had no information that would indicate that cultures of pathogenic microorganisms or viruses maintained at the Haskins Laboratories, Inc., would represent a menace to the public health. She stated that, consequently, a registration number had been issued in accordance with the Public Health Law.

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It would appear from the above that [redacted] concerning whom the New York indices are negative, is the [redacted]

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b7C

The indices of this office contain the following additional information concerning the Haskins Laboratories:

On October 13, 1946, [redacted] concerning whom the New York indices are negative, advised this office that one [redacted]

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The indices of the New York Office reflect that one [redacted] reference

b6
b7C

With reference to persons mentioned above as being employed at the Haskins Laboratories in 1942, the indices of the indices of the New York Office reflected the following:

[redacted] b6 b7C

The Bureau advised that [redacted] who was possibly engaged in Russian atomic espionage, had [redacted] name and address in his personal address book. Investigation in 1947 in the New York area disclosed no derogatory information concerning [redacted] except that [redacted] from the Haskins Laboratories, , 305 East 43rd Street, postmarked August 29, 1944. b6 b7C

Confidential Informant [redacted]

[redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7D

The same source advised that the National Photo-Color Corporation of 305 East 43rd Street, was incorporated in New York in 1939, and is engaged in the manufacture of "one shot" color cameras.

The Credit Bureau of Greater New York disclosed that the old address of [redacted] and that the laboratory had offices in Boston and Schenectady. Its credit rating was "good". b6 b7C

"American Men of Science" reflects that Dr. HASKINS was with the National Defense Research Commission from 1940 to 1943. In 1943 he became executive assistant to the Chairman of the Commission. In 1943 he was Senior Liaison Officer with Great Britain in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 1530 P Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

The indices of the New York Office contain no references to the following persons employed at the Haskins Laboratories:

[redacted] b6 b7C

Confidential Informant [redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] and advise this office.

[redacted] stated that his records reflect that on September 5, 1945, the responsibility for registering non-clinical laboratories in New York City was transferred from New York State to his office. On that date, the State registration for the Haskins Laboratory (Number 415) was transferred to his office, where it was given City Registration Number 60, which it still bears, having been renewed in 1946, 1947 and 1948. He stated that only the most perfunctory investigation is made prior to registering a laboratory under the State law and that this is concerned with the ability of the laboratory personnel to handle bacteria, rather than with the loyalty of the personnel. He added that there are 58 non-clinical laboratories registered with him, these being school laboratories, private research laboratories, and industrial laboratories, all of which are entitled to have deadly germs under their control. [redacted] further stated that, so far as he knows, no branch of the Federal Government is concerned with the control, regulation or registration of laboratories which are

b6 b7C

allowed to have deadly bacteria under their control. However, he expressed the opinion that bacteriological warfare is not nearly as dangerous a threat as the public has been led to believe, and stated that he doubts if bacteria would have any substantial usefullness in modern warfare.

He stated that the investigation referred to in his letter of June 29, 1942, which has been quoted above, was conducted by [redacted] who had reported that the Laboratory was doing a combination of research work in bacteriology, bio-physics, bio-chemistry on animals, and the effect of radiation on living matter by means of x-rays, neutrons and protons. While the Laboratory was [redacted] b6 b7C

On the application for registration, dated June 15, 1945, the [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that he had deemed the Laboratory "peculiar" because of the following considerations:

1. The Laboratory claimed to be doing work involving the use of protons and neutrons, and yet none of the employees appears to be a competent nuclear physicist.

2. Why weren't the associates of the Laboratory recruited for work on the atom bomb during the war? What were they doing that was more vital to the war effort than the bomb?

3. The places in which they have associates located (General Electric, M.I.T., Physics Department of Harvard, and Memorial Hospital, New York City) are all concerned with research on atomic energy, directly or indirectly. With a small amount of equipment, they could find out much concerning the manufacturing process used in atomic bomb construction.

An individual in the office of [redacted] at the subject Laboratory was contacted under pretext, and it was ascertained that [redacted] was out of town. b6 b7C

- P E N D I N G -

LEADS

NEW YORK

At New York, N.Y.:

Will report the results of inquiries by the New York Office of the Veterans Administration as to what information is available in its files regarding subject organization.

Upon receipt of Bureau authority, will interview [redacted] for information regarding [redacted] During the interview, will attempt to ascertain whether the organization is working on classified contracts, and what its sources of income are. If [redacted] appears to be cooperative, will ascertain from him the nature of any dealings which he or his personnel might have had with [redacted]

b6
b7C

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

The Confidential Informants mentioned in the report of SA [redacted] dated November 8 , 1948 at New York are as follows:

[redacted]

G-2, Governor's Island,
New York City.

Office of the Army Chief of Staff
G-2, MDW
Washington, D. C.

b2
b6
b7C

[redacted]

Inspection and Investigation Service
Veterans Administration,
346 Broadway,
New York City.

100-93216-166X

CHANGED TO

100-355226-21X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-29-2004 BY 60267 uc/NCS/bjapaa

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: December 10, 1948

#337627

FROM : SAC, Boston

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE,
aka Biological Warfare; "BW"
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
(Bureau File ~~100-353654~~)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-18-92 BY 1048DKM/CAR

b6
b7C

Reference is made to the enclosed report of Special Agent [redacted] dated December 9, 1948 at Boston. It is noted that this file has previously been titled [redacted] INTERNAL SECURITY - R." The subject matter of the file, however, has always been bacteriological warfare. The title has been changed so that it may fit the subject matter of the report. The change has not been noted on the front page of the enclosed report inasmuch as to do so would reveal the identity of the principal source of information.

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It is noted further that this report has been prepared for dissemination to IDA and ONI in accordance with Bureau instructions. The report, as prepared, is severable. It is noted that the last section deals with the possibility that BW propaganda originally emanated with approval of Camp Detrick. Although Boston copies have been made for ONI and G-2 locally, they will not be distributed until December 20, 1948 in the event the Bureau wishes to delete this section or otherwise revise it.

It is to be further noted that [redacted] has most confidentially advised

[redacted]

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b7D

100-93216-162

[redacted]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

The foregoing information should not be disseminated to ONI and G-2 as it was furnished the Bureau Agent on the express stipulation that it would not be disseminated.

The instant case has been closed because it is felt that the activities of [redacted] in this field can best be covered in the future through the reports concerning the individual and the organization emanating from Boston and New York.

b6
b7C

BSG:MCG
100-21199

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CONFIDENTIAL

Originated at: BOSTON File No. 100-21199 MCG

Made at:	Date Made:	Period:	Report Made By:
BOSTON, MASS.	12-9-48	12/1-5/48	[redacted] b6 b7C

Title
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE,
aka Biological Warfare, "BW"

Character of Case
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
REFER 5-IS

Synopsis of Facts: Boston Confidential Informants, scientists in the field, have noted the extensive propaganda campaign, on local, national and international levels, concerned with Bacteriological Warfare. Said informants, familiar with work at Camp Detrick, Maryland, advise that propaganda is misleading and inaccurate from scientific standpoint; that it is apparently predicated upon ulterior motives. One ulterior motive could be to aid the Soviet Union, and another could be to increase War Department appropriations. Facts available tending to substantiate both theories recounted herein. Included are summaries of the activity in this field on the part of the American Association of Scientific Workers, the Arts, Sciences and Professions Council, the RCA, the Federation of American Scientists, the Society of American Biologists, the United Nations, the International Congress for Experimental Cytology and the International Microbiological Congress.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

1cc ONI, IDA, AFI 1-26-49 EHMcard

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

8.18.92 CLASSIFIED BY: 104 SPCM/LMK DECLASSIFY ON: ADR #337627

Reference; Bureau file 100-353654.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7CI/RDS ON 1/16/03

APPR. & FWD. SAC (970329) SE 22

Copies:
5 - Bureau (Encls.)
2 - New York (Encls.)(Info.)(1 NY 1[redacted])
1 - Philadelphia (Encls.)(Info.)
1 - Washington Field (Info.)
1 - San Francisco (Info.)
1 - Baltimore (Info.)
1 - Indianapolis (Info.)
1 - ONI, Boston
1 - IDA, Boston
4 - Boston

[redacted] b6 b7C

RECORDED INDEXED - 23 167 INDEXED - 109

RETURN TO INDEX DESK

BOS. 100-21199

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BOS. 100-21199

DETAILS:

CONFIDENTIAL

INTRODUCTION

The instant report is predicated upon information furnished by [redacted]

[redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] point out that in the past two years, it appears to them that there has been conducted an extensive and at times terrifying propaganda campaign concerned with research in the field of Bacteriological Warfare, sometimes called Biological Warfare, and commonly referred to as BW. [redacted] note that from the scientific standpoint, the propaganda had been inaccurate. Neither individual knows of a competent authority in the field who subscribes to the type of propaganda which will be described in detail below. The informants are, therefore, of the opinion that this propaganda has been issued with an ulterior motive, but exactly what this motive is is a matter of conjecture.

[redacted] notes that the BW propaganda is of a nature which would cause anyone who accepted it as true to believe that there existed a weapon as devastating as atomic energy; that the same propagandists have in some instances declared that Soviet scientists have gone further in the field than the United States and allied scientists. This would lead to an easily drawn inference that in the event of hostilities between the U.S. and the USSR, the Russians are equipped with a weapon as damaging as the atomic bomb. Such a conclusion would be a basis for a further propaganda campaign that "peace at any price" would be a profitable and desirable thing. b2 b7D

[redacted] also notes that if this propaganda campaign is not inspired from abroad, then it might well be found that it has been initiated with the approval of the Department of the Army for the purpose of convincing the American people that there is a race in this field of research between the U.S. and the USSR. Such an opinion, if prevalent, would ordinarily result in the public's demanding large appropriations for the Department of the Army for research in this field.

[redacted] offered the first theory and of his own initiative pointed out that if the propaganda campaign were designed by Soviet sources, it should logically take the following five steps:

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1. A subtle propaganda campaign allegedly explaining the operation of BW and in so doing arouse the antipathy of the public against this weapon because of its horrible effects. Such a campaign would be most successful if conducted through scientific journals, professional societies and the public press.

2. The initiation of actions on the part of the United Nations to investigate and control BW, which would further heighten the publicity and on a worldwide basis.

3. The initiation of a Congressional investigation for its great publicity value.

4. The establishment of an organization prepared to sabotage the United States by putting BW to use on a non-publicized basis.

5. The conducting of a "field trial" whereat a germ of non-lethal character would be spread to measure the effect on production, transportation, communication, as a result of a large number of people being hospitalized or otherwise indisposed.

It is noted that the outline furnished above by [redacted] was supplied prior to a number of the incidents which will be enumerated below and which would appear to substantiate this master plan.

In January, 1946, Mr. GEORGE W. MERCK, Special Consultant for BW to the War Department, delivered a report to the Secretary of War. From it is drawn the following definition of Biological Warfare:

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"Biological Warfare may be defined as the use of bacteria, fungi, viruses, rickettsies and toxic agents from living organisms (as distinguished from synthetic chemicals used as gases or poisons) to produce death of disease in men, animals or plants."

[redacted] notes that in the statements made by such people as Dr. THEODOR ROSEBURY, the public is told that one ounce of a deadly bacteria, if dropped into a reservoir, would be sufficient to poison the largest part of a city using the reservoir. [redacted] points out that this statement is at best only theoretically true. In order for the bacteria to function in the manner described, the following elements would be necessary: There would have to be an even distribution of the poison throughout the whole reservoir, an almost impossible mixing job.

The bacteria, a living organism, has a short life and it would be necessary that the properly mixed water be consumed within a relatively short period of time. In the average reservoir it takes one month for the water to reach the tap, and this period of time is too long for the bacteria to survive. Further, the statement is made on the presumption that chlorination would have no effect on the bacteria, and this presumption has been proven in most cases to be entirely false. Finally, the statement further presumes that the bacteria would be unaffected by the saliva of the consumer, and experiments have proven that in most instances the opposite is true.

Similarly, with reference to airbourne infection, the propagandists, attempting to frighten the public, ignore the curative powers of the sun which destroy the life of the bacteria.

[redacted] notes that the potentially greatest value of B. from a military standpoint is its propaganda value as a psychological weapon of fear in time of war.

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PROPAGANDA CONCERNING BW CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA IN 1946

The first disclosure of the nature and extent of research into BW came in the form of an Army press release dated January 3, 1946. It was a report by GEORGE W. MERCK, Special Consultant for BW to the Secretary of War. This report is summarized below:

BW was not unknown in World War I but was only employed on a limited scale. In the years between November 11, 1918 and September 3, 1939, the War Department gave serious consideration to the dangers of this weapon. In the Fall of 1941, the Secretary of War requested the National Academy of Sciences to make a survey of BW. In February, 1942, the NAS Committee submitted a report in which it found that BW was a potentiality and urged that steps be taken in defense. A War Research Service was organized in the Summer of 1942 under the direction of the above-named MERCK. It was originally attached to the Federal Security Agency and worked in collaboration with the Medical Corps of the Armed Forces, the Chemical Warfare Service of the Army. It maintained liaison with these agencies, with the U. S. Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, [redacted] ONI, G-2, and FBI. As the war progressed, the WRS developed an effective liaison with British and Canadian scientists and extended its operations for protective measures into Hawaii, Caribbean area, the Canal Zone, and by the conclusion of hostilities operated everywhere U. S. troops did. b2

In November of 1942, in an effort to strengthen defense, it was decided to endeavor to develop weapons which might be used against us. The Chemical Warfare Service of the Army collaborated with the WRS in establishing Camp Detrick, Frederick, Maryland. From there on, approximately April, 1943, the work grew in leaps and bounds. The parent research and pilot plant remained at Camp Detrick. Field testing facilities were established in Mississippi. A plant designed for the investigation of larger scale production was begun in Indiana in 1944 and, finally, a large field testing facility was established in Utah. A wide varity of fungi, bacteria, etc., was tested, refined and developed.

The report then goes on to describe in generic language some of the results of the research in BW. It is noted that the report does not speak of specific weapons, nor does it portray in horror the use of these alleged weapons. It is a semi-documentary recital of the history of an efficient wartime agency.

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[redacted] points out that this report was accepted by the public with more than the usual interest that a report of scientific research ordinarily developed, but that it did not cause any great alarm in the country.

In May of 1946, "Collier's" a national weekly, published an article on BW written by a feature writer named SIDNEY SHALLET. This article was of a strictly propaganda nature, according to [redacted] and the informant has developed some information tending [redacted]

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[redacted] advises that their efforts were unsuccessful at this time for two reasons: (1) The superior authorities at Columbis University, College of Physicians and Surgeons threatened to dismiss the authors from its faculty and (2) they were not then able to obtain the clearance desired from the War Department.

Later in May, 1946, GEORGE W. MERCK made a speech under the auspices of the Westinghouse Research Foundation in which he paraphrased the report referred to above in popular language. A photostatic copy of this speech, as furnished by [redacted] is enclosed for the Bureau.

On November 1, 1946, the President of the New York State Association of Public Health Laboratories held a meeting at Albany, New York. The presiding officer, ERNEST WITEBSKY, in his opening remarks, pointed out the dangers in BW and called upon his organization to ascertain the horrible facts so as to be able to prepare a defense for the citizens of New York. [redacted] is of the opinion that WITEBSKY's remarks were of a "scare propaganda nature" and he has classified WITEBSKY as a bacteriologist with about the same qualifications of a New York City "White Wing." A photographic copy of WITEBSKY's remarks, as obtained by [redacted] is being furnished the Bureau as an enclosure. b2 b7D

PROPAGANDA in 1947.

The Rosebury Report and the Journal of Immunology.

All of the information contained under this heading was obtained from - Boston [redacted] unless otherwise and specifically noted. b2 b7D

The "Journal of Immunology" is a monthly publication of the American Society of Immunologists. The organization is the most distinguished in

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its professional field and its field is directly concerned with the subject matter of instant report. The Journal is regarded internationally as the outstanding scientific organ in this field of scientific research. The subtitle of the Journal is "Virus Research and Experimental Chemotherapy."

The editors of the Journal in the Spring of 1947, were:

JACQUES J. ABRONFENBRENNER
JOHN F. ENDERS
ROBERT GREEN
SANFORD B. HOOKER
KARL F. MEYER

The associate editors were:

JOSEPH D. ARONSON
OSWALD E. AVERY
STANHOPE BAYNE-JONES
GEORGE P. BERRY
FRANCIS G. BLAKE
WILLIAM C. BOYD
PAUL R. CANNON
M. RUIZ CASTANEDA
ALPHONSE R. DOCHEZ
C. E. DOLMAN
THOMAS FRANCIS, JR.
DONALD T. FRASER
W. M. HAMMON
M. HEIDELBERGER
ARTHUR P. LOCKE
STUART MUDD
HOWARD J. MUELLER
A. M. PAPPENHEIMER, JR.
THOMAS M. RIVERS
R. O. ROBLIN, JR.
A. SORDELLI
W. H. TALIAFERRO
WILLIAM S. TILLETT
A. B. WALZER
ALFRED J. WEIL
A. S. WIENER

The managing editor at that time was ARTHUR F. COCA, of Pearl River, New York.

The normal policy of the Journal called for approval of a majority of the foregoing in the event a controversial article were being considered for publication.

The May, 1947 issue of the Journal of Immunology contained the Rosebury Report on BW in full. The issue was released simultaneously with a meeting of the National Executive Committee of the American Association of Scientific Workers at Chicago, Illinois. The latter organization made a national press release from Chicago featuring this report. The two releases were further timed with the National Convention of the American Association of Experimental Biologists, a distinguished professional group who are the leaders in that particular field of research,

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and one of whose national officers was at that time also the National President of the AAScW, i.e. Dr. MAURICE VISSCHER. It is further noted that of the foregoing officers of the Journal of Immunology, Dr. STUART MUDD, of the University of Pennsylvania, is also a national officer of the AAScW.

The publication of the Rosebury Report by the Journal of Immunology was greeted with cries of anger by some of the associate editors of the Journal, Notably Dr. KENNETH F. GOODNER, of the Jefferson Medical School in Philadelphia, and Dr. JOHN HOWARD MUELLER, Head of the Department of Immunology of the Harvard Medical School, were offended by the publication in a distinguished journal of the article which they regarded as "pseudo scientific" and unworthy of a Hearst weekly. They undertook a campaign to determine who had been responsible for the publication of this article in the Journal of Immunology and at times suggested that the managing editor, ARTHUR COCA, resign because the May, 1947, issue was a clear demonstration of his incompetence.

From the series of charges and countercharges which resulted in this internal fight within the organization staff, the informant has been able to product the following facts:

The Rosebury Report was first prepared by ROSEBURY and KABAT in 1943 on the basis of preliminary research conducted under Government auspices through late 1942. The report was prepared as propaganda to be used by the War Department when and if necessary as a fear psychological weapon. It was at that time and through 1944 and 1945 reviewed by many prominent scientists as a secret document for its fear propaganda value. In April of 1946 it was presented to the editorial staff of the Journal of Immunology for publication. Dr. WILLIARD C. RAPPELEYE, Dean of the Columbia University, College of Physicians and Surgeons, with which the authors were affiliated, stopped publication by threatening to sever the faculty relationship of ROSEBURY and KABAT. The authors then undertook a campaign to change Dean RAPPELEYE's mind and were successful when they secured the approval of an Army official. Said approval will be cited below.

On January 13, 1947, they resubmitted the article to Dr. COCA together with a cover letter which noted that the article as submitted had been approved by the War Department and that no changes could be made therein without losing this approval.

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Dr. COCA then ordered the manuscript published and subsequently claimed to have had it approved by Drs. ENDERS, HOOKER, HEIDELBERGER, WEIL, DOCHEZ and MEYER, mentioned above. This does not appear to have been a completely true statement, as will be demonstrated below.

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eriodicals. It was learned that the article was first suggested for inclusion in the Journal of Immunology to the publisher by Dr. ARTHUR J. WEIL. It was suggested on January 13, 1947, and the article was

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actually furnished to the publisher on February 19, 1947. [redacted]

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In addition, the "Press Alliance of New York City" received permission to distribute the Rosebury Report in its entirety throughout Continental Europe. At a subsequent time, Dr. ROSEBURY withheld his consent to the latter distribution.

[redacted] also offered his professional opinion that as a scientific work, the Rosebury Report lacked the fineness of character which would have enabled it to be published in book form with a view towards slow sale over a long period of time.

The part played by the War Department in the publication of this article will be referred to in the last section of this report.

The Rosebury Report and the American Association of Scientific Workers.

As indicated above, the Journal of Immunology published the Rosebury Report simultaneously with a meeting of the National Executive Committee of AASW, being held in Chicago on May 22, 1947. This meeting also timed with a meeting of the American Association of Experimental Biologists.

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The American Association of Scientific Workers has, in the words of Boston [redacted] "literally picked up the ball" dropped by the Journal of Immunology and has since "continued to run with it."

It can be noted herein that THEODORE ROSEBURY is an active and leading member of the New York Branch of the American Association of Scientific

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Workers. His comments concerning BW had circulated among the officers and membership of that organization prior to the May, 1947 publication in the Journal of his report.

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The AAScW endeavors, according to Boston [redacted] to publish a monthly "New Letter," which is circulated to its membership and interested affiliated organizations on a national basis. The issue of April, 1947, is numbered 3-47 and contains in part a report submitted by Dr. STUART MUDD. The report was in answer to a question propounded of Dr. MUDD by the National Executive Committee of AAScW, "Is control of BW feasible?" Dr. MUDD's partial report is quoted in its entirety as published in the aforementioned News Letter:

"With regard to BW, I do not feel that rigid controls are feasible. The equipment is such as is used in industrial fermentations, products of vaccines, penicillin, etc. The type of research is hardly distinguishable from necessary research in public health, hospital and medical school laboratories. I do not think, therefore, that the problem of BW is susceptible to direct attack by an organization such as the American Association of Scientific Workers. I think the implications of BW would intensify our efforts toward a reasonable peace and against warfare and the things that tend toward warfare. Perhaps the most important of these are whatever correctives may be applied to the current anti-Red hysteria and efforts towards relationships of friendly rivalry and cooperation between the peoples of the USSR and the U.S."

The article then offers the following comment on MUDD's report:

"His prescription is a difficult one to secure. The local units of AAScW can undoubtedly perform a service by arranging for radio broadcasts and speeches before various groups on the subject of BW and its hazards."

In their comments in the press release of the Rosebury Report at Chicago, the national officers of the AAScW made the following statements:

1. That the Rosebury Report was the "Smythe Report of BW."

2. "The preparation of this report was one of a number of projects initiated in 1942 by the AAScW to make the best possible use of scientific skills and ideas in the effective prosecution of the war."

3. The authors prepared the Rosebury Report as private citizens and voluntarily withheld publication during the war.

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4. ROSEBURY was identified as the Chief of a research unit at Camp Detrick who was awarded a decoration for exceptional civilian service by the War Department. KABAT was identified as a consultant to Dr. MARTIN H. BOLDT while a medical student at Columbia and as one who had served at Camp Detrick as a member of the Army Medical Corps.

The press release further noted that the Rosebury Report had been approved by the War Department; that it did not take into account available information developed through wartime research because such matter was either classified or developed independently of the authors; that it skipped the common scourges and referred to but thirty germs and carriers. The press release further noted that the report could have been written by anyone, but was not.

Immediately after the press release in Chicago in May of 1947, Boston [redacted] advises that the AAScW began a campaign to widely publicize the Rosebury Report. This campaign was created with the intention of arousing the public to a great fear of this weapon and to a further demand that some means be instituted by which it, and research concerning it, could be controlled on a national and international level. Press releases were obtained in the principal papers in the United States. b2 b7D

In all this activity, the principal actor was Dr. THEODOR ROSEBURY. He was aided by Dr. HARRY GRUNDFEST, DR. MELBA PHILLIPS and DR. MAURICE VISSCHER. All of these persons are prominent in the American Association of Scientific Workers. [redacted] b6 b7C

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Information furnished by the New York Field Division reflects that Dr. THEODOR ROSEBURY is employed as Associate Professor of Bacteriology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New York City. He was born in England in August, 1904 and is believed to be a naturalized citizen of the United States. During 1943-1945 he was a Research Bacteriologist at Camp Detrick, Maryland. He has been associated with the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, which has been declared within the purview of Executive Order 9835 by the Attorney General. He has further been associated with the Consumers Union, which has been cited as a Communist front organization by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as of March 29, 1944. He has been an active leader in the Science Division of the Progressive Citizens of America. He was one of the founders of the American-Soviet Science Society, an outgrowth of the Science Division of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship.

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The latter organization was declared within the purview of Executive Order 9835 by the Attorney General. He is a member of the Association of New York Scientists, a division of the FAS. He has also been affiliated with the New York Conference on Inalienable Rights and the Schappes Defense Committee, both of which were cited as Communist front organizations by the HCUA on March 29, 1944.

As a result of the publicity emanating from Chicago in May of 1947, ROSEBURY undertook a lecture tour of the United States and his sole topic was BW. This tour, according to [redacted] resulted in other organizations undertaking a campaign to educate the public on the dangers of BW and to demand some means of controlling research in this field. b2 b7D

[redacted] advised that in the Summer of 1947, ROSEBURY delivered a lecture on BW at the Marine Biological Laboratory, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, through arrangements perfected [redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] furnished a copy of the "Monthly News Bulletin" of the Philadelphia Branch of the AASciW for November, 1947. This bulletin contains a news item reflecting that on October 3, 1947, under the auspices of the branch, ROSEBURY delivered a lecture on BW. The Chairman of this meeting was Dr. STUART MUDD. The news item comments that Dr. ROSEBURY found the only defense against BW to be the abolition of war. The article then reads: "Dr. ROSEBURY concluded by asking the question, "Why did the UN discussions on atomic warfare end fruitlessly?' His answer suggested that discussion of BW would have had the same fate as the atomic energy discussions because both the Baruch and Scheson reports were based on the needs and desires of a capitalist world, so that the controls of these reports were more harmonious to a capitalist world than to a socialist world. But, it must be remembered that one-half of the world is no longer capitalist. Therefore, we cannot approach peace as a technical problem alone. We must consider it also as a political and economic problem. Until these problems are resolved, we are not likely to have peace." b2 b7D

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The October, 1947, issue of the National News Letter of the AASciW, being numbered 5-47, contained an article entitled, "BW - An Infectious Route to Peace." The article initially described BW as a weapon thoroughly as efficient as the atomic bomb.

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It next described the Rosebury Report as the first authoritative statement on the potency of this weapon and noted that until the Rosebury Report the U. S. War Department had "wrapped a cloak of absolute secrecy around its experiments with BW." Thereafter, the article defined Psittacosis as the most dangerous fluid in the world. It was alleged that one ounce of this fluid properly distributed would account for a half billion human deaths.

Continuing, the article noted that the publication of the Rosebury Report and its subsequent publicity under AAScW sponsorship had resulted in strong reactions throughout the world. It referred to two resolutions adopted by international bodies, which will be described below. The next paragraph of the story stated that the AAScW, together with the people of the world, demanded international control of this weapon and concluded with the item that the organization had performed its duty in submitting a memorandum to the United Nations which pointed out the dangers and called for the necessary international control.

On December 9, 1947, the Boston-Cambridge Branch of the AAScW sponsored a public lecture by Dr. ROSEBURY on BW. The lecture was given at the Littauer Center of Harvard University.

[redacted] were present at the lecture. [redacted]

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The public meeting at the Littauer Center was attended by 150 to 200 persons, according to the three informants who were present. KENDELL FURRY presided. ROSEBURY was introduced by FURRY and began his talk with a general discussion of the types of bacteria used in BW. He emphasized the viruses which would be easily disseminated, were quickly effective and hard to control. He pointed out that BW was a desirable means of warfare, more so than atomic bombs, because BW destroyed human life but not property. Thus, the conquering nation using BW is enabled to take over a physically sound plant without the usual problems connected with prisoners of war or the other human elements.

HARLOW SHAPLEY arose from the audience at this point to interrupt the speaker with his own comment. SHAPLEY told ROSEBURY that with reference to his foregoing description of a BW war, ROSEBURY had forgotten an important point. According to SHAPLEY, the sole aim of a warring nation in the modern world is to eliminate a competing factor on the face of the earth. Therefore, in SHAPLEY's judgment, a nation such as the United States would not care whether the physical facilities of the enemy were left intact so long as the disrupting force to the American ideal had been eliminated.

ROSEBURY then expressed regret at the failure of the United States and Russia to reach political accord and warned that the entire world could be devastated in any future war. He felt that the U. S. proposals on the control of atomic energy were inadequate and that the U. S. foreign policy left little chance for peace.

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ROSEBURY then developed his main thesis. He urged the membership of the B-C Branch of the AAScW to create public opinion which would force the United Nations to take necessary steps to establish international control of BW. A question period followed.

The Bureau is being furnished as an enclosure with this report an alleged transcript of the remarks of ROSEBURY and the public question period which followed. This was furnished through an intermediate source by ROSEBURY to [redacted] The New York Division is being furnished with a summary of ROSEBURY's remarks made up from notes taken by a representative of [redacted] who was present at this lecture. It is noted that these documents do not substantially differ, although the photographic copy being furnished New York is less detailed than that furnished the Bureau. It is further noted that both of these items are concerned with the actual workings of BW from a scientific standpoint and do not develop the political aspects to the extent which [redacted] state that these items were developed as they understood the lecture. b2 b7D

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The meeting of December 9 was followed by a front-page story in the Boston HERALD of December 10 which emphasized ROSEBURY's attitude of "striking scientists" in Government research. An editorial was also published which criticized ROSEBURY severely for his remarks and specifically pointed out that scientists in foreign lands were unable to strike; that this was particularly true in the Soviet Union, which he had obliquely defended. It suggested that ROSEBURY, if a competent bacteriologist, would do well to stick to his own field and avoid the specialized fields of social science.

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indicating that ROSEBURY has made other appearances publicly under the sponsorship of the AASCW. Informant, however, could provide no specific information definitely describing the time, place, or circumstances under which these alleged appearances were made.

The Federation of American Scientists and the Rosebury Report.

It is noted that ROSEBURY is also a member of the Association of New York Scientists, a New York City division of the Federation of American Scientists. It is to be further noted that the Federation of American Scientists is largely composed of people interested in the development of atomic energy and the problems relevant thereto.

The source of all the information contained under this heading in the absence of specific indication to the contrary, is [redacted]

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[redacted] has furnished two issues of the "News Letter" published by the Association of New York Scientists on a monthly basis. These issues are dated March 17 and August 25, 1947, and are numbered 12 and 13 in Volume 2. Both issues dedicate the largest portion of their space to forecasting and then subsequently reporting the lecture given by ROSEBURY on BW under the auspices of this organization at the Horace Mann Auditorium of Columbia University on August 5, 1947. Interim bulletins published by the same group but in mimeographed rather than lithographed form, dated July 22 and August 12, 1947, lend further publicity to ROSEBURY's speech. A review of these fails to reflect that ROSEBURY developed anything additional to his speech in Boston.

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[redacted] furnished a copy of the Cornell University Weekly Calendar dated October 25, 1947, being number 6 in Volume 39. This reflected that on the evening of October 28, 1947, ROSEBURY again gave his lecture on BW before the Cornell Association of Scientists. The lecture was given in the Memorial Room of the Willard Straight Hall. [redacted] further advised that a further lecture under the auspices of an FAS subdivision in Albany, New York, had been planned for two weeks prior to the Cornell meeting. The meeting was canceled when a member of the Society of American Bacteriologists, who happened to be in Albany at the time, threatened to attend and publicly disclose ROSEBURY as a "phony."

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The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is the national organ of the FAS. In Volume 3, Issue No. 12, dated December, 1947, at page 363, the bulletin devoted a considerable amount of space to the activities of the AAScW in attempting to publicize BW and particularly in their efforts to develop an interest in this matter in the UN. Accompanying the article there was published a complete bibliography prepared by the AAScW concerning BW.

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The Arts, Sciences and Professions Council of the Progressive Citizens of America, and the Rosebury Report.

As indicated above, ROSEBURY has been an active member of the Arts, Sciences and Professions Council of the Progressive Citizens of America. [redacted] has furnished a pamphlet distributed by this organization which sets forth its aims and purposes and in which ROSEBURY is described as one of the seven principal sponsors of the science division of this group.

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The AIMS and the Rosebury Report

As indicated above, ROSEBURY is a member and sponsor, according to his own statement, of the New York Chapter of the Association of Internes and Medical Students.

On December 29, 1947, ROSEBURY appeared at a meeting of the Chicago Branch of this organization to lecture on BW. The lecture occurred while he was in Chicago to attend the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. [redacted] was present and noted that the Rosebury lecture and AIMS were not referred to in the AAAS catalog program. The Rosebury lecture was delivered in the main lounge of the University of Illinois Medical School on South Wood Street, Chicago, Illinois. In addition to the medical students present, ROSEBURY was [redacted]

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[redacted] notes that in substance ROSEBURY's talk is identical to that given in Boston with the exception that he "pulled his punches." In the question period which followed, SHAPLEY indicated to ROSEBURY and the audience that he felt that ROSEBURY had pulled his punches. ROSEBURY in response indicated that he was fearful of criticism by the HCUA or some other body on a charge that he had violated certain rules of secrecy. SHAPLEY told those present never to be concerned about the HCUA or other bodies; that he had personally handled them without difficulty on the simple defense statement that freedom of science justified everything.

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A summary of ROSEBURY's lecture in Chicago was published in "Interne", monthly organ of the AIMS in its February, 1948 issue.

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The Society of American Bacteriologists and the Rosebury Report

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The Society of American Bacteriologists, according to [redacted] is the outstanding organization in this field of scientific research from the professional standpoint.

On May 15, 1947, the Society had a General Business Meeting, an annual event. At this meeting, Dr. STUART MUDD, referred to above, introduced a resolution that the Society of American Bacteriologists do condemn development and/or use of BW and, further, that the Society calls upon all Federal and international (UN) authority to control the research and use of said weapon. A committee was appointed by the President of the Society, Dr. THOMAS FRANCIS, JR., M.D., of the University of Michigan School of Public Health. The committee was to prepare a resolution and to recommend adoption or non-adoption at the next General Meeting of the Society. The only member of the committee who attempted to form the resolution and who thought it was necessary was Dr. MUDD. The other members of the committee felt that the resolution smacked of political activity and not of the scientific research approach to which the organization was dedicated. Accordingly, no action was taken by the committee and it was dissolved at the next General Business Meeting with a verbal report that the passage of events had rendered such action on the part of the organization both unwise and unnecessary.

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THE UNITED NATIONS AND BW

The New York Times on October 4, 1947, carried a lengthy story reflecting that on that date Dr. IGNATZ ZLOTOWSKI, Polish delegate to the UN Committee on Atomic Energy, had introduced a resolution at the request of the American Association of Scientific Workers which called upon the UN to start immediate study of BW. The ultimate objective of the study would be to arrange for international control of BW through the UN Committee on Atomic Energy. Together with this appeal for action, the UN Committee was furnished with a copy of the Rosebury Report.

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[redacted] regards it as at least unusual that American citizens concerned with an international problem should make their representations to an international body through the representative of an alien government rather than their own.

A copy of the memorandum on BW presented to the UN by the AASc[illegible] is being furnished the Bureau as an enclosure with this report. It is noted that this copy contains a bibliography on BW and the latter is identical with that published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists of December, 1947.

[redacted]

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On May 13-15, 1948, the National Research Council's subcommittee sponsored a conference at San Francisco, California on UNESCO. The purpose was to develop U. S. aims in this regard. [redacted] on this conference and furnished a copy t[redacted] This report reads in part as follows:

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[redacted] advises that ELBERT KABAT introduced a resolution condemning BW as a perversion of science before the International Congress of Experimental Cytology at Stockholm, Sweden in July of 1947. The resolution was passed by acclamation and again adopted when the society changed its name to "The International Society for Cell Biology." The resolution further called for the establishment of a joint international committee under the direction of the ISCB and the International Association of Microbiologists (IAMB), said committee to offer itself as a technical advisory body to UNESCO. When a similar resolution was offered by STUART MUDD to the IAMB, that body decided that the only real function of their organization was to strongly condemn BW on moral grounds. Sir ALEXANDER FLEMING was instructed to and did draft such a resolution for the IAMB which condemned B. as barbaric and urged every member to do all in his power to suppress it. FLEMING's report was passed by acclamation again at the International Congress of Microbiology and again by the General Assembly of the International Union of Biological Societies, both of which held international conventions at Copenhagan in July of 1947. The text of all these resolutions was released to the press by UNESCO Headquarters in Paris and the news stories concerning them were carried in the Sunday New York Times for the last Sunday of July, 1947.

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The Boston Herald for November 21, 1948, carried a news story datelined Paris, November 20 (AP). The story quoted remarks of ALEXEI PAVLOV of the USSR made during a debate on human rights in the UN Assembly Social Committee. PAVLOV was quoted as follows:

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"In the United States science serves the interest of militaristic classes. In America, the best intellectual forces are ordered to create the most aggressive forms of weapons against all humanity, including women and children. One cannot read without ire and indignation that American scientists are seeking means of poisoning one hundred and eighty million Russian people. I tell you we feel ire and indignation."

The AP dispatch noted that PAVLOV did not quote the source of his material.

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POSSIBILITY THAT BW PROPAGANDA INITIALLY INSTIGATED BY WAR DEPARTMENT

In the introduction of this report it was noted that [redacted] expressed the opinion that perhaps one ulterior motive of the propaganda concerning BW might well be found in the War Department. As indicated, the informant stated that it was entirely possible that the Department of the Army might wish to create the impression that there was a "race on" between the United States and the USSR in this field and that such a feeling might encourage public support for increased Army appropriations in this field of research.

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ENCLOSURES

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TO BUREAU:

Photographic copies of each of the following documents:

1. "Peacetime Implications of BW" by GEORGE W. MERCK.

2. "Our Responsibilities in the Prevention of BW," - ERNEST LITEBSKY.

[redacted]

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8. Original of a hectographed memorandum on BW presented to UN by AASc. dated September 26, 1947 and including bibliography on BW.

TO NEW YORK

1. Summary of remarks made by Dr. ROSEBURY at Cambridge on December 9, 1947, [redacted]

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To PHILADELPHIA

[redacted]

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ALTHOUGH COPIES HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED FOR ONI AND G-2, NO DISTRIBUTION WILL BE MADE UNTIL AFTER JANUARY 1, 1948, SO THAT THE BUREAU MAY BE AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO WITHHOLD SAME OR ALTER THE LAST SECTION. IT IS NOTED THAT THE REPORT WAS PREPARED FOR DISTRIBUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS.

- C L O S E D -

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MEMORANDUM AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DATA

ON BACTERIAL WARFARE

Presented to the United Nations General Assembly by
the American Association of Scientific Workers on
September 26, 1947

The American Association of Scientific Workers sends you a copy of its Memorandum to the UN General Assembly so that you can become informed about an extremely important development in the social relations of science — Bacterial Warfare (BW).

The American Association of Scientific Workers has made the problem of BW its business for a number of reasons.

(1) The basic wartime approach to BW was formulated by Drs. ~~Rosebury~~ Theodor Rosebury and Kabat as apart of the War Efforts activity of the N.Y. Branch, AASoW. Their report to the Government, submitted as an AASoW project, was an important element in developing our country's BW program.

(2) While the dangers of Atomic warfare (AW) have been widely recognised, the policy of secrecy on science has kept the public ignorant of BW weapons, — perhaps even more dangerous than AW.

(3) The difficulty, or even impossibility of controlling BW pointed out in the Memorandum highlights the essential fact that prevention of war itself should be the approach to all weapons of mass destruction. Thus atomic weapons become only one class in a large and deadly number of mass weapons.

The AASoW therefore advocates outlawing and abolition of all weapons of mass destruction, general disarmament, and a return to friendly relations between our country and Russia as the conditions which would prevent another world war in which weapons of mass destruction would inevitably be used.

Although the recent session of the General Assembly could not find time to consider mass weapons, it is expected that the UN Atomic Energy Commission will take up the BW problem. O r Memorandum has already stimulated an article by Admiral Zackarias (USNR) - "The Absolute Weapon" (United Nations World, Nov., 1947) which calls for a special session of the General Assembly to consider outlawing of mass weapons and general disarmament. Following our release of the Rosebury-Kabat report on May 19, 1947, editorials in both the N.Y.Times and Herald-Tribune called for outlawing of war itself.

The bibliography appended to the Memorandum gives general references and a comprehensive list of recent technical literature. The most complete statement on BW is the Report of Drs. Rosebury and Kabat (Ref. 6: also available from Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore at $1 per copy.) We urge you to read it and to initiate action in your community as follows:

1. To apprise people of the dangers of BW.

2. To stress that prevention of their use will depend upon:

   a) outlawing of all weapons of mass destruction

   b) a rapprochement between the USA and USSR

   c) building the UN in such a way as to abolish war itself

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-19-92 BY 1048D kmbff

The American Association of Scientific Workers respectfully submits to the United Nations the following material dealing with bacterial warfare: (I) A statement of the problem of bacterial warfare as a threat to international peace; (II) Suggestions for the action by organs of the United Nations: (III) A classified and annoted bibliography of general references on bacterial warfare; and (IV) A technical bibliography.

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

Bacterial (or biological) warfare comprises the use in war of pathogenic bacteria, fungi, protozoa, rickettsiae, viruses, and other agents of infectious disease, of their toxic products, and of certain other organic chemical poisons (animal or plant toxins, plant "hormones"), intended to kill or incapacitate human beings or economically useful animals, or to destroy or damage food crops or other useful plants. Bacterial warfare is known (reference 1) to have been under investigation and development by Germany and Japan, and as a joint project by the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. The American Bacterial warfare project is continuing (24).

As of Jan. 3, 1946, (1), wartime studies of bacterial warfare in American, British and Canadian laboratories were officially stated to have shown "that this type of warfare cannot be discounted." Since bacterial warfare in its modern form has not actually been used in a military operation, no precise estimate of its effectiveness can be made. Published data that might indicate the potential activity of its agents are scanty. It has been suggested (18) that botulinus toxin, as crystallized by American bacterial warfare scientists (26,30), contains per gram about 7,000,000 lethal doses for man. Being a poison, not an agent of self-propagating disease, this substance would be expected to be less potent than infectious material. The hemolytic streptococcus, a common pathogenic bacterium not considered important as a bacterial warfare agent (6) would probably be many times as active against man on a weight basis.* A routine unpurified preparation (chick embryo yolk sac suspension) of psittacosis virus, a representative member of the group of highly infective disease agents characteristic of bacterial warfare (6,66-75) has been reported to contain per milliliter approximately 20,000,000 respiratory doses for man (102). No published data are available on dispersion efficiency of bacterial warfare munitions, but even if the efficiency were as low as 0.01 per cent, the potency of this material would still be extraordinarily high. Such preparations of psittacosis virus could easily be produced in liter amounts in a single small laboratory, with only such equipment and materials as are common to virus laboratories throughout the world. The payload in psittacosis "bomb," and therefore probably the whole munition, could be small, cheap, and easily turned out in quantity.** Although bacterial warfare comprises a varied range of agents

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* Hamburger, M. G., Puck, T. T., Hamburger, V. C., and Johnson, M. A. Studies on the transmission of hemolytic streptococcus infections III. Hemolytic streptococci in air, floor dust, and bedclothing of hospital wards and their relation to cross ventilation. J. Infec. Dis. 75: 79-94 (July-Aug.) 1944

** It may be noted that a vaccine of unproved utility has been developed against psittacosis virus (74) and that this virus, unlike most others, is amenable to chemotherapy (66-68,75,102). Those facts would doubtless have defensive value. Yet the whole problem of defense (see 4,6) against bacterial warfare appears extraordinarily difficult, so that it does not essentially modify the argument developed herein.

and techniques, these circumstances may serve to exemplify it and to contrast it with atomic warfare, which is known to require enormous amounts of expensive materials and equipment, huge installations, and a very high level of industrial potential and technology.

Bacterial warfare comprises a varied and flexible group of weapons. It would be used to destroy men, animals or plants selectively -- or merely to make them useless, and, if desired, perhaps only temporarily. Unlike the atomic bomb it would not destroy property. It is the pre-eminent terror weapon, because its effects would always be delayed rather than instantaneous, and because it would employ strange or altered or artificially combined diseases. It might be used to produce casualties in large numbers, or in such a way that only a few cases would be needed to demoralize a whole population. Bacterial warfare epitomizes the total war that is now or will very soon be ready for use.

Among the diseases whose agents are listed in the appended technical bibliography as having been investigated during World War II for purposes of bacterial warfare are: botulism, a rare and highly fatal form of food poisoning; anthrax; tularemia or rabbit fever; brucellosis or undulant fever; glanders; psittacosis or parrot fever; rinderpest of cattle; Newcastle disease of poultry; fowl plague; fungous diseases of plants; and plant poisoning with synthetic "hormones." It is probable that many other disease agents could be used (6).

Bacterial warfare production could proceed in any civilized country irrespective of its size or relative wealth (1). Since it could employ the facilities of normal medical and biological research and development, bacterial warfare could hardly be controlled by an international policing authority without interference of a most intimate sort with activities upon which the health and welfare of nations depend. Yet it is plain that bacterial warfare constitutes an extremely serious potential menace, and that world peace demands the elimination of this major weapon of mass destruction.

During July, 1947, both the International Congress for Experimental Cytology, at Stockholm, and the International Microbiological Congress, at Copenhagen, adopted resolutions condemning bacterial warfare (22,23). The Cytological Congress set up a committee to offer technical advice and assistance to the United Nations on this problem.

II. SUGGESTIONS

Since bacterial warfare falls into the category of major weapons of mass destruction, the problem belongs with that of atomic warfare within the province of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. This body, which up to now has dealt only with atomic energy, is responsible, in the eyes of the peoples of the world, for paving the way for general disarmament and peace. It is therefore imperative that the Atomic Energy Commission proceed without delay to consider bacterial warfare even as its deliberations on atomic energy continue. Since the problem of bacterial warfare is very different from that of atomic warfare, there is no reason to assume that the accomplishment of the control of atomic energy would necessarily have the slightest value in the solution of the problem of bacterial warfare. On the other hand, parallel examination of bacterial warfare and atomic warfare by the commission may disclose new means whereby both may be eliminated.

The American Association of Scientific Workers therefore hopes that the United Nations General Assembly will take cognisance of this matter, that it will undertake a preliminary investigation of the available factual information on bacterial warfare, and that, if the findings of such an investigation warrant such action, it will instruct the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed at once to devote part of its attention to this major weapon of mass destruction.

The appended bibliographies are provided to facilitate such investigations.

III. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL REFERENCES

A. Pre-World War II. References to papers on bacterial warfare published through 1941 are given in (6). These are considered to be largely of historical interest.

B. Official Releases (U.S.A.)

1. War Department, Jan. 3, 1946. Report to the Secretary of War by George W. Merck, Special Consultant for Biological Warfare. Military Surgeon 98: 237-242 (March) 1946. Consensed in N.Y.Times, Jan. 4, 1946.

2. Navy Department, Jan. 4, 1946. N.Y.Times, Jan. 5, 1946.

A report of the Navy's special project known as Naval Medical Research Unit No. I at Berkeley, California.

3. Merck, G. W. Peacetime implications of biological warfare (Westinghouse Forum paper). Chemical and Engineering News, 24: 1346-1349 (May 25) 1946.

4. Merck, G. W., Fred, E. B., Baldwin, I.L., and Sarles, W. B. Implications of Biological Warfare. The United States and the United Nations Report Series No.5, "The International Control of Atomic Energy," Scientific Information Transmitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946 - October 14, 1946, Prepared in the Office of Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, U.S.Representative. U.S.Govt. Printing Office, Dept. State Publ. 2661, pp. 65-71

Items 1, 3 and 4 repeat the same phrasing in part, but each contains material not included in the others.

C. Unofficial Technical Reports

5. Anon. Bacteria as weapons of war. Pharmaceutical J. (London) 156: 40-41, (Jan.19) 1946.

Comparable in purpose and original date (May 8, 1942), but not in scope, with item (6).

6. Rosebury, T., Kabat, E. A., with the assistance of Boldt, M.H. Bacterial Warfare: a critical analysis of the available agents, their possible military applications, and the means for protection against them. J. Immunol. 56: 7-96 (May) 1947 (original date, June 8, 1942).

By far the most complete statement available of the principles and techniques of bacterial warfare, as defined and predicted in 1942 from open technical sources. Recommended as a starting point, and for orientation of and comparison with other [illegible] references.

7. Editorial. Bacterial Warfare. Brit. Med. J. 1: 893-894 (June 21) 1947

A review of the Rosebury-Kabat-Boldt report, incorporating some additional ideas.

D. Items and Articles in the Public Press (A Selected List)

8. Text of speech by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes at Charleston, S. C., Nov. 16, 1945. N.Y.Times, Nov. 17

Includes the statements, "There will be no protection against bacteriological warfare, an even more frightful method of human destruction" (than the atomic bomb) and, "But it is not enough to banish atomic or bacteriological warfare. We must banish war."

9. Text of speech by Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons, Nov. 22, 1945. N.Y.Times, Nov. 23

Includes the statement, "In my view it is impossible to isolate the problem of the atomic bomb from that of the use of other destructive weapons, and other relevant remarks.

10. One World or None, edited by Dexter Masters and Katherine Way. McGraw-Hill, N.Y. 1946.

Includes the following relevant remarks: by J.R. Oppenheimer, p. 25: "My own estimate is that the advent of such weapons (atomic bombs) will reduce the cost, certainly by more than a factor of ten, more probably by a factor of a hundred. In this respect only biological warfare could seem to offer competition for the evil that a dollar can do."

And by Walter Lippman with a reference to the Navy Dept. report (2): "If there is another war of the giant powers, atomic and even more deadly and malign nant weapons will -- we must assume -- be used."

11. Newspaper and magazine accounts of and comment on the War and Navy Department releases of Jan. 3-4, 1946, including: N.Y.Times, Jan. 4 and Jan.5; editorial, Jan. 12. comment, Jan. 13; Newsweek, Jan. 14; Time, Jan. 14; Science News Letter, Jan. 12.

12. Associated Press dispatches dated May 23 and 24, 1946, on an alleged U.S.Navy "secret weapon:" N.Y.Times, May 24-25; N.Y.World-Telegram, May 25; Time, June 30.

13. Columns by Hanson W. Baldwin, N.Y.Times, July 14 and Sept. 27, 1946.

14. Text of the Summary of the Verdict of the International Military Tribunal at Nurenberg, Germany, Sept. 30, 1946. N.Y.Times, Oct. 1.

Includes the statement that Soviet prisoners of war were used as victims in medical experiments by Germany in preparation for a campaign of bacteriological warfare.

15. The deadliest war, by Sidney Shallet. Collier's, June 15, 1946

16. Editorial, Germ warfare. The New Republic, June 10, 1946

17. New ways to killing, by Dyson Carter. New Masses, Sept. 13, 1946

18. Silent death, by Gerald Wendt. Science Illustrated, Oct., 1946

Includes this writer's estimate of the potency of crystalline botulinus toxin for man, based on data for the mouse given in references (26,30). This information had been presented by Dr. Wendt in a lecture on Sept. 18 (N.Y.Times, Sept. 19). See also N.Y.Times, Sept. 20 (new item including comment by Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, Chief of Chemical Corps; and editorial) and comment by Waldemar Kaempffert, N.Y.Times, Sept. 22.

19. BW by Gerard Piel. Life, Nov. 18, 1946

Probably the best of the popular magazine articles on bacterial warfare in terms of scientific ac[redacted]

20. Items on U.S.policy of secrecy in bacterial warfare. N.Y.Sun, Jan.23, 1947; editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, Jan.27, 1947.

21. Newspaper accounts of and comments on publication of Rosebury-Kabat-Boldt report, especially N.Y.Herald-Tribune, May19, 1947; editorials, N.Y.Times and N.Y.Herald-Tribune, May 20; column by Waldemar Kaempffert, N.Y.Times, May 25. See also press release of American Association of Scientific Workers, and A.A.Sc.W. -- N.Y.Branch Newsletter of May-June, 1947, (The last two items appended herewith).

22. Texts of resolutions adopted by (a) International Congress for Experimental Cytology at Stockholm, July, 1947; and (b) International Microbiological Congress at Copenhagen, July, 1947, (copies appended herewith).

23. Dispatch on resolution of International Microbiological Congress, including comments of scientists in Copenhagen. N.Y.Times, July, 1947

24. Items on U.S.policy of secrecy in bacterial warfare. N.Y.Herald-Tribune and PM, Sept. 15, 1947

25. Comment on resolutions of International Congresses (see (22)), and quotations from a lecture on bacterial warfare by T. Rosebury. R.C.A. Science-Technology Division (N.Y.) Newsletter, Sept., 1947, (appended herewith).

IV. TECHNICAL REPORTS FROM CAMP DETRICK AND OTHER KNOWN BACTERIAL WARFARE INSTALLATIONS

A. Botulinus Toxin and Botulism

26. Abrams, A., Kegeles, G., and Hottle, G. A. The purification of toxin from Clostridium botulinum. J.Biol.Chem. 164: 63-79 (July) 1946

27. Hottle, G. A., and Abrams, A. Detoxification of crystalline botulinum type A toxin. J.Immunol. 55: 183-187 (Feb.) 1947

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29. Kegeles, G. The molecular size and shape of botulinus toxin. J.Amer.Chem.Soc. 68: 1670, 1946

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31. Lewis, K.H. and Hill, E.V. Practical media and control measures for producing highly toxic cultures of Clostridium botulinum, type A. J.Bact. 53: 213-230 (Feb.) 1947

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34. Reames, H.R. and Kadull, P.J. Studies on botulinus toxoids, types A and B; immunization of man. J.Immunol. 55: 309-324 (April) 1947

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B. Bacillus Anthracis and Anthrax

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PEACE-TIME IMPLICATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
By George W. Merck

Biological Warfare no longer can be regarded as a Laboratory experiment. It has advanced far beyond the Laboratory stage, and its possibilities have been sufficiently explored to permit its serious consideration as an effective type of warfare. It is something which must be given adequate attention in any comprehensive defense plan, and the art of its use must be developed as a "threat-in-being" of importance equal to our potentialities in gas warfare.

Biological Warfare is not new. It was known in World War I, although employed only on a very limited scale. There is clear evidence that in 1915 German agents inoculated horses and cattle shipped from the United States to the Allies with disease-producing bacteria. It might have been employed in World War II, for it offered an open avenue of attack upon us. That it wasn't developed and used by our enemies was due not merely to their inadequacies but assuredly to a conviction on their part that our potentialities in terms of scientific prowess and productive capacity were far greater than theirs.

Biological Warfare may be defined as the use - and the defense against the use - of bacteria, fungi, viruses, rickettsias, and toxic agents derived from living organisms (as distinguished from synthetic chemicals used as gases or poisons) to produce death or disease in men, animals, or plants. It may be directed against military or naval forces, civilian populations, livestock, or crops. Employed against personnel, it may cause fatalities or only incapacitate; the duration of illness may be brief or protracted; the causative agents used may be persistent or non-persistent; they may spread readily from infected to healthy persons, or they may be of a type which produces non-contagious disease.

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What Led Up to the Project

In the years between World Wars I and II, an interest in Biological Warfare was maintained by scientists and military men in many countries. In several of these countries this type of warfare was believed to be possible or even probable.

In the fall of 1941, opinion in the United States regarding the value of Biological Warfare was by no means united. But common prudence dictated to those responsible for the nation's defense that they give serious consideration to the dangers of possible attack. The views of scientists, alert to its dangers, was made known to the Secretary of War. Thereupon, Mr. Stimson promptly requested the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council to give him the benefit of the best scientific advice available concerning this problem.

After an intensive and thorough study by a special committee of biological scientists, the Academy and the Research Council advised the Secretary of War that Biological Warfare appeared distinctly feasible, and urged that appropriate steps be taken for defense of the nation against its use. The report stated in part:

> "The value of biological warfare will be a debatable question until it has been clearly proven or disproven by experience. The wise assumption is that <u>any method which appears to offer advantages to a nation at war will be vigorously employed by that nation</u>. There is but one logical course to pursue, namely, to study the possibilities of such warfare from every angle, make every preparation for reducing its effectiveness, and thereby reduce the likelihood of its use."

The advice given to the Secretary of War, coupled with reports of enemy activities in this field, prompted the President to direct the

initiation of intensive, large-scale investigation in the United States of the possibilities and potentialities of Biological Warfare, and the establishment of active collaboration in this field with our British and Canadian allies.

While Biological Warfare was not actually used in military operations, the objectives were attained. Defenses against a potentially dangerous method of warfare were devised, and the likelihood of surprise from this quarter was forestalled.

An Example of Team Work

The work done during the war not only scored tangible advances but also demonstrated the effectiveness of the type of teamwork the subject demanded. Our investigations were carried on by a combined organization in which the Army, the Navy, civilian scientists (in and out of uniform), universities, private research institutions, industries, and several departments of the Government - chief among them the United States Public Health Service and the Department of Agriculture covering both animals and plants - all worked together with allied teams in a most effective manner. Adequate protection against the possible use of Biological Warfare by our enemies was a matter of great urgency and it was attacked with zeal and energy and with the unstinted support of those directing the war effort.

Starting as a project under the most extreme secrecy, the work was undertaken under the wing (and cloak) of the Federal Security Agency. Emerging from this "cover" (but not from secrecy) the Army, with the Navy collaborating, took over. Unique facilities were built by the Chemical Warfare Service and by the Navy for experimentation on pathogenic agents.

While the main objective in all these endeavors was to develop methods for defending ourselves against possible enemy use of biological warfare, it was necessary to investigate offensive possibilities in order to

offense and defense were closely interwoven in all the investigations conducted. Consideration of the problem from an offensive point of view necessitated numerous new developments and concepts.

At the height of its development, the Special Projects Division of the Chemical Warfare Service of the Army, which carried the main responsibility for the Biological Warfare program, had a personnel of almost four thousand. Of these, twenty-eight hundred were Army personnel, approximately one thousand Navy, and about one hundred civilian. In addition, the Navy had a separate group of nearly a hundred at work on a special phase of the problem. The work of these groups, and that done in the universities, research institutes, and industries, represented a truly combined operation in which Army, Navy, civilian personnel and Allied groups worked together in the closest cooperation. They worked under high pressure and under the strictest secrecy. Their achievements were numerous.

Some General Accomplishments

In general terms, the following were some of the chief accomplishments:

I. The development of methods and facilities for the mass production of pathogenic microorganisms and their products.

First, the microorganisms selected for exhaustive investigation were made as virulent as possible, produced in specially developed culture media under optimum conditions for growth and maintenance of virulence, and tested for disease-producing power on animals or plants. In this work it was necessary to determine how well various organisms of high disease-producing power could retain their virulence, and how long they would remain alive under different conditions of storage. At the same time it was necessary to discover and develop biological, physical, and chemical means for protection of

personnel, animals, and plants against these organisms. This work involved exact determination of the numbers of microorganisms required to produce infection, and a thorough study of all possible means of dissemination and routes of entrance into the susceptible individual. New methods had to be developed to prevent contamination of the laboratories and pilot plants in which this work was being done.

Among others, one problem, new to large-scale production of pathogenic microorganisms, involved the prevention of contamination of air, water, and land surrounding the experimental stations. That the procedures developed were effective is proven by the fact that no accidental infection occurred outside the boundaries of the experimental areas.

Here is an anecdote which illustrates the point:

The doubts of the health authorities of the municipality in which the main Biological Warfare experimental station was located were aroused regarding the adequacy of the sanitary measures. The local health officer determined to test the sewage of the establishment where it entered the city system. Imagine his surprise when confronted with the baffling fact that his tests showed the sewage sterile - perhaps the only sterile sewage in the world! Had he tested the ventilating outlet flues from the laboratories and pilot plant operations, he would have found them sterile too.

II. The second accomplishment was the development of methods for the rapid and accurate detection of minute quantities of disease-producing agents.

If any system of defense against biological warfare is to function, there must be rapid and accurate detection of any pathogenic agent which might be employed. The methods of chemistry and microbiology available for work of this type in 1942 were entirely inadequate.

Much progress was made in developing procedures for this purpose which were highly sensitive and selective. These will be of value in peace-time work in laboratories, hospitals, and industries.

III. Significant contributions to knowledge of the properties and behavior of air-borne disease-producing agents.

In this work, precise methods were developed for producing and measuring "clouds" of microorganisms for determining the viability of the organisms in such "clouds", and for studying the factors controlling movements of air-borne pathogenic agents.

It is easy to visualize the importance of these categories of achievements when one considers the problems in ventilation brought by modern problems of war: increase in size and underwater range of submersible craft; ventilation of bomb-proof shelters, hospitals and factories.

IV. For the first time, a pure, crystallin, bacterial toxin was isolated and studied.

This was the toxin of Clostridium botulinum, type A, which is the most potent biological poison known to man. Knowledge gained in this work will open the way for the isolation and purification of other bacterial toxins, and will undoubtedly make possible the preparation of more effective substances which can be used for the immunization of men and of animals against such toxins.

V. The development of vaccines for the protection of chickens against two highly fatal poultry diseases known as Newcastle disease and Fowl Plague.

This work was performed by civilian scientists who worked in laboratories established in one of the buildings of the Harvard Medical School under the supervision of the American members of the joint United States-Canadian Commission which had charge of the rinderpest investigations.

VI. Advances in the treatment of certain infectious diseases of mammals, including man.

Although extreme care was taken to protect personnel against infection, a few cases of disease attributable to laboratory accidents occurred. All of these were treated successfully, and the knowledge gained from the treatment of these cases will be of value to the medical profession.

I would like, at this point, to interrupt the reading of the record to pay a tribute to the men and women of the United States Army and the United States Navy and their civilian associates, who month after month subjected themselved to the risks and dangers of the work in which they were engaged. They are among the unsung heroes of the war.

I have seen experienced physicians and bacteriologists visiting the experiment station stand aghast when they realized what was going on about them. Their sighs of relief, when they left the secured areas, were not put on, I assure you.

Nor should the achievements of those responsible for the direction, design, and planning of the specialized operations which resulted in such a high safety record go unnoted. Only a few, because of special circumstances, have been given public recognition. I hope as secrecy is lifted and more of the achievements of this group are revealed, that some kind of Unit Citation will be awarded these men and women who demonstrated courage and patriotism of the highest order.

Returning to the record: the seventh group of accomplishments was the development and large-scale testing of a vaccine for the protection of cattle against rinderpest, a highly fatal disease of cattle which might have been introduced into this country by accident or by enemy action.

This work was done by a joint United States-Canadian Commission. This project will be discussed in greater detail later.

VIII. Extensive studies on the production and control of diseases which might affect crops of economic importance.

In this work, fungus, bacterial, and virus diseases of crop plants were studied intensively.

IX. Information was obtained regarding the effect of more than 1,000 different chemical agents on living plants.

This is a particularly fertile field and one that promises much to agriculture in the form of weed killers and selective plant control agents. The work was initiated to find destructive agents against various crops and was successful. Only the rapid ending of the war prevented field trials in an active theater of synthetic agents which would, without injury to human or animal life, affect the growing crops and make them useless.

Applications of certain of these agents, even in infinitesmal dilution, had shown that they were capable of depriving the enemy of the benefits of his own labor by depriving his garden and field crops of their fruits. Not until he had carried through the labors of cultivation would he find that the roots had grown sere and that the plant must wither away without yield.

Other Specific Results on Plant Growth Regulating Substances

Results and findings which will be reported on - among others - are:

1. The synthesis and testing of about 1100 new compounds, of which a number were found to be effective in various degrees and ways.
2. New formulations and methods of application for greater effectiveness.
3. New knowledge concerning the relative sensitivity of various species and varieties of important plants. Especially valuable were the findings correlating cultural conditions under which crops are grown, types of soil on which produced, and other environmental factors, with the effectiveness of growth regulators.
4. Effects of these compounds in and upon soils, soil fauna and flora.

5. The persistence of these chemicals in soils of various types, and their subsequent effect on crops produced on treated soils.

6. Correlation of effectiveness and time of application with climatic conditions before and after application, such as sunshine, humidity, rain, etc.

7. Relation of droplet size and distribution to effectiveness when used as sprays.

8. Comparative effectiveness of water, oil, or other substances used as dispersion media in sprays.

9. Comparative effectiveness of sprays, dusts, vapors, aerosols under different environmental conditions and various stages of growth of plants.

10. Value of some compounds for destruction of certain parts of a plant without injury to other parts. Example - destruction of mature tops of potato plants without injury to tubers, to aid in ripening and harvesting.

11. The setting and development of various fruits without pollination or seeds.

PEACE-TIME IMPLICATIONS

The scientists who were in charge of this work are leaders in their fields - as were all the scientists in charge of the various projects. They have stated that eventually any living plant process may be brought under control through critical use of some growth regulating substance. This means that every agricultural or horticultural practice which affects growth, development, ripening or storage, can be influenced, to economic advantage.

The pattern of the plant projects is no different from the general form of the entire Biological Warfare program and its other divisions, the animal and the human. It is obvious in all of them that there can not help but be important advances in knowledge - many of them fundamental - and gains in scientific achievement - many of them capable of practical application. In fact, it is quite impossible for work to be done in this field without such

results. It is inherent in the nature of the work. Perhaps no other type of warfare can bring with it such a guarantee of good economic advantages in agriculture, parallel gains in animal husbandry, and above all, vital contributions to the fight against human ills and suffering.

Many of the detailed results of the research performed are now in process of publication in scientific journals which represent every phase of biological science. These papers will serve as concrete evidence of the job that was done - and as the work continues, more will appear.

All scientific knowledge, except that which would involve the disclosure of vital military information, should be published promptly and fully. The Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, has expressed himself emphatically in agreement. He had indicated that this is and will be the policy of the War Department. Also, in reviewing present plans with the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, General Waitt, he has stated that he wholeheartedly supports this policy and has issued instructions that it be carried out. And Admiral McIntire, the Surgeon General of the Navy, who has under his charge the Naval activities in Biological Warfare, has asked that he be recorded as concurring and taking similar action.

It should be mentioned too, that the Special Committee for Biological Warfare, formerly known only by cryptic alphabetic designations, is being continued by the National Academy of Sciences, and to this Committee will be referred current questions relating to policy, including decisions on publication. With such a policy no question of military dominance can be raised. And so far as I know it never has been raised in connection with the Biological Warfare program.

Prediction of the results of scientific inquiry is not easy; neither is it safe. There are too many "ifs". But most of these "ifs" grow out of

the almost universal practice of research workers to indulge in what Horace Walpole called "serendipity". You perhaps recall the story of the three princes of Serendip (the ancient Kingdom of Ceylon) who, faring forth on an errand, returned not with what they sought but always found and brought back something of greater value. Hence "serendipity". It means the making of unexpected discoveries by chance and by acute observation along the road toward some main objective.

Pasteur stated the same idea in a different way when he said " . . . it is characteristic of science and of progress that they continually open new fields to our vision", and the "in scientific investigation, chance favors the trained mind".

The Rinderpest Activity

I can best illustrate some of the potentialities of research in this field by recounting briefly the accomplishments of the United States-Canadian team which worked during the war to develop defenses against rinderpest of cattle. It is quite apparent that the value of this project in peace time will be as great as, if not greater than, its value in meeting the wartime emergency.

In 1941, when we were considering the livestock diseases which might be introduced on this continent, either through accident attributable to rapid air traffic or by deliberate enemy action during the War, rinderpest, an exceedingly contagious cattle malady with a very high mortality rate, stood out as one disease against which every possible precaution should be taken. With a one hundred per cent susceptible cattle population of many millions on the North American continent, it would have been catastrophic to our food supplies had this rapidly spreading virus disease appeared. In the Orient and

other places where this disease occurs it has always been a plague of the first magnitude.

Our Canadian allies had arrived at the same conclusions as our own with regard to rinderpest and were in full agreement with us on the importance of promptly undertaking measures to place us in the best position possible to defent our vast and critically essential cattle population against this possible threat.

Therefore, it was decided to make the undertaking a joint one. Accordingly, a joint United States Canadian Commission, consisting of four members appointed by the Secretary of War of the United States, and four by the Canadian Minister of National Defense, was constituted for the purpose of planning and supervising the project.

A suitable, isolated location, an island in Canada, was agreed upon as the place to carry on the work. A highly-qualified project director was obtained, and proficient United States and Canadian scientists and technicians were assembled to accomplish the mission, which was of a two-fold character. In the first place, it called for the prompt development of ways and means for the safe production and stocking of a type of rinderpest vaccine which it was known could be produced, and which some years previously had been successfully used in eradicating the disease from the Philippine Islands.

This type of vaccine, however, had to be made from the tissued of calves or adult cattle artificially infected with the disease and destroyed at its height to provide the necessary virus-containing tissue. Vaccine of this type, besides being expensive, presented a number of technical difficulties when the necessity of possible production on a vast scale was contemplated. It was realized that if huge quantities of such vaccine had to be produced it would involve the procurement and handling of thousands of cattle, and the

proper disposition of their carcasses after collection of the virus-containing tissues used in the production of vaccine. Thus, while under the circumstances it was considered necessary to provide for the production of this type of vaccine, irrespective of difficulties, it was likewise highly important to initiate research studies to determine whether an effective vaccine could be produced without having to utilize cattle as the source of virus. This latter constituted the second phase of the mission.

In the light of knowledge developed in recent years with regard to the cultivation of filtrable virus in developing chick embryos, studies were inaugurated for the purpose of determining whether the virus of rinderpest could be cultivated by such a procedure. After a number of attempts, success was attained in establishing the virus in developing chick embryos. However, difficulty was encountered in propagating the virus in high concentration by this method. As a result, vaccines prepared from chick-embryo-propagated virus, inactivated by chemical means, were found to have little or no potency. The result of this combined effort was the discovery that after the bovine rinderpest virus had been successively passed through some fifty developing chick embryos it had become avianized to the point where it would not produce appreciable disease in cattle. As a matter of fact, only very minor reactions were found to follow its injection into susceptible animals. On the other hand, cattle receiving injections of this avianized virus were subsequently found to be substantially immune when exposed to the fully virulent bovine virus. The new vaccine has been subjected to a wholly successful field test in Africa through the cooperation of our British allies.

These findings immediately pointed the way to the means for providing protection for millions of our cattle with a vaccine which could be produced in huge quantities without the many difficulties involved in producing the

bovine tissue type of vaccine. Thus, had rinderpest unfortunately made its appearance on this continent during the war, we would have been prepared to cope with it in a manner heretofore impossible. Aside from the insurance provided by the rinderpest investigations and their results during the War period, the findings and knowledge gained from this work will be of great postwar value.

Now a method for the economical production of an effective type of rinderpest vaccine is available for use in countries and localities where the disease has been a crippling plague of livestock. Arrangements have already been made whereby surplus vaccine produced through the operation of the project in Canada will be made available to UNRRA for use in China, where rinderpest is today a disease of great importance.

Further, in carrying out the rinderpest project, a number of findings and observations with regard to the disease and its epizoology resulted. These will constitute valuable additions to the overall knowledge of rinderpest. In addition, some of these findings will undoubtedly have a bearing on virus diseases other than rinderpest.

In Conclusion

My purpose in referring to the work and achievements of this particular project is to illustrate the peace-time implications of the entire program. The work resulted in building up an adequate defense. It has made that particular agent impotent as a weapon in Biological Warfare. One might give a thought to this paradox: While we perfect a biological weapon, we perfect the defense against it, thereby destroying the weapon. Would that all weapons of war could be liquidated from the earth as simply as this.

Research in Biological Warfare gives a firm promise of the control on a worldwide scale, of many diseases afflicting man and beast and plant life.

These investigations and the revelation of their inherent quality of producing not only weapons and defenses but also fundamental advances of knowledge and practical contributions to medicine and agronomy, have necessitated the writing of a new chapter in Biological Science. There is still much to be done. Let me leave these final thoughts with you:

Those responsible for our defenses and preparedness in this upset world are alert; they have their programs ready. But they need support.- support from scientists, academic and industrial, which should be given generously and in full measure - and it should not wait for an emergency call of patriotism.

There must be support from the people through Congress and its proper committees. That means money for research. If anything is sure about such an investment, it is that it will pay large dividends - dividends for the nation's health and for the country's economy.

Above all, there should be careful and serious consideration of the subject in whatever deliberations take place concerning the implementation of a lasting peace in the world. The potentialities of this type of warfare cannot be ignored. This is the most important peace-time implication of Biological Warfare.

#####

SAC, New York

December 8, 1948

Director, FBI

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;
HASKINS LABORATORIES, INC.
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
SABOTAGE

Reurlet November 8, 1948.

A review of the Bureau's files concerning the principle employees of the captioned company has failed to reflect any additional pertinent information other than that set forth in your report dated November 8, 1948, captioned as above.

You are authorized to interview [redacted] for the information set forth in your referenced report. This interview should be handled with care and tact and the results submitted to the Bureau in the near future. b6 b7C

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DATE 7-29-2004 BY 60267 uc/nws/bja/pam

G. I. R. -8

[redacted] according to Bureau files, has an excellent reputation, is loyal, discreet, and patriotic and [redacted] 116-73547). b6 b7C

EHM:dhb:rmb

[redacted] b6 b7C

Tolson
Nease
Clayton
Boardman
Nichols
Beaman
Ladd
Mohr
Parsons
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Sandy

RECORDED: 8 Dec 1948 116-73547-216
EX-117
F. B. I.
DEC 16 1948
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 14
DEC 9 1948 P.M.
DEC 23 1948

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DATE 7-29-2004 BY 60267 uc/nws/bjatpam

100-93216- 169, 170, 171
CHANGED TO
65- 58698- 9X, 11,
100- 355226- 17X

SECRET

Director, FBI

3-29-49

SAC, Boston

DATE: 7-29-2004
CLASSIFIED BY: source: FBI/DOJ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,6 7-29-2029

b1 [redacted] (S)

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

b1

(S)

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated March 14, last under the instant caption.

[redacted]

[redacted] (S) b1

From the long-range standpoint, the following is offered for the Bureau's consideration. The Bureau's attention is directed to the report of Special Agent [redacted] at Boston dated December 9, 1948 and titled "Bacteriological Warfare, aka, Internal Security (R)." The principal source of information in said report, and it is noted that the data therein have been in the main substantiated in statements attributed to former Secretary of Defense Forrestal appearing in the New York Times, March 13, last, was [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

The Bureau is advised that since last December [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C

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62 APR 1 1949

If the Bureau subsequently advises that there are research installations regarding BW located in this area, it is felt that with the cooperation of [redacted] a program of placing an informant in a sensitive position and arranging his development and recruitment by the Communist Party can be effected. No action is being taken in this direction, however, until the Bureau has advised that such installations are located in this area and has further advised that such informant development is in the interests of the national security. [redacted]

b6
b7C

In conclusion, the Boston Office will continue to remain alert to the problems suggested in the referenced Bureau letter. Promptly upon the development of any further information concerning this program, the Bureau will be advised.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : THE DIRECTOR DATE: March 30, 1949

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

7/29/2004
CLASSIFIED BY uc/nls/cja/cam 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 7/29/2029
By 37143, OGA 10/25/04 uc/nls/cja/cb

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

PURPOSE

[redacted] (S) b1

BACKGROUND

[redacted] (S) b1

RESULTS OF FIRST CONFERENCE (MARCH 24, 1949)

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S) b1

Attachment
EHM:mer

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INDEXED - 77
EX-141

100-73216-178

50 APR 12 1949

32 APR 5 1949

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[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S) b1

RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH [redacted] ON MARCH 30, 1949 b6 b7C

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S) b1

SECRET

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

ACTION:

A review of the Bureau's files is being made on all persons who attended the above conference and you will be advised of the results of this review.

The results of additional conferences and matters discussed with [redacted] in the future will be brought to your attention immediately. b6 b7C

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 4, 1949

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nus/bp/pan ON 11-1-2004 60267 uc/nus/bp/pan 11-1-2004 AJ, [ ], OGA 10-25-2004

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Quinn
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

You will recall the existence of a liaison arrangement between this Bureau and the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of National Defense regarding biological warfare matters. My memorandum to you dated March 21, 1949 reflected recent information concerning this committee, also the fact that [redacted] had advised of the anticipated connections of [redacted] with this committee.

With respect to the above, you commented, "Wouldn't it be well for liaison to brief [redacted] connection with this project. H." (S)(U)

Agent [redacted] discussed this matter with [redacted] on April 1 (S)(U) 1949. He was advised merely of [redacted] participation and expected presence at future meetings of the committee in question. [redacted] reaction implied that he was amazed at [redacted] He stated that he had always considered [redacted] to be somewhat stupid and now he felt certain of this fact. (S)(U)

[redacted] stated that he intended to discuss this matter with [redacted] the first of this week. He added that [redacted] had a deep-seated prejudice against all committees established by [redacted] and that the Committee on Biological Warfare would undoubtedly be no exception. (S)(U)

[redacted] (S)(U)

ACTION:

This matter will be followed closely and you will be currently advised of any developments.

CDD:mk

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INDEXED - 1

100 - 93216 - 1
HF IB H

3 APR 7 1949

DATE: 7-29-2004
CLASSIFIED BY: uc/nus/bp/pan 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 7-29-2029

53 APR 18 1949 124

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FIVE

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 14, 1949

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

[redacted] called at my office and left the attached draft of a secret letter to be addressed to various individuals named therein inviting them to sit as a Committee to look into the problem of bacteriological warfare. b6 b7C

[redacted] stated the first meeting to be held in Washington in order that [redacted] could open the meeting in order to arouse some interest in this problem; that thereafter about two meetings a month would be held in New York in the evening for the purpose of discussing the possibilities of bacteriological warfare. b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that the purpose of his call at the Bureau to request, if desired, that a representative of the Bureau be designated to work with him on this problem and to attend bi-monthly meetings in New York with the Committee. It is noted among those making up this Committee will be b6 b7C

[redacted]

I would be inclined to recommend that in view of the above that no representative of the Bureau be designated to work on this committee but that [redacted] be advised that a representative of the Espionage Section who has been handling contacts in connection with bacteriological warfare in the past will contact him from time to time in Washington for the purpose of keeping abreast of the developments. b6 b7C

In the event you approve, [redacted] will be so advised. b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-29-2004 BY 60326 uc/lmw/kjp

DML:dad

cc - [redacted] b6 b7C

Attachment (one copy only)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 21, 1949

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/bjalpam
ON 11-1-2004
[ ] OGA 10-25-2004
60267 uc/NLS/bjalpam 11-1-2004

DATE: 7-29-2004
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NLS/bjalpam 60267
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(/) 7-29-2029

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

PURPOSE

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the results of a contact by Bureau representatives with [redacted] b6 b7C in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at 3:15 p.m., March 21, 1949.

b6
b7C

BACKGROUND

You will recall that according to the attached memorandum dated March 14, 1949, [redacted] requested that the Bureau designate a representative to attend bi-monthly meetings to be held in New York City of an advisory committee to the Secretary of National Defense on biological warfare, which meetings were to be attended by [redacted] and by other civilians. b6 b7C

You decided that no representatives of the Bureau be designated to work on this Committee but that [redacted] be advised that a representative of the Espionage Section who has been handling contacts in connection with bacteriological warfare in the past would contact him from time to time in Washington for the purpose of keeping abreast of the developments. b6 b7C

Pursuant to the foregoing, I instructed Section Chief Whitson and Supervisor [redacted] to advise [redacted] of the Bureau's decision. Arrangements for the meeting with [redacted] were handled by Liaison representative [redacted] b6 b7C

STATUS

[redacted] was advised that the Bureau was designating no representative to attend the meetings of the Committee but that [redacted] would maintain a close liaison with him for the purpose of handling any matters of mutual interest. b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that he was disappointed that the Bureau would not participate on the Committee, pointing out that these meetings would be held in the evening after the Committee had had drinks and dinner and that much interesting table talk would be lost thereby. b6 b7C

5 ENCL

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 1 100-93216-181

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3 APR 7 1949

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] was asked if he did not intend to reduce to writing anything of consequence which was discussed. He stated that in all probability important subject matters would be reduced to writing which would be available to the liaison representative of the Bureau. b6 b7C

[redacted] then asked if the Bureau representatives did not appreciate the seriousness of the potentialities of biological warfare. He was told that they did recognize the serious potentialities. [redacted] then stated that he hoped he had "sold" the Bureau representatives on the need for attending meetings of the Committee. He was told that the personal feelings of the Bureau representatives would have no effect whatsoever on their reporting of the facts in this matter, in other words, his statements would be reported accurately. b6 b7C

[redacted] then stated that when he and [redacted] had called upon the Director and later when he had talked to Mr. Ladd he thought that the Bureau officials were in favor of participating on the Committee and he wondered if the Director had all of the facts before him when he made the decision that the Bureau would not have a representative on the Committee. b6 b7C

[redacted] was advised by Supervisor [redacted] that unquestionably the Director had all of the facts presented by [redacted] at the time when his decision was made. b6 b7C

[redacted] was told that since the project was going to take at least six months and the Committee would meet presumably every two weeks during that period, there was plenty of time to determine whether or not the liaison proposed would be wholly satisfactory and that he could certainly avail himself of the opportunity to re-present his views after sufficient time had elapsed to determine the efficacy of the liaison arrangement. b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that [redacted] whom [redacted] has gone to Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of contacting [redacted] to solicit his membership on the Committee. [redacted] gave to the Bureau representatives a document classified Secret consisting of a statement of the purpose of the Committee by [redacted] and an outline entitled "Some Subject Areas For Consideration Of The Committee" prepared by [redacted] himself, as well as a confidential memorandum from [redacted] which points out the possibility of use by the Soviets of biological warfare against the populations of European countries which are the beneficiaries of the European Recovery Program. b6 b7C

SECRET

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that Supervisor [redacted] contact [redacted] shortly after the first meeting of the Committee which is scheduled to be held on March 24, 1949, in Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

I concur.
H.

Attachments

SECRET

FROM DO-7

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO
OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

SECRET

Mr. Tolson ✓ ( )
Mr. Clegg ( )
Mr. Glavin ( )
Mr. Ladd ( )
Mr. Nichols ( )
Mr. Rosen ( )
Mr. Tracy ( )
Mr. Gurnea ( )
Mr. Harbo ( )
Mr. Mohr ( )
Mr. Nease ( )
Miss Gandy ( )

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ON 4-1-2004
[ ], OGA 10-25-2004
60267 uc/nls/bjatpau 11-1-2004

Wouldn't it be well for Mason & Smith

[redacted]

[redacted]

See Me ( )
Note and Return ( )
For Your Recommendation ( )
What are the facts? ( )
Remarks:

Reaction of [redacted] in view of connection with this project.

DATE: 7-29-2004
CLASSIFIED BY uc/nls/bjatpau
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,3( ) 7292029

Mr. Mullet 179

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

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OTHERWISE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 25, 1949

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the attached memoranda dated March 21, 1949, and March 14, 1949, relating to the proposed Biological Warfare Conferences to be held by an Advisory Committee to the Secretary of National Defense and to your approval of a liaison arrangement with this committee by the Bureau.

[redacted] was telephonically contacted this morning by [redacted] Section to arrange a meeting with the [redacted] to secure the written results of the first conference which was held on the evening of March 24, 1949, at the Pentagon Building. [redacted] advised that the first meeting had been very successful he thought and that at that moment he was preparing a rough draft of the minutes which following approval by [redacted] would be put in final form and made available to [redacted] on March 28, or March 29, 1949. b6 b7C

An inquiry was made by [redacted] as to whether the Bureau might still designate a representative to be present at these meetings. [redacted] was advised that you desired at this time that the liaison arrangement be followed through and that if future developments reflect that this was unsatisfactory, you would be glad to give this matter further consideration. b6 b7C

ACTION:

This matter will be closely followed and upon receipt by the Bureau of the minutes of the first conference, you will be immediately advised.

EHM:lfc

RECORDED - 1 100-73216-1

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53 APR 18 1949

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT NEW YORK

NY File No. 100-91131 RK

REPORT MADE AT	DATE WHEN MADE	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE	REPORT MADE BY
NEW YORK	3/31/49	3/11,14,25,28/49	[redacted] b6 b7C

TITLE
(1) BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;
(2) HASKINS LABORATORIES, INC.

CHARACTER OF CASE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
SABOTAGE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Egan
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Keese
Miss Candy

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] interviewed. [redacted] advised that his laboratories are not engaged in experimentation of pathogenic microorganisms or any other experimentations which have a biological warfare application. [redacted] source of income obtained. Background information set forth for [redacted] not engaged in any classified contracts. [redacted] advised of the nature of his dealings with [redacted] personally acquainted with [redacted] Detailed information set forth. Background information obtained on [redacted] and his laboratory activities from the VA, NYC.

ICC to 9-2
ICC to ONI
ICC to AFI
ICC to D/R
4-18-49
EHM
Sd.

- C -

REFERENCE: b6 b7C Report of SA [redacted] 11/8/48, New York City.

DETAILS:

[redacted] Street, New York City, advised that he is the [redacted] He stated that his laboratory is currently conducting experimentations in biochemistry (cancer research), in psychoacoustics (psychological research to develop new sensory aids for the blind) and in microorganisms (trace element project, which in essence is an agricultural experiment which is being conducted to increase crop yield per acre).

b6 b7C

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: [redacted]

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

100-93216

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EX-133

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4-18-49 EHM

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ON 7-29-2010
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 7—2034

[redacted] further stated that he is not currently engaged on any classified or restricted contracts, and that his laboratories have never in the past conducted experimentations which could be applicable to Biological Warfare. b6 b7C

[redacted] also advised that he is not conducting any pathogenic microorganism experimentations at his laboratories. However, he advised that he is licensed by the New York State Board of Health to conduct this type of experimentation, as numerous other laboratories of this type are licensed in the State of New York, and particularly New York City. b6 b7C

[redacted] advised that he and [redacted] are on the Advisory Board of the Secretary of Defense for Biological Warfare. [redacted] advised that these aforementioned research projects were being financed through grants from the National Cancer Institute, Carnegie Institute, [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that between May 13, 1944 and October 2, 1947 his laboratories had conducted research in the development of sensory aids for the Committee of Sensory Devices of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and the National Academy of Science. He stated that he had contracts in the amount of $150,000 for the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and $259,210 for the National Academy of Science. He further explained that part of these contracts were in essence in subcontract of the Medical Division of the Veterans Administration. b6 b7C

[redacted] advised that in connection with this sensory aid project, he had employed, among others, [redacted] according to [redacted] was recruited by [redacted] for the explicit purpose of working on the sensory aid project for his laboratory. He advised that [redacted] came to him from the Bell Telephone Laboratories in New York City to also work exclusively on the sensory aid project. He advised that [redacted] and was extremely interested in working on such a project which would materially aid handicapped individuals such as himself, [redacted] further advised that [redacted] left his employment upon completion of the sensory aid project, and is believed to be currently [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that this sensory aid project was at first considered by his laboratory as being classified and restricted; however he believes that this classification was not on a security basis, and that in essence it was a labeling to keep this project out of the newspapers. b6 b7C

[redacted] further stated that he is currently employing approximately thirty individuals in his laboratories, and with the exception of [redacted] none of the current employees were engaged on the sensory aid project. He advised that he is not acquainted with [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that he has been personally and professionally in contact with [redacted] He explained that he and [redacted] and possibly [redacted] had had contact with [redacted] and is considered one of the foremost experts in the field of television. He stated that he conferred on many occasions with [redacted] pertaining to the sensory aid project and other projects which were conducted, in which [redacted] could be of technical assistance. b6 b7C

[redacted] advised that [redacted] probably knew [redacted] as he [redacted] and he may have had professional contact in that capacity. b6 b7C

4/18/49
this guy was a ref for Gladys Swarthout on Gregory case
I Hm

[redacted] advised that he had obtained [redacted] name from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and that he had come to him with the highest of recommendations. He stated that [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] further advised that he was [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] and that he had had very limited contact with [redacted] He volunteered that while in the capacity of [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] further stated that he had known [redacted] personally and professionally for several years, and that for the most part his contacts with this individual were in connection with his official duties with [redacted] He also stated he had had in the past, in the capacity of [redacted] extremely limited contacts with Russian and Polish delegates to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and in every instance, these contacts were in connection with his duties as [redacted] b6 b7C

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [redacted] b6 b7C

The records of the Veterans Administration, 346 Broadway, New York City, reflect the following information:

[redacted] b6 b7C

The records contain one letter signed by [redacted] who signed as [redacted] b6 b7C

The records further disclose that [redacted] who was previously mentioned, [redacted] presumably had been investigated during that period. One of the activities of the laboratory was to test sensory devices made by other firms for blind ex-G.I.'s. Several contracts between Haskins Laboratories and the National Research Council were in the file. Among the clauses contained in these contracts were some which provided that "the contractor", apparently referring to the Government, may inspect the work done by the laboratory at any reasonable time. The clauses also stated that the subcontractor "shall not disclose any information concerning this contract.....without the written consent of the contracting officer....." b6 b7C

Another clause stated that "the subcontractor shall immediately submit a confidential report to the contractor and the contracting officer whenever for any cause it has reason to believe that there is an active danger of espionage or sabotage affecting any of the subject work."

Another clause prohibited the subcontractor (Haskins Laboratories) from employing any alien, or permitting any alien to have access to the specifications of the contract without written consent of appropriate officers.

It should be noted that the above contract clauses are reportedly contained in practically all contracts of the National Research Council, and accordingly, no significance should be attached to their inclusion in the contract with Haskins Laboratories.

In view of the fact that the Haskins Laboratories have not in the past, or are not currently engaged in any experimentations of any type whatsoever in Biological Warfare, or are not presently engaged in any experimentations involving pathogenic microorganisms, and there is no evidence to substantiate the basis for this investigation, this case is being closed.

- C L O S E D -



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

STA. FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: January 12, 1950

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;
SABOTAGE -- ESPIONAGE.
(Bufile 100-353654)

CONTAE;
INTERNAL SECURITY - R.
(Bufile 100-345079)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/9/04 BY LCD/STW/MCS/KSTA/RAP
CR 977600

Enclosed are two (2) clippings of each of two (2) articles appearing in the "New York Herald Tribune" and the "New York Times" of January 3, 1950 which reflect that TRYGVE LIE, General Secretary of the United Nations, has suggested that the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission begin examining the possibilities of international control of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Mr. LIE's suggestions are set forth in an article in the January 1950 issue of the "Scientific American" in which he states "even a preliminary study of the problem of establishing international controls for such weapons and providing safeguards against violations might lead to conclusions shedding new light upon what is necessary and attainable in the international control of atomic energy."

It is to be noted that on September 26, 1947 [redacted] (suspected Soviet espionage agent -- Bufile 40-46866) [redacted] introduced a resolution requesting that body to study "bacteriological warfare." This resolution was prompted by a memorandum submitted to the United Nations by [redacted] (Bufile 100-334195.)

b6
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Speculation concerning the possibility that the propoganda on the BW - atomic energy parallel as a device to defeat the U. S. plan for control of atomic energy has been reported to the Bureau in the following reports:

"CINRAD - IS-R," 12/20/47, New York. (Bufile 100-190625)
"DR. THEODOR ROSEBURY, was - IS-R," 11/3/48, New York. (Bufile 100-354290)
"BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE - IS-R," 12/9/48, Boston. (Bufile 100-353654)
[redacted] IS-R," 5/5/49, New York. (Bufile 100-334195)

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The aforementioned is submitted to the Bureau for information.

Encs. (4)

cc: 100-82520
100-69120
100-89574
97- 908

JMS:DRS
100-91131

EX-9

RECORDED - 23
INDEXED - 23
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JAN 20 1950

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-345079

Trygve Lie Bids U.N. Study Ban On Germ War

Believes East-West Talk on That Topic May Pave Way to Atomic Accord

Early consideration of elimination of biological and chemical poisons as weapons of mass destruction might break the atomic energy control deadlock, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, suggested yesterday.

Writing in the January issue of the "Scientific American," Mr. Lie said, in effect, that the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission should open this new, untouched subject while temporarily suspending negotiations between East and West on the atomic energy problem.

"Even a preliminary study of the problem of establishing international controls for such weapons and providing safeguards against violations might lead to conclusions shedding new light upon what is necessary and attainable in the international control of atomic energy," Mr. Lie explained.

Looks Forward to '50

He said he did not know if such an approach would be fruitful, but said it was "worth trying."

He said there was good reason to hope for a "constructive turn" in the consideration of atomic energy control during 1950, and added the world could look forward to "a resumption . . . of genuine negotiations between East and West" on the problem.

Mr. Lie said that the world could take hope in the fact that the Soviet Union and the Western democracies are in basic agreement on "the universal desire to protect mankind from the use of atomic energy for war and to promote its use for peaceful progress."

Doubts Third War

Although there are people who talk of the inevitability of a third world war, "I do not believe there are many with such a suicidal bent of mind," Mr. Lie wrote. "All of us should know by now that another war with the weapons of mass destruction now available would destroy all existing political, economic and social systems and set civilization back by a thousand years."

He said that "every action of the U. N. that contributes to the lessening of tension between East and West, that increases confidence and develops the processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes among all nations, that extends the area of organized international co-operation, will help to prevent atomic destruction and to insure the use of atomic energy for peaceful progress.

"This is the road we must travel. . . . Real security from war can be attained only on a universal worldwide basis through U. N. There is no possible substitute and there no short cut."

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DATE 9/9/01 BY 60324UC/LMS/1004/RNP

100-93216-252

CLIPPING FROM THE
N. Y. Herald Tribune
DATE 1-3-1950

Lie Suggests U. N. Begin Study On Controlling of Germ Warfare

Says Debate on Biological and Chemical Weapons Might Help End Deadlock on Outlawing the Atomic Bomb

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LAKE SUCCESS, Jan. 2—Secretary General Trygve Lie suggested toda, that the United Nations begin examining the possibilities of international control of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

The chief executive of the United Nations said that the Atomic Energy Commission was charged in 1946 with the job of working out proposals for controlling not only the atomic bomb but all weapons capable of wiping out huge numbers of people. The commission, he pointed out, has concentrated only on atomic weapons and never has touched biological and chemical weapons.

Writing in the January issue of Scientific American, Mr. Lie said that a study of control problems of biological and chemical weapons might shed new light on the long-deadlocked atomic control controversy.

"I do not know whether any or all of these approaches would be fruitful," he said. "I do suggest that they are worth trying."

In the field of atomic control, Mr. Lie found reason to hope for a "constructive turn" in the debate during 1950.

"The world can rightfully expect a resumption this year of genuine negotiation between East and West on the problem of atomic energy," he said. "This in itself is important, for an absolute stalemate on this question has existed for more than two years. During that time there has been no real negotiation between the majority and the minority."

Mr. Lie cautioned against expecting "important immediate results," but said that any progress inside or outside the United Nations toward solving any major East-West dispute was bound to have a favorable influence on the atomic controversy. The year 1950, he said, presents a better chance of progress than any time since early in 1947.

The Secretary General said there was a tendency to overlook the "important areas of agreement" between East and West in the atomic debate.

"Both sides," he said, "have agreed that atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated from national armaments. Both have agreed upon the establishment and terms of reference of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Both have agreed that there should be an international system of control over atomic energy with a control organ that operates without veto in its day-to-day operations.

"Both have agreed that there should be international inspection of some sort to help prevent violations of the control system and to discover them if they occur, even though there appear to be important differences about the nature of this inspection."

Mr. Lie went on to warn that another world war would destroy all existing political, economic and social systems. It would "set civilization back by a thousand years," he said. There is no short cut to agreement, no way but through the United Nations, he declared.

"It will be necessary to pay less attention to the many things that divide us and more attention to those that unite us," Mr. Lie concluded.

100-93216-252

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 9/9/04 BY [illegible]
C#977600

CLIPPING FROM THE
N. Y. Times
DATED 1-3-1950
FORWARDED BY N. Y. DIVISION

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL DATE: 1/31/50

FROM : SAC, Baltimore

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

ReBulet 1/9/50, relative to establishing liaison with [redacted] and to my letter of 1/5/50, setting out the results of the initial contact by SA [redacted] of this office with [redacted] as well as the alternate, [redacted] b6 b7C

Efforts were made to telephonically contact [redacted] on 1/25/50 for the purpose of arranging a conference. It was ascertained that both [redacted] and will not return until approximately 2/3/50. At that time contact will be had with [redacted] for the purpose of arranging a conference. b6 b7C

SA [redacted] is proceeding to Boston on a special assignment and SA [redacted] will handle the liaison relationship in the absence of SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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66-891

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EX-103

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/NSB/BTM/RNP
ON 9/9/04

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61 FEB 14 1950

SAC, Baltimore

February 24, 1950

Director, FBI

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

RECORDED - 117 100-9326-261

Reurlets February 10 and February 14, 1950.

As indicated in your first referenced letter, it is not believed desirable or necessary that a representative of this Bureau engage in the two experiments referred to. It is noted that the results of these experiments will be made available to the Bureau.

In regard to the suggestion made by [redacted] beginning on line 2 of page 6 of your first referenced letter, it is suggested that you inform [redacted] that the identities of persons who might logically be regarded as Biological Warfare suspects are being furnished to the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army as such information is obtained by the Bureau. b6 b7C

With regard to the information referred to in your letter dated February 14, 1950, in the captioned matter it is desired that you furnish to the Bureau, if obtainable, the identity of the buildings against which the simulated BW attacks will be made.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/10/04 BY [illegible]

EHM:jam

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

FEB 24 1950
COMM - FBI

32 MAR 15 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: February 24, 1950

FROM : H. B. Fletcher

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

BACKGROUND:

You may recall that in connection with our responsibility in relation to the captioned matter the Baltimore Office has instituted a liaison arrangement at the Army's Biological Research Center, Camp Detrick, Maryland. The purpose of the liaison is to enable us to receive information promptly concerning the captioned matter in order that we may more efficiently carry out our responsibilities.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

By letter dated February 10, 1950, the Baltimore Office furnished the following pertinent information relating to experiments in Biological Warfare which was obtained from

[redacted]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/9/04 BY 60267 uc/mjs/sdm/emp

[redacted] stated that after conducting the first experiment consideration had been given to how to combat the effectiveness of such a Biological Warfare attack if made by an enemy. He has recommended

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[redacted] further advised they anticipated conducting a third experimental attack on the Pentagon Building by setting up their equipment [redacted]

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[redacted] This experiment will be conducted without any previous notice to anyone connected with the Pentagon Building.

Another experiment which [redacted] have in mind involves their coming to Washington, D. C., without equipment of any kind, renting an apartment and endeavoring to purchase supplies necessary to set up a Biological Warfare laboratory on a small scale. They will try to get equipment by piecemeal purchase which would enable them to launch a simulated BW attack against strategic agencies and buildings in Washington, D. C. This experiment is expected to be inaugurated in the spring of 1950. [redacted] invited the Bureau's liaison agent or any suitable representative of the Bureau to be present and participate both in the experiment at the Pentagon Building and in the experiment set forth immediately above. The Bureau's representative advised them that he did not feel it would serve any purpose for the FBI to be physically present during these experiments particularly in view of the completeness of the reports which are being submitted to the Bureau in connection with these experiments. The Baltimore Office advised that under present arrangements the Camp Detrick representatives intend to notify the Bureau's liaison representative at the time that these experiments are initiated but that no other agency will be given any notification.

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By letter dated February 14, 1950, the Baltimore office advised that the names of the key agencies against which [redacted] intend to conduct an experimental BW attack in Washington, D. C., were not furnished. The Baltimore Office pointed out that the Department of Justice Building in Washington, D. C., may be one of the buildings against which the simulated attack may be launched.

ACTION:

The above is submitted for your information. It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the Baltimore Office.

Attachment.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Baltimore, Maryland

February 10, 1950

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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Director, FBI

Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Baltimore letters dated January 5, 1950 and January 31, 1950.

On February 8, 1950, Special Agent contacted

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exhibited to Special Agent Special Report #117, dated October 12, 1949, published by the Special Operations Division of the Biological and Chemical Warfare Service, Camp Detrick, Maryland, which report reflects the results of the experiment conducted at the Pentagon Building in Washington, D. C., referred to in referenced letter dated January 5, 1950.

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 9/15/2029

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Declassify on: 3-8-90

[redacted] stated that since conducting this experiment consideration has been given of means that could be used to combat the effectiveness of such an attack if made by an enemy, and he has recommended [redacted]

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[redacted] also exhibited to Agent [redacted] photographs of the mechanism used in the second experiment referred to in the January 5th letter, whereby [redacted] In order to put this experiment in operation, it was necessary to have an [redacted]

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[redacted] no instance did anyone question the presence [redacted] or question any of the people participating in the experiment as to what there purpose was in being in the building.

As a result of this experiment, [redacted] stated that the area in the immediate vicinity of [redacted]

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[redacted] emphasized that they felt that the only way of combating the success of an experiment or an attack of the second type, if actually conducted by an enemy agent, would be by increased security within the building, and by alerting those in the building, or in any similarly vital building, to the possibilities of a biological warfare attack so that if an apparatus in any way similar to the one used in the experiment were observed in the building, an immediate alarm would be given, and if the building could be evacuated, the possibility of detecting those responsible for the attack would be greater, depending on how soon the device used for introducing the agent was noticed.

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[redacted] stated it was possible through the use of [redacted] to create a room which would be infection-proof to any presently known biological warfare agents. The general concensus of opinion on the part of [redacted] however, that alertness is the only defense to an attack of this kind.

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Concerning the subsequent experiments which [redacted] intend to undertake, they advised that they expect, within the next three weeks, to conduct the third experimental attack on the Pentagon Building by merely [redacted]

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[redacted] anticipate setting up their equipment in the north or south parking area in the vicinity of the Pentagon Building in conducting this experiment, and it will be done without any previous notification to anyone connected with the Pentagon Building.

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they will

Another experiment which they have in prospect involves [redacted]

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launch an assimilated BW attack against strategic agencies and buildings in Washington, D. C. This experiment is expected to be inaugurated in the spring of 1950, and no one will be notified when it is to begin.

[redacted] invited Agent [redacted] or any suitable representative of the Bureau, to be present and participate both in the [redacted] at the Pentagon Building, or in the experiment outlined immediately above. Agent [redacted] advised them that he did not feel that it would serve any purpose on the part of the FBI to be physically present during the course of these experiments, particularly in view of the completeness of the report which was exhibited in connection with the first experiment at the Pentagon Building. [redacted] indicated that all future reports in conjunction with the biological warfare experiments will be equally complete, and it appears that they would serve any purpose that the FBI might have in connection with analysis of the attack in order to make plans for possible measures that could be taken to defend against such an attack.

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In the event that the Bureau does deem it advisable to have an agent or any representative present at the time these experiments are conducted, the Baltimore Office should be immediately advised so that arrangements can be made with [redacted] Under present arrangements, they intend to notify Agent [redacted] at the time the experiments are initiated, but no other agency will be given any notification.

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[redacted] advised that those experimenting with biological warfare have some information concerning experiments conducted by the Japanese, and this information indicates that the Japanese were considering the use of brucellosis and anthrax. [redacted] stated that there is definite indication that the Japanese actually experimented in biological warfare during the course of the Japanese-Chinese war, and at that time it appeared that they had introduced typhoid fever among the Chinese. He had no reports that he considered would accurately reflect the success of these experiments. He advised that the Russians have in their possession all of the information that was available to the Japanese, and all of that which was available to the German scientists, but that so far as he knows, the United States does not have any information concerning the experiments being conducted by the Germans. He offered no explanation for this fact.

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The experiments being conducted by [redacted] also include efforts to develop [redacted]

[redacted]

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One step to be taken in combating possible biological warfare attacks by an enemy, which was suggested by [redacted] was to alert Public Health Agencies to the prospect of biological warfare attack, so that in the event of any unusual increase in certain types of infectious diseases which possibly could be attributed to a biological warfare attack, the proper security agency would be notified so that an investigation could be made to determine whether there was any indication that an epidemic of this nature had been initiated by an enemy agent.

Response measures suggested.

[redacted]

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Another suggestion made by [redacted] was the possibility of the FBI being alert for any contacts that known enemy agents may have with persons engaged in biological research or related fields of activity.

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on the theory that their interest in such persons may be connected with biological warfare. He also suggested that it might be possible for the FBI to inform him and [redacted] of the identity of scientists who were suspected of having Communist affiliations, so that if they made any inquiries or attempted to purchase material which could be traced to the potential development of a BW agent, [redacted] might become aware of such efforts to purchase this material, because occasionally they are contacted to secure material of this type for other experimental units, or they indirectly hear of purchases of this type made directly through drug or chemical houses by reason of their own contacts with these drug and chemical houses. b6 b7C

This info being furnished as requested to I.D.A.

It did not appear to Agent [redacted] that the second of these suggestions would have practical value as the field would be too wide, and it did not seem to be possible that there was any way of narrowing it down. The first suggestion to the effect that the Bureau be alert to contacts on the part of known espionage agents with persons interested in the field of biology, or related sciences, seems practical. b6 b7C

Agent [redacted] suggested to [redacted] that any contact of foreign government representatives with the Biological Warfare Services of the United States, which came to their attention, might be of interest to the FBI, and they agreed to notify us of any development of this nature. (U) b6 b7C

[redacted] b1

Director, FBI
Re: Biological Warfare
February 10, 1950

[redacted] b1

[redacted] C

Further commenting on the security aspects of biological warfare experiments, [redacted] said that shortly after V-J Day, the United States Army authorities decided that it would be proper to lift security restrictions on biological warfare, and published some reports of results of experiments conducted at Camp Detrick. Approximately five months later, when it became apparent that we were going to have trouble with Russia, strict security was again restored concerning the operations at Camp Detrick. However, in the opinion of [redacted] considerable damage had been done. For example, a book was published by Dr. THEODORE ROSEBURY, who formerly occupied the position now held by [redacted] entitled "Peace or Pestilence", which gives a very thorough review of the experiments and the progress of experiments conducted up to that time at Camp Detrick. Both [redacted] are in violent disagreement with the policy which resulted in the publication of this book, or the giving of any publicity to the BW experiments. b6 b7C

Info on Rosebury furnished to IDA Ethan

IDA advs. book contains no classified info Ethan

The next contact with [redacted] will be made in a thirty day period, if the [redacted] referred to above has been conducted. However, if it has not, no recontact will be made until this experiment has been completed, as it is the only new development presently on the agenda of [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

Very truly yours,

M. W. McFARLIN
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LABORAT[redacted]
PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY SECTION

Date_____, 1950

____Mr. Harbo	7625	____Mr. Beach	7121
____Mr. Parsons	7121	____Mr. Berley	7416
____Mr. Bowles	7601	____Mr. Berte	7417
____Mr. Conrad	7140	____Mr. Bidez	7125
____Mr. Downing	6228IB	____Mr. Donaldson	7410
		____Mr. Duckett	7410
____Miss Frawley	7625	____Mr. Duncan	7125
____Miss Keough	7121	____Mr. Flach	7328
		____Mr. Frazier	7416
____Miss Grobusky	7121	____Mr. Gallagher	7417
____Mrs. Kidd	7121	____Mr. Gormley	7407
____Mrs. Quartana	7121	____Mr. Heiberger	7125
____Miss Smith	7121	____Mr. Heilman	7417
		____Mr. Jevons	7328
____Laboratory Files	7621	____Mr. LaRock	7324
____Mail Room	5533	____Mr. Magee	7407
____Reading Room	5531	____Mr. Poppleton	7416
____Records Section		____Mr. White	7407
____Single Fingerprint	6306IB	____Mr. Williams	7416
		____Mr. Zimmers	7416

____M_____

____Please See Me
____Please Handle
____Note and Return
____Please Call Me
____Please Send File
____Please File

Pls file

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DATE 9/10/04 BY 60322uc/pas/bja/jenp

PHYSICS & CHEMISTRY SECTION
Room 7121, Ext 353

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 2/14/50

FROM : SAC, Baltimore

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

ReBAlet 2/10/50, in which are outlined experiments to be conducted in the future by [redacted] of the Special Operations Division, Camp Detrick, Md., in the field of biological warfare. b6 b7C

Referenced let indicates that they intend to conduct an experiment in BW attack against key agencies in Wash., D. C., in connection with their project. The identity of these key agencies was not furnished, however, this letter is for the purpose of specifically calling the attention of the BU to the fact that the Dept. of Justice Bldg., in Wash., D. C., may be one of the buildings against which the simulated attack might be launched.

The referenced letter indicates that [redacted] were not impressed with the security presently in force at the Pentagon Bldg. when they conducted biological warfare experiments at this location. b6 b7C

DEFERRED RECORDING

This information is being furnished to the Bureau for whatever action is deemed appropriate.

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DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]/NICHOLSON/ENP
ON 9/15/04

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MAR 8 1950

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[redacted] b6 b7C

February 2, 1950

Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

VITAL FACILITIES
THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

100-93216-

As you are aware, the various departments of the Department of Defense have previously furnished to this Bureau lists of vital facilities considered to be of major importance to the Department of Defense in the event of war. At the present time, a complete and up-to-date list of vital facilities is being prepared by the Department of Defense. The previous lists referred to above, which were furnished to this Bureau by the Department of the Army, contained the water supply systems of many of the major cities in the United States, including the city of New York.

[redacted] recently advised this Bureau that his department is frequently requested to admit representatives of foreign governments to inspect the New York water system and that such inspections are allowed. b6 b7C

There are transmitted herewith for your information and assistance one photostatic copy each of seventeen self-explanatory letters and one memorandum, which were made available to this Bureau by Commissioner Paduano, relating to this matter and which indicate that representatives of foreign governments are also being allowed to visit water facilities in other cities of the United States which have been named as vital facilities in the above lists.

It is not known by this Bureau whether foreign representatives are being furnished with blueprints and/or detailed information concerning these water supply systems at the time they are conducted on these tours of inspection. It is believed, however, that in view of the apparent danger to the internal security of this country from the standpoint of biological warfare sabotage, the personnel in charge of these facilities should use considerable caution in furnishing information to representatives of foreign governments.

The above information and copies of the attachments referred to herein were furnished to the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army by this Bureau in view of the fact that this Bureau has no jurisdiction for the protection of these vital facilities. The Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army subsequently advised that it was their belief that the Department of the Army was not in a position to discuss directly precautionary security measures with the officials of civilian water supply systems.

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DECLASSIFIED BY 1048 DXM/GWN
ON 12/10/92

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The above is being brought to your attention as [redacted] with the thought in mind that you may desire to bring this matter to the attention of the Committee for its consideration. b6 b7C

Enclosure

14 NOV 1949

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter, Subject: "Vital Facilities", dated 31 October 1949 and inclosures thereto which indicate that representatives of foreign governments are being allowed to visit water facilities in cities in the United States which have been listed as vital facilities by the National Military Establishment.

The Intelligence Division, GSUSA, has no information as to whether such foreign representatives are furnished with blue prints and/or detailed information concerning the water supply systems visited. However, the Intelligence Division, GSUSA, is in thorough accord with your opinion that the personnel in charge of these facilities should use considerable caution in furnishing information to such foreign visitors in view of the apparent danger to the internal security of the United States from the standpoint of biological sabotage.

In this connection, it is believed that the Department of the Army is not in a position to discuss directly this precautionary security measure with the officials at civilian water supply systems. It is believed that this is a matter that falls within the purview of the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Accordingly, it is suggested that the appropriate representative of the Department of Justice be apprised of this situation and requested to present the matter to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for its consideration.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

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DATE 9/15/04 BY [illegible]

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Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
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F.B.I. TELETYPE

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ON 9/15/04

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DECODED COPY

WA 1 FROM BALTIMORE 10 12-39 PM MLF

DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE. REBALET FEBRUARY 10, 1950. SPECIFIC REFERENCE PAGE THREE, PARAGRAPH THREE.

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FOR INFORMATION ONLY.

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RECEIVED: 3-10-50 1:20 PM MET

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MAR 14 1950

EX-87

31

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b7C

Bid 3/13/50

b6
b7C

6 MAR 17 1950

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to b
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably pa
order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: March 17, 1950

FROM : SAC, NEWARK

SUBJECT: PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

Re Bureau letter dated March 6, 1950.

[redacted] advised on March 14, 1950 [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] stated he has done this work under the direction of officers from Camp Detrick, and the work has been discussed in seminars. According to [redacted] the officials of Camp Detrick call this work non-classified and he stated that no classified secret or restrictive work is being done by him for the Armed Forces at Rutgers University. He also advised that nitrogen metabolism in plants in common language is working with weed killers and has been discussed in many publications, and products of this type are on the market for the public to buy.

In connection with referenced letter to Albany from the Bureau which Newark and Baltimore received copies with enclosures, the enclosure for Newark, besides having a lead to contact [redacted] also contained the name of [redacted] b6 b7C

It appears that this name was inadvertently sent to the Newark office and consequently Baltimore is being notified of this individual and requested to interview [redacted] as per instructions in referenced Bureau letter. b6 b7C

NK 65-3888
JRL:eg
cc: Baltimore

100-73216-
NOT RECORDED
135 MAR 21 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324uc/nls/sta/rnp
ON 9/15/04

a5

DIRECTOR, FBI

March 15, 1950

SAC, MINNEAPOLIS

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ReBurlet to Albany dated March 6, 1950.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

and he promised his full hearted cooperation.

Appropriate index cards have been prepared.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/15/04 BY [illegible]

GRD/abw
65-799

INDEXED - 60 100-93216-365
NOT RECORDED
148 MAR 17 1950

ORIGINAL FILED IN [illegible]

PERSONAL ATTENTION

RECORDED - 46 / 62-93716-266

SAC, Baltimore
Director, FBI

March 31, 1950

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

EX-136

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/15/04 BY 60340TUC/NLS/RSTP/RNP
Pg 1; OGA 10/18/04 60340TUC/NLS/RSTP/RNP

Reurlet March 17, 1950.

Reference is made to the suggestion of [redacted] contained in paragraph one, page six of your referenced letter that Special Agent [redacted] of your office, meet the appropriate representative of [redacted] to obtain information relating to the captioned matter. For your information, by letters dated September 16, 1949, the Director of Intelligence, General Staff, Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of Special Investigations, The Department of the Air Force; [redacted] were requested to keep the Bureau currently advised of all pertinent developments in the captioned matter considered of interest to the Bureau in view of our investigative responsibilities. Agent [redacted] should inform [redacted] that liaison has already been established in this matter with the [redacted] by the Bureau and no purpose would apparently be served in having Agent [redacted]

b2
b7C
b6

Reference is made to the suggestion of [redacted] contained on pages seven and eight of your referenced letter, that the Bureau alert Public Health Agencies throughout the United States to the possibilities of a biological warfare attack. Agent [redacted] should advise [redacted] that such action is not within the jurisdiction of the Bureau. You are further instructed to advise [redacted] that this matter has been referred by the Bureau to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for appropriate consideration and action. The jurisdiction of this Bureau in this field is to investigate violations of espionage and sabotage relating to biological warfare.

b6
b7C

For your additional information, the Bureau is endeavoring to obtain copies of the documents referred to in your referenced letter relating to the captioned matter.

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

EHM:de;jw;sd

APR 5 10 07 AM '50
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED FBI

APR 30 1950
COMM - FBI

62 APR 12 1950

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Baltimore, Maryland
March 17, 1950

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

PERSONAL ATTENTION
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322/UC/NLS/DSTA/RNP
ON 9/15/11
Ag1, DGA-10/18/04 60322/UC/NLS/DSTA/RNP

Director, FBI

Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE; SABOTAGE

Dear Sir:

On March 9, 1950, Special Agent [redacted] of the Baltimore Office, contacted [redacted] advised that a test run of [redacted] whereby a simulated BW attack was made against the Pentagon Building [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

The full-dress attack was to be held on March 11, 1950, and the same equipment used in the March 3rd attack was to be used.

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

EGG:KSS
66-891

Rec'd 3/24/50 Elm

Sac Baltimore 3-31-50 Elm

RECORDED - III 100-93216-266
MAR 22 1950
34
FILED - III
SERIALIZED

Director, FBI
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
March 17, 1950

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

A full report of the result of the experiment will be prepared by [redacted] and should be available about April 10, 1950. A copy of this report will be furnished to the Bureau directly. b6 b7C

With reference to the Bureau letter dated February 24, 1950, inquiring as to the identity of buildings against which simulated BW attacks will be made, [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

In this regard, [redacted] stated that the scientists engaged in BW research have had difficulty in selling the military higher-ups on the practicality of BW warfare, but that in the past month a great deal more interest has been shown in this type of warfare both from the standpoint of offensive weapon in the hands of our own armed forces, as well as from the standpoint of taking precautions to protect the United States from a BW attack by an enemy. b6 b7C

[redacted] both agree that it is probable that foreign countries engaged in BW research will arrive at the same conclusions, and in all probability decide on the same BW agents for use in an offensive attack on their part. It therefore appears to be of some value to list the types of [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

There is no doubt in the mind of [redacted] that it will be possible, both for the United States and for a foreign enemy, to bring about the infection of humans with any of the above ailments because they have been known to occur in human beings in every instance, and

b6
b7C

Director, FBI
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
March 17, 1950

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] No date has been set for this experiment.

At the time of Agent [redacted] contact, [redacted] had in his possession a photostatic copy of an article entitled [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] The document itself does not contain any information reflecting its origin.

The document is in extremely general terms, but does indicate

b6 b7C b7D [redacted]

It appears that it would be of assistance to the Bureau to ascertain, if possible, the origin of this article, and it is suggested

that contact be made with the appropriate authorities at IDA at Washington, D. C. so that in the event subsequent information of this nature is put out by the Army, it will be available to the Bureau.

[redacted] is of the opinion that the information reflected in this article had been compiled by [redacted] and suggested that he would make arrangements for Agent [redacted] to meet the appropriate representative of [redacted] so that any further information of this nature could be made available to the Bureau through Agent [redacted] This suggestion was made at such a time that it was not possible for Agent [redacted] to discuss it further with [redacted] However, he will be advised that it would probably be more practical for a representative from the Bureau to make contact with [redacted] to receive information of this kind, and it is suggested that a specific request for this type of information be made by the Bureau from the headquarters of [redacted]

b6
b7C
b2

[redacted] also exhibited to Agent [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

Copies of all of these reports are in the possession of IDA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., and it appears that it would be of some value to the Bureau to secure them and have them digested for the information of the agents.

The Baltimore letter dated February 10, 1950, called the attention of the Bureau to a suggestion made by [redacted] that Public Health Agencies throughout the United States be alerted to the possibilities of an enemy BW attack, and be furnished the information concerning the most likely agents to be used by an enemy in order that they might be alert to reporting an unusual number of cases of these types of diseases so that if warranted, an investigation to determine the possibility of their originating as a result of an enemy BW attack might be undertaken.

b6
b7C

The reaction of the Bureau to this suggestion would be of interest to the Baltimore Office and to [redacted]

b6
b7C

Director, FBI
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
March 17, 1950

It is recognized that the alerting of Public Health Agencies, if not handled in a most discreet manner, might result in public panic, but at the same time, in view of the present international situation, it does not appear too improbable that Biological Warfare could be launched by Russia at any time. It would, therefore, seem necessary for the Bureau, in order to carry out its responsibility of attempting to protect the American public from a BW attack, to immediately take some positive steps to inaugurate such a program of protection, and any practical suggestions offered by men in the position of [redacted] should be given every consideration. b6 b7C

Very truly yours,

M. W. McFarlin
EXEC.

M. W. McFARLIN
Special Agent in Charge

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN.

From "ROSSIYA", November 3,1949, 480 Canal St., NEW YORK 13,N.Y.- Page 1,col.5,6.

THE USSR HAS RECOURSE TO BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE.

WASHINGTON.- The new Chief of the Chemical Corps of the Army, Major General ANTHONY C. McAULIFFE, stated that "the RUSSIANS have recourse to bacteriological warfare and will set everything in motion that they can,if war approaches".

General McAULIFFE began his assignment as Chief of Chemical Defense after his return from JAPAN where he had been commander of the 24th Infantry Division.-

FGN.
3/20/1950.

[redacted] b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/16/04 BY 60324uc/NIS/ROTA/RNP

File 100 - 93216

INDEXED - 27

File ~~100 - 25~~

EX-136

100-93216-261

[redacted] b6 b7C

5 1 APR 12 1950

301 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
March 20, 1950

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

RE: PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of March 6, 1950, wherein it is requested that [redacted] be contacted and informed of the Bureau's jurisdiction and responsibilities in espionage, sabotage and internal security matters as they may apply to the project on which [redacted] is working. b6 b7C

Reference is further made to the Bureau teletype dated March 20, 1950, wherein it was stated that contact should be held in abeyance.

For the Bureau's information [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted] prior to the receipt of reference teletype. The Bureau's jurisdiction in espionage, sabotage and security matters were explained to [redacted] and at the time of contact [redacted] mentioned he was not aware that the contracts he was working on were classified but was aware of the fact that the contracts related to Biological Warfare. b6 b7C

[redacted] advised that any matter of interest along the lines mentioned in reference letter would be immediately reported to the Salt Lake City Office. b6 b7C

RUC

Very truly yours,

100-93216-V

JAY C. NEWMAN
SAC

CEJ:MEN
65-1103

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322 TUC/NLS/STA/RNP
ON 9/16/04

Director, FBI

March 21, 1950

SAC, Chicago

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324UC/baw/sdr/rmp
ON 9/16/04

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R
(Bufile 100-349987)

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to Bureau letter directed to Albany, with a copy for the Chicago Office, dated March 6, 1950. Reference is also made to Bureau teletype dated March 20, 1950, containing the same captions.

Prior to receipt of this teletype, the Chicago Office had contacted [redacted] b6 b7C [redacted] The jurisdiction of the Bureau was explained to [redacted] in accordance with Bureau letter dated March 6, 1950.

In view of the instructions furnished in Bureau teletype dated March 20, 1950, it is noted that [redacted] volunteered the information that the contract in question pertained to Biological Warfare, and also that he was aware of the fact that the contract was classified as secret by the Army. He mentioned this when he made the observation that he could not understand why the contract on which he was working was regarded as classified at all. He stated that some time ago this type of contract, on which he has worked for some time, was regarded as classified by the Army. He said that the classified nature of the contract had then been removed and that all the information of a technical nature pertaining to his work had been freely published in technical and scientific publications. He stated that recently the contract had again been regarded as classified, but it was his opinion that nothing has been developed to date in connection with this project that was not already published during the period when the work was not regarded as classified.

b6 b7C

With further reference to this matter, the Bureau's attention is directed to Baltimore letter to the Bureau dated March 8, 1950, with copies for Chicago, prepared under the "Procli" caption and pertaining to contracts within the Chicago Division. That letter pertains to Contract [redacted] which was placed with Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, and classified as secret. It was ascertained in the course of the interview with [redacted] that this is the contract number of the Biological Warfare contract on which he is engaged. This raises the possibility that the Baltimore Office, in advising various divisions of contracts placed by Camp Detrick, may have initiated Procli contacts in connection with other Biological Warfare contracts.

b6 b7C

100-93216-

NOT RECORDED
135 MAR 23 1950

SFT:lab
65-3242
cc: Baltimore

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-349987-9

189B

Letter to Director Re: Procli

For the information of the Bureau, the Chicago Office has made no contact in connection with the Biological Warfare contract at the University of Chicago, and will not do so until advised to the contrary by the Bureau, in view of the contents of Bureau teletype dated March 20, 1950.

Director, FBI

March 22, 1950

SAC, Cincinnati

PERSONAL ATTENTION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference Bureau letter to Albany dated March 6, 1950, with copy to Cincinnati.

[redacted]

always keep them advised of any suspicious activities. He stated, however, that he was very glad to learn of the location of the Bureau Field Office in Cincinnati and would definitely contact this office in the event anything of a suspicious nature should come to his attention, although he did not believe that any such thing would occur in view of the secrecy in which his work is being carried out.

[redacted] during the course of the conversation, mentioned that he was aware of the type of research that was being carried on along the lines of biological warfare.

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL
100-93216-
NOT RECORDED

JHZ:NJB
65-1646

DECLASSIFIED BY COR/FBI/NJS/ETA/RNP
ON 9/16/01

58 MAR 30 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-3 [illegible]

b6
b7C

Director, FBI

SAC, Baltimore

3/23/50

PERSONAL ATTENTION - CONFIDENTIAL

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE (R)

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ReBulet 3/6/50 and Butel 3/20/50 in the captioned matter.

Referenced Bulet instructs the Baltimore Office to make contact with [redacted] in connection with their handling of the biological warfare research at that institution. Referenced teletype instructs that this contact be held in abeyance inasmuch as these individuals may not be aware of the classification of contracts and the fact that these contracts are related to biological warfare. b6 b7C

The attention of the Bureau is called to the fact that [redacted] is identical with the [redacted] b6 b7C

SAC FRED HALLFORD of the Baltimore Office are carried under the [redacted] file caption and are available to the Bureau.

It is suggested that the Bureau take these facts into consideration in determining whether [redacted] should be contacted at any time in the future by Agents of the Balto. Office in connection with biological warfare ~~matters~~, and that the Balto. Office be appropriately advised. b6 b7C

It is also suggested that the Bureau may desire to call the attitude previously exhibited by [redacted] to the attention of the Military Intelligence authorities responsible for Biological Warfare Intelligence. b6 b7C

As indicated in the [redacted] communications, the Baltimore Office indices contain no derogatory information concerning [redacted] and a 116 investigation conducted by the Baltimore Office under file #116-598 disclosed no derogatory information on him. However, in connection with the [redacted] incident, [redacted] indicated that [redacted] in the sense that he was thoroughly familiar with [redacted] activities and ideologies, and it appears that this may in itself make [redacted] a poor security risk. b6 b7C

EGG:ELC
65-1609

INITIALS OF ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] ON 9/16/04

58 MAR 30 1950

Director, FBI

March 23, 1950

SAC, New York

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE-R
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE-SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/16/04 BY [illegible]

Rebulet to Albany, March 6, 1950

[redacted] was contacted on March 15, 1950 by SA [redacted] and apprised of the bureaub jurisdiction regarding classified government contracts. [redacted]

b7C
b6

[redacted] SA [redacted] and advised of the bureau's jurisdiction in this matter on March 16, 1950. [redacted] advised that the work being done for the government concerns contract [redacted] He said that he does not consider the work being done by the association at the present time to be of a confidential nature or anything that is of importance. He said that the following persons, other than himself, are connected with the project.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] said he believed that the army had cleared all the above mentioned persons to work on the project.

b6
b7C

[redacted] also advised that during the summer months a symposium is held at the association and there are many scientists who come from all parts of the country, including foreign countries. He said that, of course, he does not know most of these people and that they have free access to the buildings where some of the government work is being conducted. He said there is a question in his mind whether anyone not familiar with the project would understand what is being done.

b6
b7C

Inasmuch as rebulet reflects that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

JWL:EMR
65-14683

44 MAR 28 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-34991-3 H-1-12

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] Arrangements have been made for him to contact SA [redacted] upon his return. The above contacts were made prior to receipt of butel March 20, 1950, requesting that these leads be held in abeyance. Unless advised to the contrary by the bureau, if [redacted] does contact Agent [redacted] a general discussion concerning the bureau's interest in classified contracts will be had with him, making no mention of Biological warfare.

b6
b7C

Director, FBI

March 27, 1950

SAC, Mobile

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/16/04 BY [illegible]

ReBulet 3/6/50 to Albany captioned as above, a copy of which was furnished this office.

In accordance with the instructions contained in relet, SA [redacted] personally contacted [redacted] on 3/20/50. The latter is [redacted] He advised SA [redacted] SA [redacted] informed [redacted] b6 b7C of this Bureau's jurisdiction and responsibilities in espionage, sabotage and internal security matters and he was requested to promptly furnish this office with any information coming to his attention in connection with the project which would logically be of interest to the Bureau in view of our responsibilities.

[redacted] stated that he understood the Bureau's jurisdiction and responsibilities in connection with this matter and he assured SA [redacted] that he would cooperate to the best of his ability. He pointed out that the project being handled by his department at this University is a relatively small one, that it is his understanding that the Army funds appropriated for its furtherance have been almost exhausted and it is also his understanding that instant project will not be carried on at Florida State University after 8/1/50. b6 b7C

It should be noted that the above contact with [redacted] was made on 3/20/50 in compliance with Bureau instructions contained in reBulet. Subsequent to this contact on 3/20/50, the Bureau advised this office as well as the Birmingham and Memphis Offices by teletype dated 3/20/50 that the contacts requested in relet should be held in abeyance as information has been received indicating that the supervisors of the contracts may not be aware of the classification of the contracts and that the contracts are related to Biological Warfare. b6 b7C

It should be noted, however, that in the contact with [redacted] the subject of Biological Warfare was not mentioned and the contact was limited to a very brief discussion of the Bureau's jurisdiction and responsibilities in espionage, sabotage and internal security matters as previously set forth in this letter. b6 b7C

No further action in this matter is being taken by the Mobile Office. RUC

JBH:lg
65-10

INDEXED - 87

NOT RECORDED
86 MAR 31 1950

ORIGINAL FILE IN

APR 4 1950

Director, FBI

March 23, 1950

SAC, Cleveland

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/17/04 BY [illegible]/NLS/BSM/RNP

Re Bureau letter to Albany dated March 6, 1950.

In accordance with referenced letter, [redacted] b6 b7C [redacted] He was further requested to promptly furnish this office with any information coming to his attention in connection with the project which would logically be of interest to the Bureau in view of the Bureau's responsibilities in this matter.

[redacted] advised that he presently held two contracts with the Department of the Army in this matter as follows:

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] added that neither of these contracts were classified in that they were neither secret, confidential, nor restricted in nature.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

65-2614
CAE:EM

INDEXED - 87

[illegible]-278

FOR THE RECORD
86 MAR 31 1950

56 APR 4 1950

ORIGINAL FILE IN [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

In view of the above facts, Cleveland will not maintain any subject index cards for Western Reserve University in connection with this case as authorized in this program nor will copies of reports concerning subjects of security cases be forwarded to the armed services, if these subjects are employed by the University, inasmuch as the above contracts are non-classified. If classified contracts are awarded to Western Reserve University, however, in connection with this program, the cards will be maintained and reports will be forwarded to the armed services as before.

In connection with the Procli Program, the following firm and individual was contacted on the date indicated and the Bureau's jurisdiction and interest in accordance with the Procli Program was explained to the security representative:

[redacted]

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b7C

b6
b7C

AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
S DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 20 1950

TELETYPE

CARBON COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr Tracy
Mr Harbo
Mr Belmont
Mr Mohr
Tele Room
Mr Nease
Miss Gandy

FBI CLEVELAND 3-20-50 1-52 PM EST

DIRECTOR FBI

URGENT

PROCLI, ESPIONAGE - R. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE.

REURTEL TODAY. LEAD ALREADY COVERED AND LETTER BEING SUBMITTED

b6
b7C

END

1-34 PM OK FBI WA HK M

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/16/04 BY 60324 UC/NKS/SSTK/RNP

100-93216-

NOT RECORDED

136 MAR 27 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b6
b7C

Orig:

52 APR 10 1950

CONFIDENTIAL
VIA LIAISON

Date: March 24, 1950

To: Director of Intelligence
General Staff
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: [redacted] b6 b7C

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: LIAISON CAMP DETRICK, MARYLAND
Biological warfare

Reference is made to your letter dated December 14, 1949, wherein you advised that arrangements had been established in order that liaison could be instituted between a representative of this Bureau, Special Agent [redacted] and your representatives at Camp Detrick, Maryland. b6 b7C

This is to advise that Special Agent [redacted] of the Baltimore Office of this Bureau, has been instructed to replace Special Agent [redacted] for a temporary period in this liaison arrangement. b6 b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324uc/MLS/KSR/RNP
ON 9/17/04

RECORDED - 56 62-93216-274
INDEXED - 56

EHM/de

Olson
Nichols
Boardman
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Tidy

Personal delivery 3-24-50 cmb

APR 29 1950

ne

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b7C

March 31, 1950

Director, FBI

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

A suggestion was recently made to this Bureau that the Public Health Agencies throughout the United States should be alerted by this Bureau to the possibilities of an enemy BW attack, and that these agencies should be furnished with information concerning the most likely BW agents to be used by an enemy.

In view of the fact that the alerting of such agencies is not within the jurisdiction of this Bureau, the above suggestion is being forwarded to you for appropriate consideration and action by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

It would be appreciated if you would advise this Bureau of any action taken in connection with this matter in view of our responsibilities in this field.

RECORDED - 129 100-4321-275

APR 10 1950

80

EHM:se

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] ON 9/17/04

RECEIVED DIRECTOR
F B I
MAR 31 8 59 AM '50

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE RECEIVED-FBI
APR 5 10 40 AM '50


U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE
F B I
RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM
APR 5 4 52 PM '50

RECEIVED READING ROOM
F B I
U S DEPT OF JUSTICE
APR 5 10 06 AM '50

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

MAILED 12
APR 6 1950
COMM - FBI

65 APR 14 1950



Director, FBI

SAC, New York

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

April 12, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/13/04 BY 60324 uc/NK/ccp/ENP

Rebulet 3/6/50, butel 3/20/50 and mylet 3/23/50.

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

cc--NY File 100-93980

100-93216-

NOT RECORDED
137 MAR 21 1950

ORIGINAL COPY

JWL:EMD
65-14683

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

422 Federal Office Building - Civic Center
San Francisco 2, California
April 17, 1950

AIR MAIL
REGISTERED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Director, FBI

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Dear Sir: Rebulet 3/22/50.

In accordance with Bureau instructions, liaison with [redacted] b2 b7D has been broadened to include the scope outlined in referenced Bureau letter. There is set out hereinafter the results of the initial conversations with [redacted] in accordance with instructions contained in rebulet.

[redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7D

CFB:afh
65-4167

100-93216-217


RECORDED 34

SEP 19 1950

37

52 SEP 19 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/17/04 BY 60322 UC/NLS/BCA/RNP



b2
b6
b7C
b7D

In accordance with Bureau instructions, instant communication will be supplemented at least every thirty days. It is noted that the initial discussions with [redacted] have not been concerned with specifics in so far as the BW media are concerned and it is felt that until such time as the liaison agent has gained

b2
b7D

sufficient background in this matter, no discussion of specifics can be profitably conducted. The Bureau is requested to submit any observations it may have with regard to the foregoing material.

Very truly yours,

Harry M. Kimball

HARRY M. KIMBALL
SAC

[illegible] Committee on Internal Security

2107 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

April 7, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

This will acknowledge receipt of your memorandum dated March 31, 1950, concerning "Biological Warfare (BW) Sabotage - Espionage."

I wish to inform you that this matter has been referred to the ICIS Standing Committee for appropriate consideration. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/04 BY 60324 uc/ICIS/BOTA/RNP

RECORDED - 39

EX-20

[illegible] 1950

5- Ethan

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 22 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : [redacted] b6 b7C

FROM : [redacted]

DATE: December 6, 1949

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

62-1

RH

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

b6 b7C

[redacted]

PURPOSE:

Your approval is requested in order that the attached report can be forwarded to the FBI Laboratory in order that a study can be made to determine what safeguards can be employed by the Bureau and its Field Offices to prevent the effective [redacted] b7E

BACKGROUND:

The attached memorandum dated November 25, 1949, with enclosure dated October 12, 1949, received from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sets forth in detail the results of a study of the vulnerability of the Pentagon to sabotage with biological warfare agents via the ventilating system.

The results of this test are shown graphically in figures 2 through 19 of the enclosure referred to above. Although only a relatively small amount of a simulant was used and that was placed in only one of the 59 air conditioning units in the Pentagon building, the results indicate that [redacted] b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum and the attachment thereto be forwarded to the FBI Laboratory for the reason set forth under the Purpose Section of this memorandum.

Attachment

RECORDED - 6
INDEXED - 6

100-93216-279

APR 18 1950

EHM:jam

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/17/04 BY 60267 uc/lns/sbr/rnp

34

FIVE

[redacted] b6 b7C

MAY 22 1950

SAC, San Francisco

March 22, 1950

Director, FBI
100-93216-279X
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

PERSONAL ATTENTION
REGISTERED - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

RECORDED - 40 ~~65-56698-55~~

EX-94

Reference is made to your letter dated March 2, 1950.

Authority is granted for your office to establish liaison arrangement between your office and the Navy's Biological Warfare Center, which is presently being moved to the Navy Supply Depot in Oakland, California. In this connection the Agent of your office assigned to handle this liaison arrangement must be an experienced and mature agent. As you know, the subject matter of biological warfare is regarded by the Department of Defense as top secret and the contacts made in this case must be handled carefully and with mature judgment.

The purpose of instituting this liaison is to enable the Bureau to have in its possession the necessary information relating to this case which will enable us to more efficiently carry out our investigative responsibilities. It is desired that the Bureau be kept currently advised of all pertinent information relating to biological warfare, which will enable us to recognize potential biological warfare sabotage or espionage techniques and which will assist us to locate in the United States, or in the territories under the Bureau's jurisdiction, any individual or groups of individuals who are prospective BW sabotage-espionage agents. Through this liaison it is believed that we can secure pertinent background data concerning BW and information relating to the latest developments and discoveries in this field.

Information obtained, by the liaison agent selected by you in this case, during his contacts at the Navy's Biological Warfare Research Center should be furnished to the Bureau in a clear, concise, and intelligent manner on a 30 day basis.

It is believed that this liaison agent should be thoroughly familiar with SAC letter #81, dated May 25, 1948, captioned, "Biological Warfare - Sabotage," and SAC letter #104, Section A, dated November 16, 1949, captioned, "Biological Warfare, Sabotage-Espionage," prior to making his first contact at the Navy's Biological Warfare Research Center.

[redacted] b7D

You are instructed to personally see that this matter is given thorough attention and that the results of the first contact in this liaison arrangment be furnished to the Bureau in the near future.

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

EHM:gmu(eew) 65 APR 12 1950

MAILED
MAR 23 1950
COMM-FBI

REGISTERED
497364

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/13/04 BY SCG/TAS/SEH/RWP

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
F B I
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAR 23 11 03 AM '50

MAR 22 5 21 PM '50
D. TOLSON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 21, 1950

FROM : [redacted] b6 b7C

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

PURPOSE

To secure your approval in order that the attached letter can be forwarded to the San Francisco Office.

BACKGROUND

In connection with the captioned matter it is noted that the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction in matters relating to biological warfare espionage and sabotage within the U. S., Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii. In order that we will be kept advised of all pertinent developments relating to the captioned matter within our jurisdiction we have in the past addressed communications to the [redacted] b2 Army, Navy, Air Force, and to our representatives abroad requesting them to keep us informed. In addition liaison has been set up on a monthly basis whereby an agent of the Baltimore Field Office contacts appropriate [redacted]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The San Francisco Office has advised that while contacting [redacted] in the case entitled, [redacted]

[redacted] b2 b7D

RECORDED - 40

MAR 31 1950

EHM:gmu(eew)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/13/04 BY 60267luc/NLS/EOA/RNP EX-94
Per letter dtd 10/18/04 60267luc/NLS/EOA/RNP

E.H.M

MEMO FOR A. H. BELMONT

OBSERVATION:

It is not believed desirable or necessary to have several Bureau Agents attend orientation courses under [redacted] at the Navy's Biological Warfare Research Center. It is believed that more benefit can be obtained by this Bureau in matters relating to the captioned case by having the San Francisco Office institute a liaison arrangement with the Navy's Biological Research Center. In this manner pertinent information can be obtained by the San Francisco Office and forwarded to the Bureau. Where the information obtained would be of benefit to the Bureau in its responsibilities in this matter, such information will be furnished to all of our field offices.

b2
b7D

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the fact that we are interested in obtaining all pertinent information which in any way relates to our investigative jurisdiction in the captioned matter, it is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the San Francisco Office authorizing them to arrange appropriate liaison at the Navy's BW Research Center, Naval Supply Depot, Oakland, California.

Attachment

mm

100-93216

MAY 24 1956

Jules Ehrman
Biological Warfare
file

RECEIVED
MAY 24 10 44 AM '56
SECRET ESPIONAGE
F B I
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

MAY 26 1956

DIRECTOR, FBI

4/17/50

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

Biological Warfare

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R
(Bureau File 100-349987)

Contract - San Francisco Field Division

Re Baltimore letter to Bureau dated 3/8/50.

[redacted] b7D

b2
b7D
b6
b7C

It was ascertained from [redacted]

Bulet of 3/6/50 to the SAC at Albany and certain other SAC's captioned "PROCLI, Espionage - R and Biological Warfare, Espionage - Sabotage" furnished an enclosure to the San Francisco office indicating that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D held a contract having to do with Biological Warfare research and development. Thereafter Butel of 3/20/50 instructed that contact with the person named in the enclosure to Bulet of 3/6/50 should be held in abeyance.

In view of the above instructions, no action is being taken with regard to the information contained in relet from Baltimore to the Bureau.

65-3899
CFB:afh

CC: Baltimore

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/17/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BSTA/RNP

INDEXED - 23

NOT RECORDED
44 APR 22 1950

ORIGINAL COPY

DIRECTOR, FBI

April 18, 1950

SAC, SAN ANTONIO

PROCLI
ESPIONAGE - R
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

ReBulet 3/6/50 and Butel 3/20/50.

This is to advise that [redacted] were contacted in accordance with instructions in Bulet 3/6/50 prior to the receipt of Butel 3/20/50. b6 b7C

Both [redacted] were interviewed in accordance with instructions in Bureau letter dated March 6, 1950, and during the course of the interview it was apparent that both [redacted] were aware of the fact that they were engaged on some sort of a secret research for the Army. No information was furnished to [redacted] other than as set forth in Bureau letter and they advised that they would contact the San Antonio office in the event any information came to their attention. b6 b7C

GWHC:md

SA-65-1357

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324uc/nls/sta/cnp
ON 9/30/04

100-73216-
5-5448

NOT RECORDED
137 MAR 22 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

62 APR 22 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [redacted] b6 b7C

FROM : [redacted]

DATE: April 14, 1950

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room b6
Gandy b7C

Reference is made to a memorandum to Mr. Belmont from [redacted] in the above-captioned matter dated March 31, 1950, which sets forth certain information obtained from individuals at the [redacted] by representatives of the Baltimore Field Office. The memorandum requests that the Liaison Section endeavor to obtain copies of the reports referred to in paragraph 4 and 6 in referenced memorandum from [redacted] Division for review in connection with the captioned matter.

b6 b7C b7D

The writer has approached [redacted] and he stated that he would attempt to procure the documents and make the same available to the Bureau. When these documents are received from [redacted] they will be forwarded to the Espionage Section to the attention of [redacted]

b6 b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Espionage Section for their information.

b6 b7C

SWR:eb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/5/04 BY 60322 UC/NCS/BTA/RNP

RECORDED - 68

100-73216-281

APR 19 1950

APR 27 1950

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 31, 1950

FROM : [redacted] b6 b7C

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

PURPOSE

To secure your approval in order that the attached memorandum and letter may be forwarded to [redacted] and to the Baltimore Office respectively. The memorandum to [redacted] sets forth a suggestion of [redacted] and recommends that appropriate action and consideration be taken by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. The letter to the Baltimore Office states that the above suggestion made by [redacted] is not within the Bureau's jurisdiction and that their suggestion has been referred by the Bureau to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security; also that the Baltimore Office need not maintain liaison with [redacted] regarding Biological Warfare. b6 b7C b7D b2

To secure your approval in order that the Liaison Unit can secure from I.D.A. the documents referred to by [redacted] which would be of interest to the Bureau in the captioned matter and which are in the possession of the Army.

BACKGROUND

You will recall that a liaison arrangement presently exists between the Baltimore Field Office and representatives of the Army's BW Research Center, Camp Detrick, Maryland. The Baltimore Office has advised by letter dated March 17, 1950, that during their latest liaison contact with [redacted] b6 b7C b7D the following pertinent matters were brought to the attention of the Baltimore Office:

[redacted] b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/5/04 BY 60322 uc/sta/lew DOJ 10/18/04 603 Fuck/sta/lew

Attachments

EHM:de;jw;se

RECORDED - 68

INDEXED - 68

APR 19 1950

5 APR 27 1950

E.H.M.

It is not believed that the Bureau's responsibility in the captioned matter includes the protection of the civilian population from a BW attack. Our responsibility is rather to investigate and determine the facts concerning any act of sabotage or attempted sabotage. The Bureau is not in a position to advise any civilian groups or agencies as to what diseases may be regarded as BW agents. This type of information is in the possession of the Department of Defense. The alerting of such agencies is, in fact, interdepartmental in nature. Inspector Keay has advised me that matters of this nature are being considered by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

ACTION

1. It is recommended that the attached memorandum be directed to [redacted] b6 b7C

2. It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the Baltimore Office instructing that [redacted] be advised as follows: b6 b7C

In regard to their suggestion set forth in paragraph No. 5 of this memorandum that the Baltimore Agent meet a representative of [redacted] to obtain information in the captioned matter, the Baltimore Office is being advised that liaison has already been instituted with [redacted] by the Bureau in the captioned case and that information is being currently received.

In regard to the suggestion in paragraph No. 7 of this memorandum that the Bureau should alert public health agencies throughout the United States to the possibilities of a BW attack, the Baltimore Office is being advised to inform [redacted] that the alerting of these agencies is not within the Bureau's jurisdiction. In addition the Baltimore Office is being advised to inform them that their suggestion as to the necessity of alerting such agencies has been brought to the attention of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security by the Bureau for appropriate consideration and action. b2 b6 b7C

The Baltimore Office is being advised to point out that the Bureau's jurisdiction in this field is to investigate violations of espionage and sabotage relating thereto.

The Baltimore Office is also being advised that the BW documents referred to in paragraphs No. 4 and 6 in this memorandum are being made the subject of an inquiry by the Bureau in order that they may be obtained and reviewed.

3. It is further recommended that Liaison endeavor to obtain copies of the articles and reports referred to in paragraphs No. 4 and 6 from I.D.A. for review in connection with the captioned matter by the Espionage Section.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

April 25, 1950

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Jones
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

The attached was sent in by Walter Winchell. It bears the pencilled notation: "To Clyde T. Is this true? Walter W."

Attachment

b6
b7C

mpd

no action 4-27

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/30/04 BY 60324UC/MLS/BTA/RWP

To Clyde T. ?
Do This True
Walter W

WASHINGTON:- The Army is interviewing phizzee-olo-gists and chemists now in civilian clothes. Men who worked on bacteria warfare projects during the war. It is not, of course, the plan or intention of Americans to ever use germs as weapons. But our military has tons of bacteria - a germ killer nicknamed "The Green Death" now stored in deep desert caves in Nevada New Mexico and Arizona. U.S. Chemical War top brass--consider this deadly germ--as lethal--as the Atomic bomb.

Biological Warfare

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/30/04 BY [illegible]

RECORDED
INDEXED - 87

100-93216-783

b6
b7C

SERVICE UNIT 4-22a

Supervisor [redacted] Room 370 8

Subj: [redacted]

___Exact Spelling
__✓__All References
___Subversive Ref.
___Mail File
___Restricted to Locality of

Searchers
Initial mdw
Date 4-22-50

N.D.

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
~~100-93216-254~~	
D.	
NP	
One	
NP	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/30/04 BY 60324UC/NS/BTA/RW

Initialed

SAC, Butte

May 10, 1950

Director, FBI

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

There is attached hereto for each Office receiving a copy of this communication one copy of a letter from the Albuquerque Field Office dated April 24, 1950 to the Bureau entitled "Bacteria Warfare."

The Offices receiving a copy of this communication are instructed to be alert for any similar type reports occurring in your respective Field Office territory, and to promptly advise the Bureau upon receipt of any similar report relating to the captioned matter.

The Albuquerque Office is instructed to promptly advise the Bureau of any additional information developed concerning this matter.

Enclosure

cc-Albuquerque
Denver - Enclosure
Los Angeles - Enclosure
Phoenix - Enclosure
Portland - Enclosure
San Diego - Enclosure
San Francisco - Enclosure
Salt Lake City - Enclosure
Seattle - Enclosure

RECORDED - 89
EX-9
100-13216-286
MAY 15 1950
80

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/04 BY 60324uc/NIS/SCAN/KMP

MAY 10 3 54 PM '50
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

EHM:dmd

MAILED 12
MAY 11 1950
COMM - FBI

MAY 18 1950

b6
b7C



RECORDED - 75 100-93216-887

CONFIDENTIAL
BY REGISTERED MAIL

Date: May 1, 1950

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC/NLS/BSA/ENP ON 7-30-11

Attention: Chief, Security and Training Group

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE, ESPIONAGE - R

THE PHYSICIANS FORUM, INCORPORATED
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

An informant of known reliability has advised this Bureau that

b6
b7C
b7D

There is being furnished for your information a copy of the report of Special Agent dated March 8, 1950, at New York entitled "The Physicians Forum, Incorporated, Internal Security - C."

It will be noted that the current telephone directory for Washington, D. C. lists the address

b6
b7C

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

WAK:dmd

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR

MAILED 14
MAY 3 1950
COMM - FBI

[redacted] b6 b7C

Both of the above organizations have been declared within the purview of Executive Order No. 9835 by the Attorney General.

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

The House Committee on Un-American Activities in its report of March 29, 1944, cited the National Lawyers' Guild as a Communist front. Francis Louis Budenz former Managing Editor of the Daily Worker and former member of the Communist Party National Committee advised the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives that the Communist Party considered the National Lawyers' Guild to be a working ally.

The following information concerning [redacted] b6 b7C

It has been reliably reported to this Bureau that [redacted] a member of the Communist Party in Washington, D. C.; further that as of December 1949, he regularly received copies of the "Daily Worker" and was on the mailing list of "Soviet Russia Today," the National Council of American Soviet Friendship, Incorporated, the Washington Bookshop, and the Council on African Affairs.


The "Daily Worker" was cited as an official Communist Party organ by a Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities March 29, 1944. The Council on African Affairs, the National Council of American Soviet Friendship, Incorporated, and the Washington Bookshop Association have been declared by the Attorney General to fall within the purview of Executive Order No. 9835.

It has been reliably reported that [redacted] has been called upon frequently to fill in as a speaker at the Washington Bookshop Association meetings. b6 b7C

b6 b7C b7D

The following information appears in the files of this Bureau concerning [redacted] This information was provided The Baltimore Office

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy



b6
b7C
b7D

The above information in furnished you in confidence and no dissemination is to be made outside your Division.

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence (CONFIDENTIAL - BY REGISTERED MAIL)
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Director of Special Investigations (CONFIDENTIAL - BY REGISTERED MAIL)
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Tolson_____
Ladd_____
Clegg_____
Glavin_____
Nichols_____
Rosen_____
Tracy_____
Harbo_____
Mohr_____
Tele. Room_____
Nease_____
Gandy_____
_____

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: March 23, 1950

FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare
Sabotage, Espionage - R
The Physicians Forum, Inc.
Internal Security - C

SECRET

100-93216

Re: Bulet dated March 14, 1949
Bureau file 100-358069
New York file 100-91102

In connection with the above captioned matters, it is desired to bring to your attention information received through a trash cover on the home of [redacted] on March 16, 1950. b6 b7C

Contained in this trash cover was a postal card announcement addressed to [redacted] at the above listed address, and postmarked March 9, 1950 at Washington, D. C. This postal card read as follows: b6 b7C

"The Washington Chapter of the Physician's Forum
presents
NORMAN WEISSMAN PhD
on
Medical and Social Implications of Bacteriological Warfare
on
Tuesday, March 14, 8 P.M.
at
[redacted]

The Forum feels privileged to have secured an expert in this important and little discussed field." b6 b7C

[redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7D

INDEXED - 79

GGB:DMD
100-20142, 100-13742, 100-21930, 100-1190
cc: New York

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-358069-1

CLASSIFIED BY: uc/nw/sbh/pmp 60267 AMG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 10/6/2029
10/6/04

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD
DATE : March 23, 1950

RE: Biological Warfare
Sabotage, Espionage - R
The Physicians Forum, Inc.
Internal Security - C

a frequent speaker before that organization. Confidential Informant [redacted] has described [redacted] as a member of the (S) Communist Party in the District of Columbia. b1 b6 b7C

The indices of the Washington Field Office are negative concerning [redacted] b6 b7C

The above is being forwarded for the information of the Bureau. The original of the above mentioned postal card will be maintained as an exhibit in Washington Field Office file 100-13742.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

May 15, 1950

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
VIA LIAISON

b6
b7C

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] UC/NLS/BSTA/RNP
ON 10/6/04

My dear [redacted]

There is set forth below for the information of the President and yourself the following confidential information which has been furnished to this Bureau relating to possible acts of biological warfare committed by the Japanese during World War II.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

EHM:dmd:ppg


INDEXED - 11

MAY 22 1950

5-18-50

E B I
RECEIVED-LOCATION

E B I
RECEIVED-LOCATION



b6
b7C
b7D

In the event any additional information is received by this Bureau relating to the above matter you will be promptly advised.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards.

Sincerely yours,

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: April 24, 1950

FROM : SAC, ALBUQUERQUE

SUBJECT: BACTERIA WARFARE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/7/90 BY SP4 AUC 307009

65-569-217
6-14-Serials-396

JJM/cab
62-0

RECORDED - 32
INDEXED - 32

100-9.3216-295

5-Ethan

May 11, 1950

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
VIA LIAISON

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ASSIFIED BY SP1 A.C.P.S.
3/7/90
#307 009

My dear [redacted]

There is set forth below for your confidential information the following data which has been furnished to this Bureau relating to possible acts of biological warfare committed by the Japanese during World War II.

[redacted]

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b7D

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

EHM:cmd:bar

RECEIVED - 111
MAY 25 1950
FBI

100-93216

5-18-50

28 1950

May 16, 1950

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
VIA LIAISON

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY SP1 AGS C
ON 3/7/90

Dear [redacted]

[redacted]

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Ladd
Clegg
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Nichols
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Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
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[redacted]

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DEPT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARY OF DE...

WASHINGTON

19 May 1950

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/6/04 BY 60267uc/NLS/STA/RNP

b6
b7C

Dear Edgar,

b6
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Thank you very much for your letter of May 16th relating to the report you received from [redacted] This matter is of considerable importance and I would most certainly appreciate having any further information you might receive on this subject.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

100-93216-293

RECORDED - 143

INDEXED - 143

5-EHW

CONFIDENTIAL

62133

SECURITY DIVISION - FBI 5-7

[redacted], 1950

____Mr. Ladd	____Mechanical Section
____Mr. Belmont	____Crime Records Section
____Mr. Hennrich	____Crime Statistics Section
____Mr. Laughlin	
____Mr. Baumgardner	____Identification Division
____Mr. Keay	
____Mr. Stanley	____Technical Laboratory
	____ _____
____Mr. Winterrowd	Room_____

SUPERVISORS

____Mr. Aull	____Mr. Lamphere
____Mr. Bird	____Mr. Linberg
____Mr. Branigan	____Mr. Little
____Mr. Brent	____Mr. Marchessault
____Mr. Brown	____Mr. McCloskey
____Mr. Callahan	____Mr. McMahon
____Mr. Carter	____Mr. Meehan
____Mr. Cattaneo	____Mr. Mossburg
____Mr. Clayton	____Mr. Mrytle
____Mr. Collier	____Mr. Norstrom
____Mr. Dissly	____Mr. Nulty
____Mr. Donahoe	____Mr. Riley
____Mr. Ellis	____Mr. Smith
____Mr. Ezell	____Mr. Stigler
____Mr. Fults	____Mr. Turner
____Mr. Gans	____Mr. Van Loon
____Mr. Goold	____Mr. Walsh
____Mr. Gregg	____Mr. Wannall
____Mr. Jones	____Mr. Whitson
____Mr. Kelly	
____Mr. Kolar	
____Mr. Kuno	
____Mr. Kurtz	____RECORDS SECTION
____Room_____	____Send File
____Mrs. Tuttle, 1736	____Bring file up-to-date
____Miss Borowick, 1736	____Place on Record
____Correct	____Place on Record and return
____Redate	
____Please call me	____Indicate index reference
____Please see me	____Note and return

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/6/95 BY 60322 Fuc/jus/BTA/lenp

See [redacted] letter relative to b6 b7C

Bird Special Wayne.

b6 b7C [redacted]

--Espionage Section

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [redacted]

FROM : [redacted]

b6
b7C

DATE: May 12, 1950

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/04 BY 60267tuc/NIS/ROTP/RNP

Tolson
Ladd
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Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
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[redacted]

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Reference is made to the reports on the experiments conducted by [redacted] The experiments referred to were directed towards ascertaining the vulnerability of the Pentagon personnel to biological sabotage [redacted] Reference is also made
b6 [redacted]
b7C to the memorandum of [redacted] of December 6, 1949, which requests
b7D the Laboratory to determine what safeguards can be employed by the Bureau and its
b7E Field Offices to prevent the effective employment of biological warfare sabotage in [redacted]

[redacted]

RECORDED - 43

100-93216

MAY 24 1950

TDB/DJP/mek

EX-6

5-Ephm

51 MAY 31 1950

b6
b7C

Memorandum to [redacted]
Re: Biological Warfare
Sabotage - Espionage

b6
b7C
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b2
b7E

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL DATE: 5/29/50

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

This is to advise that SA [redacted] has been in telephonic contact with [redacted] during the past 3 weeks and [redacted] has advised that a report of interest to the BU is in the process of preparation and as soon as it is completed he will notify Agent [redacted] and arrangements will be made for another personal conference between Agent [redacted] and [redacted]

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MWMCF:arf
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MAY 12 [redacted]

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52 JUN 2 1950

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ON 10/13/04



Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: February 3, 1953

FROM : MR. H. H. CLEGG

SUBJECT: PROJECT EAST RIVER REPORT

Tolson ✓
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Nease
Gandy

PURPOSE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

To set forth the results of the review of a report submitted by Associated Universities, Incorporated. This report was dated October 1, 1952. It was sent to the Bureau under letter dated December 22, 1952, and signed by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board and the Acting Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. This report was not received in the Bureau, however, until December 30, 1952. The letter was acknowledged under date of January 5, 1953.

Two copies of the report were furnished. One of the cover letters was addressed to Mr. Hoover as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the other was addressed to Mr. Hoover in his capacity as Director of the FBI.

DETAILS:

On June 28, 1951, an agreement was entered into between the Department of the Army and Associated Universities, Incorporated of New York City, which is a nonprofit organization sponsored by nine outstanding universities, whereby the Associated Universities was to conduct studies, surveys, make critical analyses, and prepare and furnish a report on the defense of the Continental United States against foreign attacks by atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. This project was to be referred to as Project East River.

Final report was submitted by letter under date of October 1, 1952, and addressed to the Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration; Chairman, National Security Resources Board; and, The Secretary of Defense. This letter stated that the project was initiated to evaluate and recommend the optimum combination of nonmilitary measures which would

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FHS: 56 APR 9 1953

INDEXED - 90

100-93216-606

13 MAR 27 1953

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ON 12/15/03
Pg 11, OCA 1297600
12/15/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

assist (1) Federal Civil Defense Administration in discharging its responsibilities for preparing to minimize the effects of attack by atomic, biological, chemical, or other weapons on the population and industry of the United States; (2) The National Security Resources Board in discharging its responsibilities of advising the President concerning the strategic location of industries, services, government, and economic activities essential to the National security; (3) the Department of Defense in collaboration with Federal Civil Defense Administration and National Security Resources Board in discharging their responsibilities.

The subject of this report was placed on the agenda of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Working Committee at their meeting on 1/14/53. Receipt of the report was noted and the members were advised that it was being analyzed by the FBI.

This report consists of 11 paper bound volumes and divided into the following 10 parts:

Part I. GENERAL REPORT. (It contains an introduction concerning the Project, Statement of Concepts and Principles, and a Summary of Recommendations.)

Part II. MEASURES TO MAKE CIVIL DEFENSE MANAGEABLE

II-A. Military Measures Precedent to a Manageable Civil Defense

II-B. Federal Leadership to Reduce Urban Vulnerability

Part III. DESTRUCTIVE THREAT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

Part IV. CIVIL DEFENSE ASPECTS OF BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Part V. REDUCTION OF URBAN VULNERABILITY

Part VI. DISASTER SERVICES AND OPERATIONS

Part VII. WARNING AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

Part VIII. CIVIL DEFENSE HEALTH AND WELFARE

Part XI. INFORMATION AND TRAINING FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

Part X. SELECTED REFERENCES FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

Some of these volumes are ~~classified.~~

This report primarily pertains to the organization and functions of the Federal Civil Defense Administration and contains 246 recommendations. The entire report was reviewed to determine if it contained any information affecting the Bureau's operations or pertinent to the War Plans of the Bureau. The following information of these types was taken from the report.

BUREAU'S JURISDICTION

In Volume 1, page 9, in which the term Civil Defense was discussed, it was stated that Civil Defense does not include Federal police missions exclusively assigned to specific agencies charged with the responsibility for combating espionage and sabotage. In Volume 4, on page 6 and 51, in which the subject of biological warfare was discussed, recommendations were made as to actions which should be taken by the Federal Civil Defense Administration in establishing liaison with governmental agencies concerning this matter and action which the Department of Agriculture should take in minimizing the effect of enemy attack upon crops. At both places it was pointed out, however, that this does not mean assuming any of the responsibilities of the FBI for the internal security of the country.

In Volume 8 which is entitled, "Civil Defense Health and Welfare," at page 43 a recommendation was made that responsibility should be delegated to the Public Health Service for carrying out activities necessary for preventing or minimizing the effects of outbreak of disease initiated by enemy attack, but there should be no infringement on the responsibilities of the FBI in internal security.

BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Volume 4 of the report is entitled "Civil Defense Aspects of Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Warfare Against Crops, Animals and Man." This particular portion of the report was dated June 23, 1952. It contained the following data which appears to be of interest to the Bureau:

There is evidence that a potential enemy has or soon will have capabilities of mounting and sustaining major attacks with biological or chemical agents against large population centers, food crops and animals of this country. Radiological warfare is not believed to be a very great threat in the next few years. The use of biological warfare agents by saboteurs could cause casualties and disruption among selected local population groups, but a major knockout blow probably could not be dealt unless covert attacks were widespread and synchronized. The prevention of covert attacks is largely a problem of internal security and the detection of such attack is a matter of effective intelligence concerning the outbreak of epidemics.

The Federal Civil Defense Administration and collaborating federal agencies have made substantial progress in the development of measures to prevent and to minimize the effects of biological warfare, chemical warfare and radiological warfare. However, in some instances the assignment of responsibility for operational and research activities between Federal Civil Defense Administration and other governmental agencies remains unclear. Through lack of clear-cut directives, highly trained individuals and agencies who are well qualified and anxious to help solve some of these problems are not being fully used.

It was recommended by Project East River that an inexpensive anti-gas and anti-particulate general purpose civilian mask be tested and if it meets standards be distributed for general civilian use. The Bureau will determine if such a mask is now available and the advisability of obtaining quantities of it for use by the Bureau.

AGAINST MAN:

In regard to the above-mentioned type of warfare against man, the report contained the following pertinent information:

Covert use of biological warfare against man could be carried out by infectious agents being disseminated by saboteurs through water, air, or food. Safeguards stemming from internal security measures and existing health practices should make questionable the strategic success in such an undertaking. Sporadic and localized use of biological agents would be easier of accomplishment but of much lower order of effectiveness as long as internal security and the ordinary medical and health services are intact. The most likely targets are small and almost unlimited in number. Large scale synchronized sabotage would involve planning, production, and operation of such a magnitude that it should be detected by internal security activities.

The possibilities of sabotage against certain key personnel in concentrated areas must not be overlooked. This could be done through contamination of local water intakes, ventilating systems and food contamination. Protection is largely a problem of internal security and some measures of this kind have already been taken. Especially important civilian units may require additional special internal security measures directed toward guarding of water and ventilation intakes.

In summary, it was stated covert attack upon man with biological agents constitutes a real threat, but not one of strategic importance unless many key personnel are involved; that existing medical and health facilities already provide substantial defense against this form of attack; and that although research should be directed to several phases of the problem, substantial commitments in terms of personnel or funds for defense against covert attack, in addition to that contemplated in the 1953 budget request of the Federal Civil Defense Administration are not indicated except perhaps in the field of internal security.

In regard to chemical warfare against man the report stated a covert attack with chemical agents in advance of an overt attack is unlikely. After an overt attack, a covert attack with chemical agents would be possible but unlikely because of logistics difficulties. The agents would have to be obtained from home base.

Concerning radiological warfare against man, the report stated that it could be carried out today against

civilian populations but probably would not be decisive at the present time, and would most likely be used as a weapon of harassment to deny or impede access to limited areas of materials and to develop panic and confusion. Covert use appears to be quite unlikely, according to the report.

In regard to combining atomic bomb and chemical or biological warfare attack, the report stated that a synchronized covert and overt attack would present major difficulties to an enemy for the following reasons:

(a) There is substantial probability that some of the saboteurs would be apprehended while preparing or distributing the agents and the surprise effect would thus be reduced.

(b) A large number of saboteurs would need to know the places and time of attack well in advance, an enemy would thereby run the risk that this country would learn of the impending attack in sufficient time to strengthen its military and civil defense.

The report stated that any sudden outbreak or intensification of sabotage calls for the marked intensification of internal security measures by agencies familiar with the technical possibilities of chemical warfare, biological warfare and radiological warfare agents. Particular attention should be given to the protection of air, water, and food in installations using key personnel in industry. Just as there are marked military measures precedent to a manageable civil defense, so too, there are internal security measures precedent to manageable civil defense. It was stated therefore that only through close liaison among the agencies with clearly assigned technical and security responsibility can internal security measures precedent to a manageable civil defense be carried out.

The report stated that the protection of food from covert attack is primarily a problem of internal security. The report recommended that the Federal Civil Defense Administration request the Department of Defense and the Public Health Service to intensify their development and evaluation of air and water sampling techniques for use in the event of chemical or biological attack with a view of obtaining rapid automatic detection and identification of the agent employed. Among the instruments needing further development are: particle-size and number counters, protein detectors, spectroscopic biological warfare identification instruments;

membrane filters, and gas samplers.

It was also recommended that the Federal Civil Defense Administration and governmental agencies to whom operational responsibility is delegated or whose services are being used by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, continue and intensify their liaison with the agencies of the government responsible for internal security to the end that

(a) The internal security agencies may be aware of the technical problems involved in sabotage with chemical, biological and radiological weapons, and

(b) The Federal Civil Defense Administration and other agencies may be aware of the time and location of probable sabotage activities.

The report stated that there is no clear delineation of authority and responsibility between the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Public Health Service. It was recommended, therefore, that the Federal Civil Defense Administration delegate to the Public Health Service the responsibility for carrying out such Federal operational activities and retain the responsibility for coordinating the civil defense efforts of the Public Health Service with those of other agencies. In this recommendation it was noted, however, that the Public Health Service should not assume the FBI's responsibility for internal security.

AGAINST ANIMALS:

The report stated that an attack could be made against animals effectively either by sabotage or by overt act of war. It also noted that the Federal Civil Defense Administration has requested the Department of Agriculture to use its facilities for the protection of animals against biological, chemical, and radiological warfare agents. It was noted that the Bureau of Animal Industry maintains close liaison with [redacted] Department of Defense, and Department of State in order to obtain and evaluate information from foreign sources. b2

The following recommendations were made in the report:

(a) Department of Agriculture in collaboration with other appropriate agencies study what are likely to be most fruitful avenues and methods of biological warfare attack on animals and devise necessary counter-measures, [redacted] *and counter-measures would be included in such studies.* b7E

(b) The efforts of the Department of Agriculture to increase the protection of veterinary biologics against sabotage be supported.

(c) That the Federal Civil Defense Administration delegate to the Department of Agriculture responsibility for carrying out such Federal operational activities and retain the responsibility for coordinating the civil defense efforts of the Department of Agriculture with those of other agencies. The recommendation noted, however, that the Department of Agriculture should not assume the responsibility for internal security of the FBI.

CROPS AND FORESTS:

In regard to attack on crops and forests, the report stated that biological agents probably lend themselves most readily to covert warfare but they could be employed overtly by balloon or by more conventional means of delivery. Clandestine attack on crops would seem to be suited to the current program of psychological and economic harassment of this country without the formal declaration of war. It was recommended in the report that the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Department of Agriculture collaborate in planning the Federal operational activities necessary to minimize the effects of enemy attack upon crops by diseases, insects, and other pests and that the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Department of Interior collaborate in planning the Federal operational activities necessary to minimize the effects of outbreaks of forest fires. The report stated, however, that the Department of Agriculture should not assume the responsibilities of the FBI for internal security.

Volume 8 of the report is entitled "Civil Defense Health and Welfare" and contained the following pertinent information under the caption of "Epidemiological Intelligence."

Early detection and identification of illness which may be the result of covert or overt biological or chemical warfare and early clarification of the methods of dissemination are extremely important in recognizing the effects of attack and in alerting for future covert attacks.

It is noted that the danger of clandestine attacks against man is sufficiently great that substantial emphasis must be placed on epidemic intelligence service where they probably would give the first clue that an covert attack had taken place.

Local Health Departments ordinarily investigate unusual outbreaks of diseases and it was recommended that the Health Department should put their epidemic services to a state of proficiency which would assure readily available laboratory services for the identification of ordinary and extraordinary infectious agents and prompt reporting of cases of infectious diseases by physicians and hospitals and adequate personnel and facilities for the prompt investigation of outbreaks of disease.

It was also stated in Volume 8 that the prevention of covert biological warfare attacks involves both public health and internal security measures and responsibility. The latter rest clearly with the internal security agencies. Only by maintaining close liaison between the agencies with clearly assigned technical and security responsibilities can they hope to carry out their respective missions. It stated that such liaison at the Federal level has only recently been undertaken on only somewhat limited scale.

It was recommended in the report that Federal Civil Defense Administration should delegate to the Public Health Service the responsibility for carrying out those Federal operational activities necessary for preventing or for minimizing the effects of outbreak of disease among man initiated by enemy action. But the recommendation noted that there should be no infringement on the responsibilities of the FBI on internal security.

ACTION THE FBI HAS TAKEN IN REGARD TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

The FBI has taken following steps in regard to the subject of biological warfare:

1. SAC letters sent to the field.

(a) SAC Letter No. 81 dated 5-25-48 directed the attention of the field to the importance of this matter and furnished the results of a conference held by various intelligence agencies in Washington, D. C. It was instructed that this letter be brought to the attention of all agents assigned to the investigation of individuals or organizations inimical to the security of the United States.

(b) SAC Letter No. 104 dated 11-16-49 contained a summary of the final report submitted by the Secretary of Defense's Ad Hoc Committee on Biological Warfare. This letter instructed that it was to be thoroughly reviewed by agents assigned to the investigation of espionage, internal security, security matter and/or nationalistic tendency cases. It pointed out that it was the responsibility of the FBI to determine the existence and whereabouts of any sabotage and espionage agents in the United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands and Hawaii and to prevent if possible the carrying out of any acts of sabotage and/or espionage in this field. The letter stated that this did not imply that the Bureau is responsible for the physical protection of any installation or facility.

(c) SAC Letter No. 110 dated 12-14-49 instructed the field offices to interrogate Communist Party informants and to alert them to report any suspicious matters that come to their attention in the field of espionage, sabotage and related Bureau matters, particularly with regard to industrial installations.

(d) No Number SAC Letter dated 7-23-51 forwarded to the field an article on the subject of biological and chemical warfare. It pointed out that this might be of use in connection with sabotage cases should they arise. It instructed that all agents of the office should be advised of the existence of the article which covered a brief discussion of the potentialities of biological warfare and the methods of utilization by saboteurs of both biological and chemical warfare agents.

2. Liaison has been established with the Army Biological Warfare Research Centers at Camp Detrick, Maryland, and Camp Dugway, Utah. Liaison also exists with the Navy's biological project at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California.

3. Liaison exists between a representative of the laboratory and a representative of the Office of the Chief Chemical Officer of the U. S. Army Chemical Corps as to the technical aspects of this subject.

4. In September 1948, the Bureau addressed communications to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, G-2 of the Department of Army, Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force and [redacted] b2 requesting them to keep us advised of all information related to biological warfare which would be of interest and value to the Bureau in the discharge of our responsibilities in connection with this matter.

5. Liaison has been established with the Communicable Disease Center, U. S. Public Health Service to advise us of any evidence or indication of the use of biological warfare. This was done on March 29, 1951.

6. Bureau has a representative on the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Any information coming to the attention of any of the agencies represented concerning this subject would be discussed in the meetings of the Watch Committee.

7. On November 12, 1952, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security made available to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference copies of a report dated 10-21-52 concerning systems for reporting outbreaks of human, animal, and plant diseases in the United States. This report was submitted to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security by its Subcommittee on Defenses Against Unconventional Attack. The Director is Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and copies of this report were thus made available to the Bureau. This report dealt with systems for reporting outbreaks of diseases in the United Statesand made recommendations as to how this should be done.

It is noted that throughout the report the terms "internal security", and "internal security agencies" has been used. These terms have not been defined in the report of Project East River nor is a distinction drawn between those agencies which are concerned with the investigation of sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage and other types of subversion and those other agencies which are concerned with other aspects of internal security.

The FBI has imposed on it the duty of investigating sabotage, espionage, counterespionage and other acts of subversion but it does not have imposed upon it other duties which might be implied in the broad term "internal security".

CIVIL DEFENSE AND PLANT SECURITY

Volume 6 of the report is entitled, "Disaster Services and Operations." There is being set out verbatim the information contained therein concerning civil defense and plant security.

"At the local and state levels there appears to be awareness that plant security is intimately related to civil defense; indeed that some aspects of plant security are identical with civil defense. At the Federal level, the situation is unfortunately confused. Three agencies, the Department of Defense, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Department of Justice, are primarily involved. It is imperative that the functions and responsibilities of these agencies (and possibly others) with respect to plant security and civil defense be clarified. PROJECT EAST RIVER was not briefed fully on this matter by the appropriate Federal agencies. What was revealed at the Federal level confirms the evidence received directly from state and local echelons, including reports from individual plants. The existing Federal scheme appears: (a) to be unrealistic in its forced competition between plant security and civil defense for scarce manpower; (b) to set up needless and wasteful duplication of disaster services; (c) to confuse plant management for no gain but at an over-all loss to national productivity; and (d) to reveal lack of understanding of mutual interests and few attempts to coordinate related activities among Federal agencies.

"Plant security may be divided into three parts:

"(a) Measures to safeguard classified material (printed matter or equipment); control schemes to prevent unauthorized entry, and measures against possible spies, arsonists, saboteurs or, generally, 'men of evil intent'.

"(b) Measures to prevent or minimize the results of such phenomena as fires, floods, and explosions.

"(c) The privilege of Federal contracting agencies to require contractor compliance with standards, procedures, and regulations concerning (a) and (b). (Although standards for protection 'are not mandatory', they are effectively imposed by the military agencies through a close linkage with the measures for (a).)

"Concerning (a) there appears to be no difficulty with regard to the need for adequate and proper controls for classified material. On the other hand, there is need for differentiation between the measures to apprehend spies and saboteurs and the measures to cope with the results and consequences of the activities of these men. These two sets of measures are not the same nor do they even involve the same technical problems. The measures to apprehend spies and saboteurs do not appear to be a proper part of civil defense. The measures against the consequences of the actions of spies and saboteurs are substantially the same, if not always identically the same, as well-recognized civil defense functions. Those latter measures should be properly included in (b) above.

"The measures within a plant to prevent or minimize the results of natural or man-made disasters include: administrative policies and procedures such as routine provision for repair parts and encouragement to all plant personnel to participate in training courses; organization of emergency teams for fire-fighting and temporary repairs; and physical preparations such as sprinkler systems, wide and clean passage-ways, dispersal of storage facilities for explosive materials, and similar good-housekeeping measures. Many plants have found that these policies, procedures, and measures lead to better plant operations. There is a growing belief that good practices and standards are advantageously applicable to all plants, whether the plant is producing a critical defense item or a civilian luxury. The professional services engaged in civil defense are the best qualified of any available forces to advise and assist with the measures described above.

"Concerning (c), it is recognized at present that civil defense can only urge and encourage the adoption of the measures discussed in (b); civil defense is not concerned with measures against spies and saboteurs. Public Law 920 has given the Federal Civil Defense Administration responsibilities for many activities, but even under the Title III emergency conditions there is no implication that the Federal Civil Defense Administration is to assume any of the responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military security agencies. The Federal Civil Defense Administration publications and releases dealing with plant security, (ref. "Civil Defense

in Industry and Institutions', AG-16-1, August 1951,) do not trespass upon the field of responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military security agencies. This cannot be said for publications of the other agencies. The most recent publication by the Department of Defense (Munitions Board), 'Standards for Plant Protection', 1 June 1952, is typical. This publication consists of nine sections, of which the first three deal with measures against spies and saboteurs and the safe-guarding of classified material: 'Prevention of Unauthorized Entry', 'Control of Authorized Entry' and 'Espionage and Sabotage'. The remaining six sections deal, essentially, with civil defense: 'Protection of Sensitive Points', 'Minimization of Damage', 'Passive Defense Measures', 'Fire Defense Measures', 'Prevention of Accidents', and 'Restoration of Production'.

"Despite this extensive discussion of civil defense problems, the publication has been meticulously edited to avoid any mention or reference to Public Law 920, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, or to civil defense. These omissions are all the more apparent in view of frequent references to agencies such as the American Standards Association, The National Fire Protection Association, The National Safety Council, The Department of Labor, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"The difficulties appear to be these:

"(a) The term 'plant security' is now interpreted in many quarters to mean everything from damage control, defense against atomic bomb attacks, shelters, warden services, and emergency health and welfare to employee fingerprinting and indoctrination concerning espionage and sabotage.

"(b) Many agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, refuse to accept the intention of Congress in Public Law 920 that the Federal Civil Defense Administration shall be the agency at the Federal level responsible for civil defense; they ignore agreements reached by higher authorities and frequently formalized by Executive Orders.

"(c) The military agencies frequently hold a position that industrial facilities supplying equipment and material for the national defense program are too vital to be entrusted to the civil defense organization for safe guarding.

"Hence it is recommended that:

"The Federal Civil Defense Administration recognize its responsibilities and take the initiative within the Federal Government for

(a) preparing definitions of terms, such as 'plant protection' and 'plant security', that will permit a separation of the civil defense interests and functions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation - military interests in espionage, sabotage, and safe guarding classified material;

(b) reaching agreements with other agencies, particularly those of the Department of Defense, on how 'plant protection' programs may be made an integral part of civil defense; and

(c) coordinating requirements affecting plant protection standards for civil defense.

"And it is further recommended that:

"The Department of Defense should revise its attitude toward the civil defense program and the Federal Civil Defense Administration and prescribe such measures as may be necessary to insure that the responsible heads of agencies within the Department are aware that they and their contractors are but a part of the overall national security program, that civil defense is also a vital part of national security, and that the country can not afford separate, uncoordinated civil defense programs conducted independently by the Department of Defense agencies with their contractors."

The above material begins on page 21 and goes through page 24 of the report.

The FBI does not have the responsibility for plant protection and such functions have been specifically assigned to the Munitions Board and to the Facilities Protection Board. Our responsibilities for espionage and sabotage do not come under any phase of Civil Defense and the distinction of the responsibilities are clearly set forth in the above report. With regard

to the publication "Standards of Plant Protection" issued by the Office of Industrial Security, Munitions Board, The Department of Defense; the report made certain criticisms of the publication in its reference to measures to be taken against spies and saboteurs. The sections referred to in that report deal with prevention of unauthorized entry, the control of authorized entry, and a section on espionage and sabotage.

This latter section of "Standards of Plant Protection" points out that in establishing any system for plant security or plant protection critical areas of a plant should be determined and thereafter carefully guarded and protected. The publication recommends that employees be screened and informed of the necessity of plant protection. It makes recommendations that the provisions of the Espionage and Sabotage Statutes be brought to the attention of all employees and that the guard force be instructed to be alert to detect action of espionage and sabotage. This publication also set forth that such actions should not be investigated by the management or plant guards but immediately reported to the FBI. While the above sections may have some bearing on Civil Defense they are undoubtedly of prime importance in the establishment of any logical plan for the protection of strategic plants.

In regard to the provision of the report set forth above which states that plant security may be divided into three parts and then lists the three parts; it should be pointed out that the first one listed, "Measures to Safeguard Classified Material (Printed Matter or Equipment), Control Schemes to Prevent Unauthorized Entry and Measures Against Possible Spies, Arsonists, Saboteurs or Generally, Men of Evil Intent," could also be divided into three parts: (1) Measures to Safeguard Classified Material; (2) Control Schemes to Prevent Unauthorized Entry; and (3) Measures Against Possible Spies, Arsonists, Saboteurs or Generally, Men of Evil Intent. Of these three, the FBI has jurisdiction only in regard to the latter.

In regard to the statement that at the Federal level, the situation is confused and that the Department of Defense, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Department of Justice are primarily involved; it is to be noted that no specific facts are set forth to justify such a statement.

Concerning the statement that Project East River was not fully briefed on this matter by appropriate Federal agencies, it ~~should be~~ pointed out that information was not furnished to Associated Universities by FBI, Office of Naval Intelligence, G-2 of the Department of the Army, and Office of Special Investigations of the Air Forces.

GENERAL INFORMATION

The following information appears in various places of the report which might be of interest to the Bureau:

On page 25 of Volume 1 of the report appears the statement that it is recommended that if it has not been specifically outlined that the President or the National Security Council should prescribe the role to be played by the Federal Civil Defense Administration in developing, coordinating and inspecting the internal civil defense program of the various agencies of the Federal Government. It is noted that Executive Order No. 10346 had provided the opportunity for a good start. This order provides that in furtherance of national planning for the utilization of the personnel, materials, facilities and services of the federal departments and agencies which will be required in the event of a civil defense emergency, each federal department and agency shall in consultation with the Federal Civil Defense Administration prepare plans for providing its personnel, materials, facilities, and services in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Civil Defense Act during the existence of a civil defense emergency.

This section of the report also noted that the ideal situation would be for the Federal Civil Defense Administration to obtain the necessary funds from Congress and then to allocate these funds to various agencies of the government on a virtual contractual basis. This pertains to the marshalling of federal resources for civil defense tasks which are not internal to the normal responsibilities of the agencies involved.

In Volume 7 which is entitled, "Warning and Communications for Civil Defense," on page 8 it was recommended that the Air Force have the responsibility of providing at least one hour warning to Civil Defense of approaching aircraft and that the general public be advised by Civil Defense whenever the attack by hostile aircraft is probable. The present procedure provides that warning should be given to the general public only when an attack by hostile aircraft is imminent.

Volume 9 of the report entitled, "Information and Training for Civil Defense," on page 11 it is stated that all interested governmental agencies should support the Civil Defense Program. The Federal Civil Defense Administration should assume responsibility and then gain recognition as the official agency for issuing information bearing primarily on civil defense.

It is also stated that,"civil defense at the national level necessarily moves in the field of national security affecting the interests of other Federal departments and agencies. As a result, the Federal Civil Defense Administration has continuing and growing interests coincident with those of the Departments of Defense and Agriculture, the National Security Resources Board, the Public Health Service, U. S. Office of Education, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the American Red Cross, and Federal Communications Commission. Only through a continuing program of education and indoctrination can these agencies become more fully aware of their responsibilities in civil defense and their relationship with the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

"Since each agency is now in the process of working out its civil defense functions, such preparedness should be coordinated through a central agency charged with the primary civil defense responsibility. Further, the total result of these efforts should be made known by the Federal Civil Defense Administration and cooperating agencies to assure complete coverage of all problems. Agencies, such as the Department of Defense, have issued statements to the public on civil defense, for example on the possibility of attack and the nature and effects of biological and chemical warfare."

In Volume 6, page 6, it was stated: "Liaison representatives of Federal Civil Defense Administration should be accredited to the Atomic Energy Commission, Departments of Defense and Agriculture and other appropriate agencies for the express purpose of seeking out information of civil defense significance and reviewing the research and development programs for results acceptable to Civil Defense."

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the attached letter (Cancelled) be sent to the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Acting Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Secretary of Defense concerning the following items which appear in the report:

(a) The fact that the term "internal security" as used throughout the report is not defined and to point out that the FBI is only responsible for the investigation of acts of sabotage, espionage and other subversive activities.

(b) To ask for specific information concerning the alleged confusion which exists in regard to plant security between the Department of Defense, Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Department of Justice.

(c) To ask for specific information concerning the statement that liaison between the Public Health Service and internal security agencies at the Federal level has only recently been undertaken on a somewhat limited scale.

2. That the attached letter (Cancelled) be sent to the Attorney General setting forth the background of Project East River, the Bureau's jurisdiction concerning the matter of internal security, the highlight of the report as it affects the Bureau, and the fact that the above-mentioned letters are being sent to the National Security Resources Board, Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Secretary of Defense.

b6
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3. A copy of this memorandum be sent to Special Agent [redacted] who is Secretary of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, inasmuch as this report has been placed on the agenda of that organization. The Director is Chairman of this Conference.

4. That the Liaison Section of the Bureau obtain available information from the Chemical Corps of the Department of Army concerning the gas mask which the report states is being developed by that organization. The purpose of this will be to determine if it is advisable for the Bureau to obtain quantities of the mask for its use. Handled separately.

5. That a separate desk be set up in the Domestic Intelligence Division for 90 days to correlate and coordinate all available information concerning biological, chemical, and radiological warfare. At the end of 90 days the work on the desk should be analyzed to consider whether the desk should be maintained or the work handled by an existing desk in the Domestic Intelligence Division. This matter is being handled separately.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 2/4/53

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: PROJECT EAST RIVER REPORT
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

Present 2/4/53 were Messrs. Ladd, Nichols, Glavin, Mohr, Sizoo, Gearty, Belmont, [redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr

b6
b7C

BACKGROUND

On 6/28/51 the Department of the Army entered into an agreement with Associated Universities, Inc. of New York City whereby the latter organization would conduct studies surveys, make critical analyses and furnish a report on th defense of the continental United States against foreign attacks by atomic, biological and chemical weapons. This project was to be referred to as "Project East River." Associated Universities, Inc. is a nonprofit organization sponsored by nine universities. The authors of the report did not have access to the files of the FBI or other intelligence agencies. At the request of the National Security Council on 8/4/51 the Bureau's files were checked against the names of officials of Associated Universities, Inc. As a result of the name checks no subversive derogatory information was developed regarding the officials of the organization except for the following: [redacted]

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b7D

[redacted]

RECEIPT OF REPORT BY BUREAU

The 11-volume report dated 10/1/52 of the Associated Universities, Inc. on "Project East River" was submitted to the National Security Resources Board, Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Secretary of Defense. On 12/30/52 two copies of this report were received at the Bureau. One copy was for the Director as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the other for the Director of the FBI. There are 246 recommendations in the 11 volumes. The recommendations do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

HHC:hc

cc: Mr. Mohr
Mr. Clegg

RECORDED - 90
INDEXED - 90

100-93216-607

6 APR 7 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/7/04 BY 60267 uc/mcs/bja/cb

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-11320-

Throughout these volumes frequent reference is made to the fact that the assignment of responsibility to a particular agency does not mean that such agency is to assume any of the responsibilities of the FBI for the internal security of the country.

It was pointed out to the Executives Conference that in numerous instances in this voluminous report there is reference to the need for a marked intensification of internal security measures by internal security agencies in dealing with such matters as chemical, biological and radiological warfare, plant security, civil defense and health and welfare matters. There are also references to measures to protect individuals, animals, crops and forests, as well as industrial plants.

It was noted throughout the report that the terms "internal security" and "internal security agencies" are used. These terms are not defined nor is a distinction drawn between those agencies which are concerned with the investigation of sabotage, espionage, counterespionage, and other types of subversion and those agencies which are concerned with other aspects of internal security.

In one instance the statement is made that "Project East River" was not fully briefed by appropriate Federal agencies. It does not appear that any information was furnished to Associated Universities, Inc. by the FBI, by ONI, by G-2 of the Department of the Army, or by the OSI of the Air Forces. A statement with regard to general security measures is to the effect that at the Federal level the situation is confused and that the Department of Defense, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Department of Justice are primarily involved, yet there are no specific facts set forth to justify such a statement.

A recommendation was made that a communication be addressed to the Attorney General referring to this report, calling attention to the alleged confusion in which the Department of Justice is involved with the suggestion that the Attorney General seek to obtain clarification. It was also recommended that a letter be addressed to the Chairman of the National Security

Resources Board with a copy to the Acting Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, pointing out that the terms "internal security" and "internal security agencies" are not defined and asking for clarification in order that there will be no implied obligation on the part of the Bureau beyond its normal scope of investigation.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

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b7C

[redacted] recommended, and the Conference unanimously agreed, that the memorandum be referred to the Liaison Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division in order that there could be discussed with the National Security Resources Board the references which give the Bureau concern and the fact that the terms "internal security" and "internal security agencies" are not defined in fixing responsibility as to the various aspects of chemical, biological and radiological warfare, plant security, the protection of individuals, forests and the like. Based upon this discussion and based upon a further discussion of the alleged confusion in which the Department of Justice is allegedly involved, it was recommended that, ~~without the debate being shown~~, a letter of confirmation then be sent to the National Security Resources Board, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Department of Defense confirming the understanding that this report does not in any way change or modify the jurisdiction of the Bureau or add to its responsibility. The Conference unanimously agreed with this recommendation.

I concur.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Gandy

TO : MR. HOOVER

DATE: February 31, 1953

FROM : SAC AUERBACH

PERSONAL

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY FACILITY
RICHLAND, WASHINGTON

I thought you would like to know that the Atomic Energy Commission installation at Richland is conducting

b7E

RDA:LM

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/lwc/bjA/cb

RECORDED-86 100-93216-608

INDEXED-86

13 MAR 30 1953

EX-112

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

5 APR 7 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : Mr. Clegg

DATE: March 6, 1953

SUBJECT: BUREAU WAR PLANS

[redacted] b6 b7C

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

DETAILS:

The report of Project East River stated that a gas mask was being developed by the Army Chemical Corps which would afford effective protection against gas attacks as well as against biological warfare attacks. The Liaison Section contacted [redacted] concerning this matter. They informed that military personnel are being issued standard M-9 mask, which is the best mask presently under production for gas and biological warfare. It is produced at a cost of approximately $18 to $20 per mask. ESPIONAGE AND Sabotage

b6 b7C

They also informed that the Army is developing and conducting research on an E-51 mask and an E-52 mask. The former will cost approximately $4 to $5, and the latter approximately $1.50 each. The latter cannot be used for any extended period in a contaminated area. Neither of these types is being produced in quantity at this time.

The Bureau presently has 1348 of the M-4 type gas masks. According to officials at Edgewood Arsenal, the M-4 mask is considered obsolete, and the M-9 is used to replace it. The M-9 has a canister attached to the side of the mask which does away with the necessity of having an air tube as the M-4 has. The M-9 is more compact, and it would be easier to use while firing a gun. The officials, however, considered the M-4 will give equal protection as the M-9.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that on July 1, 1953, the Liaison Section again contact the Army Chemical Corps to determine the progress made in connection with the E-51 and E-52 masks.

2. It is recommended that at that time consideration be given to purchasing additional gas masks.

3. That we obtain at this time six of the M-9 gas masks for testing and training at Quantico to see if this mask is suited for Bureau work.

Model M-91 adopted by Army of M-9. M-91 replaces file M-9

FHS:KMM

RECORDED-37 100-93216-608X

INDEXED-37 18 APR 30 1953

memo from [redacted] to Belmont 4/16/53 - JEH - 108

b6 b7C

5-6 MAY 11 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/7/04 BY [illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 3/27/53

FROM SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE; SABOTAGE

Remylet dated 3/4/53.

On 3/25/53 [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

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b7C
b7D

[redacted]

JLF:mhe
AMSD, REG.RRR

INDEXED-45

RECORDED-45

EX-112 100-93216-609

MAR 30

21

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 2/7/04

b6
b7C

[redacted]

APR 14

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

cc - Mr. Sullivan, R[redacted] 7645

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 7, 1953

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Sandy

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY [illegible]

misfiled
Rte slip

SYNOPSIS:

You will recall the Baltimore Office has liaison with [redacted] in the captioned matter. On March 20, 1953, the following information was obtained by the Baltimore Office:

[redacted]

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b7D

100-93216
Attachment one
EHM:eme

4/10/53 Mr. Tolson - [redacted] is furnishing a briefing of Gen. Cutler on 4/13/53 as liaison unable to obtain an appointment until then. EHM

RECORDED-107 100-93216-610
APR 16 1953

EX-REC

MOSSBURG

RECOMMENDATIONS:

b7D

[redacted]

2) It is recommended a copy of our memorandum to G-2 be furnished to the SAC of the Baltimore Office for its future guidance in carrying out liaison at Camp Detrick in the captioned matter.

3) It is recommended a copy of Baltimore letter dated March 31, 1953, containing the information set forth herein be furnished to the Special Agent In Charge of the New York Office for his personal

and confidential information. That he be furnished a copy of our memorandum to G-2 containing the action taken by the Bureau in this matter, and that he be instructed to make no commitments and to advise the Bureau promptly of any contacts made with his office by representatives of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland.

DETAILS:

You will recall the Baltimore Office maintains liaison with [redacted] on a monthly basis to obtain any information which would be of assistance to us in connection with our sabotage responsibilities. On March 20, 1953, [redacted] advised the Baltimore liaison agent the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory is again interested in [redacted]

b6
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b7D

The liaison agent of the Baltimore Office was present on March 20, 1953, at the request of [redacted] at a conference attended by [redacted] and three other members of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory. At that time, [redacted] stated [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Room 5744 4-9, 1953

TO:
- ✓ Director
- ___ Mr. Ladd
- ___ Mr. Clegg
- ___ Mr. Glavin
- ___ Mr. Harbo
- ___ Mr. Nichols
- ___ Mr. Rosen
- ___ Mr. Tracy
- ___ Mr. Belmont
- ___ Mr. Mohr
- ___ Mr. Gearty
- ___ Mr. Callahan
- ___ Mr. Holloman
- ___ Miss Gandy
- ___ Personnel Files Section
- ___ Records Section
- ___ Mrs. Skillman

Mr. Gleason ✓
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Gandy

See Me For appropriate action

Send File Note and Return

LIAISON HANDLING 4-13-53.

Nate. I think Mission should orally advise General [redacted] of this situation

Yes. Also send [redacted] memo

[redacted] Clyde Tolson

[redacted] to AG 4/10/53-Ltr.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/2/04 BY 60267 uc/pks/bjl/03

ENCLOSURE

100-93216-610

~~SECURITY INFORMATION -- FOR SECRET~~

The Attorney General

April 10, 1953

Director, FBI

RECORDED-107

100-93216-610

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 7/7/04

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

For your information, the Baltimore Office of this Bureau maintains liaison with representatives of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland, for the purpose of obtaining information which would be of assistance to us in connection with our responsibilities in the captioned matter. On March 20, 1953, [redacted] of that Division was contacted and the following information was furnished to a representative of this Bureau:

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[redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

100-93216

EHM:brg

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - FOR SECRET~~

MAILED 11
APR 13 1953
COMM-FBI

63 APR 22 1953

APR 10 6 14 PM '53

[redacted]

b6
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b7D

This Bureau's representative was invited to attend a group conference to hear a briefing by [redacted] on [redacted] Attending the conference were [redacted] and [redacted]

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b7C
b7D

Several additional suggestions were made at the conference as to the manner in which [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

The above information has been brought to the attention of [redacted] the President, by this Bureau. G-2, Department of the Army, has been furnished a memorandum containing the above information. In addition, G-2 was informed that the information furnished to our representative on March 20, 1953, as set forth above, and the presence of our representative at the briefing referred to above, does not indicate the approval of this Bureau of any of the experiments mentioned nor does this Bureau accept any responsibility in connection with any of the experiments. In connection with [redacted]

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b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

SAC, New York

April 9, 1953

Director, FBI (100-93216)

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 uc/pwb/bj/AGB
ON 2/7/04

There is attached for your information and assistance in this matter a copy of a self-explanatory letter received by the Bureau from the Baltimore Office dated March 31, 1953. The enclosures to this letter are not being forwarded to your office. There is also attached for your information and assistance a self-explanatory copy of a memorandum furnished to G-2 by the Bureau.

In the event any representative of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory, Camp Detrick, Maryland, should contact your office for any assistance in connection with the type of experiments referred to herein, you are instructed to make no commitments and to advise the Bureau at once.

Attachment

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
F B I
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
APR 9 6 37 PM '53

MAILED 16
APR 10 1953
COMM-FBI

RECORDED - 93 100-93216-611
APR 13 1953
130

EHM:ene

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

56 APR 23 1953

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
F B I
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
APR 9 6 03 PM '53

SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

April 9, 1953

Director, FBI (100-93216)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reurlet March 31, 1953.

There is attached for the future guidance of your office in the handling of liaison with the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory, Camp Detrick, Maryland, in this matter, a self-explanatory copy of a memorandum addressed to G-2 by the Bureau.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJAKB
ON 2/2/04

RECEIVED DIRECTOR
F B I
APR 9 6 37 PM '53
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE

MAILED 16
APR 10 1953
COMM-FBI

RECORDED - 93

100-93216-672

APR 13 1953

RECEIVED
F B I
APR 9 6 03 PM '53
COMM-FBI ROOM

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele Rm
Holoman
Gandy

EHM:eme

56 APR 23 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 3/24/53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Gandy

b6
b7C

During the regular liaison contact between SA [redacted] on March 20, 1953, [redacted] mentioned that it had been some time since [redacted] of the Bureau had visited Camp Detrick. He pointed out that [redacted] would be interested in observing first-hand the changes that have occurred in the past year or so.

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[redacted] has been very cooperative and seemed quite sincere in extending the aforementioned invitation. He stated he hoped [redacted] could find it convenient to come up and look around Camp Detrick for a day or two, and he was advised that his invitation would certainly be brought to the attention of the Bureau.

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At such time as it may be convenient for SA [redacted] to visit Camp Detrick, it is suggested that telephonic arrangements be made with [redacted] either directly or through the Baltimore Office.

Details of the recent meeting with [redacted] will be reported in the near future at which time various bulletins and other material furnished by him will be transmitted to the Bureau.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/Bj1/CB
ON 7/7/04

RCV:mhp

REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED : 118/100-93216-613

Yes (Clear to send in agmd 4-15 RH)

b6
b7C

62 APR 24 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

FROM : SAC, Atlanta (100-4126)

DATE: 4/9/53

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 7/7/04

Rebulet 2/19/53.

It was ascertained from the Communicable Disease Center, USPHS, Federal Security Agency, Atlanta, Ga., that [redacted] have been transferred.

[redacted] was advised of the Bureau's jurisdiction in Biological Warfare - Sabotage. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

In the future, [redacted] will be contacted on a semi-annual basis in order to assure a working liaison with the Communicable Disease Center of the USPHS in Atlanta, and to assure that that center is aware of the Bureau's jurisdiction in the field of Biological warfare.

56 APR 21 1953

LCD:ml

100-93216-6

RECORDED - 59

INDEXED - 59

[redacted]

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 13, 1953

FROM : D. M. LADD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 UC/NCS/BJA/CB

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference is made to the memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. Belmont dated April 7, 1953, which outlined plans of the Army Biological Laboratory, Camp Detrick, Maryland. [redacted]

Among other things the memorandum recommended that this information be made available to G-2 in memorandum form. You noted that [redacted] should be briefed in this connection.

[redacted] was briefed by Special Agent [redacted] on April 13, 1953, at which time [redacted] indicated [redacted] stated that [redacted]

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b7E

b6
b7C

General Cutler stated that inasmuch as this information was obtained by the Bureau on a liaison basis and any action on his part could prejudice Bureau relations with the Army, he felt it desirable that the Bureau pass his observations to the head of G-2 in order that the people at Camp Detrick can be advised of his desires prior to any simulated attacks. He noted that this can be accomplished in all probability by the Bureau in a discreet manner without embarrassing the Bureau or the Army.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that [redacted] of G-2 be briefed concerning [redacted] views immediately. [redacted] has requested to be advised of the outcome and has stated he will help in this matter in any way possible if you feel

b6
b7C

ESS:hke

RECORDED - 57

100-93216-

5 APR 24 1953

APR 20 1953

b6
b7C

Memorandum for The Director, 4/13/53

that his observations should not be passed to the Army by the Bureau.

O.K.

4-15-53

[redacted]

SO ADVISED. WILL TAKE PROPER ACTION.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

4-17-53

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 4/13/53

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/7/04 BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB

Remylet 2/27/53.

[redacted] were recently contacted by a representative of the San Francisco office, at which time they stated that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

RECORDED - 79 100-93216-617

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b7D

APR 28 1953

b6
b7C

APR 1953

cc's [redacted] & DA (100-30190)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/1/53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

Remylet 3/31/53, advising that a composite film marked ~~"Top Secret"~~, showing [redacted] would be transmitted to the Bureau. The film in question is being transmitted herewith to the Bureau by Special Messenger.

b7E

The Bureau may desire to give consideration to showing this film to agents attending In-Service Schools. It was obtained on permanent loan and thus may be retained by the Bureau.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mls/BJA/CCB
ON 2/7/04

RCV:mhp

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Mrs Belmont 5-12-53 PRB

Films located in tape cabinet

b6
b7C

100-93216-618

RECORDED - 44

APR 23 1953

EX-102

6/18/53 There is nothing in this file that is pertinent to the espionage section. As such, filed.

66 AUG 3 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: March 20, 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM : SAC, Detroit (98-0

b6
b7C
b7D

SUBJECT: [redacted]

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE, and Espionage

[redacted] advised on February 24, 1953 that [redacted] caused him some concern along that line which he wished to relate to the FBI.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY C0267 uc/ws/sp/cb ON 2/7/04

On February 19, 1953, [redacted] called [redacted] and made an appointment to see him on February 24, 1953.

JRC:ELO/SGG

Let FBI
CC-ONI, N2, OSI
Blank Memo
4-20-53
PKB

Mandburg Board

RECORDED - 68 100-93216-619

INDEXED 68

EX-102

[redacted]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7D

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: [redacted]
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE - SABOTAGE

The foregoing is submitted for the information of the Bureau in accordance with instructions set forth in SAC Letter 81-48.

April 20, 1953

b6
b7C

RE: [redacted]
DR. PHILIP H. BROUDO
INFORMATION CONCERNING

[redacted] advised on February 24, 1953, that [redacted] caused him some concern along that line which he wished to relate to the FBI.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was interviewed along with [redacted]

[redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/7/04 BY 60267uc/NLS/BJA/CB

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] said that he had made a search of the professional journals available to him and had determined that Dr. Broude was born in 1887, was a graduate of the University of Illinois College of Medicine in 1913, was licensed in 1919 and is listed as a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology as well as in radiology.

NUMEROUS REFER[redacted]E 4-22c

SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor Bibler Room 1706

Subj: Philip Braude

___Exact Spelling
___All References
✓Subversive Ref.
___Mail File
___Restricted to Locality of
Rose

Searchers
Initial
Date 3-26-53

FILE NUMBER	SERIALS
N.R.	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60260 LUC/MK/sdp/tes

Initialed

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CO
ON 2/7/04

RECORDED - 68
100-93216-619

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date: April 20, 1953

To: [redacted]
Surgeon General
U. S. Public Health Service
Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Washington 25, D. C.

b6
b7C

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]
DR. PHILIP E. BROUDE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

b6
b7C

Enclosed herewith is a memorandum reflecting information furnished to the Detroit Office of the FBI. This is furnished for your confidential information only and should not be disseminated outside your Agency.

The indices of this Bureau reflect no subversive information identifiable with [redacted] or Dr. Philip E. Broude.

b6
b7C

No investigation will be conducted by this Bureau.

Enclosure

2cc: Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure

2cc: Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

APR 30 1953

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER
APR 24
COMM - FBI

Sec: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Attention: Chief, Security Division

Enclosure

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 16, 1953

FROM : [redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo

SUBJECT: BUREAU WAR PLANS

b6
b7C

Reference is made to [redacted] memorandum to Mr. Tolson, dated March 6, 1953, in the above-captioned matter in which Liaison was requested to determine the progress made by the Army Chemical Corps in [redacted] be obtained for testing and training by the Bureau in Quantico.

In my memorandum of February 20, 1953, to you, you were advised that the Army Chemical Corps was producing the M-9 masks in quantity at the cost of approximately $18 to $20 per mask, and that the E-51 and E-52 masks were in the research and development stage. The E-51, the Army stated, could be produced at approximately $4.00 to $5.00, and the E-52 at $1.50. The Bureau ordered a number of M-91 type masks in lieu of the M-9. The M-91 is a modified version of the M-9. Subsequently, Liaison was requested by the Administrative Division to recontact the Army Chemical Corps to obtain six of each of the E-51 and E-52 masks for testing at Quantico.

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On April 14, 1953, [redacted] Research and Development Section of the Army Chemical Corps, Room 2739, Gravelly Point, was contacted by [redacted] to determine the progress made in the research test of the E-51 and E-52 masks. [redacted] advised that the Army Chemical Corps had just completed tests of these masks which were conducted at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He stated that in about 10 days to two weeks, he would have a number of each type of masks which he would make available to the Bureau for the Bureau to conduct tests with. He added he had reports of the tests conducted with these masks. He stated that he would call [redacted] when the masks were ready and recommended that a Bureau expert visit with him when the masks are picked up as at that time he would make available and explain the results of the reports on the Oak Ridge tests.

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RECOMMENDATION:

That upon receipt of word from [redacted] that the masks are ready, the Bureau make available a technical expert to go to Gravelly Point with [redacted]

b6
b7C

JFS:lae

100-93216-620

INDEXED-37

56 MAY 6 1953

BIOLOGICAL Warfare ESPIONAGE And Sabotage

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/31/53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET b6 b7C

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference is made to my letter of March 24, 1953, advising that liaison contact was had with [redacted] at Camp Detrick on March 20, 1953.

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY 64326 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 7/7/04

b6
b7C
b7D

RCV:pla
REGISTERED MAIL
Enclosures (6)

RECORDED 100-93216-621

SECURITY INFORMATION

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b7C

BA 66-891

b7D

(S)

(S)

b1

(S)

There is enclosed for the information of the Bureau one copy of a report marked "Secret," prepared by the University of Kansas Task Force No. 2 on the subject "Biological Warfare and the Navy Supply System." It will be recalled that an FBI representative appeared before the group preparing this report at the University of Kansas last August to discuss the subject of sabotage. This report carries and identification number It was obtained on temporary loan and it is requested that it be returned to the Baltimore office when it has served its purpose at the Bureau. Thereafter it will be returned to

b2
b7E

A composite film marked "Top Secret" showing has been obtained and the same will be transmitted to the Bureau within the next several days by special messenger.

Returned by [illegible] FBI

~~INFORMATION - TOP SECRET~~

RECORDED

100-93216 - 621

VIA LIAISON

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc/mls/sgs/cb
ON 7/7/04

Date: April 9, 1953

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

As your Division is aware, the Baltimore Office of this Bureau maintains liaison with representatives of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland. On March 20, 1953, [redacted] of that Division was contacted and the following information was furnished to a representative of this Bureau:

b6
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b7D

[redacted]

cc - 1 - Baltimore (BG-891) (Under separate cover)
- 1 - New York (Under separate cover)

MAY 25 1953

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET~~

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman

4/13/53

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR
JUSTICE

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

This Bureau's representative was invited to attend a group conference to hear a briefing by [redacted]

Attending the conference were [redacted] and [redacted]

Enclosures: To the Bureau

3 latent fingerprint lifts
taken from 1950 Chevrolet Tudor
[redacted] at Claremore, Okla.

b6
b7C

OC 26-15096

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/2/04 BY 60267 uc/sad/sbl
#977600

DISEASE	Immunization Recommended	No. Shots for Series	Frequency for Series	Protection Afforded	Duration of Maximum Protection	Frequency for Boosters	Probable Reaction to Initial Series	Treatment Available for Diseases
Plague (Bubonic) Plague (Pneumonia)	No	2	One week	Fair	5-6 Mos.	6 Mos.	Mild	Good ?
Cholera	Yes	2	One week	Fair	Few weeks	6 Mos.	Mild	Fair
Anthrax	Yes, when available		-	-	-	-	-	Doubtful if pneumonia
Botulism	Yes	4	2 weeks	Excellent	1 year	1 yr.	Mild	None
Rift Valley Fever (None available)								
Russian Spring-Summer Encephalitis (None available)								
* Q Fever	No	3	One week	Excellent	6 Mos.	6 Mos.	None	Good
V. Equine Enceph.	Yes	3	One week Six weeks	Excellent	6 Mos.	6 Mos.	None	None
Psittacosis	No	3	One Week	Good	6 Mos.	6 Mos.	None	Good
Tularemia	No	3	Daily (SK-)	Fair	6 Mos.	6 Mos.	Mild	Good
Tetanus Alum Plain	Yes	2 3	4-8 weeks 21 days	Excellent	1 yr.	1 yr. 4 yrs.	None	Fair
*Typhus	No	2	One week	Good	6 Mos.	6 Mos.	None	Good
Smallpox	Yes	1	-	Excellent	2-5 yrs.	3 yrs.	Mild	Fair
Yellow Fever	Yes	1	-	Excellent	4 yrs.	4 yrs.	None	None
Typhoid	No	3	7-28 days	Fair	1 yr.	1 yr.	Mild	Good
E. Equine Enceph.	Yes	3	1 week 6 weeks	Excellent	6 Mos.	6 Mos.	None	None
W. Equine Enceph.	Yes	3	1 week 5 weeks	Excellent	6 Mos.	6 Mos.	None	None
R. Mount. Sp. Fever	No	3	1-4 weeks	Good	1 yr.	1 yr.	Mild	Good

#977600
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/7/04 BY 60322 uc/plj/sbj; a/cb

* Now available in small lots from Lederle as a combination.

100-93216-621

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI 5-7

4/9, 1953

___Mr. Ladd
___Mr. Belmont
___Mr. Hennrich
___Mr. Laughlin
___Mr. Cleveland
___Mr. Baumgardner
___Mr. Branigan
___Mr. Keay
___Mr. Stanley
___Mr. Scatterday

___Mechanical Section
___Translation Sec.
6228 IB
___Identification Div.
___Technical Lab.

Room _____

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull
___Mr. Bird
___Mr. Brennan
___Mr. Broden
___Mr. Calame
___Mr. Callahan
___Mr. Cattaneo
___Mr. Dissly
___Mr. Donahoe
___Mr. Dunn
___Mr. Ezell
___Mr. Fults
___Mr. Gallant
___Mr. Gibbons
___Mr. Hitt
___Mr. Jaquiss
___Mr. Jensen
___Mr. Johnson
___Mr. Jones
___Mr. Kuno
___Mr. Kurtz
___Mr. Lamphere
___Mr. Lee
___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Linberg
___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Little

___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. McCool
___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. McShane
___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Mossburg (last)
___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Roney
___Mr. Ronksley
___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Turner (last)
___Mr. Van Loon
___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Ward
___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Whitson

next to

1706 BIBLE
7121 BEACH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2/19/04 BY 60247 uc/dks/BJA/cb #977 Rod

___MAIL ROOM-5533
___Mrs. Dean
___Mr. Hammond
___Miss Woody
___Miss Stomerosky
___Correct
___Please Call Me
___Please See Me

___RECORDS SECTION
___Send File
___Bring File up-to-date
___Place on record and return
___Indicate Index Ref.
___Note and return

FYI - See indexed

E. Hyatt Mossburg 3710
Espionage Section

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI 5-7

4/9, 1953

___Mr. Ladd	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec.
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Laughlin	___Identification Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab.
___Mr. Baumgardner	
___Mr. Branigan	_____
___Mr. Keay	
___Mr. Stanley	Room _____
___Mr. Scatterday	

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. McCool
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McShane
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg (LAST)
___Mr. Cattaneo	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Bissly	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Roney
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Ronksley
___Mr. Fults	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Gallant	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Gibbons	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Turner (last)
___Mr. Johnson	___Mr. Van Loon
___Mr. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Ward
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Lewis	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Linberg	___Mr. Whitson
___Mr. Litrento	1406 Butler
___Mr. Little	7121 Branch 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/16/81 BY SP4 Auch uc/mls/bg 9/1/83

___MAIL ROOM-5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File
___Miss Woody	up-to-date
___Miss Stomerosky	___Place on record
___Correct	and return
___Please Call Me	___Indicate Index Ref.
___Please See Me	___Note and return

Fyi - See index

E. Hyatt Mossburg 3710
Espionage Section

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI 5-7

4/9, 1953

___Mr. Ladd
___Mr. Belmont
___Mr. Hennrich
___Mr. Laughlin
___Mr. Cleveland
___Mr. Baumgardner
___Mr. Branigan
___Mr. Keay
___Mr. Stanley
___Mr. Scatterday

___Mechanical Section
___Translation Sec.
6228 IB
___Identification Div.
___Technical Lab.

Room _____

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull
___Mr. Bird
___Mr. Brennan
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___Mr. Calame
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___Mr. Cattaneo
___Mr. Dissly
___Mr. Donahoe
___Mr. Dunn
___Mr. Ezell
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___Mr. Gibbons
___Mr. Hitt
___Mr. Jaquiss
___Mr. Jensen
___Mr. Johnson
___Mr. Jones
___Mr. Kuno
___Mr. Kurtz
___Mr. Lamphere
___Mr. Lee
___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Linberg
___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Little

___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. McCool
___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. McShane
___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Mossburg (LAST)
___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Roney
___Mr. Ronksley
___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Van Loon
___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Ward
___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2/17/05 BY 60322 uc/MLS/BJA/cc #97600

___MAIL ROOM-5533
___Mrs. Dean
___Mr. Hammond
___Miss Woody
___Miss Stomerosky
___Correct
___Please Call Me
___Please See Me

___RECORDS SECTION
___Send File
___Bring File up-to-date
___Place on record and return
___Indicate Index Ref.
___Note and return

FYI - See index

E. Hyatt Mossburg 3770
Espionage Section

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI 5-7

4/13, 1953

___Mr. Ladd	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec.
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Laughlin	___Identification Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab.
___Mr. Baumgardner	
___Mr. Branigan	_____
___Mr. Keay	
___Mr. Stanley	Room _____
___Mr. Scatterday	

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. McCool
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McShane
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg (LAST)
___Mr. Cattaneo (Italy)	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Dissly	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Roney
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Ronksley
___Mr. Fults	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Gallant	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Gibbons	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Johnson	___Mr. Van Loon
___Mr. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Ward
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Lewis	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Linberg	___Mr. Whitson
___Mr. Litrento	
___Mr. Little	

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/jnc/slb/jm 4/08 #9794

___MAIL ROOM-5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File up-to-date
___Miss Woody	
___Miss Stomerosky	___Place on record and return
___Correct	
___Please Call Me	___Indicate Index Ref.
___Please See Me	___Note and return

EVI - See index

E. Hyatt Mossburg 3710

Espionage Section

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 30 1953

TELETYPE

b6
b7C

BALTI 1 FROM WASH DC 30 10-52 AM

SAC URGENT

BW WARFARE, SABOTAGE. SA [redacted] WILL ARRIVE NINE AM TOMORROW MORNING CAMP DETRICK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY. KINDLY ARRANGE NECESSARY PASS FOR ONE DAY.

HOOVER

KNNX

HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/JWS/BJL/CAB

URGENT

APRIL 30, 1953

SAC, BALTIMORE

b6
b7C

BW WARFARE, SABOTAGE. SA [redacted] WILL ARRIVE NINE AM TOMORROW MORNING CAMP DETRICK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY. KINDLY ARRANGE NECESSARY PASS FOR ONE DAY.

WARFARE ESPIONAGE And Sabotage

HOOVER

TDB:bld

bld

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 30 1953

TELETYPE

RECORDED - 90

100-93216-622

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Tels. Room
Nease
Gandy

5 C MAY 8 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : The Director

DATE: April 28, 1953

FROM : Mr. D. M. Ladd

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267uc/mrs/sjs/cb

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

(4)

Reference is made to my memorandum of April 25, 1953, concerning the proposed biological warfare attack upon President Eisenhower. The Bureau's Army Liaison representative on April 25, 1953, had taken this matter up with [redacted] in the hope of having the entire matter dropped by the Army. After [redacted] had learned of your concern he had ordered no final action to be taken in the matter without it being cleared by G-2 and had ordered [redacted] of G-2 to tie the matter up until Monday, April 27, 1953, at which time [redacted] would get in touch with [redacted] assured [redacted] that he would probably "kill it" Monday. Liaison was to follow closely with [redacted] and you indicated "Yes let me know." On Monday, April 27, [redacted] advised [redacted] that he had been in touch with the Chemical Corps people at the Pentagon who advised him that the conference which had been held at Camp Di edrick was at a research and development level and that under no circumstances could that group institute [redacted] was assured by [redacted] have the fullest coordination of all the services, which is required under a Joint Chiefs of Staff paper of 1949, and further tha[redacted] to furnish immediately a letter to [redacted] incorporating these last three points.

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[redacted] advised [redacted] that the letter had been expected on his desk that day but had not arrived. He advised that as soon as it was received, he would furnish a copy to the Bureau for its information.

RECOMMENDATION:

RECORDED - 16
INDEXED - 16

100-93216-623

Liaison will follow this matter until it is finally determined and you will be kept advised.

EX-130

MAY 8 1953

56 MAY 19 1953

JFS:mpm

Send memo to A.G. re development - ESP

~~ORMATION~~ -

cc: Mr
Mr

The Attorney General

April 28, 1953

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/pcs/sbj a/cb
ON 7/7/04

RECORDED - 16 100-93216-623

With respect to your telephone conversation with me of April 24, 1953, concerning a meeting attended by one of our agents [redacted] I had my Liaison Agent immediately contact [redacted] G-2, to whom he expressed my deep concern in this matter and inquired whether some action could not be taken by the Army [redacted]

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b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] requested the Chemical Corps to confirm the above by letter, which it did on April 28 over the signature of [redacted]

JFS:mpm

MAILED 8
APR 30 1953
COMM-FBI

6 MAY 19 1953

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo

TO : The Director

DATE: April 25, 1953

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

Reference is made to your memorandum of April 24, 1953, with respect to your conversation with the Attorney General [redacted] The Attorney General indicated that he would like to do whatever was necessary to stop it and you assured him that you would take the necessary steps to indicate our concern about it and see whether the Chemical Corps [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

The Bureau's Army Liaison Representative, [redacted] on April 25, 1953, took this matter up with [redacted] The Army's position at present is-:

Based on the information previously received from you, [redacted] assigned the Security Division to determine [redacted] Contact with the Chemical Corps revealed that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] assured [redacted] that he would probably "kill it" Monday.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2/7/04 BY 60324 uc/jms/bja/cb

RECOMMENDATION:

RECORDED - 16 100-93216-624

13 MAY 8 1953

This is for your information. Liaison will follow this matter closely with [redacted] on Monday, April 27, and advise you of the ultimate disposition.

b6
b7C

6 MAY 19 1953

Yes let me know

JFS:amb

EX-SEC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [redacted] b6 b7C

DATE: May 6, 1953

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Sandy

SYNOPSIS:

In consultations with scientists at Camp Detrick, Maryland, the Army's BW installation, on May 1, 1953, SA [redacted] was shown [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

For information only.

b6
b7C

TDB

RECORDED - 67

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/mls/bj/4/cb

100-93216-626

5-24-

TDB:bld

56 MAY 16 4 19 1953

b6
b7C

[redacted]

DETAILS:

SA [redacted] of the Laboratory visited Camp Detrick, Maryland, on May 1, 1953, during which time he was able to talk to a number of the scientists in the Biological Laboratories. He was taken on a tour of the two new buildings which will house two additional pilot plants. One of these is unusually large and will receive a charge for normal operations of 2500 gallons. The capacity of the "fermenter" is 3,700 gallons, the additional space which is required for foam which is formed during the growing period of the organisms. b6 b7C

[redacted] was advised of the completion of a mass production plant which is located at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. He was also advised that they are unable to staff either the new pilot plants or the mass production plant at the present time because of a personnel "freeze."

In discussing protection and detection problems with the Chief of the Protection and Detection Division, [redacted] was advised that considerable progress had been made in three phases of detection. [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] b7E

It is anticipated that SA [redacted] will return to Camp Detrick in July at which time it is expected that the pilot plants will be completed and in the initial stages of operation. Further inquiries will be made at that time concerning progress with respect to detection and identification of organisms in the air and other aspects of BW research which would be of interest to the Bureau. b6 b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Kandy

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 5/5/53

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE; SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 7/7/04

Remylet dated 3/27/53.

On April 27, 1953, [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

JLF:mhe

AMSD REG. RRR

56 MAY 21 1953

RECORDED-20

100-93216-627

b6
b7C

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo

DATE: May 5, 1953

FROM : D. J. Parsons

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60867 uc/ns/bja/cb

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Gasso
Tele. Room
Nease
Sandy

b6
b7C

SYNOPSIS:

SA [redacted] of the Laboratory spend May 1, 1953, at Camp Detrick for the purpose of technical discussions with Camp Detrick scientists. However, while there his attention was brought to information contained in a Bureau communication to G-2 dated April 9, 1953, relative to [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

office, requested SA [redacted] to assure the Bureau that [redacted]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the excellent relationship existing between the Camp Detrick authorities and the Bureau and fine liaison arrangements, it is recommended that the Domestic Intelligence Division consider whether it is appropriate to reiterate the assurances set forth above to G-2.

RECORDED-20 100-93216-628

MAY 13

5/8/53
MATTER ALREADY
HANDLED

[redacted]

b6
b7C

TDB:bld

5 6 MAY 21 1953

5-EHW

DETAILS:

On May 1, 1953, SA [redacted] of the Laboratory traveled to Camp Detrick, Maryland, the BW installation, with [redacted]

Although this contact was for the purpose of exchanging technical information, upon his arrival [redacted] referred to information concerning proposed

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

The results of the technical discussions will be reported on in a separate memorandum.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/15/53

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET~~

[redacted] was contacted on 5/7/53 by representatives of the San Francisco Office, at which time he advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] According to [redacted] they left the door open for future negotiations with [redacted] if the necessity presents itself.

Informant stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc/mls/sjr/cab ON 2/7/04

b2
b7D

~~CONF. INF.~~

Contact will continue wit[redacted] Calif.

PWM:td
cc [redacted]

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET~~

AIR MAIL - REGISTERED

RECORDED-77

100-93216-634

INDEXED-77

b6
b7C

19

6 MAY 26 1953

SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

May 19, 1953

Director, FBI (100-93216)

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reurlet 3-31-53, and enclosures.

Pursuant to your request contained on page 5 of reflet, there is returned herewith the copy of the report marked "Secret" prepared by the University of Kansas, Task Force No. Two, on the subject "Biological Warfare and the Navy Supply System." This report should be returned to [redacted] Army Biological Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland, by your office in the near future.

b6
b7C

Attachment

[redacted]

[redacted]

20 - 67

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/mcs/BJA/CB

100-93216-632

MAY 20 1953

130

EHM:rw

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

MAILED 16
MAY 19 1953
COMM-FBI

FBI
RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM

62 JUN 1

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 12, 1953

FROM : [redacted] b6 b7C

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Nease
Gandy

Baltimore memorandum of April 1, 1953, advises that a composite film marked ~~"Top Secret"~~ and showing a number of biological warfare experiments, has been furnished to the Bureau by the Special Operations Division, Biological Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland. Baltimore letter suggests Bureau may desire to show this film to In-Service [redacted]

This film was shown to a recent security school by a representative of the FBI Laboratory. It runs for seventeen minutes and depicts experiments in the methods of transmitting biological warfare agents. The laboratory representatives intend to show the film to other security schools to be held at the Bureau in the future.

It is not believed suitable for inclusion at In-Service in connection with the regular sabotage lecture material in that it is believed to be too specialized and take up to much of the time allotted in covering the work of the sabotage desk. From the standpoint of the sabotage desk, therefore, it is not being recommended that it be exhibited at In-Service.

RECOMMENDATION

It is suggested that this memorandum be forwarded to the Espionage Section and to the FBI Laboratory for recommendations as to whether this film should be exhibited at In-Service and that these recommendations should be forwarded to the Training Division.

F

PRB:eok

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/ms/sa/cb

RECORDED - 56

100-93216-633

MAY 28 1953

6/4/53 called Branch + Preston, Preston will ask when he can view film. Ekm

ESP SEC

56 AUG 20 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/2/53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE-SABOTAGE

Liaison contact was had on May 29, 1953, by SA [redacted] with [redacted], Biological Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland, as well as with [redacted]

[redacted] shortly after the conference started, [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

The inference was that a number of people, who heretofore had no knowledge of their operations, are now familiar with them.

[redacted]

RCV:FAS
REGISTERED MAIL
ENCL. (3)

Detached routed 6/5/53
Interested persons

100-93216-634

RECORDED - 44

JUN 3 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

b6
b7C

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/lws/bs 4/cb
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 2/7/04

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ENCLOSURE TO BUREAU WITH
LETTER DATED 6/2/53 RE

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE-SABOTAGE

3 copies of bulletin
entitled "Review of
Information with Biological
Warfare Implications"

BUFILE 100-93216
BAFILE 66-891

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI 5-7

6/5, 1953

___Mr. Ladd	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Section
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Laughlin	___Identification Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab.
___Mr. Baumgardner	
___Mr. Branigan	_____
___Mr. Keay	
___Mr. Stanley	Room _____

___Mr. Scatterday

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Linberg
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Brent	___Mr. McCool
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg (Dart)
___Mr. Cattaneo	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Dissly	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Roney
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Ronksley
___Mr. Fults	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Gibbons	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Johnson	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lewis	___Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/14/94 BY sp2aw2 mc/jbs 13:A 108 #97760

___MAIL ROOM-5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File
___Miss Woody	up-to-date
___Miss Stomerosky	___Place on record
___Correct	and Return
___Please call me	___Indicate index ref.
___Please see me	___Note and return

For your info - see index

_____

_____

_____

Espionage Section

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI 5-7

6/5, 1953

___Mr. Ladd	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Section
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Laughlin	___Identification Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab.
___Mr. Baumgardner	
___Mr. Branigan	_____
___Mr. Keay	
___Mr. Stanley	Room _____

___Mr. Scatterday

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Linberg
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento 1/15
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Brent	___Mr. McCool
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg (last)
___Mr. Cattaneo	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Dissly	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Roney
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Ronksley
___Mr. Fults	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Gibbons	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Johnson	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Lamphere P115	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lewis	___Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3/7/84 BY 6024 2mc/jms/8/9/84 #9776 OD

___MAIL ROOM-5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File
___Miss Woody	up-to-date
___Miss Stomerosky	___Place on record
___Correct	and Return
___Please call me	___Indicate index ref.
___Please see me	___Note and return

For your info - See index
please.

E. Wyatt Mossburg 3710
Espionage Section

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI 5-7

6/5, 1953

___Mr. Ladd	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Section
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Laughlin	___Identification Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab.
___Mr. Baumgardner	
___Mr. Branigan	_____
___Mr. Keay	
___Mr. Stanley	Room _____
___Mr. Scatterday	

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Linberg
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Brent	___Mr. McCool
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Cattaneo	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Dissly P134	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Roney
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Ronksley
___Mr. Fults	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Gibbons	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Johnson	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lewis	___Mr. Whitson

BIBLER (1706) P-121 P125 — BOARDS P119 etc

___MAIL ROOM-5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File
___Miss Woody	up-to-date
___Miss Stomerosky	___Place on record
___Correct	and Return
___Please call me	___Indicate index ref.
___Please see me	___Note and return

See Costello for info & submit to Lyons' desk.

E. Wyatt Mossburg 3710
Espionage Section

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2/7/04 BY 60267 uc/lmc/sbj #97760

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: June 2,1953

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (66-1122) ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB
ON 2/7/04

Remylet dated 5/5/53.

On June 1, 1953, [redacted] Utah, was contacted and furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

JLF:bjp
AMSD
Reg - RRR

RECORDED - 143

100-93216-636

b6
b7C

[redacted]

5 JUN 19 1953

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 6/18/53

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS CONCERNING BACTERIAL WARFARE IN KOREA AND CHINA
SECURITY MATTER - X

On 6/17/53, [redacted] Cornell University Medical College, 1300 York Avenue, New York 21, New York, made available to the New York Office the enclosed book titled as above. b6 b7C

This book is being forwarded to the Bureau for information purposes.

Bacteriological War Fare

Enclosure (1)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60247 uc/mls/bja/cb

RECORDED - 58 100-93216-637

JUN 13 1953

INDEXED - 58

ENCL BEHIND FILE

1 ENCL 58

b6 b7C

EHM:ATM 53 JUN 6 1953

REPORT

OF THE

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION

FOR THE

INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS CONCERNING BACTERIAL WARFARE IN KOREA AND CHINA

(With Appendices)

PEKING
1952

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: June 16, 1953

FROM : SAC, CLEVELAND (100-0)

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SECURITY MATTER -- CHINA AND KOREA

ATTENTION: CENTRAL RESEARCH DESK

Transmitted under separate cover is a book entitled, "Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China."

Instant book was received from [redacted] of the School of Medicine, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio. [redacted] was unable to furnish the source who sent him this book, as there was no return address on the package. b6 b7C

This is being forwarded to the Bureau for their information.

CC: 1 Package

RHG:mas

Enclosure Sent to Publications Unit

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/7/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/SJA/CB

100-93216-638

RECORDED - 50

JUN 18 1953

INDEXED - 50

[redacted] b6 b7C

53 JUL 3 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) AM Reg

DATE: 6/22/53

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 2/7/04

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE- SABOTAGE

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET~~

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was contacted on May 26, 1953 and June 18, 1953 by representatives of the San Francisco Office, at which time he advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

Informant advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

In regard to [redacted] Informant states that he has no further information regarding this [redacted] Informant

[redacted]

Contact will continue with [redacted]

PWM:mea

[redacted] b2 b7D

RECORDED - 9 100-93216-639
INDEXED - 9

JUN 24 1953

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, FBI

DATE: June 3, 1953

FROM : Charles M. Metzner
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General

SUBJECT:

Pursuant to the conversation at lunch the other day, I have arranged with [redacted] to come over at 5:00 p.m., Thursday, June 11th, for a talk and the showing of a motion picture dealing with "brain washing." The meeting will take place in the Attorney General's office. Will you kindly indicate on this slip whether or not you will attend.

b2
b6
b7C

ack 6/9/53

100-93216-640

ENCLOSURE

JUN 15 1953

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/cb

ENCLOSURE

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

June 4, 1953

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Jones
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Attached is the invitation to attend "Brain Washing" at 5:00 p. m. Thursday, June 11th, in the AG's office.

O

Biological Warfare Espionage And Sabotage

Attachment

1 ENCL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-28-80 BY SP-5
REVIEW

RECORDED - 82
INDEXED - 82

100-93216-640

JUN 15 1953

EX-123

b6
b7C

Mr. Charles M. Metzner,
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General

June 9, 1953

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 82
EX-129 100-93216-640

In reply to your memorandum of June 3, 1953, relative to the showing of the motion picture dealing with "brain washing," I desire to advise that I plan to attend, as will also Messrs. A. H. Belmont and D. M. Ladd, of my office.

DML:CSH

JUN 9 9 54 AM '53

DIRECTOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/12/80 BY SP-5 RJG/EWW

MAILED 2
JUN 9 1953
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Pele. Room
Neede
Sandy

CC: Mr. Tolson

C

C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: June 12, 1953

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: KENNETH LLOYD ENOCH, ET AL
TREASON
Biological Warfare Espionage and Sabotage

With reference to the meeting in the Attorney General's Office on the afternoon of June 11, 1953, at which [redacted] showed a film [redacted] but which reportedly reflected confessions of captured U. S. Air personnel that they participated in germ warfare, I thought you would like to know the following: b1 b3 (5)

The four U. S. Air personnel in the [redacted] film are Lieutenants [redacted]

In connection with our investigation of individuals attending a peace conference in Peking, China, in October, 1952, we learned that [redacted] had attended the conference. When [redacted] returned to the U. S. in December, 1952, they declared to U. S. Customs officials in New York that "noncommercial" film was being sent to them via air from Prague, Czechoslovakia. Our New York Office had Customs place a stop on this film, which arrived on December 22, 1952. The film was reviewed by our Agents in NY and it was ascertained it was a film issued by the International Scientific Commission for the investigation of bacteriological warfare by the US in Korea and Northeast China. The film was turned over to us by Customs and sent to the Bureau where it was reviewed on January 16, 1953. The film runs for about an hour and a half and, in addition to the scenes of the confessions of the four Airmen, it shows scenes of various germs and insects allegedly dropped by U. S. Forces. The [redacted] version shown to the Attorney General apparently was cut to the four confessions only. b2 b6 b7C

By memo to the Department (Criminal Division) on January 28, 1953, we advised the Department we had this film and inquired whether the Department would desire to view it. By memo dated February 6, 1953, the Criminal Division requested that we arrange to show the film to attorneys from the Criminal Division. Accordingly, the film was shown to six attorneys from the Criminal Division on February 16, 1953. We also loaned the film to the U. S. Air Force on December 31, 1952, and the Air Force made a copy of it.

It is noted that we opened cases on these four Air Force Lieutenants in October, 1952, under the Treason classification based on Chinese news stories indicating they had confessed to participation in bacteriological warfare. The four cases are still

AHB:mer

EX-129 100-93216-6

RECORDED - 82 JUN 25 1953

INDEXED - 82

59 JUL 2 1953

~~SECRET~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 61-11450 - 61-11451 - 61-11452 - 61-11453 -

CLASSIFIED BY NSISM/BJALCB 40207 Deriv ative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 25X9
Pgs 1, 2, 3, 4 NSISM/BJALCB 10/15/03

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

pending; however, active investigation has not been conducted because these four individuals are prisoners of war and still in enemy custody. We have requested OSI to furnish us the results of their investigation in Korea, and all information we have received in these cases has been transmitted to the Department.

What about background of their families? Have we checked into that?

K

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : D. M. Ladd

DATE: June 16, 1953

SECRET

SUBJECT: "Brain Washing" movie (Kenneth Lloyd Enoch, et al - Treason) (S)(U)
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Roo
Nease
Gandy

b2
b6
b7C
b1
b3

Merely for record purposes, it should be noted that on the afternoon of 6/11 the Director, you, Mr. Belmont, and myself, attended a showing of the motion picture which [redacted] exhibited in the Attorney General's office, and which [redacted] entitled "Brain Washing." (S)(U)

[redacted] and [redacted] briefly introduced the showing of the film, advising the assembled group that [redacted] had made quite a study [redacted] They stated they had picked up a film [redacted] which had been made in several languages and was being shown throughout the United States, wherein the four captured American flyers were supposed to have been questioned and admitted that they had flown missions the purpose of which was to drop bacteria. (S)(U)

The film was then shown and, in sequence, the four American flyers were shown being questioned by Chinese Reds, and they admitted in considerable detail dates when they allegedly received briefing on bacteriological warfare and dates of missions which they allegedly flew for the purpose of dropping bacteria. After each sequence showing the questioning of one of the four airmen, the group was briefed in a very general way by [redacted] advised the group that the statements of the prisoners obviously were not correct, inasmuch as a check had been made and no lectures or briefing had been given at the camps on the dates alleged by the prisoners, and several of the missions which they claimed to have flown were, in fact, never flown by them. (S)(U)

b1
b3

The representatives of [redacted] pointed out their theory that these captured prisoners were forced to say over and over what they had done wrong; that after a lack of food and sleep, and being forced to stare into bright lights and similar treatment, they were of the opinion that the prisoners may have believed the stories which they had been forced to repeat over and over, to the point where they would repeat them at a trial. (S)(U)

b2

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/sks/gmh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1)(2)(5)(6)
1/15/03 cd 62267 uc/sks/gmh

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-28-03 RJG

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

61-11451-1
61-11451-1
61-11451-1
61-11451-1

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-5 RJS
REASON-FCIM II 1-2.4.2 2,3
DATE OF REVIEW 9/12/90

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FILED. OSHICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF Nov 63 JUL 7 1953 DATE 9-17-

RECORDED - 82
EX-129
C#96322
SECRET
INDEXED - 82

9-12-90

100-93216-642

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3

[redacted] They indicated that the prisoners of war had stated that in most of the camps where American prisoners were held there were a number of "hard core" Communists who had been in the American army and who seemed to have taken over the direction of the prison camp and to be assisting the Chinese Reds in the indoctrination and discipline of the American prisoners of war. They indicated that they had learned, through questioning of prisoners of war, that there was some question that probably some of these "hard core" Communists from the American troops, who were allegedly captured in the early days of the fighting, may have been "walk over" cases. (S)(U)

It will be recalled that this picture which was shown was the subject of a memorandum from Mr. Belmont to me, dated 6/12/53, wherein it was pointed out that the Bureau had obtained this film in January of 1953 and had already made it available to the Criminal Division. (S)(U)

✓

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M[illegible]m • UNITED [illegible] GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 6-23-53

FROM : SAC, BIRMINGHAM (100-0)

SUBJECT: ANONYMOUS MATERIAL RECEIVED 6-5-53
BY [redacted]
REGARDING INTERVIEWS WITH [redacted]
[redacted] REGARDING GERM WARFARE
Biological WARFARE ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

b6
b7C
b7D

Enclosed herewith is an envelope containing mimeographed material which was furnished this office 6-5-53 by [redacted] received this material through the mails anonymously. It was postmarked 5-29-53 at Philadelphia. He had no information regarding the origin of the material or why it was sent to him.

b6
b7C
b7D

The Bureau has previously been furnished information regarding [redacted] has in the past contacted this office a number of times.

The enclosed material purports to set forth the results of the interview of [redacted] The interviews were conducted by [redacted]

This material is being forwarded for whatever action the Bureau deems advisable.

JLP:fc

encl.

61-7691-4
61-11450-1
61-11451-
61-11452-
61-11453-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/MLS/BJA/CB

RECORDED - 82

100-93216- 643

INDEXED - 82

EX-129

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b7C

[redacted]

6 JUL 7 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 29, 1953

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to memorandum to you dated May 12, 1953, in the captioned matter.

Pursuant to your request, Supervisor reviewed the color film depicting possible open and covert methods of employing biological warfare by an enemy against this country. The film failed to depict any matter of interest to the Espionage Section.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/7/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

EHM:eme:mjh

RECORDED-99
EX-124

100-93216-643X

AUG 20 1953

56 AUG 20 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED [redacted] ERNMENT

TO : R. T. Harbo

FROM : D. J. Parsons

DATE: July 1, 1953

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB

Tolson
Ladd
Clavin
Nichols
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Harbo
Alden
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Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 12, 1953, from [redacted] with reference to reviewing the film furnished by the Biological Laboratory, Camp Detrick, Maryland, for the purpose of determining the desirability of showing it to In Service Classes. It is not believed that the film is suitable for the In Service Classes at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the film furnished by Camp Detrick which depicts experiments in methods of transmitting Biological Warfare agents not be shown to In Service Classes but at the present time be restricted to security and certain other specialized classes. It should be shown to the latter groups in selected cases.

100-93216

TDB:md

RECORDED-99
EX-124

100-93216-643X1

AUG

b6
b7C

56 AUG 12 1953

NMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 7/2/53

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Remylet 6/2/53.

On 6/29/53 an effort was made to contact [redacted] with negative results. It was determined that [redacted] He will be contacted upon his return and the Bureau will immediately be advised of the results of the interview with him.

b6
b7C

PROCESSING

JLF:jt
AM
Reg.

100-93216-644

RECORDED - 91

87 JUL 1953

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 7/7/04

b6
b7C

[redacted]

57 JUN 26 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7-1-53

FROM : SAC, DALLAS (100-0)

SUBJECT: PAMPHLET CONCERNING BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
IS - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/lnw/sbs/cb

ATTENTION: CENTRAL RESEARCH DESK

Enclosed is a pamphlet dated April 25, 1953, which was received by [redacted] on Junel, 1953, and which was transmitted to this office by the Postal authorities. This pamphlet purports to contain interviews with [redacted] concerning [redacted] knowledge of bacteriological warfare.

b6
b7C

This pamphlet is being transmitted to the Central Research Desk for information purposes and in the event it is not needed it may be destroyed.

1 ENCL

Central Reference Unit

RECORDED - 85 100-93216-645
INDEXED - 85 12 JUL 21 1953

WHB:mwr

Enc.

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[redacted]

79 JUL 27 1953

July 6, 1953

RECORDED - 50 100-93216-646

INDEXED-50

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

Dear [redacted]

Your letter of June 29, 1953, with enclosure, has been received.

I sincerely appreciate the interest which prompted your communication and want to thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

NOTE: The enclosure submitted by correspondent was a mimeographed document purported to be transcript of interviews conducted by a group of scientists with [redacted] There was no indication in the enclosure as to where it originated.

b6
b7C

ELT:mad

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

6 JUL 25 1953

FBI
JUL 6 7 25
MAILED 25

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/14/53

FROM: SAC, Houston(14-0)

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROPAGANDA
SEDITION

b6
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Attached mimeographed material was received from [redacted] without comment from [redacted] This office has no record of [redacted] and the receipt of the material has been acknowledged.

This material is brought to the Bureau's attention as a matter of information and to determine whether the Bureau has been previously aware of this propaganda and its source and for any observations the Bureau might be able to make or to secure from the armed forces relative to the allegations contained therein.

It would appear that circulation of this matter is a possible violation of the Sedition Statutes. However, no action is being taken pending advice from the Bureau.

A review of the material discloses that it is accompanied by an unsigned cover letter dated 4/25/53 which cover letter states that the sender recently received the material and thought it his duty to make copies. The material purports to be excerpts from an investigation conducted by a group of scientists into the question of whether the United States has participated in bacteriological warfare. The alleged excerpts, if true, would indicate that members of our armed services have stated that they have received instructions in the pursuance of bacteriological warfare and have actually participated in such activity in Korea.

Should the Bureau feel that investigation by this office is advisable, it is requested that the attached material be photostated for this office.

AFL:nk
Encl. (1)

Ltr Houston 7-30-53 RWC

Ltr Criminal Affairs 7-30-53 RWC

RECORDED 51

100-93216-647

[redacted]

b6
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 LC/NCS/BJA/QB

SAC, Houston (14-0) July 30, 1953

RECORDED - 114
Director, FBI (100-93216) - 647

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROPAGANDA
SEDITION

Reurlet dated July 14, 1953, transmitting mimeographed material furnished your office by [redacted] mentioned in the enclosed material, [redacted] who has also allegedly furnished a statement [redacted] knowledge of bacteriological warfare.

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The results of the findings of the International Scientific Commission as well as the statements of the above officers were printed in many languages and sent throughout the world and the Bureau has received numerous

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/7/04 BY 60324/uc/NLS/6/4/05

Tolson
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Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

RWC:mmr

50 AUG 6

MAILED 11
JUL 30 1953
COMM-FBI

copies of this material. The enclosed material contains excerpts from the testimony of these individuals before that Commission. Although the material furnished with your letter does not reflect its origin, within recent weeks the Bureau has received many copies of identical material bearing a Philadelphia postmark and investigation is being made by the Philadelphia Office to determine the source of this material.

A copy of the material furnished to you is being forwarded to the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, for its information in connection with the trecson investigations on the above-mentioned officers and for consideration in connection with any possible violation of the sedition statutes.

No further action is desired in the absence of an additional request by the Bureau.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Gearty	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Mr. Sizoo	
Miss Gandy	

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 7/20/53

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

On July 16, 1953, [redacted] was contacted, and furnished the following information:

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b7D

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc/jw/sbj

JLF:rr
Registered
AMSD

61 JUL 31 1953

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[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/21/53

REGISTERED MAIL

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (100-21199)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

On July 3, 1953, [redacted] at the Harvard Medical School, furnished Special Agent [redacted] with an eight-page mimeographed letter which [redacted] advised he had received through the mail on June 1, 1953.

A review of this literature received by [redacted] revealed that it was purported to be a copy of the testimony given by [redacted]

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b7D

[redacted]

This material was seen to have been postmarked from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on May 28, 1953.

[redacted] considered this literature to be Communist propaganda of the most vicious type and stated that several other professors in the medical and scientific field at Harvard who had attended a recent conference in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with him had received the same type of literature.

The above-described literature received by [redacted] is being forwarded as an enclosure for the information of the Bureau.

RWA:MT
Enc. (1)
2cc: Philadelphia (Info)

RECORDED - 95
INDEXED - 95

100-93216-649

27 JUL 23 1953

30

92

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

b6
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6 AUG 6 1953

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mls/bja/clb
ON 7/7/04

REGISTERED MAIL

ENCLOSURE TO BUREAU FROM BOSTON

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE
(BS 100-21199)

[redacted]

b6
b7C
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED on EM
HEREIN CLASSIFIED
DATE 2/7/04 BY 60267 uc/MLS/BMCB

(18)

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8-7-53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET~~

12/15/03
CLASSIFIED BY: 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 12/15/2028
Pg. 2, Pg 4 OGA 12/15/03 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

Liaison contact was had on August 5, 1953, by SA [redacted] with [redacted] b6 b7C b7D Prior to the date of this contact, it was ascertained that [redacted] with whom liaison is normally maintained, [redacted]

At the outset [redacted] stated that he supposed the agent was already familiar with the proposed reorganization plan in connection with the research work being performed by the Biological Laboratories at Camp Detrick. Thereafter he explained that [redacted] had been directed by the Department of the Army to survey the possibilities of contracting out to a commercial concern, the work of the Biological Laboratories at Camp Detrick. He stated that drawing up an all inclusive contract has many complications and that [redacted] had been designated to assist [redacted] in this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

b6 b7C

ENCL [redacted]

RCV:PK
REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED - 23

100-93216-651

56 AUG 21 1953

Encl. (1)

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

L/DIRECTOR
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
BA 66-891

It was ascertained that [redacted] was transferred recently to [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

During the conference it was ascertained that during recent weeks, the Laboratory Branch of the S. O. Division has been focusing considerable attention on the following human bacterial and fungal diseases:

1. [redacted]
2.
3.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1
b3

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

L/DIRECTOR
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
BA 66-891

On the early morning of August 5, 1953, at Camp Detrick, [redacted]

b7E [redacted] will recommend that this method be utilized to solve the problem.

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

The next liaison contact will be made during September, following Dr. SCHWAB's return to Camp Detrick.

~~SECRET~~

Copy: emp

~~CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TO: G- [redacted]

b6
b7C

Date: August 19, 1953

FROM: NA [redacted]

SUBJECT: Attached FBI Memorandum "Korean Truce Agreement".

With reference to the problem raised by the attachment regarding the implications of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention as related to the POW provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement, I am attaching a memorandum prepared in L which makes the following principal points:

1. The terms of reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, which will take custody of prisioners of war not desiring repatriation, do not vest in this commission any general functions of negotiation, investigation, arbitration or adjudication unrelated to its specific functions in connection with the disposition of nonrepatriates.

2. This conclusion is further borne out by the fact that there is nothing in the Indian resolution of December 3, 1952, which suggests any intention of expanding the functions of the repatriation commission or its umpire to cover the investigation of the conduct of either side during the hostilities.

3. Article 132 of the Geneva Convention for the protection of ~~prisoners~~ of war of 1949 is not connected with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which relates to bacteriological (biological) warfare.

Enclosures filed with original

100-93216-
NOT RECORDED
146 AUG 26 1953

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b7C

FE:NA [redacted] mak:mtb

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NRS/BJA/CB
ON 7/7/04

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-370-23

~~CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

56 SEP 1 1953

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 8-27-53

FROM: SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 8-25-53 [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

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b7C
b7D

[redacted]

JLF:LG
REG. RRR
AMSD.

RECORDED - 30
INDEXED - 30

100-93216-652

31 AUG 28 1953

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB
ON 7/7/04

ESP SEC

INT SEC

[redacted]

b6
b7C

56 SEP 4 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 9-2-53

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJW/CB
ON 2/7/04

Remylet 6/22/53.

~~CONF. INF.~~

b2
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b7C
b7D

[redacted] will be contacted upon his return and the Bureau immediately notified.

PWM:mdg
AM, REGISTERED

cc: [redacted]

b2
b7D

100-93216-654

RECORDED-92
INDEXED-92

SEP. 4 1953

56 SEP 11 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9-30-53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet 8/7/53.

Telephonic contact was had by SA [redacted] with [redacted] on September 30, 1953. He stated that [redacted] effect on October 5 next, and that he would furnish the details at the time of the next contact with him.

b6
b7C
b7D

Liaison contact with [redacted] has been arranged for October 7, 1953.

RCV:pom

REGISTERED MAIL

10-19-53 0-1 To Atlanta & subst from Atlanta subs Let sub 10/21/53

~~EXPEDITE PROCESSING~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED-38 100-93216-655

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CAB
ON 7/7/07

EX-122

[redacted]

b6
b7C

56 OCT 6 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Gearty	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: September 24, 1953

FROM : SAC, Atlanta (100-41-26)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

Re Bulet 2-19-53 and Atlanta letter to Bureau dated 4-9-53.

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised 9-24-53 that his office had just received a memorandum from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare which was an agreement between the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Federal Civil Defense Administration whereby it was agreed, among other things, that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare would report telephonically to the Health and Special Weapons Defense Office of the Federal Civil Defense Administration any unusual incidents of diseases, or outbreaks of unusual diseases in man, and keep it informed of progress being made in handling the reported outbreaks as well as to establish, insofar as possible, the anticipated time of maximum impact of unusual occurrences and whether they are due to accidental or natural causes or are the results of biological warfare. He continued that in this memorandum the Federal Civil Defense Administration agreed to analyze such information received and take such action as necessary to determine whether unusual occurrences should be considered acts of biological warfare and to notify the President of the United States of its findings.

DECLASSIFIED BY 6020 7 uc/NLS/BS/4/08
ON 2/7/08

[redacted] advised that the above memorandum created a question in his mind as to whether unusual incidents of diseases or any other evidence of biological warfare should also be reported to the FBI as had been previously the policy. He pointed out, however, that to date there had been no evidence of biological warfare coming to the attention of his office.

b6
b7C

[redacted] was advised that in view of the Bureau's jurisdiction in biological warfare - sabotage that he should report any evidence of such to the FBI. [redacted] stated that in view of above mentioned "Memorandum of Understanding" that he desired a question cleared up as to whether such a report to the FBI should go through channels and be reported to the FBI Headquarters by his headquarters in Washington, D.C.

ENCL

Enclosure
LGD:lch/jjd

INDEXED-43 100-93216-156
RECORDED - 43 SEP 28 1953

ESP. SEC

b6
b7C

AT 100-41-26

The above is being furnished for the Bureau's information together with a copy of the "Memorandum of Understanding" between the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

It is requested that this office be advised whether there has been any change in the policy of requesting the U. S. Public Health Service to report directly to Field Divisions suspected acts of sabotage in the biological warfare field.

SAC, Atlanta (100-41-26) October 5, 1953

RECORDED - 43
Director, FBI (100-93216) - 656

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

Reurlets March 29, 1951, April 9, 1953, and September 24, 1953.

Your referenced let dated March 29, 1951, reflected the headquarters of the Communicable Disease Center, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was located in Atlanta, Georgia, and that liaison had been established by your office with the Communicable Disease Center in order that your office could be immediately furnished with any information indicating espionage or sabotage in the biological warfare field. Your referenced letter of April 9, 1953, reflected that in addition to furnishing your office such information, the Communicable Disease Center would also furnish such information through channels to FBI Headquarters. Pursuant to previous Bureau instructions, your office made arrangements to recontact the Communicable Disease Center on a semiannual basis in order to make certain that any information within this Bureau's jurisdiction concerning the captioned matter would be promptly reported.

In regard to the request contained in your referenced letter dated September 24, 1953, the following is set forth:

COMM - FBI
OCT 5 - 1953
MAILED 28

There has been no change of policy concerning the Bureau's jurisdiction in the investigation of espionage relating to biological warfare or sabotage caused by biological warfare. There has been no change of policy as far as the Bureau is aware in having complaints concerning such activity referred to your office by the Communicable Disease Center, Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

For your information, liaison does exist between the Bureau and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C., in the captioned matter, but it is still desired that the existing liaison between your office and the Communicable Disease Center at Atlanta, Georgia, be continued. It is not necessary, however, for the Communicable Disease Center to also advise the headquarters of this Bureau

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

EHM:eme

as your office is maintaining the liaison arrangement with the Center. The copy of the agreement between the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Federal Civil Defense Administration forwarded as an attachment to your referenced letter does not alter the Bureau's jurisdiction of the investigation of espionage and sabotage in the field of biological warfare. It is noted that the agreement does not contain any statement indicating the Bureau's jurisdiction is altered in this regard.

You are instructed to recontact [redacted] and make certain that liaison arrangements in the captioned matter will continue between your office and his office. The Bureau should be advised of the results of your recontact with [redacted]

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 9/29/53

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Vincent
Mr. Mohr
Miss Gandy

On 9/23/53, [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/03
ON 7/7/04

AMSD
REGISTERED RRR
JLF:jt

RECORDED - 30
INDEXED - 41
EX-125

100-93216-657
OCT 6 1953

56 OCT 14 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 10/9/53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~SECRET~~

Remylet, 9/30/53.

Liaison contact was had by SA [redacted] with [redacted] on October 7, 1953. Under the re-organization plan previously mentioned to the Bureau, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[

Advice is requested also as to what type of Bureau contact is maintained at the Biological Laboratories at Fort Terry, Pine Bluff and the Dugway Proving Ground. [redacted] It would be desirable to know therefore prior to the next contact with [redacted] what type of Bureau contact is maintained at the three BW installations referred to above.

b6
b7C
b7D

A brief contact was also had with [redacted]

(S)

b1

(S)

SAC, Baltimore (66-891) October 27, 1953

Director, FBI (100-93216)-658

RECORDED - 4

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/pks/bja/cib

Reurlet 10-9-53.

The liaison arrangement presently being maintained by your office with [redacted] appears to be a very satisfactory arrangement for the Bureau. The development of additional contacts at this installation after it is taken over by the Mathieson Chemical Corporation, Baltimore, Maryland, would appear to be duplicative inasmuch as your referenced letter reflects [redacted] will occupy the position of Deputy Director of the Biological Laboratories, Camp Detrick. It is noted your referenced letter indicates [redacted] will continue to be in a position whereby he will be able to keep your office advised of pertinent developments concerning captioned matter which may be of assistance to the Bureau in matters within our jurisdiction. Inasmuch as Camp Detrick will be the headquarters for all biological warfare operations in the United States, it is not deemed desirable by the Bureau that liaison be established at Fort Terry, New York, or at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The Bureau has been advised through its liaison with the Army Chemical Corps that up until the present time no research has been completed at Fort Terry. In addition, according to present plans, it has been determined through this same source that the results of any research conducted at Fort Terry will be made available to Camp Detrick.

b6
b7C
b7D

MAILED 8
OCT 27 1953
COMM-FBI

NOTE: The Bureau at the present time has established liaison in the captioned matter through the Atlanta Office with the headquarters of the Bureau of Preventable Diseases, Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the Baltimore Office maintains liaison at Camp Detrick, Maryland; the Salt Lake City Office maintains liaison at Camp Dugway, Utah, and the San Francisco Office has liaison with the Naval BW Laboratory, Oakland, California; [redacted] in the FBI Laboratory maintains liaison with [redacted] of the Army Chemical Corps.

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

79 JAN 14 1954

EHM:brg

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Gearty	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 10-21-53

FROM : SAC, Atlanta (100-4126)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE-ESPIONAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re Bureau letter 10-5-53.

b6
b7C

[redacted] has been contacted in accordance with referenced bureau letter. [redacted] advised that he would contact the Atlanta Division should any information come to his attention indicating sabotage-espionage in the biological warfare field.

In accordance with Bureau wishes, liaison will be continued with the Communicable Disease Center and contacts made on a semi-annual basis.

LGD:lch

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJ/HCB
ON 7/2/04

RECORDED - 69 100-93216-659

OCT 27 1953

58 NOV 3 1953

b6
b7C
[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/4/53

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/Bj/AlCB
ON 2/7/04

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET~~

Remylet 9/2/53 and teletype 11/3/53.

[redacted] was contacted on 10/29/53, 10/31/53, and 11/3/53 by representatives of the San Francisco Office, at which time he advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

PWM:rk
REGISTERED - AIRMAIL

b2
b7D

RECORDED - 90

660

cc: [redacted]

EX-12

[redacted]

b6
b7C

63 NOV 13 1953

URGENT CABLE
CIPHER PAD CODE

NOVEMBER 4, 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/7/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/sj/kb

RECORDED-97

100-93216-661

LEGAL ATTACHE
PARIS, FRANCE

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ESPIONAGE DASH SABOTAGE. [redacted]

[redacted] ADVISED

SF OFFICE NOVEMBER THREE LAST HE OBTAINED FOLLOWING INFORMATION DURING FIRST PART OF OCTOBER LAST FROM [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

SUCABLE

Foreign Service Desk

Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gea
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

Initialed per Mr. Holloman 11-4-53 PRD

b6
b7C

Cable 11-5-

sent

56 NOV 18 1953

FILED BY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Gandy	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 10-26-53

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 10-23-53 [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

PROP

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc/lmsl0/jm/cb
ON 2/7/01

MJK:LG

AMSD REG. RRR

RECORDED - 100-93216-662

11-25-53 0-1 Ltr Belle to Mellett Ex-102

Belle adv letter mailed Mellett 12/7/53

50 NOV

[redacted]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7D

Negotiations are presently in process with the Mathison Chemical Company of Baltimore, Maryland, to take over contracts in the Biological Warfare Division.

MJK:LG

CIPHER PAD CODE URGENT

NOVEMBER 10, 1953

RECORDED - 12

62-124/00-93216-663

LEGAL ATTACHE
PARIS, FRANCE

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE. REUR CABLE NOVEMBER NINE, LAST, [redacted]. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO RECONTACT [redacted] AND DETERMINE THE IDENTITY OF [redacted] REFERRED TO IN YOUR [redacted] CABLE. [redacted] SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO ADVISE [redacted] IN THE EVENT [redacted] HE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO DO THIS, YOU SHOULD DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS TO BE USED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THIS INFORMATION. THE BUREAU DESIRES THIS MATTER BE GIVEN IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

b6
b7C
b7D

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/10/04 BY 60324 UC/MLS/BJA/CB

NR. 95
ENC. 2340-0030
CK. 0100-0230
APPROVED BY
TYPED BY RPP
FILED BY

RECEIVED REVIEWING OFFICE
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
NOV 10 4

EBI
Foreign Service Desk

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

via State Dept. Cablegram

5 6 NOV 20 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/17/53

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

On November 9, 1953, [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

MJK:JEB

AMSD, REG.RRR

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 7/7/04

RECORDED-48

EX-126

100-93216-664

[redacted]

b6
b7C

53 NOV 25 1953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson 1-3
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
BRANIGAN

12/15/03
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NLS/BJA/CB 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 12/15/2028
Pgl, [ ], OGA 12/15/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 439 DATED NOVEMBER 12, 1953 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE. REBUCABLE NOVEMBER 10. [redacted] ADVISED TODAY THAT HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] ADVISED THAT THE BUREAU [redacted] b1

[redacted] HAS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT HE NOT BE QUOTED AS THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION.

[redacted]

RECEIVED: 11-12-53 3:53 PM DR [redacted]

NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION OBTAINED FROM GARBLE. AWAITING CORRECTION

b6
b7C

[redacted] RECORDED - 63

100-93216-665

b2

[redacted]

cc:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~TOP~~ SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RECORDED - 63
EX-124

100-93216 - 665

BY COURIER SERVICE

12/15/03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 12/15/2028
b2, b7D, OGA 12/15/03 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB

Date: November 20, 1953

To: [redacted]

b2

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOCICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

On November 6, 1953, a confidential and reliable source advised this Bureau that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

EHM:jdb

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~TOP~~ SECRET

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

79 DEC 1 - 1953

BY SPL. MSGR.
COMM - FBI

NOV 20 5 35 PM '53

[redacted]

b7D

In regard to the statement set forth above, concerning documents published from 1946 by Camp Detrick, Maryland, this Bureau's source advised [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A.H. Belmont

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: November 20, 1953

FROM : W.A. Branigan

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SYNOPSIS:

On 11-3-53, Confidential Informant [redacted] advised he obtained the following information [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] (C)

b1

ACTION:

It is recommended the attached memorandum [redacted] (C)

12/15/03
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NRS/BJA/CB 60267 DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 12/15/2028
Pg. 1, [redacted] AND Pg 3 [redacted], OGA 12/15/03 60267 uc/NRS/BJA/CB

100-93216-666
RECORDED - 63
NOV 24
INDEXED - 63
EX-124

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-93216
EHM:jdb
Attachment

DEC 1 - 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] requested that he not be identified as the source of the Bureau's information. (C)

b1

NDARD FORM NO. 64

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 12/8/53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

(25)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Liaison contact was had on December 4, 1953, by SA [redacted] with [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

It was pointed out that Hepatitis is of two types - human and canine. The human type will not affect dogs, and vice versa. In explaining the problem [redacted] referred to the following canine diseases:

7/7/04
CLASSIFIED BY 60247 UC/NLS/BJA/CKB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 2/7/2029
#977600

1. Distemper
2. Hard Pad
3. Canine Infectious Hepatitis

The first two have been known for many years, although Hepatitis has been recognized only since about 1948. [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

FCV:FAS
REGISTERED MAIL
ENCL (2)

[redacted]

54 100-93216-667

DEC 8 1953

20

[redacted] b6 b7C

DEC 28

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 12-7-53

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

On 12-2-53 [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

MJK:LG

AMSD REG. RRR

RECORDED-38
INDEXED-38

100-93216

65-103

DEC 20 1953

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/jws/sbs/kab
ON 11/15/04
#979600

50 DEC 17 1953

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/8/53

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY: 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/DFW
ON 11/15/04

RE: SUICIDE OF DR. FRANK R. OLSON

Remylet of December 8, 1953, captioned as above, making reference, among other things, to the suicide of Dr. FRANK R. OLSON, who, until the time of his death on November 28, 1953, was a scientist attached to the Special Operations Division, Biological Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland.

During the regular liaison contact at Camp Detrick, on December 4, 1953, [redacted] related in considerable detail the facts concerning the suicide of Dr. OLSON, and the events preceding his death. According to [redacted] a "technical" conference was held at Oakland, Maryland, on November 17, 18 & 19 last, in which Dr. OLSON participated. However, OLSON's presentation and comments at this conference were obviously not up to par, which was the first indication to [redacted] and others that OLSON was troubled.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

EXPEDITE

Letter submitted 1-15-54

RCV:FAS
REGISTERED MAIL
~~ENCL (1)~~

1-15-54 MR
RECORDED - 32
1-16 SF to subject SLC to subject Ethan

100-93216
20 DEC 1953
11


EX-103

63 DEC 18 '53

b6
b7C

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL~~

L/DIR
BA 66-891



b6
b7C
b7D

From previous correspondence with the Bureau concerning BW operations at Camp Detrick, it will be observed that Dr. OLSON had been attached to the Special Operations Division at Camp Detrick for some years, and that he was Chief of this Division during the latter part of 1952 and early part of 1953. For reasons of health (ulcers), he was replaced as Chief of the Special Operations Division, but remained on the Staff. OLSON was 42 years of age, and until the time of his death, resided [redacted] in Frederick, Maryland. He is a former Army Officer, and has been connected with BW operations at Camp Detrick since 1943. It was stated that OLSON has made some outstanding contributions in the BW field.

b6
b7C

The above is being submitted to the Bureau as a matter of information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: December 11, 1953

FROM : SAC, Indianapolis (65-2064)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

(RS)

Quoted herewith is a letter this office has received from [redacted] and which is submitted for information of the Bureau:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C

HAK:BH
REGISTERED MAIL
cc: [redacted]

b2
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-03 BY 60267 uc/pus/bja/DFW

RECORDED - 24 100-93216-6

DEC 14 1953

JAN 14 1954

[redacted]

b6
b7C

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/NCS/BJA/CB
ON 11/15/04
OCA 11/22/04 60267uc/ncs/BJA/CB

100-93216

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: January 4, 1954

To:

b2

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference is made to my memorandum dated November 20, 1953, captioned as above.

It would be appreciated if your Agency would advise this Bureau the status of the request contained in my referenced memorandum.

1-21-54 Guiana contact to arrange 1-27-54 date for Miller visit. Follow contact.

1/29/54 Called to ascertain status of request. EHM:beg

RECORDED-84 100-93216-671

JAN 5 1954

130

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

BY COURIER SVC.
36 JAN - 4
COMM - FBI

DEC 30 4 03 PM '53
DEPT OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM

JAN 4 10 52 AM '54
U S DEPT OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM

51 JAN 11 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: January 11, 1954

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267/uc/NLS/Bja/CB
ON 12-5-03

Remylet 11/4/53.

[redacted] was recently contacted by representatives of the San Francisco Office, at which time he advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

. Contact with [redacted] will continue.

PWM:kam

b2
b7D

cc: [redacted]

REGISTERED

RECORDED-88 100-93216-62

JAN 15 1954

53 JAN 20 1954

EX-110

b6
b7C

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-4167-123-1

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/15/54

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 ue/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 11/15/04

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

On 1/13/54 [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

Also contacted on the above date were [redacted]

b6
b7C

These interviews were at the request of [redacted]

AMSD REGISTERED RR

MJK:htg

RECORDED-58
INDEXED-58
EX-124
100-93216-624
JAN 18 1954

124


51 JAN 26 1954

b6
b7C

Letter to Bureau
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

[redacted] were advised of the purpose, scope, and original arrangements of the liaison, as set forth in Bureau letters dated 8/16/50 and 10/3/50. [redacted] b6 b7C at the time of this interview, pointed out the ~~top secret~~ nature of the information being furnished and stated that the liaison arrangements should be continued with [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL



100-93216

Date: January 20, 1954 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: [redacted] b2

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference is made to my memoranda dated November 20, 1953, and January 4, 1954, captioned as above.

It would be appreciated if your Agency would advise this Bureau the status of the request referred to in my referenced memoranda.

EHM:mc/mae

RECORDED-92 | 100-93216-675
JAN 21 1954
130

BY COURIER SVC.
61 JAN 21
FBI - HWG

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
ON 8-9-64
OGA 11/22/04 60267 uc/nls/BJA/cb

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

50 JAN 27 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

[redacted]DENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/28/54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NCS/BJA/CB
ON 11/15/04

Liaison contact was had on 1/27/54 by SA [redacted] with

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

1 ENCL

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

RCV:AFS
Enclosure - 1
REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED - 18 100-93216-62
INDEXED - 18
JAN 29 1954
2-3


EX-122

51 FEB 11 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

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b6
b7C
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and weighing approximately one pound. These bombs have been designed for release in clusters from aircraft and to explode on contact.

Enclosed is one copy of a publication entitled, "Graphic Summary - Selected Infectious Diseases," dated July, 1953, made available by Colonel RUWETT. This is a revised copy of the publication first printed in March, 1952, a copy of which was previously made available to the Bureau.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-~~93216~~ 93216)

DATE: 2/9/54

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

DECLASSIFIED BY 4024 uc/NCS/BJA/CB
ON 8-9-94

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

On 2/1/54 [redacted] and furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

AMSD REGISTERED RR

MJK:htg

RECORDED-97

INDEXED-97

100-93216-679

EX-127

[redacted]

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b7C

53 FEB 25 1954

SAC, Miami

February 15, 1954

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH PROJECT
(BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fla -

Fla.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/DFW
ON 11/15/04

Reference is made to Bureau letter of January 30, 1953, in the above-captioned matter, which advised, for your personal and confidential information, [redacted]

[redacted]

You were advised [redacted] for your information and guidance in handling complaints which may be of a sabotage nature with respect to this project, and also to assist the Chemical Corps by acting as a listening post for any security leaks. You were subsequently contacted by the Chemical Corps representatives in this regard.

b6
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b7E

Please be advised that [redacted] will be in Florida from February 17 to February 19, 1954, on a similar visit and probably will call upon you on February 18, 1954. They will discuss the project with you and you are to follow the instructions issued in referenced letter of January 30, 1953.

RECORDED-92 100-93216-

INDEXED-92 EX-125 FEB 16 1954

JFS:mpm/mpm

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

COMM — FBI
FEB 15 1954
MAILED 31

63 FEB 23 1954

FEB 15 3 23 PM '54
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI

[redacted]

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 15, 1954

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

FROM : [redacted] b6 b7C

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH PROJECT
(BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-04 BY 60247 uc/mrs/bja/dfw

On February 8, 1954, [redacted] called Liaison Agent [redacted] to advise that he [redacted] were taking their annual trip to Florida to check [redacted] He advised that his party would be in Florida from February 17 to February 19, 1954, and probably would be in Miami on February 18, at which time he would call upon the SAC in Miami. b6 b7C b7E

You will recall from my memorandum of January 29, 1953, that [redacted]

[redacted] The Chemical Corps also desired to notify SAC's at that time of the sites in their areas for their information and guidance in handling instant request, plus complaints from local citizenry. On the authority of the Director, appropriate SAC letters were sent out to the interested SAC's recommending that the Bureau offer the assistance requested by [redacted] to act as a listening post with no investigative responsibility. b6 b7C b7E

There is attached an appropriate letter to the SAC, Miami, advising him of the pending visit of [redacted] No mention was made at this time by [redacted] of visiting [redacted] in Idaho, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin; accordingly, until further word is heard from him, SAC letters will not be dispatched to those areas. 100-93216-681

RECOMMENDATION: In view of the importance of [redacted] it is recommended that the Bureau offer the assistance requested by [redacted] If approved, the attached letter should be forwarded to the SAC, Miami.

Attachment part 2

RECORDED-38

INDEXED-38

63 MAR 1 1954

JKS:mpm

NATOUSA

[redacted] b6 b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: SAC, Miami (67-235-775)

DATE: February 19, 1954

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH PROJECT
(BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Tretter
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

ReBulet February 15, 1954.

On February 18, 1954, [redacted] called at the Miami Office.

The purpose of this call was to re-establish liaison in connection with this matter and to request the continued cooperation of Resident Agents located in the vicinities of the Chemical Warfare Projects at Avon Park and Boca Raton, Florida, in acting as listening posts to report any publicity or gossip which might jeopardize the secrecy of these projects.

They were assured of our continued cooperation, and arrangements were made so that liaison could be refreshed between the Chemical Corps Field Representatives at these points with out Resident Agents.

REGISTERED MAIL
HRA:ms

EX-PROC
FEB 23 1954

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/lmc/BJA/DFW
ON 4/9/04

RECORDED-53 100-93216-685
INDEXED-53
FEB 23 1954

EX-125

MAR 9 1954

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: March 2, 1954

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/ml/sl/BJA/DFW
ON 8-5-04

Remylet, dated 1-11-54.

CONF. INFT

[redacted] was recently contacted by representatives of the San Francisco Office and it was ascertained that [redacted]

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[redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

EXP. PROC.

b2
b7D

PWM/ms
cc [redacted]
cc 100-30190 (DABIOW)

RECORDED - 69
INDEXED - 69

REGISTERED

65-4167-[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

124
MAR 15 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/5/54

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

On 3/4/54 an effort was made to contact [redacted] with negative results. It was determined that [redacted] and would not return until the following week. He will be contacted upon his return and the Bureau will be immediately advised of the results of the interview with him.

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b7D

AIR MAIL
REGISTERED [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mls/ BJA/DFW
ON 8-9-04

MJK:htg

EXP. PROC.

MAR 8 9 AM

100-93216-688

[redacted]

RECORDED - 69
INDEXED - 69
EX-125

MAR 15 1954

124

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b7C

100-93216

BY COURIER SERVICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
OGA 11 [illegible] 04 60267 uc/nls/BJA/GB

Date: March 4, 1954

To: [redacted]

b2

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference is made to my memoranda dated November 20, 1953; January 4, 1954; and January 20, 1954, captioned as above.

It would be appreciated if your Agency would furnish to this Bureau the information requested in my referenced memorandum dated November 20, 1953.

EHM:mpp

EX-125
RECORDED - 68 93216-689
MAR 8 1954
130

BY COURIER SVC.
MAR - 5
COMM - FBI

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

MAR 15 1954

124

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: March 5, 1954

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 DAE/NIS/BSA/CRS ON 11/15/04

[redacted] with whom regular liaison is maintained, advised SA [redacted] telephonically on March 2, 1954, of a statement appearing in the New York "Times" February 25, 1954, by G. ASHTON OLDHAM concerning the refusal of the Mathieson Chemical Corporation of Baltimore to enter into a contract with the Army to operate the Biological Laboratories at Camp Detrick and elsewhere. [redacted] pointed out that the article had referred to the operation of "germ warfare plants" rather than to Biological Laboratories. The article referred to appeared in the February 25, 1954, issue of the New York "Times", page 30, under "Letters to the 'Times'," and is quoted below:

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"Germ Warfare Plants Protested (to the Editor of the New York 'Times')

"On February 6 an item appeared in the New York 'Times' entitled 'Germ War Deal Balked--Company Refuses to Operate Military's Three Main Plants.'

"The article described the invitation to the Mathieson Chemical Corporation of Baltimore to manage 'three main germ warfare plants' and stated as the reasons for their refusal to do so 'the administrative and business problems involved and the mass destruction the weapon would create.' This last phrase would seem to indicate that 'ruthless' Capitalism is here at least more considerate and ethical than the government.

"This is the first intimation I have had that the U. S. was embarking on germ warfare and already has 'three main plants' for that purpose. The news is both surprising and shocking to me and doubtless

RCV:jca
Regis. M.

cc: 2-New York (Regis.M.)

100-93216
RECORDED-53
INDEXED-53
100-93216-690
20 MAR

57 MAR 22 1954

EX. - 104

b6
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[redacted]

"to many more of our people.

"When one recalls the violent revolution and indignant condemnation throughout this country some years ago at reports that our enemies were using or about to resort to germ warfare, it is hard to understand what could have happened to the conscience of America to produce this complete change of front. I am still inclined to think it is not the American people but a few of their leaders who are so affected. If this is so, it is high time that the people made themselves heard. The wanton and indiscriminate slaughter of thousands of innocent women and children is too high a price to pay for our security or life itself. And as for democracy, it could well be lost completely in the mad scramble for control of these horrible and diabolical powers.

"Do our people know the steps which our government has taken, and if so, do they approve? How can we profess to be sincerely concerned about the welfare of mankind if we resort to this fiendish method to accomplish our ends.

"(The Right Rev.) G. ASHTON OLDHAM, New York, 2/11/54."

The article referred to by OLDHAM appeared in the New York "Times," Saturday, February 6, 1954, page 3, under a Washington, D. C., dateline of February 5, and is captioned "Germ War Deal Balked--Company Refuses to Operate Military's Three Main Plants." The article is quoted as follows:

"The Defense Department's effort to induce a private chemical company to operate the military's three main germ warfare plants has failed. The only firm that had indicated an interest is the Mathieson Chemical Corporation of Baltimore, has informed the Department it has decided against taking a contract and negotiations have been dropped, it was learned today.

"The efforts to interest a company in running the bacteriology warfare laboratories and test facilities was part of Secretary of Defense CHARLES E. WILSON's

"program to get more participation of business in certain fields of national defense that customarily are operated by the military itself.

"Informed persons said the two main reasons for private industry's reluctance were the administrative and business problems involved and the mass destruction the weapon would create."

[redacted] advised that a statement such as [redacted] is not good as far as public relations in the BW program are concerned, for which reason he thought the matter should be called to the attention of the FBI, indicating that he would be interested in knowing something concerning the [redacted]

Information that the Mathieson Chemical Corporation had refused to accept the contract with the Army was brought to the attention of the Bureau by Baltimore letter of January 28, 1954, captioned as above. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] letter to the New York "Times" editor are submitted as a matter of information to the Bureau and the New York Office. New York Office is requested to search its indices on [redacted] and briefly furnish whatever pertinent information is available on him in the New York files.

The next regular liaison contact with [redacted] will be had around the latter part of March.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 3/12/54

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY 66267 uc/rls/BJA/DFO
ON 8-9-84

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 3/11/54 [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

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[redacted]

EXP-DBOO

MJK:htg

AMSD REGISTERED RR

RECORDED-29
INDEXED-29

100-93216-611

[redacted]

b6
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58 MAR 25 1954

RECEIVED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

TO : Mr. Nichols

DATE: March 16, 1954

FROM : M. A. Jones

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-04 BY 60267 uc/ml/s

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Biological Warfare Espionage and Sabotage

I received a call today from [redacted] of Congressman John Jarman's Office (Oklahoma) stating that the Congressman was interested in securing a copy of the film [redacted] He said that the Congressman wanted to take this film back to Oklahoma during the Easter season for the purpose of showing it to various civic groups. [redacted] wanted to know if we had a copy of the film which we could lend the Congressman. [redacted] pointed out that they had contacted the Treasury Department (Customs) and they had advised that their copy was tied up but that the "FBI had a copy." b6 b7C

I advised [redacted] that we would check into the matter and see if we could identify the film.

The film in question is apparently that which was seized by Customs in our case entitled [redacted] It was seized by Customs. This film deals with the confession of four American flyers.

We, of course, reviewed the film and immediately made a copy available to the Air Force for its concern.

We contacted Supervisor [redacted] of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and he advised that the matter was still pending and that in his opinion we should not under any circumstances make the film available to the Congressman for the purpose indicated. b6 b7C

It should be noted that [redacted] also indicated that the Senate Internal Security Committee also had a copy of this film.

RECORDED-1 100-93216-69
EX-118
MAR 19 1954

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) It is felt perhaps we might have Inspector [redacted] call on Congressman Jarman and explain the fact that we do not have a copy of this film available for such distribution.

explained to Woodley
phone 3/17/54
MAJ

MAJ:mnf 124

58 MAR 25 1954

(2) It is further felt that Liaison should contact Customs and discreetly caution them about telling individuals that we have certain material in our possession. This could be based on the fact that material seized by Customs may well constitute evidence in a pending case and might prove very embarrassing if that evidence were known to be in our possession by outside sources.

3/18/54 Protest made to [redacted] Deputy Commissioner of Customs. He said someone in Customs used bad judgment in passing this information along and that he will take steps to try to prevent it happening again. [redacted]

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RECORDED - 60 - 93-216-693

Date: March 17, 1954

b6
b7C

To: [redacted]

Federal Civil Defense Administration
1930 Columbia Road, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: Project East River Report

In accordance with the request contained in your letter of March 5, 1954, an appropriate marking has been placed on the copy of Part III of the Project East River Report, which is in the possession of this Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-4-84 BY 16026 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

jaw
FHS:jaw

Tolson
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Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

MAILED 5
MAR 17 1954
COMM-FBI

63 APR -2 1954

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

100-93216

Date: April 7, 1954

To: [redacted] BY COURIER SERVICE

b2 [redacted]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference is made to my memorandum dated November 20, 1953, January 4, 1954, January 20, 1954, and March 4, 1954, captioned as above.

It would be appreciated if your Agency would furnish to this Bureau the information requested in referenced memorandum dated November 20, 1953.

8-9-04
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NLS/B/A/CB 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 8/9/2029
Pg. 1, Note, OGA 11/22/04 60267 uc/NLS/B/A/CB

EHM:alp

NOTE:

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

RECORDED - 68
EX-129

100-93216-695

BY COURIER SVC.
7 0 APR - 8
COMM - FBI

APR 8 1954

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

51 APR 13 1954

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/9/54

FROM : SAC, New York (100-91131)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Baltimore letter to Bureau, 3/5/54.

Enclosed herewith are three copies of a blind memo concerning [redacted] Also enclosed are three copies of this blind memo for the Baltimore office. Three copies are enclosed for the Bureau inasmuch as it is not known what, if any, distribution of this memo will be made by the Bureau. b6 b7C

Following are the identities of the informants mentioned in this memo.

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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[redacted] - [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

No further investigation will be conducted by the New York Office UACB. RUC.

11/15/04
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/B;A/CB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 11/15/2029
Pg.1,[ ]OCA11/22/04 60267 uc/NLS/B;A/CB

Encs. (3)

100-93216-696

RECORDED-27
INDEXED-27
APR 12 1954

1 - Baltimore (66-891) (Encs. 3)

EX-127

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AGENCY Ltr 7 encl to RM 3(6-6), 1 cc 2 encl to G-2(6-14)
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 4/14/54
HOW FORW.
BY EHM-JVH

WGO:BW APR 22 1954

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

4/9/54

Rev. G. Ashton ~~/~~ Oldham

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

In an article in the Daily Worker on July 27, 1953, page 8, column 5, Rt. Rev. G. Ashton Oldham, Norfolk, Connecticut was listed as one of the signers of a letter to President Eisenhower asking him to urge Congress "to repeal or thoroughly revise "the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act. This letter was sponsored by the National Committee to Repeal the McCarran Act.

In an article in the Daily Worker on June 28, 1950, page 3, column 3, Rev. G. Ashton Oldham, Protestant Episcopal Bishop (retired) of Albany, New York was listed as a signer of the World Peace Appeal.

In 1947, [redacted] of known reliability, advised that

[redacted]

In June 1950, [redacted] of known reliability, advised

[redacted]

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On February 28, 1953, [redacted] of known reliability,

[redacted]

100-93216-696

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: mc/NLS/Bias 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 11/15/2029
Pg. 2, 7, 8 can 11/22/04 60267 mc/NLS/Bias
11/15/04

~~SECRET~~

In 1942, the pamphlet of Russian War Relief Inc. lists Rev. G. Ashton Oldham as a sponsor.

[redacted] b6 b7C

In regard to the organizations mentioned above the following have been declared subversive by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450:

National Federation of Constitutional Liberties
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief Inc.

The American Friends of the Chinese People was cited as a Communist Front by the House Committee on Un-American Activities in a report dated March 29, 1944, pages 40 and 147.

No derogatory information is available concerning the Voluntary Christian Committee to Boycott Nazi Germany.

The World Youth Conference was cited as a Communist front by the California Committee on Un-American Activities in its report for 1948, page 185.

In regard to the National Committee to Repeal the McCarran Act, the New York Herald Tribune for December 27, 1950 contained an article reflecting that this committee had been formed the preceding day with the purpose as stated in the name of the Committee. [redacted] of known reliability. b2 b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b1 (S)

The American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (Indusco) has been described

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

by [redacted] of known reliability, [redacted]

[redacted] of known reliability, advised [redacted]

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[redacted]

The Committee for Peaceful Alternatives was cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist front in report No. 378, dated April 25, 1951.

The National Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism was described in an article in the Daily Worker for December 20, 1943 as a Committee "dedicated to the proposition that anti-semitism is Fascism."

[redacted]

b2
b7D

The 1949 report of the California Committee on Un-American Activities describes the Russian War Relief as one of the more important Communist Party fronts conducted for the purpose of carrying on propaganda on behalf of the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

INDEXED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: April 8, 1954

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABATOGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Regular liaison contact was had on April 5, 1954 by SA [redacted] with [redacted]

[redacted] displayed to agent [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

2 ENCL 68

RJV:ers
2 Enclosures
REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED - 68
INDEXED 68

100-93216-697

EX-129

SECRET

51 MAY 7 1954

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Exp. Proc.

~~SECRET~~

BA 66-891

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[redacted] Some discussion was had concerning an article which appeared in "The Periscope Column","Newsweek" issue of March 29, 1954, which is being quoted below for ready reference purposes.

"Real Worry"

"German scientists, arriving in Washington for a conference on bacteriological warfare, bring a secret underground report that the Kremlin seems more worried about U.S. activities at Camp Detrick, Md., than atomic tests in the Marshall Islands. Scientists at Camp Detrick have perfected airborne crop-killing germs that could starve Russia's millions into subjection."

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[redacted] (S) wonders whether the "Newsweek" story could have been planted in an effort to create confusion. As far as he knows, no further effort is being made to determine the source of this story.

[redacted] presently subscribing to "Pravda" and the "Daily Worker" [redacted] and through a private post office box, [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/20/54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-9-04 BY 60260 ucn/s/BJA/DKW

Re New York letter dated 4/9/54 to Bureau, copy to Baltimore, to which were attached copies of a blind memo concerning [redacted] NY

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b7C
b7D

UACB, a brief oral summary of the information in the blind memo will be given to [redacted] at the time of the next regular liaison contact with him at Camp Detrick, Maryland, around the middle of May next.

RCV:vcm
REGISTERED MAIL

EX-PROC.

RECORDED - 65
INDEXED 68 100-93216-698
EX-125
APR 22 1954

22

b6
b7C

[redacted]

124
APR 19 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Boardman

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: April 15, 1954

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SYNOPSIS:

On November 3, 1953, Confidential Informant [redacted] advised he obtained the following information during the first part of October, 1953, from [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b1
b3

(S)

11/22/04 NSC/NUS/DJ/dcb 4/12/07 Derivative Declassify On: 25(1) NSC 2029 A3, A5+6 dcn 11/22/04 2.4.7 NSC/NUS/DJ/dcb

100-93216

Attachment

EHM:fjm

RECORDED - 68
INDEXED 68
EX. - 118
13 APR 21 1954

100-93216-699

[redacted]

cc - [redacted] b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

RECORDED - 68

100-93216 - 700

EX - 118

Date: April 19, 1954

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

b6
b7C
b7D

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
[redacted], SABOTAGE

[redacted]

On November 6, 1953, a confidential and reliable source advised this Bureau that a report dated June 6, 1953, was furnished by [redacted]

[redacted]

11/15/04 CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mls/bjr/cb DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 (1) 11/15/2029 Pg 2 of 3 on 11/22/04 uc/mls/bjr/cb

b7D

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

cc - 1 - San Francisco (65-4167) (For information)

51 APR 27 1954

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

In regard to the statement set forth above, concerning documents published from 1946 by Camp Detrick, Maryland, this Bureau's source advised it was his opinion the Belgian report referred to published articles on basic science and did not relate to classified biological warfare reports of Camp Detrick.

Attempts were made by this Bureau to obtain additional details concerning this matter by contacting SHAPE, Paris, France. [redacted] (S)

b1
b3

b7D [redacted]

cc - 2 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/22/54

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

SECRET

Remylet dated 3/2/54.

[redacted] who was recently contacted by representatives of the San Francisco Office, advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Contact will continue with [redacted] 100-93216-70 XX

b2
b7D

AIRMAIL - REGISTERED
PWM:rk
cc: [redacted]
100-30190(DABIOW)

RECORDED-31
EX-129

APR 26 1954

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DPW
ON 8-9-04

b6
b7C

51 MAY 4 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 4-23-54

FROM: SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Mr. Gandy

On 4/22/54 [redacted] was contacted [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

AIR MAIL REG. RRR
MJK:mhe

b6
b7C

RECORDED-1 100-93216

APR 28 1954

INDEXED-1

58 MAY 3 1954

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucdals/BJA/DFW
ON 11-3-84

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Minneapolis

DATE: April 22, 1954

SUBJECT: [redacted]

INFORMATION CONCERNING -
Letter to the President of
the United States

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-9-04 BY 60942 uc/nls/BSAT/JFC

On April 22, 1954, [redacted] appeared at the Minneapolis Office and announced that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

COL:RSK

AIRMAIL

[redacted] 100-93216-124

RECORDED-62 13 APR 29 1954

INDEXED-62

EX-123

MAY 10 1954

EX-[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 5/21/54

FROM : SAC Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

On 5/20/54 [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

DECLASSIFIED BY 64267 uc/sms/bja/cb ON 11/15/04

AIR MAIL REG. RRR

MJK:jh

100-93216-706

RECORDED-14
INDEXED-14

[redacted]

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI 100-93216 DATE: 5/24/54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE 66-891

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Telephonic contact was had today with [redacted] concerning a convenient date for the next Md. liaison conference. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

The next regular conference with him by the liaison agent of this office has been set for June 2nd, following which the BU will be promptly advised.

SSA:arf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-04 BY [redacted] BJA/DFW

RECORDED-14
INDEXED-14
EX-106

100-93216-
5-26
21 MAY 25 1954

[redacted]

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOV

CC -
CC -
CC -
CC -

SECRET

TO : L. V. Boardman

FROM : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 1, 1954

b6
b7C

Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

SYNOPSIS:

b1
b3

[redacted] (S)

ACTION:

The above is for your information.

11/22/04
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NLS/BJA/CB 60267 DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 11/22/2029
Pgs 1-3 FBI, DOA 11/22/04 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

ENCL. [redacted]

EX-123

RECORDED-21
INDEXED-21

100-93216-78

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

13 JUN 17 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
F331 95

SECRET

EXCISED

Attachment

EHM:SGK

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/4/54

FROM SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SECRET

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Liaison contact was had on June 2, 1954 by SA [redacted] with [redacted] Also present was [redacted]

During the course of the conference a brief oral summary of information on [redacted] supplied by the New York Office in their letter to the Bureau of 4/9/54, was furnished to [redacted] It will be recalled that Reverend OLDHAM, in a letter to the Editor of the New York Times newspaper, which was quoted in the issue of February 25 last, was highly critical of the Government's BW program. b6 b7C b7D

It was ascertained that [redacted]

11/15/04 CLASSIFIED BY 4026 JHS/BJA/CB DECLASSIFY ON: 20 YEARS 11/22/04 per code 7 HC/JHS/BJA/CB

RCV:FAS
REGISTERED MAIL
ENCL. (1)

RECORDED - 21 100-93216
INDEXED - 21

EX-123

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

SECRET

b6 b7C

51 JUN 24 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 6/21/54

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 6/16/54 [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

AIR MAIL
REGISTERED RR

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/n/s/BJA/DFW
ON 8-9-04

RHT:htg

RECORDED - 32 100-93216-710

EX-1

JUN X 1954

34

[redacted]

b6
b7C

50 JUN 30 1954
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

b6
b7C

DATE: 6/24/54

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted] who was recently contacted by representatives of this office, furnished the following observations:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-84 BY 6002 ucdnls/BSTA/DFW

EXPEDITE

RGF:efw

cc: [redacted]
100-30190 (DA)

b2
b7D

RECORDED-39 100-93216-

AIR MAIL
REGISTERED

53 JUL 13 1954

EX-123

13 JUN 30 1954

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/30/54

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167) ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted] furnished a representative of this office with information to the effect that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

PWM/bam
AIR MAIL - REGISTERED

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucdn/sl/BJS A/DKW
ON 8-9-04

b2
b7D

CC: 1 - Los Angeles (RM)
[redacted]
100-30190 (BW)

RECORDED - 8 EX-125

100-93216-712

INDEXED - 8

2

135

30 JUL 14 1954

b6
b7C

[redacted]

SAC, San Francisco (65-4167) July 7, 1954

RECORDED - 69 100-93216-713

Director, FBI (100-93216)

EX-103

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reurlet 6-23-54.

You are instructed to submit a memorandum containing the pertinent information set forth in your referenced letter in order that the memorandum can be disseminated to interested Government agencies by the Bureau.

EHM:sgk

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-84 BY 6026 rudnls/BJA/DFW

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

COMM — FBI
JUL 7 1954
MAILED 27

JUL 14 1954

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVING ROOM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

BRANIGAN

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 6/23/54

11/22/04 CLASSIFIED BY uc/NLS/BJA/DFW 66267 Derivative DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 11/22/2029 Pg 1, ED, Pg 2 per 11/22/04 uc/NLS/BJA/DFW

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-04 BY 66267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Remylet dated 4/22/54.

CONF INFT

[redacted] was recently contacted by representatives of this office and advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] informed that a Dr. ARCADIUS ALEXANDER LEMPERT, recently from Hong Kong, had some information about the Russian BW program which would be of interest to the FBI. [redacted] stated that Dr. LEMPERT was a very loyal and trustworthy person, and was making plans to leave this area in the near future to find a position in the East, and that he was presently staying with [redacted] The San Francisco indices contained no information concerning Dr. LEMPERT [redacted]

Dr. LEMPERT was interviewed by representatives of this office and exhibited a certificate of identification #64 from the Commissioner of Police, Hong Kong, indicating the following information: Born 3/19/1896, Kursk, Russia; height, 5'4"; weight, 160 pounds; hair, brown; eyes, grey; father, ALEXANDER LEMPERT; mother, EDOKYA LEMPERT; wife, HELEN GEORGIEVNA; no children; occupation, M.B. Med. Technologist.

Dr. LEMPERT stated that he was forced to flee from Russia in 1918, and he and his sister were the only ones of his family to escape from Russia. He took up practice in Shanghai and in May 1950, was forced to flee from Shanghai to Hong Kong, leaving everything behind. Dr. LEMPERT then taught at the University of Hong Kong until May 1954, when he came to the United States. Dr. LEMPERT advised that he was a white Russian and was on the list of 14,000 white Russians to be liquidated in 1918. [redacted]

b1
b3

[redacted] (S)

PWM: efw
cc: [redacted]
SF 100-30190 (DA)

b2
b7D

AIR MAIL
REGISTERED

[redacted]

RECORDED - 69
INDEXED - 69

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI 6/23/54
RE: BW
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

According to Dr. LEMPERT, [redacted] who is a Catholic, was in Hong Kong for about two weeks during 1953 and related the following information:

Dr. HUANG had been the Professor of Biochemistry at the University of Soochow, having received his training in Germany before the war. Dr. HUANG, who is about 50 years of age, along with other chemists and doctors mostly between the ages of 20 and 30, were sent to Pekin for indoctrination from a political standpoint. Their names were changed while attending this indoctrination and at the end of this indoctrination they were given a number instead of a name, and sent to Russia for further training before they could return to China. The wives and children of these men were taken care of by the State and were completely separated from these men. Dr. LEMPERT advised that he had heard rumors regarding this information prior to his conversation with [redacted] but that after talking to her the information, in his opinion, was probably authentic.

b6
b7C

Dr. LEMPERT stated that he had learned from [redacted] and miscellaneous sources that a scientific research center in BW is located at Sverdlovsk. Further, in Novosibirsk, Sibera, an industrial center is located and, in Dr. LEMPERT's opinion, this is where the BW agents are manufactured. In 1952, a new plant, rumored to be BW, was built completely underground at Harbin, and West of Harbin at Tsitsihar, a sub plant was located. Another plant (believed by Dr. LEMPERT to be a BW plant) was built in Sian, Western China, and equipped with supplies taken from Hungary after the war and, according to Dr. LEMPERT, they are working on virus at this plant. Dr. LEMPERT also stated that a BW plant is located at Mukden, which is heavily guarded.

Dr. LEMPERT informed that a [redacted] head of the Soviet Medical Mission in China in 1951 or 1952, and Professor in Bacteriology at Sverdlovsk, was the official adviser to the newly organized plant at Harbin. The BW research work being carried on at Harbin did have to do with plague, but it is Dr. LEMPERT's opinion that they discontinued the research concerning plague and are now working on virus pneumonia.

Inasmuch as [redacted] has knowledge of the above information [redacted] no distribution of this information is being made, but it is being submitted to the Bureau for informative purposes.

b1
b3

(S)

[redacted] had no further information at this time.

b2
b7D

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7-13-54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DKW

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

INDEXED-96

Telephonic contact was had by SA [redacted] on July 12, 1954, with [redacted] with whom liaison is maintained at Camp Detrick, Md.

[redacted] advised that he had nothing of an urgent nature to discuss at this time and through mutual agreement the next liaison conference will be scheduled for the first part of August.

b6
b7C
b7D

During the conversation he mentioned that [redacted]

As stated, the next regular liaison conference will be held during the first part of August.

RCV:PK
REGISTERED MAIL

100-93216-715

RECORDED-96
INDEXED-96
EX.-113

15 JUL 19 1954

55 JUL 19 1954

[redacted]

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 7/16/54

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

On 7/15/54, [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY 60242 UC/JNLS/SAB
ON 11-15-04

AIR MAIL
REGISTERED RR

RHT:htg

RECORDED-117 100-93216-716

EX-113

JUL 22.

RECEIVED

b6
b7C

[redacted]

51 JUL 30 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: July 20, 1954

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reurletter dated July 7, 1954.
Reourletter dated June 23, 1954.

Enclosed herewith is an original and four copies of a memorandum containing the pertinent information set forth in our letter dated June 23, 1954 in order that the memorandum can be disseminated to interested Government agencies by the Bureau.

AM REG.

Enclosure

PWM:maf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW PER LTR DTD 11/22/04 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

EXP. PROC

AGENCY /ccs ONI (0-14); ccs G-2 (0-14); ccs CAB - Internal Security Div (0-6); REQ. REC'D ccs INS (0-6); ccs [redacted] (0-14) b2
DATE FORW. 7-26-54
HOW FORW. by r/p
BY EHM - VAL

100-93216-8

1 photostat of enclosure added - 7-26-54.

RECORDED - 32

INDEXED - 32

EX. - 113

1 ENCL. detached & filed with copy AUG 25 1954

b6
b7C

-UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-58698-

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 11/15/04

July 20, 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Dr. ARCADIUS ALEXANDER LEMPERT, & Mrs recently from Hong Kong, Calif stated that he was making plans to leave the San Francisco area in the near future to find a position in the East, and that he was presently staying with his brother-in-law, NICOLAS N. SOLOVIEFF, 1120 Ordway Street, Albany, California, telephone number LA. 6-6948.

Dr. LEMPERT exhibited a certificate of identification, #64, from the Commissioner of Police, Hong Kong, indicating the following information:

Born:	March 9, 1896, Kursk, Russia
Height:	5' 4"
Weight:	160
Hair:	Brown
Eyes:	Gray
Father:	M & M ALEXANDER LEMPERT Russia
Mother:	EDOKYA LEMPERT Russia
Wife:	HELEN GEORGIVNA Lempert calif
Children:	No children
Occupation:	M.D., Med. Technologist

Dr. LEMPERT stated that he was forced to flee from Russia in 1918, and he and his siter were the only ones of his family who escaped from Russia. He took up practice in Shanghai and in May of 1950 was forced to flee from Shanghai to Hong Kong leaving everything behind. Dr. LEMPERT then taught at the University of Hong Kong until May of 1954 when he came to the United States. Dr. LEMPERT advised that he was a White Russian and was on the list of 14,000 White Russians to be liquidated in 1918.

According to Dr. LEMPERT, [redacted] N.A b6 b7C who is a Catholic, was in Hong Kong for about three weeks during 1953 and related the following information:

Dr. HAUNG had been the Professor of Biochemistry at the University of Soochow, having received his training in Germany before the war. Dr. HAUNG, who is about 50 years of age, along with other chemists and doctors between the ages of 20 to 30, were sent to Pekin for indoctrination from a political standpoint. Their names were changed while attending this indoctrination and at the end of this indoctrination they were given a number instead of a name and sent to Russia for further training before they could return to China.

11/22/04 CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 25X6 11/22/04 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB
pg 1, 2, 3, 4 11/22/04

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

100-93216-117

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

The wives and children of these men were taken care of by the State and were completely separated from these men. Dr. LEMPERT advised that he had heard rumors regarding this information prior to his conversation with [redacted] but that after talking to her, the information, in his opinion, was probably authentic.

b6
b7C

Dr. LEMPERT stated that he had learned from Mrs. HAUNG and miscellaneous sources that a scientific research center in BW is located at Sderdlovsk. Further, in Nodosibirsk, Siberia, an industrial center is located, and in Dr. LEMPERT'S opinion, this is where the BW agents are manufactured.

In 1952, a new plant rumored to be BW was built completely underground at Harbin, and west of Harbin at Tsitsihar, another plant was located. Another plant (believed by Dr. LEMPERT to be a BW plant) was in Sian, Western China, and was equipped with supplies taken from Hungary after the war, and according to Dr. LEMPERT, they are working on virus at this plant. Dr. LEMPERT also stated that a BW plant is located at Mukden, which is heavily guarded.

Dr. LEMPERT informed that a [redacted] in 1951 or 1952, and Professor in Bacteriology at Sderdlovsk, was the official advisor to the newly organized plant at Harbin. The BW work being carried on at Harbin would have to do with plague, but it is Dr. LEMPERT'S opinion that they discontinued research concerning plague and are now working on virus pneumonia.

Dr. LEMPERT advised that he had previously talked to a representative of the BW Laboratory in Oakland, California [redacted] (S)

b1
b3

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60262 UC/NLS/BJA/CB
ON 11/15/04

BY COURIER SERVICE

RECORDED - 50-100-93216-718

Date: September 13, 1954

EX-124

To: Mr. U. E. Baughman
Chief
United States Secret Service
Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

During an interview in connection with another matter, [redacted] furnished the following information:

According to [redacted] made the observation there is an alcove on the east side of the old State Department Building on Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C., just west of the White House which, in his opinion, might make the President and members of his immediate staff vulnerable to an attack from that area. [redacted] was not present at the time of this conversation with [redacted] did not know the exact location of the alcove referred to above. [redacted] advised that [redacted] had apparently ascertained the President occasionally posed for photographs with visiting dignitaries in an area just outside of the executive offices at which time he would be in full view and in fairly close proximity to the alcove. [redacted] stated he

b6
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EHM:sjr:mpp (4)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 1 - Records Administration Branch (by routing slip 06a)
Attention: Internal Security Division (under same date)

RECEIVED - BOARDMAN
BY COURIER SVC.
91 SEP 14
COMM - FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI

71 SEP 28 1954

3(4)b 7E1

had no way of knowing whether the alcove was blocked off by the Secret Service when the President emerged from the executive offices, but the principal thought was a person with a silencer on a firearm could possibly harm the President or a member of his official family from the alcove.

The above information is being furnished for appropriate action by your Service.

5-7

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI

_____, 1954

___Mr. Boardman	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec.
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Keay	___Ident Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. Ferris, 7143
___Mr. Branigan	
___Mr. Roach	_____

___Mr. Scatterday Room_____

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Cotter	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Day	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. O'Donnell
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Fitzgerald	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Fults	___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Gibbons	___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Gregg	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. A. R. Jones	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. F. L. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kitchel	___Mr. H. H. Wallace
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Whitson

___Mail Room, 5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File
___Miss Taylor	up to date
___Miss Martis	___Place on record
___Correct	and return
___Please call me	___Indicate index ref.
___Please see me	

F.Y.I.

See index & attachments.

4730

E. Henry Mossburg

Espionage Section

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/15/96 BY 60267 uc/lws/bj 4/CD

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/1/54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY uc/nws/bjs/cls 10-26-07 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 9 11/15/2029

11/15/04

Regular liaison contact was had on August 27, 1954 by SA [redacted] with [redacted]. Also present was [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

It was ascertained that [redacted]

[redacted] advised he is now in the process of making preparations to attend the Tri-Partite Conference in London, England, scheduled for the middle of September. There will be a number of panels, he said, on BW, CW and RW, to be attended by representatives of the United States, Canada and England. [redacted] will represent the Camp Detrick Biological Laboratories.

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Recently, the S. O. Division submitted a paper entitled [redacted]

[redacted] the FBI will receive a copy thereof.

RECORDED - 9 100-93216-718

The problem submitted by the Pentagon to Camp Detrick for solution is based on the assumption that two ~~Soviet agents~~

RCV:cm
Encl. 2
REGISTERED MAIL

b6
b7C

EX-122

27 SEP 2 1954

~~SECRET~~

EX-122 ENCLOSURE

COVER LETTER FOR BLOCKED MAIL TOO LARGE FOR FILE

~~RECORDED~~

THIS SERIAL IS TOO LARGE FOR FILE AND WILL BE CARRIED AS A NOT RECORDED SERIAL BEHIND THE FILE

THIS SERIAL THE (Date)

August 11, 1954

ISSUE OF THE (Name of the pamphlet)

Destructive Devices Orientation and Demonstration

SUBJECT

O Benjamin Harper

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Training Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/04 BY 60247 UC/NCS/BJA/CB

FILE NUMBER

100-93216-717

55 SEP 10 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/23/54

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau dated 7/16/54.

On 9/20/54, [redacted] was contacted and furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] ON [illegible]

AIR MAIL REG! [illegible]

RHT:mj

100-93216-720

INDEXED [illegible]

RECORDED-140

[illegible] SEP 29

EX-120

b6
b7C

71 OCT 5 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: September 27, 1954

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted] expects to call a board meeting in the near future.

According to [redacted]

b2
b7D

[redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue and the Bureau will be promptly advised.

PWM:ij

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b7D

REG. - AM

cc - [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/5/04 BY 60226 tuc/mls/BJA/ab

100-93216-
16-F

RECORDED - 23

FBI
SEP
SECURITY SECT

FEB 30 3 33 PM '54

RECEIVED

[redacted]

b6
b7C

63 OCT 12 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: October 14, 1954

FROM: SAC, Atlanta (100-4126)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
SABOTAGE - ESPIONAGE

In accordance with instructions contained in Bureau letter dated October 5, 1953, liaison still exists between the Atlanta Division and [redacted]

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b7D

[redacted] has advised that to date nothing has come to his attention indicating either sabotage or espionage in the Biological Warfare Field.

In accordance with Bureau wishes, liaison will be continued with the above officer and contacts made on a semi-annual basis.

LGD:jjd

REGISTERED MAIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/84 BY 60267 uc/jw/sl/bjt/cb

11/5/54 → adv letter mailed 10/15/54 sm
0-1 to SP & SLC
adv letter mailed 11/5/54
Either

EX-116

RECORDED - 23

INDEXED - 23

100-93216-

29 OCT 18 1954

INTD SEC

ESP Klein

F 403

58 OCT 27 1954

124

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI 100-93216 DATE: 10/28/54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE 66-891

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESP. - SABOTAGE

Telephonic contact was had with [redacted] 10/27/54 b6 b7C b7D to arrange for the next liaison conference. He will not be available until 11/5/54.

The next regular liaison contact at Camp Detrick willbe made on 11/5 and results thereof furnished to BU promptly.

RCV:arf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/04 BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB

RECORDED - 26

100-93216-733

8 OCT 29 1954

[redacted]

INDEXED - 117

b6
b7C

58 NOV 5 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/28/54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE 66-891

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re BA let 4/1/53 captioned as above, advising that a composite [redacted] "~~TOP SECRET~~" obtained from [redacted] was being transmitted to the BU by special messenger.

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This office has now been advised that [redacted] "~~TOP SECRET~~" to "~~SECRET~~" by authority of the Intelligence Officer dated 10/5/54.

[redacted]

RCV:arf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/04 BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CAB

Film is being regraded

RECORDED - 26 100-93214-794

8 OCT 29 1954

JAN 5 1955

7-189

EX-117

~~JAN 4~~ 1955

[redacted]

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: October 28, 1954

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mls/cb/a/cb
ON 11/15/04

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference San Francisco letter dated September 27, 1954.

CONF. INFT. [redacted] furnished a representative of this office with information to the effect that [redacted]

b2
b6
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b7D
[redacted] mentioned that this was all speculative, and if he received more concrete information he would advise the Bureau.

In my previous letter dated September 27, 1954, I mentioned that [redacted]

The above information is being pointed out to the Bureau in order that this confidential information will not be divulged to Camp Detrick.

PWM/lps

REGISTERED
AIRMAIL

RECORDED - 22

INDEXED - 22

EX-128

b6
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[redacted]

b2
b7D
cc: [redacted]

[redacted]

71 NOV 9 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/3/54

FROM: SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60242uc/pls/BJA/CB
ON 11/15/04

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 10/28/54, [redacted]

furnished the following information:

[redacted]

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b7D

[redacted]

AIR MAIL REG. ~~REC~~

VGB:mhe

53 NOV 19 1954

RECORDED-INDEXED

2 NOV 1954

[redacted]

b6
b7C

SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

November 19, 1954

Director, FBI (100-93216)

RECORDED-40 100-93216-720

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/15/04 BY 60247 uc/jms/bja/cib

EX-112

Reurlet 11-16-54.

Enclosed herewith are a copy of a report captioned [redacted] prepared by SA [redacted] at Houston, Texas, 9-28-43, a report bearing the same caption prepared by SA [redacted] at New York City, 12-22-43, and a copy of a report captioned "Aviation Week, Espionage - M," made at New York City, 3-10-48, by SA [redacted] For your additional information [redacted] by letter dated May 20, 1954, addressed to [redacted], FBI, Washington, D. C., requested assistance in the form of illustrative photographs for use in connection with an article which he said he was preparing for "Mechanixs Illustrated." [redacted] advised that the article was going to deal with sabotage, including the possible use of biological warfare agents, atom bombs, nerve gases, and spreading of panic.

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[redacted] was, of course, advised that this Bureau could not assist him in this regard. The material set forth herein is for your information only and since it comes from our files, it should not, under any circumstances, be furnished to [redacted] Any additional information which you receive as a result of the search of the indices of the New York and New Haven Offices, which you have requested, should likewise not be furnished to [redacted]

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MAILED 6
NOV 22 1954
66MM FBI

Enclosure

NOTE ON YELLOW:

[redacted] They called the attention of the Bureau's Liaison Agent to that installation

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

EGG:lll
(6)

DEC 3 1954

124

to an article prepared by Martin Caidin in which he came very close to describing actual experiments which had been conducted by Camp Detrick personnel in the field of BW. Caidin was previously investigated for an article concerning aviation developments which he prepared for the magazine "Aviation Week" as reflected in Bufile 94-3-4 Sub 1108, Serial 206, and was also investigated because of letters he had written in which he set forth extremely accurate information regarding military aircraft. The latter investigation is maintained in Bufile 65-51039. No evidence of espionage on the part of Caidin was developed in either case.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/16/54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible] ON 11/15/04

Re Baltimore letter to Bureau 11/15/54 in the above captioned matter.

During a discussion on November 5, 1954 with [redacted] with whom liaison is maintained from time to time, he called attention to an article entitled "Sabotage" by MARTIN CAIDIN appearing in the October 15, 1954 issue of Mechanix Illustrated, which revealed methods by which a covert BW attack might be launched by the enemy. According to [redacted], Technical Assistant in the SO Division, [redacted]

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The article referred to the possibility of an enemy using the following apparatus and techniques in carrying out a BW attack:

1. Use of an ordinary valise with a small vent located in the bottom through which a vapor laden with deadly germs could be released in the New York subway or railroad stations.

2. Use of trucks with exhaust pipes slightly altered to permit the release of vapor containing epidemic germs.

3. Depositing Botulinus toxin in a reservoir, it being pointed out that five cubic centimeters will kill a person who later drinks from the reservoir. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

100-93216-128

RCV:cm
REGISTERED MAIL
Encl. (1)

RECORDED-49 7 NOV 1954

INDEXED-49

cc: 2 - New York (Encl. 1)(Registered Mail)
2 - New Haven (Encl.1)(Registered Mail)

Get Baltimore
11-19-54
egg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

4. Illustration as to manner in which BW attack could be made on the Pentagon Building by introducing a BW agent into the ventilating system by means of apparatus resembling a fire extinguisher.

b6
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The article is not limited to BW sabotage but includes methods of committing sabotage by other means - the causing of forest fires by means of fountain pens containing magnesium dropped in the woods, radio signals for guided missile attacks launched 200 miles at sea. The article points to the discovery in Philadelphia to a shipload of "sardine" cans, each filled with pamphlets listing methods and targets.

The author of the article describes methods by which the country can protect itself against sabotage and warns that the enemy will exhaust every means of creating panic, defeatism and dissension among our people.

As a matter of information, one photostatic copy of the magazine article referred to herein is being forwarded to the Bureau, as well as to the New York and New Haven offices. It is observed that Mechanix Illustrated is published monthly by the Fawcett Publications, Inc., Greenwich, Connecticut, and its editorial offices are located in New York City.


The Bureau, New York and New Haven offices are requested to search the indices on the name [redacted] and furnish any pertinent information concerning him.

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UACB, the results of the indices search will be made available to [redacted]

BA 66-891

Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland, during the next regular liaison contact with them.



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/07 BY 60260 uc/baw/sbj/clm

100-93216-128

Sabotage!

By Martin Caidin


IT could happen today—tonight—without warning. An attack on our country—but not necessarily with roaring jet bombers, screaming rockets and exploding atom bombs. A crippling assault without warning could be launched against our critical cities, ports, rail centers, factories, farm belts, power stations and military objectives by one of Communism's deadliest weapons—*sabotage*.

Sabotage has always been a danger in war. It has, in fact, constituted on many occasions the opening blows of a major conflict. Until today, however, attack by subterfuge has never been more than a minor element in any great war. It has rarely inflicted serious blows against the ability of a nation to fight.

That situation has changed. Because of the tremendous increase in the destructive power of weapons which may be transported and used against vital objectives —*by only one man or woman*—the significance of sabotage has mushroomed. It is now a weapon which is equal to many crack divisions in the field. It may become a weapon which will decide the outcome of wars.

Our own nation is particularly vulnerable to attack by sabotage. Let us suppose that the night for action has arrived. A man walks through the milling crowd at New York City's Grand Central Terminal during the evening rush hour. He carries an ordinary valise, at the bottom of which there is a small vent. An almost invisible vapor hisses out the vent, unheard in the clamor of the crowd. The vapor is laden with deadly germs; it swirls amidst the hurrying throng, is breathed in by thousands of men and women, and is transported to thousands of homes by the dispersing commuters. In La Salle Station

Exhaust pipes allowed trucks spread delayed-action death gas in our cities.



in Chicago, in other rail centers all over the U.S.A., in the jammed, milling, disease-spreading subways, on the streets—the inconspicuous men and women walk along, deadly vapor escaping from their innocent-looking suitcases.


In dozens of cities, trucks rumble through the crowded streets. They are ordinary vehicles but their exhaust pipes have been slightly altered. As the trucks roll through the cities, a vapor issues from the false exhaust pipe and disappears among the moving people on the sidewalks. Ten miles off America's West Coast, a Russian submarine cruises beneath the surface; its periscope and a strange pipe slice unseen above the waterline. A cloud of vapor pours from the strange pipe and drifts on the wind, gradually moving eastward over the unsuspecting land. An epidemic is on the way!

Down another big river, a rowboat glides silently across the surface of a great city reservoir. One man rows while his companion dumps the contents of a plastic bag into the water. *Bacillus tularis*, 10,000 times deadlier than potassium cyanide, sinks into the reservoir of 10,000,000-gallon capacity. The bag released 250 gallons of death in aerosol form—five cubic centimeters will kill a man who later drinks from the reservoir.

A janitor works late at night in the Pentagon. Unnoticed, he hurries to a broom closet, drags out a heavy cylindrical object which looks curiously like a large fire extinguisher. He stands on a desk, unhinges the grille to the main ventilation system and slides the cylinder within the shaft. He sets a battery-operated soundless timer and closes the grille. Next day, with thousands of high-ranking military officials at work, this container and many others like it pump an invisible, odorless, tasteless, deadly nerve gas throughout the vast building.

Hunters, fishermen, hunters and tourists range unobtrusively through the great forest regions of the nation. Along their paths they drop "bomblet guns." The "guns" are hidden by the green and shrubbery of the forest beds. Hours later, a small city explodes. Magnesium flares brilliantly. The flames spread rapidly.

In San Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston, New York, Baltimore, Boston, Washington, D. C., Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Seattle and other great industrial cities, men and women go to their closets, brush aside clothes, open panel doors and activate radio beacon sets. The aerials run to commonplace TV antennas on rooftops. Each radio




Late at night in the Pentagon, a janitor opens a grille in the ventilating system. Next day lethal nerve gas kills hundreds of top officers.

operator then leaves the city. From each set issues a distinctive radio signal. Submarines 200 miles at sea tune in to the signals, track the source and launch guided missiles with atom bomb warheads. The missiles' command systems "lock" on the beams and they hurtle unerringly to their targets.

This is war by sabotage—and sabotage with a vengeance. It is a means of attack to which the United States is particularly vulnerable.

Industrial sabotage is perhaps the most effective weapon which can be applied against America's war potential. The destruction of key factory buildings, of generator stations, the poisoning of water supplies, the dissemination of bacteriological agents, the disruption of physical communications and other means of subversive





Who would suspect that the harmless-looking "pen" this vacationer has dropped in the woods is a fire bomb, set to go off hours after she has left?

can help cripple, along with open enemy assault, our ability to wage war. The individual saboteur, now that atomic bombs may be transported in small, commonplace carriers, is worth his weight in ten divisions in the field.

Industrial sabotage is not necessarily exhibited through physical destruction. Panic, rumor, dissension, strife, strikes and similar activities foistered by the individual allied to the enemy's cause may be, and have been, equally as effective.

The key to this terrible means of attack is that the saboteur is not necessarily a foreign national, or even of foreign parentage. He may be a rank amateur—a laborer, a machinist, a truck driver, a clerk, a highly-trained professional, a scientist, or the director of a large corporation. One thing, however, is almost certain: the saboteur will be the *least suspected* man or woman in a factory, a shop, or on the street.

What's the record on sabotage? It's no secret that agents of the Communist Party in this country have pinpointed every major industry for sabotage attack and have, in fact, selected the critical plants upon which a host of giant factories depend to keep operating. There are, for example, numerous aluminum plants in the United States but only a few which supply them with the necessary abrasive materials. A few key plants in our petroleum industry, knocked out, would represent a disaster to the nation's aviation fuel supplies.

During the last several years we have intercepted thousands of small booklets with sabotage instructions for Red agents in this country. In Philadelphia, we discovered a shipload of "sardine" cans, each filled with 30 to 40 tiny pamphlets listing sabotage methods, instructions and means. The sabotage methods included directions on how to destroy low and high tension electrical lines, transformers, waterfalls, sluices, dams, pipes and other key industrial equipment. Instructions were available on how to manufacture at home incendiary bottle-bombs; how to sneak home made explosive bombs beneath the beds or desks of individual personnel targets; how to mix common chemicals and sugar into hatband bombs which will rip a man's head to pieces; how to murder; how to use an ordinary pack of matches and a cigarette as a delayed-action incendiary bomb; how to cripple vital machinery with a handful of emery dust and acid; how to cut bridges and rail trusses with homemade explosives. It was an exhaustive manual on how to rip apart the productive ability of a nation behind its lines. And tens of thousands of such pamphlets have been issued to Red agents in the country, for the past 15 years!

The saboteur may not even be devoted to the enemy country, as past experience has proved. He may, of course, work for love of his homeland but he may also carry out his insidious tasks on a traitorous basis: for cash, for real or imagined hatred, for revenge. He may be under blackmail for

threats of death to loved ones in a foreign land.

With new disease agents perfected to the point where they are mass-produced, easily stored and transported over long periods of time, biological warfare by sabotage becomes a deadly possibility. BW weapons can spread disease, sickness, death and panic throughout a country. Because of the freedom of movement throughout America, and the massive quantities of goods shipped by sea, air, rail and highway, we are particularly vulnerable to BW attack. Enemy efforts would be directed against our farms and crops, with diseases and pests directed against livestock and plants.

There is one tremendous point in our favor and that is that we have the best epidemic and hygienic controls in the world. Our natural national standards of health provide a tremendous defense against biological agents. Our rapid systems of communication and transportation also mean that we can move quickly to stamp out disease outbreaks. Also, and not to be ignored, we can deal out devastating retaliation against enemy nations far more vulnerable to this type of warfare than the U.S.


The most active defense against BW is to be prepared to detect quickly any new insects or foreign diseases and be ready to stamp them out at once. The better these preparations of ours to move and act quickly, the less chance the enemy will have for success in such a venture.

Attacks against America's livestock would most likely begin in hatcheries, stockyards, sales barns, railroad terminals, feed mixing plants and other places where large quantities of feed and many animals pass through on their way to and from farms.

We must remember that some of the world's greatest crop and livestock blights have never been loose inside our nation. Such diseases include, among many, the Asiatic cattle plague *rinderpest* which destroys nearly every animal it strikes. Foot-and-mouth disease, often raging throughout Mexico ($30,000,000 and years of work haven't stamped it out) is an insidious destroyer of cattle. Fowl pest and foreign strains of Newcastle disease are probably the two most destructive poultry diseases on the globe.


Foot-and-mouth disease in 1924 got a month's start accidentally in Michigan and soon spread to Chicago stockyards. It flared in 22 states before it was halted—and resulted in [Continued on page 283]

Bacteria are a tempting target for saboteurs. Only 250 gallons of a germ 10,000 times deadlier than potassium cyanide, will poison 10 million gallons.



SEND for FREE CATALOG


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Sabotage!

[Continued from page 59]

the necessary slaughter of 172,222 animals. And we were lucky that we caught it when we did.

Asiatic Newcastle disease only two years ago slipped in by accident from Hong Kong to a California fowl establishment. We were extremely fortunate to discover the disease at once. But not before 41 of the 42 chickens on the farm were killed.

Government experts admit there are hundreds of crop pests and diseases which have never reached our shores and which could wreak disastrous havoc. They could be smuggled easily across our borders, dropped from enemy planes or sown by hand, and they could blight our crops with rusts, scales and other effects.

A few men—*one man*—with a few vials of wheat rust like the new 15B conceivably could scatter amounts from Mexico to Canada, and within a year or two the nation would be suffering from a raging scourge across the Great Plains.

Possibly the greatest danger from BW when used against people—against you—is mental: the generation of rumor and subsequent panic. Because many of the BW agents which may be used against us are of a foreign, strange nature, their apparent effects could touch off wildfire panic. There are no really new diseases among biological agents; old diseases have been made more dangerous, and diseases strange to our shores may be used. But medical facilities, despite initial outbreaks, stand an excellent chance of combatting such scourges if the public refuses to panic and cooperate with health authorities.

If the enemy can cause panic, by spreading wild rumors regarding BW agents, and can cause our people to flee from their cities, he is just as successful in his efforts as if he had actually detroyed thousands of factories. The basic goal of war against a nation's homeland is not to destroy factories—*it is to destroy production.* And that can be accomplished by wholesale desertion of the production line as well as by atomic attack.

Fortunately, there are defenses against sabotage of all kinds. We can, by intelligent thinking and action now, reduce by a great margin the possible success of saboteurs. Guards can be placed on 24-hour patrol of our reservoirs (as they have been done in some cases) to protect our drinking water supplies against contamination by disease and poisons. We can install filter traps to test our water on a 24-hour basis.

A security system can be established to protect vital rail bridges, mountain cuts and

tunnels, so that unauthorized persons are not allowed to linger at these crucial points. Power and generator stations can be safeguarded by fences, electronic warning devices and patrolling guard teams of dogs and men. We can restrict the parking of cars in our great factories so that they are far removed from the actual buildings. Institution of more thorough personnel and vehicular checks will reduce the possibilities of successful infiltration with concealed atomic weapons.

Our coastlines and cities can be protected by special microbe detectors, inspected daily, which would record the passage or the presence of strange diseases in the air. Early identification of alien diseases, remember, is the key to successful defense against BW attack. A well-informed population can be instructed to report strange physical reactions to disease. And possible outbreaks can be stopped *before* they have the opportunity to spread. Many states have already stockpiled tens of millions of dollars of medical supplies which can prevent mass BW outbreaks, if they are detected in time.

Never forget that the enemy will exhaust every means of creating panic, defeatism and dissension among our people. The primary objective of a sabotage campaign is the individual—you. There is something known as *passive sabotage*, where enemy agents spread dissension among workers, cause slowdowns, start strikes, instigate race riots and enable false rumors to spread. Such activities do not at first appear to affect our war effort but magnified hundreds of times they are of great help to the enemy. The enemy's objective is to halt production. A strike can accomplish this even more effectively than an atomic bombing.


Panic has often been described as the ultimate of all weapons, which it is, for it leads to the utter disintegration of many people to work together. It can produce a chain reaction of destruction far greater than that of any hydrogen bomb.

Fear is a healthy thing, normal and experienced at various times in our lives. Panic is simply uncontrolled fear. Its main symptom is violent, unreasoning action. This means that enemy agents attempting to create panic must always strike at you. People, not inanimate objects, convoy panic. And panic results at times in terrible loss of life and property damage.

Think not? Let's look at some cases, where the record shows that grief and death could have been avoided if the people involved had kept their heads.

On June 5, 1941 in Chungking, China, 1,000 persons died horribly in an air raid shelter.

Paint outside trim the fast, neat way...



Paintbrushes with bristles of Du Pont Tynex® nylon

You make easy work...tidy work...of any paint job outdoors or in when you use brushes with bristles of Du Pont "Tynex" nylon.


"Tynex" bristles carry a full load of paint... flow on a satin-smooth coat. They can be quickly cleaned afterwards with any commercial cleaner.

"Tynex" bristles don't get brittle...last up to 5 times longer than other bristles. When buying any type brush, "Tynex" is your guide to quality.

For free booklet "How to Choose and Use a Paintbrush Bristled with Du Pont 'Tynex' Nylon," write Du Pont Polychemicals Dept. MI-10, Wilmington 98, Del.


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Get AERO SHAVE Lather Bomb today . . . in the handy metal container with the turret top that won't leak when you travel.



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They were jammed together in a vast room where poor ventilation snuffed out the oil lamps. The darkness and heat mushroomed the feeling of stuffiness into choking. The people exploded in panic, with the result that 1,000 men, women and children died horribly.

In 1943, during an air raid on London, a woman and child tripped on the stairway entrance to a large subway shelter. Hundreds of people behind them pressed anxiously to get into the shelter. Instead of helping the woman and child, they began to push frantically. Others tripped. Panic mushroomed. The stairway became a mob of screaming, struggling bodies. More than 170 died.

Panic is suicide in the event of war. The Russians know this and would like nothing better than to send panic racing through our cities. Consider the case of Hiroshima, when it was atom-bombed. More than 20,000 people died from panic in the aftermath of the attack, when they fled wildly and, in many cases, rushed into rather than away from the fires.

Americans today are becoming increasingly aware of their peril and susceptibility to panic. The humiliating lesson of Orson Welles' 1938 broadcast of a fictional Martian invasion is deeply ingrained in many people. The use of the word panic has in the last five years increased by 1,047 per cent in the public press!

Russia studies carefully the greatest weaknesses of our nation and our people. The Princeton University report of the reaction to the Orson Welles broadcasts is required reading of Soviet staff officers. The Russians know that, in war, to generate panic among your enemy is to increase your own chance for victory.

Remember—the enemy saboteur, whether he causes destruction by TNT, by atomic bomb, by spreading BW agents, by starting forest fires or by generating the wild emotional and destructive storm of panic, has *you* as his main objective. Forewarned is forearmed. °

Oil-Pump Drive

[*Continued from page 102*]

longer be a problem because the oil required for the hydrostatic drive can be pumped through *flexible* tubes, making breakages virtually impossible. Construction of brakes could be simplified; the very fact that the main engine can be situated anywhere in the truck or trailer would avoid balancing problems. And a special cooling device for the oil is unnecessary because the tubes can be run under the chassis, using the moving air to dissipate any excess heat. °

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 11/15/54

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
b7C
b7D

Liaison contact was had on November 5, 1954, by SA [redacted] with [redacted] Contact was likewise had with [redacted] It was ascertained that [redacted]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFY ON: 11/15/2029

-ENCL 2

RCV:mhk/dfl

ENCLOSURE (1)

REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED - 82
INDEXED - 82

100-93216 - [illegible]

13 DEC 1 [illegible]

EX-120

b6
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51 DEC 16 1954

RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

[redacted]

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During the subsequent conference with [redacted] he referred to an article "Sabotage" by MARTIN CAIDIN appearing in the October, 1954, issue of the magazine "Mechanix Illustrated". He stated that included in the article is information concerning certain types of apparatus that could be used to disseminate BW agents. [redacted]

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[redacted]

This is being made the subject of a separate communication.

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/6/54

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60242uc/pls/BJA/CB ON 11/15/04

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

WRT Bacterial Warfare

b

Reference San Francisco letter, dated October 28, 1954.

[redacted] who was recently contacted by a representative of this office, furnished information to the effect that [redacted]

b2
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[redacted]

Attached hereto are two photostatic copies of a letter from [redacted] and two photostatic copies of a letter from [redacted] confidentially furnished these letters to a representative of this office for the Bureau's information and a copy of each letter is being retained in the San Francisco file.

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

4 ENCL

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b7D

100-93216-730

RECORDED - 19

15 DEC 1954

PWM:npm
Enclosure(1)
cc: [redacted]
REGISTERED

EX-130

b6
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[redacted]

64 DEC 17 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/7/54

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On December 1, 1954, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] furnished the following information:

b7D

[redacted]

EX-130

b6
b7C

VGB/jc
(2) - Bureau AM Reg.
1 - Salt Lake City

RECORDED - 3 100-93216-76
INDEXED - 3
27 DEC 18 1954

EX-130

51 DEC 21 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont

b6
b7C

D. J. Parsons

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

December 10, 1954

(ORIGINAL AND ONE)

Director, FBI

100-12316-732

RECORDED - 35

(C) b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-28-82 BY SP4 Jenkins
4-28-82
CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON - FCIM II 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 3, 1954, your reference WFT:BV:nsj, requesting this Bureau's comments and suggestions regarding draft regulations in the captioned matter.

b1

(C)

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CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

b1

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Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

NOTE: This matter has been discussed with

LW:bjg
(9)

JAN 28 1954

DEC 13 1954

COMM-FBI

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b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: Jan. 3, 1955

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/nls/BJA/DKW
ON 8-9-04

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference San Francisco letter dated December 6, 1954. [redacted] who was recently contacted by a representative of this office, advised that

[redacted]

b2
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[redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

PWM:bjn
(4)
REGISTERED
AIR MAIL
CC: 1 - [redacted]

b2
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RECORDED-35

100-93216-733

EX-117

JAN 11 1955 57-189

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[redacted]

TICKLER [redacted] b6 b7C

January 7, 1955

SAC, New York (65-13466) (orig and one)

RECORDED - 15 100-93216-134

Director, FBI (65-51039)

EX-104

MARTIN CAIDIN, aa
ESPIONAGE - R
REGISTRATION ACT

Reurlet 12-30-54 captioned "BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ESPIONAGE -SABOTAGE," New York file 100-91131.

The pertinent information in relet should be included in the next report submitted by your office concerning [redacted] b6 b7C

VHN:rmp
(4)

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DATE 8/21/97 BY SP2 AM/ETH
FOIPA#387945

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MAILED 5
JAN 7 - 1955
COMM-FBI

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
F B I
RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM

b6 b7C [redacted]

typed

7-189
66 JAN 18 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/30/54

FROM : SAC, New York (100-91131)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Baltimore letter to Director and New York dated 11/16/54.

[redacted] was interviewed on 12/13/54, as requested by Bureau air-tel to New York dated 12/8/54, captioned [redacted]

During the course of this interview [redacted] was questioned concerning an article entitled "Sabotage" written by CAIDIN appearing in the October 1954 issue of "Mechanix Illustrated". [redacted] received the information for this article from the following sources:

1) The American Association Of Science Workers Biological Warfare Report of 40,000 Words written by Docters ROSEBURY and KABAT, professors of Bacteriology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University with the aid of Doctor MARTIN H. BOLDT. (All worked on Biological Warfare at Camp Detrick, Maryland).

2) Report of Secretary of Defense in the June 1950 issue of "Bulletin Of Atomic Scientists".

3) An article in the New York "Times" dated 3/11/51, entitled "Curbs Against Possible Germ Attacks".

4) An article published in the 11/6/50, issue of the "Daily News".

1 - Baltimore (66-891) (Enc. 1)
1 - NY 65-13466

FRJ:ETM

RECORDED - 15
INDEXED - 15
27 JAN 1955

100-93216-

EX-104

[redacted]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/21/97 BY SP2 AW/STH
FOI # 387945

EXPEDITE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-13466

[redacted] further knowledge for these articles also came from numerous and various research that he has done on the subject of Biological Warfare.

For the information of Baltimore, a copy of the report of SA [redacted] dated 12/28/54, at New York, entitled [redacted] is enclosed herewith.

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It is not deemed advisable for Baltimore, when making contact with Biological Laboratories at Camp Detrick, Maryland, to disclose the fact of [redacted] This enclosed report contains all background information concerning [redacted]

The files of the New York Office also reflect that [redacted] was interviewed in 1943 concerning [redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 1/7/55

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
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b7D

[redacted] the most reliable and cooperative contact of this office in this matter, [redacted]

He will be contacted as soon as possible and the results of the contact submitted promptly. It is anticipated a report will be submitted by 1/15/55.

AIR MAIL

VGB:htg

2 - Bureau
1 - Salt Lake City

1-D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-5-04 BY 60267 ucdmls/BJA/DFW

RECORDED - 84 100-93216-735

JAN 1955

EX-115

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[redacted]

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RECEIVED

50 JAN 13 1955
7-189

Tickler - [redacted] b6 b7C

AIR TEL
URGENT

JANUARY 10, 1955

RECORDED - 8
100-93216 - 736

SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891) (orig & 1)

EXBU[illegible]ICAL WARFARE, ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE. REURLET 1/4/55. PURSUANT TO YOUR REQUEST AUTHORITY IS GRANTED FOR YOUR OFFICE TO ORALLY FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted]

IN VIEW OF THE INTEREST EXPRESSED BY THEM CALLING CAIDIN'S ARTICLE ENTITLED "SABOTAGE" TO THE BUREAU'S ATTENTION AND IN THE INTEREST OF FURTHERING THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN YOUR OFFICE AND THE ARMY'S BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY, AS INDICATED IN YOUR LETTER, ONLY INFORMATION CONCERNING [redacted] AND THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY [redacted] MATERIAL CAME FROM PUBLIC SOURCES SHOULD BE FURNISHED THEM. THE FACT THAT [redacted] IS THE SUBJECT OF A BUREAU INVESTIGATION AND OTHER FACTS DEVELOPED BY THE INVESTIGATION SHOULD NOT BE FURNISHED THEM.

HOOVER

b6 b7C b7D

100-93216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-04 BY 66267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

NOTE: You will recall the Bureau some time ago arranged, through the Secretary of Defense, liaison between the Baltimore office and the Army's Biological Laboratory at Camp Detrick, Maryland. During the previous liaison contact [redacted] expressed interest in an article written by Martin Caidin [redacted]

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EHM:blo (5)

COMM-FBI
JAN 10 1955
MAILED 20

JAN 15 1955

7-189

b6 b7C [redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1-4-55

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference Baltimore letter 11/16/54, Bureau letter 11/19/54, New York letter 12/30/54 concerning the above captioned matter and ~~two~~ reports attached thereto relating to [redacted]

Bureau referenced letter states material relating to [redacted] is for the information of the Baltimore Office only. However, in view of the interest expressed by [redacted] and in the interest of a close liaison relationship, it is requested that the Bureau authorize informally and ~~confidentially~~ furnishing to them information concerning [redacted] concerning the source of information for the preparation of the article entitled "Sabotage" (set out in New York letter dated 12/30/54) without comment relative [redacted] it is observed that in the past, with Bureau approval, ~~confidential~~ information has been orally made available to [redacted]

b6
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[redacted]

Telephonic contact was had with [redacted] on 1/3/55 and the next liaison contact at Camp Detrick has been scheduled for 1/12/55.

Bureau advice in this matter is requested prior to 1/12/55.

100-93216-7

RCV:pom

RECORDED - 8

INDEXED - 8

9 JAN 6 1955

[redacted]

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1-D cc Lt. Baltimore RHM 1-10-55

EX-107

~~SECRET~~

Tic: [redacted] b6 b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED - 25 100-93216-737

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 uc/pls/sjs/kb ON 11/15/04

EX-101

Date: January 7, 1955

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Original and 1)
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted] b6 b7C
ESPIONAGE - X

There is attached a copy of a self-explanatory memorandum dated December 30, 1954, with a Photostat of 3 pages of handwriting reported to be that of the subject. Inasmuch as the subject appears to be an officer in the United States Army, no investigation is being conducted in this matter by this Bureau.

Attachments (2)

cc - 1 - Records Administration Branch (Attachments 2)
Attention: Internal Security Division
(by O-6a routing slip on same date)

MAILED 5
JAN 7 - 1955
COMM-FBI

EHM:plv
(5)

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Holloman
Gandy

7-189
66 JAN 18 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/cb
ON 11/15/04

[redacted]

original and two photostatic
copies of 3 pages of handwriting
(presumably by [redacted])

b6
b7C

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

100-93216-937

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/04 BY 60267 uc/pks/sp/kb

3/9/55
Classification
reduced to Conf.
at request of G-2

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/13/55

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-9-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

On 1/11/55 [redacted]

furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

VGB/jc (AIR MAIL - REGISTERED)
2 - Bureau
1 - Salt Lake City

RECORDED - 15 100-93216-738

INDEXED - 15 16 JAN 1955

EX-117

7-189

64 JAN 26 1955

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/14/55

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

~~SECRET~~

Liaison contact was had on January 12, 1955 by SA [redacted] with [redacted] It was ascertained this is [redacted]

It was ascertained that all preliminary work has been completed in regard to [redacted] Background information concerning this matter appears in Baltimore letter to the Bureau dated November 15, 1954, captioned as above.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

RCV:cm
(3)
REGISTERED MAIL
ENCL. 2

RECORDED-92
EX-110
1 JAN 1955

b6
b7C

INT SEC

~~SECRET~~

64 FEB 9 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY uc/nus/bja/cg 60247 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) mus/2029
11/5/04

BA 66-891

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

During the course of the liaison conference, a brief oral summary concerning [redacted] MARTIN CAIDIN, author of an article entitled "Sabotage", [redacted] material for the preparation of this article came from public sources, was made available [redacted] in accordance with authorization from the Bureau.

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

CONFIDENTIAL

b6
b7C

[redacted]

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins (ORIG AND ONE)

January 31, 1955

Director, FBI 100-93216-740

RECORDED - 43

PROPOSED JOINT DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE REGULATIONS REGARDING BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION AND DISPOSAL

Reference is made to your memorandum dated January 18, 1955, your reference WFT:BW:nsj 146-018-18. You supplied language of a proposed paragraph to supplant language originally objected to by this Bureau. The original language appeared to place responsibility for disposal of devices used in the covert manufacture and dissemination of biological and chemical warfare agents on the Department of Justice.

The language now proposed places such responsibility on the agencies of the Department of Defense rather than on the Department of Justice but allows the Department of Justice possible use of such material in connection with their introduction as evidence or otherwise.

The proposed paragraph appears to overcome the objections raised to the original language.

LW:bjg
(8)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
ON 8-9-04

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 4
JAN 24 1955
COMM-FBI

7-189

66 JAN 28 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

ST/ RD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: January 18, 1955

FROM: William F. Tompkins
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

WFT:EW:nsj

146-012-18

SUBJECT: PROPOSED JOINT DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE REGULATIONS REGARDING BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION AND DISPOSAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-9-04 BY 60267 ucn/s/ BJA/DKW

b6
b7C

Reference is made to your memorandum of December 10, 1954, captioned as above, furnishing your comments regarding draft regulations in the captioned matter.

Further discussions with the Office of Chief Chemical Officer of the Department of the Army have produced the following proposed paragraph to supplant paragraph 2a(3)(e) which was mentioned in your memorandum:

[redacted]

b7E

I should appreciate your views as to whether the proposed paragraph overcomes the objections which you had to the original language.

EX-120

RECORDED - 43
INDEXED - 43

100-93216-710

FBI JAN 26 1955

5 JAN

Memo to AAG Tompkins 1-21-55 EW:lfg

b6
b7C

cc [redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 1/31/55

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

DECLASSIFIED ~~X~~ 60247 uc/NLS/BJ:A/CB
ON 11/15/04 ~~X~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Remylet dated 1/3/55.

A representative of the San Francisco Office recently contacted [redacted] and learned that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] informed that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

11/22/04 CLASSIFIED BY: 60247 uc/NLS/BJ:A/CB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 2029 ~~11/22/04~~ 11/22/04 60247uc/NLS/BJ:A/CB

EXP. PROC.

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

b1
b3

b2
b7D

cc: [redacted]
REGISTERED - AIR MAIL
PWM:efw
(4)

RECORDED - 5
INDEXED - 5
EX-122
11 FEB 2 1955

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

67 FEB 11 1955 7-187



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

FD-36 (Rev- 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 1/17/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE-SABOTAGE

#977600
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60226 24 dnls/BJA/DH

[redacted] Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, advised on 1/16/57 the SO Division is about to [redacted] From comments made by [redacted] in past, [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

Group of SO personnel [redacted] are as follows:

[redacted]

RECORDED - 80 100-93216-827
24 JAN 19 1957
X-126

[redacted]

b6
b7C

3 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Detroit (Info)(REGISTERED-AIRMAIL)
1 - Baltimore
RCV:car
6 (5)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev- 3-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following message via _____

_____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

BA 66-891

[redacted] b7E

Copy of this airtel designated for information Detroit Office so that it may be aware of SO Division plans in Battle Creek, particularly should their operation or personnel be detected and reported to local police or FBI.

This matter is classified as ~~"Secret"~~ by the SO Division.

b6
b7C [redacted]

END

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

SAC, Baltimore (66-891) (Original & 1) January 30, 1957

RECORDED - 21 100-93216-537

Director, FBI (100-93216)

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

EX-125

Reurlet 1-22-57 suggesting that the Bureau advise the Chief Chemical Officer, Department of the Army, of the designation of SA [redacted] as liaison agent to maintain contact with [redacted] and his assistant, [redacted] at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland. In the absence of any particular problems or reasons to the contrary, this matter should be handled on a local basis. Should any problem exist, the Bureau should be advised.

b6
b7C

ESS:ssl
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

COMM - FBI
JAN 30 1957
MAILED 20

67 FEB 7 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: January 22, 1957

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference Baltimore airtel 1/17/57, concerning captioned matter.

[redacted] on 1/15/57, telephonically advised Special Agent [redacted] that he had a matter for discussion which he thought the Federal Bureau of Investigation should know about. Contact was had with him on 1/16/57, at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland and the results thereof were set out in referenced Baltimore airtel.

b6
b7C

In connection with the Biological Warfare liaison relationship maintained at Fort Detrick, reference is made to my letter of 1/15/57, advising that SA [redacted] is now assigned to the Resident Agency at Silver Spring, Maryland and recommending that SA [redacted] Resident Agent at Frederick, Maryland, be designated as liaison agent to maintain contact with [redacted] and his assistant, [redacted]

It is suggested that the Bureau advise the Chief Chemical Officer, Department of the Army, of the designation of another Special Agent to act as FBI liaison representative with [redacted] so that these men may be advised of the change through regular Army channels.

RCV:kss
(3)

RECORDED - 21 100-93216-828

ccs: 2 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - BA

2-1
16 JAN 23 1957

EX-12

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 2/1/57

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re San Francisco letter, dated 12/27/56.

[redacted] advised a representative of the San Francisco office
b2 on January 30, 1957 that [redacted]
b6
b7C
b7D

Regarding [redacted] informant
pointed out that [redacted]

The informant further advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

RECORDED-59 100-93216-829

INDEXED-59

2 Bureau (100-93216) (REGISTERED)
b2 1 San Francisco (65-4167)
b7D 1 San Francisco ([redacted])

PWM:LMR
(4)

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

~~SECRET~~

: Liaison [redacted] b6 b7C

11/7/04 CLASSIFIED BY 60487 uc/pms/bja/cg
DECLASSIFY ON: (1) 11/7/2029

RECORDED-79

100-93216-831

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

EX-125

Date: February 15, 1957

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Orig & 1)
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS AS COVERT OR SABOTAGE WEAPONS
(Your Reference CMLIT-C)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

This Bureau is not in possession of evidence which would confirm such use or intended use by the Soviets of biological warfare agents as a covert or sabotage weapon in the United States. Based upon available information concerning the Soviets and conditions as they exist in this country, it appears that the Soviets have the capability of introducing, if necessary, and utilizing biological warfare agents within the United States.

COMM - FBI
FEB 13 1957
MAILED 31

ESS:ssl

NOTE: The Bureau has taken the position within the IIC and NSC discussions that the Soviets have the capability of clandestinely introducing atomic weapons. Such capability would also apply to the introduction of biological warfare agents for purposes of clandestine use.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

51 FEB 26 1957

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b6 b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible] b6
Miss [illegible] b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 2/15/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

[redacted]

On 2/12/57 [redacted]

furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

RECORDED - 33 100-93216-432

[redacted]

1957

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2- Bureau (REGISTERED)(AM)
1- Salt Lake City

JPH:mjm
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BSA/DRW

13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

FD-205

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (File 100-93216) DATE: 3/15/57

FROM : ~~SAC,~~ SALT LAKE CITY (File 65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

This case will be delinquent.

Date of Bureau deadline: 3/15/57

Reason for the delinquency: DUE TO KIDNAPPING CASE Requiring services of all SA's Bufile cannot be met.

Date the report or necessary communication will reach the Bureau: 3/20/57

AEC zone designation, e.g., OR, CH, etc.:
(This applies only to 116 cases.)

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 ucd n/s/BJA/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 3/19/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DRW

On 3/19/57, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

EXP. PROC.

2 - Bureau (AIR MAIL)(REG)
1 - Salt Lake City

100-93216-833

JPH:cd
(3)

RECORDED-48

EX-132

20 MAR 20 1957

b6
b7C

INDEXED

1-D

51 APR 4 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) (REG) DATE: 3/29/57

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED #225,201 DATE 3/23/99 BY SAIT 39679/KE

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted] b6 b7C

Re San Francisco letter, dated 2/1/57.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 3/27/57. Informant advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau (100-92316) (Reg)
1 - San Francisco (65-4167)
1 - San Francisco [redacted]

INDEXED - 39
RECORDED - 39

100-93216-634

18 APR 3 1957

PWM:JC
(4)

b2
b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C

52 APR 15 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

cc - Branigan
Belmont

DATE: April 10, 1957

FROM : W. A. Branigan

b6
b7C

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

b7E

IS - R

Under date of 4-1-57, transmitted to the Bureau a report prepared by

b6
b7C
b7E

b3

LW:jdb
(6)

RECORDED - 81 100-393216

INDEXED - 81

16 APR 15 1957

Enclosure

b6
b7C

64 APR 17 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/ BJA/DFW
OGA 11122/04 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB


Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: Biological Warfare [redacted] b7E

[redacted]


[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached a reply to [redacted] suggesting [redacted] b6 b7C b7E that agencies establishing a "need to know" make arrangements for the receipt of information from the Intelligence Advisory Committee [redacted] and that the unit cost and estimated total cost to the Government of a building protection program be shown in the report. b3



SECRET



b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RECORDED - 17 Date: April 12, 1957

To: [redacted] (orig. & 1) b6 b7C
Justice Representative
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

EX-107

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted] b7E

[redacted]

MAILED 10
APR 12 1957
COMM.-FBI

11/17/04 CLASSIFIED BY 60324UCBAW/MS/BJA/CAB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, MAR 2029

b1

[redacted]

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:jdb
(8)

64 APR 19 1957

Cover memo Brannigan-Belmont, same caption, was prepared by LW:jdb 4-10-57 in connection with outgoing mail.
NOTE: Secret because the document being discussed is classified Secret.

[redacted] b6 b7C

SECRET

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

This Bureau would be interested in receiving a copy of the final draft of this report.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/12/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

[redacted]

On 4/11/57, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (AM)(REG)
1 - Salt Lake City

RECORDED-98 100-93216-837

JPH:cd
(3)

6 APR 25 1957

EX. - 131

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

b6
b7C

[redacted]

EX-PROC

57 MAY 1 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4-30-57

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Unsuccessful attempts were made on 4/18/57 and 4/29/57 to contact [redacted] On the latter date, it was determined that both individuals are currently attending [redacted] and will not be available for contact until 5/6/57. Baltimore will thereafter make contact with [redacted]

b6
b7C

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore

JFR:pb
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/B;A/CB

RECORDED-32 100-93216-838

EX-104

MAY 1 1957

71 MAY 7 1957

ESP. SECT.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 5/14/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 5/14/57,

furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-97 BY 6970 uc/ns/BTA/DAE

2 - Bureau (AM)(REGISTERED)
1 - Salt Lake City

JPH:mm
(3)

RECORDED - 28

EX-103

MAY 15 1957

b6
b7C

66 MAY 23 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: May 29, 1957

FROM : SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8 7 2004 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/dc

Regular liaison contact was had on 5/20/57 by SA [redacted] with [redacted] Fort Detrick, Md. An unsuccessful attempt had been made on 5/15/57 to contact [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore

JFR:lw
(3)

100-93216-840

RECORDED - 83

11 MAY 31 1957

ESP. SEC. INT. SEC.

105 XH

63 JUN 10 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 6/3/57

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted] b6 b7C

Re San Francisco letter, 3/29/57.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on May 17, 1957. Informant advised that [redacted]

b2 b6 b7C b7D

According to Informant, [redacted]

Informant furnished a representative of this Office with a letter concerning the [redacted] The contents of this letter are being set forth as follows, verbatim:

[redacted] 4/16/57

b6 b7C b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

CCs: 2-Bureau (REG)
1-San Francisco

RECORDED - 80
INDEXED - 80

JUN 7 1957

ESP/SEC

PWM/gj
(3)

6 JUN 7 1957

-1-

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/13/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 6/12/57, [redacted] furnished the following information concerning the following tests:

[redacted]

[redacted]

11/22/04 CLASSIFIED BY uc/nsis/BJA/cb DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 11/22/2029 Pgs 2 P3, OGA 11/24/04 Cat 2 & 7 Declassify 11/22/2029 uc/nsis/BJA/cb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED BY 60262 uc/nsis/BJA/DEJ DATE 8-12-05

2 - Bureau (REG.)(AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

JPH:dk
(3)

RECORDED - 80 100-[redacted]-842

15 JUN 14 1957

EX 105

~~SECRET~~

55 JUN 27 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: July 3, 1957

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-7-84 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter, June 3, 1957.

[redacted] related that [redacted]

Informant advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Informant furnished this office with a copy of a letter from the U. S. Navy Department, Washington, D. C., which is being set forth verbatum as follows:

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (100-93216) (Reg)
2 - San Francisco
(1-65-4167)
(1- [redacted]
PWM/REW
(4) SEC. D - ESPIONAGE

b2
b7D

RECORDED - 80

100-93216-84

EX 105

5 5 JUN 11 1957

10 JUL 8 1957

b6
b7C

[redacted]

ESP. SECTION

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/12/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 7/11/57, [redacted]

furnished the following information:

[redacted]

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b7D

EXP. PROC

[redacted]

RECORDED - 73 100-93216-8[illegible]

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

JPH:mm
(3)

[redacted]

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INT. SEC

ESP/Sab

57 JUL 31 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

100-93216-845, 846

CHANGED TO

105-64064-1, 2

SEP 20 1957

U.S.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 8/14/57

FROM : ~~1~~ SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE-
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

[redacted]

On 8/13/57, [redacted]

[redacted]

furnished the following information:

[redacted]

EXP. PROC.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

RECORDED - 94 100-93216-

AUG 1957

JPH:ap
(3)

b6
b7C

EX. - 107

[redacted]

EXP. SEC.

55 SEP 5 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/28/57

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re San Francisco letter dated 7/3/57.

[redacted] informed that [redacted]

b2
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b7D

[redacted] further related that [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b7D 2 - Bureau (REG.)
1 - SF 65-4167
1 - SF [redacted]
PWM/lp
(4)

100-93216-848

RECORDED - 7 31 SEP 5 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-23-93 BY SP3RDDCUM 321913

55 SEP 11 1957

INDEXED - 7

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 9/13/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On September 11, 1957,

furnished the following information:

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-24-84 BY Lo 0362 uc/nls/BJA/DAJ

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED - AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

DJO:jab
(3)

RECORDED - 30 65-93216-849
INDEXED - 30
15 SEP 1957

EX-127

b6
b7C

SEP 19 1957

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/30/57

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

On 9/27/57, contact was had by SA [redacted] with [redacted] On that date it was determined that [redacted] has no particular problems at this time and no further information would be of any value. He added, however, that there are a few reports which will be available about 10/4 or 5/57, which he felt might be of some interest to the FBI.

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[redacted] will be contacted during the first week in October.

KELLY

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

JFR:kss
(4)

ccs: 3 - BU (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - BA

RECORDED - 53

100-93216-850

100-93216

OCT 1 1957

ESP. SEC.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

60 OCT 4 1957

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 10/14/57

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

On 10/10/57 [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

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100-93216-851

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

RECORDED-41
INDEXED-41

EX 105

ESP

DJO:mhe
(3)

58 OCT 21 1957

OCT 18 1957

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 10/16/57

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Walters
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
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On 10/14/57 , advised SA that

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3 - Bureau
1 - Newark (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore
JFR:faw
(5)

RECORDED - 6 100-93216-452

re OCT 17 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

MX 105

b6
b7C

SEC.

Approved: Sent

Special Agent in Charge

58 OCT 29 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/28/57

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter 8/28/57.

[redacted] informed that [redacted]

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[redacted]

b2
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b7D

[redacted]

INDEXED - 20 RECORDED - 20 100-93216-853

According to [redacted]

[redacted]

10 NOV 7 1957

Contact with [redacted] will continue [redacted]

2 --Bureau (REG.)
1 - SF 65-4167
1 WM [redacted]

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b7D

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b7C

A. H. Belmont

11/25/57

[redacted]

b6
b7C

National Security Council
Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing
for Intelligence Agencies)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/dpw

SYNOPSIS:

Briefing on biological warfare (BW) given to representatives of U.S. intelligence agencies, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Md., 10/20 and 21/57. Representatives of IIC agencies in attendance because of interest in clandestine aspects of BW. U.S. knows little regarding actual Soviet BW installations and preparations. We recognize Soviet BW capability. Hemorrhagic fever among U.S. troops in front lines during Korean War suspected of being BW but no proof available. Briefing covered preparation and delivery of BW agents (bacteria, fungi, toxins, viruses and rickettsia). Emphasis was placed on overt military delivery of BW although covert use of BW agents against specific selected targets shown to be feasible. Precise timing of BW attack not possible because of incubation period for each disease and physical differences in persons affected. Large area contamination tests indicate possibility of contamination of large areas of U.S. from BW agents released at Canadian border.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

62-101958
Enclosures
1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont

100-93216 - 1

NOT RECORDED
145 DEC 3 1957

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

[redacted]

b6
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Webbr
(8)
100-93216 (Biological Warfare)

MAIL ROOM ☐

62-101958-1

DECLASSIFIED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing
for Intelligence Agencies)
Bufile: 62-101958

DETAILS:

On 11/20 and 21/57 a briefing on biological warfare (BW) was given to representatives of U.S. intelligence agencies at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, by members of the staff of that installation. Seventy persons were in attendance the first day, when classified information up to ~~Secret~~ was discussed. There were a few less in attendance the second day, when Top Secret information was discussed.

Representatives of the IIC agencies were in attendance because of their interest in the clandestine aspects of biological warfare. [redacted] of the Laboratory and SA [redacted] of the Domestic Intelligence Division represented the Bureau. b6 b7C

The agenda for the briefing, a copy of which is attached, will be followed herein to indicate briefly the subject matters covered.

BW intelligence problems are basically the collection of intelligence and the classification of that intelligence. It was pointed out that we do not have positive information regarding the location of the Soviet equivalent of Fort Detrick, the research center for U.S. BW, nor do we have the location of the Soviet equivalent of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, where our BW agents would be mass-produced and loaded for delivery against a target. We do not know what advances the Soviet Union has made either offensively or defensively in the field of BW. Finally, we do not know the extent of preparation for use on the part of the Soviets of any specific BW agent.

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing
for Intelligence Agencies)
Bufile: 62-101958

On the matter of classification it was pointed out that it was difficult at times to know how to classify scientific information which might or might not relate to BW and reporting agencies were in effect urged not to overclassify. An example was given of a "foreign intelligence" report on the building of what was alleged to be a BW laboratory in Denmark. Since the report was disseminated the laboratory has been completed and an extremely detailed report unclassified is now at hand which negates the original allegation in the ~~Secret~~ report that the laboratory was for BW purposes. The original erroneous report is still classified ~~Secret~~.

A film was shown entitled "Antipersonnel BW" which pointed out the dangers to the U.S. and the need for such an establishment as Fort Detrick.

Talks were given on BW agents covering the field of bacteria, fungi, toxins, viruses and rickettsia. The important points made were that the living organisms had to be kept alive in order to keep them effective as BW agents and, consequently, they had to have a medium in which to live, sufficient nourishment and adequate temperature up to the time of their use. This requires their use in liquid form, or, in the case for example of the rickettsia of Rocky Mountain spotted fever, a host, such as the tick. BW agents that could successfully be used in dry powder form would be those which existed in spore form.

The next lecture concerned arthropod vectors (insects used to carry and transmit disease-causing microorganisms. The best known of these are ticks, mosquitoes, flies, fleas, body lice and chiggers. The experts at Fort Detrick believe that chiggers were the cause of an epidemic of hemorrhagic fever among U.S. troops in the front

lines in Korea when the big communist propaganda campaign regarding U.S. BW was under way. There were ten per cent fatalities among the troops afflicted. The disease is very serious and is not normally encountered in Korea, although it is known in the area along the Amur River, which runs between Manchuria and Siberia. Our military has no proof that the Russians or Chinese dropped the infected chiggers which are believed to have caused the epidemic. It was noted that there were no known cases of this fever among the North Koreans who were taken prisoner by U.S. forces and there were likewise no known cases in other parts of South Korea.

It is known that strains of insects can be bred to withstand various insecticides and likewise to withstand extremes of heat and cold. It is now known that mosquito larvae, if grown in a yellow fever "broth" can transmit yellow fever in their adult stage. The Israelis are aware of this technique. It has been proved by field tests that mosquitoes released over air bases could infect all humans on those bases within a very short time. Yellow fever could thus be spread in our southern states and progress northward without suspicion being directed toward any particular country since there has been a resurgence of yellow fever in the Caribbean area. It was pointed out the Russians may be far ahead of us in their studies of ticks and body lice as carriers of disease.

[redacted]

b7E

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing
for Intelligence Agencies)
Bufile: 62-101958

[redacted] b7E

In physical defense against BW there is very little that is now available to the individual except the gas mask with proper BW filters. By employing the same filter principal and providing proper air conditioning, a building could be made reasonably secure against BW. Work is being done on a warning device and a workable model has been developed but it is not known when such a warning device could become available in the field. The important thing, of course, is to know when one is going to be attacked. If that is not possible, the next best thing is to know that you have been attacked and by what. It was pointed out that BW agents cannot be seen, smelled, tasted, heard or felt, although their insect carriers, if such are used, could be apparent to the senses. The same is true of other "delivery systems."

Medical defense against BW is strictly "after the fact." While it is possible to have immunization programs for various types of diseases, no enemy is going to waste a BW effort on a disease for which immunization has been publicized. Medical defense, therefore, consists

primarily of identification of the disease, sanitizing the affected geographical area of the outbreak, containing the disease within the initially affected area and providing therapy for the persons afflicted.

The film "Packaged Famine" showed how wheat rust could be spread to destroy a wheat or cereal crop in a large area. (Destruction of food crops, however, has only seasonal applicability and would certainly not be a decisive factor in the conduct of a short all-out nuclear war in which immediate stocks of food on hand would be the deciding factor in the continued survival of those who survive the nuclear attack. Presumably the growing crops at the time of a nuclear attack could be affected by the radioactive fallout.)

Various points were given to those intelligence agencies engaged in foreign collection regarding the identification of BW plants. It was pointed out that they may be of three kinds: fixed plants on land; mobile plants on land (truck-trailer combinations); or floating plants in merchant vessels. These are all geared to fairly large scale production of BW agents. It was pointed out that on a clandestine basis any trained person could make substantial quantities, i.e., several gallons, of BW agent in his kitchen or basement.

[redacted] b7E

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing
for Intelligence Agencies)
Bufile: 62-101958

b7E

The persons attending the briefing were afforded a tour of Fort Detrick, including a pilot plant in which all of the steps in making BW agents were followed, although

no harmful agents were present;

[redacted]


b7E

The tour also included the grid area in a wide level field where the release of simulated BW agents by aerosol can be measured downwind from a release point at specified intervals.

The lecture on aerobiology indicated that a double stream aerosol was the most efficient for obtaining some uniformity in droplets both as to size and microorganism. Tests for effectiveness of aerosol dissemination of BW agents are accomplished through use of impingers which precipitate the aerosol in a specially constructed flask. The use of impingers at a field test area would be the clue that BW agents rather than chemical warfare agents were being tested.

[redacted]

b7E



b7E

OBSERVATIONS:

From the standpoint of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee problems relating to clandestine attack, it would appear that biological warfare is still the least satisfactory of the media of mass destruction for use against Strategic Air Command bases. The incubation time and the physical resistence of each individual exposed makes BW unsuitable as a means of preventing Strategic Air Command

planes from taking off. Movement of personnel to replace those infected can be accomplished in a matter of hours and the difficulty of timing the effect of a BW attack or "alert crews" so that there would be no possibility of replacement between the time the BW agents took effect and the time the planes should take off makes BW unsatisfactory weapon for this type of target.

On the other hand, against a Government relocation site where replacement of key personnel would have to await the election process or could not be accomplished as in the case of certain key scientists, BW would be a satisfactory weapon.

The briefing was worthwhile from the standpoint of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee studies.

There are also attached the following unclassified items: synonyms for various BW weapons, Recognition Factors of Plant Interiors, and Comparison of Products and By-Products of Various Related Industries, and a reprint from the Baltimore "Sun" of 7/21/57 regarding Fort Detrick entitled "Maker of Invisible Weapons."

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/12/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 11/8/57 [redacted]

furnished the following information:

[redacted]

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100-93216-83

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

DJO:mjc
(3)

EX-132

RECORDED - 53
INDEXED-53

12-10-
NOV 15 1957

ESP. - SED.

58DEC 12 1957

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BSH/br

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/13/57

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UTAH

On 12/10/57, Dr. HOWARD E. MOORMAN, Deputy Director for Biological Warfare Operations for the Directorate of Materiel Testing, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, furnished the following information:

Concerning Tunnel Series of Tests

Tests in this series have been completed and the results forwarded to the Medical Department at Fort Dietrich, Maryland, for examination. Dugway personnel are awaiting recommendations from the Medical Department at Fort Dietrich, and upon return of these tests the Dugway personnel will prepare a final analysis. (See my letter of 11/12/57.)

Concerning E-22 Series

As previously pointed out the Portable Biological Generator is not expected to be in the hands of the Dugway personnel until 3/1/58, and consequently no tests in this series are not being conducted.

Concerning E-120 Series

No "shoots" in this series have as yet been conducted inasmuch as the weather conditions necessary to conduct these tests have not been favorable or in accordance with the requirements previously set forth by the Army Chemical Corps. (See my letter of 11/12/57.)

Concerning Fortification-Penitration Series of Tests

Within the next thirty days a documentary film will be made on the Rising Sun Grid which is located eight miles southwest of Dugway Proving Ground Technical Operations Area. This area is a simulated fortification containing fox holes, slit trenches and reinforced concrete implacements. Tests on the Rising Sun Grid in the past have been used to obtain technical data on area coverage and the penetration of deadly biological agents on the fortification

RECORDED 75 100-93216-855

57 DEXEON

24

DEC 16 1957

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED - AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

DJO: dk
(3)

EX-135

58 DEC 30 1957

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 12/27/57

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT : BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTOGE

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Contact was had on 12/17/57 by SA [redacted] with [redacted]

[redacted]

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Exhibited at that time to SA [redacted] were various devices

[redacted]

RECORDED - 48

(3) - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore (REGISTERED MAIL)
JFR:car
(4)

100-93216-857

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[redacted]

6 JAN 9 1958

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/30/57

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DKW

Re San Francisco letter 10/28/57.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 12/27/57. Informant advised that

[redacted]

[redacted] related that [redacted]

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[redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

100-93216-858

2 - Bureau (REG.)
1 - SF 65-4167
1 - [redacted]
PWM/lp
(4)

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RECORDED - 47

JAN 6 1958

EX-132

55 JAN 13 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 1/13/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE; SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DPW

On 1/7/58, [redacted]

furnished the following information:

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[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (100-93216)(REG)(AM)
1 - Salt Lake City (65-1122)

DJO:cd
(3)

100-93216-859

RECORDED - 61
INDEXED - 61

17 JAN 15 1958

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[redacted]

SEC.

ESP/SEC.

58 JAN 20 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 2/14/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-11[redacted])

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 2/12/58 [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
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b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

CONTAINED
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-12-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

100-93216-8160

2 - Bureau (Registered - Air Mail)
1 - Salt Lake City

RECEIVED
21
12 FEB 1958

EX-131

CDB:mb
(3)

55 FEB 25 1958

INTERCEPT

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) REG

DATE: February 18, 1958

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

00-San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter dated December 30, 1957.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on February 7, 1958. Informant advised that [redacted]

b2
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Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
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2-Bureau (Encls. 2)
2-San Francisco (65-4167)
[redacted]
PWM:FM
(4)

1 ENCLOSURE

100-93216-861

REC-7

FEB 24 1958

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62 MAR 4 1958

INT. SEC.

1 - [redacted] b6 b7C

SAC, San Francisco (65-4167) February 28, 1958

Director, FBI (100-93216)

REC- 79 100-422 16-862

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

EX-135

Reurlet 2/18/58 which requested a check of Bureau files concerning [redacted] b6 b7C

No information in Bureau files which can be identified as relating to [redacted] referred to in referenced letter.

1 - Chicago

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

ESS:dmn
(5)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

55 MAR 6 1958

MAIL ROOM

MAILED 5
FEB 28 1958
COMM-FBI

SA 03

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) REG DATE: February 18, 1958

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: ~~BIOLOGICAL WARFARE~~
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

OO-San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter dated December 30, 1957.

The Oakland Tribune Newspaper dated January 14 and 15, 1958 published information concerning the Navy Biological Laboratory at Oakland, California. About this same time [redacted] talked with [redacted] (it is noted that [redacted] is identical with [redacted].

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[redacted] related to [redacted] that he was interested in writing an article regarding Biological Warfare which could make a fine national magazine article perhaps for the Saturday Evening Post or Reader's Digest.

[redacted] furnished [redacted] with a copy of a letter [redacted] The letter is being set forth verbatim as follows and a photostatic copy is being retained in the files of the San Francisco Office:

[redacted]

2-Bureau REG
1-Chicago REG
2-San Francisco
(65-4167)

REC- 79 100-93216

15 FEB 24 1958

b6
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[redacted]

PWM:FM
(5)

[redacted]

Let to SF
1-Chicago
2-28-58-ESS

EX-135

SF 65-4167
PWM:FM

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

The Bureau and the Chicago Office are requested to check the indices and furnished any information concerning [redacted]

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b7D

Chicago should also discreetly ascertain if [redacted]

[redacted]

For the information of the Chicago Office, [redacted] has been a Bureau informant in the Biological Warfare Field since 1950 and has furnished the Bureau with [redacted]

[redacted]

PLEASE EXPEDITE THE ABOVE LEADS.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: February 28, 1958

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (98-1616)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(00 San Francisco)

Re San Francisco letter dated February 18, 1958.

The files of the Chicago Office contained no information concerning [redacted]

b6
b7C

RUC.

2 - Bureau (Registered)
2 - San Francisco (65-4167)(Registered)
1 - Chicago

JJH:bpw
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-13-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

100-93216-863

EX-26

b6
b7C

58 MAR 12 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/13/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 3/12/58 [redacted] b6 b7C b7D furnished the following information:

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED - AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

CDB:htg
(3)

100-93216-85

REC-18

EX-117

55 MAR 27 1958

INT. SEC.

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) REG

DATE: April 1, 1958

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE-
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

00-San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-13-04 BY 60267 uc/ nls/BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter dated February 18, 1958.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on March 17, 1958. Informant advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2-Bureau REG
2-San Francisco (65-4167)

b2
b7D

PWM:FM
(4)

REC- 50

100-73216-865

21 APR

55 APR 11 1958

b6
b7C

EXP. PROC.

INT. SEC.

NAT. INT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 4/11/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 4/27/58, [redacted]

furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-13-04 BY 60262 uc lnls/BJA/DPW

100-93216

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED - AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

REC-9 EX-128 APR 14

CDB:mm
(3)

58 APR 23 1958

ESPIONAGE-G
nat
INT.

b6
b7C

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 4/30/58

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED ~~AIR~~ MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

Contact was made on 4/30/58 by SA [redacted]
with [redacted]
[redacted] They advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

This information is being furnished to the Jacksonville office in view of the possibility that [redacted] and authorities and the Jacksonville office may be subsequently notified.

b7E

REC-95 [redacted]

EX-117

20 MAY 1 1958

(2) - Bureau (Registered ~~Air~~ Mail)
1 - Jacksonville (Registered Air Mail)(Info)
1 - Baltimore
~~JER~~ jd
(4)

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

58 MAY 6 1958

NAT. INT. SE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-13-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/12/58

b6
b7C

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

[redacted]

On 5/9/58 [redacted]

furnished the following information:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-13-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

REC-99

100-93216-268

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED - AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

CDB:mjc
(3)

63 MAY 20 1958

23 MAY 13 1958

ESP

INT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: June 2, 1958

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE -
ESPIONAGE-SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-13-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

(OO: SAN FRANCISCO)

Re San Francisco letter, dated April 1, 1958.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office, on May 21, 1958.

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Informant advised that [redacted]

[redacted] related that according to [redacted]

[redacted] reported that he has no information regarding [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b7D

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
2 - San Francisco (1-65-4167)
[redacted]

PWM/amr
(4)
#12

REC-78 100-93216-871

EX-117

9 JUN 9 1958

NAT. INV. SEC.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

F68

58 JUN 13 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 6, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-13-04 BY 60267 ucn/s/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: COMPROMISE OF U. S. ARMY BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

b6
b7C

100-93216-8

By memorandum dated May 23, 1958, in captioned matter, you were advised that a booklet prepared by the U. S. Army Chemical Corps, which set forth complete data concerning the Army's use of biological warfare agents, had been mailed to U. S. Army Military Attaches abroad, including those in the Iron Curtain countries. These booklets had been mailed through regular mail channels and, therefore, it was assumed by the Army that they had been compromised. A full investigation of this matter is being conducted by the Inspector General, Department of the Army.

By memorandum dated June 3, 1958, you were advised that ACSI had, through Liaison, furnished the copies of this booklet, along with the original mailing envelopes which mailed them to Moscow and Budapest, requesting that a Laboratory examination be made of the envelopes in an effort to determine if they had been clandestinely opened. ACSI has now furnished the copies and the envelopes which went to Bucharest, Prague, and Warsaw. These have been forwarded to the Laboratory.

On June 5, 1958, while talking to Brigadier General Royal Reynolds, Jr., he advised SA D. J. Sullivan, Liaison Section, that the Inspector General's investigation to date has not indicated any willful or malicious intent on the part of the individual within the Chemical Corps who actually mailed the booklets. General Reynolds stated that it looked very much like the Chemical Corps had given entirely too much responsibility and authority and the use of discretion to a low-salaried incompetent individual. General Reynolds further added that the Inspector General's investigation is endeavoring to determine who within the Chemical Corps was responsible for ordering or authorizing the mailing of this booklet overseas. He stated that Army regulations require that any classified mail intended for the U. S. Military Attaches abroad must be cleared by ACSI and mailed through regular Army channels by ACSI. The Chemical Corps completely ignored these regulations in instant matter.

ACTION: For information.

EX-102

REC-74

100-93216-878

JUN 10 1958

DJS:jlk (8)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Nease
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - Liaison Section
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

JUN 12 1958

Biological Warfare - Espionage Act - Sabotage

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 29, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: COMPROMISE OF U. S. ARMY BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman

By memorandum dated May 23, 1958, in captioned matter, you were advised that a booklet prepared by the U. S. Army Chemical Corps, which set forth complete data concerning the Army's plans, preparation and possible use of biological warfare agents, had been mailed to U. S. Army Military Attaches, including those in the Iron Curtain countries, through regular mail channels and, therefore, was assumed to have been compromised.

Detached & returned to Belmont.

Attached hereto is a copy of the booklet referred to above. It is noted that it was prepared as the basis for an Intelligence Agencies Biological Warfare Briefing held at Fort Detrick, Maryland, November 20-21, 1957. This copy was furnished to SA [redacted] Liaison Section, by [redacted] did not know the status of the Army's investigation into this matter inasmuch as practically the entire investigation has been taken over by the Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. [redacted] stated, however, that efforts were being made to obtain the mailing envelopes from the Attaches in the Iron Curtain countries and when received he would probably request the Bureau Laboratory to conduct an analysis of same in an effort to determine whether they had been opened clandestinely. [redacted] also stated that the Military Attaches in Poland, Russia, and Czechoslovakia had advised that they had received their copies. The Attache in Bulgaria had advised that he has not as yet received his.

b6
b7C

ENCL BEHIND FILE This Encl. returned to HQS per their request. 5/15/58

ACTION:

See Roach-Belmont memo 5/15/58

100-392616-873

For information

ENCLOSURE

EX-140 REC-51

Same caption - Re 8-20-58

REC-51

JUN 13 1958

EX-140

Enclosure
DJS:jlk (7)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Nease
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - [redacted]
1 - Liaison Section
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

5/31

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-13-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

LIAISON

58 JUN 17 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 6/13/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE—
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 6/10/58 furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

EXP PROC

DATE 8-13-04 BY 60322 uc/ns/BJA/dfd

REC-86 100-93216-874

FBI
JUN 18 11 33 AM '58

2 JUN 16 1958

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED - AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

CDB:htg
(3)

b6
b7C

58 JUN 20 1958

REPORT of the

FBI LABORATORY

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

June 12, 1958

Via Liaison

Attention: Chief, Security Division

b6
b7C

Re: EXAMINATION OF ENVELOPES FOR EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE TAMPERING
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

John Edgar Hoover, Director

YOUR FILE NO. 100-93216-
FBI FILE NO. 65-48647
LAB. NO. D-280924 BS

Examination requested by: Addressee

Reference: None

Examination requested: Document

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/als/BA/CB
ON 11/17/04

Specimen:

Five outer and inner envelopes from Headquarters, Chemical Corps, Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C., described as follows:

ITEM #	ADDRESSED TO
I	Army Attache, American Embassy, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
II	Army Attache, American Legation, Budapest, Hungary
III	Army Attache, American Embassy, Prague, Czechoslovakia
IV	Army Attache, American Legation, Bucharest, Rumania
V	Army Attache, American Embassy, Warsaw, Poland

ALSO SUBMITTED: Five copies of 110-page booklet entitled "Intelligence Agencies Biological Warfare Briefing," each accompanied by transmittal letter, DA Forms 1203 and 1204, OCS Form 505, and original and two carbon copies of letter from respective Army Attache.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen

Enclosure

JME:pjc (4)
PCC

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 65-48647-1

Results of Examination:

Examination of items one through five revealed that both the outer and inner envelopes addressed to Moscow and Bucharest were opened and resealed. The two envelopes to Moscow were found to have been opened by unsealing the bottom flaps which were resealed. The outer envelope to Bucharest was found to have been opened by unsealing the bottom flap which was resealed. The inner envelope to Bucharest was found to have been opened by unsealing and pulling out the right side flap.

The outer envelope to Budapest was found to have been opened by unsealing the bottom flap. The inner envelope reveals no evidence of tampering with the flaps.

The envelopes to Prague and Warsaw could not be examined adequately because of the manner in which these envelopes were opened apparently by the recipients.

The envelopes submitted were destroyed pursuant to instructions received from your office. The material listed as also submitted is attached.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

D-280924

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 3, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: COMPROMISE OF U. S. ARMY BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM

By memorandum dated May 23, 1958, in captioned matter, you were advised that a booklet prepared by the U. S. Army Chemical Corps, which set forth complete data concerning the Army's plans, preparation and possible use of biological warfare agents, had been mailed to U. S. Army Military Attaches, including those in the Iron Curtain countries, through regular mail channels and, therefore, was assumed to have been compromised.

Enclosed herewith are the copies of instant booklet which were forwarded to the U. S. Army Attaches in Moscow and Budapest respectively. Enclosed also are the cover letters returning same from Moscow and Budapest to Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI). The original mailing envelopes in which the documents were forwarded to Moscow and Budapest have been returned to ACSI and are enclosed herewith. All of the above were furnished to SA [redacted] Liaison Section, on June 2, 1958, by [redacted] ACSI. [redacted] requested that the original mailing envelopes be examined in the Bureau's Laboratory in an effort to determine whether same had been clandestinely opened and resealed prior to delivery to the U. S. Attaches.

b6
b7C

100-93216-1

NOT RECORDED
141 JUN 16 1958

ACTION:

If you approve, that the Bureau Laboratory make an examination as requested by ACSI. Upon the completion ~~of the~~ examination, all enclosures should be returned to Liaison for delivery back to ACSI. Enclosures are being retained in the Liaison Section.

Enclosures
DJS:jlk (7)
1 - Mr. Nease
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 -

b6
b7C

10 JUN 13 1958

LIAISON

Encls returned to ACSI-4-13-59 DP

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/plj/sbj/clb
ON 11/17/04

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 65-4616-4

'Biological Warfare - Espionage' Sabotage

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/14/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/04 BY 60267uc/sls/BJA/CB

On 7/11/58, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

REC- 64 100-93216-875

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED - AIRMAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

20 JUL 15 1958

CDB:ap
(3)

EX-117

NAT. INT. SEC.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

FBI
JUL 18 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 7-23-58

FROM : [redacted] b6 b7C

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE SABOTAGE
Biological Warfare

Supervisor [redacted] provided the attached newspaper clipping from the "National Enquirer" for 7-6-58. In the column entitled "Inside Politics" by James Miljae is a garbled account of the experimentation underway at the U.S. Army Chemical Center, Edgewood, Maryland. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. We just don't have any weapon now nor will we have in the foreseeable future like the article describes.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/04 BY 60867uc/NLS/BJA/CB

REC-86 100-93216-876

EX-117 12 JUL 24 1958

Enclosure
LW:cvg
1 - Branigan
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

55 AUG 5 1958

REC-86 EX-117

NATIONAL ENQUIRER, July 6, 1958

INSIDE POLITICS
By James Miljae

Sifting through the confusion and into the secrecy of real facts: The United States' biggest secret weapon is a new drug that has been developed by government scientists at Edgewood, Md. President **Eisenhower** is studying the scientific reports as you read this. The drug is a tranquilizer that may be used in exactly the same way as a gas. It has no odor and is believed to cause no post-ill-effects. The "secret" plan presently being discussed by Ike and Secy. of Defense **Neil McElroy** is to use the drug by filling a missile warhead with it, sending the missile to Russia and exploding it via remote control.

According to the scientific findings in the report, the drug would work over a 50-mile radius and cause "extreme laziness." Generally the population of that 50-mile radius would care more about eating and relaxing than they would about fighting.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/04 BY 60267 uc/ncs/bja/cb

100-93216-876

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont
1 -
1 -
1 -

DATE: 7-15-58

FROM : A. H. Belmont

b6
b7C

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sandy
N. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: VULNERABILITY OF VITAL TARGETS TO COVERT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CBR) ATTACK

11/22/04 #977600
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NLS/BJA/CPB 60267 DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 11/22/2029
Pg 2 [illegible], OGA 11/22/04 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CPB

SYNOPSIS:

Under date of 7-7-58, [redacted] transmitted to the Bureau and to the IIC copies of an ICIS report on the Vulnerability of Vital Targets to Covert CBR Attack. This is a revision of a report dated 2-27-57 prepared by the ICIS Subcommittee on Defense Against Uncoventional Attack. Bureau commented on 1957 report by memo to [redacted] 4-12-57. Report concludes Soviets have capability for destructive covert use of CBR agents and would not hesitate to use them against us; physical protection countermeasures can be taken; best defense is development of intelligence and prompt exchange of information regarding CBR attack.

RECOMMENDATION:

No FBI or IIC action is necessary. Our channels of liaison for exchange of information with other agencies are established and in operation and report was forwarded for information only. Report is being scheduled for formal notation during the next working committee meeting of IIC.

#977600
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-12-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
b7C

DETAILS:

By memoranda of 7-7-58, [redacted] forwarded to the Bureau and to the IIC copies of an ICIS report on the Vulnerability of Vital Targets to Covert CBR Attack. This report, which was approved by the ICIS 5-8-58, is a revision of one dated 2-27-57 prepared by the ICIS Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack. The Bureau commented on the earlier draft by memo of 4-12-57 suggesting that statistics on the number of Communist Party members be deleted since a small number of saboteurs in the right place at the right time could achieve the results desired by the Soviets. The memo of 4-14-57 also suggested that it might be well

LW: cmg (8)

1 - 100-93216 (Biological Warfare)
1 - 66-8603 (IIC)

REC. 10 EX 105 100-93216-878

55 JUL 29 1958

JUL 24 1958

SECRET

b6
b7C

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

b2

to point out that those agencies not members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee should review their channels of liaison with [redacted]

b1
b3

[redacted] It was also suggested that the ICIS might wish to include some comment regarding the cost of a physical protection program relating to the modification of the existing Government buildings and adoption of new construction to provide for filters against CBR agents. The first 2 suggestions were followed by the ICIS but the current paper contains no comment concerning costs of physical protection. This, however, is not a serious defect since the purpose of the paper is to point out the vulnerability of key installations to CBR attack.

The report concludes that the Soviets have the capability and would not hesitate to use covert CBR attack against us. It indicates that the use of biological warfare agents (BW) would be the most likely and effective. While physical protection countermeasures can be taken the best defense is the development of intelligence. The report notes that requirements for data concerning the CBR capabilities and intentions on the part of the Soviets are among the highest priorities of the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies and urges that those Government agencies with a "need-to-know" assure that channels of communication are clearly established with the intelligence collection agencies and particularly

b2 [redacted]

Various Federal agencies are listed as sharing responsibility for defense against CBR attacks including the Army Chemical Corps, Civil Defense, General Services Administration, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and others. The report states concerning the FBI "The Bureau has jurisdiction over violations of espionage, sabotage, treason, and other matters pertaining to the internal security of the U.S.

There is nothing for the Bureau or the IIC to do under the various recommendations of the report since we have our liaison and communications channels well established and functioning.

~~SECRET~~



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts


Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CAB
#97760C

b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/29/58

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BW
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: SAN FRANCISCO

Re San Francisco letter 6/2/58.

b2
b7D [redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 7/25/58.

Informant advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D and that he had no information indicating that [redacted] Informant stated that [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue. b2 b7D

2 - Bureau (REG.)
b2 2 - SF (1 - 65-4167)(1 - [redacted]
b7D KGT/lp
(4)

EXP. PROC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

REC-74 65-124

100-93216-880

21 AUG 6 1958

[redacted] INV. SEC. [redacted] b6 b7C

52 AUG 7 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED S[illegible] GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 15, 1958

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: COMPROMISE OF U.S. ARMY BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By memo 5-23-58 in captioned matter you were advised that a booklet prepared by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps which set forth complete data concerning the Army's plans, preparation and possible use of biological warfare agents, had been mailed to U.S. Army Military Attaches abroad, including those in the Iron Curtain countries. These were mailed through regular mail channels and, therefore, the booklet was presumed to have been compromised.

By memo dated 5-29-58 on the same subject, you were advised that a copy of the booklet in question had been made available to the Bureau through Liaison. On 8-14-58 [redacted] Counterintelligence Branch, Security Division, ACSI, advised SA D.J.Sullivan, Liaison Section, that the Chemical Corps was recalling all outstanding copies of instant booklet. He, therefore, requested that the Bureau return to him the copy which had been previously furnished to the Bureau.

b6
b7C

Enclosed herewith is the copy of the chemical warfare booklet furnished to the Bureau. It is noted that the serial number is 100-93216-873.

ACTION:

If you approve, enclosed booklet will be returned to [redacted] in compliance with his request.

b6
b7C

Encl. Returned to [redacted] ACSI 8/20/58 DJS

b6
b7C

Enclosure

DJS:llg
1 - Belmont
Liaison Section
Sullivan
(4)

OK

EX-102

REC-14

100-93216-881

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

AUG 20 1958

FBI AUG 22 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/14/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60226 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On 8/12/58, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised [redacted] was unable to [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] stated he is not very familiar with the [redacted]

b7D

REC-3 100-93216

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

24 AUG 18 1958

GDB:ap

55 AUG 22 1958

EX-PROC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 8/27/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Attached is a clipping from the "Washington Daily News" dated 8/26/58 regarding an epidemic of encephalitis in South Korea.

Referral/Direct

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that the Liaison Section make inquiry of the Army as to the current epidemic with particular reference to whether it has affected U. S. or United Nations troops; whether it is a type usually found in communist-controlled territory; and whether there is sufficient data available for the Army to make a determination as to whether this is, in fact, a biological warfare operation on the part of the communists. The latter is important to know in view of the present military activity on the Chinese "off shore" islands.

Enclosure
LW:smk
(7)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Roach
b6 b7C 1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. Whitson

8/28/58 Ncsl
advised that Army had no indication that Biological warfare being used. There is yearly epidemic of encephalitis in Asia.

b6
b7C

REC. 60

100-93216-883

11 SEP 3 1958

[redacted]

REC 60
1 - ENCLOSURE

55 SEP 10 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Far East

Epidemic Spreads

AN encephalitis epidemic that struck southern Korea leaving 160 dead among more than 1000 cases, is spreading toward Seoul.

Memo Branigan to Belmont 8-27-58 LW/amk

Washington Daily News

August 26, 1958

Page 2, Column 1

100-93216-883

ENCLOSURE

5-Rel

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/29/58

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Referral/Direct

NR

b6
b7C

On 8/22/58, contact was had by SA with On that date by SA

CLASSIFICATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY Sec 3 (b) (1) (5) (6) BJA/DFW

Referral/Direct

REC-86 66-891-884

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore
JFR:lmb (4)

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

AUG 30 1958

55 SEP 8 1958

CC returned from 5734

EX-108

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/15/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 9/12/58, [redacted]

furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-2014 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA(DFC)

EX-138 REC 1 100-93216-885

EXP PROC

2 - Bureau (100-93216) (REGISTERED - AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SEP 24 1958

CDB:dns
(3)

55 SEP 26 1958

STANDARD FORM NO 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE September 23, 1958

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(OO: San Francisco)

Re San Francisco let, 7-29-58.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on September 16, 1958. Informant advised that [redacted] and that he had no information indicating that [redacted]

Informant advised that [redacted]

According to informant, [redacted]

[redacted] mentioned that [redacted] according to informant, [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

REC-3 100-93216-886

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 160262 uc/nls/BSA/DFW

12 SEP 29 1958

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco
(1- [redacted]
PWM/hs
(4)

NAT. DEFENSE

50 OCT 10 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/14/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 10/13/58, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-30-04 BY 60260 uc/nls/BSA/dfw

EX-PROC

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED - AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

REC- 12 100-93216-887

EX.-132 21 OCT 16 1958

CDB:jl
(3)

15 OCT 23 1958

NAT. INT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/3/58

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Referral/Direct

On 10/27/58 contact was had with [redacted] b6 b7C by SA [redacted] It was noted that [redacted]

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (Registered mail) EX-124 REC-13 100-93216-888
1 - Baltimore
JFR:dwd
(3)

25 NOV 4 1958

61 NOV 6 1958

STANDARD FORM NO 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/14/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On 11/10/58, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

[redacted] explained that, [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED - AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

CDB:dpt
(3)

REC 14 100-93216-889

23 NOV 14 1958

EX-116

55 NOV 20 1958

SECRET

- Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C
- Mr.
- Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

VIA LIAISON

REC-46 100-93216-890

b3 50 USC SECTION 403

Date: December 3, 1958

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

EX-135

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SOVIET INTELLIGENCE INTEREST IN UNITED STATES BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENTS

b1
b3 50 USC SECTION 403

[redacted] (5)

Any evaluation of the Soviet request for information would require some knowledge of the source to which the request was made and the availability to that source of the information requested. The Soviet request would appear to be a reasonable one and any further information along these lines coming to your attention would be of interest to this Bureau.

LW:smk
(7)

NOTE:

b1
b3 50 USC SECTION 403

Classified "Secret" because document commented upon is so classified. [redacted] (5)

DATE: 8-20-04 uc/als/BTA/DFW
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/als/BTA/DFW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,3(1) 8-20-2029
M1,06A 11/22/04 60267 uc NLS/B/M/CG

SECRET

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

66 DEC 5 1958

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/28/58

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-2004 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

OO: SAN FRANCISCO

Re San Francisco letter dated 9/23/58.

[redacted] was last contacted by representatives of the San Francisco Office on 11/24/58, at which time he advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Informant related that [redacted]

He pointed out that [redacted]

b7D

He further advised that [redacted]

Informant mentioned that [redacted]

He further stated

b7D

that [redacted]

It was informant's opinion that [redacted]

[redacted] stated that to his knowledge [redacted]

b2
b7D

Informant related that [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

REC-76 100-93216-891

12-5

2 - Bureau (REG.)
b2 2 - San Francisco (65-4167)
b7D 1 cc [redacted]

EX-133 24 DEC 8 1958

PWM:lvh
(4)
#12

61 DEC 8 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/12/58

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 12/10/58, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

1-0

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED - AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

REC-60 100-93216-892

CDB:dns
(3)

FEB 51 DEC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: December 31, 1958

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGULAR MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/JFW

b6
b7C

Referral/Direct

On 12/22/58 contact was had by SA [redacted] b6 b7C with [redacted]

Referral/Direct [redacted]

Referral/Direct

Contact will be had with [redacted] during January, 1959.

- P -

100-93216-893

EX-128 REC- 92

JAN 1 1959

3-Bureau (REGIS. MAIL)
1-Baltimore
JFR:eae
(4)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

61 JAN 9 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/9/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On 1/7/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] stated [redacted] He stated [redacted]

[redacted] stated [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] stated [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

EX-135 REC-13 100-93216-894

2 - Bureau (100-93261) (REGISTERED AM)
1 - Salt Lake City (65-1122)
CDB:dez
(3)

2 JAN 12 1959

53 JAN 19 1959

ESP. INTEL.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/26/59

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/BOA/SFW

OO: San Francisco

Re San Francisco letter, 11/28/58.

[redacted] was last contacted by representatives of the San Francisco Office on January 19, 1959, at which time he advised that [redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7D

Informant mentioned that [redacted] b7D

[redacted] stated that he has received no information indicating that [redacted] b2
[redacted] Informant related that he is consistently on the alert for b7D information [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue. b2 b7D

CCs: 2-Bureau (REG)
2-San Francisco (65-4167) [redacted] b2 b7D

PWM/gj
(4)
#12

REC- 92 100-93216-895

90 FEB 2 1959

66 FEB 6 1959

NAT. INV. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 2/11/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 2/10/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted] stated [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-20-04 BY 60322 uc/nls/BJA/dkr

(2) - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

100-93216-896

REC-25

EX-102

FEB 16 1959

53 MAR 3 1959

(3)

b6
b7C

NAT SEC

INT SEC

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 2/9/59

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Referral/Direct

On February 5, 1959, contact was had by SA [redacted] with [redacted] b6 b7C

Copies of this airtel are being designated for the Richmond and Norfolk Offices so that should any inquiries be received by those offices regarding such individuals or activities, those offices will be aware of the circumstances. [redacted] b6 b7C

(3) - Bureau REGISTERED MAIL REC 33 100-93216-897
1 - Norfolk (Air Mail) REGISTERED MAIL
1 - Richmond REGISTERED MAIL EX-135 25 FEB 1959
1 - Baltimore REGISTERED MAIL
JFR/bab
(8)

Approved: Sent M Per
Special Agent in Charge

52 FEB 27 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 16, 1959

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Under date of February 11, 1959, the Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, Department of the Army, invited two Bureau personnel to attend a 2-day orientation at Fort Detrick, Maryland, March 5 and 6, 1959, on U.S. Biological Warfare developments.

The previous Biological Warfare orientation course given at Fort Detrick in November, 1957, was attended by SA [redacted] of the Domestic Intelligence Division and [redacted] of the Laboratory. This orientation was found to be extremely helpful to the Bureau in the discharge of its responsibilities in connection with the Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conference contribution to the annual Net Evaluation studies. The Laboratory would like to have White attend the March, 1959, evaluation.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that [redacted] be designated to attend the March, 1959, orientation at Fort Detrick. If approved, the Espionage Section will contact the Security Officer of the Chemical Warfare Intelligence Agency, Chief Warrant Officer [redacted] extension [redacted] furnishing the names of the agents and the fact that they have Top Secret security clearances.

b6
b7C

100-93216

LW:prd
(6)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
b6 1 - Mr. Branigan
b7C 1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]

REC-46 100-93216-899

12 MAR 5 1959

b6
b7C

b6
b7C CWO [redacted] CCIA
ADVISED 3PM 2-18-59
LW

61 MAR 12 1959

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-84 BY 60262 ucl n1s/BJA/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/13/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BSA/DFW

On 3/12/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

REC-100-93216-900

CDB:zch
(3)

53 MAR 20 1959

23 MAR 16 1959

ESPIONAGE SEC.

INFO SEC.

A. H. Belmont

3/16/59

W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]

b6
b7C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
(BIOLOGICAL WARFARE BRIEFING FOR
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES)

SYNOPSIS:

On 3/5 and 6/59 briefing on biological warfare (BW) given to representatives of U. S. intelligence agencies at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, [redacted] of Laboratory and Special Agent [redacted] of Domestic Intelligence Division represented the Bureau. [redacted]

b6
b7C

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-101958-0

Referral/Direct

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

100-93216-1
NOT RECORDED
102 MAR 23 1959

62-101958
Enclosures 0
1 - 100-93216 (Biological Warfare)
LWesmk
(8)

ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

59

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

55 MAR 25 1959

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-10-84 BY 160762 ucl/ns/BOBMOFW

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: National Security Council
Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing for Intelligence Agencies)
62-101958

DETAILS:

On 3/5 and 6/59 a briefing on biological warfare (BW) was given to representatives of U. S. intelligence agencies at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, by members of the staff of that installation. Approximately 50 persons were in attendance each day. Dr. B. J. White of the Laboratory and Special Agent L. Whitson of the Domestic Intelligence Division represented the Bureau. The agenda for the briefing, a copy of which is attached, will be followed herein to indicate briefly the subject matters covered.

White and Whitson had represented the Bureau at the previous BW briefing 11/20 and 21/57. The current briefing was repetitious of much that was given in 1957, consequently, only those matters in which there have been significant developments since that time will be discussed.

Referral/Direct

Referral/Direct

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: National Security Council
Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing for Intelligence Agencies)
62-101958

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

Memorandum from Mr. Brantigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: National Security Council
Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing for Intelligence Agencies)
62-101958

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: National Security Council
Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing for Intelligence Agencies)
62-101959

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: National Security Council
Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing for Intelligence Agencies)
62-101958

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b7E

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: National Security Council
Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(Biological Warfare Briefing for Intelligence Agencies)
62-101958

b7E

The briefing was worthwhile from the standpoint of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee studies.

There are attached the following sheets which were disseminated at the briefing:

1. Agenda
2. Microbiological Definitions
3. Exterior recognition of BW operations
4. Recognition factors in BW plant interiors.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/31/59

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DPW

Re San Francisco letter dated 1/26/59.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on March 30, 1959, at which time he advised that [redacted]

b2 b6 b7C b7D

According to [redacted]

[redacted] Informant related that [redacted]

[redacted] Informant mentioned that [redacted]

b2 b7D

[redacted] added that [redacted]

Informant also added that [redacted]

b2 b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] stated that he has received no information indicating [redacted]

b2 b7D Contact with [redacted] will continue

100-93216-901

2 - Bureau (Reg.)
2 - San Francisco
1 - 65-4167
b2 b7D 1 - [redacted]
PWM:mhb
(4)
#12

REC-93

23 APR 6 1959

ESP SEC

INT SEC

61 APR 13 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4/17/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 4/16/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60260 uc/ns/BJA/Dfw

(2) Bureau (REG.AM)
1- Salt Lake City

CDB:jl
(3)

REC-4 100-93216-902

12 APR 22 1959

67 APR 29 1958

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 4/30/59

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Referral/Direct

On 4/23/59 and 4/24/59 contact was had by SA [redacted] with [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

JFR:fa[redacted]

3 - Bureau
1 - Baltimore

(4)

REC-25 100-93816-

MAY 1 1959

66 MAY 11 1959

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M _____ er _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE. 5/18/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On 5/14/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

Parsons
Belmont

EX-PROC.

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

CDB:dpt
(3)

52 MAY 26 1959

EX 109 LEBI

REC-32 100-93216-904

RECEIVED 7 MAY 19 1959

INT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/28/59

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: SAN FRANCISCO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter 3/31/59.

b2 b7D [redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 5/27/59, at which time he advised that [redacted]

According to [redacted]

b2 b7D [redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

b2 b7D [redacted]

[redacted]

b2 b6 b7C b7D [redacted] Informant advised that to his knowledge, [redacted] Informant mentioned that [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue. b2 b7D

2 - Bureau (REG.)
2 - SF (1 - 65-4167)(1 - 123A)
PWM/lp
(4)

REC-93 100-93216-905

18 JUN 2 1959

62 JUN 8 1959

[redacted]

NAT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M[redacted]m • UNITED [redacted] VERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/17/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: O
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 6/15/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-22-04 BY 60462 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

2 Bureau (REG AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

CDB:zch
(3)

REC- 92 100-93216-906

23 JUN 19 1959

EX-

60 JUL 1 1959

ENCL.
INTENSEC.

4-117

COVER LETTER FOR BLOCKED MAIL TOO LARGE FOR FILE

[redacted]

THIS SERIAL IS TOO LARGE FOR FILE AND WILL BE CARRIED AS A NOT RECORDED SERIAL BEHIND THE FILE

THIS SERIAL THE (Date)
3-31-59

ISSUE OF THE (Name of the pamphlet)
Monthly Intelligence Summary Supplement Number 2

SUBJECT
Biological Warfare

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

FILE NUMBER
100-93216 — 907

55 JUN 23 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/30/59

FROM : SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

In view of the resignation of SA [redacted] of the Frederick Resident Agency, who served as liaison agent to
b6 maintain contact with [redacted]
b7C
b7D [redacted] it is believed that these liaison contacts should now be handled by SA [redacted] who is assigned to the Resident Agency at Frederick, Maryland.

b6 UACB, SA [redacted] is being designated as liaison repre-
b7C sentative to maintain these contacts, and [redacted]
b7D [redacted] will be notified of his designation.

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore

lw
(3)

File reviewed. Record OK. Nothing noted to preclude this designation.
LBO
7/2

EX 100

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60260 uc/als/ BJA/DFW

REC- 23 100-93216-908

12 JUL 1 1959

57 JUL 9 1959

ESPIONAGE

INTERNAL SECURITY

PETTS, PILES

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/15/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 7/14/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60322 uc/ns/BJA/DFW

EXP PROC

2 - Bureau (REG AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

CDB:dsb
(3)

REC- 39 100-93216-909

JUL 17 1959

EX-13[illegible]

LABORATORY

INT. SEC.

67 JUL 27 1959

4-117

COVER LETTER FOR BLOCKED MAIL TOO LARGE FOR FILE

[redacted]

THIS SERIAL IS TOO LARGE FOR FILE AND WILL BE CARRIED AS A NOT RECORDED SERIAL BEHIND THE FILE

THIS SERIAL THE (Date)

May 15, 1959

ISSUE OF THE (Name of the pamphlet)

Chemical Corps Intelligence Estimate Czechoslovakia (C)

SUBJECT

Biological Warfare Espionage & Sabotage

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 ucl nls/BJA/DFW

FILE NUMBER

100-93216-910

55 JUL 23 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED ST GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 7/29/59

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C
1 - Mr.
1 - Mr. Whitson

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, CHEMICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE & SABOTAGE

Referral/Direct

The Bureau is in receipt [redacted] was initially received in the FBI Laboratory and a copy has been retained there.

[redacted]

Of special interest is [redacted] is apparently intended for a "layman" rather than a scientist.

ACTION:

For your information.

[redacted] b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

100-93216
LW:smk
(6)

REC-15

100-93216-911

RECORDED
2 JUL 31 1959

ENCLOSURE (Pamphlet)

ENCL. BEHIND FILE

1959

ESP. SEC.

INT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/3/59

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(OO: San Francisco)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-10-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/ BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter dated 5/28/59.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 7/27/59, at which time he advised that [redacted]

b2
b7D

[redacted] Informant stated that [redacted]

[redacted] mentioned that [redacted]

b2
b7D

[redacted] Informant further advised that [redacted]

[redacted] informant was unable to furnish any further information at this time.

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b7D

EXP. PROC.

2 - Bureau (REG.)
2 - San Francisco
b2 (1 - 65-4167)
b7D (1 - [redacted])

PWM:PCB #12
(4)

REC-41 100-93216-912

11 AUG 19 1959

EX-

57 AUG 24 1959

NAT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE. 8/14/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 160267 uc/n/s/BJA/DFW

On 8/12/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:dst
(3)

REC-39 100-93216-9

24 AUG 20 1959

EX-

57 AUG 24 1959

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M[redacted]m · UNIT[redacted]OVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: August 20, 1959

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-2004 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

OO: San Francisco

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco office on August 10, 1959, at which time he advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] Source advised that [redacted]

[redacted] According to source, [redacted]

Source further advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] It was informant's opinion that [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he has received no information indicating [redacted]

b2
b7D

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b7D

b2
b7D
2- Bureau (REG)
1- San Francisco [redacted]
1- San Francisco (65-4167)

PWM-ldb #12
(4)

100-93216-914

REC-62

15 AUG 24 1959

57 AUG 31 1959

HSINHUA — DAILY — NO 609

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1959 -5-

083112 -- SCIENTISTS WANT BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE BANNED

PEKING, AUGUST THIRTYFIRST (HSINHUA) -- THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SCIENTISTS, INITIATED BY CYRUS EATON, A PROMINENT AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIST AND PUBLIC FIGURE, HAS ENDED IN PUGWASH, CANADA TASS REPORTED FROM OTTAWA YESTERDAY.

THE CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY TWENTYSIX DISTINGUISHED SCIENTISTS FROM CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE USSR, THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, BRITAIN, FRANCE, INDIA, SWEDEN AND DENMARK. DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE WERE UNANIMOUS IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO USE THE GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN PROSPERITY INSTEAD OF WHOLESALE DESTRUCTION.

SUMMING UP THE PUGWASH CONFERENCE, ACADEMICIAN M. M. DUBININ, HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, TOLD TASS THAT "THE OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFERENCE WAS TO CONSIDER THE POTENTIALITIES OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL (BACTERIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AS A THREAT TO MANKIND AND A MEANS OF MASS ATTACK PARALLEL WITH NUCLEAR AND THERMO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

MR. CYRUS EATON READ OUT N. S. KHRUSHCHOV'S MESSAGE TO HIM WITH GREETINGS AND WISHES OF SUCCESS TO THE CONFERENCE. THE MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE ACCLAIMED KHRUSHCHOV'S MESSAGE WITH UNANIMOUS APPLAUSE."

DUBININ REPORTED THAT THE ELEVEN CONFERENCE SESSIONS HAD HEARD AND DISCUSSED PAPERS BY SCIENTISTS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. THE CONFERENCE WAS UNANIMOUS IN QUALIFYING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

THE FIRST STEP TO BE TAKEN, IN THE OPINION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE, WAS TO IMPOSE AN UNQUALIFID BAN ON THE MANUFACTURE AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, DUBININ SAID. NEXT, AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON METHODS OF CONTROL WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF INTER-NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND ON CLASSIFICATION OF THE WORK DONE IN THESE FIELDS.

THE DIFFERENCE BF OPINION ON INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS DID NOT PREVENT THE CONFERENCE FROM TAKING JOINT AGREED DECISIONS IN THE SHAPE OF ITS FINAL STATEMENT AGAINST THE MANUFACTURE AND USE OF BACTERIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

HAVING CAREFULLY ANALYSED THE DESTRUCTIVENESS OF THESE WEAPONS, THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS DECLARED THAT IN THE OPINION OF SOME OF THEM, A SURPRISE ATTACK WITH THESE WEAPONS ON A CITY DISTRICT MIGHT CLAIM ALMOST AS MANY VICTIMS AS A SMALL ATOM BOMB.

REPUDIATING THE CONTENTIONS THAT THESE WEAPONS WERE MORE HUMANE THAN OTHER MEANS OF WARFARE, THE SCIENTISTS ADVOCATED THE PROHIBITION OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF STUDIES LEADING TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND PERFECTION. THE STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT ONLY TOTAL PREVENTION OF WAR WOULD SAFEGUARD THE LIFE OF MANKIND AND CIVILISATION AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

END ITEM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-19-2012 BY 60324 uc/baw/sbs

REC-20 100-93216-914X

NOT RECORDED

145 SEP 15 1959

53 SEP 23 1959 EX-124

083119 -+- U. S. INTERVENTION IN LAOS DENOUNCED

HANOI, AUGUST THIRTYFIRST (HSINHUA) -+- THE PATHET LAO FIGHTING UNITS ON AUGUST TWENTYFIRST DENOUNCED THE CONTINUOUS SENDING OF WEAPONS, ARMAMENT AND U.S. MILITARY OFFICERS INTO LAOS BY THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND THE SANANIKONE GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS HERE QUOTING THE LAO HAKSAT.

A GROUP OF MEMBERS OF THE SECOND BATTALION OF THE PATHET LAO FIGHTING UNITS AT A GATHERING OPPOSED THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' AND THE SANANIKONE GOVERNMENT'S PLOT TO SUBMIT THE PROBLEM OF LAOS TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A PRETEXT FOR FURTHER U.S. INTERVENTION IN LAOS AND DENOUNCED SANANIKONE'S COLLUSION WITH THE NGO DINH DIEM CLIQUE AND THE REACTIONARY ELEMENTS OF THAILAND FOR EXPANSION OF THE CIVIL WAR IN LAOS.

THE GATHERING UNANIMOUSLY ENDORSED A RESOLUTION, IN WHICH THEY EXPRESSED ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE IN THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP OF THE NEO LAO HAKSAT PARTY AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO FIGHT AGAINST THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND THE SANANIKONE GOVERNMENT.

THEY DEMANDED THE RESTORATION OF THE FREEDOM OF PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE NEO LAO HAKSAT PARTY AND IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ANY ACTION TO EXPAND THE CIVIL WAR IN LAOS END ITEM

083118 -+- SHANGHAI PREPARES FOR TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF NATIONAL DAY

SHANGHAI, AUGUST THIRTYFIRST (HSINHUA) -+- PREPARATIONS ARE GOING AHEAD IN SHANGHAI FOR THE CELEBRATION OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF NATIONAL DAY. ABOUT ONE HUNDRED OPERAS, CHINESE AND FOREIGN PLAYS AND MUSICAL ITEMS ARE BEING REHEARSED BY THEATRE AND MUSIC COMPANIES. HANDICRAFTSMEN ARE MAKING FANCY FIREWORKS, ARTIFICIAL FLOWERS AND OTHER ARTICLES OF DECORATION.

SOVIET COMPOSER KHACHATURIAN'S "NUMBER TWO SYMPHONY" AND BERTOLD BRECHT'S "MOTHER COURAGE AND HER CHILDREN" WILL BE PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN CHINA.

LEADING ACTORS WILL APPEAR IN THEIR FAVOURITE ROLES OR IN NEW PLAYS. EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE SINGING, ACTING AND MUSIC OF MANY TRADITIONAL OPERAS WITH POPULAR THEMES THAT HAVE LONG BEEN PRESENTED TO PACKED HOUSES. THERE ARE ALSO NEW OPERAS AND PLAYS ON HISTORICAL, REVOLUTIONARY AND CONTEMPORARY THEMES.

THE "CANTATA OF THE RIVER OF HAPPINESS", WINNER OF A FIRST PRIZE AWARDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL JURY AT THE SEVENTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL IN VIENNA, AND A MODERN PLAY "BATTLE HYMN OF SHANGHAI" DEPICTING THE LIBERATION WAR IN THIS CITY, WILL ALSO BE PERFORMED. ACROBATS ARE REHEARSING A GRACEFUL TIGHT ROPE DANCE CALLED THE "RED SILK DANCE".

FIREWORKS ARE BEING DEVISED TO SENT ALOFT INTO THE SKY GIGANTIC DANCING DRAGONS AND A PAGODA WITH BRIGHT FANCIFUL PATTERNS. HANDICRAFTSMEN ARE ALSO MANUFACTURING LARGE QUANTITIES OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LANTERNS WHICH ARE CUSTOMARILY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/10/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-2004 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On 9/8/59, [redacted] jointly furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

EXP. PROC

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:nlb
(3)

REC-57 100-93216-915

EX-133

10 SEP 14 1959

57 SEP 18 1959

INT. SEC.

ESP. SEC.

REC-61 100-93216-916

18 SEP 15 1959

Sep 10 9 34 AM '59

55 OCT 5 1959 REC'D

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/16/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

BQ White
BQ

On 10/15/59, [redacted] jointly furnished the following information.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
GWL:zch

REC-22 100-93216-917
EX.-109
OCT 18 1959

55 OCT 26 1959

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 10/21/59

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. Whitson

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WARFARE

b6
b7C
b7D

Reference is made to the memorandum from Special Agent in Charge Auerbach to the Director dated 10/14/59 re "Chemical Warfare Developments." Mr. Auerbach had been told by [redacted]

Mr. Auerbach, in discussing chemical warfare developments [redacted] suggested that the Bureau might look into the chemical warfare situation (1) to be fully aware of its availability and possible uses in the cold war for intelligence purposes, and (2) so that official U.S. personnel on duty abroad, such as State Department and CIA, would be aware of the potentiality of the newly developed "psychochemical agents." b6 b7C b7D

The Bureau has kept abreast of chemical warfare developments. Representatives of the Domestic Intelligence Division and of the Laboratory have visited the Chemical Warfare Center at Edgewood, Maryland, for the purpose of observing practical demonstrations. [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

The Bureau is well aware of current developments and the Laboratory can take advantage of such developments should the need arise.

Representatives of the Department of State, CIA, and the military intelligence services are cognizant of such developments. The Bureau's liaison with the Army Chemical Corps exists not only at the Seat of Government but also at Fort Detrick, Maryland; Army Chemical Center, Maryland; and Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.

100-93216-918

EX. 109 REC- 31

It is noted that [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

RECOMMENDATION: Attached is a letter to Special Agent in Charge Auerbach informing him that the Bureau is on top of the situation.

55 OCT 26 1959

Enclosure
LW:smk (6)

Pol; OGA 11/22/04 60267 ucdn/s/BJA/DFW
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 ucdn/s/BJA/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : Mr. Hoover

DATE: 10/14/59

FROM : SAC Auerbach

Personal

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare Espionage and Sabotage
CHEMICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENTS

In the course of meeting other governmental officials here as the new SAC, I have met with [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] talked off the record and most confidentially to me as to the situation since he is a great admirer of you and the Bureau. He says that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] states that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] states that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Pgs 1-3 DATE: 11/22/04 6026TW/MWS/BJA/DFW
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60226 uc/ns/BJA/DFW

REC-22 100-932716-919

EXP PROC

OCT 16 1959

OCT 29 1959

Memo Branigar to Belmont 10-14-59 LW Lapham

Ltr SF Chamberlain 10-22-59 LW Lapham

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C
1 - Mr. Whitson

SAC, San Francisco (65-4167) 10/22/59

REC- 22

Director, FBI (100-93216)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE -
CHEMICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6 b7C b7D Reference is made to your letter of 10/14/59 regarding "Chemical Warfare Developments." I wish to thank you for bringing to my attention the comments of [redacted]

For your information, the Bureau has been fully aware of [redacted] b6 b7C b7D The military intelligence agencies of the U. S. Government, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State, are also aware of these developments and their potentialities.

Any additional information which you may receive in the future regarding developments in the field of biological warfare or chemical warfare will, of course, be of interest to the Bureau.

LWismk
(8)

Cover memo Branigan to Belmont prepared 10/21/59 by LWismk re "Chemical Warfare," in connection with this outgoing.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-2004 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW
Pg 1, OGA 11/23/04 60267 uc/nls/BJA/CKB

MAILED 5
OCT 22 1959
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W C Sullivan
Tele Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

55 NOV 6 1959

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 10/23/59

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIR TEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE
Referral/Direct

On October 9, 1959, contact was had with [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] was advised to notify their liaison contact, SA [redacted] when they had decided upon the number who desired to make the tour and the date on which they could make the trip to Washington, D.C. and SA [redacted] would attempt to make the necessary arrangements.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-84 BY 60267 uc/als/BJA/DFW

REC-92 100-73216-920

3 - Bureau(Registered Mail)
1 - Baltimore (66-891)
RRL:ps
(4)

OCT 24 1959

b6 b7C

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

55 NOV 6 1959

7-9 (Rev. 9-21-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LABORATORY
PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY SECTION

10/26, 1959

(1) [redacted]

		7621		Mr.	7416
	Mr.	7621		Mr.	7125
				Mr.	7410
	Mr.	7601		Mr.	7416
	Mr.	6228		Mr.	7416
	Mr.	7140		Mr.	7410
	Mr.	7133		Mr.	7125 b6
				Mr.	7328 b7C
	Miss	7621		Mr.	7416
	Miss	7621		Mr.	7417
				Mr.	7407
	Miss	7133		Mr.	7407
	Mrs.	7133		Mr.	7417
b6 b7C	Miss	7133		Mr.	7417
	Miss	7133		Mr.	7328
	Miss	7129		Mr.	7324
	Mrs.	7129		Mr.	7417
	Miss	7129		Mr.	7133
	Mrs.	7133		Mr.	7410
	Miss	7129		Mr.	7417
				Mr.	7410
	Mr.	7416		Mr.	7416
				Mr.	7125
	Laboratory Files	7141		Mr.	7417
	Mail Room	5531		Mr.	7407
	Reading Room	5533		Mr.	7416
	Records Section			Mr.	7416

Record & Return

(2) M

Please See Me
Please Call Me
Please Handle

b6 b7C

Since we work closely with Army Chemical Corps I would like to personally take them on tours of Laboratory when they come.

P. G. White

Physics and Chemistry
Room 7133, Ext. b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/13/2014 BY 60324 uc/sml/sbr/ksl

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/13/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-20-04 BY 60260 ucnls/BJA/DFW

Bc

On 11/12/59, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] further stated that [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

SEC. 48 100-93216-921

EX-13

23 NOV 16 1959

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

62 NOV 24 1959 59
(3)

NOV 20 1959 SEC.

INT. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/19/59

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: ~~BIOLOGICAL WARFARE~~
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: SF

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 11/12/59. [redacted] related that [redacted] According to [redacted]

Source stated that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] Source advised that to his knowledge [redacted]

Source further mentioned that [redacted]

[redacted] Contact with [redacted] will continue.

EX-124

REC-62 100-93216-9

2 - Bureau
2 - San Francisco (1-65-4167)
(1) [redacted]

PWM/yt
(4)

12-3
NOV 23 1959

INT. SEC.

67 DEC 8 - 1959

STANDARD FORM NO 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/15/59

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BTA/DPW

On 12/15/59, [redacted] jointly furnished the following information.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

REC-34 100-93216-923

16 DEC 18 1959

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:jec

55 JAN 8 1960

EX-117

ESP

INT

EXP PROC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SP. ML.

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/23/59

FROM SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
~~ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE~~
OO: SAN FRANCISCO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-2004 BY 60267 uc/n/s/BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter to Bureau dated 11/19/59.

b2 b7D [redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on December 18, 1959. Source related that [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b2 b6 b7C b7D [redacted] Source mentioned that [redacted]

[redacted] understands that [redacted]

b2 b7D [redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

b2 b7D [redacted]

b2 b7D [redacted] related that [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2 b7D

b2 b7D 2 - Bureau (REG.)
2 - SF (1 - 65-4167)(1 - [redacted]
PWM/ls
(4)

REC- 94

100-93216-94

EX-135

18 DEC 28 1959

58 JAN 4 1960

ESPIONAGE SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 12/16/59

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

Referral/Direct

Enclosed for the FBI Laboratory are the following two documents which were made available to SA [redacted] on December 7, 1959, by [redacted] These documents were turned over to SA [redacted] for transmittal to the FBI Laboratory for information purposes.

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

5 - Bureau
(2 - FBI Laboratory - Enc. 2)
REGISTERED MAIL
1 - Baltimore
RRL:dfl
(6)

EX 109

REC-11 100-93216-925

2 ENCLOSURE

16 DEC 17 1959

58 JAN 12 1960

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MC GUIRE

DATE: 12-30-59

b6
b7C

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AT FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

[redacted] furnished the attached newspaper clipping from the 12-24-59 edition of the Frederick News, a Frederick, Maryland, evening newspaper. She stated that she thought the article might be of interest to the Bureau inasmuch as a group of people, who are not from Frederick, Maryland, have been standing vigil at the entrance to Fort Detrick for approximately 6 months in opposition to biological warfare. Fort Detrick is the Army Biological Warfare Center at Frederick, Maryland.

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised that [redacted] told her that Fort Detrick employees have been instructed not to engage in conversation with the people standing vigil.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum and attachment be referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for information.

LWB:bpr
(3)
Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-07 BY 60267 uc/nlk/BJA/DFW

100-93216-926

REC-8

13 JAN 5 1960

EX-117

1 ENCLOSURE

55 JAN 8 1960

A Christmas Greeting To The People Of Frederick

From

THE APPEAL AND VIGIL AT FORT DETRICK

324 WEST PATRICK STREET MOnument 2-5721

rnd

For six months we have stood in a vigil at the entrance to Fort Detrick appealing to the conscience of men and women everywhere to stop preparation for biological warfare.

At this season, which comemorates the birth of Jesus Christ, we are particularly mindful of the manner of life revealed in Him, and to which he called all mankind. "Love your enemies" and "Return good for evil" are not unrealistic counsels. That way was always the way by which men could avoid mutual slaughter and share in abundant life. Now it has become the only way to preserve civilization.

Within this generation the moral failure by men of all nations brought mankind to the atrocities of Nazi gas chambers, mutual obliteration, bombing of open cities of women and children and the blasphemy of nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Why We Stand In Silent Vigil

We stand in vigil at Fort Detrick because potential crimes and atrocities against humanity are being prepared there and in similar centers in the Soviet Union and other countries, and may become a reality if armed conflict breaks out. As we have visited with people in Frederick — those who work at Fort Detrick and those who condone by their silence — we have heard the justifications by which men and women still the small voice of conscience. Yet, the moral law of the Universe cannot be canceled.

We stand in vigil at Fort Detrick in penitence and compassion — penitence that our own lives have not measured up to the standard of love and consideration for all men, compassion for the pain and suffering through which we all must pass before we learn to overcome evil with good.

Yet, we stand in vigil at Fort Detrick in joy and hope at this season. We have faith in the Spirit of God working in the hearts of men. We wish you a joyous Christmas and a New Year of life in peace with all men.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-26-04 BY 60262 uc/n/s/ 8JA/DFW

Frederick News
12-24-59
Frederick, Md.

ENCLOSURE 100-93216-926

b6
b7C

Memo [ ] to Mr. McLean LWB:bv 12-30-59

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

b6
b7C

FBI

Date: 1/8/60

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-20-84 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR TOUR OF FBI LABORATORY FACILITIES BY BRANCH CHIEFS, CAMP DETRICK, FREDERICK, MD., FRIDAY, 1/15/60, AT 10 AM

Re BA airtel to Bu dated 10/23/59 entitled "BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE."

b6
b7C SA [redacted] of the Frederick Resident Agency, advised the BA Office today that the following Branch Chiefs at Camp Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, are desirous of making a tour of the FBI Laboratory facilities at Washington, D.C., on Friday, 1/15/60, at 10 AM:

[redacted]

b6
b7C

SA [redacted] stated that the above individuals are interested in seeing [redacted] who was the Bureau's liaison officer at Camp Detrick about six years ago; also, they would like to discuss some technical questions about the identification of metals.

If the tour can be arranged, please advise promptly.

EX-124 REC-32 100-93216-927

3-Bureau
2-Baltimore (1- 80-0)(1- 66-891)
JEB:MMS
(5)

cc Fole Lt T. Baltimore 1-12-60 NHC

15 JAN 9 1960

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

SEVEN

January 12, 1960

EX-124

airtel

REC. 32 100-93216-927

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

To: SAC, Baltimore

From: Director, FBI

Subject: REQUEST FOR TOUR OF FBI LABORATORY FACILITIES BY BRANCH CHIEFS, CAMP DETRICK, FREDERICK, MARYLAND, FRIDAY, 1-15-60, AT 10 A.M.

Reurairtel 1-8-60.

Arrangements have been made for the above group to tour the Bureau facilities on the date indicated and to discuss questions about the identification of metals with a metallurgist.

This group should enter the Ninth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, entrance of the Department of Justice Building, and meet in Room 1734, the Tour Room, and make their identity known at which time a Special Agent will conduct them on the tour.

b6
b7C

It will not be possible for this group to see Special Agent [redacted] as he is not currently assigned in the Washington area.

MAILED 27
JAN 12 1960
COMM-FBI

2 - Laboratory Division
Attention: Ivan W. Conrad
B. J. White

1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

NOTE: Bufiles contain nothing identifiable with [redacted] Nothing of a derogatory nature for [redacted] No record in Bufiles of [redacted] Above referred Baltimore airtel of 10-28-59 contains no pertinent information concerning biological warfare, espionage and sabotage and indicates that [redacted] indicated a desire to tour FBI Laboratory facilities in the future if such a tour could be arranged. SA [redacted]

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Sandy

55 JAN 13 1960

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/20/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE
[redacted] 8-2004 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

On 1/11/60, it was determined [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

On 1/19/60, [redacted] jointly furnished the following information: b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b7D

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:cj
(3)

REC-48 100-93216-928

JAN 22 1960

NAT. INT. SEC.

55 FEB 8 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 2/18/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 1/15 and 16/60, [redacted] were unavailable for interview. b6 b7C b7D

On 1/17/60, [redacted] furnished the following information: b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

EXP. PROC.

[redacted]

b7D

100 93216-929

24 FEB 1960

25

2 - Bureau (RM)(AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL;plw
(3)

EX 101

55 FEB 29 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/1/60

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-09 BY 60267 uc/nls/BSA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter to the Bureau, dated 12/23/59.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on February 18, 1960. Source related that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Source stated that [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b2
b7D

[redacted] further advised that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Source stated that [redacted]

Source related that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
2 - San Francisco (1-65-4167)
(1- [redacted])

b2
b7D

PWM/slm
(4)

REC- 66 100-93216-930

131

13 MAR

55 MAR 14 1960

SF 65-4167
PWM/slm

According to [redacted] b2 b7D

[redacted] Contact with [redacted] will continue.

OPTIONAL FORM NO
5010-104-01

UNITED [redacted] NT

Memoranda[illegible]

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/10/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BOA/DFW

On 3/8/60, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] added that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] added that [redacted]

[redacted]

100-93216-931

REC 14

2 - Bureau (RM) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:cj
(3)

13 MAR 14 1960

55 MAR 21 1960

EX-117

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 21, 1960

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

SUBJECT: **WARFARE SEMINAR - PENTAGON**
INFORMATION CONCERNING (CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTER)

Recently while attending a seminar at the Pentagon, Army lecturers brought out two points which may be of some passing interest. Referral/Direct

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information.

REC- 68 100-93216-932

24 MAR 25 1960

WCS:lmm (5)
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Section tickler
1 - Mr. Sullivan

53 MAR 29 1960

CENTRAL RESEARCH

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STAT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/13/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 4/12/60, [redacted] jointly furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] added that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:jl
(3)

100-93216-934

REC-46

APR 14 1960

59 APR 20 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/25/60

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

(OO: SAN FRANCISCO)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter to the Bureau dated 3/1/60.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 4/15/60. b2 b7D

On 3/28/60 [redacted] furnished the San Francisco Office with [redacted] b2 b7D

[redacted] Source advised that to his knowledge [redacted]

Per Bureau letter dated 3/7/60 granting authority to continue contacting [redacted] informant was advised that [redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] It is noted that informant has been contacted from time to time as an established source [redacted] Contact with [redacted] will continue.

2 - Bureau (REG.)
2 - San Francisco (1-65-4167) REC-78
(1-[redacted]) b2 b7D

00-93216-935

PWM:ERG
(4)

EX 109

2 MAY 2 1960

[redacted]

53 MAY 6 1960

NAT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 5/19/60

REC- 69

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BTA/DFW

It was determined that both [redacted] both were unavailable for interview on 5/13/60 and 5/16/60.

b6
b7C
b7D

On 5/18/60, [redacted] (see above) furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

stated that, [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

EXPEDITE

100-93216-937

EX-100

REC- 69

4 MAY 23 1960

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:kre
(3)

64 MAY 31 1960

INT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE 6/16/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BOA/DKW

On 6/14/60 [redacted] both furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2- Bureau (REGISTERED AM)
1- Salt Lake City
GWL:dzw
(3)

REC-89 100-93216-938

9 JUN 21 1960

EX 104

64 JUN 27 1960

NAT. INT. SEC.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

To: Director, FBI Date: 5/30/60

From: SAC, Miami (65-2672) Bacteriological Warfare

Subject: ~~CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH PROJECT~~
~~DEPARTMENT OF ARMY~~
~~AVON AIR BASE, AVON PARK, FLORIDA~~

Bufile # _____

Due to the opening of the Tampa Office, the following changes in the above case have been made:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DRW

A. Location of File

( ) Entire file sent to Tampa herewith.
( ) File sent to Tampa, except one copy of the following serials.
(X) File retained in Miami but one copy of following serials sent to Tampa.

~~Report of~~ SA Bulet to Miami
Dated 1/30/53 at _____

~~Report of~~ SA Bulet to Miami
Dated 2/15/54 at _____

~~Report of~~ SA Miami let to Bureau
Dated 2/19/54 at _____

Report of SA Letterhead memo at Miami
Dated 12/30/54 at _____
(continue description page 2 if necessary)

B. Office of Origin

( ) Miami
(X) Tampa
( ) Other Office as shown in file

C. Status, MM Office

( ) Pending
(X) RUC

1 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Tampa (Encls. 12) (RM)
1 - Miami
LOT:cac/
1 - _____
1 - _____ EX 101
1 - _____

REC- 52 100-9226-939

20 JUN 20 1960

(3)

57 JUN 24 1960

ESP. SEC.

MM 65-2672

Miami let to Bureau dated 12/30/54

Letterhead memo dated 4/21/55 at Miami

Miami let to Bureau dated 4/21/55

Miami let to Bureau dated 6/9/55

Letterhead memo at Miami dated 11/14/57, captioned [redacted]

b6
b7C

Miami let to Bureau dated 11/14/57, captioned [redacted]

Bulet to Baltimore dated 11/21/57 captioned [redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/21/60

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE-SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-84 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

OO: San Francisco

Re San Francisco letter to Bureau, 4/25/60.

[redacted] was contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 6/15/60. [redacted] related that [redacted] b2 b7D

[redacted] According to Source, [redacted]

Source added that [redacted] According to the Source, he has b7D received no information to indicate that [redacted]

It is noted that Source was contacted [redacted] b7D [redacted] at which time Source furnished information regarding [redacted]

b2 b7D Contact with [redacted] will continue.

(2) - Bureau (Reg.)
b2 2 - San Francisco (1 - 65-4167)
b7D (1 - [redacted])

PWM/jr (#12)
(4)

REC-53 100-93216-940

9 JUN 27 1960

EX-112

52 JUL 1 1960

NAT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/18/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 ucn/s/ BJA/DRW

On 7/12/60, [redacted] jointly furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

REC-76 100-93216-941

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (REG.) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:chl
(3)

51 AUG 1 1960

27 JUL 1960

ESPIONAGE

INT. SEC.

MAIL ROOM

INT. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8/16/60

FROM : SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE
Referral/Direct

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60326 gcl/nks/BJA/10 FW

On August 5, 1960, contact was had with the following

[redacted]

(2)- Bureau (Registered Mail)
1 - Baltimore
RRL:em
(3)

100-93216-943

REC- 25

REC- 16

AUG 17 1960

(p. 2-3)

b6
b7C

NAVAL SEC.

SAC, Baltimore (66-891) 9/12/60

REC- 19 100-93216-943

Director, FBI

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE

Reference Baltimore letter to Bureau dated 8/16/60.

The FBI Laboratory has no information that would be of assistance in the problems regarding "scout" dogs.

The September, 1960, issue of the magazine "Sports Afield" carries an article by Mr. Henry P. Davis on "The Mystery of Scent." Mr. Davis refers to a book entitled "Hunting by Scent" by Mr. Hubert M. Budgett, ex-master of the Bicester and Warden Hill Hounds in England. Mr. Davis reports that most of Mr. Budgett's work was done with bloodhounds. This book may be obtained from the Library of Congress.

The Laboratory is not aware of any sources in Soviet Bloc countries where samples of petroleum fuels may be obtained.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-26-84 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

RWS:RYS (5)

MAILED 9 SEP 16 1960 COMM-FBI

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W C Sullivan
Tele Room
Ingram
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/22/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE; SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 acl/nls/BJR/DKW

On 8/12/60, by telephonic contact with [redacted] b6 b7C b7D for purposes of making an appointment for an interview advised that [redacted] would not be available until the latter part of the following week.

On 8/19/60, [redacted] referred to above, furnished the following information:

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

100-93216-944

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED)(AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:rwe
(3)

REC- 23 AUG 25 1960

50 SEP 6 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: August 25, 1960

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(OO: San Francisco)

Re San Francisco letter to the Bureau, dated 6/21/60.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 8/18/60. This source stated he had received no information to indicate that [redacted] b2 b7D

[redacted]

It is noted that since the last letter, source has been contacted regarding [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

Source was also recently contacted concerning a

[redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will be continued. b2 b7D

(2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco
b2 (1 - 65-4167)
b7D (1 - [redacted])

REC-78

100-93216-945

10 AUG 29 1960

EX-108

SEC.

52 SEP 9 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/04 BY 60242 uc/nes/BjA/cb

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/17/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/04 BY 60267uc/mls/BJAKB

On 9/16/60, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau (RM)(AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

REC- 29

100-93216-946

GWL:plw
(3)

EX 104

25 SEP 23 1960

52 SEP 27 1960

INT. SEC.

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN

"KOMMUNIST," No. 13, September, 1960

BARBARIANS

By A. BERKOV

Pages 125 - 127

Latest "Achievement" of American Science

At the end of last month, when all the world applauded the Soviet scientists who accomplished the launching and return to earth of a powerful space ship, the Pentagon also decided to demonstrate the newest achievements of American science and technology. For this purpose, a two-day trip to the proving grounds in Dagues (sic), Utah, was organized for a group of Washington scientific reviewers and specially selected representatives of the American press, reports United Press International Agency. What did the ruling circles of the USA gladden us with?

This is what is reported by one of the "specially selected," a "New York Herald" correspondent, LURIE (phon.):

"....On August 25, the Army fired 12 howitzer shells with a deadly chemical substance, to a distance of two miles over sage-covered, salt-marsh desert in the direction of "enemy" trenches made in a mountain. This was the first public demonstration of the capacity of the United States to carry on a tactical warfare with the use of nerve gas."

The "enemy" was represented by several goats and pigeons. The correspondent paints a picture of the death of experimental animals minutely and, at the same time, "poetically" (you see, this took place exactly at sundown; how touching!)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-24-95 BY 60226 UCLN 15/80/10/FW

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

100-93216-

NOT RECORDED
150 NOV 9 1960

50 NOV 15 1960

"The shells with this substance were fired at 6:15 p.m., at the very same moment when the sun began to dip behind a big mountain on the southern end of the Great Salt Lake Desert. Thick clouds of dust covered the test area and by the time the dust settled, which happened a minute after the firing of the shell, a goat and a pigeon in a machine-gun nest were dead. A minute and a half later, a goat and a pigeon in a hastily erected fortification fell to the ground in terrible convulsions and died. A few seconds later, a goat died at a command post. A pigeon which was there was already dead."

At one time, when the first space ship soared into the sky with an experimental animal, there were hysterical women in the USA who, closing their eyes to the greatest scientific achievement of the Soviet people, heart-rendingly cried about the "barbarity of the Russians." "How could they! A little dog has perished!" hysterically shouted representatives of various societies, "Friends of the Animals" and "Salvation Army." No sensible people paid any attention to them, because every one understood that Laika was a sacrifice upon the altar of science, just as necessary and justified as guinea pigs of KOCH and EHRLICH. It was sacrificed in the name of realization of an age-long dream of mankind about flight toward the stars, a solution of the great task of the conquest of space.

But in the name of what do they destroy pigeons at proving grounds in Dagues? In all countries they are regarded as a symbol of peace; they figure in PICASSO's paintings; they are an emblem of the World Peace Movement; but here they are sacrificed for testing barbaric weapons banned by the international law and resolutely condemned by progressive mankind as a whole.

Of course, this is not the matter of pigeons or experimental animals, but the matter of animal hatred which American imperialists, who create new monstrous means of mass destruction, feel toward the human beings. Seemingly afraid that some people may have doubts with regard to the real aims of tests in Dagues, or their military purpose, LURIE dots his "i's" and crosses his "t's": he reports comparative data on the effects of gas upon experimental animals and human beings. "According to the statement of scientists," he writes, "in this absolutely secret

military center for testing chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, goats have more resistance to the deadly chemical substance than man. However, the goats unprotected by gas masks, also died and very fast, too." As for pigeons, they "react to the nerve gas exactly like people; in other words, they die, and die quickly."

They React to Gas, Just as People Do; in Other Words, They Die

With what Olympian calm, with what cold cynicism have these words been written! As though it is a matter of new insecticides and the firm is advertising a "patent device"!

....The preparation for chemical and bacteriological warfare has been intensified in the USA with every year. A special organization for work in this field was created as far back as 1941, according to a book "Peace or Pestilence" by Professor ROSEBERRY (phon.) of Columbia University. At first it was modestly titled "Military Research Service," but since 1944 it cast off the mask and became the "United States Committee on Biological Warfare." To the same period also dates the construction of a center for the production of means for bacteriological warfare at Camp Detrick (phon.), with branches in the States of Utah, Indiana, and Mississippi.

Despite the atmosphere of the fullest secrecy, information regarding its activities seeped into the press from time to time. An American newspaper published the data from a report of a "Special Government Bureau" which stated, in particular: "The research work carried on by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other organs includes.... the spreading of poisonous radioactive substances through the air, as well as secret techniques for application of bacteriological means against people, animals, and plants." And in 1949, FORRESTAL officially admitted that this work is carried on in the USA "on such a scale, so that it will be possible to utilize bacteriological weapons in the future."

US ruling circles, who insistently advertise their humanitarianism and incessantly invoke God in confirmation of their Christian virtues, did not recoil before testing bacteriological weapons on human beings. Monstrous as it may be, it is a fact: in 1949 the testing of the action of bacteria of the plague was conducted upon Eskimos in Canada, and in 1951, upon captured Chinese volunteers in Wonsan. Similar barbaric experiments were also conducted with chemical weapons. "Improved types of psychic chemicals (sic) have been created in the USA and the Army Chemical Corps in the United States, the leaders of which advocate their use during the war or in situations involving national security, have sucessfully tested them upon people," wrote recently N. COUSINS, editor of an American magazine, the "Saturday Review."

The pace, at which the work of improving the available means of mass destruction and creation of the new ones is being pushed ahead, can be judged from the growth of appropriations for the US Army Chemical Corps:

1951 - 25.8 billion dollars

1952 - 31.6 " "

1960 - 103.4 " "

1961 - 133.4 " " (estimate)

Although formerly, as a rule, the reports about production of the means of chemical and bacteriological warfare in the USA were taboo, lately representatives of American militarists have been continually bursting out in hymns of praise to this type of weapons of mass destruction on the pages of the press, advertising their "incomparable advantages." What are they, these advantages, from the Pentagon's point of view?

As a result of an active struggle of the socialist countries and all the peace-loving forces, the suspension of tests of the thermonuclear weapons has been practically achieved; world public opinion persistently demands a complete ban on these weapons and destruction of their entire stocks. As to the chemical and bacteriological weapons, American imperialism , apparently, believes itself free to use them.

A custom prohibiting the use of poison in warfare has been known since deep antiquity. It has been formally confirmed in the 20th century, by the 23rd Article of the Supplement to the 4th Hague Convention of 1907, while the Geneva Protocol of 1925 speaks with ultimate clarity of the ban on use of asphyxiating or poisonous(gases?) or any other similar toxic or bacteriological devices in warfare. However, up to now, the US has been evading the ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Is this accidental? Exactly a year ago, U. S. Congressman KASTENMEIER introduced a resolution demanding that the United States confirm the obligation in case of war, not to be the first in using bacteriological/chemical weapons. However, the Department of State and Pentagon opposed this resolution and it has not been yet examined by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.

In distinction from the atomic production, creation of bacteriological means is not connected with a large specialized enterprise; they can be produced in small laboratories, while the development of the methods of bacteriological warfare is carried out under the guise of conventional medical bacteriological research. Representatives of the US military clique rub their hands with satisfaction and brazenly declare that control by international organs is practically impossible in this field. Can there be any greater self-exposure by the enemies of disarmament and control over it?

Still, this is not all. In June of last year, representatives of the Pentagon stated in a congressional committee that chemical and bacteriological devices are cheaper and more effective means against human life than the nuclear weapons. Citing the example of a chemical substance designated by a code name "GB," they noted particular effectiveness of its use against civilian population and stressed its "particular merits": industrial installations remain intact; occupation troops and authorities are relievedof the problem of radiation.

But this is a complete physchology of a highway bandit who wants to get possession of someone's property "without extra trouble"! These are aggressive, predatory aims, expressed with ultimate cynicism and frankness!

In the Footsteps of Hitlerites

What is this mysterious "GB" device causing such enthusiasm in American militarists? This is the very same nerve gas, the effect of which was demonstrated at the proving grounds in Dagues. The above mentioned LURIE from the "New York Herald Tribune," who was present at this demonstration, likewise cites data on the effectiveness of its application against the population: "A drop of the size of a pinhead getting upon man's skin is sufficient in order to put him out of action. A somewhat larger drop kills a man in a few minutes." And then he mentions, as though in passing: this is a "deadly substance created in Nazi Germany during World War II and never used in combat."

Here it is, the succession of aggressors: a barbaric device which was produced by the Hitlerites, but which even they, who shocked mankind by unheard-of atrocities at Oswiecim, Maidanek, and other death camps, did not dare to use in combat; this device is taken on as a weapon by American imperialism.

We know that the most aggressive, extremist, fascist forces counted upon chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Nazis conducted bacteriological experiments on prisoners of war, preparing to use this weapon against the USSR. Italian fascists stated on the pages of the "Journal of Military Medicine": "....the task of bacteriological laboratories in wartime is the search for the means of attack, i. e. production of infectious material." Japanese militarists were actively preparing for bacteriological warfare stocking up on bacteria of the plague, cholera, typhus, and anthrax.

Thus, American imperialism is not the first to enter this path; it has predecessors. But there is a difference too. Hitlerites who, it would seem, reached the limit of social demagoguery, still did not go as far as advertising bacteriological or chemical means of warfare as the most humane. The Pentagon does this.

Colonel PRENTISS, director of the course on chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, states: "I am a devotee of biological and chemical weapons. I believe this to be a great cause. Such weapons are more humane than anything invented by us." The Army Chemical Corps, report American newspapers, conducts a weekly demonstration for the higher military representatives and representatives of the Government, and now it has carried

out a demonstration for correspondents, "attempting to justify its proposition to the effect that chemical and bacteriological weapons, essentially, are more humane than the nuclear and conventional weapons."

For many years already, imperialist propaganda of all shades - from frankly militaristic to honeyed religious - has been using the utmost effort to overcome resistance of the peoples to the armament race in one of the types of weapons of mass destruction - the nuclear weapons (the latest "news" is a work of certain "Professor" SCHLINCK (phon.), "Atomic Problem From the Point of View of Christian Religion," where it is asserted that it makes no difference whether mankind will cease its existence as a result of a nuclear war now or as a result of the general "thermal death" of our planet in the future). Now the working-over of public opinion is activized with regard to other types of weapons of mass destruction--chemical and bacteriological.

There is little probability, however, that this sort of propaganda will be successful. It only exposes the aggressive essence of imperialism, which strives to subordinate the achievements of modern science to the needs of war and destruction of the people.

The preparation of the USA for chemical and bacteriological warfare indicates the extent of barbarity reached by American militarists. Their man-hating plans and criminal activities arouse angry protest from the entire peace-loving mankind. The peoples of all countries become still more convinced of enormous significance for the destiny of the world of the Soviet program of a universal and complete disarmament. One of the most important demands of this program introduced by N. S. KHRUSHCHEV in 1959, at the session of the General Assembly of the UN, was the "ban on production, possession and storing of the means of chemical and bacteriological warfare and destruction of the stocks of these types of weapons." A disarmament and banning of all types of weapons of mass destruction - this is the crucial question of the struggle for the preservation and consolidation of peace.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/17/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On 10/14/60, [redacted] furnished the following information: b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

REC-62 100-93216

2 - Bureau (RM) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:sab
(3)

57 OCT 28 1960

18 OCT 19 1960

EXP. PROC.

INV. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATE[illegible]

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. A. Branigan

DATE: 11/1/60

FROM : Mr. L. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-2004 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
CHEMICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Bureau is in receipt of schedule for Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Weapons Orientation Course at the Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. The course lasts three and a half days. Classes are scheduled in November and December, 1960, and beginning March 6, 1961, at weekly intervals through June 23, 1961.

Bureau has kept up-to-date in these fields through attendance by representatives of the FBI Laboratory and the Domestic Intelligence Division at orientation courses in biological warfare at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, and in chemical warfare at Army Chemical Center, Maryland.

On November 1, 1960, Special Agent [redacted] of Liaison, in the absence of [redacted] Training Branch, Plans and Training Division, Office of the Director for Military Operations, Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, Department of the Army, spoke to [redacted] was the officer who had prepared the letter of invitation. [redacted] was told that we appreciated the invitation but that the interested personnel could not attend the Dugway course. [redacted] stated that his office would be sure to include the FBI in any future invitations.

b6
b7C

ACTION:

None. For your information.

LW:wmt
(6)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Tamm
b6 1 - Mr. Branigan
b7C 1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
b6
b7C

REC-23 100-93216-949

NOV 3 1960

X-139

67 NOV 9 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/31/60

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-30-84 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DPW

OO:SAN FRANCISCO

Re San Francisco letter dated 8/25/60.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on October 27, 1960. Source related that [redacted] According to source, [redacted]

Source advised that [redacted] Source understood that [redacted] According to source, [redacted] Source stated that [redacted]

Further, source mentioned that [redacted] Source stated that [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

2 - Bureau (REG)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 65-4167) (1 - [redacted])

PWM:cmc
(4)
#12

DOI XEROX REC-33 100-93216-950

18 NOV 3 1960

NATL INT. SEC.

62 NOV 10 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 31, 1960

b6
b7C FROM :

SECRET

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60067 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The National Security Council (NSC) Planning Board discussed on October 27, 1960, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security's recommendation that additional research and development be undertaken in the captioned matter. IIC was not asked to express a position concerning this, either during preparation of the ICIS recommendation or during the Planning Board consideration.

The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), which ICIS had recommended be assigned the task of funding the additional work, stated that OCDM felt that Defense should pay for any additional work in the field and that the amount of extra money (eight million dollars) recommended by ICIS represented a disproportionate share of OCDM's budget. Defense stated it is spending more than a half million this year and three-quarters of a million next year on research looking toward detection of BW, but that its conclusions might not be applicable to civilian needs.

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) through its Public Health Service is conducting research concerning the prompt identification of various contagious diseases, but these are the more prevalent diseases and are not necessarily the ones which would be used in BW. HEW states that the Appropriations Committee has indicated that any funds to be used for Civil Defense purposes must be included in OCDM's budget and HEW cannot, therefore, secure additional funds for its research.

The representative of [redacted] stated between fifteen and seventeen million dollars are being spent annually in BW research although much of this is involved in the military positive use of BW rather than in defense against it. He questioned whether additional research was needed at this time.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

11/22/04 CLASSIFIED BY uc/nls/BJA/DFW 60267 Derivative DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 11/22/2029 Mgo. 1-3004 11/22/04 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

REC- 33 100-93216-951

15 NOV 1960

GAD:hke (7)
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Tamm
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Liaison
1-Mr. [redacted]

b1
b3 50 USC SECTION 403
b6
b7C

52 NOV 9 1960

SECRET

EX 101

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. Belmont
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

[redacted] recognizing the divergent views above summarized, stated that [redacted] working with Defense, OCDM, and HEW, for an analysis of the work presently in progress and an estimate of what research might be conducted if additional funds were available.

b6
b7C

ACTION:

For information.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 20, 1960

FROM : [redacted]

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

The National Security Council (NSC), by the attached material, is being asked by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) to decide whether additional research and development are needed concerning our protection against BW and which agency shall be responsible for this.

On May 20, 1960, ICIS asked the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) to request the necessary funds to increase research leading to development of procedures for rapid detection and identification of BW material. OCDM, replying on July 7, 1960, said, (1) the Army Chemical Corps by contract with the Douglas Aircraft Corporation is expending $660,000 in fiscal 1960 and much more in fiscal 1961 for development of a detection and warning system; and (2) the U. S. Public Health Service is spending $464,000 on studies looking toward rapid identification of disease organisms. OCDM pointed out that the funds being expended in these two avenues of research equal or exceed total for all other Civil Defense research in fiscal 1961 (aside from the Shelter Program) and, therefore, declined to comply with the ICIS request.

ICIS has turned the problem over to NSC, pointing out, with reference to the two avenues noted above, (1) Defense has advised that the Douglas research is still "inconclusive" and even if successful, may not be suitable for nonmilitary use; further additional research and development are needed; and (2) the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has advised that it is concentrating on diseases of public health interest and its research will contribute little toward the rapid identification of most BW organisms.

ICIS has recommended to NSC that research and development be expanded, that added funds be sought by OCDM to do this and that the detection and identification procedures, when developed, be coordinated by OCDM. ICIS estimates that about eight million dollars additional will be necessary during fiscal 1962 through 1964.

Enclosure
CAD:hke (8)

100-93216-952

EX-102

57 DEC 1 1960

1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Tamm
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Mooney
1-Liaison
1-Mr. [redacted]

NOV 3 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-28-04 BY 60362 uc/nls/BJA/dpw

62-93938-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b6
b7C

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. Belmont
RE: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

OBSERVATION:

NSC Continental Defense Policy calls for the protection of highly critical industrial and governmental facilities against clandestine attack by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as conventional sabotage. ICIS and IIC are jointly charged with the responsibility for the Internal Security section of the Continental Defense Policy, which includes the above. ICIS, however, has handled the BW problem, and IIC was not consulted regarding the ICIS request of OCDM.

Neither FBI nor IIC should become involved in discussion over which agency should spend more money on BW defenses, nor do we know which research program offers the greater possibilities of success. All we can state, if asked, is that from information furnished by the military, the Soviets have the capability to prepare and introduce biological agents into this country which could cause widespread disabling illnesses. The decision as to what preventive or defensive measures should be taken and the resolution of the attendant budgetary problems must be made by NSC based on advice from agencies with specialized knowledge in the BW field.

ACTION:

If you approve, we will discuss this matter with the IIC Working Committee members and will take the position outlined above.

OK

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Callahan
Mr. DeLeach
Mr. Malone
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/04 BY 60267uc/bs/BJA/CB

RECEIVED
OCT 18 1960

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/15/60

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 11/10/60, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
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b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:chl
(3)

REC-40 100-93216-953

109

25 NOV 17 1960

63 NOV 25 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: December 8, 1960

b6
b7C FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

[redacted]

On December 6, 1960, the National Security Council Planning Board (PB) considered biological warfare (BW) detection and identification.

The discussion centered about problems of identification of the BW agents and the necessity for additional research and development in detection and identification.

It was decided that Health, Education, and Welfare; Department of Defense; and Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization would continue research into the detection and identification problem. The National Security Council will not consider the problem.

ACTION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-2004 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

BAW:hke
(9)
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Tamm
1-Mr. Whitson
b6 1-Mr. [redacted]
b7C 1-Mr.
1-Mr.
1-Liaison

100-93216-954

REC- 88

DEC 13 1960

001 XE

5-BW

57 DEC 16 1960

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/13/60

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On 12/7/60, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

P
2 - Bureau (AM) (REGISTERED)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:kre
51 DEC 21 1960

REC-74 100-93216-955

DEC 19 1960

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/20/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60226 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

On 1/17/61, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:bb
(3)

REC-76 100-93216-956

5 JAN 24 1961

57 JAN 30 1961

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: January 30, 1961

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: SAN FRANCISCO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60226 tuc/nls/BTA/DFW

Re San Francisco letter dated October 31, 1960.

[redacted] was last contacted on January 17, 1961, by representatives of the San Francisco Office. Source related [redacted] Source stated that [redacted] he would immediately contact the San Francisco Office of the FBI.

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Further, [redacted] stated that he had no information regarding [redacted] Source furnished information regarding [redacted] advised he had received no information to indicate that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

b2
b7D

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

- P -

REC- 61 100-93216-957

EX-113

2 JAN 31 1961

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 65-4167
1 - [redacted]

b2
b7D

PWM:lg
(4)

NAT. [illegible] SEC.

57 FEB 7 1961

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 2/15/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

[redacted] CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-29-84 BY 60267 uc/nks/BJA/DFW

On 2/14/61, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

P
2 - Bureau (AM)(RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:sab
(3)

50 MAR 1 1961

EBI
REC
EX-113
100-93216
25 FEB 24 1961
REC'D

2/6/61

Airtel

REC-98 100-93216-959

EX-113

To: SAC, Minneapolis

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

From: Director, FBI

b6
b7C

RESEARCH (CORRESPONDENCE AND TOURS)

Enclosed are two copies of captioned individual's letter of 1/26/61 to the Attorney General. Bufiles contain no information identifiable with her.

You are instructed to discuss this matter with appropriate personnel of your office. If it is determined there is merit to allegations, furnish explanations. If claim appears to be without foundation, you are to interview her, orally acknowledge that her letter was referred from the Attorney General, and explain that this story is completely without foundation. You should also request her to identify her source and, if not precluded by information in your files, this individual should be interviewed concerning his knowledge of this matter. He should also be informed that these allegations are completely without merit. Furnish results under above caption by 2/16/61.

b6
b7C

Enclosures (2)

MAILED 5
FEB 6 - 1961
COMM-FBI

Follow-up made for 2/16/61

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
Evans
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

CJH:njs (6)

62 MAR 8 1961

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

3/2/61

PLAIN TEXT

AIRTEL REGIS. MAIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-7-2004 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-67994)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (105-3109)

b6
b7C SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

CO: NEW YORK

Biological Warfare

Re New York airtel to Director, 2/24/61.

On March 2, 1961, [redacted] advised SA [redacted] that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D [redacted]

RUC

5 - Bureau REGIS. MAIL
(2 - 100-93216)
2 - New York (105-29410) REGIS. MAIL
3 - Baltimore (105-3109
b2
b7D [redacted] 66-891)

100-93216
NOT RECORDED
168 MAR 6 1961

REL:ers
(10)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-3109-25

50 MAR 9 1961

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/20/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 3/16/61, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

EXP. PROC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-20-84 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJP/DFW

2 - Bureau (RM)(AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:jl
(3)

REC. 68

100-93216-960

5 MAR 21 1961

63 APR 6 1961

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/31/61

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: San Francisco

Re San Francisco letter, 1/30/61.

[redacted] was last contacted by representatives of the San Francisco Office on 3/24/61. The source related that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] The source stated that [redacted] Source indicated [redacted] Source stated that [redacted] source, has received no information to indicate [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue. b2 b7D

EXP. PROS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-20-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/BJR/DRW

REC-92 100-93216-961

EX-108

16 APR 8 1961

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 65-4167)
(1 - [redacted])

b2
b7D

PWM/dml #12
(4)

66 APR 11 1961

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STA

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-9316) DATE: 4/18/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE; SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-20-94 BY 60260 ucl/nls/BJA/BFW
II 977600

On 4/13/61, [redacted] furnished b6 b7C b7D the following information:

[redacted]

b7D

2 - Bureau (RM) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

57 MAY 3 1961

GWL:bb
(3)

REC-64 100-73216-962

12 APR 20 1961

INT. SEC.

EX-PROC



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

#977600
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/94 BY 60267 uc/MLS/BJA/CB

April, 1961

Dear Neighbor:

Some people think Civil Defense is a necessary and integral part of America's defense; others think it is rushing to Armageddon with a Band-Aid. What is its true wobth? How realistic, sane and moral is Civil Defense in the light of present war preparations?

Civil Defense is based on the assumption that what is called "CBR" warfare or a nuclear war would not be total and that its resulting general conflagration, pestilence, famine, and chaos could be checked. We think not.

In case of war, we should expect nothing less than several medium-sized hydrogen bombs to be aimed at New York, with at least one directe at Idlewild Airport. Even if the warhead were to be off target as much as 1½ miles, all of what was the Five Towns would fall somewhere in the eighty square mile obliteration. Moreover, each explosion would set off firestorms, consuming all of the oxygen and thereby suffocating and roasting all living beings within a thousand mile area, including any unfortunate ones in basement-shelters. We must recognize this if we accept Civil Defense as part of our national policy.

But these effects of nuclear bombs aren't all we have to expect from a major war. Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons are also likely to be used. As Norman Cousans points out, present CBR weapons are not to be confused with what was used in the First World War anymore than the H-bomb is to be confused with the mortar shell.

Chemical warfare agents act like a super-insecticide against human beings, killing on contact. The U.S. News and World Report describes it as a "liquid poison that can be converted into odorless, invisible fog, hard to detect and almost impossible to defend against." Like pollen, it can pass from tree to tree, killing millions of people on a breezy spring day. In June, 1959, testimony in Congress brought out that shelters, no matter how deep, offer no protection against nerve gas. Major General William H. Creasy, former Chief Chemical Officer of the United States Army, said:

REC-25 100-93216-963
EX 104

> If we go around gearing up civil defense with underground shelters, to protect against the atomic bomb, and, instead of having the atomic bomb, when the guided missile comes over, it has a chemical or biological warhead, instead of saving people, you are guaranteeing sure death or sure sickness or whatever effect the particular warhead is designed to produce.

58 MAY 8 1961

15 MAY 2 1961

Biological warfare is the deliberate use of manufactured micro-organisms against human life; it has been called "public health in reverse." Anthrax, dysentary, cholera, diphtheria, plague, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, Q fever, encephalitis, smallpox, yellow fever, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, and hepatitis are among the diseases that can be delivered from planes, drones, balloons, generators on the ground, shells, rockets, missiles, ships, and floating mines. As for defense against these, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare said, "To withstand a biological warfare attack, it is essential to know quickly when, where, and what agent was used. These will be difficult questions to answer in time to initiate countermeasures." The

RESPONDENCE

Subcommittee on Disrmament pointed out that "identification of th agents used) could often be too late to permit effective counter-measures.

There are many people who having realized the horrors of another major war have convinced themselves that government will not let it occur. Contrary to public opinion, these tools of death will be used if one nation finds sufficient reason. "Any military decision to use CBR warfare would almost certainly be made . . . in the light of other important factors such as political, economic, health and perhaps even moral considerations," (our emphasis). That statement is from the Sub-committee on Disarmament's hearings, August, 1960. Today, there are 14,0 people in the U.S. engaged in chemical and biological war preparations and production; at one plant near Denver, where the gas was manu-factured until recently, there have been more than 800 industrial casualties, some of them fatal. In addition, 450 private firms are tied up in chemical and biological warfare research. Moreover, there is an army of infected insects "stationed" at Fort Detrick, ready for war.

"What you people don't understand," said General Heubner, head of New York State Civil Defense, "is that the shelter becomes your home, after the blast. When you think it's terrible to be underground you forget there won't be anything above." In the women's section of the New York Times, it was reported that the industrial design firm of Lippincott and Margulies suggests "for the survival shelter . . . a family might have a library of tapes to be played on a battery drive machine. These tapes might play the ordinary sounds of a house-- the refrigerator going on and off, or traffic outside. Or the sound of the wind in the trees . . ." Let's be realistic. Civil Defense in the Five Towns simply will not work. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO PEACE. Pastel-colored bomb shelters will not extinguish the permanent infec-tions of war.

We ask you to sacrifice one-tenth as much for peace as you would for war. We ask you to work for peace, write letters for peace, study and inform yourself for peace, devote part of your life to peace, and live and think in peace. The world will have peace when enough men and women all over the world clearly acclaim that they will accept nothing but peace.

In 1946, Albert Einstein said that "The atomic bomb has altered profoundly the nature of the world. There is no defense in science against the weapon that can destroy divilization. Our defense is not in armaments, nor in science, nor in going underground. Our defense is in law and order."

Quite Sincerely,

both NI Buffalo dcl

b6
b7C

P.S. This letter was written by [redacted] for the residents of the Five Towns. [redacted] We will be glad to document any allusion or statement we have made, and we will answer any questions. Comments are welcome (but please don't sign them "anonymous").

[redacted] b6 b7C

SAC, Baltimore (66-891) May 18, 1961

Director, FBI (100-93216)

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

By letter dated 4-18-61 the Salt Lake City Office advised that the Chemical Corps no longer intends to use the word "warfare" in its vocabulary. They added that the Chemical Corps operations at Fort Dietrich, Maryland, will, in the future, be known as U. S. Army Biological Laboratories.

You should ascertain from appropriate officials at Fort Dietrich whether U. S. Army Biological Laboratories is the name which will be used throughout the United States for the experiments which heretofore came under the title of "Biological Warfare." In the event it is appropriate change the title in your office and advise Bureau.

JFF:blw
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY 60267 uc/NKS/BJA/CCB
#97600

EX-114

REC-75 100-93216-964

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Room

MAILED 18
MAY 17 1961
COMM-FBI

57 MAY 22 1961

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 5/22/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60247 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

By telephonic contact with [redacted] on 5/15/61, for the purpose of making an appointment for interview with [redacted] it was determined they would not be available until the last of that week. b6 b7C b7D

On 5/19/61, [redacted] (referred to above) furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

100-93216-96

2 - Bureau (RM)(AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

REC-41

EX-112

GWL:sbw
(3)

55 MAY 31 1961

8 MAY 24 1961

INTERNAL SECURITY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/23/61

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NKS/ca/08

Re Bulet to Baltimore, 5/18/61.

On 5/19/61, [redacted] b6 b7C
[redacted] Fort Detrick, Maryland, advised that by General Orders Number 12, dated 4/19/60, issued by the Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, Washington, D. C., the designation, "U. S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories" was to be changed to "U. S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories," effective 7/1/60. Similarly, the same General Order changed the designation "U. S. Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories" to "U. S. Army Chemical Research and Development Laboratories," effective the same date.

The title of the case in the Baltimore Office which is captioned as above will be changed to read as follows:

U. S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

EXP. PROC.

REGISTERED MAIL

2 Bureau
1 - Baltimore

RRL:jdb
(3)

REC-7

EX.-119

100-93216-966

16 MAY 25 1961

INT. SEC.

56 JUN 8 1961

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/26/61

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(OO: SF)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/mls/BJA/CB

Re San Francisco letter dated 3/31/61.

Last contact by a representative of the San Francisco Office with [redacted] was on 5/23/61. Source related that [redacted] According to source, [redacted] Source stated that if he received any information of value to the Bureau [redacted] he would immediately contact the Bureau.

b2 b6 b7C b7D

Source advised that [redacted]

b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] Source stated that [redacted]

Source was contacted regarding [redacted]

b6 b7C b7D

Further, source has been contacted [redacted] According to source, [redacted] and that he, source, has received no information to indicate [redacted]

b7D

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2 b7D

61 AUG 9 1961

REC- 95 100-93216-967

17 MAY 29 1961

(2) Bureau (REG)
2 San Francisco
(1 - 65-4167)
(1 - [redacted])

PWM:LMR #12 b2 b7D

(4)

b6 b7C

INT SEC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 6/8/61

FROM : SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
U. S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS
BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

Referral/Direct

During a liaison contact with personnel at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, [redacted] Ft. Detrick, discussed the following matter with SA [redacted] with a view toward enlisting the Bureau's help in arranging for a meeting between [redacted] with the Commissioner of Narcotics, Mr. Harry J. ANSLINGER, 1300 E St., NW, Washington, D. C.

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

[redacted]

they have made this request for the Bureau's help in arranging the interview.

Referral/Direct

REC-23 100-93216-968

Ft. Detrick authorities do not maintain liaison with the

EX-130

17 JUN 16 1961

EX-PROC JUN 9 1961

(2)-Bureau
1-Baltimore
RRL:MMS
(3)

Letter to SAC, Baltimore 6/13/61 PDT/lhm

5

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/29/01 BY SP2 AUC/plm/bja/las

Treasury Department, and they feel that past experience with the Bureau enables them to place their trust and confidence in Bureau personnel in a matter of such delicacy.

[redacted]

Bureau is requested to advise Baltimore if such a meeting can be arranged through the Bureau's liaison contact with Mr. ANSLINGER.

1-Mr. W. C. Sullivan 1-Liaison
1-Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C
1-Mr.

SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891) June 13, 1961

REC-23
DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) - 968

BB

U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS
BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/09 BY 60267uc/lws/bja/kb

Reurlet June 8, 1961.

Although we have excellent liaison contacts in the Bureau of Narcotics, the Bureau is taking no action with regard to your request to contact Commissioner of Narcotics, Mr. Harry J. Anslinger. It is felt that [redacted] at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, are circumventing normal Army channels in requesting the Bureau to contact Mr. Anslinger, and any action by the Bureau in this regard could very well be critically viewed by Army authorities. It is consequently felt that the Bureau should not be brought into this matter as an intermediary. Referral/Direct

You may advise appropriate Army authorities at Ft. Detrick that the Bureau, of course, has excellent liaison relations with the Bureau of Narcotics; however, in the interest of protocol, it is felt that Army authorities at Ft. Detrick may consider directly contacting Mr. Anslinger, whose telephone number is [redacted] in order to make further arrangements for discussion of this matter with him. b6 b7C

PDP:hke (7)

NOTE ON YELLOW: Incoming states that [redacted] Referral/Direct

MAILED 22
JUN 13 1961
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

50 JUN 21 1961

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/26/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/04 BY 60267 uc/lcs/bjk/cb

[redacted] who is normally contacted in this matter on 6/14/61, [redacted] On 6/21/61, [redacted] advised as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

EX-PROC

REC 16 100-93216-969

(2) - Bureau (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:plw
(3)

14 JUN 30 1961

EX-113

62 JUL 10 1961

56 JUL 5 1961

INT. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 6/23/61

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS.
BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY
ESPIONAGE -SABOTAGE
O BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Referral/Direct

b6
b7C [redacted] furnished the following information to SA [redacted] during liaison contact on May 21, 1961:

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (Registered Mail)
1 - Baltimore
RRL:mcs
(3)

REC-44 100-93216-970
25 JUN 26 1961
EX-105

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/04 BY 60267 uc/lcs/sbj/cb

let to Balt. 7-6-61 L.w.m.h.d

INT. SEC.

LABORATORY

BA 66-891

Referral/Direct

[redacted] have expressed a desire to tour the Bureau Laboratory facilities at Washington, D.C., and as soon as the names of the interested persons can be determined, a letter will be directed to the Bureau to arrange such a tour at which time, [redacted]

1 - Sullivan
1 - Conrad
1 - Whitson

SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

7-6-61

EX-105 REC-44

Director, FBI (100-93216) - 970

U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS
BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Referral/Direct

Reurlet 6-23-61 concerning [redacted]

You should furnish promptly the name of this [redacted]

Referral/Direct

NOTE: Special Operations Division, Ft. Detrick, Maryland, has advised agent of Baltimore Office that [redacted] since, unless problem can be solved, possibility exists many SAC aircraft might be grounded for extensive repairs, thereby lessening U.S. defense capabilities.

MAILED 31
JUL 5 1961
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

LW:mhd (6)

66 JUL 12 1961

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60324UCFNLS/BJA/CB

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 7/18/61

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS
BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Referral/Direct

Re BAlet to BU, 6/23/61, and BUlet to Baltimore, 7/6/61.

b6
b7C
furnished the following information to SA
on July 13, 1961:

[redacted]

EXP. DOC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/97 BY [illegible]

(2) - Bureau
1 - Baltimore

REGIS. MAIL

EX-109

REC-14 100-93216-973

7-25

16 JUL 20 1961

b6
b7C

RRL:ers
(3)

58 JUL 28 1961

INTERIOR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/28/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (66-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/mls/bja/cb

On 7/14/61, it was determined that there would be no one available for interview on this matter until 7/17/61.

On 7/17/61, [redacted] advised as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

EX-105 REC- 14 100-93216-973

961

(2) - Bureau (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:bb
(3)

66 AUG 7 1961

EX. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/31/61

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(00: SF)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/B;A/CB

ReSFlet dated 5/26/61.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 7/28/61. Source related that [redacted]

Source advised that [redacted] According to source, [redacted]

Source further stated that [redacted]

Source advised that he had received no information to indicate [redacted] Source mentioned that [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

EX. - 137 REC- 68/100-93216-974

(2) - Bureau (REG)
2 - San Francisco (1 [redacted])
PWM:csi
(4)

56 AUG 8 1961

EX-102

30

INT. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/21/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7D

On 8/17/61 [redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-2010 BY 60322 uc/sks/sbj/klm

2 - Bureau (AM)(REGISTERED)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL: sbw
(3)

EX-112

REC-86 166-975

15 AUG 23 1961

64 AUG 31 1961

EX-PROC

OPTIONAL FORM NO 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **9/18/61**

FROM : **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE


b6
b7C



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY sp2auw uc/jws/bj

On 9/15/61, [redacted] related as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D



b7D

2 - Bureau (AM[redacted]LEFT DIA
1 - Salt Lake Ci[redacted]EC.D

GWL;pwo
(3)

REC-12 100-93216-976

SEP 25 5 21 SAC, 1961

b6
b7C

65-1122

56 OCT 2 1961
F146

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/27/61

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: SAN FRANCISCO

Re San Francisco letter dated 7/31/61.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on September 18, 1961. Source related that [redacted] Source related that [redacted]

[redacted] was alert to any information that [redacted]

Source advised that he had received no information to indicate [redacted] but that he was constantly alert for any information that was within the jurisdiction of the FBI.

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/als/sjs/cb

(2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 65-4167)
(1 - [redacted])

PWM (#11):lms
(4)

EX 100

REC- 55

100-93216-977

8 SEP 29 1961

64 OCT 5 1961

INT. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/13/61

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pws/sb/ja/cb

On 10/10/61, [redacted] related as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:nba
(3)

100-93216-16 ENCLOSURE

REC- 70

OCT 24 1961

EX 104

b6
b7C

64 OCT 27 1961

1 - Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C

SAC, Baltimore (66-891) October 26, 1961

Director, FBI (100-93216)

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reference the last communication from Baltimore dated 7-18-61 in this matter under the caption "U. S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratory, Espionage - Sabotage."

Although you have been carrying this case under the caption "U. S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratory, Espionage - Sabotage" in accordance with Bureau instructions, you should discontinue the use of this caption and carry it as reflected in the title and character of this letter in the future.

JFF:eab
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/04 BY 60324 uc/LMS/BJA/CB

REC-52 100-93216-974

19 OCT 26 1961

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

62 OCT 30 1961

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/22/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C
b7D

Weather conditions (deep snows) and the unavailability of [redacted] who was contacted in this matter, have prevented an earlier contact than 11/20/61 on this matter for the month of November, 1961.

On 11/20/61, [redacted] related as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/94 BY 60322 uc/lms/bjs/cb

2 - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:ps
(3)

REC- 95 EX-115 100-93216-980

NOV 27 1961

51 DEC 1 1961

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/30/61

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(OO: San Francisco)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 UC/NCS/BJA/KB

Re San Francisco letter 9/27/61.

b2
b7D

was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on November 29, 1961.

Source was contacted regarding

b6
b7C
b7D

Source related that

b6
b7C
b7D

According to source, he has received no information to indicate

Source mentioned that

b7D

Contact with will continue.

b2
b7D

EXP. PROC.

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
2 - San Francisco
(1 - 65-4167
1 -
PWM:lg
(4)

b2
b7D

REC-72 100-93216-981

EX-105

15 DEC 4 1961

62 DEC 8 1961

b6
b7C

INT SEC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/19/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY [illegible]

On 12/18/61, [redacted] advised as follows:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:nba
(3)

REC- 127 100-93216-982

22 DEC 21 1961

DOT XG

64 JAN 5 1962

EXP. PROC.

INT. SEC. ESP.

4-641 (Rev. 7-14-60)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : b6 b7C

FROM : [redacted]

DATE: 1-24-62

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pks/BJA/DB

The attached Biographic Intelligence Report has been received in the Records Branch, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Branch, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure."

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

ENCLO. BEHIND FILE

REC-34 100-93216-983

NOT RECORDED

EX-101 10 JAN 24 1962

63 JAN 30 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/19/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/04 BY 60267 uc/plj/sls/bja/cb

On 1/18/62, [redacted] advised as follows:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

REC- 31 116-984

2 - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:ps
(3)

29 JAN 23 1962

b6
b7C

EX 100

8 FEB 1 1962

4-641 (Rev. 7-14-60)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C TO :

DATE: 2-1-62

FROM :

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/19/04 BY 60322uc/jas/sbj/a/cb

The attached Biographic Intelligence Report has been received in the Records Branch, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Branch, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure."

RECORD FILE

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

5 0 FEB 7 1962

100-93216-985

NOT RECORDED

5 FEB 1 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/31/62

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(OO: San Francisco)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pcs/bja/cab

Re San Francisco letter dated 11/30/61.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on January 26, 1962. Source related [redacted]

b2
b7D

Source was contacted concerning [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

According to source, he has received no information [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b7D

EXP. PROC.

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED)
2 - San Francisco
(1 - 65-4167
1 - [redacted]
PWM:lg
(4)

b2
b7D

REC-46 100-93216-986

EX 101

12 FEB 5 1962

LABORATORY

INT. SEC.

b6
b7C

57 FEB 13 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 2/16/62

FROM SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/laws/b,j/a/cb

On 2/14/62 [redacted] advised as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C

b7D

[redacted]

100-93216-98

2 - Bureau (AM) (RM) REC-3
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:FR
(3)

EX-107

FEB 19

b6
b7C

FILED
FEB 26 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/31/62

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/04 BY 60267 uc pks/bj/cb

Re San Francisco letter dated 1/31/62.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 3/27/62. Source related that he received no information [redacted] According to source, [redacted]

b2
b7D

Further, [redacted] was contacted regarding [redacted]

b2
b7D

Source mentioned that [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b7D

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
2 - San Francisco (1 - 65-4167
1 - [redacted]

b2
b7D

PWM:rap/lg
(4)

REC-32 100-93216-988

EX-RHOC

3/31

11 APR 9

b6
b7C

NAT. INT. SEC.

57 APR 11 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/26/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (66-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/aks/sb/mjb

During the week of [redacted]

[redacted] was not available for interview.

[redacted] advised as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

REC-32 100-93216-989

18 APR 4 1962

b6
b7C
b7D

NAT. SEC.

EXP. PROC.

(2) Bureau (AM) (RM)
1-Salt Lake City

GWL:cer
(3) APR 11 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 4/16/62

FROM: SAC, SALTLAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 3/28/62, [redacted]

advised as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

EXPEDITE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

2 - Bureau (AM)(RM)
1 - Salt Lake City
GWL:cer;pwo
(3)

EX 113

REC-13 100-93216-

16 APR 30 1962

INT. SEC.
NAT. INT. SEC.

b6
b7C

57 MAY 7 1962

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/3/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/04 BY 60267 uc/pas/bjt/cb

It is noted that [redacted]

was not available for interview [redacted] In addition, [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] It is noted that [redacted]

On 4/26/62, [redacted] advised as follows:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

EXP PROS

(2)-Bureau (AM) (RM)
1-Salt Lake City

REC- 49 100-93216-991

GWL:cer
(3)

RECEIVED - COPY

11 MAY 1962

53 MAY 18 1962

EX-105

INT. SEC.

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/21/62

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167)

Referral/Direct

SUBJECT: [redacted] AIRPORT - CALIF

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

OO: SAN FRANCISCO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/04 BY 60267 uc/lws/bja/cb

Referral/Direct

On 5/18/62, [redacted] called at this office and furnished the following for the information of the FBI concerning [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REG.)
1 - Denver (INFO) (REG.)
3 - San Francisco
1 - 135-96 - Beale AFB

REC-6 100-93276-992

5 MAY 23 1962

GAH/af
(6)


58 MAY 29 1962

EX 101

b6
b7C

SF 65-4167
GAH/af

Referral/Direct



The above is furnished for the information of the Bureau and Denver.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/25/62

FROM: SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

The last letter submitted on this matter was 5/3/62.

SA [redacted] handles all contacts with officials at Dugway Proving Grounds, which is southwest of Salt Lake City in the desert approximately ninety miles. b6 b7C

SA [redacted] is on special assignment in the El Paso Division in the [redacted] investigation. The next letter in captioned matter will be furnished after his return to this division. b6 b7C

2 - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City
LB:FR
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/wls/BJA/CAB

REC-1 100-93216-993

17 MAY 28 1962

b6
b7C

51 JUN 4 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/19/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 5/17/62, [redacted] advised as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/26/04 BY 60267 uc/jw/sbj

2 - Bureau (AM) (REG.)
1 - Salt Lake City

GWL:nba
(3)

REC-7

100-93216-994

MAY 28 1962

50 JUN 5 1962

EX-115

INC. SEC.

b6
b7C

EX-PROC

37

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/11/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

Below covers period 5/21/62 to 7/6/62.

On 7/6/62, [redacted] advised as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/04 BY 60267 uc/sws/bj/a1/cb

REC-22 100-93216-995

② - Bureau (AM) (REG.)
1 - Salt Lake City
GWL:lbp
(3)

56 JUL 24 1962

EX-115

8 JUL 13 1962

NAT INT SEC.

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/27/62

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-4167) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

00:SF

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/jws/bja/cb

b1
b3 50 USC SECTION 403
b2
b7D

Re San Francisco letter 5/21/62.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on 7/23/62. [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

According to source, [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

Source advised that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] Source advised that he had received no information [redacted] but that if such comes to his attention, he would notify the FBI.

Contact with [redacted] will continue. b2 b7D

11/22/04 CLASSIFIED BY uc/jws/bja/cb 60267 Derivative DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 11/22/2029 per LTR DTD 11/22/04 of subj uc/jws/bja/cb

DOM INTELL DIV
REC. REC-26

100-93216-996

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco
(1 - [redacted]) b2 b7D
PWM/cmp
(4)
#11

EX-101

5 JUL 30 1962

[redacted] b6 b7C

153 F14

SEC. NAT. INFO. CONTROL

SEP 10 1962

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/29/62

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

REC-66

On 8/23/62, [redacted] b6 b7C
Fort Detrick, Maryland, advised that the name of that installation has been changed from U. S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratory to U. S. Army Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - Baltimore

RRL:mgl
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pjs/bja/kab

[redacted]

100-25216-917

REC-36 AUG 31 1962

53 SEP 10 1962

NAT. SEC. b6 b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **8/28/62**

FROM: **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

It was determined that [redacted]

was not available [redacted]

On 8/23/62 above [redacted] **advised as follows:**

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/20/07 BY 60324 uc/sjw/sbg

EX-106

REC-52 100-93216-948

EX-113

[redacted]

b7D

Laboratory

9-4

2-Bureau (RM) (AM)
2-Salt Lake City

12 AUG 30 1962

GWL:cer
(4)

INT. SEC.

b6
b7C

54 SEP 10 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES G[redacted]NT

Memora[redacted]

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/21/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pjs/bjm/kcb

On 9/17/62, [redacted] advised as follows:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

2-Bureau (AM) (RM)
1-Salt Lake City

REC-63 100-93216-999

EX-113

12 SEP 24 1962

NAT. SEC.

57 OCT 1 1962

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI(100-93216) DATE: 9/25/62

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167) (P)

SUBJECT:
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/04 BY 60322 uc/jws/bja/cb

Re San Francisco letter dated 7/27/62.

[redacted] was last contacted by a representative of the San Francisco Office on September 24, 1962. Source advised that [redacted] and would immediately advise the FBI if he receives anything within our jurisdiction. b2 b6 b7C b7D

According to Source, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

Source related that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

Source stated that [redacted]

According to Source, he has received no information [redacted] b7D but that, if such comes to his attention, he would notify the FBI.

Contact with [redacted] will continue. b2 b7D

REC-38 100-93216-1051

2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco
(1 - 65-4167; 1 - [redacted] b2 b7D
PWM:lg
(4)

EX-114

10 SEP 27 1962

50 OCT 4 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/23/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/94 BY 60324 UC/pxs/BJA/CB

On 10/19/62, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

EXP. PROC.

b7D

[redacted]

9/27/62
VB

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

REC-43 100-93216-100

2 - Bureau (AM) (REG.)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:gch
(3)

30 NOV 2 1962

F146

8 OCT 26 1962

30

ST-118

NAT. INT. SEC.

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/19/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 LP/MS/BJ/CB

On November 16, 1962, [redacted]

furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:wrs
(3)

REC- 13 100-93216-1002

5 NOV 21 1962

ST-104

NAT. SEC.

FILED
55 NOV 30 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3 50 USC SECTION 403
b2
b6
b7C
b7D

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/29/62

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (165-4167) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO:SAN FRANCISCO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/22/04 BY 60267 uc/NKS/BJA/CLB

Re San Francisco letter dated 9/25/62.

[redacted] was last contacted by representatives of the San Francisco Office on 11/21/62. Source advised that [redacted] and would advise the FBI if he received anything within their jurisdiction. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] (5)

[redacted] According to source, he has received no information [redacted] Contact with [redacted] will continue.

11/22/04
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NKS/BJA/CLB 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 11/22/2029
Bj.1, C3, OCA 11/22/04 60267 uc/NKS/BJA/CLB

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco
b1 (1 - [redacted]
b2
b7D PWM/rms
(4)

REC- 42 100-13216-1003

12 NOV 30 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

NAT. DET. SEC.

51 DEC 12 1962

~~SECRET~~



1315 JB

1 - Belmont
1 - Conrad
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Wannall
1 - [redacted] b6 b7C
1 - Whitson

W. C. Sullivan 12-6-62

W. A. Branigan

ECONOMIC MATTERS - EAST GERMANY Referral/Direct

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION:

For information.

100-93216-
NOT RECORDED
141 DEC 17 1962

LW:mhd
(8)

110-6-397
1 - 100-93216 (Biological Warfare)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267uc/ms/bj/ccb

139

5/5 DEC 17 1962

ORIGINAL FILED IN 110-6-397

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/22/62

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
EXPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 12/21/62, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(2) - Bureau (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:wrs
(3)

EX-120

REC- 41 100-93216-1004

11 DEC 27 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

F1460

53 DEC 31 1962

NAT. SEC.

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/18/63

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60226/uc/pks/BAC

On January 17, 1963, [redacted] furnished the following information: b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

b7D [redacted]

[redacted]

b7D [redacted]

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:ps
(3)

REC-17 100-93216-1005

EX-114

6 JAN 22 1963

62 JAN 28 1963

EXPEDITE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/30/63

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (65-4167) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
OO: San Francisco

Re San Francisco letter dated November 29, 1962.

[redacted] was last contacted by representatives of the San Francisco Office on January 25, 1963. Source related [redacted] Source mentioned that [redacted] if this happens, source advised that he would contact the FBI immediately.

It is noted that the source has been contacted concerning [redacted] and source is alert for any information regarding [redacted] According to source, he has received no information [redacted]

Contact with [redacted] will continue.

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

- Bureau (RM)
2 - San Francisco
(1 - 65-4167
1 - [redacted]

PWM:lg
(4)

EX-102

REC- 25 100-93216-1006

10 FEB

ESP.

54 FEB 14 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60322uc/sws/baw/cb

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **Director, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **2/18/63**

FROM: **SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 2/13/63 [redacted] **furnished the following information:**

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/97 BY 60324 uc baw/sdg 98/03

EXP. PROC.

2 - Bureau (REG., AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:FR
(3)

EX-102 REC-23 65-93216-1007

ESPIONAGE SEC

FEB 20 1963

54 MAR 11 1963

FILE

NAT SEC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/18/63

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60226 TUC/JAS/BJA/CB

On 3/14/63, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

REC- 63 100-93216-1008

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:kre

56 MAR 21 1963

12 MAR 18 1963

NARA, DEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: 3/13/63

b6
b7C FROM [redacted]

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ORIENTATION COURSE, DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, DUGWAY, UTAH

b6
b7C

SA [redacted] attended Class No. 12 of the Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Weapons Orientation Course at Dugway Proving Ground, March 5 - 8, 1963. This course was designed to present information regarding U. S. capabilities and policy concerning CBR weapons to senior officers of the U. S. Government. The material presented also dealt with Soviet capabilities in this field.

The area involving chemical warfare dealt primarily with current U. S. capabilities with respect to nerve gases and incapacitating gases such as those producing psychological changes. The items dealing with chemical warfare were presented by means of lectures and practical demonstrations.

The biological weapons section of the course consisted of lecture material on current biological agents available for use by U. S. forces as well as research items and current Russian capabilities.

b6
b7C SA [redacted] advised that this was an outstanding course both from the standpoint of presentation as well as the technical material that was made available to members of the class.

Inasmuch as the Laboratory has a responsibility in the field of CBR warfare defense and intelligence, it is thought that attendance by an FBI representative at this course was well worthwhile.

ACTION: None, for information.

REC-6 100-93216-1009

11 MAR 22 1963

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - 100-93216
1 - 80-645

CGM:GL
(6)

NOTE: A separate memorandum concerning the technical aspects of the CBR Weapons Orientation Course is being prepared.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/94 BY [redacted]

80-645-

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: March 26, 1963

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/28/01 BY 65179 uc/baw/sbp/kb

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised on March 20, 1963, that [redacted]

They advised that [redacted]

b7D

b7D

[redacted]

3 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Newark (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - New York (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Philadelphia (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Pittsburgh (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - WFO (REGISTERED MAIL)
2 - Baltimore
RRL:dfm
(10)

b6
b7C

REC-38 100-93216-1010
EX-117
10 MAR

Approved: Sent M Per

Special Agent in Charge

BA 66-891

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

A copy of this communication is designated for the information of the Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Washington Field Offices so that they may be aware of the b7D

[redacted]

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 4/2/63

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ~~REGIS. MAIL~~
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESP - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/aks/bjl/cb

Re Pittsburgh airtel, dated 3/28/63, captioned "Unsub; Threat to Bomb B & O Passenger Station, Pittsburgh, Pa., 3/27-28/63; FTWS; DAMV-FR."

From a general knowledge available to the Baltimore office concerning the operations of the Special Operations Division of Ft. Detrick, Maryland, it is felt certain that that organization would under no circumstances place a false call concerning a train station blowing up. To the contrary, this Division desires to conduct their experiments with the public knowing as little as possible of the operations as the results are therefore more effective.

3 - Bureau REGIS.MAIL
1 - Pittsburgh (Info) (160-New)
1 - Baltimore

MEG:ers
(5)

REC. 13 100-93216-1011

13 APR 3 1963

CC - Wick

8 APR 11 1963

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **4/5/63**

FROM : **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bj 4/03

On 4/4/63, furnished the following information concerning

b6
b7C
b7D

b7D

b7D

REC- 74

(2) - Bureau (Registered AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:kre
(3)

53 APR 15 1963

APR 1963

b6
b7C

FD-36 (Rev 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 4/8/63

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Baltimore airtel to Bureau, dated 3/26/63.

Referral/Direct

On April 5, 1963, [redacted] advised SA [redacted] that [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/15/94 BY [redacted]

(3) - Bureau REGIS.MAIL
1 - New York " (Info)
1 - Newark " (Info)
1 - Washington Field " (Info)
2 - Baltimore
RBLyers
(8)

100-93276-1013

APR 9 1963

NAPP INT. SEC.

REC-28

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

[redacted]

A copy of this communication is designated for the information of the Newark, New York and Washington Field Divisions so that they may be aware of [redacted]

[redacted]

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 4/30/63

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b6
b7C

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESP - SABATOGE

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

A copy of this communication is designated for the New York Office so that they may be aware of [redacted]

[redacted]

(3) - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (RM) (Info)
2 - Baltimore
RRL:mgl
(6)

EX-102

REC-89 100-93216-1014

10 MAY 1 1963

Laboratory

NAT. SEC.

10 MAY 8 1963

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY 60322 uc/baw/sdp

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/3/63

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 5/2/63, [redacted] was telephonically contacted for the purpose of making an appointment with him for the regular monthly meeting concerning this matter.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

In view of this, [redacted] was not contacted personally. He will be recontacted in about one month's time, as in the past, and results of this contact submitted.

b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)(AIR MAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:ap
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267uc/NKS/BJA/CB

REC- 16

100-T226-1015

5 MAY 7 1963

EX-117

NATSEC.

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-23-63

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE-CHEMICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b1
b3 50 USC SECTION 403

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3 50 USC SECTION 403

ACTION:

For information.

DATE: 7/25/06
CLASSIFIED BY 60322
UC/LP/BJA/CB60322AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (1) 7/25/2031
Pg.1, Para.1&2,OGA 7/25/06 60322 UC/LP/BJA/CB

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
b6 1 - [redacted]
b7C 1 - [redacted]
1 - Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

100-93216

LW:mhd
(7)

REC 54 100-93216-1016

EX-117

22 MAY 28 1963

SECRET

67 MAY 29 1963

100-93216

June 3, 1963

VEg Liaison

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY uc/lnes/bja/cb

Delivered
6-4-63 DLP

Lieutenant General F. S. Besson, Jr.
Commanding General
United States Army Materiel Command
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Dear General:

In order that this Bureau might have certain information regarding chemical and biological warfare readily available in fulfilling our intelligence responsibilities, we would like to obtain any printed material concerned with United States capabilities in chemical and biological warfare. Specifically, information is desired as to current chemical and biological agents and their physiological effects.

Also, any printed material regarding the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Satellite countries in the area of chemical and biological warfare would be of benefit.

100-93216-1017

Sincerely yours,

EX-120 REC-84 19 JUN 4 1963

John Edgar Hoover
Director

CGM:sh (5)
1 - Liaison Section

NOTE: In order to keep abreast of current capabilities in chemical and biological warfare and to assist us in fulfilling our security responsibilities, it is desirous that we obtain CB warfare material from the U. S. Army for reference.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

[redacted] U. S. Army, Washington, D. C., was contacted by SA [redacted] Physics and Chemistry Section, relative to the desired material. [redacted] advised that the best way to obtain this material is to make a written request to the addressee.

b6
b7C

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI JUN 6 1963

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/10/63

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Conrad
1 - [redacted] (Rm. 7125) b6 b7C
1 - [redacted]

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DOCUMENTS REQUESTED FROM ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND LABORATORY MATTER

Reference is made to the telephone call to you from [redacted] Army Material Command, Dover, N. J. b6 b7C concerning the Bureau's letter dated June 3, 1963 to Lt. General F. S. Besson, Jr. requesting documents relating to chemical and biological warfare.

It was determined that the Bureau's letter originated in the Laboratory and requested up-to-date information concerning chemical and biological warfare research for our use. Pursuant to your request, [redacted] b6 b7C was telephonically contacted on the afternoon of 6-7-63; and he advised that the documents requested would be brought to the Bureau on the afternoon of June 13, 1963. He was thanked for his desire to furnish these documents promptly, and he was requested to deliver them to the office of Assistant Director Conrad.

ACTION:

None. For the record.

100-93216

OAE:hc
(6)

REC-21 100-93216-1019

EX-101

12 JUN 17 1963

JUN 21 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/baw/BJA/CB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **6/17/63**

FROM **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pks/BJA/CB

On June 13, 1963, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D **was intercepted at his residence at** [redacted] **as a result of arrangements previously telephonically made.**

[redacted] **said that** [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b7D

2-Bureau (REG.) (AM)
1-Salt Lake City

VGB:crm
(3)

REC-84 100-93216-1020

11 JUN 19 1963

EX-116

b6
b7C

NAT. SEC.

51 JUL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/10/63

FROM SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau, 6/17/63. A short paragraph was inadvertently left out of last month's Salt Lake City letter concerning this matter. The Bureau is requested to add to this letter. b7D

[redacted]

On June 9, 1963, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D Appropriate recontact [redacted] will be made per schedule.

36

1-[redacted] 2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:FR
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267uc/NJS/BJA/CB

REC-36 100-93216-1021

[redacted]

b6
b7C

65 JUL 23 1963

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: 7/5/63

b6
b7C

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Referral/Direct

On 7/2/63, [redacted] was received in the Laboratory via registered mail [redacted]

b6
b7C

Arrangements [redacted] were made through [redacted] by SA [redacted] on 6/21/63. It will be maintained for reference purposes in the Office of the Section Chief of the Physics and Chemistry Section and may be obtained by contacting the Section Chief of the Physics and Chemistry Section or SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

ACTION:

For information.

100-93216

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. Whitson)

CGM:fch
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/nks/bja/cb

REC- 11

100-93216-1022

EX-108

JUL 17 1963

62 JUL 26 1963

SEVEN

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MUNITIONS COMMA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
DOVER, NEW JERSEY

JUN 10 '63-1 PM

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/sks/BJA/CB

Mr. J. E. Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

General Besson referred your letter of 3 June 1963 concerning Chemical and Biological Warfare to me for action. I note that he advised you of this by his letter of 5 June 1963.

I have designated [redacted] of my staff to provide the requested information to you. He plans to review your needs in detail with your Assistant Director Conrad at the Justice Department building on 13 June 1963.

I believe that this will be the most expeditious method of satisfying our request, since [redacted] will act as a courier for the classified documents involved, and you will be able to determine which documents will best meet your requirements.

Sincerely,

F. A. HANSEN
Major General, USA
Commanding

REC-58 100-392160-1023

22 JUL 18 1963

56 JUL 23 1963

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad

b6
b7C

FROM [redacted]

DATE: 6/14/63

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267uc/sks/BJA/cb

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

In order to keep abreast of current capabilities in chemical and biological warfare and to assist us in fulfilling our intelligence responsibilities as well as to maintain current liaison with the U. S. Army chemical and biological warfare group, we requested by letter dated June 3, 1963, certain current printed material relating to chemical and biological warfare. In reply to the Bureau's letter of June 3, 1963, to the Commanding General of the U. S. Army Materiel Command, SAs [redacted] and [redacted] met with [redacted] of the Munitions Command, Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey, and [redacted] Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, The Pentagon, on the afternoon of June 13, 1963, and discussed the Bureau's needs relating to chemical and biological warfare. b6 b7C

As a result of this discussion, it was decided that it would be most advantageous to have SA [redacted] review and obtain for the Bureau the pertinent documents from [redacted] office during the latter part of the week of June 17, 1963. b6 b7C

Both [redacted] and [redacted] were thanked for their desire to be of assistance. b6 b7C

ACTION: Unless advised to the contrary, SA [redacted] will contact [redacted] during the latter part of the week of June 17, 1963, and obtain the pertinent documents. b6 b7C

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
CGM:GL (6)

100-93216

REC-58 100-93216-1024

60 JUL 23 1963

22 JUL 18 1963

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: July 19, 1963

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

b6
b7C FROM :

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Referral/Direct

On July 18, 1963, [redacted] was received in the Laboratory via registered mail from [redacted]

Arrangements [redacted] were made through [redacted] by Special Agent [redacted] on June 21, 1963. It will be maintained for reference purposes in the Office of the Section Chief of the Physics and Chemistry Section and may be obtained by contacting the Section Chief of the Physics and Chemistry Section or SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

ACTION: For information.

100-93216

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. Whitson)
CGM:sh
(6)

REC-26 100-93216-1027

EX-116

JUL 24 1963

5 - Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/cls

55 JUL 30 1963

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: 7/29/63

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pas/sb/mb

b6
b7C FROM :

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

U. S. Army Chemical Research and Development Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, called SA today and advised that he was calling in response to a verbal request from Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, the Pentagon, to furnish the Bureau with certain information regarding chemical warfare agents. stated that his office had a two-volume set on the properties of chemical warfare agents and that he would be glad to make this available to the Bureau on a loan basis so that we might be able to review it. He further stated that he would reproduce any of the material contained in this set which would be of interest to us. He advises however that since some of the information is of a classified nature, that it would facilitate matters if the Bureau would direct a letter to his office and make a formal request in order that they might have it for their files.

b6
b7C

For your information, we have made a prior request to to furnish us certain material on chemical and biological warfare. has been most helpful in fulfilling our requests

b6
b7C

The material which we have obtained is necessary in order for us to keep abreast of current chemical and biological warfare capabilities and to assist us in fulfilling our intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be forwarded to the U. S. Army Chemical Research and Development Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, requesting that we be furnished printed material concerned with the properties of chemical warfare agents.

REC- 27 100-93216-1028

ST-103

AUG 2 1963

Enclosure Sent 7/30

100-93216

1-Mr. Belmont 1-Mr. Sullivan

CGM:fch (5)

REC- 27
100-93216 -1028

ST-103

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pls/bja/cb

Date: July 30, 1963

To: The Commanding Officer
U. S. Army Chemical Research and
Development Laboratories
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

Attention: [redacted] b6 b7C
Information Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Reference is made to the telephone conversation between [redacted] of your office and Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau on July 29, 1963, regarding certain information in the chemical warfare field. b6 b7C

In order that this Bureau might have certain information regarding chemical warfare readily available in fulfilling our intelligence responsibilities, we would like to obtain printed material concerned with the properties of chemical warfare agents.

NOTE: See memo [redacted] to Mr. Conrad, 7-29-63 captioned as above. b6 b7C

RECEIVED - CONRAD
JUL 30 10 50 AM '63
FBI - JUSTICE
REC-D BETHONI

CGM:fch
(5)

MAILED
JUL 30 1963
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JUL 30 11 58 AM '63
53 AUG 8 1963
REC'D
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/2/63

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 8/1/63, [redacted]
furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:ap
(3)

REC-9 100-93216-1029

6 AUG 5 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/alw/BJA/cmb

NAT. SEC.

AUG 14 1963

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **9/18/63**

FROM: **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 9/18/63, [redacted] **furnished the following information:**

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED) (AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:kre
(3)

100-9212-1032

REC-4

25 SEP 20 1963

EX-114

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/04 BY 60324uc/pks/bja/cb

NAT. SEC.

[redacted]

b6
b7C

59 OCT 2 1963

0-4a (Rev. 2-14-61)

100-93216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/sab/cb

Invoice of Contents from
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date 10/2/63 Case References CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Consigned to: CRDL Technical Library
US Army, Edgewood Arsenal
Attn: Document Control
Bldg. 3310, Room 205
Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

MAILED IN
OCT 3 - 1963
SOMM-FBI

List of Contents

"Report on Properties of War Gases"

Volume I.
Volume II. 716391
Volume III.

Rec'd 10/3/63 CHM

Crypt.-Trans.
Document
Electronics
Physics-Chemistry
LFPS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Mail Room, place date of shipment and registry number; Shipping Room, show date of shipment, bill of lading number and initial this invoice; then return it to section checked in column at right. After this checked section has been initialed, invoice should be placed in administrative file. Registered Mail Special Delivery

53 OCT 8 1963

1 - [illegible]. Sullivan
Attention: Mr. Whitson
(for information)
sent direct

100-93216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267uc/mdb;a/cb

Date: October 2, 1963

To: The Commanding Officer
U. S. Army Chemical Research and
Development Laboratories
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

b6
b7C
Attention: [redacted]
Information Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Reference is made to the four volumes entitled "Report on Properties of War Gases" which were loaned to this Bureau for a period of ninety days on August 5, 1963.

The four volumes have been reviewed and are being returned under separate cover by registered mail special delivery to the CMDL Technical Library, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland.

REC-32 100-93216-1033
EX-[illegible]
OCT 3 1963

Your assistance in arranging for the loan to this Bureau of the four volumes concerned with the properties of war gases is greatly appreciated.

NOTE: By letter dated July 30, 1963, to addressee, this Bureau requested certain information regarding chemical warfare agents. On August 5, 1963, the four volumes entitled "Report on Properties of War Gases" were furnished to this Bureau for a ninety-day period for review. Special Agent [redacted] conducted the review and Xeroxed copies of the summaries of each of the volumes were made and are being retained in the office of the chief of the Physics and Chemistry Section. Attached for filing purposes is a copy of the invoice which accompanied the four volumes.

b6
b7C

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

ENCLOSURE
MAILED 27
OCT 2 1963
COMM-FBI

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

FBI - WASH. METRO FIELD OFFICE
RECD DEPT MAIL
OCT 3 11 00 AM '63

CGM: bsm (7)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENV.
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 UC/MLS/BJA / CB



100-93216-1033

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/18/63

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 10/16/63, [redacted] was contacted [redacted] concerning this matter. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

(2) - Bureau - Reg. AM
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:MEN
(3)

EX 104

REC- 36 100-93216-1034

6 OCT 21 1963

NAVAL INT. SEC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/baw/sbj/cb

FBI

5 5 OCT 31 1963

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **W. A. Branigan** DATE: **11-1-63**

FROM : **L. Whitson**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE--CHEMICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b1
b3 50 USC SECTION 403

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

(1)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

ACTION:

For information.

DATE: 7/25/06
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/BJA/CB 60322 AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 7/25/2031
Pg.1,Para.1-4,OGA 7/25/06 60322 UC/LP/BJA/CB

100-93216

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C

100-93216-1035

REC-117

25 NOV 4 1963

LW:mhw
(4)

57 NOV 6 1963

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pus/bja/cb

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/8/63

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 11/7/63 [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

EXP-PROC

38

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:FR
(3)

REC 22

100-93216-1036

Laboratory

[redacted]

14

3 NOV 12 1963

b6
b7C

EX-116

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/94 BY 60267 UC/LMS/BS 94-CV

WH Wilson
Soviet Sec.

Adm
Inv. Sec.

2 NOV 20 1963

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **12/4/63**

FROM : **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/Bja/CB

On 12/3/63, [redacted] **furnished the following information:**

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED AM) REC- 53 100-93216-1037
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:deb
(3)

EX-102

DEC 9 1963

F140
12 DEC 23 1963

INT. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/16/64

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 1/10/64, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] B b7D

[redacted] b7D

REC-45 100-93216-1038

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:deb
(3)

EX-112

14 JAN 20 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60324 uc pks/BJA/CB

NAT. INT. SEC.

[redacted]

F146
53 JAN 27 1964

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 2/14/64

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 2/13/64 furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

EXP. PROC

2 - Bureau (Registered AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:FR
(3)

REC-23 100-93216-1039

FEB 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60242 uc/baw/sbj/cb

5 9 FEB 26 1964

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 3/6/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Referral/Direct

b6
b7C [redacted] on 3/5/64, made the following information available to SA [redacted] and [redacted]

Referral/Direct [redacted]

Referral/Direct [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/15/04 BY [redacted]

REC-17 100-93216-1040

(3) - BUREAU (RM)
2 - NEW YORK (Info) (RM)
2 - Baltimore
RRL:mmm
(7)


MAR 7 1964

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

cc - Washington

BA 66-891
RRL:mmm

Referral/Direct



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/13/64

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/04 BY 60267 UC/JAS/BJA/CB

On 3/10/64, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED AM)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:ap
(3)

REC- 19 100-93216- 1041

6 MAR 16 1964

EX-114

Laboratory
NATIONAL SEC

66 MAR 24 1964

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/16/64

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267uc/NCS/BJA/CB

On 4/6/64, [redacted] furnished the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau (AM) (REG)
2 - Salt Lake City

VGB:wrs
(4)

REC- 22 100-93216-1042

12 APR 20 1964

NAT. SEC.

4 MAY 5 1964

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/8/64

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/alw/BJA/cb

On 5/6/64, [redacted] was contacted. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (AM)(REG)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:ap
(3)

REC 5 100-93216-1013

6 MAY 11 1964

FX-112

NAT. SEC.

Laboratory

F148

MAY 27 1964

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **6/8/64**

FROM : **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/JWS/BJA/CLB

On 6/4/64, [redacted] **furnished the following information:**

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

REC-40 100-93216-1044

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Salt Lake City
VGB: lh
(4)

EX-108

14 JUN 12 1964

61 JUN 24 1964

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Laboratory
NAT. SEC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **7/9/64**

FROM : **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

On 7/7/64,

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

(2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - Salt Lake City
VGB:lbp
(4)

EX-112
REC 45

100-1-216-1045

6 JUL 13 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/baw/bja/cb

NAT. SEC.

64 JUL 29 1964

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/6/64

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pks/sj/cb

On 8/4/64 [redacted] was contacted.

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REG.)
2 - Salt Lake City

VGB:mhe
(4)

REC-38 100-93216-

EX-102

18 AUG 20 1964

NAT. INT. SEC.

b6
b7C

60 AUG 20 1964

EX-PROC. 33

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **9/17/64**

FROM **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJM/CB

On 9/15/64 [redacted] **was contacted.**

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (REG.)
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:FR
(3)

REC- 51 100-93216-1047

EX- 131

11 SEP 21 1964

NATIONAL SEC.

58 SEP 24 1964

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/12/64

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

On 10/8/64, [redacted] was contacted. He furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

EX-PROC

35

100-93216-1048

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED) REC-66
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:ap
(3)

OCT 15 1964

EX-114

NAT. SEC.

Laboratory

b6
b7C

F146

OCT 23 1964

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/12/64

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/pms/BJA/ca

On November 10, 1964, [redacted] was contacted. He furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

REC-53 100-93216-1049

EX-100

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City
VGB:lh
(3)

5 NOV 16 1964

ASSISTANT SEC.

F14b

0 NOV 24 1964

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

4-650 (Rev. 10-6-64)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy


TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: 11-30-64

FROM : W. S. Tavel

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Bufile: 100-93216




b6
b7C

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

LWB:amb

(2)

Inasmuch as sensitive methods and sources are involved in this file, it should be retained in the Special file room.



12/1/64

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/aks/sj/cb

100-93216
NOT RECORDED

FEB 9 1965

~~65 FEB 9 1965~~

65 FEB 9 1965

1 - Mr. Griffith
1 - Mr. [redacted]

b6
b7C

SAC, Baltimore (66-891)

December 1, 1964

REC 8
EX-100

Director, FBI (100-93216) - 1050

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/jws/bja/cb

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reurlet 11/18/64, relative to the inquiry of

b6
b7C [redacted] concerning the feasibility of using the microdot technique in an information storage and retrieval system.

No commercial system of this kind in which documents of conventional size are reduced to microdot size images is known. It is likely that the many technical problems that would be encountered in such a system involving reductions in the neighborhood of 50 to 300 times have caused commercial concerns to use methods not requiring such extreme reductions in size.

There are several companies who have investigated and who may have developed systems in which original documents are greatly reduced on film and in which copies can be produced for use. Some of these companies are:

Eastman Kodak
(Minicard system)
Rochester, New York

FMA, Incorporated
142 Nevada Street
El Segundo, California

Remington Rand
(Film-A-Record)
535 St. Paul Place
(Service Office)
Baltimore, Maryland

[redacted]
COMM-FBI

FEW:pl (5)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

53 DEC 14 1964

Letter to SAC, Baltimore
Re: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
100-93216

The National Cash Register Company
(Photochromic Micro-Image)
Electronics Division
2815 West El Segundo Boulevard
Hawthorne, California

b6
b7C The above information may be of assistance to [redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: November 18, 1964

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

Referral/Direct

On November 12, 1964, [redacted] advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

EXP PROC

3 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore

RLT:dfm
(4)

EX-100 REC 8 100-93216-1650

15 NOV 18 1964

SEN DEM NAT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

The Bureau Laboratory is requested to advise the Baltimore Office if any information which may be useful to [redacted] is available.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-05

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 12/23/64

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

[redacted] b6 b7C

On 12/22/64, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D [redacted] was contacted.

He was met in [redacted] through a previous arrangement, telephonically made. [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

2 - Bureau (REG. AIRMAIL)
1 - Salt Lake City

VGB:deb
(3)

REC-7 100-93216-105 Laboratory

1-4

a DEC 29 1964

EX-102

[redacted] b6 b7C

Soviet Sec

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 UC/LMS/BJA/CB

FINE

JAN 7 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/28/65

FROM: SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 1/21/65 efforts were made to contact [redacted] It was determined that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will be contacted [redacted] and results reported.

2 - Bureau (REG.)
1 - Salt Lake City

WJG:mhe
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60324 uc/nks/bja/cb

REC- 129 100-93216-1052

EX-117

25 FEB 10 1965

Sorrel Sect.
Wilson

FLYD

64 FEB 10 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10.
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 2/23/65

b6
b7C

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 2/15/65, efforts were again made to contact [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Continued efforts will be made during March, 1965, to contact [redacted] and upon doing so the results will be furnished the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/b;a/cb

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

JOS:lbp
(3)

Laboratory

REC- 11 / 100-93216-1053

EX-112

3-1
21 FEB 25 1965

70 MAR 10 1965 F146

SOVIET SECTION

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)** DATE: **3/19/65**

FROM : **SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)**

SUBJECT: **BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB

On 3/8/65, [redacted] was contacted. He furnished the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

EXP PROC

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JOS:wrs
(4)

REC-137 100-93216-1054

16 MAR 22 1965

b6
b7C

58 MAR 30 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
0-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/14/65

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

On 4/14/65, efforts were made to contact [redacted] b6 b7C b7D with negative results. It was determined that [redacted]

Continued efforts will be made during May, 1965, to contact [redacted] and upon so doing, the results will be furnished to the Bureau. b6 b7C b7D

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

JOS:ps
(3)

REC-40 100-93216-1055

19

25 APR 15 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/baw/sb;a/cb

60 APR 23 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/3/65

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGULAR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Referral/Direct

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised SA [redacted] on 5/2/65, that [redacted]

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY [illegible]

3 - Bureau
2 - WFO
1 - Baltimore
RRL:jtk
(6)

REGISTERED MAIL
REGISTERED MAIL

EX-116

100-93216 1056

8 MAY 4 1965

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

BA 66-891

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

A copy of this communication is designated for the information of the WFO, so that it may be aware of

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REC 36
100-93216 1051

EX 105

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Conrad
1-Mr. [redacted] 7125
1-Office, 7133

b6
b7C

Registered Mail

11/18/04
CLASSIFIED BY: uc/mcs/bja/pb #60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 11/18/2029

Date: June 3, 1965

To: Lieutenant General F. S. Besson, Jr.
Commanding General
United States Army Materiel Command
Washington, D. C. 20315

715570

b6
b7C

Attention: [redacted]
Deseret Liaison Officer

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: Chemical-Biological Weapons and Defense Systems Test Program

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

b1

I am pleased to advise that I have designated Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau to attend this briefing on June 8, 1965. Special Agent [redacted] has a "Top Secret" security clearance.

b6
b7C

Your thoughtfulness in reserving space for personnel of this Bureau to attend the above-described briefing is appreciated.

MAILED 12
JUN 3 - 1965
COMM-FBI

Commander
Joint Task Force-Eight

715571

Attention: J2
4th Street and Adams Drive, Southwest
Washington, D. C. 20305

NOTE: Coordinated with the Domestic Intelligence Division. Being sent "Confidential" to conform with incoming.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

CGM:tch
(9)

58 JUN 15 1965

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Downgraded at 12 year Intervals
Not Automatically Declassified
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/28/65

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

Contact was made with [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] on 5/17/65, by SA [redacted] at which time he furnished the following information:

He stated [redacted]

He stated [redacted]

[redacted] b7D

[redacted]

100-93216-1258

[redacted]

12 JUN 1 1965

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

JOS:ps
(3)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NAT. SEC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/19/04 BY 60322uc/sbs/baw/cab

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Contact will be made with [redacted] on or about 6/15/65. The results of this contact will be furnished to the Bureau.

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad

FROM :

DATE: June 11, 1965

1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr.
1 - Office, 7933

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/Bj/4/05

By letter dated 6/3/65, from the Director to the Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command, Washington, D. C., it was approved that SA [redacted] attend a two-hour briefing in Washington, D. C., relative to Chemical-Biological Weapons and Defense Systems Program.

On 6/8/65, SA [redacted] attended this briefing which was conducted by [redacted]

[redacted]

To a large extent this briefing was for the Scientific Intelligence Community of the Washington, D.C., area. It was pointed out that [redacted]

[redacted]

100-93216

100-93216-1159

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan

REC-21 12 JUN 16 1965

EX-102

CGM:bas
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

SEW

Memorandum to Mr. Conrad
Re: CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND
DEFENSE SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM
100-93216

b7D

ACTION: None. For information only.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/22/65

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

Contact was made with [redacted] on 6/15/65, by SA [redacted] at which time the following information was furnished by [redacted]

He stated [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

He stated [redacted]

He stated [redacted]

Contact will be made with [redacted] on or about 7/15/65, and the results of this contact will be furnished to the Bureau.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JOS:ps
(4)

REC- 65

100-93216-1060

11 JUN 24 1965

EX-102

NAT. ANTI-SEC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-22-84 BY 6002-6 ucnls/ BJA/ DFW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/21/65

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Contact was made with [redacted] on 7/14/65, at which time [redacted] furnished the following information:

He stated [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

He stated [redacted]

He stated [redacted]

Contact will be made with [redacted] on or about August 15, 1965, and results of this contact will be made available to the Bureau.

2 - Bureau
2 - Salt Lake City
JOS:msl
(4)

b6
b7C
[redacted]

EX-106

REC 25 100-93216-1061

9 JUL 27 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60262 uc/n/s/ BJA/DFW

FILE

NAT. INT./SEC.

100-93216

7 AUG 3 1965

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 8/26/65

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

On 8/24/65, [redacted] was contacted. He stated [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted on approximately September 15, 1965, and results furnished to the Bureau.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:deb
(4)

EX. PROC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 ucnls/BJA/DFW

REC-71 100-93216-1012

EX.-107

9 AUG 30 1965

51 SEP 2 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Office, 7133

b6
b7C

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Conrad

b6
b7C

DATE: 8-31-65

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: ~~CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS~~
AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Reference is made to my memo dated 6-11-65 advising that SA [redacted] attended a two hour briefing relative to Chemical-Biological Weapons and Defense Systems program. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

ACTION:

None. For information.

100-93216

1 - Mr. Sullivan (with attachment)

CGM:nlb (5)

3 - ENCLOSURE

REC 4 100-93216 1 U.S.

ST-112

18 SEP 7 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-22-04 BY 60262 uc/n/s/ BJA/DFW

5 - AW

7 - Jmy

65 SEP 14 1965

100-93216

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-4

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/29/65

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

On 9/23/65, efforts were made to contact [redacted] It was determined [redacted] Inasmuch as the last contact with [redacted] no further effort will be made to contact him during the month of September UACB.

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will be contacted on approximately 10/15/65, and results furnished to the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

EX-102

REC 36 100-93216-1064

8 OCT 1 1965

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Salt Lake City
WJG:11
(4)

NAT. SEC.

OCT 13 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Orig & 1
1-Yellow
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Conrad
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. [redacted]
1-Mr. B. J. White
1-Liaison
1-Mr. [redacted]

BY LIAISON

REC 14 100-93216-1065

Date: September 23, 1965

EX-103

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force

Attention: AFNINDA

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: VISIT REQUEST, CERTIFICATION OF CLEARANCE AND NEED-TO-KNOW, CONTRACT AF 08(635)-5158, DUNLAP AND ASSOCIATES, INC.

b6
b7C

Reference is made to letter dated September 17, 1965, from [redacted] of your agency and to discussion between him and Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau.

The request for technical discussions and assistance outlined in referenced letter covers an area somewhat outside the scope of FBI investigative responsibility. It is noted that information previously received by this Bureau concerning chemical and biological matters in most instances originated with and was furnished by various military chemical and biological warfare units.

In the event there are specific areas in which you feel this Bureau could be of assistance in this matter, it is requested you define the type of technical assistance desired so a determination can be made concerning the possibility of this Bureau providing information of value. It would be preferable if such requests could be handled directly with your office rather than with the Air Force contractor involved.

BCR:hke
(10)

(Cover memorandum from D. J. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, 9/22/65, re "Air Force Request for Authorized Visit by Dunlap and Associates Personnel to Discuss Chemical and Biological Warfare Matters." BCR:hke)

OCT 12 1965

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FBI - READING ROOM
SEP 23 3 52 PM '65

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/18/04 BY 60267 uc/jrs/sjg/cb

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN REG NO 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/04 BY 60242 uc/ALS/BS/A/CB

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE September 22, 1965

FROM D. J. BRENNAN, JR.

SUBJECT AIR FORCE REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZED VISIT BY DUNLAP AND ASSOCIATES PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE MATTERS

Air Force requested FBI authorize periodic visits by personnel of Dunlap and Associates, Incorporated, Air Force contractor, for technical discussions with FBI personnel regarding chemical and biological warfare matters. Recommended such visits be discouraged by advising Air Force that requested technical discussions deal with matters outside FBI investigative jurisdiction and that any information we possess concerning chemical and biological warfare matters originated with military chemical and biological units.

By letter, September 17, 1965, to Assistant to the Director Belmont, [redacted] Resources Management Group, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air Force, requested FBI authorize intermittent visits by personnel of Dunlap and Associates, Incorporated, no address given, an Air Force contractor, for technical discussions concerning chemical and biological warfare matters. Dunlap and Associates was awarded the contract by the Air Proving Ground Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, to conduct a program of study and evaluation designed to determine the extent of clandestine chemical and biological attack modes which could be employed against Air Force installations, to analyze the vulnerability of Air Force installations to such attacks and to develop procedures to detect and minimize such attacks. On behalf of Dunlap and Associates, Air Force has requested we allow four Dunlap and Associates scientists - [redacted] all certified by Air Force to possess "Top Secret" clearances, to visit FBI facilities intermittently for eight months, beginning September 15, 1965, for technical discussions in connection with their work under this contract.

b6
b7C

On September 21, 1965, [redacted] advised Liaison Agent that the entire responsibility for monitoring and evaluating results of this Air Force contract with Dunlap and Associates rested with the Air Proving Ground Center at Eglin Air Force Base and that his

Enclosure
BCR:hke (8)

REC 14 100-93216-1066
EX-112
9-23-65

CONTINUED - OVER

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Conrad
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Jevons
1-Mr. [redacted]
1-Liaison
1-Mr. [redacted]

11 OCT 11 1965

5-[redacted]

b6
b7C

office was strictly an intermediary. He recognized his letter was nonspecific and did not clearly define the type of technical assistance desired but admitted his office was unable to supply anything more specific. It was pointed out to [redacted] that the assistance requested appeared to be somewhat outside the area of FBI investigative responsibility and that any information we might possess in this area would likely have originated with military chemical and biological units. He recognized the need in this instance, should the Air Force desire to pursue this matter, for Air Force to more clearly specify the type of technical assistance desired and recognized the desirability from our standpoint of dealing with the Air Force in this matter rather than an individual contractor. [redacted] sympathized with the FBI position in this matter, pointing out he had reservations concerning this request at the time referenced letter was directed to us. b6 b7C

OBSERVATIONS:

This Air Force request, which apparently emanated with Dunlap and Associates, is nonspecific and unclear. Although we might in limited instances discuss technical matters with private contractors, we should discourage such a contact in this instance even though Air Force Intelligence certified to Air Force interest. The matter of clandestine chemical and biological warfare is certainly outside the scope of our investigative and technical responsibilities. However, if Air Force feels there is any specific area in which we could be of technical assistance, such a request should be clearly defined by the Air Force so we could make an intelligent evaluation of any possible assistance we might offer. We should, however, deal directly with Air Force as a matter of policy rather than an Air Force contractor unless circumstances might justify other action.

This matter has been coordinated with Inspector [redacted] and Section Chief R. H. Jevons of the Laboratory Division. It is noted Bureau files contain no derogatory information concerning Dunlap and Associates or its personnel above named. b6 b7C

ACTION:

That the attached letter advising Air Force that the technical assistance requested would appear outside our investigative responsibilities, and that any information we might possess in this area would have emanated with the military, be approved for transmittal by Liaison.

Handled 9-28-65 BBR

BK

- 2 -

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/25/65

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

On 10/25/65, [redacted] was contacted. He said [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

In addition, [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted on approximately 11/15/65.

EX-PROC.

(2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:ap
(4)

REC-47 100-93216-1067

EX-107

15 OCT 27 1965

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/ BJA/DFW

50 NOV 1 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Conrad

1 - Mr. Conrad
DATE: October 29, 1965
1 - Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C
1 - Office, 7133

FROM : R. H. Jevons

Biological Warfare

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 8/31/65,
b7D concerning [redacted]

By letter dated 10/28/65, [redacted] b7D

b7D [redacted]

ACTION: None. For information only.

100-93216

1 - Mr. Sullivan (with attachment)
CGM:bas
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/OFW

3 ENCLOSURE

REC- 52 100-93216-1068

25 NOV 4 1965

51 NOV 12 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/24/65

FROM : EMD SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-22-04 BY 60226 ucn/s/BJA/DFW

[redacted] was contacted 11/23/65. [redacted] stated that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] will be contacted on or about 12/15/65 for additional information. b6 b7C b7D

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:mhe
(4)

REC-10 100-93216-1069

EX-112

NAT'L INFO SECT

12 NOV 26 1965

LABORATORY

57 DEC 16 1965

b6 b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/17/65

FROM SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-22-04 BY 60262 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

On 12/15/65, [redacted] was contacted. [redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

In view of this, the next contact with [redacted] will be attempted during the latter part of February, 1966.

b6
b7C
b7D

K. W. Bittner AA

100-93216-1070

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:lbp
(4)

REC-67

10 DEC 20 1965

NAT. DIV. SEC.

LABORATORY

[redacted]

b6
b7C

51 DEC 27 1965

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 12/8/65

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESP - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/BJA/DFW

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies each of 12 Agent Reports of [redacted] b7D

The following is a synopsis of information set out in these reports:

b7D [redacted]

b7D [redacted]

b7D [redacted]

(2) - Bureau REGIS. MAIL
1 - Baltimore
MEG:ers

[redacted]

24 - ENCLOSURE

"ENCL. BEHIND FILE"

EC-103

100-93216-1071

WHITE HOUSE ON SOVIET SECTION

b6
b7C [redacted]

1 DEC 23 1965

Laboratory DIV. SEC.

10 JAN 5 1966

5 DEC 28 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. DeLoach

February 25, 1966

1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Office, 7133

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/8/04 BY 60324 uc/pks/baw/05

Dr. Van M. Sim
Deputy Medical Director
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland 21010

Biological Warfare

Dear Dr. Sim:

My associates, Assistant Special Agent in Charge Harold Hart and Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] have informed me of the courtesies extended to them during their visit to the Edgewood Arsenal facility on February 17, 1966.

The obligations of this Bureau regarding the internal security of the nation and the training of law enforcement officers make it essential that this Bureau be aware of research and developments in the use of chemical agents. Therefore, your kind offer of continued assistance is greatly appreciated. In accordance with your discussion with Special Agent [redacted] he will periodically confer with you concerning those matters.

Please be assured of my desire to be of assistance in all matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

100-93216
1 - Baltimore

NOTE: Based on memorandum R. H. Jevons to Mr. Conrad dated 2/24/66, under the caption: DR. VAN M. SIM
DEPUTY MEDICAL DIRECTOR
EDGEWOOD ARSENAL, MARYLAND
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

CGM:bas
(10)

MAILED 7
FEB 25 1966
COMM-FBI

5 5 MAR 8 1966

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

100-93216
NOT RECORDED
241 MAR 3 1966

62-110712-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO b6 b7C Mr. Casper

DATE: February 21, 1966

FROM [redacted]

Biological Warfare

SUBJECT: DR. V. M. SIM
DEPUTY MEDICAL DIRECTOR
EDGEWOOD ARSENAL, MARYLAND

b6
b7C

Reference is made to my memorandum dated January 24, 1966, which recommended and it was approved ASAC Harold K. Light visit the Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, for a tour and a demonstration of riot control agents.

On February 17, 1966, Light accompanied by Supervisors [redacted] and [redacted] from the Laboratory Division visited the Arsenal and spoke with Dr. Sim and a [redacted] Medical Corps.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted] The Laboratory Division contemplates continuing liaison with Edgewood Arsenal to keep abreast with new developments along these lines.

Dr. Sim advised they are in the process of writing a script for a riot control movie and on its completion will submit it to the Bureau for our review.

ACTION:

None . . . Informative.

1 - Laboratory Division

HKL:les

(4) FMB

55 MAR 8 1966

MAR 2 1966

100-93216-

MAR 3 1966

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/08/04 BY uc 24 Tuc/sis/sp/ac

NOT RECORDED 12 JUL 11 1966

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 2/25/66

FROM: SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet 12/17/65.

On 2/25/66, contact was made with [redacted] and it was determined that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

In view of this, [redacted] will be contacted approximately March 15, 1966, and the Bureau advised of the results.

2 - Bureau (REG.AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
WJC:FR
(3)

REC 5 100-93216-1072

ST-109

10 FEB 28 1966

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/BJA/DRW

70 MAR 14 1966

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad

FROM : R. H. Jevons

SUBJECT:

b6
b7C

1 - Mr. Conrad (Enc.)
1 - Mr. [redacted] (Enc.)
DATE: February 24, 1966
1 - Office, 7133 (Enc.)

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C

By memorandum from SAC Sloan to Assistant Director Casper dated 1/24/66, [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

Enclosure sent 2-25-66
100-93216
1 - Mr. Mohr (Enclosure)
1 - Mr. Casper (Enclosure)
1 - Mr. Sullivan (Enclosure)
1 - Mr. DeLoach (Enclosure)

EX-113 REC-82 100-93216-1073

4 MAR 10 1966

CGM:bas
(8)

55 MAR 18 1966

CONTINUED - OVER

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/25/66

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Referral/Direct

[redacted] on March 25, 1966, advised as follows:

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 uc/rls/BJA/DEW

[redacted]

Above for information of Bureau and New York.

REC-13 100-93216-1074

3 - Bureau REGIS. MAIL
1 - New York (Info) REGIS. MAIL
1 - Baltimore
MEG:ers
(5)

20 MAR 26 1966

CC Wick

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/31/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C
b7D

Remylet 2/25/66.

On 3/30/66, [redacted] was contacted.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during the latter part of April, 1966.

b6
b7C
b7D

EX 109

REC 36/00-93216-1015

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Salt Lake City

WJG:pa
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/BJA/DFW

15 APR 13 1966

b6
b7C

7 APR 18 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-106

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/28/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Remylet dated 3/31/66.

On 4/25/66, [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] will be contacted for additional information during May, 1966. b6 b7C b7D

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:mhe
(4)

REC-3 100-93216-1076

FX-112

TO MAY 1966 b6 b7C

Laboratory

NAT. SEC.

MAY 11 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/27/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet 4/28/66.

On 5/25/66, [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] will again be contacted during June, 1966.

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:mhe
(4)

REC 33 100-93216-1077

EX 109

16 MAY 31 1966

50 JUN 14 1966

EX-PRO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-22-03 BY 60226 uc/n/s/BJA/DFW

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 6/3/66

Transmit the following in ~~PLAINTEXT~~ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL (Priority)

b6
b7C

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Referral/Direct

On 6/3/66, [redacted] advised as follows:

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-22-04 BY 60260 7uc/nb/BJA/DFW

EX-114 REC 36

100-93216

3-Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1-New York (Info) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1-Baltimore
MEG:med
(5)

14 JUN 4 1966

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-4

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/28/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet 5/27/66.

On 6/28/66, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during July, 1966. b6 b7C b7D

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:pw
(4)

REC-82 100-93216-1077

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-27-04 BY 60260 ucnls/BJA/DFW

18 JUN 30 1966

SEC'd

JUL 12 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/29/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C
b7D

Remylet 6/28/66.

On 7/28/66, [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

REC 5

100-93216-1080

2 - Bureau (REG, AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

55 SEP 7 1966

MJG:mhe
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-2-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

4 AUG 1 1966

NAT. INT. SEC.

EXP. PROC.

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 8/31/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C
b7D

Remylet 7/29/66.

On 8/31/66, [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will be recontacted during September, 1966.

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

REC-21 100-93216-1081

11 SEP 2 1966

WJG:mhe
(4)

55 SEP 12 1966

b6
b7C

NAT. INT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-27-04 BY 60226 ucdnls/BSA/DAU

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106-05

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 9/29/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet 8/31/66.

On 9/26/66, [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted in October, 1966.

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:deb
(4)

REC- 18 100-93716-1083

EX 106

5 OCT 3 1966

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

(2)

GR. SEC.
NAT. INT. SEC.

[redacted] SEC.

OCT 12 1966 KBW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/31/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re SU letter 9/29/66.

Inquiry at [redacted] has indicated that [redacted] will be contacted on his return [redacted] and an appropriate letter submitted to the Bureau. b6 b7C b7D

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:mhe
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267uc/nls/BJA/DFW

REC 53 100-93216-1083

18 NOV 2 1966

EX-108

NAT. SEC.

53 NOV 10 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/29/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter, 10/31/66.

[redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted] on 11/28/66. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted in December, 1966.

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-22-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BSA/DFW

(2) - Bureau - REGISTERED - AM
1 - Salt Lake City
WJG:MEN
(3)

REC 22 100-93216-1084

DEC 9 1966

DEC 13 1966

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/29/66

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

Re Salt Lake City letter to the Bureau dated 11/29/66.

On 12/27/66, inquiry was made [redacted] and it was determined that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

He will be contacted during January, 1967, and appropriate letter forwarded to the Bureau.

(2) - Bureau - REGISTERED - AM
1 - Salt Lake City

WJG:lkr
(3)

EX-105

REC-19 100-93216-1085

12 JAN 4 1967

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-22-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

EX-104

DFT. SEC.

6 JAN 9 1967

FILED

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/31/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re SU letter to Bureau dated 12/29/66.

On 1/30/67, [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during February, 1967. b6 b7C b7D

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:mhe
(4)

REC [redacted] 100-93216-1056

FEB 2 1967

FEB 10 1967

NAT. DEF. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-27-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFH

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 2/28/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to the Bureau dated 1/31/67.

On 2/27/67, [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

EXP. PROC.

33

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during March, 1967.

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

REC-103 59 100-93216-1087

MAR 2 1967

JLT:deb
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-27-04 BY 60267 uc/als/BJA/DFW

6 MAR 14 1967

b6
b7C

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/29/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Re Salt Lake City letter to the Bureau dated 2/28/67.

On 3/28/67, [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during April, 1967.

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JLT:dy
(4)

REC 48 100-93216-1088

EX-103

8 MAR 31 1967

6 APR 11 1967

NAT. INT. SEC.

b6
b7C

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 4/28/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

b6
b7C

Re Salt Lake City letter to the Bureau dated 3/29/67.

On 4/27/67, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

was contacted by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during May, 1967.

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JLT:dy

REC 49 100-93216-1089

EX 109

11 MAY 1 1967

56 MAY 8 1967

55

NAT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-106

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-30-94 60324 uc/rls/BCTA/DFW

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/31/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 uc/als/ BJA/DFW

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau dated 4/28/67.

On 5/26/67, [redacted] was contacted by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during June, 1967.

REC-14 100-1216-1090

JUN 2 1967

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JLT:pw
(4)

NAT. INT. SEC.

5 JUN 8-1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 6/30/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau dated 5/31/67.

On 6/30/67, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during July, 1967. b6 b7C b7D

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JLT:dy
(4)

EX-103
REC-61 100-93216-1091

11 JUL 5 1967

51JUL10196

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 7/28/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau, dated 6/30/67.

b6
b7C
b7D

was contacted on 7/26/67, by SA stated that

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

will again be contacted during August, 1967.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

EX-115

REC 82

100-93216-1012

AUG 15
JUL 31 1967

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

WJG:brs

51 AUG 16 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 8/31/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau dated 7/28/67.

[redacted] was contacted 8/30/67, by SA [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] will again be contacted during September, 1967.

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JLT:deb
(4)

EX 106 REC 16 100-93216-1093

18 SEP 5 1967

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

NAT. INT. SEC.

6 SEP 19 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 9/28/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BOA/DFC

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau 8/31/67.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was contacted 9/26/67 by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during October, 1967.

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City
JLT:FR
(4)

REC-75 100-93216-1094

13 OCT 3 1967

EX-106

OCT 4 3 30 PM '67

NAT. SEC.

53 OCT 5 1967

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/31/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

L. W. [illegible] 759 Lab -

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau 9/28/67.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was contacted 10/30/67 by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] will again be contacted during November, 1967.

b6
b7C
b7D

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
JLT:FR
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-30-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

REC-64 100-93216-1095

EX-108

9 NOV 2 1967

NATL. INT. SEC.

3NOV 7 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/30/67

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau, 10/31/67.

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

was contacted 11/30/67 by SA [redacted]

b6 b7C b7D [redacted]

[redacted] will be contacted during December, 1967. b6 b7C b7D

(2) - Bureau - REG. AM)
1 - Salt Lake City
JLT:MEN
(3)

RECEIVED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-30-09 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

REC-42 100-93216-1096

EX 101

15 DEC 5 1967

NAT. INV. SEC.

Laboratory

DEC 14 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/2/68

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to the Bureau, 11/30/67.

b6
b7C
b7D

Attempts were made on 12/18/67, to contact [redacted] was not available for interview.

Recent contacts [redacted] have indicated that [redacted] and has indicated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will be contacted during January, 1968.

(2) - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City
JLT:srs
(4)

REC 36 EX-103

100-[illegible]16-1077

13 JAN 4 1968

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

NAT. SEC.

9 JAN 1 91968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-106

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 1/31/68

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet dated 1/2/68.

[redacted] was contacted on 1/29/68, by SA [redacted] advised [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during March 1968.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

REC 48

100-93216-1098

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JLT:tw
(4)

EX 106

22 FEB 5 1968

b6
b7C

FEB 12 1968

INV. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 3/29/68

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted] b6 b7C

Laboratory

Remylet dated 1/31/68.

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

was contacted on 3/27/68 by SA [redacted]

advised that [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D will again be contacted during May, 1968.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-30-04 BY 65216 uc/nls/BDA/DFS

REC-75 100-93216-1094

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

JLT:dy
(4)

APR 8 1968

5 - Washington

INT. SEC.

57 APR 12 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

3010-106

SU 65-1122

Bureau attention is invited to [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

b6 [redacted] advised that [redacted]
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

This information has been furnished to the Bureau in the event of [redacted] and no investigation is being conducted at the present time b7D [redacted] in this matter.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 5/31/68

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/12/04 BY 60267 UC/NCS/BJA/CB

Remylet dated 3/29/68.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was contacted on 5/28/68 by SA [redacted] b6 b7C

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised that since last contacted,

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted during July, 1968.

REC 102

100-73616-1100

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

2 JUN 3 1968

JLT:lbp
(4)

59 JUN 6- 1968

NR-IA C

SOVIET SECTION

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. S. TAVEL / Asst

b6
b7C

FROM : [redacted] / Encs

DATE: 7-9-68

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-30-04 BY 60267 ucnls/BJA/DFW

The attached Civil Defense Research Project has been received in the Records Branch, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Branch, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure."

100-93216-1102
NOT RECORDED
6 JUL 9 1968

Enc.

ENC. BEHIND FILE

54 JUL 12 1968

100-93216

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G[illegible]NT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/30/68

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet dated 5/31/68.

Attempts were made to contact [redacted] b6 b7C b7D on 7/19/68 and 7/29/68, with negative results.

[redacted] was not available on either of these b6 b7C b7D dates for interview, and will be contacted during the month of August for information concerning [redacted]

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City
JLT:FR
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-30-84 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
#977600

EX-103

100-93216 1104

REC-35 10 AUG 1 1968

59 AUG 8 1968

NAT. INT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-106



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 8/30/68

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-31-05 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW #977600

Remylet dated 7/30/68.

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D was contacted on 8/27/68 by SA [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

b7D [redacted]

b7D [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D stated that [redacted]

b7D [redacted]

[redacted] will again be contacted in October, 1968. b6 b7C b7D

REC-21 100-93216-1105

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City
JLT:dy
(4)

EX-101

25 SEP 3 1968

NATIONAL SEC[illegible]

9 SEP 12 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DIRECTOR, FBI 10/7/68

SAC, BUFFALO (62-1305)(C)

UNSUB;
Allegations By [redacted] b6 b7C
[redacted] in September, 1968, and
October, 1960, Regarding Use of
Biological Weapons by Russian
Scientists Against the West
IS-R WARFARE, CHEMICAL WARFARE

100-836-15

ReBuairtel to Buffalo 10/2/68, captioned as above and Buffalo letter to Bureau 9/19/68, with enclosed LHM dated 9/19/68, at Buffalo bearing instant caption.

There is enclosed herewith for Bureau a xerox copy of a photostat which was made of an enclosure which had been received at the Buffalo FBI Office 10/29/60, with a cover letter from [redacted] dated 10/28/60, with which she also transmitted other items. b6 b7C

The original enclosure received from [redacted] was returned to her since she had requested its return. In the cover letter, the only statement made by [redacted] relative to instant enclosure was as follows: b6 b7C

"I've hesitated about sending you the enclosed copy of a letter I recently received from abroad. As I have explained in a foreward, I carefully destroyed the original and the envelope, remembering what happened to [redacted] At any rate, the letter is moving, and my husband, who reads and writes Russian fluently said it was 'Russian written in English.'" b6 b7C

ORIGINAL FILED IN

100-93216

NOT RECORDED
183 OCT 31 1968

3 - Bureau (Enc. 1)(AM)(RM)
1 - Buffalo

TJS;rmm
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267UE/NLS/BJ4/CB

67 OCT 31 1968

It is noted that the last line of page 1 of the enclosure is not complete. This is the way the line appears on the photostat in the Buffalo Office file and is not a defect in the xeroxing of the copy enclosed for the Bureau.

The Buffalo Office is unable to locate any previous correspondence re enclosure with the Bureau, and the enclosure is being sent to the Bureau for review in its entirety because it is written in a manner which makes portions of it very difficult to understand, particularly the portions contained in the last paragraph of page 1, and the first full paragraph of page 2. These paragraphs deal generally with the existence of a virus in the "New Lands" (of Russia), and at one point contain ~~contain~~ the statement, "Then soon it shall appear in great quantities in the West liberty world, with your physicians who have been subordinated."

[redacted] in the postscript to her letter of 9/11/68, describes the enclosure which was written in 1960, as a letter reflecting "that Russian scientists had perfected a terrible illness which destroys lung tissue, and they had developed this as a secret biological weapon which they were even then using on the West." This interpretation by [redacted] b6 b7C [redacted] of the ambiguous phraseology of the enclosure is subject to considerable question. [redacted] used this interpretation for the purpose of suggesting that her own husband may now be the victim of a Soviet developed biological weapon, whereas on a previous occasion in a letter written to the FBI dated 5/31/68, [redacted]

It is also noted that in the postscript to her letter of 9/11/68, [redacted] describes the enclosure flatly as "a letter written to me by a Russian medical scientist," whereas in the foreward she wrote in 1960 at the top of page 1 of the enclosure, she said the writer "is apparently a physician-scientist" and that the letter had been received from a "free" country in Europe. b6 b7C

[redacted] postscript to her letter of 9/11/68, and pertinent portions of instant enclosure were set forth in referenced Buffalo LHM dated 9/19/68, to reflect for the reader the various liberties which [redacted] resorts to in her correspondence, which liberties serve to b6 b7C

alter materially the importance and possible meaning of other items of correspondence furnished by her previously.

Buffalo taking no further action UACB.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 10/29/68

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE 8-31-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BOM/DFW

Remylet dated 8/30/68.

[redacted] was contacted on 10/22/68, by SA [redacted] advised that [redacted] was unable to furnish [redacted] advised that [redacted] stated [redacted] and he believes that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

REC 55 100-93216-1106

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] will again be contacted in December, 1968.

2 - Bureau (REG.AM)
2 - Salt Lake City
LHB:srs
(4)

12 OCT 31 1968

NOV 13 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/8/68

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (66-891)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESP - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267uc/plm/baw

Enclosed for the Bureau and Chicago are one copy each of three pages from the National Review dated 10/8/68.

Referral/Direct

[redacted] requested a meeting with SA [redacted] a Resident Agent, Frederick, Maryland, on 11/4/68, at which meeting [redacted]

b6
b7C

In this connection they have been made aware of an article which appeared in the 10/8/68 edition of the National Review which deals with an alleged attempt by three young people in Chicago who were supposed to have attempted to "turn on" Chicago during the Democratic National Convention in that city by dumping crystalized LSD into a Chicago water treatment plant at 2:30 a.m. on 8/22/68.

Referral/Direct

[redacted]

REC- 56 100-93216-1108

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL) (Enc. 1)
2 - Chicago (REGISTERED MAIL) (Enc. 1)
2 - Baltimore
RRL:csm
(6)

SI-113

1 NOV 15 1968

1 - ENCLOSURE

SOUTHERN SECTION

61 NOV 21 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Chicago is requested to determine if information relating to such an incident is available and if so whether or not it can be made available to the Baltimore Division for transmittal to

[redacted]

Wm. F. Buckley Jr. on
THE ATTACK on POPE PAUL

NATIONAL REVIEW

—the
Berkeley campus; and by crime I don't
mean anti-intellectualism, or a
speech by Humphrey (JOHN R. COYNE, JR.

"HEROES IN THE SEAWEED," a report
Newport by a hippy
anqué (ANTHONY R. DOLAN)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/pws/sj 4608

b6
b7C

Shlack Power
AVID BRUDNOY—Professor Brudnoy
you, baby.

100-932116-1108
ENCLOSURE

WM. F. BUCKLEY JR.

The Reaction to the Encyclical

On The Right

New York, Sept. 17—The reaction to the encyclical of Pope Paul VI has been of many kinds, ranging from intelligent and conscientious, all the way over to *Punch*. *Punch* is the well-known English humor magazine of illustrious lineage which is nowadays edited by Bernard Hollowood, who continues to believe, one suspects, that his journal is the last word in civilized chic. He greeted the encyclical with a long editorial entitled "Sex and the Single Pope" (*Punch* thinks of itself as a taste-setter), accompanied by an enormous cartoon depicting a complacent Pope Paul being carried in his papal throne on the shoulders of a mass of emaciated, scrofulous children, and the caption, "Suffer little children . . ."

The encyclical, says *Punch*, "has saddened all humanists who were under the impression that dogmatic religion was losing its doleful grip on the mind of man." But the editor is not nearly through. "It is clear," he laments, that many people have "not yet been able to escape into independence of mind from the mysticism and bigotry of ancient times."

The only good thing about the encyclical, says the editor, who begins to sound like John Galt, is that it will drive "another nail in the coffin of organized mysticism." Unfortunately, in the meantime, "countless millions of lives will be blighted by the totalitarianism of fearful faith before mankind as a whole ascends to the age of reason." (Now he sounds like Robespierre.) And, by way of reiterating his disgust, "What is so staggering about the current controversy is that so much attention should be paid to the mental processes and decisions of one man and his team of male advisers living unnaturally and remotely in a miasma of outdated obsessions." There follow a few stretches of factual misinformation ("Intercourse, says the Pope, is immoral unless there is in it the possibility of the transmission of life"—the Pope says no such thing), ending up with a pitch for the overthrowing of "*decrepit dogma*."

Now there are many grounds for disagreeing with the conclusions reached by the Pope. Non-Catholics are, to begin with, free of any ties that bind them to submission to papal authority. Even so, they are competent to examine the Pope's reasoning, though their views on the matter, if they speak as *Punch* does, i.e. like the village atheist, are of course uninteresting or rather interesting for different reasons than they think.

But others raise perfectly legitimate questions, and it is obviously the responsibility of Catholic spokesmen to do the best they can to acknowledge that consequences of Catholic teaching are visited not only on Catholics but also on others, and that although the community of the generous will concede that that is sometimes good, some will argue that that is sometimes bad: as in the present instance. Overpopulation, for instance in Latin America, will not become an exclusively Catholic problem.

A prominent Jewish theologian, Dr. Will Herberg, writes about the population explosion that, after all, there are at least three known ways of coping with it. One is contraception. A second is abortion. A third, and far and away the most efficient, is infanticide. "It is sure, painless, and it enables the parents or society to select which children, boys or girls, are to be preserved. Moreover, infanticide was practiced, for perhaps a thousand years, by the most civilized people of antiquity, the Greeks." So why not?

"*Because and only because it runs counter to our moral convictions.* In other words," says Dr. Herberg, "approval or disapproval of any particular method of population control, including contraception, is basically a moral, not primarily a medical or a demographical question." Accept that structural insight, and the argument can go forward. Refuse to accept it, and you will sound punchy.

The Catholic Church is in great ferment, as everybody knows. As not everybody knows, the efforts of the renewalists are in many cases driving Catholics away from the Church. "Catholic renewalists," observes Protestant theologian Martin Marty, "engage in overkill when their attempt to reform the Church leads to their removal from it."

The crisis of authority is the derivative crisis. It is more important by far, ultimately, than the population explosion because if moral authority and moral considerations, indeed if all of religion, is extirpated from the face of the earth, there will then be, and for the first time, good reason for wishing that there should be an end not merely to the population explosion, but to population. □

THE ATTEMPT TO TURN ON CHICAGO

New York, Sept. 20 — My young visitor chatted about some of the achievements of the chemical industry and some of its headaches. For instance, how to protect city water supplies. Take what happened a few days ago just before the convention opened in Chicago, the young chemical engineer went on. The cops caught a couple of hippies pouring a fortune's worth of LSD into the city water supply. What they didn't know is what any freshman in chemistry would know, that chlorine neutralizes lysergic acid, so that the LSD didn't take. The police have hushed up the story—they don't want the city to panic. It's bad enough as it is (we spoke on the day that Mr. Humphrey was nominated).

Little did I know how resolutely the police intended to guard their secret. I reported the incident to the editors of *Combat*, NATIONAL REVIEW's new anti-leftist newsletter, and an account of it appeared in the opening issue. *Time* Magazine, appraising that issue, labeled the story as "more colorful than correct, since there are no reservoirs in Chicago, and LSD would have no effect anyway." The *New York Times* checked out the story: and was informed, one infers from the subsequent silence, that it was apocryphal.

Here are the facts (My God, I sound like Drew Pearson!): Chicago's "reser-

voir" is Lake Michigan. Nobody is likely to attempt to contaminate Lake Michigan, so that the Chicago police, putting on *Time* and the *New York Times*, were technically correct in saying that nobody threw LSD into Chicago's "reservoir." What happens between Lake Michigan and the drinking glass, however, is that the water is drawn from Lake Michigan, filtered, and then stored and chlorinated in lakeside banks. At 2:30 A.M. on August 22, a guard at one of the newer water treatment plants, built on 51 acres of filled-in lakefront, surprised two boys and a girl, all three of them from the Chicago area and all of them in their early twenties, dumping a quart-sized glass jar of crystallized LSD into the plant's final holding tank. Although the miscreants have since then been utterly uncommunicative, acting on the advice of their lawyer, they did admit, on being apprehended, that they had poured out the contents of a quart into the holding tank every single night for a week, and were baffled at their failure to turn on Chicago.

The police sent the empty jar to the laboratory to confirm that its contents were LSD. They then shut off the bank, tested the water, and found it pure. Indeed, they even found that the chlorine content was at the normal level (one part per million parts of water). This was testimony to a smoothly functioning automatic chlorine regulator which pumped in more as existing chlorine was dissipated by the LSD. At the ratio of one/one-million, the holding tank could have absorbed twenty times as much LSD as had been tossed into it, raising the interesting question: what would happen if more than twenty times as much acid as was used in Chicago were poured into a reservoir which, unlike the supermodern installation in Chicago, doesn't have the benefit of an automatic chlorinator?

And what if—the chemical engineer gave several examples—other drugs and most frighteningly poisons, of the variety that are not neutralized by chlorine, were introduced into the water systems? There are infinite variables in the situation. Opium, for instance, does not deliquesce at an even rate, like LSD: so that an attempt to turn on a city by opium could result in one individual's drinking a perfectly harmless dose at one drinking fountain, while his neighbor, at an adjacent fountain, gulped down a lethal dose.

The police in Chicago don't know what to do. There are plenty of laws knocking around. The flower children used a ladder, scaled a barbed wire fence, had no difficulty in reaching over to the ground level tanks, which are covered only by open grillwork. There is order to keep the story quiet. If on the other hand they did prosecute, even *Time* and the *New York Times* would hear about it, and the craze might spread. On the other hand, three contaminators could be sent up for a good long time if you add together all the laws they violated, including, possibly, a federal national security statute. As always, a dilemma.

Chicago has meanwhile instituted, following the episode of a fortnight ago, a 24-hour guard over its water reservoirs, and young chemists, who know the horrors that deranged laboratory technicians are capable of, tremble at the thought of what could be. □

A GREAT DEBATE? *New York*, Sept. 26—You will see the pressure increase on Congress to pass special legislation to permit the networks to single out the two leading Presidential contenders for special treatment. The idea is to relieve the networks of the statutory obligation to provide equal time to all candidates, from Richard Nixon to Lar Daly. Two questions are posed:

1) Should Congress oblige? It was much easier to say yes in 1960 when John Kennedy and Richard Nixon were the candidates of about 99 per cent of the people. Today the third candidate, George Wallace, is the apparent choice of approximately 20 per cent of the people, so that there would be no disguising the fact that congressional legislation favoring Humphrey and Nixon would be something of a bill of attainder against George Wallace, as a House committee has in effect acknowledged.



But then the networks are not disposed to grant equal time to George Wallace, and the two principal candidates are emphatic in their refusal to debate with Wallace. That would appear to present a dilemma—which, however, is hardly impassable. Surely the thing for Congress to do is nothing at all (so often the right thing for Congress to do). Let the candidates purchase their network time. Coast-to-coast prime time costs a great deal of money, but then the candidates have a great deal of money, and it is deceptive for them to go about poor-mouthing as though any failure by Congress to act, will mean their inability to reach the voters the candidates, including Wallace, show that money has been committed even as it stands for prime time TV. This is still a partially free country, and if Nixon and Humphrey want to debate without Wallace, let them hire the time, split the cost, and proceed to do so, end problem.

Except 2) that the question naturally arises in the Nixon camp, should Nixon debate? One begins a discussion of the question by recalling that he has said that he would debate the Democratic candidate and that, to be sure, is a problem.

The ethics on the matter of debate between Presidential contenders have not crystallized. 1960 was, of course, the first debate; and the magnitude of its consequences has not yet been thoroughly assimilated. A year or two after taking office, President Kennedy was asked point-blank whether he would debate the Republican candidate in 1964. Under the influence, presumably, of a chivalrous sense of obligation to an encounter that propelled him into the White House, Kennedy said yes, he would. Lyndon Johnson said no, and was subject to a little teasing by the Goldwater people, but Johnson loftily replied that he did not believe it prudent for a President of the United States to submit to debate, and I for one agree with him. Agree not only with his position but with the larger position involving not only Presidents but also Presidential candidates.

I do not believe that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Humphrey should debate. The stakes are too high, and are awarded to a candidate for reasons extrinsic to his qualifications for office. It often happens that one and the same man is brilliantly qualified to lead his country and to win a debate—one thinks of Lincoln and Churchill. But it often happens otherwise, and I struggle to make the point without partisanship. Thomas Dewey could unquestionably have chopped off FDR's head in a debate, but although I'd have preferred him as President, indeed all the more so if he had chopped off FDR's head, I cannot relate my preference for him to his obviously superior skill at debate.

Nixon and Humphrey are, forensically, pretty well matched. But suppose one of them has a bad night? What about the gambles the runner-up is in a position to take? Do we really desire to stretch even further the telegenic aspect of the candidate? If I were Nixon I'd say: no. He will take a lot of flak for it, but so what else is new. Better to say it flatly like LBJ, than to fiddle around with all kinds of contrivances like waiting for congressional action and the rest of it. Better not to be tricky. □

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 11/21/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (98-1616)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESP-SABOTAGE

Re Baltimore letter 11/8/68.

Baltimore may wish to advise appropriate officials at Fort Detrick, Maryland, that Director THOMAS LYONS, Intelligence Division, Chicago, Illinois Police Department, has advised that a thorough investigation of allegations regarding efforts to introduce LSD into Chicago's water supply, which appeared in the National Review, showed these allegations were "completely false."

Baltimore may also wish to refer interested officials at Fort Detrick to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which reportedly has conducted extensive research in this field.

b6
b7C

EX-102

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Baltimore (RM)
1 - Chicago
HM:meb
(5)

REC-20 100-93216-1109

12 NOV 22 1968

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/B;4/CB

SOVIET

7 DEC 6 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106-05

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 12/26/68

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Remylet dated 10/29/68.

On 12/16/68, [redacted] was interviewed by SA [redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/04 BY 60267 uc/ns/sj/4/cm

100-93216-1110

2 - Bureau (REG AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

LHB:ks
(4)

REC 54

16 DEC 30 1968

54 JAN 23 1969

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] b7D

b6
b7C
b7D [redacted] will be contacted again in February, 1969.

REC-2 100-93016-1112

REC-34 FEB 6 1969

FEB 4 11 17 AM '69

LIAISON SECTION, FBI

51 FEB 17 1969

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 2/25/69

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet dated 12/26/68.

On 2/17/69, [redacted] was interviewed by SA [redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted] will be contacted again in April, 1969.

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/10/98 BY 60322 uc/pms/bja/ms

REC 107

100-93216-1114

FEB 27 1969

2 - Bureau (REG. AM)
2 - Salt Lake City

CDH:deb
(4)

4 MAR 12 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-106

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 4/18/69

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Remylet, 2/25/69.

On 4/15/69, [redacted] was interviewed by SA [redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60322 uc/jms/bj 4/08

EX 110
REC 37

100-93216-1115

2 - Bureau
2 - Salt Lake City
CDH:cj
(4)

4 APR 21

APR 28 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SU 65-1122

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] b7D

b6
b7C
b7D [redacted] will again be contacted in June of 1969.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 6/24/69

FROM :SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122)(P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/dcs/Bja/cms

Remylet, 4/18/69.

On 6/13/69, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] was interviewed by SA [redacted]

advised that [redacted]

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] advised that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] b7D

100-93216

FX-115

REC-47

1 JUN 25 1969

SOVIET SECTION

(2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - Salt Lake City

CDH:jb23

5 JUL 1 - 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted] b7D

b6
b7C
b7D [redacted] will again be contacted in August, 1969.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 8/29/69

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau, 6/24/69.

On 8/28/69, [redacted] was interviewed by SA [redacted] advised that [redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60247 uc/pxs/cja/clb

EX-104

100-93216-1117

REC-19

(2) - Bureau
2 - Salt Lake City
ECS:cj
(4)

9 SEP 3 1969

5 SEP 8 1969

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-106

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 10/30/69

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau, 8/29/69.

Efforts to contact [redacted] b6 b7C b7D on 10/20/69 and 10/27/69, met with negative results due to the fact that [redacted] will be contacted immediately upon his return and a letter will be submitted concerning that interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60247 uc/lnc4/bja/cb

REC 25 [illegible] -1119

2 - Bureau
2 - Salt Lake City

ECS:jb
(4)

EX-105

3 NOV 3 1969

NOV 6 1969

INDEXED

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 12/5/69

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau, 10/30/69.

On 11/24/69, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D was interviewed by SA [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D stated that [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/Bj 4/ch

REC-15 100-93216-1121

18 DEC 8 1969

56 DEC 16 1969

EX-111

SOVIET SECTION

(2) - Bureau
2 - Salt Lake City
ECS:cj
(4)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-106

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216)

DATE: 1/31/70

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau, 12/5/69.

On 1/26/70, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] was interviewed by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

EX-105

(2) - Bureau
2 - Salt Lake City

REC- 66 100-93216-1122

ECS:lbp
(4)

16 FEB 4 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 UC/MLS/BJA/KS

FEB 11 1970

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 7/31/70

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P*)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to the Bureau, 1/31/70.

b6
b7C
b7D

On 7/27/70, [redacted] was interviewed by SA [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60324 uc/sks/sbj; a/cb

REC-62 100-93216-1124

(2) - Bureau
2 - Salt Lake City

EX-100

12 AUG 3 1970

HPW:deb
(4)

60 AUG 7 1970

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] further advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

100-93216-1126

REC-26 ~~100-93216-26~~

EX-111

4 OCT 30 1970

OCT 6 11 38 AM 1970

REC'D
FBI INTELL DIV

58 NOV 9 1970

NOV 19 1970

ST-110

REC 17 100-93216-1127

NOV 3 1970

AUG 11 4 08 AM 1970

REC'D
FBIHQ INTELL DIV.

61 NOV 19 1970

ST-110
REC 17 100-93216-128

1 NOV 3 1970

AUG 11 4 08 AM 1970

REC'D
DOM INTELL DIV.

61 NOV 19 1970

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-93216) DATE: 2/11/71

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (65-1122) (P*)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Re Salt Lake City letter to Bureau, 7/31/70.

On 2/8/71, [redacted] advised that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/pms/bja/ccb

EX-115

REC-71 100-93216-1137

16 FEB 16 1971

ESPIONAGE [redacted]
ESPIONAGE

(2) - Bureau
2 - Salt Lake City
JCC:cj
(4)

2/24/71 ltr to SAC, SG
2 cys

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

SAC, Salt Lake City (65-1122) 2/24/71

EX-10 REC-128 100-93216-11320-1to Su 3/15/71

EX-[illegible] Director, FBI (100-92316) 1 - Mr. Whitson

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE

Reurlet 2/11/71, advising [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

Inasmuch as the President, in effect, has stated that there will be no more testing of biological and chemical weapons, you should close this case.

LW:as
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60207 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAILED 22
FEB 24 1971
COMM-FBI

316
MAR 15 1971

FEB 26 1971

MAR 4 1971

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

EX-100

REC-32 100-93216-1134

17 DEC 3 1971

Nov 30 2 [illegible] PM 1971

REC'D

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(Attn: Intelligence Div.; Attn: FBI Laboratory)

DATE: 2/6/75

FROM: SAC, SAN ANTONIO (62-New) (C)

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION
[redacted]
[redacted] INFORMANTS
Texas

b6 b7C

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten (10) copies and for Dallas one (1) copy for information of an LHM setting forth information contained in an anonymous letter received by [redacted]

b6 b7C b7D

It is to be noted that the original anonymous letter is in the possession of [redacted]

b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] furnished the letters [redacted] to SA [redacted] and stated that [redacted] could not identify the author of the anonymous letter.

REC-18 100-93216-1136

Since the San Antonio Division is not in a position to evaluate the information in the anonymous letter, it is being set forth in an LHM for dissemination at the Bureau's discretion to other government agencies which might have an interest.

FEB 10 1975

No further action is being taken by San Antonio in this matter.

Note Information in the anonymous letter is [redacted]

b7D

SEVEN

ENCLOSURE

(2) - Bureau (Enc. 10)
1 - Dallas (Info.) (Enc. 1)
1 - San Antonio
JAY/jkh
(4)

10

1cc of LHM sent to Dallas 2/13/75

DIRECTOR
BIOMEDICAL LABORATORY
EDGEWOOD ARSENAL
U.S. ARMY
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND, 21010

7 MAR 6 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

Biol. Science Res. Lab

b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-04-2007 BY 60226 7uc/sbp/mlm

FBI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Antonio, Texas 78296
February 6, 1975

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE -
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

On [redacted]

[redacted] made available [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/pxs/Bja/cb

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-93816-1134

[redacted]

1 - Mr. Cochran
1 - Mr. Stack (Attn: [redacted]) b6 b7C

Glen E. Pommerening
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration (Attn [redacted]) b6 b7C
Thomas J. Jenkins
Deputy Associate Director

January 9, 1976

U. S. COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION - REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION

Your memorandum of January 8, 1976, with enclosures concerning the captioned matter has been received.

Attached is the certification prepared by Director Clarence M. Kelley as requested in your memorandum of January 8, 1976.

Enclosure

Biological Warfare

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/09 BY [illegible]

MAILED 5
JAN 9 1976
FBI

REC-25 100-93216-1138

EX 104

5 JAN 20 1976

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JC:bms
(5)

57 FEB 3 1976

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

0618

Foregin Broadcast Information Service
Daily Report for the Soviet Union
March 14, 1980

Biological warfare

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BjA/CB
Pgs. 1+2 OCA 12/9/04 60267 uc/NLS/BjA/CB

BRITISH MAGAZINE CITED ON BACTERIAL CATASTROPHE

DW141207 Hamburg BILD in German 27 Oct 79 (page unknown) DW

100-93216-

[Text] SAD, AFP London, 27 October--Several hundred people were killed in a catastrophe in a Soviet factory for bacteriological weapons, and thousands became mortally sick. This was disclosed yesterday by the British news magazine NOW.

The accident happened in June in Novosibirsk (population: 1.4 million), but has become known only now. Several thousand people were taken ill, the clinics were jammed, most of these people died quickly.

NOT RECORDED
MAR 18 1980

file in 100-93216-

59 MAR 4138

Their families were not allowed to see the corpses. The caskets were sealed. Some people nevertheless secretly looked at the dead. The corpses were dotted with brown spots.

Shortly after the accident the factory and the environment were disinfected with sprinkler trucks, and an entry and exit ban was imposed on Novosibirsk.

The Soviet authorities are keeping silent about the catastrophe. Possibly the Soviets experimented with a hitherto unknown death virus which can be spread by air, or a chemical combat agent was released in an explosion.

Former GDR scientist Frucht had disclosed a year ago that the Soviets are producing a terrible nerve gas. People become sick within 2 hours, vomit, writhe with stomach pain, then follows a circulatory collapse, and death.

'BACTERIOLOGICAL' EXPLOSION NEAR KASHINO REPORTED

DW140931 Hamburg BILD in German 13 Feb 80 (page unknown) DW

[Text] Moscow, 13 February--The research department of a Soviet factory for bacteriological bombs 1,500 kilometers east of Moscow is said to have exploded. Billions of deadly bacteria polluted the air in one of the most important Soviet industrial areas around Kashino in the Ural Mountains. More than 1,000 people died in great pain.

This is what a Western intelligence service has now ascertained. The people contaminated themselves through respiration: peasants in the fields, truck drivers and the bacteriological scientists themselves. A special department with military physicians and nurses from the Red Army was set up at the hospital in the city of Sverdlovsk, 35 km away. Between 30 and 40 new cases were brought in daily for a month, but the Soviets did not have any remedy against the terrible combat agent.

The contaminated people died within 4 hours after hospitalization because their lungs and trachea were paralyzed. The Soviet Government managed to keep the catastrophe secret for 10 months. It happened on the afternoon of 3 April 1979 on military installation No 19 near Kashino, a hamlet on the eastern side of the Ural Mountains.

The Soviets had also sought to keep another bacteriological accident near Novosobirsk in 1979 secret, though in vain. There too, hundreds of people died. BILD reported it. The victims of Kashino were not transported back to their families in an attempt to keep the cause of death quiet. After a brief funeral ceremony the corpses were cremated, eyewitnesses reported.

The local authorities suppressed reports on the mysterious mass deaths. Nothing but horror tales! Yet in early May construction gangs started to asphalt all roads around Kashino. In addition, bulldozers took off the upper layer of earth in the surrounding area to destroy even the smallest nest of bacteria.

1140

1

11/10/04
CLASSIFIED BY: 6026 TUC/NLS/BJA/CB
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 11/10/2029
Pg. 2, [redacted], Pg. 6, [redacted]s, DCA 11/29/04 6026 TUC/NLS/BJA/CB

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

1- Mr. E. J. O'Malley
1- Mr. T. E. Burns (CI-3A)
1- Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C
1- Mr.

BY LIAISON
Delivered 7/8/83 [illegible]

Date: July 7, 1983

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

To: Mr. Leonard E. Durham
Chief, Special Projects Branch
Community Counterintelligence Staff
Intelligence Community Staff

Bio[illegible]AL WARFARE

From: Edward J. O'Malley
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division

Subject: ~~SOVIET INTEREST IN~~
~~CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CBW)~~
~~ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES~~

The contents of this communication are classified "~~Secret~~" ~~in their entirety~~. As some of the information contained herein refers to current operational cases, it is requested that this document be handled on a need-to-know basis.

[redacted] b1 (S)

[redacted] (S)

b1 [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

Exec AD Adm.
Exec AD Inv. I-
Exec AD LES JCM:tgm (9)
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs.
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Insp.
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

1- 100-93216 (Bio-Chemical Warfare)
1- [redacted] in biological warfare) (S) b1

SEE NOTE PAGE SIX

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR

DE-105 100-93216-1141

ID JUL 20 1983


OK EGO KLL

68 AUG 24 1983

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Leonard E. Burham
Chief, Special Projects Branch



b1

We hope the above information proves to be of assistance to you.

5-134a (9-8-80)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

Warning - Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

INTERNAL CONTROL

Report Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Report No.: 3A-UR-770-1-83

Country: USSR

Date: August 26, 1983

Subject: THE SOVIET UNION AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE (DOI: June, 1983)

References: HQ 100-93216

This communication is classified "Secret" ~~in its entirety~~

Source: [redacted] (S) b1

Synopsis: [redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S) b1

11/10/04
CLASSIFIED BY: 6026 TUC/NLS/BJA/CB
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 11/10/2029
OCA 12/9/04 6026 TUC/NLS/BJA/CB

DE-105 100-93216-11/2

JAN 8 1984

CMB:jyl (8)

SAC, WFO SEE NOTE PAGE 3.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: 859
Declassify on: OADR

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Insp. ___
Intell. ___
Lab. ___
Legal Coun. ___
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Rec. Mgmt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

Distr.:
☑ State 8/29/83 RH
☑ CIA 8/29/83 RH
☑ NSA 8/29/83 RH
☑ DIA 8/29/83 RH
☐ Treasury
☐ Commerce
☐ DOE
☑ Other SAC, WFO

MAIL ROOM ☑

DELIVERED BY LIAISON 8/29/83 RH

61 FEB 2 '84

FBI/DO

Re: THE SOVIET UNION AND
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
(DOI: June, 1983)


[redacted] b1

(S)

SECRET

Re: THE SOVIET UNION AND
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
(DOI: June, 1983)

Note



b1

Cm3 1994

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1 - Mr. [redacted] b6
1 - Mr. J. L. Tierney b7C
(Attn: T. E. Burns)
1 - Ms. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

BY LIAISON

DELIVERED BY LIAISON
DATE 3/13/84

Date: March 9, 1984

To: [redacted] b6 b7C
National Foreign Intelligence Board

Attention: [redacted] Biological Warfare

From: Edward J. O'Malley
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division

Subject: [redacted] (S) b1

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" ~~in its entirety~~. Some of the information contained herein refers to current investigations. It is requested, therefore, that this document be handled on a need-to-know basis.

b1 [redacted] (S)

b1 [redacted] (S)

b1 [redacted] (S)

DE-105 100-[redacted] 1143

b1 [redacted] (S)

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Insp. ___
Intell. ___
Lab. ___
Legal Coun. ___
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Rec. Mgnt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

1 - 100-93216 (Bio-Chemical Warfare)
1 - [redacted] in Biological Warfare) (S) b1

7 MAR 14 1984

DRB:jyl (8)

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE ~~PAGE~~ 6.

Classified by: 859
Declassify on: OADR

11/10/04
CLASSIFIED BY: 60267uc/NCS/BJA/CLB
REASON: 1.4 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 11101 2029

MAIL ROOM

99 JUL 6 1984

784


A1, [redacted], A2, [redacted], A4, [redacted], OGA 11/22/04 60267uc/NCS/BJA/CLB

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b6
b7C

National Foreign Intelligence Board

NOTE:



The source of the information used in this paper is set out, where applicable, on the Bufile copy.

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serva. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____

Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Serva. _____
Training _____

FD-654 (12-2-83)

724

~~SECRET~~

Date 11-15-June 1984

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
- ☐ Confidential
- ☐ Secret
- ☑ Top Secret*
- ☑ SCI*

Mail Category:

Letter		Airtel	
LHM		Memo	
Report	X	Other	
Teletype			

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject Biological Warfare

Date of Mail 11-15-June 1984

Description of Material 00: [redacted] (S) b1

(Include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☑ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ

☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager — 100-93216 - 1144
File and Serial number

11/10/04
CLASSIFIED BY: UC/NLS/BJA/CB 60267 AAG
REASON: 1.4 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 11/10/2029

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

_____
(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

_____
Date

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

FBI/DOJ

RESTRICTED ACCESS

Memorandum

SSR

CLASSIFICATION:

CLASS
SRC/D
SER
REC

To : Assistant Director AHM/Mao
Records Management Division

Date 5/5/89

From Assistant Director
Laboratory Division

RTC/RM

Subject : BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
(See No. 4 Below)

PURPOSE: To designate file #_____ or other material identified herein for handling by the SFR as indicated. Execute numbered paragraphs only as they may apply. For new cases, the SFR will insert the file number, but depositors should specify classification desired for file.

rec'd 5-9-89

1. The attached file/document should receive special restricted processing and access in the SFR for the reasons set forth below (Specify justification):

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

2. The Control Officer for file number_____ _____is designated as the Unit Chief of the _____ _____Unit; Unit cost code _____, extension number _____, room #_____ Alternate Control Officer is the Section Chief of the_____ Section; extension number _____, room #_____, Division_____.

3. The following entities may be granted direct access to this file/document with the understanding that no information contained therein may be used or extracted without the knowledge and concurrence of the depositor. (Check as appropriate or specify additional).

a. Legal Counsel Division_____
b. Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Section_____
c. Classification Appeals and Affidavits Unit_____

100-93216-1145

[redacted] 1989

CLASSIFICATION:

7-Rm7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60247 uc/NES/BJA/CB

CLASSIFICATION:

d. Elsur Index Subunit_____
e. Security Programs Unit_____
f. Name Check and Service Unit_____
g. Industrial Security and
Clearance Invest. Unit_____
h. Facility Access and Security Unit_____
i. _____

4. File # 100-093216 should be removed from the SFR and placed in general filing space. Authorized by Ronald M Jurgenson, Chief, Admin Unit (Signature and Title).

5. The code word/name_____ should be indexed and assigned to this investigation entitled: (Show Title and identify approving communication. Also, submit search slip showing General Indices was searched.)

_____
_____
_____

CLASSIFICATION:

4-22 (6-10-91)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Information Services Section

FR UTD 6/29, 19 92

- ☑ Name Searching Unit, 4989, TL# 121
- ☐ ~~File Maintenance & Retrieval Subunit Information Services, 4330, TL# 111~~
- ☐ Special File Room, 5991, TL# 122
- ☐ Forward to File Review, 5447, TL# 143
- ☑ Attention _____
- ☑ Return to _____ b6 b7C
  Supervisor, Room, TL# , Ext.

Scope of Search: (Check One)
- ☑ Automated Data Base - 5 & 20
- ☑ Automated Data Base - 5 & 30
- ☐ Unrestricted (ADB & Inactive Index)

Type of Search Requested:
- ☑ All References (Security & Criminal)
- ☐ Security Search
- ☐ Criminal Search
- ☐ Main _____ References Only

Special Instructions:
- ☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- ☐ Builup ☐ Variations
- ☐ Restricted to Locality of _____ b6 b7C

Subject _____
AKA(s) _____

Birthdate & Place _____
SSAN _____
Localities _____

R# _____ Date 6/30 Searcher Initials LDG
Prod. _____

File Number	Serial	Ident	ADB	Inactive	Date of Ref M/Y
	NA		✓		

b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
~~DATE~~ 11/10/04 BY 60207 uc/ws/cg A/CB

4-22 (6-10-91)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Information Services Section

FR UTD 6/29, 1992

- ☐ Name Searching Unit, 4989, TL# 121
- ☒ ~~File Maintenance & Retrieval Subunit-Information Services, 4330, TL# 111~~
- ☐ Special File Room, 5991, TL# 122
- ☐ Forward to File Review, 5447, TL# 143
- ☐ Attention
- ☒ Return to [redacted] b6 b7C
  Supervisor, Room, TL# ,Ext.

Scope of Search: (Check One)
- ☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 20
- ☒ Automated Data Base - 5 & 30
- ☐ Unrestricted (ADB & Inactive Index)

Type of Search Requested:
- ☒ All References (Security & Criminal)
- ☐ Security Search
- ☐ Criminal Search
- ☐ Main _____ References Only

Special Instructions:
- ☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- ☐ Builup ☐ Variations
- ☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Subject Iranian Research organization of
~~AKA(s)~~ Science + Technology

Birthdate & Place _____
SSAN _____
Localities _____

R# _____ Date 6/30 Searcher Initials [redacted]
Prod. _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/04/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

	File Number Serial	Ident	ADB	Inactive	Date of Ref M/Y
	100-93216-1148		✓		
	IROST (GUA) SI		✓		
	Iranian Research Organization for Science + Technology var				
~~for~~	109-12-251-3309		✓		
	199-99990-20986 OR		✓		
	~~199-99990-ABN~~				
N/A	199-0-20986		✓		

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91)

Date 3-13-96

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
- ☐ Confidential
- ☑ Secret
- ☐ Top Secret*
- ☑ SCI*
- ☑ Other

Mail Category:

Letter _____ Airtel _____

LHM _____ Memo _____

Report _____ Other _____

Teletype ✓

FD-501 Number 93-21101 FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 12-21-93

Description of Material _____
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☑ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ

☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☑ Field Office Manager — 100-93216-~~X~~ 1160
File and Serial number

_____
(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

_____
Date

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FBI/DOJ

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91)

Date 3-13-96

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
- ☐ Confidential
- ☑ Secret
- ☐ Top Secret*
- ☑ SCI*
- ☑ Other

Mail Category:

Letter		Airtel	
LHM		Memo	
Report		Other	
Teletype	✓		

FD-501 Number 93-21099 FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 12-21-93

Description of Material _____
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☑ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ

☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☑ Field Office Manager — [illegible] 1161
File and Serial number

_____
(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

_____
Date

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/NCS/B; A/CB

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FBI/DOJ

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91)

Date 3-13-96

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
- ☐ Confidential
- ☑ Secret
- ☐ Top Secret*
- ☑ SCI*
- ☑ Other

Mail Category:

Letter		Airtel	
LHM		Memo	
Report		Other	
Teletype	✓		

FD-501 Number 93-21102 FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 12-21-93

Description of Material _____
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☑ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ

☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☑ Field Office Manager — 101-93[illegible]X1102
File and Serial number

_____
(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

_____
Date

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/cm

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91)

Date 3-13-96

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
- ☐ Confidential
- ☑ Secret
- ☐ Top Secret*
- ☑ SCI*
- ☑ Other

Mail Category:

Letter		Airtel	
LHM		Memo	
Report		Other	
Teletype	✓		

FD-501 Number 93-21103 FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 12-21-93

Description of Material _____
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

- ☑ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ
- ☐ _____
  (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

- ☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065
- ☑ Field Office Manager — [illegible] 1103
  File and Serial number

_____
(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

_____
Date

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/mls/B;A/CB

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91)

Date 3-13-96

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
- ☐ Confidential
- ☑ Secret
- ☐ Top Secret*
- ☑ SCI*
- ☑ Other

Mail Category:

Letter _____ Airtel _____

LHM _____ Memo _____

Report _____ Other _____

Teletype ✓

FD-501 Number 93-21097 FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 12-21-93

Description of Material _____
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☑ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ

☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☑ Field Office Manager — 100-93216-1104
File and Serial number

_____
(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

_____
Date

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/axw/BSA/cm

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91)

Date 3-13-96

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
- ☐ Confidential
- ☑ Secret
- ☐ Top Secret*
- ☑ SCI*
- ☑ Other

Mail Category:

Letter _____ Airtel _____

LHM _____ Memo _____

Report _____ Other _____

Teletype ✓

FD-501 Number 93-21096 FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 12-21-93

Description of Material _____
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

- ☑ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ
- ☐ _____
  (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

- ☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065
- ☑ Field Office Manager — 100-93216-1165
  File and Serial number

_____
(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

_____
Date

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267uc/NLS/B;A/R3

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FBI/DOJ

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91)

Date 3/20/95

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
- ☐ Confidential
- ☑ Secret
- ☐ Top Secret*
- ☐ SCI*
- ☑ Other

Mail Category:

Letter		Airtel	
LHM		Memo	
Report	✓	Other	
Teletype	✓		

FD-501 Number 93-21093 FD-502 Number

Subject Destruction of Documents Relating to Bio. Warfare

Date of Mail 12/21/93

Description of Material (include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

- ☑ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ
- ☐ _____ (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

- ☐ TSCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065
- ☑ Field Office Manager — 100-93216 ~~105-1166~~ File and Serial number

_____ (Signature and Title of Approving Official)

_____ Date

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/10/04 BY 60267 uc/NKS/BJA/CB #977600

*required special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT