



April 12, 2024

MR. JOHN R. GREENEWALD JR.
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request No.: 1380241-001
Subject: CORSO, PHILIP JAMES

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The FBI has completed its review of records subject to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) that are responsive to your request. The enclosed documents were reviewed under the FOIPA, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552		Section 552a
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1)
<u>50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1)</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2)
_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3)
_____	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)		<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7)

449 pages were reviewed and 313 pages are being released.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

Based on the information you provided, we conducted a main and reference entity record search of the Central Records System (CRS) per our standard search policy. For more information about records searches and the standard search policy, see the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum General Information Section.

This is the final release of information responsive to your FOIPA request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

Enclosed are cross-references that are identifiable with the subject of your request. Cross-references are defined as mentions of the subject of your request in files to other individuals, organizations, events, or activities. In processing the cross-references, the pages considered for possible release included only those pages that mention the subject of your request and any additional pages showing the context in which the subject of your request was mentioned.

Duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

Due to the age and condition of the original documents, some of the reproduced copies are extremely difficult to read. Every effort has been made to obtain the best copies possible.

Records that may be responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request have been transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). If you wish to review these records, submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to NARA, Special Access and FOIA, 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500, College Park, MD 20740-6001. Please reference the file numbers 62-HQ-109090-A, 63-HQ-5327, 100-HQ-420468.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "**Part 1**" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "**Part 2**" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. "**Part 3**" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at www.fbi.gov/foia. Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison at foipaquestions@fbi.gov. The subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,



Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) **Intelligence Records.** To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) **Requests for Confidential Informant Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches and Standard Search Policy.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files.
 - a. *Main Entity Records* – created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
 - b. *Reference Entity Records*- created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Foreseeable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.
- (iv) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1380241-001

Total Deleted Page(s) = 4
Page 20 ~ Duplicate;
Page 21 ~ Duplicate;
Page 43 ~ Duplicate;
Page 44 ~ Duplicate;

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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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- Mr. Mohr
 - Mr. DeLoach
 - 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Mr. Evans
 - 1 - Mr. Rosen
 - 1 - Mr. Malley
 - 1 - Name Check
 - 1 - Mr. Brown
- b6
b7c

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
DECLASSIFY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

per OGA letter dated 3/31/99
The Acting Attorney General

November 10, 1964

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

Director, FBI

~~Philip J. Corso~~

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIP J. CORSO

Reference is made to the request of Mr. Harold Reis of your staff to Assistant Director Courtney A. Evans on November 5, 1964, for a name check concerning the captioned individual.

Our files do not reveal that Corso has been investigated by this Bureau. We do have information indicating that he has been connected with the U. S. Army for over twenty years engaged primarily in the intelligence field. Over a period of years he has contacted the FBI furnishing information in connection with various allegations of subversive activities on the part of different individuals.

In 1955, General Arthur S. Trudeau furnished this Bureau as well as other agencies with a list of various individuals alleged to be "Fabian Socialists" who were in policy positions in the United States Government. At that time General Trudeau indicated that Colonel Philip Corso, then assigned to the Operations Coordinating Board, would be in a position to elaborate concerning the list of names as he, Corso, had actually accumulated the information regarding these individuals. It has been ascertained that this list was disseminated outside of the Executive Branch of the Government and had not been handled in a secure and prudent manner. Concerning the list, the FBI files were reviewed concerning the individuals named and although we did find derogatory information concerning many of them, there was insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the allegation of "Fabian Socialists." "Fabian Socialists" has been described as a British socialist organization founded in 1884 which advocates the gradual transition from capitalism to parliamentary socialism and opposes Marxism and revolutionary action.

Our files disclose also that Corso appeared before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary on May 15, 1961, and again on April 3, 1962.

NOTE: No arrest record on basis of name check in Identification Division per Miss Oakes, 11/6/64.

JWB:ncb

NOV 10 1964

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR
293/828
13-01-1
1-10-81

MAILED 30
NOV 10 1964
COMM-FBI

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- DeLoach
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Evans
- Gearty
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

NOV 12 1964
MAR 23 1965

REC-42
62-110017-A
NOV 10 1964
[Handwritten signatures and initials]

The Acting Attorney General

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The testimony consisted primarily of his reading into the Committee's records the entries from personal and private office diaries that he kept during his service with the Operations Coordinating Board from 1953 to 1957. He criticized certain United States Government policies as well as officials and non-Government individuals with regard to American opposition to communist moves throughout the world since World War II. Most of the testimony was apparently based on the allegation and material concerning "Fabian Socialists" previously mentioned. U

[redacted] In February, 1964, we received information from an official and reliable source that a rumor was being passed around among high Government officials and even in newspaper circles that Lee Harvey Oswald, prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, had been an informant of the FBI and was being paid \$200 a month. The source of this rumor was alleged to be Corso. As the rumor was entirely false and without any foundation, Corso was interviewed by an official of this Bureau. After considerable discussion, Corso admitted that he had passed out information concerning Oswald's alleged connection with the FBI, stating "his sources in CIA had merely presumed that Oswald was an FBI informant." Upon being requested to identify his sources within the Central Intelligence Agency, he refused saying that as his "CIA friends had no facts whatsoever he did not want to reveal their identity." He emphasized the fact that his allegations had been strictly deductions and had no basis in fact. U [redacted]

With respect to a Polish defector, Michal Goleniewski, who has been under control of the Central Intelligence Agency, this Bureau has received information that there is some basis to believe that Corso had "leaked" information to the press concerning his defection and information that he had furnished to United States authorities. There is also some basis to believe that Corso may have deliberately distorted information concerning this defector. Another Government agency has characterized Corso as a "parasite" who has never produced any intelligence through his own efforts but has profited from information developed by dedicated Government agents and investigators. U [redacted]

~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b3
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

_____, 19____

Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
 Service Unit - Room 6524
 Forward to File Review
 Attention _____
 Return to Scattered 612573
Supervisor _____ Room _____ Ext. _____

Type of References Requested:

Regular Request (Analytical Search)
 All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
 Subversive References Only
 Nonsubversive References Only
 Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

Restricted to Locality of _____
 Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
 Buildup Variations

Subject Corso, Philip J.
 Birthdate & Place _____
 Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 11/5 Searcher Initials 588

Prod. _____

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
<i>J. J.</i>	[Redacted]	(3124/64) Person
<i>J.</i>	62-48717-2813	#1-120 Testimony
<i>SI</i>		2415
<i>I</i>		2448
<i>E</i>		2449
<i>Refer</i>	63-5327-1010	
<i>NP</i>	[Redacted]	
<i>NP</i>	102-344224-1	
<i>NP</i>	102-12-233-249	250
<i>NP</i>	[Redacted]	
<i>NP</i>	116-165494-1	Testimony
<i>NP</i>	140-3155-43	
	<i>Philip</i>	
	62-104-363	
<i>NP</i>	62-20114-337	
<i>NP</i>	62-109090-A	(117) [unclear] 3-29-61
<i>NP</i>	[Redacted]	
<i>NP</i>	67-405022-6	

Written

b3
b7E

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: Corso, Phillip J.

Supervisor _____ Room _____

R# _____ Date 11/5 Searcher Initial 508

Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

Philip (cont'd)
MP 77-43811- 30

MP 100-343544- 1

MP 100-420464- 7. 15

I [Redacted]

I [Redacted]

SI [Redacted]

MP [Redacted]

b3
b7E

MP 62-101815- X 8

MP [Redacted]

MP 62-105211- 12

Phillip (cont'd)

TV 100-2555- 605

Phillip J. (cont'd)

MP 62-101815- X 9

MP 100-420464- 2, 8

b3
b7E

P. J. (cont'd)

NI [Redacted]

MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN
20TH DISTRICT, OHIO

MEMBER OF
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

February 6, 1965

CHAIRMAN:
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
SUBCOMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN:
JOINT COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY POLICY

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson | ✓ |
| Mr. Belmont | ✓ |
| Mr. Mohr | ✓ |
| Mr. DeLoach | ✓ |
| Mr. Casper | ✓ |
| Mr. Callahan | ✓ |
| Mr. Conrad | ✓ |
| Mr. Felt | ✓ |
| Mr. Gale | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen | ✓ |
| Mr. Sullivan | ✓ |
| Mr. Tavel | ✓ |
| Mr. Trotter | ✓ |
| Tele. Room | ✓ |
| Miss Holmes | ✓ |
| Miss Gandy | ✓ |

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The enclosed material on Philip J. Corso
and copies of correspondence in connection there-
with are self-explanatory. I want you to have
this background information before I call upon
you to discuss the case.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

Michael A. Feighan

Enclosures

*Copy to DeLoach
2-11-65
HAA: jfw*

ENCLOSURE

XEROX
MAR 22 1965

MCT-13

REC 53
62

110017-1

3-10
17 FEB 9 1965

64 MAR 26 1965

BW

Classified

SECRET

EX-100
FEB 9 1965
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The four main points in memorandum received by Mr. Celler from Acting Attorney General Nicholas de Katzenbach concerning Philip Corso and which Mr. Celler permitted Mr. Feighan to read on 1-7-65 were:

1. Reference to materials prepared by Colonel Corso for General Arthur Trudeau in 1954, alleging this was the key to so-called Fabian-Socialists in the government.
2. The Goleniewski Case.
3. Testimony by Colonel Corso before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.
4. The Oswald Case.

THE FACTS

1. The so-called Fabian-Socialist list. --This list of names was prepared in conjunction with a series of charts showing United States Policy from 1947-1955. The list was never labeled Fabian-Socialists, but showed the positions held by the people influential in making the policy set forth in the charts. The policy was based upon actual N.S.C. papers and other supporting documents. General Trudeau, as Chief of Army Intelligence, personally gave these materials to J. Edgar Hoover. Seven years later these charts were placed, by sworn testimony, in Executive Session in the files of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. This was done at the request of the Senate Committee, with the authority and approval of the Department of Defense. Further, this testimony was given under the condition that the record of hearing was to be made available to Mr. Robert Kennedy, then Attorney General.

ENCLOSURE

1-2-110017-1

MAR 22 1965

pm

2. The Goleniewski Case.-- Colonel Corso came into this case at my request. Goleniewski wrote and telephoned, informing me that his life was in danger as a consequence of the report on his case accompanying the bill to make him a citizen. I did not want this on my conscience, even though I had nothing to do with preparation of the report (Besterman prepared it.) Goleniewski gave his story to the newspaper directly. Colonel Corso had nothing to do with that. This I learned from Goleniewski on a second visit, and as well through sources in the press. I sought to have^{the} newspaper story killed before it appeared, but did not succeed. Newsmen approached Colonel Corso, but he advised them, in every case, to come to me, since he was not free to discuss the case.

3. Testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.-- A request was made to the Department of Defense in 1961 by the Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that Colonel Corso appear in Executive Session. Approval was given by the Department of Defense and the Legal Counsel of the Army. Colonel Corso appeared in uniform and I, Congressman Michael A. Feighan, was present as counsel for Colonel Corso. The testimony covered policy and policy implications for a ten year period. This testimony was later shown to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, but has never been made public since it covered sensitive National Security Council matters. (Colonel Corso was a professional staff member of the Operations Coordinating Board from 1954-1957). Colonel Corso was performing his duty, under oath, with the consent of the proper authorities, before a bona-fide Committee of Congress, established and having jurisdiction over such matters.

4. The Oswald Case.--Colonel Corso allegedly said that Oswald was a CIA agent. Colonel Corso never made any such statement. The facts are that Colonel Corso was performing an official function for a member of the Warren Commission. Colonel Corso was requested to assist in gathering information which might be of help. Colonel Corso subsequently reported that a certain communist in Texas was spreading the rumor that Oswald was an FBI agent. In addition, Oswald had been in contact with two CIA men in the United States Embassy in Moscow. This information, with Colonel Corso's approval, was passed to the FBI. The FBI in turn, [redacted] b7D [redacted] Colonel Corso). After Colonel Corso secured approval of his superior, the meeting was arranged.

Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach, Assistant Director of the FBI, came to the office of a United States Senator. Present at this meeting were the Senator and two staff aides. Mr. DeLoach handed Colonel Corso an affidavit signed by J. Edgar Hoover that Oswald never worked for the FBI. Colonel Corso stated it was not necessary to convince him of this fact since his purpose was to assist the FBI, not accuse them. Mr. DeLoach then asked for the source of the information. The answer by Colonel Corso was that he could not reveal this or involve people without their consent, and he, Mr. DeLoach, should know this as basic in the intelligence business. Mr. DeLoach then told Colonel Corso he would have him brought before the Warren Commission. Colonel Corso replied, that he was only trying to assist the FBI, but due to the reaction, he had nothing else to say except to provide two names which might assist in the investigation.

The meeting ended after some comments by the Senator and others present. Later Mr. DeLoach telephoned Colonel Corso and said in effect,

"I am closing out this case and will submit a report to the Director stating that you acquired some raw information and passed it to us." Colonel Corso concurred in the accuracy of this conclusion. This closed the issue.

SUMMARY

There is, therefore, one major issue in the Corso case which bears upon his suitability for appointment to the staff of the subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality. That issue is - should any individual on the basis of "unevaluated" information, and who has been called before a Committee of the Senate or House, with full approval and authority of his superiors, be penalized or put under suspicion as a shady or undesirable character;

A serious legal and moral issue arises when an unofficial (no letterhead) and unsigned report on an individual from any branch of the Executive Department is considered as trustworthy information. Such procedure opens the door to character assassination of loyal and able citizens, who have no recourse or remedy such as presentation of the facts before the proper people. It violates their civil rights in a most serious manner. A practice of this type is destructive of our institutions and violates every reasonable procedure of government.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
DeLoach	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 2-11-65

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: PHILIP J. CORSO
RESEARCH ASSISTANT
SENATOR STROM THURMOND'S OFFICE

By letter dated 2-6-65, Congressman Michael A. Feighan (D-Ohio) wrote the Director alleging captioned individual has been the subject of condemnation on the basis of "unevaluated" information being circulated through an unofficial and unsigned report. Feighan contends this amounts to a serious violation of Corso's civil rights and the Congressman indicates he plans to call upon Mr. Hoover to discuss this matter. He enclosed a summary of the information which he said is being disseminated, and accompanied it with his own refutation of each point of controversy concerning Corso. Feighan is reputed to be eager to employ Corso on the staff of the House Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee, of which he is the Chairman. Following is a resume of the pertinent information in Bufiles concerning Corso.

INFORMATION IN BUFILES:

Philip J. Corso: Bufiles contain a number of references to Corso, although we have never investigated him. He was an intelligence officer for over 15 of his 20 years in the U.S. Army. He has contacted the FBI from time to time, especially in the 1940s, usually in connection with some allegation concerning the subversive activity of one individual or another.

In September, 1955, General Arthur G. Trudeau, following his removal as Assistant Chief of Staff of G-2, contacted Mr. Hoover and subsequently furnished the Bureau with a list of 122 individuals alleged to be "Fabian Socialists" or communist sympathizers who were in policy positions in the U.S. Government. Trudeau had been relieved of his duties in August, 1955, with G-2 and transferred to the Far East Command reputedly as the result of charges by CIA Director, Allen Dulles, that Trudeau's activities had been prejudicial to U.S. intelligence efforts.

Trudeau gave the FBI the names of Colonel Earl Lerette, then of his staff, and Colonel Philip Corso, then assigned to the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), National Security Council, as the individuals the FBI could contact concerning the list of names. Lerette later advised the Bureau that Corso actually accumulated the information which General Trudeau gave the FBI.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. DeLoach - Enclosure
HHA:jks (6)

EX-114
MAR 26 1965

DEC 53 2 - 110017
MAR 10 1965
CLERK [Signature]

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Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: Philip J. Corso

Over 5,500 references were reviewed in Bufiles on these 122 names. Identifiable derogatory information was found on 105 of the 119 identified; however, there was insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the allegations regarding Fabian socialism. The Bureau had already investigated 94 of the 105 previously. It was also determined that Lerette, Corso and Trudeau disseminated information regarding their charges outside the Executive Branch and that the matter had not been handled in a secure or prudent manner. The Director indicated he wanted the FBI kept out of the resulting dispute between G-2 [redacted] (100-420468)

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Corso testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on 5-15-61, 8-28-61 and 4-3-62. His first appearance was taken up with his experiences in Italy during World War II, and dealt largely with anti-American and anti-Italian propaganda engaged in by the communists in Italy during the War. On his second appearance, Corso was highly critical of U.S. Government policy since 1947 as it pertained to the Soviet bloc. His third session was devoted to his reading into the Committee's record entries from two personal and private office diaries he kept during his OCB service. These entries, criticizing individuals and policies, appear to be the basis of the allegations which General Trudeau brought to the attention of the Bureau in 1955. (62-88217-2815; 2849)

In May, 1961, Colonel Lerette, then assigned to the Joint Staff (Intelligence), advised the Bureau it had recently come to his attention that General Trudeau, then serving as Chief of Army Research and Development, had been actively engaged in trying to revive interest and concern over the issue of "Fabian Socialists" in Government. According to Lerette, Trudeau contacted certain members of Congress through Philip Corso, who had been reassigned to Trudeau's staff. Lerette said he had a hand in preparing the original list of "Fabian Socialists" for General Trudeau; however, he again alleged it was Corso who accumulated the basic information while he was assigned to OCB. Lerette said he merely organized and put together Corso's information in 1955.

Lerette said since Corso had returned to the Pentagon in May, 1961, he had been in frequent contact with him. Corso told Lerette he had recently appeared in a closed session of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Lerette said in addition to the individuals still active in Government whom Trudeau had identified as "Fabian Socialists" in 1955, Corso identified before the Subcommittee, the following individuals as "Fabian Socialists" attached to the White House staff: W.W. Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and J.B. Wiesner.

Lerette said he was opposed to General Trudeau again raising the "Fabian Socialist" issue. He said he reminded Trudeau this was partially the cause of his problem in 1955 with the "Dulles family" which caused his transfer from Army Intelligence. Trudeau denied he was becoming involved again; however, Lerette said Trudeau has a fetish about security and intelligence work and cannot keep his fingers out of that area.

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Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: Philip J. Corso

Lerette said in spite of Trudeau's denials, Corso told him confidentially his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee was at Trudeau's direction. It was his opinion that at some opportune time, the Committee hoped to hold an open hearing with Corso as a witness in order to "smear" the Kennedy Administration. Declaring he was as "security minded" as anyone, Lerette said the "Fabian Socialist" issue had been "milked dry," and to again raise it publicly could only harm the U.S., particularly in the field of international relations. (100-420468-15)

Corso was also alleged to be responsible for putting out a rumor that Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant. When interviewed on 2-10-64, by you (Mr. DeLoach) regarding this, Corso indicated his "sources in CIA had merely presumed that Oswald was an informant for the FBI." When you challenged him to identify his CIA sources, Corso repeatedly failed to produce names. There is good reason to believe Corso never got such information from CIA and the "deductions" were his own. The Director noted: "Corso is a rat."

The interview with Corso took place in Senator Thurmond's office, in the presence of the Senator's Administrative and Legislative Assistants, Harry Dent and Fred Buzhardt. Corso repeatedly refused to identify his alleged CIA sources and, after you kept pressing him on this point, he modified his story by saying a Communist Party member in Texas named "Stanford" knew Oswald had been the source of FBI information and "Stanford" had been spreading this story around. When you told Corso he was inconsistent in his story, he got very melodramatic about his fear the communists were promoting a deliberate smear of the FBI.

Oddly enough, when you met with Senator Eastland and Jay Sourwine on 2-6-64, about this matter, the Senator, in Sourwine's presence, told you that the latter's source said Oswald was being handled as an FBI informant by a Special Agent named "Stanford." Later, Sourwine identified his source to you as Corso. (There is a Celia Joanna Stanford on the Reserve Index, Section B, of the San Antonio Office.)

From your interview with Corso on 2-10-64, you got the definite impression that he was a rather shifty-eyed individual who fancied himself a great intelligence expert. It was difficult for you to pin him down and he continually insisted on expounding his theories in preference to sticking to facts. In spite of the fact Corso promised to call you on 2-11-64, relative to the identity of his sources, he did not do so. When you reached him that evening he said he had not had an opportunity to recontact his sources. He then stressed his sources had no facts but that their belief Oswald was an FBI informant merely stemmed from idle deduction during a conversation. He said he was responsible for leading this discussion in this regard because of his extensive experiences with military intelligence, he felt than any American citizen who was given a job in the Soviet Union, allowed to marry a Soviet citizen and then permitted to return with her

Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: Philip J. Corso

to the U.S., could only be an FBI or CIA informant. He indicated neither he nor his CIA sources had any facts on which to base these deductions. He again promised to contact you within 3 days. When you had no word from him by 2-25-64, you contacted Corso again. Claiming to have been traveling with Senator Thurmond, Corso apologized for not getting in touch with you as he had promised. He again refused to disclose his so-called CIA sources, and again emphasized the fact that his allegations had been strictly deductions and had no basis in fact. You told him this was a pretty poor way of doing business, especially for a man who supposedly had been trained in intelligence operations, and you advised him of the tremendous amount of work his gossip had caused the FBI. His reply was to invite you to lunch. This was refused.

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On 3-3-64, [redacted]

On 10-30-64, Edward A. Loughran, Associate Commissioner for Management, Immigration and Naturalization Service, advised the Bureau that an employee of his had found a carbon copy of a letter on the streets of Capitol Hill addressed to the Director and dated 10-28-64. This communication signed by Philip J. Corso, Research Assistant to Senator Strom Thurmond, alleged that Mr. Hoover or the FBI was being used to follow up leads derived from illegal telephone monitoring of calls from Senator Thurmond's office. The letter indicated a hoax call was made and recorded to determine if the Bureau was involved and being used as a political tool by the present Administration. Corso said this incident, which he did not identify, was particularly appalling since you (Mr. DeLoach) had personally assured him no phones on Capitol Hill were ever illegally monitored. Corso said it was obvious that you were lying.

On 11-3-64, you interviewed Corso regarding this letter. SA David W. Bowers was also present. Corso acknowledged the communication as his and expressed surprise that it had got out. He tried to explain it away as a joke, engaged in by himself and three of Senator Thurmond's assistants. According to Corso, this joke materialized one night when the group was sitting around with nothing else to do. He said there was no intention of releasing the letter, and that he thought the original and all copies had been destroyed. You asked him why, if it were a joke, the letter had been witnessed by Robert Manuel, an attorney who had formerly been on the Subcommittee of the Senate investigating Billie Sol Estes. Corso continued to insist it was written "in fun." You very strongly impressed upon him that the FBI did not tap telephone wires on Capitol Hill and that we certainly did not appreciate his brand of so-called humor. (62-52026-76)

Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: Philip J. Corso

Michael A. Feighan: Feighan, Democrat of Cleveland, Ohio, has been a member of Congress since 1942. Our relationship with him has been a cordial one, with the majority of our contacts relating to constituent matters and invitations for the Director to address groups in which Feighan has a personal interest. On 8-2-63, Representative Feighan visited the Bureau and talked with Inspector Robert Wick. He showed Wick a letter which he had received from Michal Goleniewski, dated 7-28-63. Feighan said he was familiar with Goleniewski and was aware that CIA was handling him; however, it appeared this informant was disgruntled and was asking protection for himself and his family. The Congressman said he came to the FBI for guidance. Wick suggested Feighan contact Director McCone of CIA; advise him of the receipt of the letter from Goleniewski; and request guidance from CIA. Feighan agreed to this, stating he did not wish to do anything contrary to the Bureau's wishes in the matter.

On 5-13-64, Inspector Edward Kemper contacted Feighan to determine the basis for the Congressman's statement that there are now "communists in high places in the CIA and the State Department, and it is time to get rid of them." When Kemper asked Feighan about this, he became "extremely flustered" and said he would like to "marshal his facts" and that he would get in touch with the Bureau as he would like very much to discuss the entire situation. He did not contact Kemper again and, by 5-25-64, it was decided he had nothing of value. The probability exists that Feighan was relying on material furnished to him by Goleniewski, and the Director approved dropping the matter.

Feighan is extremely hostile to communism. There is^a probability that Feighan frequently leaks information to Guy Richards. The Congressman requested to see the Director on 10-6-64, and it was deduced that Richards was using Feighan in an effort to determine why the Government suddenly dropped its espionage case against Alexandre Sokolov and his wife.

OBSERVATIONS:

The memorandum referred to by Congressman Feighan undoubtedly stems from the Director's letter to the Acting Attorney General, dated 11-10-64. (Copy attached.) Mr. Hoover's communication was in response to a request from Harold Reis of the Department for a name check on Corso. Apparently the memorandum furnished by the Department to Representative Celler was based on the Director's letter. Feighan states Celler showed the memo to him on 1-7-65, and it is a good possibility that Feighan either let Corso see the memo or told him of its contents. This is based on the fact that Feighan's attempted refutation of the four points covered in the Department's memo could only come, for the most part, from Corso.

In giving the so-called "facts" of the four points, Feighan states the list was never labeled "Fabian Socialist." Apparently he has never read the transcripts of Corso's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee. In his third appearance,

Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: Philip J. Corso

Corso uses this phrase to describe some of the people in CIA, USIA and State. Too, when General Trudeau saw the Director, this is the term he used to describe the list Corso had prepared.

The transcript of Corso's testimony during his three appearances before the Senate Subcommittee is quite revealing. By the time he began reading excerpts from his diaries into the record, it was apparent that he suspected practically everyone in Government of ulterior motives except himself. This was especially true if an individual did not agree with Corso's opinions. He apparently believed he was the only patriot working in intelligence. He ascribed suspect motives to every action and every utterance of practically everyone he came in contact with. He told the Subcommittee that subversives controlled State, CIA, USIA and he described the United Nations as an instrument designed by Alger Hiss to destroy the U.S.

One example of his reasoning was his opposition to splitting Red China and the Soviet Union apart. He told the Subcommittee that it was quite apparent to him, if to no one else, that this was a communist plot by "agrarian reformers" and that no good could come of it. He called the role on dozens of people, labeling them dupes, communists, subversives, fools, idiots, "Fabian Socialists," etc. He indicated to the Subcommittee that only he really had the best interest of the U.S. at heart during the years since 1947. The man, from his testimony, sounds psychotic. He reads subversive motives into everything.

Corso and General Trudeau have caused the FBI and other Federal agencies to expend many hours of work and much manpower in running down wild accusations. For example, on 2-2-54, the Bureau was asked by State to conduct a Security of Government Employees investigation of Jesse MacKnight, then Special Assistant to the Secretary for Public Affairs. Since MacKnight had represented the State Department on OCB, Corso was interviewed. He provided a signed statement based on his contacts with MacKnight from the fall of 1953. According to Corso, MacKnight had never been enthusiastic about the various propaganda papers Corso prepared. Corso said MacKnight's attitude and actions, he felt, aided the cause of communism. He admitted he never heard MacKnight espouse the cause or government of another country, but neither had he ever heard MacKnight express any anger with the actions of communist nations. Based on this, Corso said he reached the conclusion that while he did not know whether MacKnight belonged to any subversive organizations, he did know that MacKnight's policies did not seem to be "in the best interests of the United States."

Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: Philip J. Corso

After giving the statement, Corso then told the interviewing Agent that he had some confidential background information to relate. He said "a highly-placed CIA representative," told him MacKnight had requested affidavits from about 70 CIA employees attesting to his character and loyalty. Corso, as usual, refused to identify his CIA informant, but he told the Bureau Agent that Frank Wisner, Deputy Director for Covert Operations, CIA, "ordered" the men listed by MacKnight to submit favorable affidavits attesting to MacKnight's character and loyalty or be fired within 24 hours. Interestingly enough, Corso gave this signed statement on 12-7-56; however, when he testified before the Senate Subcommittee he related this same story and identified his informant as one Parrott who was assigned to the Security Office of the State Department.

Corso's charges against MacKnight were dropped by reason of a "high level policy decision" at the Department of State. This was done because approximately 100 depositions were submitted in MacKnight's behalf, including a number from various individuals in State, USIA and CIA who either served on OCB with MacKnight or were familiar with OCB activities. These depositions supported MacKnight's contention that he had merely presented to OCB the official State Department policy as he was instructed to do. Among those who submitted depositions to this effect was the then Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith. MacKnight is still with State and is currently assigned to East African Affairs. (140-3155-43, 50)

Meanwhile, Corso's good friend General Trudeau has not been idle. The 8-1-60, edition of the "Evening Tribune," a San Diego, California, daily newspaper, reported that General Trudeau advised a press conference that attempts had been made to sabotage Atlas missiles with wrenches and sandwiches. He said this was probably the work of "people with communist leaning." On 8-3-60, both the Air Force and the Army denied there had been any such attempts. When interviewed by the FBI on that same day, General Trudeau said he had no personal knowledge regarding any sabotage to Atlas Missiles. He said that while en route to San Diego by plane on 8-1-60, he read in an unrecalled magazine an item which stated a sandwich had been found in a sterile pipe in a missile, and he referred to this in his speech and his press conference. He said he certainly hoped Mr. Hoover and the FBI had suffered no inconvenience or embarrassment because of his remarks. He claimed he was misquoted by the press. (98-45521-4)

On 3-20-64, General Trudeau told the FBI he had received a report from Major General John Murphy (Ret.) in Washington, D. C., that a mutual friend named John R. Hecht said arms were being smuggled into the U.S. on ships flying the Liberian flag. These ships were being used to ship wheat to Russia and General Trudeau said the arms were for the use of the "Black Muslims" in the civil rights struggle. Trudeau said he advised General Murphy to bring this information to the immediate attention of Philip Corso in Senator Strom Thurmond's office.

Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: Philip J. Corso

Bureau Agents [redacted]

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eventually determined this was another instance where Trudeau and his friends began on the basis of supposition and ended up reporting their suppositions to Federal agencies as facts. There was nothing but some wild imagination connected with this episode; however, it took time, money and manpower expended over a period of a month or more to determine this fact. (62-105211-5 Serials 5 through 17)

It is felt that Philip Corso has probably "sold" himself to Congressman Feighan as an intelligence expert. Based on his past history, if he is placed on the staff of the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee, we can expect another spate of wild accusations--this time about how communists are engaged in thwarting the policies of immigration and naturalization in the U.S. Too, it would seem that Corso is "coaching" Feighan on how to combat criticism of the former's history of biased personal attacks on all those he decides are un-American.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you (Mr. DeLoach) be permitted to meet with Representative Michael A. Feighan and attempt to set the record straight with respect to Philip Corso.

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y
J.P.M.
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
DeLoach	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
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Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 2-11-65

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: PHILIP J. CORSO
RESEARCH ASSISTANT
SENATOR STROM THURMOND'S OFFICE

3-1

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Democratic Congressman Michael A. Feighan (Ohio) reputedly is interested in employing captioned individual for the staff of the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of the House. Feighan is Chairman of this Subcommittee.

By letter dated 2-6-65, Representative Feighan advised Mr. Hoover he had seen a memorandum from Acting Attorney General Katzenbach to Congressman Celler concerning Corso's background which he took exception to, terming it a violation of the latter's civil rights. Feighan desires to meet with the Director and discuss this matter; however, it is felt there is no necessity for Mr. Hoover to take time away from his busy schedule for this. It is believed the matter can be handled by having Mr. DeLoach meet with Feighan and set him straight with respect to Philip J. Corso.

Corso is well known to the Bureau. He fancies himself as an expert in the intelligence field and has a history of wholesale accusations against many people and many agencies of the Federal Government of plotting to subvert the Nation. He has caused many agencies, including the FBI, to expend much manpower, money and effort to disprove some of his injudicious accusations. He has enlisted the aid of such people as General Arthur Trudeau (Ret.) in his campaigns against various individuals. He apparently has now convinced Mr. Feighan that he is a badly needed intelligence expert.

There is attached a detailed memorandum of the past history of Philip Corso with emphasis on his excesses in conducting a personal war against what he considers to be security risks. Examples of his injudicious actions and his lack of good judgment are set out in detail. For example, we recently came into possession of a letter Corso had written in which he accused the Director of tapping Senator Strom Thurmond's telephone lines and of permitting the FBI to be used as a political tool by the current Administration. When confronted by you (Mr. DeLoach) with this communication, Corso admitted authorship but said it was never meant to get out. He lamely attempted to explain the letter away by saying it was meant as a joke. You firmly emphasized to him that it was a pretty poor joke.

Enclosure
1 - Mr. DeLoach
HHA:jks (6)

MAR 26 1965

MAR 22 1965

REC 53 62 - 110017-3

MAR 10 1965

Handwritten signatures and initials at the bottom of the page.

Jones to DeLoach
Re: Philip J. Corso

Included in the detailed memo is some pertinent background on General Trudeau and Mr. Feighan.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Director authorize Mr. DeLoach to meet with Representative Michael Feighan and, using the background set forth in the attached detailed memorandum, set the record straight with the Congressman concerning Philip J. Corso.

MS.

AM

[Signature]

V. GPC

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
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 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 Felt _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
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 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: February 17, 1965

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: PHILIP J. CORSO
 RESEARCH ASSISTANT
 SENATOR STROM THURMOND'S OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
per OGA letter dated 3/31/99

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/8/89 BY [redacted]

FOIPA 23632

Mr. Jones memorandum to me dated 2-11-65 reflected that Congressman Michael A. Feighan had written to the Director under date of 2-6-65 advising he had seen a memorandum from Attorney General Katzenbach to Congressman Celler concerning the background of one Philip J. Corso. Feighan took exception to this memorandum terming it a violation of Corso's civil rights. Feighan stated he desired to meet with the Director and discuss this matter. Referenced memorandum recommended that the Director not take time to discuss this matter with Feighan but that I should meet with Feighan and set him straight with respect to Corso.

As a matter of background, as previously indicated in referenced memorandum, Corso is a self-styled intelligence expert who retired from the military approximately 3 years ago, and he has been working as one of Senator Strom Thurmond's many assistants. He has been somewhat of a thorn in our side because of self-initiated rumors, idle gossip and downright lies he has spread to more or less perpetuate his own reputation as an intelligence expert. His activities so far as we are concerned are:

(1) In 1955 he furnished the FBI a list of 122 individuals alleged to be "Fabian Socialists" or communist sympathizers who were in policy positions in the United States Government. He was assisted in these allegations by General Arthur G. Trudeau, who was removed as Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence, because of conflicts with Allen Dulles. There was insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the allegations made by Corso. Nevertheless, Corso and Trudeau disseminated this information outside the Executive Branch of the Government and the matter was not handled in a secure or prudent manner.

(2) Senator Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and a good friend, told me in strict confidence in February, 1964, that he had learned from a "source" that Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant. Senators Dirksen and Hruska had also been given this information. The Director had me spend considerable time and trouble running down this rumor only to find out that the "source" was Corso. When confronted, Corso complained that sources within the CIA had given him this information. He refused to identify the sources. The Director noted at this time, "Corso is a rat."

MAR 22 1965

5 MAR 3 1965

166 MAR 26 1965
CDD:bsp (3)

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CONTINUED - OVER

CRIME RESEARCH

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delivered to [redacted] 2/1/65

DeLoach to Mohr memo, 2-17-65

RE: PHILIP J. CORSO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Congressman Feighan's letter to the Director, Feighan claimed that I (DeLoach) threatened Corso by telling him that if he did not reveal his sources he would be brought before the Warren Commission. This is true. I did threaten Corso and would do it again. I felt that the only way to make him tell the truth on the record was to possibly get him on the witness stand. I not only threatened him but also told him that he was a poor representative of a background which supposedly possessed intelligence experience. In this latter incident, the Director had me see Senators Eastland, Dirksen and Hruska and give them the correct facts so that the record could be set straight. As a matter of fact, I had to see Senator Dirksen in the hospital inasmuch as he was suffering from a bleeding ulcer at this time, however, was greatly concerned about this matter.

(3) On March 3, 1964,

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(4) Perhaps the most disturbing incident of our experience with Corso was the fact that on 10-30-64 the Associate Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization advised the FBI that an employee of his had found a carbon copy of a letter on the streets of Capitol Hill addressed to the Director dated 10-28-64. This communication was signed by Corso who gave his title as Research Assistant to Senator Strom Thurmond. This letter alleged that Mr. Hoover or the FBI was being used to follow up leads derived from illegal telephone monitoring of calls from Senator Thurmond's office. The letter indicated a hoax call was made and recorded to determine if the FBI was involved and being used as a political tool by the present Administration. Corso said this incident was particularly appalling since I (DeLoach) had personally assured him that the FBI did not illegally monitor telephones on Capitol Hill. The letter went on to say that it is obvious that I am lying. With the Director's approval, on 11-3-64 I cornered Corso with SA David W. Bowers as a witness. Corso admitted that he had written this communication. He tried to explain it away as a joke and stated that he had dictated this letter when he was sitting around one night with three of Senator Thurmond's assistants and they had nothing else to do. He claimed that he thought all copies had been destroyed. We took him to task in no uncertain terms at this time. He left in a very embarrassed and rebuffed manner.

- 2 - CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DeLoach to Mohr memo, 2-17-65

RE: PHILIP J. CORSO

BACKGROUND OF CURRENT SITUATION:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Congressman Feighan, who is obviously impressed with Corso, now desires to hire Corso as a staff member of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House Judiciary Committee. Congressman Feighan's letter to the Director dated 2-6-65 complaining about the letter he had previously received from the Attorney General about Corso, obviously stems from the fact that Feighan will not be allowed to hire Corso while damaging information concerning Corso is a matter of record in Chairman Celler's office. It is also obvious that Corso wrote Feighan's letter to the Director and that Corso is once again attempting to stir up trouble. He is a shifty-eyed individual who is extremely hard to pin down.

ATTEMPTED CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN FEIGHAN:

At 5:30 p. m. 2-16-65 I called Congressman Feighan. I told him the Director had received his letter dated 2-6-65 and that I would like very much to discuss this matter with him. The Congressman first replied in the affirmative. He then interrupted the conversation asking me to wait a moment. He obviously put his hand over the phone, however, he could be heard snapping his fingers and asking someone in the background if they thought it would be all right for him to see DeLoach of the FBI. The Congressman then came back on the phone and stated that in his letter of 2-6-65 he had requested to see Mr. Hoover and he thought it would be better if he did not see anyone else. I told the Congressman that I was fully conversant about the facts of this matter and desired only to give him our side of the story. He stated he did not wish to discuss the matter with me and that he would talk only with the Director. It appears obvious that Corso was in the room with the Congressman at the time of our telephone conversation.

This is the first time in 12 years that a member of Congress has refused to see me concerning a matter. It is obvious that Corso realizes that I will lay the facts on the line with Congressman Feighan. He, therefore, has persuaded Feighan not to see me. Our relationship in the past with Feighan has been cordial. Feighan, however, is given to sensationalism and wild claims in handling matters pertaining to intelligence. On 5-13-64 we contacted Feighan to determine the basis for his statement that "There are communists in high places in the CIA and the State Department and it is time to get rid of them." During our contact he became extremely flustered and stated he needed to marshal his facts. He faithfully promised to get in touch with the FBI and furnish this information. He never did. We know, of course, that Feighan constantly leaks information to Guy Richards of the "Journal-American." Richards is the sensational type reporter who constantly is distorting facts in order to make lurid headlines.

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DeLoach to Mohr memo, 2-17-65
RE: PHILIP J. CORSO

ACTION:

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There appears to be three different courses of action we can take in this matter: (1) The Director can comply with Feighan's request and grant him an appointment. I believe it is undesirable for the Director to waste his valuable time on such shoddy tactics perpetrated by Corso. (2) We can see Chairman Emanuel Celler of the House Judiciary Committee and explain our feelings concerning Corso. (As stated above, the Attorney General has written Celler concerning Corso. This letter caused Feighan to write the Director.) (3) We can ignore Feighan's request for an appointment with the Director and let the facts on the record concerning Corso stand as they are. Considering the three alternatives, I recommend that we ignore Feighan and his obvious "love affair" with Corso.

I agree ✓
✓

John ✓
✓

✓

gmc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
X

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
DeLoach	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Evans	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: February 19, 1965

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: PHILIP J. CORSO
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Corso is the unreliable individual who has endeared himself to Congressman Michael Feighan (D-Ohio), to the extent that Feighan is desperately trying to arrange for Corso to become a member of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization. This is a Subcommittee under the supervision of the House Judiciary Committee of which Congressman Emanuel Celler (D-NY) is the Chairman.

Our files reflect considerable information on Corso (memoranda of 2/11/65 and 2/17/65, attached). Feighan has attempted to get in touch with the Director regarding this matter. In his letter to the Director dated 2/6/65, Feighan claimed that Corso's civil rights had been violated. The Director approved the recommendation in referenced memorandum 2/17/65 that under the circumstances we ignore Feighan's request for an appointment.

While talking with Harold Reis of the Attorney General's Office this morning, I told him I understood that the Department was also involved in this matter. Reis then detailed to me the background.

Reis told me that Chairman Celler had requested the Attorney General to furnish information concerning Corso. Based upon this request the Department asked us for a name check on November 5, 1964. We sent the Department a memorandum concerning the results of this name check on November 10, 1964. Reis mentioned that the Attorney General showed Chairman Celler the information we furnished the Department. Reis stated the Attorney General may have left a memorandum with Chairman Celler concerning Corso. Reis continued that Celler obviously used this information to prevent Feighan from hiring Corso. As a result, there is currently a big battle between Feighan and Celler regarding this matter. The Attorney General has sided with Chairman Celler against Feighan.

Reis stated that Feighan has also gotten into recent difficulty with the White House and that the President is well aware of the fact that Feighan is a "nut."

Enclosures

- 1 - Mr. Tolson
- 1 - Mr. Jones

CDD:dgs (4)

66 MAR 26 1965

MAR 22 1965

CONTINUED - OVER

CRIME RESEARCH

ORIGINAL FILED COPY FILED IN 77-8422-

77-60370-4
62-110017-3X1
5 MAR 3 1965

DeLoach to Mohr Memorandum, 2/19/65
RE: PHILIP J. CORSO
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reis mentioned that the only potential difficulty in this matter lies in the fact that Feighan may some day become Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, inasmuch as he will succeed Celler when Celler retires or passes on. Reis stated, nevertheless, that the Attorney General is siding with Celler in this dispute.

Based on the above facts, I am even of the stronger opinion that our recommendation, and the Director's approval of this recommendation, is even more sound that we should not see Feighan or Celler and that the Director should not waste his time by seeing Feighan. We have furnished the basic facts in this matter to the Department and the Department should be the one involved, not the FBI.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

PHW

[Signature]

✓ I concur.
[Signature]

5 2 53 6H.62

PHILIP J. CORSO

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
DeLoach	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: March 4, 1965

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: PHILIP CORSO

Corso, Philip J.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-20-85 BY [redacted]
#263,557

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b7c

The Director's telephone room notified me at 3:00 p. m. that Congressman Michael Feighan (D-Ohio) was in the Director's reception room. The Director, at the time, was tied up with the Attorney General.

I went over to the Director's reception room and, while "passing through," recognized Feighan and shook hands with him. I told him that I had been in the audience when he spoke to The American Legion Americanism Commission on 3/3/65 at the Sheraton-Park Hotel. I told him I was the National Chairman of Public Relations in The American Legion and that I wished to express the Legion's appreciation for his requesting to appear before us to discuss immigration matters. He replied that he was not aware of my Legion membership.

There was some initial small talk regarding Communist Party activities in Ohio. I told Feighan I had once been assigned to the Cleveland Division, consequently, was very familiar with his territory. I then mentioned that because of the fact he was in the Director's reception room perhaps he was waiting to see the Director. I mentioned that the Director was tied up as result of being up on the Hill all morning before the Appropriations Subcommittee. Before Feighan had a chance to answer, I told him I felt I knew what he wanted to see the Director about and that I thought perhaps he, Feighan, could understand that the employment of Philip Corso was strictly a problem between the Attorney General, Chairman Emanuel Celler of the House Judiciary Committee; and Feighan. Feighan replied this was true, but the FBI had furnished information to the Attorney General which had maligned Corso's character. I told him we had furnished information at the specific request of the Attorney General concerning material from FBI files. I mentioned that we had not intentionally maligned Corso's character but it seemed to me Corso had maligned his own character.

Feighan asked what I meant by the above remark. I told him of the extreme difficulties we had experienced with Corso with respect to the assassination of the President. I told Feighan that as a man with an intelligence background I felt certain he could understand the great hysteria, chaos and alarm which swept Washington and the entire country during the initial phases of the assassination investigation.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Jones

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE.

CDD:amr (5)

64 MAR 9 1965

XEROX
MAR 22 1965

CRIME RESEARCH

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-6623-90

DeLoach to Mohr memo 3/4/65

Re: PHILIP CORSO

He stated he could understand this. I told him that quite abruptly one afternoon Senator Jim Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a good friend, had called me up to the Hill, taken me into a private room and locked the door, at which time Eastland and Jay Sourwine had confided in strict confidence that they had information indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant. I told Feighan that I had emphatically denied this allegation. Senator Eastland then told me that Senators Hruska and Dirksen were aware of the allegation and were greatly alarmed. At this point, I told Feighan that I again felt certain that he could understand the very bad position such an allegation, whether true or false, could place the FBI. He stated he understood this. I told him the Director had immediately dispatched me to see Senator Hruska, and that Senator Hruska, despite Senator Dirksen being in the hospital with a case of bleeding ulcers, had ridden in a car with me to see Senator Dirksen. I told Feighan that after straightening out this matter with the above-mentioned Senators it then became necessary to run down this false rumor so that we could stop such allegations at their source.

I mentioned that I had asked Sourwine if he would furnish the identity of his source. Sourwine told me that he must refuse to do this until he had contacted the source and obtained his permission. A short time later, Sourwine called me and revealed the identity of the source as Philip Corso of Senator Thurmond's office. I told Feighan that I had immediately contacted Corso and that Corso had admitted talking to Sourwine and telling him that considering the fact that Oswald had been given a position in the Soviet Union, had married a Soviet citizen, and had been allowed to return to the United States made it appear that Oswald had indeed been an informant for the FBI or CIA. I told Feighan at this point I had impressed upon Corso the fact that this was a false deduction and that such an erroneous deduction could place the FBI in a bad light if it continued to spread all over the Hill. I told Feighan that I had specifically asked Corso if he had picked up this information from any sources of his. I added that Corso advised me that he had picked such information up from sources within CIA. I pressed him to advise the identity of these sources and called him telephonically on at least 2 occasions to inform him to put up or shut up. On the third occasion Corso admitted to me that several friends had picked up erroneous information and had made a deduction from such information. I mentioned to Feighan that the matter ended there with Corso agreeing that he had spread a rumor based upon false information.

Feighan told me that in his opinion Corso was trying to do the FBI a favor. I told Feighan that if Corso had wanted to do us a favor he would have gotten in touch with the FBI immediately rather than spreading his rumor all over the Hill. Feighan made no reply to this.

DeLoach to Mohr memo 3/4/65
Re: PHILIP CORSO

I told Feighan that he obviously didn't have all information concerning Corso. I mentioned that the Associate Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization had furnished the FBI a copy of a letter signed by Corso late last fall. I mentioned that in this letter Corso had falsely accused the FBI of tapping Senator Strom Thurmond's telephone. I named several other scurrilous allegations included in the letter. I told Feighan that I had asked Corso to come down to my office, at which time, in presence of a witness, Corso had admitted preparation of the letter in question; however, attempted to excuse this matter by stating that he and several other men were sitting around in Senator Thurmond's office one night with nothing to do and dictated this letter as a joke. I told Feighan that such tricks were no joke to us. Feighan asked if we had the original of this letter. I told him we did not, that we had a copy of the letter which had been found in front of the Senate Office Building. I further told Feighan that we had not mentioned this to anyone and had more or less forgotten the matter, however, in view of his feelings regarding Corso, I thought he should know about this incident.

I told Feighan that I wanted to make it very clear to him that the controversy concerning employment of Corso was strictly a matter for the Attorney General, Chairman Celler, and himself. I mentioned that whether he employed Corso or not was of no concern to the FBI. Feighan again stated that the FBI had maligned Corso's character. I told him that from the facts involved, it would appear that Corso was the one that had maligned himself. I further told him that the fact that the Attorney General had given Chairman Celler a memorandum concerning Corso was not a matter in which the FBI was involved. Feighan agreed but stated that Celler had told him that Corso could not be employed until Feighan personally approached the FBI "and got Corso straightened out with DeLoach." I told Feighan I had given him our side of the story and that I would be glad to meet him face to face any time to further discuss the matter.

At this stage of the game, Feighan started looking at his watch at 30-second intervals and finally stated that unfortunately he could not wait any longer to see the Director. I told him I felt certain he could understand the Director being extremely tied up as result of being gone all morning. Feighan stated that he might attempt to see the Director later on, however, he didn't know.

It should be noted at one stage of the conversation Feighan asked me specifically if the FBI furnished raw, unevaluated data when a name check was made by us for the Attorney General. He asked a second question as to whether the FBI did not try to qualify its raw, unevaluated data. He added quickly that in the matter of Corso we should have advised the Attorney General of Corso's brilliant war record. I told

DeLoach to Mohr memo 3/4/65
Re: PHILIP CORSO

Feighan that when the Attorney General asked us for information we furnished all data in FBI files and then it was up to the Attorney General to evaluate such data. I told him that very frankly we were not aware of Corso's "brilliant war record." I mentioned that the Attorney General, being the individual requesting such information and the individual disseminating such information to Congressional sources, properly had the responsibility of furnishing the information as he saw fit. I mentioned that this, of course, was not the responsibility of the FBI. Feighan made no comment.

OBSERVATION:

Feighan had heard only one side of the story, that of Corso. He had not heard the facts. Corso has obviously planted the seed in Feighan's mind that the FBI is out to ruin him. Feighan now has some doubt in his mind concerning Corso. He was quite shaken when I told him about Corso's trick in dictating the above-mentioned scurrilous letter. While we have won a temporary point, I don't think we have heard the last of this matter. Feighan and Mannie Celler bitterly hate each other. Feighan is stubborn, tenacious, ill advised, and certainly most naive. I remain of the opinion that the Director should not see Feighan and be drawn into this controversy on a personal basis. The Attorney General has, of course, brought about this controversy by leaving a copy of our name check memorandum with Chairman Celler. The fight still would be between the Attorney General, Celler and Feighan.

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Letters to the Editor

On Controlling Crime

As anyone who reads the editorial page of this paper knows, *The Washington Post* is conducting an all-out campaign for the control of sales, and for the registration of firearms. As a reader of this paper for over 20 years, and one who has generally admired this paper's sensible stand and courageous support of many worthy causes, I am deeply disappointed and ashamed of the low level of the present series of editorials.

Some news articles in this paper have attempted to strike a sensational note by reporting at length tragic accidents in which, for example, an innocent child may have been killed by a firearm carelessly left within its reach. Just as tragic are the countless other accidents involving automobiles, knives, electrical appliances, plastic bags, and any number of other inanimate objects.

The crime rate in New York City has not gone down because of the Sullivan law. It is unrealistic to expect that the registration of guns will keep the criminal from obtaining firearms; narcotics are presently outlawed, and yet dope addicts can purchase them with little difficulty. If local law-enforcement officers are given the power to control the registration and ownership of firearms, what could we expect in a place like Selma, Ala

That there is an unduly high rate of crime in Washington is undeniable, but the firearm must not be made the culprit in this deplorable situation. Every commission which has studied the crime problem has pointed out that its solution must be found in correcting the basic causes—slum conditions, poor housing, lack of work opportunity, low income, etc. — and in more strict enforcement of already existing laws. It is abundantly clear that the law-abiding citizen and only he, is the one who is going to be harassed and restricted by the proposed control measures.

GEORGE T. JONES.

Hyattsville.

Philip J. Corso

- The Washington Post and Times Herald A-4
- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
- New York Daily News _____
- New York Post _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Baltimore Sun _____
- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- The National Observer _____
- People's World _____
- Date _____

62-110017-

NOT RECORDED

46 APR 15 1965

SEE FILE F193

79 APR 16 1965

APR 3 1965

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-21775-2199

Correcting the Story

Jack Anderson's column which appeared in your issue of March 29 contained mis-statements and distortions of the facts concerning me and my record of Government service.

Neither the FBI, Justice Department nor Attorney General Katzenbach blackballed me with the Judiciary Committee of the House, as suggested by the article. Congressman Cellor was the only one involved in this blackball operation.

I am not a "private investigator" nor have I ever been. I am paid monthly out of Government funds by U.S. Treasury check through the House Disbursing Office. I have never been on Congressman Feighan's private payroll, or paid out of his private funds.

I was not "the source of the vicious rumor that Oswald had been in the pay of the FBI" and the charge that I "blandly explained" that I picked the rumor up from CIA is equally false. I have never made either statement in public or otherwise. I did learn that a Communist in Texas was circulating such a rumor, and I reported this to the proper authorities. This hardly made me the "source" of the rumor.

The charge that "not a single Judiciary member supported Feighan's demand to put Corso on the public payroll" is false. The truth is that the only vote taken on the recommendation was in Subcommittee No. 1 of the Judiciary Committee and it was endorsed—without a dissenting vote — by the quorum then present

The charge that I was recommended as chief counsel of the Immigration Subcommittee at \$20,000 a year is false. I was recommended for another position on the Subcommittee staff.

I am a lieutenant colonel of the U.S. Army, retired, and I retain that rank in the retired reserve. Over the course of 21 years of military service as troop commander and intelligence officer in two wars, I have received 17 decorations and over 50 written citations including four from Cabinet members during my tour of duty with the National Security Council. This undoubtedly is offensive to Anderson since he continuously attempts to discredit the military.

PHILIP J. CORSO.

1st. Col. (Ret.),
Fairfax.

Notes
H

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Wick

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
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- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. DeLoach *DB*

DATE: 4/1/66

FROM : A. Rosen

- 1 - Mr. Malley
- 1 - Mr. Walters
- 1 - Mr. Frankenfield

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION FURNISHED BY
FORMER SPECIAL AGENT LEE PENNINGTON

Lee Pennington, former Special Agent, called to advise me Colonel Philip Corso, who apparently worked at one time for OSS and Senator Strom Thurmond (Republican - South Carolina), is now allegedly doing some work for Congressman Michael A. Feighan (Democrat - Ohio). Pennington said that Corso is suing Drew Pearson for libel; that he had filed a lawsuit some time ago. He did not know exactly when.

Pennington wanted to bring some information to my attention which is not in the pleadings. He said that when this case comes up for trial Corso intends to state that Pearson has indicated to three witnesses that he claims he got derogatory information on Corso in a report of the FBI pertaining to Corso. Pennington indicated he believes that such a comment was in one of Drew Pearson's columns. He said he was furnishing the above because of his interest in seeing that something was done to get Pearson. I told him that insofar as we were concerned we were not interested in Pearson.

He also advised me that [redacted] had an office on Connecticut at K right next to Jack Anderson and that [redacted] is a registered foreign agent. He also said that [redacted] was the one who copied the material which was taken from Senator Dodd's office for Jack Anderson. He said [redacted] represented the Nicaraguan Government; had an interest in the plywood factory in Nicaragua; represented an Israeli machine gun manufacturer; and apparently carried money to Nicaragua for representatives of the Nicaraguan Government. He also apparently assisted in getting some Teamsters money for the building of the Madison Hotel. The foregoing allegations are not new.

Pennington also said that he was checking on a [redacted] who is a proofreader and assistant to the Soviet Press Secretary at 1706 - 18th Street. He said his reason for checking on her is that he believed that she was supposed to be [redacted]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN [redacted] 293, 828

4/5/66
GHS: [redacted]

4/5/66
GHS: [redacted]

REC-15 62-110012-5 APR 13 1966

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101 APR 14 1966

55 APR 22 1966

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-110012-5

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Walters

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6-4-66

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
Re: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION FURNISHED BY
FORMER SPECIAL AGENT LEE PENNINGTON

[Redacted]

but they have not established this as yet.

ACTION

The above information should be made a matter of record.
Our files should be checked to see if we have any information
concerning [Redacted]

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b7c

*Memo
Answer to DeLoach
4-5-66
RHS: czo*

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APR 15 1966

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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DeLoach	_____
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Sullivan	_____
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Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. DeLoach *Wick*

DATE: 4/1/66

FROM : R. E. Wick

SUBJECT: SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITIES,
CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN
(D - OHIO), CHAIRMAN;
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CUBAN REFUGEES

ways

① *Casper*

② *Wick*

At 3:30 p. m., 3/31/66, Robert J. Beatson of the above subcommittee telephoned Bishop in my office. He identified himself as a former Special Agent of the FBI and stated that he has been assigned by Congressman Michael A. Feighan, Chairman, Immigration and Nationalities Subcommittee, Committee of the Judiciary, to make a complete and comprehensive survey on all aspects of the Cuban refugee problem. When he was requested to advise specifically what he was interested in ascertaining, he merely stated that he desired to secure all information having to do with this problem, and did not mention anything specific, although he did indicate that one of the items in which he was interested was information concerning possible unrest in Cuba. When advised that this would be information which would more likely be in the possession of the Central Intelligence Agency, he then reverted to his original general request that he desired to secure from the Bureau "all" information that the Bureau could supply to him on the Cuban refugee problem. He also indicated that he desired to talk to some Bureau representative who was knowledgeable on Cuban refugee matters in order to secure from this representative data which the Bureau might have on the subject.

DATA IN BUREAU FILES

Our files reflect that Robert J. Beatson entered on duty with the Bureau as a clerk-typist, GS-2, on 5/8/50 and on 5/20/50 was appointed as a Special Agent. He voluntarily resigned to accept other employment effective 3/1/63 while assigned to the New York Office. His services were satisfactory.

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

TEB:mls
(4)

62-110017-
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53 APR 15 1966

105-93163

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-93163-1

Wick to DeLoach Memo, 4/1/66
RE: Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationalities

With regard to Congressman Michael A. Feighan, he is a graduate of Harvard Law School, was elected to the 78th Congress on 11/3/42 and has been re-elected to succeeding Congresses. Our relations with him were generally satisfactory until early in 1965 when Feighan was attempting to employ Philip J. Corso on the staff of the Immigration and Nationalities Subcommittee. Corso is well known to the Bureau, fancies himself as an expert in the intelligence field and has a history of making wholesale accusations against many persons and agencies of the Federal Government of plotting to subvert the nation and has caused many agencies, including the FBI, to expend much manpower, money and effort to disprove some of his accusations. One of such false allegations of Corso was to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant, which allegation Corso finally admitted was based on false information. As a result of a name check request received from the Department, we furnished information to the Attorney General concerning Corso, and the Attorney General showed the information to Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler. This resulted in preventing Subcommittee from hiring Corso. Feighan accused the FBI of having maligned the character of Corso by furnishing information concerning him to the Attorney General.

Drew Pearson's column of 3/29/65 referred to Congressman Feighan's fight to put Corso on the Government payroll and a portion of the column is entitled "FBI Blackballs Aide," and indicates that Feighan phoned the Attorney General and tongue-lashed him for turning over an FBI memorandum concerning Corso to Representative Celler and accused the Attorney General of "McCarthy-like tactics" in circulating "unevaluated" information.

OBSERVATIONS:

In view of the antagonistic attitude which has been displayed toward the Bureau by Feighan, particularly with regard to the Corso matter, it is not felt that we should take any steps to be of assistance to his subcommittee or any of its representatives.

ACTION TAKEN:

The confidential nature of data in Bureau files was explained to Beatson, and he was advised that because of this, it would not be possible for the Bureau to be of assistance to him in connection with his request. He advised that as an ex-Agent, he was aware of this policy and understood the Bureau's position.

RECOMMENDATION:

None; for information.

RS

- 2 -

V.
A

JW
JW

The Attorney General

April 15, 1966

EX 114 REC-32
Director, FBI

62-110017-6

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIP J. CORSO

Reference is made to my memorandum of November 10, 1964, setting forth the results of a name check concerning the above-captioned individual.

On April 14, 1966, one Robert Manuel, Suite 620, Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C., telephone Republic 7-4660, telephonically contacted this Bureau and identified himself as an attorney representing Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso in connection with a libel suit which Corso has filed against columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. He stated that depositions are presently being taken in connection with the libel suit in the office of attorney John Donovan, Washington, D. C., who represents Anderson and Pearson. He advised that on April 14, 1966, Anderson and Pearson attempted to have put into evidence, by means of a deposition, a memorandum from me to you dated November 10, 1964, dealing with Corso and also containing data concerning one Colonel Michal Goleniewski, a defected Polish intelligence officer. Manuel advised that he has objected to the introduction of this memorandum by Anderson and Pearson.

He further stated that he has reason to believe that this memorandum was made available by you to Congressman Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and that Congressman Michael A. Feighan knows something concerning this memorandum and background but Congressman Feighan is out of town and Manuel is unable to contact him.

Attorney Manuel asked a representative of this Bureau if it was a violation of Federal law for the memorandum referred to to be in the possession of Anderson and Pearson. When he was advised that no comment could be made on this matter, he indicated that he was going to take this up with you so that appropriate action could be taken against Anderson and Pearson in the event they have violated a Federal law by being in possession of the memorandum.

The above is furnished for your information.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. DeLoach (sent with cover memo) 1 - Mr. Sullivan (sent with cover memo)

TEB:par (8)

NOTE: See R. E. Wick to DeLoach memo 4-14-66 re "Philip J. Corso, Attempt to Introduce FBI Memorandum Into Evidence in Libel Suit."

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-3-91 BY SP8 BJB/BJW
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- Rosen _____
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- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

Handwritten initials: RB, P, W

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Wick	_____
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Tele. Room	_____ b6
Holmes	_____ b7C
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: April 14, 1966

FROM : R. E. Wick

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-3-91 BY [redacted]

SUBJECT: PHILIP J. CORSO;
ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE FBI MEMORANDUM
INTO EVIDENCE IN LIBEL SUIT

298,828

At 1:10 p. m., 4-14-66, Bishop in my office received a telephone call from one Robert Manuel, suite 620, Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C., telephone REpublic 7-4660. He identified himself as an attorney who was representing Colonel Philip J. Corso in connection with the libel suit which Corso has filed against columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. He stated that depositions are presently being taken in connection with the libel suit in the office of attorney John Donovan, Washington, D. C., who represents Anderson and Pearson. He stated that today Anderson and Pearson attempted to have put into evidence, by means of a deposition, a memorandum of Mr. Hoover directed to the Attorney General dated November 10, 1964, dealing with Philip J. Corso and also containing data in the memorandum concerning one Colonel Michal Goleniewski, a defected Polish intelligence officer. Manuel advised that he has objected to the introduction of this memorandum by Anderson and Pearson.

Manuel advised that he has reason to believe that this memorandum was made available by the Attorney General to Congressman Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, as a result of a name check on Corso requested by the Judiciary Committee of the Attorney General. Manuel also advised that it is his understanding that Congressman Michael A. Feighan (D. - Ohio) knows something about this memorandum and its background, but Congressman Feighan is out of town and back in Ohio today and Manuel is unable to contact him.

EX-114

REC-32

6 APR 18 1966

BACKGROUND:

The memorandum to which Manuel undoubtedly refers is a memorandum from the Director to Acting Attorney General dated 11-10-64 (copy attached). Mr. Hoover's communication was in response to a request from Harold Reis of the Department on a name check on Corso. Previous information which we have received indicates that the Attorney General either showed the memorandum to Congressman Celler or had left it with Congressman Celler. As a result of the memorandum Congressman Celler prevented Congressman Feighan from hiring Corso on the staff of Feighan's Subcommittee on

1 - Mr. DeLoach 1 - Mr. Sullivan

Enclosures - 5

TEB:par (5)

(Continued - Over)

Wick to DeLoach Memo, 4-14-66
RE: PHILIP J. CORSO

Immigration and Nationalities which is under the supervision of the House Judiciary Committee of which Congressman Celler is the Chairman.

ACTION TAKEN:

Attorney Manuel asked Bishop if it was a violation of Federal law for the memorandum referred to to be in the possession of Anderson and Pearson. When he was advised by Bishop that Bishop would be unable to comment on this matter he indicated that he was going to take this up with the Attorney General so that appropriate action could be taken against Anderson and Pearson in the event they have violated a Federal law by being in possession of the memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached memorandum to the Attorney General be sent advising him of the above.

[Handwritten initials and marks]
A ✓ TEB Dr
Jo

Memorandum

TO : The Director, FBI

DATE: APR 15 1966

FROM : Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Attorney General

SUBJECT: Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso

Thank you for your memorandum of April 15, 1966, concerning your earlier memorandum to me of November 10, 1964, relating to Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso.

For your information, the latter memorandum was in fact made available by me both to Chairman Emanuel Celler of the House Judiciary Committee and to Chairman Michael A. Feighan of the Joint Committee on Immigration and Nationality Policy. This was done pursuant to our policy of making name checks of this type pertaining to Congressional employees available from time to time to the chairmen of Congressional committees, subject to their agreement to respect the confidentiality of the document.

I am transmitting herewith a copy of my letter of March 4, 1965, to Chairman Feighan in which I refer to the fact that name checks frequently contain unevaluated information and "for that reason we insist that its confidential status be preserved." The same point was made to Chairman Celler orally.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Wick
- Mr. Casper
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. Felt
- Mr. Gale
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy

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APR 25 1966

ENCLOSURE

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J. JAMES EXON, NEBRASKA	SAM NUNN, GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN	JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA
CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN		STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS		WILLIAM S. COHEN, RHODE ISLAND
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ALAN J. DIXON, MISSISSIPPI		JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
JOHN GLAVIN, NEW YORK		MALCOLM WALLOP, WYOMING
ALBERT J. ANDERSON, TEXAS		SLADE GORTON, WASHINGTON
THOMAS H. CRANSTON, RHODE ISLAND		TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI
RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA		DAN COATS, INDIANA
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA		

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

October 10, 1990

Honorable William S. Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

The attached letter from Colonel Philip J. Corso is forwarded for your consideration. The information on the explosive device appears genuine and may be useful in our nation's war against terrorism.

Please correspond directly with Colonel Corso if you desire additional information on this matter.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond

Strom Thurmond

ST/p

Enclosure

*Interim to
Sen. Thurmond
17 Oct. 90*

[Redacted]

*Final Reply
Sen. Thurmond
11/2/90*

[Redacted]

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SEPT 19, 1970

Best Copy Available


DEAR SENATOR THURMOND

THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF "READER'S DIGEST" HAS AN ARTICLE OF "IRAN'S MASTERMIND OF WORLD TERRORISM" PLEASE NOTE MY MARKINGS ON PAGE 61; ESPECIALLY, THE MENTION OF A "LETHAL BAROMETRIC DEVICE" DURING THE PERIOD IN WWII, WHEN I WAS THE AC6562 OF THE ROME AREA COMMAND WE CAPTURED A NAZI SABOTAGE AGENT AND HIS COMPANIONS THEY HAD NUMEROUS EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AMONG WHICH WAS A BOMB TO BE USED AGAINST AIRCRAFT. IT WAS SHAPED LIKE A SAUSAGE, GRAY IN APPEARANCE, TO LOOK LIKE A SAUSAGE, ABOUT 2 FEET LONG AND 1 1/2 INCHES IN DIAMETER, IT CONTAINED A BAROMETRIC FUZE, THE OUTSIDE WAS COATED WITH A STICKY SUBSTANCE, IT WAS QUITE FLEXIBLE AND COULD BE THROWN TO STICK ON THE SIDE OF AN AIRCRAFT AT THE PROPER ALTITUDE IT WOULD GO OFF AND DESTROY THE AIRCRAFT. WE CAPTURED THE BOMBS AND PUT OUT AN ALERT. I DON'T KNOW THAT WE LOST ANY AIRCRAFT.

HOWEVER, SINCE THE BOMB WAS MADE IN GERMANY AND THE DIGEST STORY MENTIONS REUSS NEAR DUSSELDORF THIS SHOULD BE LOOKED INTO. IT IS A DANGEROUS WEAPON IF REVIVED AND COULD BE A THREAT NOT ONLY TO CIVIL AIRCRAFT, BUT MILITARY IN SAUDI ARABIA. AM SURE YOU WILL GET THIS INFORMATION INTO THE RIGHT HANDS.


AS EVER
PHILIP J CORSO
 COL U.S. ARMY RET

AS MY PHONE IS
 407-743-8441
 IF YOU NEED MY INFO
 PHILIP CORSO



GRAY TO LOOK
LIKE A SAUSAGE

COATED WITH A STICKY SUBSTANCE
|||||



COULD BE BENT
AND THROWN LIKE A
BOMBERANG

FLATTENED OUT AS IT HIT
ROAD SURFACE

NOTE: I HANDLED THE DEVICE ONCE WE
TOOK OUT THE FUZE, I COULD THROW
IT 75 TO 100 FT. A BIGGER, STRONGER
MAN COULD DO MUCH BETTER

a recognized authority on international terrorism, reveals not only a master plan but a mastermind behind the terrorist war. His documented discoveries have been confirmed by intelligence and counter-terrorism officials in six countries, as well as by sources within Iran itself. Here is his report:

BY THE LATE MORNING of July 9, 1988, temperatures in Teheran approached 100 degrees, but the high-ranking officials gathered in the heavily guarded building on Pasdaran Street worked in air-conditioned comfort. Their purpose: to avenge the mistaken downing of an Iran Air passenger jet by the *USS Vincennes* six days earlier. The Ayatollah Khomeini had decreed that the United States must pay.

A squat, brooding figure sat at the head of the table. Wearing a dark turban and robes, the man presiding was a senior mullah, or priest, of Iran's predominant religion—the Shi'ite sect of Islam. And as Minister of the Interior, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, 42, was one of the most powerful leaders in a nation of extremists. From his offices in Teheran, Mohtashemi directed a vast network of Iranian-supported terrorist cells.

Ironically, Mohtashemi himself had been a victim of terrorism. On February 14, 1984, a bound edition of the Koran, sent to him in a diplomatic pouch, exploded, blowing away his right hand and part of an ear, and severing two fingers on his left

hand. He was flown to West Germany for medical care.

Believing that agents of the CIA and Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, were responsible, Mohtashemi's hatred of the United States reached psychotic proportions. (In fact, some counter-terrorist analysts suspect Syrians sent the bomb.)

Tragic Blunder. Mohtashemi spoke in a grainy whisper, and the planners at the table had to strain to catch his words. One was Ahmad Jibril, 51, a former captain in the Syrian army and one of the most feared terrorists in the Middle East. The plan was that not one but four U.S.-owned airliners would be blown out of the skies over Europe in a single day.

It was vital that Iran's role remain undiscovered, so Mohtashemi had "contracted" Jibril and his 500-member organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), to carry out the mission. His pay was reported to be \$10 million.

Jibril had been on Teheran's terrorist payroll for years. His trademark: sophisticated barometric-pressure bombs programmed to detonate at a specific altitude. Small but powerful, the devices contained a Czech-made explosive called Semtex, which is virtually undetectable by airport luggage scanners.

Between July and mid-October, Jibril dispatched teams to survey airports and U.S. flights out of Athens, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Stockholm. Iranian

diplomats, trained terrorists themselves who reported to Mohtashemi, assisted them. One, Mehdi Ahari Mostafavi, was Iran's ambassador in Bonn, West Germany.

The Semtex explosives were smuggled to the West German town of Neuss near Düsseldorf. Here, at one of the organization's safe houses, an expert bomb maker assembled them into lethal barometric devices concealed in cassette players and video equipment. To ensure the greatest number of deaths, the bombs would be slipped on planes during the peak Christmas travel season.

But, alerted by surveillance and wiretaps, West Germany's federal police concluded that a major terrorist incident was in the offing. On October 26, squads of heavily armed plainclothesmen arrested 16 PFLP-GC agents and other suspects in five cities, the nucleus of the organization's German network. Among those held was Jibril's chief of foreign operations, Hafez Dalkamoni, a vital link in the conspiracy. When police searched his car, they discovered one of the bombs—fully armed.

Incredibly, a judge released 11 of the suspects the next day, citing insufficient evidence—even though a police raid on a second PFLP-GC safe house in Frankfurt yielded one of the largest arsenals of terrorist weapons ever seized in West Germany. And, tragically, police were not aware of the identity of the targets.

The arrests had, however, disrupted the timing of the operation. Mohtashemi and Jibril were forced to alter their plan, concentrating on one flight instead of four.

Pan Am 103 from Frankfurt to New York via London was targeted, some analysts say, because four U.S. security and intelligence officers were on board. Three of those four were returning home after a secret mission in Lebanon. Ominously, counter-terrorist experts report, Iranian operatives have penetrated the reservations computers of major Western airlines and are able to read passenger manifests. Thus, they can single out high-profile diplomats, political leaders and intelligence officers.

According to one reliable source, on December 20—a day before the bombing—U.S. electronics-intelligence technicians intercepted a communication from Iran's Beirut embassy to Teheran, alerting Mohtashemi's aides to the Americans' itinerary. Yet, the CIA failed to warn either the officers or the airline. This despite the fact that earlier a warning had been passed on to the agency by Israel's Mossad.

On the night of December 21, a bomb exploded in the forward baggage compartment of Pan Am 103 as it passed over Lockerbie, Scotland. All 259 on board died, and another 11 persons were killed on the ground.

Terrorist Beginnings. Ali Akbar Mohtashemi was born in Teheran in 1946. Barely into his teens, he

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November 2, 1990

SSP
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Honorable Strom Thurmond
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Thurmond:

I am writing in further response to your October 10th communication forwarding correspondence you received from Colonel Philip J. Corso, USA (Ret.).

Colonel Corso wrote to you about lethal barometric devices after reading about the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in the September, 1990, issue of the Reader's Digest. We certainly appreciate his interest in sharing with us his experiences with a similar device made by the Germans while he served in World War II. His communication has been passed along to appropriate personnel.

Thank you for making this information available to us.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted]
Inspector in Charge
Congressional Affairs Office

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- 1 - Columbia - Enclosures (4)
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Congressional Affairs Office

6.9.11.11 9

NOTE: Senator Thurmond wrote on behalf of Colonel PHILIP J. CORSO, USA (Ret.), who had furnished him information regarding his experiences during WWII after reading about a lethal barometric device in connection with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Bufiles indicate that CORSO was an intelligence officer for over 15 of his 20 years in the U.S. Army. He has contacted the FBI from time to time, especially in the 1940s, usually in connection with some allegation concerning the subversive activity of one individual or another. He was alleged to have been responsible for starting a rumor that LEE HARVEY OSWALD was an FBI informant. He was interviewed regarding this, but gave conflicting information about his sources and ended up stating his sources had no facts, but that their belief OSWALD was an FBI informant merely stemmed from idle deduction during a conversation. Bufiles further indicate he has caused the FBI and other Federal agencies to expend many hours of work and much manpower in running down wild accusations. Reply coordinated with [Redacted] Counterterrorism Section, CID.

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- Exec AD LES _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. _____
- Crim. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Insp. _____
- Intell. _____
- Lab. _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Off. Liaison & Int. Affs. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____ 6
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont *Wash* DATE: May 17, 1961

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY - SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

The following volume of testimony has been received from the Committee and sent to Mr. Sizoo of the Domestic Intelligence Division for appropriate review and return to my office to be returned to the Committee:

Volume 1, May 15, 1961 - ~~Top Secret~~

Testimony of
Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso,
United States Army

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Sizoo
- 1 - Mr. H. M. Anderson, Room 7635 (with testimony)

CDD:ejr
(4)

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/9/84 BY [redacted] #2361557

*Photostats made of testimony 5-17-61
Testimony returned to Mr DeLoach's office 5-18-61
Mems Arriving at Belmont 5/25/61
REL: amw*

55 JUN 1 1961

REC-29
EX-105

62-88217-2813

7 MAY 25 1961

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

~~SECRET~~

Vol. 1

the national defense of the United States with the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

2 OF 5

Hearing held before

Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws

of the

Committee on the Judiciary

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 15, 1961

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape, Master Sheets, Carbon and Waste turned over to Committee for destruction.)

WARD & PAUL

1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL }
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8-4267
8-4268
8-4269

C O N T E N T S

jlw

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso,
United States Army

2

(AFTERNOON SESSION - page 65)

Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso, - resumed

65

Pages at which material is to be inserted:
22, 25, 40, 49, 62,

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Monday, May 15, 1961

United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws
of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 o'clock
a.m., in Room 2228, New Senate Office Building, Senator James
O. Eastland (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland (Chairman), Dirksen, and
Keating.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel; Benjamin
Mandel, Research Director; and Frank W. Schroeder, Chief
Investigator.

The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
Colonel, please stand up. Do you solemnly swear the
testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel Corso. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIP J. CORSO,
U.S. ARMY

Mr. Sourwine. Would you give the reporter your full name, please.

Colonel Corso. Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso.

Mr. Sourwine. And what branch of the service are you, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. I am in the Army.

Mr. Sourwine. What is your home address?

Colonel Corso. 305 East Leighton Drive, Falls Church, Virginia.

Senator Dirksen. A regular colonel?

Colonel Corso. No, reserve.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you presently on active duty?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Where?

Colonel Corso. I am assigned to the office of the Chief of Research and Development, Pentagon, Department of the Army.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you had experience in intelligence, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I have.

Mr. Sourwine. Has that been extensive?

Colonel Corso. 15 years. Approximately 15 years.

Mr. Sourwine. Would you tell the Committee of that experience.

Colonel Corso. Yes. When I was commissioned a Second Lieutenant I came in, I was commissioned in Artillery. Then they sent me to an intelligence school at Camp Ritchie, Maryland where I was trained in interrogation.

From there I went to England, and I worked with the British MI-19 Office, and I conducted interrogations under British supervision.

Later I was sent to North Africa before the landings in Italy, and joined the Fifth Army G-2 Section.

There I handled line crossers and interrogation.

From there I went to Rome; I joined the Rome area Allied Command as assistant G-2, and in late 1944 I became the Chief, acted as G-2 head in intelligence of Rome Area Command.

Then I returned to the States. I went to the Pentagon, and from there I went to Fort Riley, Kansas, where I headed the Department Non-Resident Instruction. I handled the writing of military intelligence courses.

Upon the outbreak of the Korean War I was sent to the Strategic Intelligence School in Washington, just prior to the outbreak. Then I went to Japan, and I joined the Plans and Estimates Branch of the Intelligence Division of G-2, which is intelligence.

Later I became the Chief of the Special Projects Branch which handled subversion, the prisoner-of-war camp riots, and I handled, also devised a system of Army bombings.

Mr. Sourwine. Were you at Panmunjom?

Colonel Corso. I was sent to Panmunjom to handle the intelligence on the exchange of wounded prisoners. I handled that under General Daniel; then I stayed on under General Harrison who was the chief delegate, and later when he found out I had my orders for about five months to go home, he called me in and let me come back. I came back to Washington, and joined the Western Division, Department of the Army Intelligence Branch.

I was there about two weeks when a letter came to the Pentagon requesting that I be loaned to Mr. C. D. Jackson at the Operation Coordinating Board. I was to support him in intelligence activities, and I did, in fact, support Dr. Mayo, did all the research, and part of the speech-writing for his speech on brain-washing that he gave at the United Nations.

When that speech was finished, all the presentation at the United Nations was finished, I handled the atrocity campaign for Lodge at the United Nations. I supplied intelligence, and so forth.

Then Mr. C. D. Jackson went back to the Pentagon and requested my permanent assignment to his staff, and I was assigned to him, and I remained with him until he left Washington.

When he went to the Security Council he handled the political part of the Security Council at the United Nations, and I supported him on speeches and presentations, in fact, I requested, I asked him, to take over three items: One was

aggression, when the Communists accused the United States of aggression; when they accused us of piracy in the area of the China Seas, and when the Czechs introduced a resolution accusing us of war-like propaganda.

He took these three items and I told him I would support him in intelligence, and part of the speech writing.

Mr. Sourwine. And you did so?

Colonel Corso. I did so. Later -- then I became a professional -- when C. D. Jackson cut his ties with the government, I became one of the professional staff members of the Operations Coordinating Board. I handled various items, National Security Council items and, in fact, I was -- C. D. Jackson before he left -- I left this out -- he assigned me to the Berlin and Geneva conference working groups, deliberation bodies we called them.

From there I went to -- I remained in that position approximately three years; and I took an assignment in Germany as -- I commanded a missile battalion, and then I became Inspector General, Seventh Army Support Command, and then I returned to the States.

I was for a while advisor to the National Guard for missile air defense, and now I am with the Intelligence Branch of the Office of Chief of Research and Development.

Mr. Sourwine. At the United Nations, in addition to the items you mentioned on the Czech accusation of war-like propa-

ganda and U.S. piracy in the China Seas, which involved the Tuapse, you were connected with the germ warfare situation?

Colonel Corso. I was. The speeches made by Dr. Mayo, I did all the research for all those speeches. In fact, the approach that we should have used there on that I worked that out, and he agreed, and so did Ambassador Lodge.

q Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, have you been commended in any way for your work?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I have.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you give us that?

Colonel Corso. In addition to the Army -- I don't want to get into the Army decorations unless you want me to, or only the United Nations part?

Mr. Sourwine. I think it would be well if this record shows what the commendations are, at least a sufficient sample of your caliber, Colonel.

Colonel Corso. I received a commendation medal for my job and the Bronze Star for my job as G-2 of the Rome Area Allied Command.

In addition, I received two decorations from the Italian government for that position. I received one of their highest awards, which is the Italian War Cross, and their Knighted Crown of Italy. These were approved by the War Department at the time.

Then, later for the Korean War operation I received the

Legion of Merit, and then I received, when I was commander of the Missile Battalion, I received another commendation medal.

At the United Nations during the bacteriological presentation, Lodge wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff of the Army commending me on that brain-washing speech in which he made a statement that this was probably one of the greatest victories since Inchon.

Later Lodge in the atrocity presentations, in another letter to C. D. Jackson on my part in that, and C. D. Jackson personally sent a letter to my superiors on the three items that I named previously, I supported him on.

end 1

Then, Elmer Staats, who was head of the Operations Coordinating Board --

Mr. Sourwine. That is S-T-A-A-T-S?

Colonel Corso. Yes. He wrote a letter telling them of my work that I had done with the Department of the Army when I was leaving, from the knowledge I had of the Government and assistance I had given him.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, I want to tell you that your name was brought into our hearings by two different witnesses, both of whom told the Committee that you were an extremely knowledgeable intelligence officer, and that you had over a period of many years made a deep study of the major intelligence problems of the United States; is that true?

Colonel Corso. That is true.

Mr. Sourwine. Former Ambassador Robert Hill, whom I think you know --

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir; I know him.

Mr. Sourwine. (continuing) -- gave the Committee the impression that you had made this a hobby, perhaps, it might be said, made it your major interest over a long period of time; is this correct?

Colonel Corso. I did. Actually it had been my profession for so many years that I wouldn't exactly call it a hobby; I would call it a profession.

Mr. Sourwine. You have made it a profession.

Why have you done this, Colonel, any particular reason?

Colonel Corso. Well, for the same reason I can say that I wear the uniform, which is mostly to protect the country and uphold, I would say, our institutions that we have here, which I think, in my opinion, I have never known or heard of any better in the world.

Mr. Sourwine. One of the gentlemen who mentioned you to us said that you had done this because you believed that for success in conflict it was necessary to know both oneself and the enemy.

Colonel Corso. That is one of the -- it is not a theory actually, it is a saying, I think the Chinese General Tsung Sun, I think that was his name, made the statement that if you don't know yourself and you don't know your enemy you lose every battle.

If you know yourself and you know the enemy you don't have to fear the outcome of a thousands battles. I think that applies to some of my feelings.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, Colonel, we were warned by the Army through Legislative Liaison, through whom we made arrangements for your appearance here, that the National Security Council had taken special note in its meeting on January 14, 1960 of the President's deep concern about unauthorized disclosures with respect to NSC documents and deliberations, and that it had been noted that the President had directed that all persons attending NSC meetings, and all recipients of NSC documents be reminded of the President's instructions that matters of substance considered in the NSC organization should be treated as matters involving Presidential privilege.

You were connected with NSC over a period of about three years, we were told?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. And we were warned if the Committee had questions specifically about matters which were a part of your official duties during that time the Presidential privilege would extend, and that subject to your judgment as to the nature of any questions you might have to assert Presidential privilege in declining to answer.

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir. I have a statement that I would like to put on record at this time, a very short one.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir.

Colonel Corso. I have been informed that my appearance here is in connection with this period of time from August 1953 to August 1956 during which I was on duty as a member of the staff of the Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council.

As you know, that Board had the responsibility of carrying out the decisions of the National Security Council, with respect to its area of authority.

As a professional staff member of the Operations Coordinating Board, I was necessarily familiar with discussions and deliberations of the National Security Council.

I have here an order of the Secretary of Defense, my superior, reminding me of the President's instruction that matters of substance covered in the National Security Council organization should be treated as matters involving Presidential privilege.

Gentlemen, I am not a lawyer or trained in the law. I intend to be as forthright as I can under the circumstances. However, I am a member of the Military Service and must obey orders as I can best interpret them.

Therefore, I respectfully request indulgence of the Committee if I feel that answering any of your questions would violate my orders, and I elect to rely upon my judgment in that respect, I am not sure whether my answer would be in violation of those

orders, I would ask permission to obtain the advice after the hearing adjourns, in either furnishing the answer or stating the grounds for not answering.

Thank you for your courtesy in permitting me to make this statement.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, in this connection I would like to point out to you that this hearing has been classified as ~~Top Secret~~. That the fact of your appearance has been classified as ~~Top Secret~~; that this Committee has been in existence since 1950, and there has never been a leak from any of its classified hearings. I hope you will take these matters into account. I hope you will take these matters into account if the question comes up and you are forced to use your discretion as to whether it is something you cannot answer.

Have you, Colonel, in the study of intelligence --

Senator Dirksen. Could I ask at this point, Jay, I have forgotten what our practice was as to whether or not a witness can look at the transcript and edit in case he must delete something?

Mr. Sourwine. The witness has access to the transcript on a classified hearing; he has to have access to it here in the Committee's own quarters.

Senator Dirksen. That is correct.

Mr. Sourwine. He may correct his testimony, but the Committee reserves the right to revert to the original version

if the witness materially changes it, but where there is a security question involved, the witness indicates it, and the Committee, of course, always takes that into consideration.

Senator Dirksen. Colonel, that would be helpful to you?

Colonel Corso. Yes, it would.

Senator Dirksen. And you can see whether there is someplace where you may have misspoken or overstated, and then you call attention to it and suggest that, perhaps, that item be deleted.

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir. I would very much like to do that.

Senator Dirksen. That would be helpful to you?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

The Chairman. Of course, we would honor the request.

Senator Dirksen. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, in connection with this study you have made of intelligence problems, have you paid particular attention, have you given particular attention, to the Soviet's intelligence techniques?

Colonel Corso. I have.

Mr. Sourwine. Has there been a change in those techniques since now about 1951?

Colonel Corso. From my observation, in some of the items I have been involved with, there has been.

Mr. Sourwine. And what has that change been, what is the nature of it?

Colonel Corso. From the information that is available to me, in 1951 there was a change.

Previous to that time, the Soviets were interested in maintaining technical and military intelligence. In 1951 a change occurred where they wanted information to be sent to the Soviet Policy Makers.

In addition to this, instructions were that NVD or NKVD agents would not come in contact with the people they had in high positions, but would leave them, and their problem was to influence or to divert and paralyze policy to their advantage and also, if possible, to assist people who thought as they did to advance it.

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, it has been since 1951 you are telling us tentative Soviet intelligence not merely to gather information but to seek to influence and control policy of what they consider the enemy countries, including the United States?

Colonel Corso. From my observation, yes, sir; and that is their primary objective as of now.

Mr. Sourwine. Does this include delaying tactics and crippling tactics?

Colonel Corso. I consider those as all part of these instructions that they gave.

Mr. Sourwine. Part of you spoke of diversion in what?

Colonel Corso. Paralysis.

Mr. Sourwine. And paralysis; diversion and paralysis.

Colonel, one portion of your experience I don't think you mentioned. You had something to do with the Voluntary Freedom Corps plan?

Colonel Corso. I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us something about that?

Colonel Corso. There was -- I had -- I was responsible for certain items, National Security Council items which included the National Voluntary Corps, the National Volunteer, and X-day planning, that is para-military, I think you have heard lately, guerrilla warfare.

In that sense I have to in here invoke Presidential privilege in discussing these papers, but there is an item which I can tell here which is unclassified and was told to me by a prominent person at one time, Mr. Charles Kersten, who was a Congressman, he was Chairman of the Kersten Committee.

Mr. Kersten became a rather good friend of mine when he was in Washington, and he told me that one time he visited Chancellor Adenauer in Germany, and he brought up these items, and he asked Chancellor Adenauer why he opposed it, and Adenauer told him, "why, I have never opposed this; I have never heard of it."

He said, "do you mean flying the flags of the captive nations military forces in Germany?" He said, "in my opinion this is wonderful. But I have never heard of this before."

And from what Congressman Kersten told me all this item was

in our government, and the impression was conveyed to the superiors that this was, that Chancellor Adenauer was, against it from what Mr. Kersten told me, and from what he told me Adenauer was not against it.

end 2

Mr. Sourwine. This plan for a voluntary freedom corps to fly the flags of the nations, was not implemented, was it?

Colonel Corso. It was not. This what I am going to say now I can't verify this, but I was told when I was given the papers that President Eisenhower wanted this implemented, and it was not implemented.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you saying you were told by Congressman Kersten it was not implemented, at least in part, because word was got up to the top levels of our government that Chancellor Adenauer opposed it?

Colonel Corso. This is my impression.

Mr. Sourwine. Whereas the fact is, according to Mr. Kersten's statement to you, that Adenauer not only didn't oppose it but didn't know about it?

Colonel Corso. Exactly.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any knowledge as to how this misinformation was conveyed upstairs in the government?

Colonel Corso. I do not.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, are you aware of subversion in our own government which affects our policy?

Colonel Corso. Mr. Sourwine, subversion is a difficult

word in this case to apply. I would rather call it paralysis or diversion and paralysis. I would rather call it by those two terms.

Subversion in the sense of the word that we recognize subversion, it is difficult for me to say.

The Chairman. Speak a little louder, please; I can barely hear you.

Colonel Corso. Do you want to repeat this?

The Chairman. No, sir; I caught it.

Colonel Corso. I was aware of instances of impediment and diversion.

Mr. Sourwine. I don't mean to argue about the word "subversion," but subversion means an effort to turn over a government. We are speaking here of efforts to slow down or control or misguide the policy of the United States, and that is why I used the word "subversion." For whose benefit have these efforts been made that you know of?

Colonel Corso. From the actual items that I was involved in, and from my impression from actual fact, they seemed always to work for the benefit of the Soviets and Chinese Communists.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have in mind specific instances of this policy of impedance that you speak of?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I know of many of these instances that happened.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us some of these instances.

Colonel Corso. This is sort of a difficult place here to separate this Presidential privilege, Mr. Sourwine, but --

Mr. Sourwine. Well, perhaps, you would rather --

Colonel Corso. I can bring up a few, yes, which are not classified. I can go back to the Korean War, and during the process of the Korean War, as you know, we were not allowed to bomb Manchuria, we did bomb the bridges; that was common knowledge in the newspapers.

The Chinese Nationalist troops were requested or they requested to come in, that was turned down. There was what I found out when I came back to Washington, there was an item known as the Fig Leaf policy; that was to cover Soviet involvement in the Korean War.

Now, that particular instance, and also there was an effort to cover, from what I understand, the conspiracy of how the Soviets, Chinese Communists and the North Koreans got together.

Mr. Sourwine. You say there was an effort to cover this as a matter of policy? Are you say there was here part of the United States' policy to conceal Soviet involvement in the Korean War?

Colonel Corso. Well, I can't exactly -- I would say yes on that.

Mr. Sourwine. Go ahead.

Colonel Corso. And incident of this type happened: That in this non-involvement that the Soviets were not involved in t

Korean War, I personally made the estimates on the Soviet troops in Korea, that material was put in a series of briefs, which were declassified and given to Ambassador Lodge. Those briefs are available.

I would like to go back --

Mr. Sourwine. Where are they available, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. They were sent to the United Nations, and I understand they were in the files of the Coordinations Operating Board.

I worked out a system with Operations Briefs, we call it, which were sent out to government agencies, and so forth, on which items such as this -- for example, I worked a whole series of information briefs on why Communist China should not be admitted to the United Nations, which were delivered to Lodge.

Now, this item on Soviet involvement in the Korean War, I worked that out in Korea originally when I was Chief of the Special Projects Branch.

This was given to Lodge, and the substance of it was that the Soviets had 26,000 actual Soviet troops in Korea, fighting a war against us. They had anti-aircraft troops; they had advisors. The pilots in the MIGs were Russians.

In fact, many of the -- in fact, I also discovered later, which was declassified and given to Lodge, that the actual order to attack across the 38th Parallel was given by a Russian General

in Russian. This was heard by two prisoners we captured. This was declassified and given to Lodge.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any other instances that you can volunteer, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. I want to get back to the Korean War for a moment.

Well, the bombing at the Yalu river bridges, I was involved in that; we were actually hampered on that when all these supplies were pouring across, and later when the -- you will remember for quite a long time the power plants, we had orders not to bomb them.

I made the estimates on those that this power was, in fact, being used by the North Korean war effort.

Also in this, we knew intelligence had known, for many years that the Soviets were actually training Soviets of Korean ethnic origin in the North Korean army, and if you remember the riots that happened in the prisoner-of-war camps, through my intelligence I found the man who created and directed the riots, and he was a leader, and I pulled him out of the camps, and we later broke him and he admitted he was a Soviet Colonel, and if we were trying to prove the Russians started the war, he was proof enough, and he asked for a Russian interrogator.

This material I also gave to Lodge, that the top staff of the North Korean army was actually made up of Russian officers of Korean ethnic origin.

Also at one time I had instructions not to prepare this data, but my chief over there in Japan let me go ahead with it, and it was sent to Washington and accepted.

Mr. Sourwine. Could you tell us where these orders came from not prepare the material?

Colonel Corso. I do not know.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have other instances you can cite, Colonel? I understand that there may be some that you will not be able to go into unless specific questions are raised.

Colonel Corso. When I prepared the speech for Dr. Mayo on the bacteriological warfare at the United Nations, I was handed a policy paper one day and told that I could not do this; that there was no market for it, foreign countries were not interested, and I disregarded the paper at the time, and I told the man who gave the paper to me if he wanted to stop he would have to see Lodge and C. D. Jackson because I was working under orders from them and not the Department of State.

Well, it was disregarded, and we did get this speech to the United Nations.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, with regard to the information which you have prepared in connection with the Korean situation, did you know whether this information reached its destination or whether it was negated or frustrated in any way?

Colonel Corso. At the United Nations?

Mr. Sourwine. Well, I don't know from your testimony whethe

for instance, your work on the Yalu River bridges and the power plants and the Soviet participation in the Korean War was originally directed to the United Nations or whether it was directed elsewhere.

Colonel Corso. It was directed originally to the Department of the Army, and from what I know when I was over in Japan, and then I took the material when I came back here and I had it declassified, and gave it -- put portions of it in some of Lodge's speeches in the United Nations.

Mr. Sourwine. Did it originally reach its intended destination, do you know?

Colonel Corso. I assume that it did, because one day in Tokyo I was brought -- telecom they call it -- and it was, I remember the Colonel brought it in, it was about six feet long; these were questions they were asking which came over the tele-communications system, so it must have reached Washington.

Mr. Sourwine. Questions about your appraisal of the intelligence estimate?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. And you answered it?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, do you consider the United States as at war now?

Colonel Corso. I do.

Mr. Sourwine. Since when?

Colonel Corso. I consider the United States at war with the Soviets, I will have to go back, back to the Comintern. From my studies of the Comintern it was an instrument of war; the Cominform in 1947 actually divided the whole world in two camps. It was a declaration of war.

In fact just recently, Mr. Malik at the United Nations on February 2, 1952, before the Joint Committee, made the statement that "this third world war has, in fact, begun."

And also even more recently in December, December 6, 1960, at the Moscow conference representing the Communist and Workers Party, I have here an analysis of that, the statement was made that, and this was their opening paragraph "an era of the world wide triumph of socialism and communism."

From all indications of what I have seen from the Communists' work, there is no question they are at war with us.

Mr. Sourwine. That estimate, that analysis, is that some- thing you did?

Colonel Corso. No, sir. This was given to me at the Pentagon recently.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this a classified document?

Colonel Corso. It is unclassified.

Mr. Sourwine. Can it be furnished to the Committee?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Can it go into the record at this point, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.
(The document referred to follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

Colonel Corso. The quote on Malik I took from a little pamphlet which I have had quite a few years. The pamphlet is a statement by communist leaders that war is inevitable.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, to be quite specific, you say we are at war. With what enemy are we at war?

Colonel Corso. With the Communist enemy wherever they are in the world, I feel even within our own country.

Mr. Sourwine. Is there anything you can add to what you have already said about the techniques used by the Soviets in continuing this war?

Colonel Corso. Well, their techniques, from what I have seen, are, they run just about across the board; they are very thorough. They use, in fact, one of the items that I would like to bring up now which is very pertinent to the present day situation -- I made quite an intensive study of their use of war by cease-fire.

Mr. Sourwine. War by cease-fire?

Colonel Corso. Yes. What I mean by that is like the truce in Korea and the truce in Indo-China.

Mr. Sourwine. You say this is recognized communist techniques?

Colonel Corso. It is, the basis of my statement is, Chou En-lai; the means is a means to an end. I don't have the statement here. It was presented to Geneva and presented to him during the 1954 negotiations; it is a means to an ultimate end.

It is a tactic of theirs. They have used it very effectively. They use it to get time for themselves.

In fact, in Korea, I know at the time when they asked for a cease-fire, the Chinese Communist armies, I think many military men have made this statement from intelligence also, the Chinese armies were on the verge of defeat, and they asked for a truce and, of course, the rest is history.

Mr. Sourwine. To clear up a point, Colonel, you spoke of Mr. Malik. Was that Jacob Malik of Lebanon or the Soviet Malik?

Colonel Corso. This is the Soviet Malik. I think he is Foreign Minister now.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, have you ever seen this?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I have.

Mr. Sourwine. What is it?

Colonel Corso. This is -- as I say, during my tour at OCB, as a member of the professional staff, and before, and even in Korea, I began to ask myself a lot of questions on why and how many of these things seem always to go on the side of the Soviets or why they make advances, and it seems like we never do, and in the course of that, with many of the newspaper stories and magazine articles that I saw, and I would like your advice on this if I should put the next phrase on the record or not.

Mr. Sourwine. I will state for the Committee members that this document has been classified as ~~Secret~~, and that indication

with respect to particular documents which were source material for this study will not be referred to in this hearing and should not be referred to on this record.

Will this solve your problem?

Go ahead with your explanation of what this is.

Colonel Corso. The study that I made which, as I say, was for reason of finding out why, I had to get behind most of this, so I found out actually what governed our thinking and our policy, and that is what is listed here.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this a chart which you prepared, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. I did.

*Sourwine called 5/17/64
& asked about this - the
deleted completely*

~~Mr. Sourwine. I will state for the record, Mr. Chairman, that this chart did not come to us from the Colonel. It was given to us by Mr. Bob Hill. I presume you gave it to Mr. Hill. It somehow came from your possession into his.~~

~~Colonel Corso. We discussed this many times.~~

Mr. Sourwine. What does this chart show? Explain it for the Committee so we will understand it.

Colonel Corso. I made an evaluation.

Mr. Sourwine. This is the chart called "Containment Policy."

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Perhaps it might be ordered in the record at this point, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. It will be ordered into the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

1947

CONTAINMENT POLICY - COMMUNISM CONTAINS SEEDS OF OWN DESTRUCTION DO NOT PROVOKE SOVIET UNION

Best Copy Available

FOREIGN POLICY INTERPRETATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
NSC POLICIES

ABOVE GROUND ACTIVITIES
DEPT OF STATE

UNDER GROUND ACTIVITIES
CIA

1. PREVENT EXPANSION OF SOVIET POWER AND INFLUENCE
2. WEAKEN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF USSR
3. DETER SOVIET UNION FROM RESORTING TO MILITARY ACTION TO SUPPORT ITS OBJECTIVES
4. PRESERVE UNITY OF WESTERN ALLIANCE AND WIN SUPPORT OF NEUTRALS OR AT LEAST PREVENT CONVERSION TO COMMUNISM

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

SHARP RUN IS
OVERIDING PRINCIPLE
IN INTERPRETING NSC
POLICIES

NO EVALUATION OF LONG
TERM SOVIET OBJECTIVES

BUILD SECURE
CLANDESTINE
APPARATUS FOR
FUTURE

EVALUATE
USSR OBJECTIVES
BY NIE AND
NSC

THWART
ACHIEVEMENT
BY GOVT

THWART
ACHIEVEMENT BY

1. EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY POWER (KOREA, BERLIN AIRLIFT)
2. POLITICAL ACTION - REBUILDING OF GERMANY
3. INTERNATIONAL ACTION - MARSHALL PLAN, NATO
4. ECONOMIC PROPAGANDA
5. POLITICAL GUIDANCE FOR COVERT ACTIONS

1. INCREASE ANTI-SOVIET FEELING AMONG GROUPS WITHIN USSR
2. ENCOURAGE NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENT
3. FOSTER PASSIVE RESISTANCE AND DISSATISFACTION
4. ENCOURAGE SUBJECT PEOPLE TO MAINTAIN CULTURAL, ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS VALUES
5. EXPRESS FUNDAMENTAL IDEOLOGICAL INCONSISTENCIES
6. EXPLOIT SOVIET NATIONALS OUTSIDE USSR
7. EXPOSE AND COUNTER GROUPS WHICH USE TO EXTEND

INTERPRETATIONS GUIDING
IMPLEMENTATION

ROLLBACK OF SOVIET POWER IN FUTURE
ALL GUIDANCE RULES FOR PRESENT REVEAL OR DETACHMENT
OF A STRONG
QUESTION OF PARANORM IS ONE FOR PEOPLE CONCERNED NOT
FOREIGN GOVTS OR EXILED GROUPS
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF RUSSIA AFTER COMMUNISM IS QUESTION
FOR DETERMINATION OF PEOPLE IN HABITING TERRITORY
A MORE APPROPRIATE METHOD IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO FIGHT THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISM
ACTION AGAINST SOVIET ALSO ARE NEGATIVE WHILE
WESTERN ALLIANCE IS POSITIVE
IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS ARE ACTIVELY UNIMAGINAT

1955 EVOLUTION INSTEAD OF REVOLUTION

RETRIEVE
NSC 20
10/2
10/5
8/11
OSB-D-31
D-10
D-15
D-18
D-43
D-33
NSC 173/3
162/2
CIA
MEMO TO NSC
DIRECTOR
NSC 185/15
14/5/11
14/1/2
PROJECT
NSC 162/2
8/11
5/10
GOSARD REPORT

Colonel Corso. I made a study on the policy of containment which was well-known, and which actually, I feel, had its birth in 1947, to the point now actually here where it is marked 1955, but from what I have seen since I have been away from the NSC, Council for three years, from what I have seen in the newspapers and magazines and so forth, this still applies, the policy of evolution instead of revolution. This covers that period.

I would extend to 1955 -- I would extend it to, say, 1960.

In the first block it shows we should prevent expansion of the Soviet power and influence.

Two, we should weaken military political and economic capabilities of the USSR.

Three, we should deter the Soviet Union from resorting to military action to support its objectives.

Four, we should preserve unity of Western Alliance and win support of neutrals or at least prevent conversion to communism.

Mr. Sourwine. Were those accepted tenets of our strategy?

Colonel Corso. They were.

Mr. Sourwine. Go ahead.

Colonel Corso. And they were public knowledge, most of those, or all of them were.

Now, also it was a well-known fact openly that the State Department in conjunction with CIA would implement this. Then we should thwart the achievement of Soviet expansionist efforts by the employment of military power. This was supposed to be

the Korean and Berlin airlifts; political action, which is a rebuilding of Germany; international acts like the Marshall Plan, NATO, propaganda, political guidance, and so forth, covert actions.

On the other hand, we should also in the gray area increase anti-Soviet feeling among groups within the USSR, . . . encourage nationalistic sentiments; foster passive resistance and dissatisfaction; encourage subject people to maintain cultural, ethnic and religious values.

end 4

We should express fundamental ideological inconsistencies; exploit Soviet nationals outside USSR; and expose and counter groups Kremlin uses to extend power.

Mr. Sourwine. There is nothing wrong with those objectives, is there?

Colonel Corso. Those objectives are very admirable, and they were publicized almost continuously in the newspapers and magazines and other periodicals and media.

As I say, they were all, as far as I am concerned, those were all very good.

But in the interpretation phrase this was seen many times and heard, that the roll back of Soviet power is in the future, and the time for present revolt, detachment of a satellite, is in the future.

The question of separatism is one for peoples concerned and not foreign governments or exiled groups.

Internal organization of Russia after communism is question for determination of people inhabiting territory.

Mr. Sourwine. These are the points at the bottom of the chart which you say is the implementation?

Colonel Corso. These are the points that negated the above points.

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, it was interpreted out of existence, it was interpreted to frustration?

Colonel Corso. Mr. Sourwine, at this point I would like to give a little explanation.

The important phase, an important phase of this policy-making but, as I, in my opinion, feel, a critical phase, is implementation.

I feel this way, even had the best policy in the world been in existence, if you never implement it, it is not worth anything, and within our government the system of implementation was very cumbersome, and not only was it cumbersome but it lent itself to diversion and paralysis.

Numerous working groups, numerous committees with the compromises, the wordage and so forth that had to be put in all the papers, tended to delay or gather time, and many times many of the words were causes of actually no policy of implementation, words like "counterproductive," "evolution," and so forth, which were almost impossible.

For example, in one case I was in charge of a paper which I

TIME FOR ROLL-BACK OF SOVIET POWER IS NOT IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE
 REVOLT OR DETACHMENT OF A SATELLITE IS RULED OUT FOR THE PRESENT
 QUESTION OF SEPARATISM IS ONE FOR PEOPLES CONCERNED AND NOT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR EXILED GROUPS
 INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF RUSSIA AFTER COMMUNISM IS QUESTION FOR DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES INHABITING TERRITORY
 A MORE OPPORTUNE MOMENT IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALISM
 ACTIONS AGAINST SOVIET ELITE ARE NEGATIVE WHILE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS POSITIVE
 IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT
 WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM - ONLY TO AGGRESSIVE TOTALITARISM
 SOVIET VULNERABILITIES ARE OF SUCH A NATURE THAT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT THEM
 VIGOROUSLY WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO REALIZATION OF U. S. OBJECTIVES

CHINA AND FORMOSA
 1950 - 1955

1. would fall before end
 O.
 Kai-Shek is decadent
 corrupt.
 his troops have low moral
 all defect.
 Communist are agrarian
 ers and can be divided
 SSR.
 would recognise Communist
 government since they
 the mainland.
 would have a cease fire
 Formosa Straits.

BOGOTA AND CARACAS CONFERENCE
 1954

1. The terms of Bogota and Caracas Conferences should not be implemented. Declarations should remain only a bunch of words.
2. Restrict travel of Communist and other collaborators throughout South America.

UNITED NATIONS
 1947 - 1955

1. We must not appear intransigent or too anti-Communist since this might convey attitude we are not interested in peace.
2. We must consult our Allies.
3. The Soviets appear as if they desire to cooperate in the interest of UN objectives.
4. Collective security was greatest victory of Korea.
5. No market for propaganda such as S.F. or atrocity presentation.

INTERNATIONAL
 1947

1. No reliable.
2. Don't at realism.
3. Organiza Soviet a Communis ed.
4. We are n nism - o itarian.
5. Exposure Communis intensif opinion- ments of Communis to reach quarters


1. Estimate slanted; lured by high government rial.
 inal Comintern orders lured by our officials. Military advisers prove false.
 2. Slanted and distorted, especially by Univer- researchers. would sacrifice a staunch in favor of a sworn to Communist benefit; to destroy Chiang Kai-'s armies.

1. All implementation killed through planned apathy and bureaucracy.
2. This was proposed by policy planning staff at Department of State. Its intent was to try to control travel of undesirable elements. This is almost impossible in South America. It would have created a sort of Iron Curtain. The proposal was certain of defeat. Dulles took the OCB staff paper given to him by C. D. Jackson.

1. This has given the USSR a clean offensive field, leaving U.S. always on defensive.
2. Failure to look after own interest - always effective in halting positive actions.
3. Same argument advanced every summer. Used to halt any offensive action during fall sessions.
4. Internationalist greatly over emphasize point.
5. Proven false by world response.

1. False - available
2. Banding
3. Control never al
4. Verisim fal occ
5. False - Communis contain

SECRET



1. Halting any drive towards final victory.
2. Communist theory states war is final step when socialist victory is certain.
3. Policy of fear paralyzed any positive actions; allowed Chinese and Soviets to operate unopposed in Manchuria. Chinese Communist armies were on verge of defeat in 1951 and not allowed continue pressure.
 - a. Resulted in almost complete lack of intelligence from within China.
 - b. Would have been great morale blow to Communist Army.
 - c. Allowed enemy move supplies without hindrance.
 - d. Resulted in Panmunjon and UN defeat.
4. False. Intelligence was available. Soviets were actively participating in war.

1. Soviet policy is to get U.S. into conference.
2. Impeded U.S. policy to point where no independent action may be made. We fail to lead, protect our own interest and compromise on moral issues.
3. Another aspect of containment policy.
4. Evidence available beyond any doubt.
5. Did dignify them as a major power.

1. Result was that not one word was put out to assist our position or explain true factors.
2. Intelligence proven this false.
3. Know as Fig Leaf policy true role of Soviets covered by slanted estimates.
4. Effective in halting all positive actions.
5. True nature of conspiracy was available but output blocked.
6. False Asiatics and Latin Americans want such information.

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Prepared by Planning Board
Approved by Pres. July 18, 1956.

Review of NSC Pol
towards USSR, em-
phasizing U.S.
policy on the ex-
ploitation of
Soviet vulnerabil-
ties

Willska paper
currency convertabili-

PRESSURES AGAINST SOVIET BLOC
AND COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Time for Roll-back of Soviet power is not in foreseeable future.
2. Present revolt or detachment of a Satellite must be ruled out.
3. U.S. policy must be a firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.
4. Do not take any undue risks which might provoke Soviets into a war.
5. Enter into negotiations with Soviets if they offer promise of achieving acceptable modus vivendi or if they appear desirable.
6. X Day planning not important or proper approach to combat Soviet propaganda

COVERT ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN
MARXIST SOCIALIST PARTIES

1. Socialism is hope of the world.
2. Soviet Communism is violent, form of Socialism. They will eventually reform and join peaceful world Socialism.
3. Foster Socialist conferences.
4. Distribute food through foreign Socialist parties.
5. Assist attaches against Communism by Socialist Labor Unions.
6. The U.S. should support any established independent Communist regime and assist any nationalistic Communist leader to assert their independence of Moscow.

EAST-WEST TRADE

1. In the interest of peace and international cooperation we must trade with Communist countries.
2. Any standing example of successful defiance of the Kremlin by an independent Communist regime should be assisted by military equipment and economic aid.
3. We should take appropriate action to achieve greater currency convertability.

- 1 and 2. False - "stimated has assisted Soviet expansionism."
3. Impossible - Soviets must be pushed back.
4. Marxist theory and Soviets state they cannot be provoked. Policy of fear worked to U.S. detriment.
5. Impossible.
6. Not implemented since it would bring pressure against Soviets especially in propaganda field.

West Germany and Hungarian revolts prove this wrong.

1. Against U.S. principle and heritage.
2. Theory advanced by socialists, and League for Industrial Democracy.
3. U.S. officials sponsored Hangoon Conference in 1948.
4. Attempted in Germany by ... Churn.
5. Activity sponsored by U.S. Agencies.
6. Any so called "Nationalistic Communist Leader" such as Tito is still a Marxist and dedicated to overthrow our present social and economic system.

CIA paper proposed this in Sept. 1956.

1. Communist trade policy is guided by political and strategic considerations not economic. Therefore, east-west trade will strengthen Communist.
2. As a result we gave Tito over three billion dollars in aid. This included VP until 1956
135-F 84-6, 130F-47-D
6 F 86 E, 900 Tanks,
2500 combat vehicles
3000 artillery pieces,
4,000,000 rd arty ammo,
2500 machine guns
with 16,000,000 rds ammo.
3. Under this system Communist could acquire all dollars they needed in exchange for printing press money.

~~SECRET~~

COMMUNIST TERRITORY

PLANT THEM

COMMUNIST TERRORISM
1947 - 1955

... appear intrinsically Communist...
... are not interested...
... our Allies...
... appear as if they cooperate in the...
... objectives...
... security was greatest...
... of Korea...
... For propaganda such as atrocity presenta-

NATIONAL COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY
1947 - 1955

1. No reliable intelligence available.
2. Don't attack Communist Colonialism using word "colonialism." The word is an anathema to Latin Americans and our Allies.
3. Organizational unity, and Soviet ability to manipulate Communist parties is exaggerated.
4. We are not opposed to Communism - only aggressive totalitarianism.
5. Exposure of international Communist conspiracy would intensify the Polarization of opinion and inflame the sentiments of already convinced anti-Communists, making it harder to retain support in foreign...

ENCOURAGEMENT OF MINORITIES AND PEOPLES UNDER COMMUNIST RULE
1947 - 1955

1. Present revolt is ruled out in the Satellites and USSR.
2. The question of separation is one for the peoples concerned and not for foreign governments or exiled groups outside USSR.

ESCAPEES AND
1947 - 1955

1. Escapees a effective psychological against Sc
2. Ideologica relatively factors of
3. Volunteer legal aid policy.
4. Internati air group should not since this opportune
5. Emigrees asset
6. Escapees not an as

COMMUNIST FACTORIES

NEUTRALIZATION OF ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

... given the USSR's offensive field, leav-
... always on defensive.
... to look after on
... always affecting
... ting positive actions...
... present advanced every
... Used to halt any
... ive action during fall
...
... nationalist greatly
... emphasize point.
... False by world res-

1. False - world of intelligence available.
2. Bandung proved this wrong.
3. Control well documented but never allowed to be publicized
4. Version of campaign of peaceful coexistence by Communist.
5. False - weak cover to protect Communist and foster static containment.

1. Caused no pressure to be brought on USSR or Satellites.
2. This brings about conditions whereby captive peoples are allowed to develop.

1. Very little done. Few gram compl induced de 1950.
2. False - Ex
3. Attorney G legality a NSC. polic
4. CIA project apathy and
5. Lenin himself An organizat controlled b positive pro socialist wa
6. Any attempt was Bureaucr handling of always turne

cannot discuss, which was to implement a certain policy over a period or certain instance over a period of about four weeks from the the paper left my hand until it returned, and one word was inserted. That word was enough to stop the entire action of the paper.

Actually, it was a sentence, and boiled down to one word.

Mr. Sourwine. This is hard to understand. Can you explain it a little further.

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir. I was in charge of a group that had to implement a certain item to assist the United States, the climate of opinion of the United States before a conference.

We had a group organized in which I was representing high officials in government personally, and we worked out a system of implementing directives which we thought were very fine. If they were implemented the Soviets would have been, we feel -- we feel we would have had at least some advantage.

When the paper left my hands and my group which approved it I won't get into the deliberations, these were lengthy, and so many times frustrating -- but the paper we thought was a good one. We thought it would assist our position in the country.

When it returned there was one sentence in it. This sentence boiled down to one word "evolution." I had three weeks to implement the program. The definition of the word did not apply to this system.

I went back to my superior, we never did anything. I don't

know how this sentence got in there.

Mr. Sourwine. You had a program, in other words, to be implemented in three weeks time, and by the insertion of one word you were directed to implement it through evolution --

Colonel Corso. Exactly.

Mr. Sourwine. (continuing) -- which was impossible to do?

Colonel Corso. Impossible. I was in the implementing stage; as we call it in the Army, I was at the end of the line. I had to implement it. It couldn't be done in three weeks.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us where this paper was, where this word might have been inserted?

Colonel Corso. I don't know where it was inserted. It came back inserted.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where it was in the meantime before it came back?

Colonel Corso. All I know it was on its way to the President.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether it reached the President?

Colonel Corso. I understand it did.

Mr. Sourwine. It reached the President with the word "evolution" inserted?

Colonel Corso. That I couldn't say, Mr. Sourwine. I don't know where it was inserted.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether it was approved by the President?

Colonel Corso. It was when it came back.

Mr. Sourwine. It becomes important to know, to learn if we can, whether it was approved by the President with the word "evolution" in or without the word "evolution." Do you know?

Colonel Corso. I couldn't answer because I don't know.

Mr. Sourwine. When it came back, did it come back showing on its face that the President had approved it with the word "evolution?"

Colonel Corso. It was retyped.

Mr. Sourwine. Well, you had to act on the assumption that this was the order, did you?

Colonel Corso. I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Which frustrated your efforts to implement?

Colonel Corso. In fact, it not only frustrated it, nothing was done.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel here is a bigger one. These are two sheets obviously meant to be laid together. Have you seen these?

Colonel Corso. These are some of the sheets that I discussed with Ambassador Hill and other people many times.

Mr. Sourwine. What is this, Colonel; what does it show?

Colonel Corso. Well, the top block already has been discussed previously.

The second line here are items which would appear continuous

any time any policy was supposed to be implemented, and the bottom is merely an explanation by --

Mr. Sourwine. Well, are these instances of diversion that you spoke about, and paralysis?

Colonel Corso. They are.

Mr. Sourwine. Under Korea, which is your first box, what are the instances of diversion and paralysis there?

Senator Keating. May I ask a question first and, perhaps, it is not proper, Colonel, and you can decline to answer, of course, if you think you should.

What is the source of this document? Where are they from?

Colonel Corso. Much of this appeared in open publications.

Mr. Sourwine. To get at what I think the Senator has in mind, did you prepare this, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Senator Keating. I see.

Mr. Sourwine. Proceed.

Colonel Corso. I would like to give an example of diversion which I think is a little better, if we get over to the fifth block, Bogota-Caracas Conference.

I want to discuss the Caracas Conference. A position was prepared on that, and we worked on the paper which Mr. Jackson gave to the Secretary of State, gave it to him when we got on the plane, and when he looked at them, the speeches, and so forth, he was very pleased with it, and he took this and adopted

it.

Later, when we tried to implement some of the items in the Caracas Conference, I went to the FBI and asked them if we could have, if they could give us some material which we could exchange with the Latins. Mr. Hoover sent over a series of pamphlets which were ~~confidential~~. I took those and I wrote what I called one of the information briefs, and I was very surprised when I sent it back with a chart they had in the center of these books which showed the Communist Party in the United States above ground and underground, and I never expected declassification, but the FBI did declassify it, and we made a pamphlet out of this, and this was distributed out unclassified.

Then I got word back from people, I cannot remember their names now, and they told me it was taken up to the high official in the State Department and they said I, in my anti-communist fervor had prepared the pamphlet, which was not the fact. I think it was Mr. Bishop, who was Mr. Herbert Hoover's assistant, and went to this high official, I can't remember his name now and he told him that this pamphlet was prepared by material by the FBI, and approved by the FBI, and he was sort of surprised. As a result, the thing was sent to Latin America.

end 5

Irsh (6)
S-fls jlw

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us who told who that it was prepared in the excess of anti-Communist fervor?

Colonel Corso. I can't -- at the moment, I couldn't tell you that name.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you spoke about your fifth box which is headed "Bogota and Caracas Conference."

The first item under that is "The terms of Bogota and Caracas Conference should not be implemented; declarations should remain only a bunch of words."

Was that the policy of our Government?

Colonel Corso. No, it was not the policy of our Government. I did get -- I was told -- I can't remember if it was from Bishop or who told me that, it was common word at the State Department that this would not be implemented.

In fact, up to this date I am not aware of anything that has been done to implement it.

Mr. Sourwine. Your point 2 is "Restrict travel of Communists and other collaborators throughout South America." Was this our policy of our Government?

Colonel Corso. This was our original policy paper. We didn't get that into policy.

Mr. Sourwine. In the box immediately below that, does your Point 2 go into that?

Colonel Corso. It does. This was never brought out. In fact, from what I understand John Foster Dulles, when he saw

ps 2

this, these were given to him, he disregarded them. He called it, what I was told, an Iron Curtain Latin America which would work against us.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, referring to the next box under "United Nations," your first point, "We must not appear intransigent or too anti-Communist. This might convey an attitude we are not interested in peace."

Was this the policy of the United States Government or are you referring to the policy carried out by the State Department?

Colonel Corso. This one here I would say that is State Department.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this a written policy or is this the policy as you understood it to be from the acts that were actually performed and not performed?

Colonel Corso. Those were; that was some of the guidance that was actually given to me when I was working at the United Nations in written form; some of this used to come over.

Mr. Sourwine. Is it fair to say this whole chart all the way through represents what you knew our actual working position to be, not the policy paper, but the actual working position, working attitude?

Colonel Corso. It goes a little further than that. It is hard to pull it apart unless I have the actual papers, which I cannot discuss. This was what was conveyed as in the implementa-

ps 3

tion stage, this is what guided the implementation.

This is where our entire program began to fall down.

Mr. Sourwine. Would it be fair to say that this chart shows in 13 particular areas which you have identified here how policy was subverted by implementation or frustrated by implementation?

Colonel Corso. I would say that. In all these items I had personal, I actually was involved in many of these items, in almost all of them.

Senator Keating. May I ask a question? What is the difference between the upper and lower boxes?

Colonel Corso. The lower boxes are my comments.

Senator Keating. Your comments on what appears in the upper boxes?

Colonel Corso. That is right. Actually this could be cut off and the bottom boxes taken out. The bottom boxes are only valid as far as my experience and my comments.

Mr. Sourwine. The upper boxes then, running all the way across the page, are what you knew actually occurred in the way of implementation?

Colonel Corso. Yes. Many of these --

Mr. Sourwine. The implementation attitude, you might call it.

Colonel Corso. That is right. Many of these items, I might say the bulk of them, here was an item I would like to

ps 4

bring up at this time -- for example, I used to be very surprised at times to see the NSC paper by number quoted, and extracts quoted in, for example, Reston's column in the New York Times verbatim. Now, when those were quoted, I would lift them out of the papers and put them in this thing.

The Chairman. Put them in where?

Colonel Corso. In these blocks here.

The Chairman. I see.

Colonel Corso. Some of those -- many times during this period -- of course, I say I had the advantage that I knew what was in the papers, and I knew I could check whether they were valid or not, and actually many of the items that appeared in columns were exactly quotes. They must have been handed the papers, there is no other way they could have gotten it.

Mr. Sourwine. Whose columns beside Mr. Reston did you note that?

Colonel Corso. I saw many extracts of this type appear in some of Lippmann's column.

Mr. Sourwine. Walter Lippmann?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Who else?

Colonel Corso. If I remember right, I saw some paraphrases in Alsop's column; and many other times they would be in editorials which I would pick up, and which I knew the editorial could not have been written unless they had access.

ps 5 Senator Keating. Those papers you are referring to are ~~top secret~~ NSC papers?

Colonel Corso. Exactly, sir. They went so far as to refer to NSC 55/01. This would be in a column. The actual NSC number would be in a column, and picked those up many times.

For example, sir, in one of these when I was responsible in one particular case to give aid to whatever it was, floods, I think, in China, and I was responsible to see that certain elements, items, were implemented, and this was approved all the way up. In fact, we had sort of a joke as we were leaving the meeting, which had the approval of the highest councils in the Government, we were joking on the way out that within 12 hours this would appear in the newspapers.

This appeared in six hours in one of the New York papers, the exact item that was laid down in the highest councils; their decision appeared in the newspaper within six hours.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see anything of this nature in Drew Pearson's column?

Colonel Corso. I didn't see actually any numbers quoted, but I did read things in his column -- I can't specify at this time which ones they were because I never kept track of them -- but I did see numerous of these items or I would say references made to them, which he couldn't have gotten unless somebody told him.

Mr. Sourwine. Is it fair to refer to this particular chart

ps6

as a distillation of your intelligence experience and knowledge focused down to demonstrate how policy in each of these areas referred to was frustrated through bad implementation?

Colonel Corso. Exactly.

Sir, I can give you one example here, "No reliable intelligence on bloc international Communist conspiracy, no reliable intelligence available."

That was not so because now this was a well known fact around the Government, and also appeared in the newspapers and publications. But I personally prepared the whole system on the international Communist conspiracy, the Comintern, and so far these were declassified and appeared in those briefs, and there was a world of material available even on Latin America.

Mr. Sourwine. And yet you are saying --

The Chairman. Let him finish; let him finish.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir.

Colonel Corso. Even in Latin America we should not bring this international conspiracy up. I prepared it personally, and had had it declassified on the ties. I remember at the time when the entire Latin American operation was being operated through Prague and Czechoslovakia that is where the Soviet headquarters were, and this was all declassified; and yet it was continuously said there was no such evidence available.

Fir(7)
ws fls ps

Mr. Sourwine. Where was this continuously said?

Colonel Corso. Well, around the government agency that I was involved in.

Mr. Sourwine. All of them?

Colonel Corso. Not all of them.

Mr. Sourwine. Which one?

Colonel Corso. I would say that it was the Department of State mostly, certain elements, and just certain elements in CIA, not the working level. This working level knew very well about the Communist conspiracy.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may this be received for the record and inserted at the point where we started to discuss it?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to follows:)

(COMMITTEE INSERT.)

ws2

Senator Keating. Under that international conspiracy your first item is "No Reliable Intelligence Available."

Do you mean that that was, if not policy, was the accepted position of our government from 1947 to 1955?

Colonel Corso. Sir, some of the highest officials in the government, who I cannot name because of the presidential privilege clause, actually made numerous speeches on this item, and I saw certain letters written by them which they said --

Senator Keating. You mean public speeches?

Colonel Corso. There is some published, I can't get them -- all I can think at the time I have seen in published speeches, but I remember letters written by these people in which they said no reliable intelligence was available.

In fact, I saw one ~~top secret~~ letter which was written and tied together three of our highest officials at the time in making such a statement that there is no such thing as an international Communist conspiracy.

The Chairman. You say it was principally the State Department that was involved?

Colonel Corso. Principally, yes.

The Chairman. That was the viewpoint of the State Department?

Colonel Corso. Well, of some high officials.

The Chairman. Yes.

Colonel Corso. I wouldn't say -- there were some people,

ws3

for example, like Hill and Mr. Bishop, and it wasn't their opinion, because there were a lot of very good people over there who I know personally. But these are delaying tactics.

The Chairman. But the prevailing opinion that was in the State Department there was that there was no such thing as an international Communist conspiracy?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. In fact, that was the State Department's policy, was it not?

Colonel Corso. Well, I would call it that.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you have spoken of this frustration in implementation. Was it your judgment that this system was deliberately cumbersome?

Colonel Corso. Well, deliberate or not, that is a hard question to ask, but from my experience what I saw -- you see, the government, actually I divided it up into three portions -- this is just as an example, the highest group, which is the National Security Council, which is the President and his Cabinet; then the secondary level of government and then, of course, the third I would consider all the rest.

Now, in the second level of government are the key people. This is where the scribes operate, the people who do the thinking, who do the writing, who actually do the writing of the implementation.

ws4

Then these go up after the committees, and so forth, and they are approved by the National Security Council.

But, sir, the National Security Council many times could only give two or three minutes on a major item because they had to cover the world, practically, and the key people were the people who wrote these papers and were given the job of implementation.

There are certain key spots which I know that if those spots were taken over by a man who didn't want the policy implemented, all he had to do was to do nothing.

Mr. Sourwine. You are saying this opportunity to frustrate by inaction is inherent in the system?

Colonel Corso. It is inherent in the system, and also I believe from what I quoted first, the Soviet policy in 1951, the Soviets surely must know this, and if they have any agents they could have, if they implant them in certain spots, make this perfect for paralysis and diversion or inactivity.

Mr. Sourwine. Well, Colonel, is this system set up to make it difficult for, impossible to pin responsibility for, such things as this evolution, not revolution?

Colonel Corso. It is very difficult. In fact, I would say it is almost impossible to prosecute a man, because there would be no evidence according to our laws and our system.

ws5

Mr. Sourwine. We know it is almost impossible to find out who is responsible. I am asking you if you think it was set up so as to make it impossible to pin responsibility?

Colonel Corso. There, Mr. Sourwine, I would be getting into opinion. Let us say, I could put it this way, the way it was set up, it made this -- I am not trying to be evasive; it is hard for me to answer and still stay within the Presidential Privilege, but the way it is set up it is perfect for this type of operation.

Mr. Sourwine. Let me put it this way to you: Could this be set up, could the implementation and the preparation of papers be set up, in such a way that it was a frustrating word inserted, responsibility could be pinned?

Colonel Corso. It could be.

Mr. Sourwine. Should it be so set up?

Colonel Corso. It should be so set up. In fact, I was involved with the proper authorities at the State Department. They asked me if I could give them some information on certain people who had impeded policy. I thought it would be my duty to. I gave it to them. In fact I gave them the six drafts of a certain paper, not the final, but the six drafts, and two or three people were suspended, and a few others transferred, and the basis was impediment of policy.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you feel that restrictions you are operating under prevent you from telling the committee about

ws6

this incident in more detail?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir. This involves a statement, this is involved in, I think, and under the Presidential Privilege.

Mr. Sourwine. Was this material transmitted to State in the form of a memorandum or otherwise in writing?

Colonel Corso. It was transmitted to the State Department; their people came over and talked to me, and this was made in the form of memorandas and signed statements.

Mr. Sourwine. Which were turned over to the State Department?

Colonel Corso. They were given to the security people of the State Department.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us approximately when this was?

Colonel Corso. I would say it was 1955.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think the committee would be able to secure this information from State, that is, do you think it is still there?

Colonel Corso. Sir, from some of the operations I have seen I doubt if it is there. It might be. That is only my opinion.

Senator Keating. Was this discussed, this incident discussed, in the National Security Council?

Colonel Corso. Which incident is that, sir?

ws7

Senator Keating. The incident or incidents to which you have referred, where State Department personnel impeded policy.

Colonel Corso. No, sir. This was not discussed in the National Security Council. These discussions went on in the State Department with the security people.

Senator Keating. I do not mean to be unduly pressing it, but I had the idea that, perhaps, you felt that your only privilege pertained to your participation in the National Security Council.

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir. I did discuss this with some high officials in the government. I don't know if I could under this Presidential Privilege -- if it would be right for me to mention their names. They were very much interested in it, and they were concerned about it.

Well, I think I can go beyond -- for example, I discussed this with Ambassador Lodge. I discussed it many times with C. D. Jackson, and numerous times C. D. Jackson would pick up the telephone right alongside of me and call up Allen Dulles or Foster Dulles to get a point across.

Mr. Sourwine. You say some people were suspended as a result of your showing what happened with these six drafts of this policy paper?

Colonel Corso. If I remember two were suspended and two transferred.

(8)

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Mr. Sourwine. What happened to the ones suspended? Did they eventually go back to work?

Colonel Corso. What I understand, one of them is reinstated and the other one works for some law firm here in Washington.

Mr. Sourwine. The man who was reinstated, was that in the State Department?

Colonel Corso. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Is he still active today?

Colonel Corso. I lost track of him in 1957, but he was back.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you feel you cannot give us the names of these individuals?

Colonel Corso. Well, the one man who is now a civilian, and I think he was well known, although I don't know just where this -- this is sort of a hazy area in this Presidential privilege.

Mr. Sourwine. It didn't concern the National Security Council, did it, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. No, sir; it concerned the State Department.

Mr. Sourwine. How does it come under your directive about Presidential privilege?

Colonel Corso. I don't feel it does, and I would like to tell the Committee his name was Herbert Fierst.

Senator Keating. He is the one not now in the government?

Colonel Corso. He is not in it.

Mr. Sourwine. What is the difference between telling us the name of a man who is now in the government and a man who is out of the government? Wouldn't it be more important to tell us the name of the man who still is in the government?

Colonel Corso. Well, the man that is in now, I think his name was Jesse McKnight.

Mr. Sourwine. McKnight?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. What was his job at the time?

Colonel Corso. He was the one who gave me the paper on the bacteriological item, and telling me it was not -- well, there was no market for it in the world, and so forth; and I asked him if this was the policy of the Secretary of State, because the paper only had his initials on it, and I disregarded it completely.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, to get that incident perfectly clear, you had prepared something which was to counter the bacteriological warfare charges which had been brought against this country; is that right?

Colonel Corso. In fact, not counter; this was the material supporting our position at the United Nations which the Soviets introduced the item, and this was our defense; in fact, my whole program was not to attack it on the basis of bacteriological warfare because this would negative -- or positively we would playing the enemy's game.

My whole policy was to attack it on Mr. Hunter's favorite term their brain-washing, and that is what we did, and we opened an entirely new field in this thing, and that is the one that Lodge gave me the commendation on, saying that this speech was the greatest victory -- actually, I have it here, I can read what Lodge said on that.

Mr. Sourwine. Why don't you just give it to us.

Colonel Corso. I can give you these,

Mr. Sourwine. If the Senator will permit, what do you have there? Are those your commendations?

Colonel Corso. These are my commendations.

Mr. Sourwine. Might they all go in the record, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

(The documents referred to follow:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

Colonel Corso. These all refer to OCB.

Lodge ended, he said that I, "should be commended for having performed this outstanding job which may prove to be the biggest setback the Communists have suffered since the landing at Inchon.

Mr. Sourwine. And he is talking there about the job which McKnight told you not to go through with?

Colonel Corso. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Is that the same McKnight who was the former superior of Judith Coplon?

Colonel Corso. Exactly. He was at the Treasury Department at the time, that is what I was told. I don't know the exact facts.

Senator Keating. Is he still in the government?

Colonel Corso. As of 1957 he was reinstated.

Senator Keating. What is he doing now?

Colonel Corso. The last I knew he was in one of those little embassies, one of those three little countries in South America. I don't know which one it is exactly.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if the Committee will order it, the staff will determine Mr. McKnight's present assignment and put it in the record as an editorial insertion.

The Chairman. The names of the two who were transferred, we would like to have that.

Colonel Corso. One was Walter Radius.

Mr. Sourwine. How do you spell that?

Colonel Corso. R-A-D-I-U-S.

Mr. Sourwine. What is his job? Or what was his job?

Colonel Corso. He was assistant, he was an assistant to Bedell Smith and Herbert Hoover, Jr.

Mr. Sourwine. Where was he transferred to?

Colonel Corso. I understand he was transferred to Germany.

Mr. Sourwine. What was the specific incident in connection with him, the same thing?

Colonel Corso. No, sir. There were a whole series of things. In fact, I think, I am not sure of this, but I told the security people that I was of the opinion that many times his statements at the OCB Board of Assistance were not consistent with what Bedell Smith or Herbert Hoover did. In fact, he was transferred, and Mr. Max Bishop took his job who was at OCB, and was a good friend of mine.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where he is now?

Colonel Corso. He was at Bonn the last I knew.

Mr. Sourwine. That is Radius?

Colonel Corso. Yes. He was one of the research associates of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Sourwine. The man, the other man?

Colonel Corso. If I remember right it was Francis Stevens, I understand now that is he writing for the U. S. News and World Report. He left the government.

Mr. Sourwine. Where was he when he was transferred?

Colonel Corso. I think he went to Jordan, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. Sourwine. Where was he before?

Colonel Corso. He was in the State Department.

Mr. Sourwine. What branch?

Colonel Corso. I am not sure of this, but he used to come to many of the working groups on the Soviet bloc. I think he was on the Policy Planning Staff. I don't know his exact position there; I can't say.

Mr. Sourwine. What year was this, do you know?

Colonel Corso. 1954 and 1955.

Mr. Sourwine. Who headed the Policy Planning Staff at that time?

Colonel Corso. Robert Bowie.

Senator Keating. You mentioned Radius as being connected in some way with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Did you mean after he left the government or while he was with it?

Colonel Corso. No, sir. I don't know if he was in the government or not. This was back -- I was, actually I was, told this, I haven't seen any paper, but I understand he was one of the research associates.

Senator Keating. In the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Sourwine. You mean he had been?

Colonel Corso. Prior to that time.

Senator Keating. Before coming into the government, is

that where he was?

Colonel Corso. I couldn't say the time factor, I don't know.

The Chairman. That is something I want the staff to verify, the time.

Mr. Sourwine. The staff, Mr. Chairman, if this meets with your wish, will insert at this point his service record and also what our records show about his connections with the IPR and the dates.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know of instances in which other individuals were involved, instances of a similar nature of frustration in implementation?

Colonel Corso. I did know many of these instances who were in working groups deliberations, and I feel those people come under the Presidential privilege. In fact, I can't name them at the moment, but there were numerous instances where I actually sat in these groups and they were on the National Security Council papers.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, have you ever seen this?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir; I saw this.

Mr. Sourwine. What is it?

Colonel Corso. This was a paper that I prepared to show -- actually I would call this an organizational chart with the names, from my experience of people, who worked in these different

places, and actually I mainly made this up to show how, in my own personal view, how actually policy was made.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you list in these boxes all of the people who worked in these agencies?

Colonel Corso. No, I didn't.

Mr. Sourwine. You only listed some of the people?

Colonel Corso. People who were mostly involved in policy matters.

Mr. Sourwine. You listed all of the people who were mostly involved?

Colonel Corso. I can't say all. I don't know how many more there were. Only people that I knew about.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any other criterion for listing these people?

Colonel Corso. Well, my suspicions.

Mr. Sourwine. Of these people you have listed?

Colonel Corso. Some of them, yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Suspicions of what nature, suspicions that they were perverting policy or frustrating policy or implementation?

Colonel Corso. I would say mostly frustrating.

Senator Keating. In other words, am I to understand that all of the names listed here you had suspicions about?

Colonel Corso. Well, not all of them, but the bulk of them, I would say.

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Mr. Sourwine. What was the basis for the inclusion in this list of names about which you didn't have any suspicions?

Colonel Corso. Well, that was just -- I would call that more in the intelligence business -- many times, for example, when I was in Japan, you have to take a lot of information and put it together, and then later -- this is just raw information -- later on you have to try to evaluate it to bring out the finished product. This was a matter of that sort, where this was raw information which possibly could be evaluated later.

Mr. Sourwine. Let me cut through what I think you are saying and tell me if I am wrong: Are you attempting to convey to the committee that you had in mind a number of instances, particular instances, in which policy had been subverted or frustrated, and you found out or came to know who had mainly to do with the instance, and you put their names down even though you may not have known that they specifically had to do with the perversion or frustration?

Colonel Corso. That is right; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. That is what you are telling us?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. These are people who had opportunity to have done what you say or people concerning whom you had suspicions that they had engaged in this frustration?

Colonel Corso. I would say that is correct.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may this go in the record at

ps 2

this point?

Senator Keating (presiding). Well, I am not sure that I want to take the responsibility for this going into the record until I ask one or two more questions.

I note in there under OCB, Board Assistants, you refer to Walter Radius. That is the one we have been talking about?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Senator Keating. And he has an asterisk showing he was relieved.

George Morgan is below that, he was relieved. His name hasn't --

Colonel Corso. He went to Japan. I think he is back now.

Senator Keating. You think he is back in the OCB Board Assistants?

Colonel Corso. No, it has been wiped out. This is an old thing here.

Mr. Sourwine. When was this chart put together?

Colonel Corso. I would say except for this one block, I would take out of there, I would say 1955.

Sir, Mr. Sourwine, in my own personal opinion, we ought not to put this chart in the record. I don't think many of the items here can be substantiated.

Senator Keating. This is based, part of it, on suspicions without having facts back of it; would that be correct?

Colonel Corso. That is it exactly. I would rather this

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not go into the record.

Senator Keating. There are some names here about whom I share suspicions, but I have absolutely no factual backing to substantiate it.

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say this was an intelligence officer's working paper, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. That is exactly what I would call this.

Mr. Sourwine. These are compilations of names of people who, if you were going to investigate to find out how these things happened, they would be the people you would investigate first?

Colonel Corso. I would start here. But this is a ray paper, and as I say many of my intelligence projects that I worked out never saw the light of day because at the end they weren't worth anything.

Senator Keating. I notice you say here the IAC. What is that?

Colonel Corso. That was the Intelligence Advisory Committee. It has a different name now. It was composed of many other people besides what is here.

Senator Keating. And the Director of the CIA, I note, is the only man who sits directly on the IAC and NSC, and OCB, and the OCB is no longer in existence?

Colonel Corso. No; and the IAC is no longer in existence. I think it is known as the U.S. Intelligence Advisory Board.

ps 4

Senator Keating. You say back at this time, in fact the Director of CIA was the only one who sat personally in those three areas, made his special assistants Bissell and Jackson extremely powerful. Is Jackson powerful today?

Colonel Corso. That is Wayne Jackson. That was not the C. D. Jackson --

Senator Keating. I know it is Wayne Jackson.

Colonel Corso. I don't know where he is today. I lost track of him in 1956. I couldn't tell you where he is today.

Senator Keating. You don't know whether he is in the CIA?

Colonel Corso. I don't know.

Senator Keating. Do you know anything about his background?

Colonel Corso. Only from what I met him in some of the deliberations that went on in the Board Assistants; I don't know any of his background.

Senator Keating. You have got down here some names under press, radio and TV. Now, some of those names you have already mentioned to us. They were not in any way parties to the frustration of policy, were they?

Colonel Corso. No, they weren't. They were just -- I would say things appeared in their columns. I wouldn't tie them in. I can't tie them in directly.

Senator Keating. How did you list these two names under foundations, what was the basis for that?

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Colonel Corso. Well, those were some of the pamphlets that used to come out of the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic which matched many of the items that I saw, the classified items.

Senator Keating. And these professors at Harvard, Princeton, MIT, and Johns Hopkins, they made statements or speeches or something similarly to match papers?

Colonel Corso. Yes; and many times went a little further than that also.

Senator Keating. How much further?

Colonel Corso. Well, I found out at times that I saw some papers when they were actually consulted, and I can't get into deliberations because when they would come to me they would be marked "~~Top Secret.~~"

Senator Keating. You have three names from the Department of Defense listed there under ISA. ISA is what?

Colonel Corso. That is International Security Agency; actually, that is something new. That wasn't in at the time.

Senator Keating. What is behind the putting of those three names in there?

Colonel Corso. Well, all I can say up in the second block there is Bundy, and he is down there now. This is not McGeorge Bundy, but another Bundy.

Senator Keating. It is a brother McGeorge Bundy.

Colonel Corso. Then, of course, Nitze from Johns Hopkins

ps 6

is up there.

Senator Keating. Yarmolinski, he is in the Government now?

Colonel Corso. Yes, he is in the Government.

Senator Keating. I don't want to unduly press you, but I wonder the basis of your putting the names in there.

Colonel Corso. Well, they just moved over from other spots.

Senator Keating. I see.

This is an interesting document, but I don't think it should go in the record.

Mr. Sourwine. May I make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman? Would the Chair direct that this document be designed as Exhibit A and to hold with the ~~top secret~~ documents in the files of the subcommittee?

Senator Keating. I think that is proper.

(The document referred to was marked as an exhibit and will be found in the ~~classified~~ files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you spoke of outsiders like columnists who would write an article or somebody who would make a speech that would parallel something. Did you ever have an instance where the article was written or the speech was made in advance and later became part of a policy paper or policy implementation?

Colonel Corso. I can't cite any examples to you now because it has been too long. But I was aware of certain of

ps 7

those instances.

For instance, I was surprised on a Middle East thing where some speeches were made, and later this became policy, by people not connected with the Government. I can't name them now. I can't give you any more facts than that I did read them at the time. Of course, I didn't keep the clippings.

Mr. Sourwine. I want to call your attention, Colonel, in connection with what you said about the importance of the second level of government. Did the fact that the State Department's publication "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation," on page 79, in giving a description of the fundamental departmental and interdepartmental committee structures for policy making says, and I quote:

"The President desired to be able later to reach in his basket and to find there whatever he needed in regard to post-war foreign policy," would you say this is an instance or an example of the power of the second level of government?

Colonel Corso. I would say it is.

Mr. Sourwine. Both through the ability to put things in that Presidential basket and also to keep things out?

Colonel Corso. Both, both ways.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, have you seen that?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I saw this.

Mr. Sourwine. What is that paper?

Colonel Corso. It is a paper I worked up quite a while back

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Mr. Sourwine. It is headed "Foreign Policy Impediment
Of Actions Against The Soviet Bloc."

What did you do with this paper after you had it worked
up?

Colonel Corso. I showed it to some people that I knew,
like Hill and Bishop.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it ever formally transmitted so as to
become a part of the official stream of documents?

Colonel Corso. Not that I know of.

Mr. Sourwine. It is your private property then?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may this go in the record at
this point?

(The document referred to follows:)

(COMMITTEE INSERT.)

ws2

Senator Keating. You end up your people "State Department policy remains, quoting the words of the policy-makers, 'planning for the future and hope that the Soviets will change their ways by evolutionary processes.'"

Now, what policy-makers made that statement, if you are able to tell us?

Colonel Corso. Sir, I can't discuss that.

Senator Keating. But that was a formal enunciation of policy?

Colonel Corso. I have seen it in many newspapers and publications.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman; if the Chair will permit, I am going to ask a question, some questions, right in this area an effort to find an area where the Colonel can testify. I think we have a document which we will discuss here in just a moment which is not within his rule, which will illustrate this.

Senator Keating. All right.

Now this, Colonel, is a paper which you prepared on the stated subject, and which you believe to be a true and accurate appraisal of instances of foreign policy impediments of actions against the Soviet Government?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I would say that is so.

Senator Keating. All right, that will be received.

(Discussion off the record.)

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Senator Keating. The committee will stand in adjournment until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee took a recess until 2:30 o'clock p. m., the same day.)

Senator Keating. (Presiding) The Subcommittee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL

PHILIP J. CORSO -- Resumed.

Mr. Sourwine. There were a couple of loose ends left from this morning, and I would like to clean them up before we start something new.

You will remember you told us of a document prepared by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover which was eventually declassified and which was used --

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. (Continuing) -- having to do with the Communists in the United States.

Did Mr. Hoover himself ever give any indication of his reaction to the use of this?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir. He sent a letter to the Operations Coordinating Board which stated that if we would cooperate this is the type of work that could come out of such cooperation, and he was very pleased with this particular item, and he wished that this type of work was continued.

Mr. Sourwine. Now again, this was the particular effort which you had been told to lay off because there was no interest in it?

Colonel Corso. That is right; and one where I was told

ws5 that that was a document that I was supposed to have prepared in my anti-Communist fervor.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a copy of this letter of Mr. Hoover's?

Colonel Corso. No, I don't. It was placed in the record of the files of the Operations Coordinating Board, and I did not make a copy.

Mr. Sourwine. This was about what time?

Colonel Corso. The Caracas Conference; I think it must have been in September or October of 1954, I think.

Mr. Sourwine. We might ask Mr. Hoover to give it to us.

Colonel Corso. Yes. It was after the Caracas, three or four months after the Caracas, Conference.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, these various papers which have gone into the record after your explanation of them show a pattern, do they not?

Colonel Corso. Yes, in my opinion they do.

Mr. Sourwine. A pattern of what you have called diversion and paralysis?

Colonel Corso. Exactly.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, there has been discussion now and again of what has been termed planned failure. Is this a good descriptive phrase?

Colonel Corso. I can't say that I have ever used the

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Foreign Policy Impediment of Actions Against the Soviet Bloc

In October 1947 the Soviet Government established the Cominform. This act constituted, in effect, a declaration of economic and political warfare against the United States and heralded the beginning of the cold war. Thus, the East-West split was formally acknowledged.

Despite this declaration of war, the U. S. Government has done virtually nothing to bring about direct pressure against the U. S. S. R., leaving the Soviets an unimpeded base from which to operate. Present U. S. policy can be summed up in one short negative phrase: "The time for rollback of Soviet power is not in the foreseeable future," and the United States should bring about changes in the Soviet system by evolutionary process.

The government officials charged with policy guidance will claim two basic objectives toward the Soviet Union:

1. To reduce Soviet power.
2. To bring about a change in the conduct of international relations by the U. S. S. R.

The reality of our policy is that none of the above has been achieved. There has been little positive action. The motivation for this inactivity is a grave matter since it has contributed to startling Communist successes. Intelligence and policy slanted to preconceived concepts by Communist sympathizers, ignorance and bureaucracy have all contributed to this paralysis in U. S. foreign policy toward the U. S. S. R. As a result, the policy of containment and evolution paralyzes any activity which might place pressure internally on the U. S. S. R., its satellites, or Communist China.

In 1948 some policies were conceived to apply certain pressure on the Soviet Union in order to halt the advancement of Communism. These policies lacked any drive or clear-cut plans, especially any over-all or long-range planning. Whatever half-spirited attempts were made, were nullified by a state of mind and thinking which permeated the Washington bureaucracy, especially the Department of State. During this period the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State laid down the policy of "patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."

This policy was ideal for Soviet purposes. It left them a powerful and unmolested base from which to plan future moves. This plan, which allowed the Soviets time to consolidate the takeover of their satellites, was, in large, conceived in the Research Centers of some of our most prominent Universities,

the Institute of Pacific Relations, and fostered by left-wing elements in radio, newspapers, and other media.

Although the policy of containment was ineffective, it was perpetuated by its creators. In addition, they wove a fine thread of fear of general war into the pattern. The more modern version of containment, "the policy of evolutionary processes," again left the center of Soviet power undisturbed. Intelligence and implementation were slanted to conform to the policy of containment and evolution. This led to a total paralysis of U. S. policy toward the Soviet Bloc.

A study of U. S. policy and its guidance is, in substance, strong and seemingly anti-Communist, but all this breaks down in the implementation stages. Many elements, whose loyalty to the United States is questionable, realize how policy is formulated; but, more important, they know how it should be implemented. The right person in the right position can effectively delay, paralyze, or destroy any positive policy implementation.

Since 1951, the primary interest of the Soviet Union has been information to be forwarded to the Soviet policymakers. Military and technical intelligence are secondary. A Communist Party member or sympathizer in a policy control position will be contacted only occasionally by MVD experts. His job will be to hold his sensitive position in order to influence policy in favor of the Communists. He will assist other Communists or sympathizers to retain their positions or be shifted or elevated to other sensitive posts.

A review of U. S. policy of the last decade has revealed that the Soviets have succeeded in their plan or we are confronted by a series of startling coincidences which accidentally have assisted Soviet operations.

U. S. Policy and Guidance Factors

The operational considerations to halt the advancement and increase of Soviet power as conceived by the Department of State are:

1. Weaken the military, political and economic capabilities of the U. S. S. R.
2. Prevent Communist expansion and influence by means short of war.
3. Deter the Soviet Union from resorting to military actions.
4. Bring about changes within the Soviet Bloc by evolutionary processes.

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5. Preserve the Western Alliance.
6. Win support of the neutral countries; or, at a minimum, prevent their conversion to Communism.

No long-range plans have been made. Anti-Communist actions have been geared to the short run and to particular international problems and situations. Government actions and activities have been consistent and without radical change. As a result, Communist power has continued to advance.

State Department claims to have sought to halt Soviet advancement by such actions as rebuilding West Germany, Berlin airlift, Marshall Plan, control of East-West trade, participation in the UN, NATO, cultural exchanges, SEATO, and political guidance for other overt and/or covert actions by CIA.

Guidance is primarily concerned with activities against the satellites, but all policy guidance rules out present revolt and actions to bring about the detachment of a satellite.

Some plans were made at the time of Stalin's death for the use of escapees, maximize disaffection and foster antagonisms (primarily in the satellites and secondarily with the U. S. S. R.). These plans remained only in the planning stages and none were ever implemented.

U. S. policy is not to encourage minorities within the Soviet orbit to assert nationalistic tendencies, since it is believed within policy-making circles that the question of separation is one for the peoples concerned and not for foreign governments or exiled groups outside the U. S. S. R. Any exploitation of non-Russian nationalism should await a more opportune moment. As a result, a policy of exploiting self-determination has never been tried.

State Department gives precedence to development of strength of the Free World rather than actions against the Soviet regime. The claim is that actions against the Soviet regime in relation to the Western Alliance would be definitely negative. As a result no actions against the Soviet regime have been implemented.

The encouragement of ideological deviation is considered minor and, therefore, no action has been taken in this field.

Little or nothing has been done to encourage escapees from the Soviet Union. There has not been an induced defector for years.

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Little or nothing has been done to counter the Soviet world conspiracy. Exchanges of information with non-Communist countries have been virtually nil, and such plans as the "Declaration of Caracas" are never implemented.

Few plans have been made to communicate with the people of the Soviet Union; the only means attempted have been radio, which is heavily jammed, and the ineffective cultural exchanges.

State Department believes that Soviet weaknesses are such that under present conditions efforts to exploit them will not contribute significantly to U. S. objectives.

U. S. policy toward the Soviet Union does not have any future outlook; therefore, no strong actions take place nor is there any positive operational planning. Our entire policy is governed by fear, lack of planning, and coordination; and implementation occurs only upon minor plans to fit specific occasions.

Present policies are inadequate to the point of danger. Timing as well as scope are to the detriment of the United States and aid the Soviet Union in furthering its objectives. As a result, there is gradual decline in the strength of the United States and the Western World in relation to the U. S. S. R., its satellites and Communist China.

Since 1947 the United States has done virtually nothing to place pressure internally upon the Soviet Union, its satellites, or Communist China. The following statements permeate all planning and thinking, i. e., (a) "without taking undue risks," and (b) "enter into negotiations with the U. S. S. R. if they offer promise of achieving acceptable modus vivendi or if, for any reason, they appear desirable." Implementation even of half-spirited plans has been blocked by elements within our government whose reasoning and loyalty are questionable.

The results of U. S. policy have been that the Soviet Union has been allowed to operate with virtually no outside pressure in its internal matters, and millions of people have been absorbed outside its borders and given no hope for freedom because of our so-called planning for the future. The U. S. S. R. therefore absorbed Czechoslovakia, China became Communist, the Korean War was planned, implemented and directed by the Soviet Union (140,000 U. S. casualties), North Vietnam was lost, most of Asia and Africa threatened, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. has continued to direct Communist Parties, espionage and sabotage in virtually every country of the Free World, while the United States remains paralyzed. State Department policy remains, quoting the words of the policy makers: "Planning for the future and hope that the Soviets will change their ways by evolutionary processes"

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Mr. Sourwine. I didn't say that you have. I don't know whether you have or not.

Colonel Corso. No, I haven't. I never used that term. I would say, yes, it could be a planned failure, an inertia.

Mr. Sourwine. Well, planned failure implies that there is a plan to make something fail. Mainly what you have been testifying about is more nearly automatic failure, isn't it, than planned failure?

Colonel Corso. Well, I would say that the system lends itself to automatic failure, but knowing the Soviet techniques and practices, in my training as an intelligence officer, I would have to be awfully naive to assume the Soviets didn't have a hand in this the way it operated.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this pattern of diversion and paralysis a partisan thing or does it cut completely across party lines?

Colonel Corso. It cuts completely across party lines.

Mr. Sourwine. Do the Soviets apply their tactics of diversion and paralysis to the Democrats and Republicans alike, so far as you have been able to observe?

Colonel Corso. Yes, as far as they are concerned, there is no such thing as Democrats and Republicans. They are enemies of our system and of our people.

Mr. Sourwine. How does this policy of diversion work specifically?

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Colonel Corso. Well, I would say actually, to explain it best this way: I will have to start, for example, and try to trace for you the birth of a NSC paper without in any way giving you the facts or substance, but as an illustration.

When a particular incident happens, say, in the Middle East, immediately the National Security Council or some high person like the Secretary of State, could ask a NSC paper to be prepared on this.

Well, this immediately goes back to what I previously called the second level of government. There, possibly, an intelligence estimate is drawn up.

This intelligence estimate is then taken by a working group, committee, task force, whatever you call it, and there immediately it begins the insertion of pet theories, vested interests, which most of the time reduce one of these papers to the lowest common denominator. It has to be staffed, coordinated, everyone has to agree.

Sometimes, despite this system, a good paper comes out. When this good paper comes out then, of course, it still remains to be implemented.

Then, this generally gets in the hands of the committees, the task forces, the working groups or whatever you want to call them. It gets into the hands -- then when the scribes or the second level of government who do the thinking and the writing -- and I have done some of this thinking and writing

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on certain of these papers -- then when it is all drawn up, it has to be usually a committee which is appointed with all of the departments of the government which are responsible are appointed and all of them sit on it.

Then what I used to call the in-fighting begins. Each department has to give its version, and here the battle of words starts, and usually words are inserted, like "strident," "counterproductive," "sensitivity with our allies," "evolution," all these phrases start to appear, and when you actually pin these down on a practical point where the man has to do the work of implementing, there is no substance left and, in my opinion, I have actually seen this, if an individual decided that he was going to get a point through, and he fought one of these committees, he would actually jeopardize his future and his career, because some of the people -- I can't discuss their names, there are some of the things that happened -- but they were not allowed, some of these actions.

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Senator Keating. Now, when you say that you can't discuss their names, you mean by that that it would enter into the field of discussions which took place in the National Security Council?

Colonel Corso. These were in the committees and working groups, yes, sir, on NSC papers; and one of the other favorite gimmicks were used -- I call it a gimmick, but this was actually inserted in a good many papers, and I have seen it in the newspaper, is the fear of general war. That was a famous one always. That tended to paralyze. That was a famous term used.

Senator Keating. Would it be proper for you to tell us whether the fact of the use of this phraseology as it appeared time after time was a subject of discussion in the National Security Council meetings?

Colonel Corso. From what I understand, the meetings at the OCB, the OCB, you remember, was composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of CIA, a special operations division in the Department of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget was represented, and the FBI.

Now, at OCB deliberations I never heard discussions of these words.

These discussions went on at the working groups. At the Planning Board of the NSC, and at the Board of Assistants of the Operations Coordinating Board, that is where the discussions took place.

ps 2

When they went to the National Security Council they were generally a paper that was supposed to be approved in its final form, and there it was either approved or disapproved.

We used to give briefings on the National Security Council deliberations, but I never remember any of these discussions occurring there.

Senator Keating. I do not want to get -- I want to leave the matter to your own discretion, Colonel, but I wonder why, if this was not, if this was the subject of discussion at the lower levels, and was not a subject of discussion in the National Security Council, why you would feel reluctant to give us more specific information?

Colonel Corso. Well, these were within the structure of the National Security Council. We were discussing National Security Council papers there, the substance of them. That is what I mean there, Senator.

Senator Keating. I see.

Colonel Corso. You see, this was a discussion of the substance of all this.

Mr. Sourwine. You consider all of your experiences in subcommittees and working groups and so forth while you were with NSC as within your instructions on executive privilege; is that the point?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir; I do. I will have to because these were substance in the content.

ps 3

Mr. Sourwine. Maybe we can find some way to get the Colonel released from the claim of executive privilege on some of these matters.

Colonel Corso. Then, to continue my discussion of this system, this system usually, with these words, and so forth, and the opposition paper, ended up, and many times at the beginning, some of the estimates that were made I questioned.

I can't discuss any of them because they were part of the estimates which were ~~top secret~~, which went into these papers.

Many times, in my opinion -- well, I would say that if somebody had a pet theory, this guided intelligence, and the intelligence didn't guide the substance. This I found out many times.

Mr. Sourwine. The theory guided the intelligence.

Colonel Corso. Yes. This I found out many times, and I got into many violent discussions and arguments over that point.

Mr. Sourwine. Such intelligence wouldn't be very helpful in reaching a sound conclusion, would it?

Colonel Corso. It was not. In fact, two particular times when I worked up an estimate well, I can give this because it was declassified -- in one of the speeches on piracy in the China Seas, I worked up the logistic capability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. I put it in C.D. Jackson's speech at the United Nations. This was objected to by the intelligence

ps 4

community, and they told me I didn't know what I was talking about.

Mr. Sourwine. By whom?

Colonel Corso. The intelligence community.

I told them I would meet with their experts at any time, and then when they failed they told me this was a combined British estimate, and I told them I didn't care; my estimate was based on Army, Air and Navy experiences during the Korean War.

Mr. Sourwine. Who was the intelligence community?

Colonel Corso. Well, I would have to take the members of the Intelligence Advisory Group.

Mr. Sourwine. That is whom you were talking about?

Colonel Corso. Well, there were not exactly them, this was State Department and CIA, a section of it.

Mr. Sourwine. Of the State Department and CIA that told you that this intelligence was unsound?

Colonel Corso. That is right; and, in fact, at the United Nations Malik introduced the item, and he started pounding on the table for points of order because I was sitting for C. D. Jackson, and Malik walked out and didn't even vote on his own resolution. That is how effective I considered that intelligence which they told me I was not correct.

These are some of the items that went on that were inserted in these papers. There was no basis of fact to support them.

The intelligence that went in there, there was no basis

pa 5

of fact to support them, yet many of them got in, because I only worked on a few -- I would say of all the working groups in the Government I was in a handful of them, although I was in quite a few in my line of work, and this adds up to, well, this added up to, paralysis, because nothing would happen.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, have you heard of sabotage by perfection?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir; I have heard about it.

Mr. Sourwine. What is meant by that?

Colonel Corso. That means that people -- but they would want a position letter perfect, with the intelligence perfect, everything else perfect, and that is almost impossible in this business that I was in to attain.

We operated -- if we operated by perfection we would never get anything done. That also goes in the war.

When you get intelligence on the enemy, perfection is what we were always trying to achieve, yet we never achieved it. Yet many times we fought wars and many times successful wars.

Mr. Sourwine. To insist on perfection is a way to defeat a paper or almost any other plan or action without going to the merits of it, isn't it?

Colonel Corso. It is. I ran across this many times.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this much of an occurrence -- is there much of this in your experience that you are telling us about?

Colonel Corso. I ran across this many times; little items

ps6

I gave you on intelligence was part of it, that type, the insistence on documentary proof beyond a doubt, which is required in a court of law, was beyond the capability of any intelligence agency, and that is what was insisted upon many times when the people insisted, and knew that this could not be attained.

If any intelligence agent could do that it would be perfect, and I have never known of a perfect intelligence agent.

Mr. Sourwine. In many projects, and in many instances, in connection with the formulation and implementation of policy, time is an important factor, is it not?

Colonel Corso. It is, very important.

Mr. Sourwine. Relatively a small amount of delay can defeat the project or the timely formation of a policy?

Colonel Corso. It is. I had occasions where short ~~delays or small delays did defeat it, the policy implementation.~~
In that case, I am sorry, I cannot discuss it because of the Presidential privilege.

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Mr. Sourwine. You spoke to us earlier in the morning session about an instance of the diversion or frustration of a particular policy paper by the insertion of one word "evolution."

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have in mind any other instances of the smothering of a project or the frustration of a policy or the implementation of a policy that you can tell us about without running into this matter of Executive privilege?

Colonel Corso. Well, at the time, to ask and coordinate with our allies was always a good one to paralyze and delay because with that, I figure we failed to lead; we always had to ask and, by the time you coordinate with the allies, the Soviets had already advanced. Not that I don't mean coordination or cooperation with the allies is not important, but not to the point where it is used to paralyze our activities.

Mr. Sourwine. It is possible to coordinate something to death.

Colonel Corso. One of the terms I used in that sense, if a paper was put into the government normally without someone following it through from the beginning to end, it is like putting it in a sausage grinder, it would come out unrecognizable at the end.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, do you remember a particular project which involved the prevention of the entry of the

ws2

Seventh Fleet into the Formosa area, the cutting of aid to anti-Communist guerrillas? Did you know about that at the time?

Colonel Corso. No, I don't know the details of that. I just know that the order went out, that the Seventh Fleet -- actually it would block the area, and this means that no one would go either way. I don't know any details of that.

Mr. Sourwine. All right, sir.

Colonel, are you familiar with the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I am.

Mr. Sourwine. Does this Center have a government connection?

Colonel Corso. Yes, there is an unclassified letter which shows a government connection.

Mr. Sourwine. I show you a letter, sir. Have you seen that letter before?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I have.

Mr. Sourwine. The classification is the committee's, Mr. Chairman. It was unclassified when it came to us. We classified it because it was intended to be used in this hearing.

Did you know about this letter at the time it was written, sir?

Colonel Corso. I did.

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Mr. Sourwine. Now, this letter refers to the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as having a relationship with the CIA. Do you know whether that relationship subsists today?

Colonel Corso. I do not know as of today. Of course, beyond this letter I again will have to exercise Presidential privilege in that.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, have you read the testimony before this committee relating to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Colonel Corso. I did. I read that years ago.

Mr. Sourwine. Specifically, do you remember reading the testimony of Mr. Lyle Munson, and the memorandum which I show you here at page 220 of our report on the I. P. R.?

Colonel Corso. I am very familiar with that. In fact, I have copies of every one of your reports at home.

Mr. Sourwine. We are flattered, Colonel.

Colonel Corso. What is that?

Mr. Sourwine. I call your attention specifically to the fact that Mr. Munson, testifying about a recommendation by John P. Davies, Jr., said it was, "Mr. Davies' recommendation that we, as officials of CIA, should avail ourselves of the knowledge and guidance and counsel that these six persons could provide us, and that they should be used for consultation and guidance and for the preparation of materials that would be useful to us in our activities or responsibilities."

And a little further along he said:

"Mr. Davies recommended that we at OPC should consult with and procure guidance and materials from Professor Fairbank" -- that is John K. Fairbank and his wife, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, and Anna Louise Strong, and Benjamin K. Schwartz, and that these materials and guidance should be used "by us and that they would represent a proper approach to effecting our responsibilities."

Now, having that testimony in mind, I will ask you if you are familiar with the two-volume publication, "The Prospects For Chinese Communist Society."

Colonel Corso. Very familiar with it.

Mr. Sourwine. This is written by Mr. W. W. Rostow, in collaboration with Richard W. Hatch, Frank A. Herman, Jr., Alexander Eckstein, and with the assistance of others in the Center For International Studies?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that in the preface to this work the editor, Richard W. Hatch, states that the work profited greatly from the help of Alexander Eckstein, who is described as now engaged at the Harvard Russian Research Center on a basic study of the Chinese economy?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I do.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know this preface also states:

"I have, of course, benefitted from the ideas, comments

and criticisms of my CENIS," and lists among such colleagues, Benjamin Schwartz, K. C. Chao, Ronald Hsia, John Kautsky, Harold Isaacs, Douglas Paauw, Tashio Tsukhira, and also mentions a wide range of academic and other experts who had helped, listing L. F. Chen, S. Y. Chen, Ai-li Sung Chin, Richard Eckaus, John Fairbank, George Kennan, John Pelzel, David Rowe, Raymond Sontag, John Carter Vincent, and Richard Walker?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. I would like to ask you, having in mind the recommendation that Mr. Davies made, and the overlapping of names in the group which is helping with the CENIS project, do you have an opinion as to whether the CENIS project is, in fact or is not, in fact, what Mr. Davies recommended?

Colonel Corso. It seems like that is obvious from the comparison of names.

Mr. Sourwine. Obvious which way? That it is?

Colonel Corso. It is.

Mr. Sourwine. That it is the same project?

Colonel Corso. I would consider it so from matching the names.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware now -- this gets to the point that Senator Keating raised this morning -- are you aware that this book "The Prospects for Chinese Communist Society" published by the Center for International Studies, contains the statement:

"It is worth emphasizing that even in a major crisis or hot war the free world's objective cannot be unconditional surrender or military liberation?"

Colonel Corso. I am aware of that.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you comment on that statement, Colonel

Colonel Corso. That statement amazes me when studying communist theory and communist actions that they are dedicated to our destruction, and yet in any conflict we would not be dedicated to their destruction. That is going against the principles even that Roosevelt, Churchill set up against the Nazis.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the Cenis work, this book, two volume book we are discussing, "The Prospects for Chinese Communist Society?"

Colonel Corso. How do you mean that?

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of it?

Colonel Corso. I did not.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware, this is right down the alley Senator Keating's question this morning that this same book

contains this statement:

"It is, of course, important that China's current and potential leaders understand that the free world offers to China an alternative relationship consistent with that nation's dignity. We suspect this is now fully understood. Peking's leaders are not hostile out of fear but out of hope in further expansion."

Colonel Corso. Yes, I am aware of that.

Mr. Sourwine. Then followed what I quoted a moment ago:

"Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that even in a major crisis or hot war the free world's objective cannot be unconditional surrender or military liberation. There must be a clear, free world concept of a Chinese future that would meet the basic continuing, still unsatisfied aspirations of modern China. A long-run western policy toward Communist China must be erected therefore on a double awareness, an awareness of Chinese underlying weakness and the extent of her present enmeshment with a stronger partner, and an awareness of the power in China of its historic aspirations for national dignity, cultural modernization and material progress."

Will you comment on that, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. Well, take the word "enmeshment." From the connotation of that word, from what I know about the Chinese Communist leaders, they are not enmeshed with the Soviets. They are part and parcel of the Soviet International Conspiracy. They were trained in the Soviet Union; they went to the Univers-

ities, and so forth.

As for national dignity, I don't consider the Chinese Communists taking over China was a national take-over. I consider it was a take-over by the Communist Conspiracy.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, sir, isn't what this book is saying just what we were talking about this morning, evolution, not revolution?

Colonel Corso. Exactly.

Mr. Sourwine. They are saying that anything we want to do with China should be done by evolution?

Colonel Corso. Exactly.

Mr. Sourwine. That is one instance, Senator, of what you were asking for.

Colonel Corso, what do you know about exploitation of Soviet European Satellite vulnerabilities?

~~Colonel Corso. I know that there haven't been any.~~

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that it was a fixed and approved policy of this government that our national strategy should recognize that until the Communist regimes are convinced that their aggressive and expansionist policies will be met by countermeasures which inherently will threaten the continued existence of their regimes, it will not be feasible to induce a change in their basic attitude or bring about the abandonment of their present objectives?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I was aware of that.

Mr. Sourwine. That is perfectly sound policy, isn't it sir?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that in the implementation of this sound policy it was directed that in taking this line the United States should not abandon its basic position that the whole Soviet system is fundamentally wrong and it should continue to state what are thought to be the errors of that system?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. That is perfectly sound implementation, isn't it?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that in connection with this implementation it was further directed that in doing so, however, the United States should make clear that it does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force? The line under this strategy should be aggressive in pressing for change and should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and generally avoiding a tone openly strident and hostile to the system?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Is that good implementation of the good policy previously enunciated?

Colonel Corso. It is not. That makes the previous statement that you have made impossible to implement.

Mr. Sourwine. And yet they were hooked together in the same

policy of this government, were they not, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. Well, let's say this: I saw that appear in a column in one of the newspapers. It was together in that column, and it mentioned an NSC member, I don't remember what it was at the time, but it was correct.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that that same implementation directive said that stressing through open propaganda our implacable opposition to the whole Soviet system may confirm for all who identify themselves in any degree with that system the image spread by the leadership of an external world aggressively hostile which will greatly narrow popular and bureaucratic conceptions of alternatives open to the USSR?

Colonel Corso. I think that statement speaks very much for itself. It is almost that type of thinking, when I hear it, which used to amaze me.

Mr. Sourwine, That is sheer balderdash, isn't it, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. It is. I just couldn't imagine statements of that type based on fact.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware --

Senator Keating. What book is that in?

Mr. Sourwine. This, Senator, is not from a book. I am asking the Colonel questions about determinations that had been made with respect to American policy and the implementation of that policy, and I was taking care to do it in such a way that it wouldn't conflict with his directive about Executive privilege

Colonel Corso. These statements in my time did appear, Senator, in newspapers, and they did appear in certain books. I can't place them at the time, I am not aware of them. I possibly could do some research and find them, but I don't know at the present, I couldn't get my fingers on them.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware in connection with this same implementation directive for this same good policy, it was said that exploitation of discontents resolvable only through revolution should be avoided?

Colonel Corso. I think the Hungarian revolution will give you an answer to that. We did not help them.

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Mr. Sourwine. Well, are you saying that our failure to aid Hungary was because of our policy of evolution, not revolution; that it wasn't mere inertia or inaction or slowness, but it was our policy not to aid the Freedom Fighters?

Colonel Corso. Well, I can put it this way: If I, as a military man, would have tried to assist them, I could very easily have been stopped because it would have been against orders, not the orders of the military, but higher.

Mr. Sourwine. You mentioned a Mr. Bowie this morning. His name was on the chart which went in as an exhibit, connected it up with our record. Do you know his first name?

Colonel Corso. Yes, Robert Bowie.

Mr. Sourwine. Does he hold a position in Government today?

Colonel Corso. I don't think so. I doubt it. I am not sure of that. I don't think he is in here.

Mr. Sourwine. What position did he hold?

Colonel Corso. He was Chief of the Policy Planning Staff.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know a Mr. Stelle?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I knew him.

Mr. Sourwine. How is that name pronounced?

Colonel Corso. Stelle.

Mr. Sourwine. What was his first name?

Colonel Corso. I think it was Charles.

Mr. Sourwine. Was he connected in any way with Mr. Bowie?

Colonel Corso. Yes, he was.

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Mr. Sourwine. How?

Colonel Corso. I think he was, if I remember -- I don't remember the organization, but I think he was on the Policy Planning Staff.

Mr. Sourwine. What can you tell us, if anything, about these two men and their activities which will not conflict with your orders under executive privilege?

Colonel Corso. I can say that many of their deliberations -- I can't discuss the content -- but I could not visualize at the time the thinking behind them or just what, how they thought vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc or Communist China.

Mr. Sourwine. I will tell you, Colonel, that this implementation document I have been talking to you about and ask your opinion on was prepared by Bowie and Stelle.

Colonel Corso. The chances are they didn't do the exact writing, although I am only guessing, I would rather not say, but I would say they influenced it.

Mr. Sourwine. This same paper contained the statement that, and I quote:

"A program of positive U. S. trade offers to the U.S.S.R. primarily of consumer goods should be considered by the appropriate departments and agencies."

Do you have a comment on this recommendation?

Colonel Corso. Any trade with the Soviet bloc is to aid and abet their expansionist tendencies and uphold their system.

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Mr. Sourwine. This same paper declared:

"It is not in the United States' interest at the present time to encourage revolution as a major element in its strategy toward its satellites." We have talked about that, haven't we?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. It contained also the statement:

"Belief on the part of satellite and Soviet leadership that the U. S. implacably dedicated to the overthrow of both satellite and Soviet regimes may negate the possibility of exerting U. S. influence towards a more acceptable evolution of Satellite or Soviet society."

Do you have any comment on that?

Colonel Corso. Well, I think that is unrealistic. I, as one, am implacably dedicated to the destruction of that system, because in words, actions and deeds they are dedicated to the destruction of our system without any reservations.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, in testimony this committee has taken in the past, we frequently have found witnesses using the term "they," and you may remember former Senator Jenner's speech, Senator Jenner once made a speech on the floor of the Senate about "they". Have you had experience with "they" and in a sense is that what you are talking about when you speak of this system which frustrates policy?

Colonel Corso. Well, I would say that Anthony Panuch,

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where he apologized for "they" he said but they are the ones who pull the wires, hamstring policy, and so forth, I think he made such a statement, and I agree with him. You may call them "they."

Mr. Sourwine. What do you mean "they"?

Colonel Corso. I mean as far as I am concerned I mean "they" the people that actually guide and direct the implementation of policy.

Mr. Sourwine. All these people?

Colonel Corso. Not all of them.

Mr. Sourwine. Collectively or only certain of them?

Colonel Corso. Certain ones in key positions, not all of them, because I would be making a mistake if I said in a system of implementation there aren't good, honest, patriotic Americans. There are many of them, I have seen many of these types of people quit in disgust because they wanted to do something to assist the country, and they were hamstrung.

Mr. Sourwine. The "they" you are talking about are people in policy implementation positions of importance whose actions lead to frustrations of the policies they are supposed to implement?

Colonel Corso. Those are the "they" because in many cases a man who is dedicated to his country, and dedicated to the destruction of communism would perform positive action against communism, and he cannot because of certain instructions which

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are given to him.

Those type of people realize after a while, and I have seen many of those people, leave and quit because they couldn't put up with it. Of course, they don't know how to fight it.

Mr. Sourwine. Could you name for the committee some or any of the individuals who make up this "they"?

Colonel Corso. I think I will have to exercise Presidential privilege there.

Mr. Sourwine. Could you do this if you were relieved from your instructions with regard to the exercise of privilege?

Colonel Corso. I could cite certain actual and factual cases.

Mr. Sourwine. How can they, used in this sense, influence patriotic individuals?

Colonel Corso. They can influence them by just nothing, because of nothing to be done.

Mr. Sourwine. Are they really faceless? I mean, do they know who each other are? Do they work together?

Colonel Corso. It seems strange to me when -- not strange, because I think Forrestal made a statement once that if diplomats only made mistakes once in a while they would make one in our favor. I had to work hard to find one that was made in our favor. In fact, the ones I saw made in our favor took an awful lot of work and in fighting by some very good people that I knew.

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Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, are they, using the term in the sense we have defined here, specifically organized?

Colonel Corso. Mr. Sourwine, you put me on the spot when you asked me that because I can't verify the organization. I never sat down to actually work it out in detail. I don't think I had the facilities available to me to do that.

Mr. Sourwine. You are saying you do not know?

Colonel Corso. I do not know.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have an opinion?

Colonel Corso. Well, for what my opinion is worth, I can give it, in the intelligence business many times, like when I worked up the entire North Korean intelligence systems, I started on opinions or facts that were unrelated, and added them together. I have an opinion. The thing looks too perfect to me.

~~Mr. Sourwine. What is your opinion?~~

Colonel Corso. That there must be some sort of organization directed by someone.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a correction. I asked a question here in such a way as to give inaccurate information. I did not intend to do so. I spoke of the editor of this volume which I had earlier identified, the two-volume census work as that of Mr. Hatch, and I am told by one of my colleagues that I went ahead and used language which indicated that the preface also was written by Mr. Hatch. This is in-

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accurate. The preface was written by Mr. Rostow.

Senator Keating. Very well.

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Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you have described for us what you called Operation Fig Leaf, concealing the truth about what our intelligence learned regarding Soviet activities. Have you observed other instances of concealment?

Colonel Corso. Yes. Now, that was Korea.

Mr. Sourwine. In Korea; yes, sir.

Colonel Corso. The Fig Leaf was Korea.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir. Specifically you were talking about Soviet participation in the Korean War.

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have other instances of similar concealment?

Colonel Corso. In the Korean War?

Mr. Sourwine. Anywhere that you can tell us about.

Colonel Corso. Well, the International Communist conspiracy. That was most difficult to get any information out on that because many people in high position, as I said before, said it did not exist, and it was over-exaggerated, and, in fact, one of my briefs in which I outlined the entire organization from the Comintern, with names, and so forth, which is well known, was stated it was not so.

That is, in covering the International Communist Conspiracy I feel it was a very serious matter because it is in being, it is in effect, and it is operating.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, the existence of the International

Communist Conspiracy has been declared by the Congress legislatively, hasn't it?

Colonel Corso. It has.

Mr. Sourwine. And it has been pretty thoroughly expatiated upon by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, and by others in the Executive Department?

Colonel Corso. That is what amazed me.

Mr. Sourwine. It has been recognized by the Supreme Court in its opinions.

Colonel Corso. It has.

Mr. Sourwine. You find all three branches of the government concurring in the existence of the Communist world conspiracy and its objective, which includes the destruction of this country and its democratic form of government.

Colonel Corso. I can give you another example.

Mr. Sourwine. In the face of this, do you still say that there are people in this government who deny the existence of the Communist Conspiracy?

Colonel Corso. I do.

Mr. Sourwine. You cannot name names because of your Executive privilege?

Colonel Corso. That is exactly so. In fact, I wrote a brief on Ho Chi Minh and Viet Minh, and there was a tremendous objection to it, saying it was not so, and we shouldn't say

ws3

it.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us where this objection came from?

Colonel Corso. It came mostly from the Department of State.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you name names?

Colonel Corso. No, I can't.

Mr. Sourwine. Because of Executive privilege?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware, Colonel, that there are facts in the public record to show that there was an immobilization, if not an outright destruction, of Army files regarding Communist activity of members of the armed forces?

Colonel Corso. I was aware of that.

Senator Keating. Before you get into that, let me be sure that this is clarified for the record. If you Executive privilege were removed, do I understand that you would be able to tell this committee of people now in government who either do not recognize or who deny that the Communist movement is an international conspiracy?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir.

Well, Senator, I will have to say one thing, this is as of 1957. The last three years I haven't had access to papers.

Senator Keating. You have not had access to the papers in three years?

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Colonel Corso. No, sir.

Well, lately I have on some, but I haven't gotten into that phase of it.

Mr. Sourwine. But you can give us the names of the people who took this position up to 1957, some of whom are still in government?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that after this immobilization or destruction of the files regarding Communist activities of members of the armed forces, after that took place in 1944, known Communists received commissions in the United States Army?

Colonel Corso. I had some instances when I was in the G-2 of Rome where I ran into that.

Mr. Sourwine. Speaking specifically of Italy, when you were at G-2 in Italy, were you aware that there were known Communists, such as Milton Wolf attached to the Office of Strategic Services there?

Colonel Corso. No, sir; not at the time.

Mr. Sourwine. You did not know that?

Colonel Corso. I knew some other cases.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you come to know that since?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe, Colonel, that the roots of what is happening at the present time, and has been happening

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in recent years may lie back there in the 1944 policies to immobilize Communist files and give commissions to known Communists?

Colonel Corso. I believe that. I think the organization started long ago.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, are you familiar with the war time operations of a top G-2 group known as Area Specialists?

Colonel Corso. Yes. I had some -- not in minute detail -- but I am familiar with it.

Mr. Sourwine. What was their function, generally?

Colonel Corso. Well, the Area Specialist is a man generally who specializes in a certain area of the world. If I understand this, it is mostly, at the time was, on the Communist bloc.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that certain area specialists were told in the forties that the President "is tired of Red-baiting intelligence and doesn't want any more of it?"

Colonel Corso. No, sir; I can't say that I heard that statement.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you were at Panmunjon. Do you think all of the American prisoners-of-war have been released?

Colonel Corso. I do not.

Mr. Sourwine. What do you think is the fact?

Colonel Corso. I think there are some American prisoners who are still within the Soviet Union.

Mr. Sourwine. How many?

Colonel Corso. I made an estimate that was sent up to the United Nations. If I remember right I think that estimate was 600.

Mr. Sourwine. Six hundred American prisoners-of-war are still prisoners and they are now in the Soviet Union?

Colonel Corso. That was my estimate. I think later it was reduced by Defense to about 300.

Mr. Sourwine. What is the prospect for those men?

Colonel Corso. None.

Mr. Sourwine, They will never be freed?

Colonel Corso. If they are freed they will have to be completely and thoroughly brain-washed and be considered reliable to the Soviet because --

Mr. Sourwine. What is being done with them? Are they slave laborers? Are they still undergoing brain-washing or what?

Colonel Corso. I don't think they are slave laborers. Knowing the Soviets and their plan, I think it was much bigger than that.

Mr. Sourwine. You think they are attempting to make defectors or fifth columnists out of these men?

Colonel Corso. Yes, or take over the intimate details of

their identity.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean substitute some other person with their identity?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. And return them to this country to do the work of the Soviet?

Colonel Corso. That was a favorite trick I was up against during my intelligence days in Italy.

Mr. Sourwine. It would have an espionage objective, of course?

Colonel Corso. Espionage or sabotage.

Senator Keating. How do they get away with such a thing with the parents and relatives of the genuine person?

Colonel Corso. You mean if the parents and relatives are still living?

Senator Keating. Yes.

Colonel Corso. If I know the way the Soviets operate and the way some Nazis and Gestapos operate, they will be very careful in a situation like this, possibly where the parents have passed away or left.

These are long-term affairs. The Soviets don't deal in short-term, two or three years. They deal in long terms, in terms of twenty, thirty years, in my experience. They will be very careful to work out such details.

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Mr. Sourwine. As a result of our intelligence activity, Colonel, are you familiar with the Pathet Lau?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I am.

Mr. Sourwine. Are those trained troops?

Colonel Corso. Those troops are part of the international Communist setup trained in -- the Pathet Lau were trained in China by Soviet and Chinese advisers; that is, in fact I put an entire write-up of the Pathet Lau and some of the material I sent up to Lodge, which was declassified, as far back as 1954.

We knew the entire make-up, the thinking, their connections, who armed them, and what their objectives were.

Mr. Sourwine. Well, isn't it true that in some quarters, at least, we, and by "we" I mean this Government persist in treating the Pathet Lau as an actual indigenous force?

Colonel Corso. Yes. We even treat them, as I say -- not we, but this was put across, we should even consider Ho Chi Minh as independent, and even, you remember the dates of the Chinese Communists, they were known as agrarian reformers and Nationalists. The same thinking still prevails.

Mr. Sourwine. You think this is all part of the same pattern?

Colonel Corso. I think so, the same thinking.

Mr. Sourwine. In addition to the Pathet Lau, were there other trained individuals sent into Laos?

Colonel Corso. Well, the agitators are part of this

ps 2

You see, Mr. Sourwine, the Communists consider political warfare as all-inclusive, shooting war is only part of the political warfare or the over-all war, and with the Pathet Lau or any such system they also train agitators who go behind the line to assist them; because these people live mostly off the land, they have to have people whom they will meet and take care of them, and so forth.

Mr. Sourwine. How many of these trained agitators or other subversives were sent into Laos, if you know?

Colonel Corso. Laos I am not sure, but I did have one figure that in South Vietnam 4,000 were sent in.

Mr. Sourwine. That would be in connection with the Pathet Lau?

Colonel Corso. No. They are all connected.

Mr. Sourwine. They are all tied up?

Colonel Corso. Ho Chi Minh, the Pathet Lau, the Chinese Communists, we shouldn't try to separate them. It is all one.

Mr. Sourwine. It is a single effort as far as the Soviets are concerned.

Colonel Corso. It has been directed from Moscow.

Senator Keating. But are the principal members of the Pathet Lau Laotian nationals?

Colonel Corso. They are Laotian nationals. Whether they are nationals or not or whether they were Chinese nationals I don't know.

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In Korea now, the high level Koreans were Koreans, they were Soviet citizens but of Korean ethnic origin, living in the Soviet Union.

Whether they are the same, I believe they are the same, because somewhere in my studies I have seen that these trained agitators, when they are trained at the Marx-Lenin-Engels Institute, and so forth, they have to take an oath, and many of them subrosa are made citizens of the Soviet Union.

Like in Korea we got our hands on some of the people, we interrogated them, we made them admit -- in fact, one of the top men in the North Korean government, I even had his Communist registration card number. He was up in Siberia, he was one of the top commissars.

Senator Keating. Had he been made a Soviet citizen?

Colonel Corso. He was a Soviet citizen and a Soviet army officer, and he came to Korea and was put into this North Korean government.

Senator Keating. But was he a Korean national originally?

Colonel Corso. No, sir. He is of Korean ethnic origin. For example, Nam Il, the man who headed the truce delegation, I traced him, he was a Soviet captain. Lee Sang Jo, the man who was also, when I was there, negotiating the exchange of prisoners, was a Soviet major.

Senator Keating. Now, had they been born in the Soviet Union?

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Colonel Corso. They were born in the Soviet Union, Siberia. This I put in Lodge's material at the United Nations.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you have had experience over a great many years in intelligence work for the Army. Can you give the committee any information about the caliber of counter-intelligence agents? Is it getting better? Is it getting worse? What is the situation? How do our people stack up with the Soviet intelligence?

Colonel Corso. Well, at the moment I would say we are at a disadvantage.

Mr. Sourwine. Why?

Colonel Corso. Well, most of the ones I have personal knowledge of, I can only speak from my personal knowledge, but really hardened and knowledgeable operators have left the service.

Mr. Sourwine. Why?

Colonel Corso. Many of them have retired, and many of them just quit because they were disgusted. In many cases they were discouraged. This also applies to the Government service.

Mr. Sourwine. Aren't we training adequate numbers of intelligence and counter-intelligence agents?

Colonel Corso. Yes, we are training them, but the difficulty is that old hardened hands, who would be the best teachers, are leaving and will have no part in it.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this a situation which can be corrected?

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Colonel Corso. It should be corrected, because otherwise we will fall into the same situation we were in during World War I and World War II. When World War II started, we practically had no intelligence.

Mr. Sourwine. How can this be corrected, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. I would like to see the universities, or I would like to see some of these old timers brought back and to train and to direct the operations of the younger ones, so that the younger ones can learn by experience and go out and learn the hard way when they meet the hardened agitators and subversives.

Mr. Sourwine. You said they quit because they were discouraged. Would they come back?

Colonel Corso. A lot of these men I knew were dedicated men. But after a few years they get discouraged and they just go out.

I have had this said to me many times, "Well, let somebody else do it. I have had it." But the experience of these men is invaluable.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel Corso, did you know or do you know Walton W. Butterworth?

Colonel Corso. Well, I don't remember if I ever sat in any group with him. I think he was in London at the time when I was over there or he went to London. I saw some cables that he wrote. I think that is about the extent of my knowledge.

ps6

of it.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you any information you can give the committee about him that would be of interest to us in connection with this present investigation?

Colonel Corso. No, I can't.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any experience with the Afro-Asian Conference?

Colonel Corso. I knew quite a bit about the Afro-Asian Conference at the time because I had to look into what instructions they gave, which I put in some of these briefs, which gave the pattern. But the Afro-Asian Conference, that was the one -- was that the one --

Mr. Sourwine. It was State, CIA, USIA combined.

Colonel Corso. Was that the one where colonialism came up? You will have to refresh my recollection. I think Romulo gave -- Chou En-lai was there?

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, if you don't mind, I would rather not testify. I would rather hold this down to what you yourself know and can remember. I don't want to appear to be prompting you in any way.

Colonel Corso. There were so many of them at the time there that I cannot at the moment pull this one out. I would rather not say unless I can identify which one it was.

Mr. Sourwine. The committee has information that Mr. Stelle was very active in writing policy for the Afro-Asian

ps7

Conference, and that is the reason I was asking you.

Colonel Corso. I couldn't get into that now.

Mr. Sourwine. You could not get into that?

Colonel Corso. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Because of your executive privilege instructions?

Colonel Corso. Now I remember which one it was.

ws fls(17)

Fir(17)
ws fls ps

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Stelle active in any way in connection with Pahmunjon

Colonel Corso. I wasn't here, but I was told that he was.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this something you cannot discuss because of your executive privilege?

Colonel Corso. Yes, that is right.

Mr. Sourwine. I have other names I would ask you about in the same connection. The same thing would apply, would it?

Colonel Corso. It would apply.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you or did you know Colonel Dwan?

Colonel Corso. I never met him personally. The only thing I knew about him, I think he was in Indochina on the committee. I think General Collins had a group down there. ~~He was on that group. I think he gave some lectures and some speeches.~~

Mr. Sourwine. This is correct. Can you give us any information about Colonel Dwan without violating the executive privilege?

Colonel Corso. No, I can't.

Mr. Sourwine. I have a number of similar questions, Mr. Chairman. I am just at a loss as to whether to pose them and just to assume we have this executive privilege thing in the way.

ws2

Senator Keating. Well, I think probably we ought to either get some clearance to relieve the colonel of the necessity of pleading that.

Mr. Sourwine. It is hardly fair for me to bring up a man's name when he can't say anything about him.

Senator Keating. I think that is fair.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, do you have any knowledge about the Communist Party setup in the Caribbean area?

Colonel Corso. At the time I made some studies on it in these information briefings. It wasn't exactly the Caribbean area. I covered the entire South America, and their connections with Prague, Czechoslovakia, and how the organization was run from over there, and came into Mexico and then spread to South America.

I did make some studies on that at the time on how it was connected, interconnected. Also I was aware --

Mr. Sourwine. You say at the time, what time was that?

Colonel Corso. I would say this was about 1955 or 1956. I did make a complete study on that and it was declassified. I don't have it available or the details escape me at the moment.

Mr. Sourwine. Where can the committee secure this study?

Colonel Corso. Those were what were known as information briefs which I wrote at OCB.

ws3

Now, USIA took some of these and put out some releases later.

Mr. Sourwine. Could you get this particular study, at least, for the committee?

Colonel Corso. I couldn't tell you, Mr. Sourwine, if it exists yet. They were in mimeographed form. It is a possibility that most of them would be destroyed.

Mr. Sourwine. Would it be fair to ask you to determine whether it is in existence, and if it exists to let us know, and tell us where to get it?

Colonel Corso. I can tell you if I can. It was unclassified. As I remember originally that was prepared for the Caracas Conference that I made this study.

Mr. Sourwine. Would it be all right for the committee to request the Colonel to do that if he can?

Colonel Corso. I will try to do that if I can.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any information about Communist objectives in British Guiana?

Colonel Corso. No.

Mr. Sourwine. The committee has recently had some testimony on this.

Can you corroborate in any way or add to or subtract from evidence the committee may have taken with respect to the Communist record of Fidel Castro? Did he show up in the study you made?

ws4

Colonel Corso. No. The main people that I had at the time were in Mexico. Castro's name did not come in into any of those studies.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, before we let you go I would like to ask you this question: Do you have any proposals for remedying this situation or any proposals for legislation that would be helpful along this line?

Colonel Corso. Well, I don't know about legislation, how you could do it.

All I can suggest, the only way it can be done, is that the President or Congress pass a bill that if the President wants something done he is going to have it go through to the end of get people he can rely on to follow through to the end to get it done, because again I can't see how these people can be rooted out. They are sewed in by, say, Civil Service, and all the other things. But administratively possibly if they were forced to comply with certain actions against the enemy they could.

For example, when I used to capture a double agent, an agent that the enemy had doubled back on me, there was only one way I made him prove himself, that he had to keep performing actions against my enemy. The moment he stopped I told him I will arrest him and throw him in jail.

The only solution I can see is in pro-Communist action that the President or Congress want that they will have to

write into that the entire implementation --

Mr. Sourwine. Wait a minute, you said any pro-Communist action that the President wants.

Colonel Corso. Not pro-Communist, but anti-Communist, positive action, in this will have to be written, within whatever bill Congress passes or whatever plan the President wants, will have to be written in the implementation details, and Congress or the President would have to assure themselves that every stage of this is carried out.

And, whoever tries to bloc it will be jeopardizing his position, and he would be exposed.

Under the present position, system, they cannot be exposed. The FBI has no case, in fact, Congress has no case, and the President has no case.

In many cases, if I tried to find out, I would have no case because a man sitting still and doing nothing, the only charge you can get on him is inefficiency, and you know how the Civil Service is made so if you try to get a man for inefficiency it takes years, if you do.

Mr. Sourwine. But, Colonel, it would not be an impossible intelligence task, would it, to complete and carry through to a conclusion this study which your chart reflected the beginning of, to determine what these people concerning whom you said you had suspicions have, in fact done, what they have had a hand in?

Colonel Corso. I don't say it is impossible, but I think it is extremely difficult under the present circumstances to do it.

Mr. Sourwine. What changed circumstances would you need in order to be able to do it?

Colonel Corso. Well, Mr. Sourwine --

Mr. Sourwine. Let us assume the President of the United States wants the United States wants this done. Couldn't you undertake to do it?

Colonel Corso. The Presidential privilege, the Communists have many times said, "Use their laws to destroy them," which means use our own laws to destroy us.

The way it is now, and many times I have heard, for example, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, the President, get up and defend his subordinates, which is admirable.

But in my case, any deliberations I have been in, and many people I know, I want no Presidential privilege protection. Anything that I do, if I am working for the interests of the country, I am not ashamed of it.

Mr. Sourwine. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is this: You are perfectly convinced that there are a group of individuals in the government, a number in the State Department, probably some in the CIA, your testimony indicates this, who, through action and inaction, through diversion and delay, are stultifying the good and announced policies

of the United States.

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir; I say that.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, we must assume, I think, that the President of the United States, does not condone this kind of a situation. If the President of the United States wants to do something about this situation, to bring it to an end, aren't there things that can be done?

Colonel Corso. The only effective action I have seen -- I am getting away now from personality -- in many cases I have seen people like John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, even or President Eisenhower wanted something specifically done, they gave orders to do it, and it was carried through.

Many of these people who have these policies would back away, and it would be done. But, on the other hand, most of the times, because of the way our system operates, it is a big -- a man like John Foster Dulles was so busy that the little implementer down there who stops it, how you get him out, Mr. Sourwine, I don't know. I couldn't see it unless you could get the evidence.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you saying we are helpless?

Colonel Corso. No, I am not.

Well, let's say this: I didn't say we are helpless, because I have had difficult cases many times where I had to arrest an espionage agent, but remember when I was confronted with that in Rome I arrested over 3,000 people, saboteurs and

agents. I was not under the obligation --

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Senator Keating. American citizens?

Colonel Corso. Well, I had a few Americans, I caught a few Americans. These were mostly Italians and Germans. But I think I had three or four American in there.

Now, I was not governed at that time by certain aspects of our law. I had arbitrary powers of arrest; I didn't answer to anybody. There was a war being fought, and it was natural that I should have that.

But nowadays, the way our system of government is, we cannot do that. Of course, it is put out for the protection of an individual. But these people can hide behind that, the Fifth Amendment. How many of them have hidden behind that? I can't see how that can be done.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you saying we should go to and stand on the principle which was once enunciated that if there is a doubt it should be resolved in favor of the government against the individual?

Colonel Corso. No, I wouldn't say that. This question you are asking me, Mr. Sourwine, is beyond me.

Mr. Sourwine. You just have no constructive suggestion to make as to how to combat the situation which you are convinced exists?

Colonel Corso. The only way that I have is administratively, where you force an action through, and then it can't

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be blocked, and then they would expose themselves maybe,
and the laws could cover it.

ps fls

ps fls ws

But in my case when I was involved with espionage agents, each case had to be different. I took each case on its own merits.

Here, you asked me to make a broad statement, I can't do it. I wish I did know.

Mr. Sourwine. May I go off the record a moment, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Keating. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Keating. Back on the record.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, if we can't go after and get rid of the individuals who may be responsible for this sort of frustration of the proper implementation of policy, can we go after the system? Is there a system which can be so changed that we have a chance to have our soundly arrived at policies carried out?

Colonel Corso. Yes. I think, if the President or Congress if Congress passed a law, and the President gives an order, and he should assure himself that it is carried out to the end result that he wants, if it is stopped anywhere along this path, he will find out who stopped it, and possibly call for an explanation or eliminate them.

Mr. Sourwine. You cannot expect the President of the United States to do this himself, can you?

Colonel Corso. No. But he has to get people he can rely

ps 2
on to do it for him. I don't know whether this was in the purview of the FBI, but I think the FBI has within it the making of such a checking system, although then they might come back and possibly criticism would be that they are becoming a super Gestapo or something.

But that is the only way I can see if the system were forced through with certain important objectives. The President or even any group he got couldn't do it all. The Government is too big.

I think I saw in a column where Eisenhower made that statement. He can't possibly supervise all these little agencies; it is too big, too vast. I think the State Department has 22,000 or 30,000 people. I don't know what it is. To supervise all the desks there is a difficult problem, so it would have to be concentrated on all the important problems.

~~Mr. Sourwine. I don't mean to knock down what you are~~
saying at all, but you don't mean to say, do you, that we should go to a system like the Soviets have of having commissars to watch the people who are actually running things?

Colonel Corso. No. The Soviets have commissars all the way from the top down to the bottom. I don't say put them all the way down, but we have to have some freedom of action.

Senator Keating. Just put commissars on the top fellows.
(Laughter.)

Colonel Corso. That is why I say it is difficult for me

ps 3

to give an explanation. I don't know. When I did it I took each case individually and went after each case. If a man was a saboteur or agent, I had to try to get him and get his net, and I worked from the net out, and this is an investigative procedure. I didn't do it, but my counter-intelligence people did it.

Mr. Sourwine. Couldn't the same thing be done in this country with regard to this frustration of the proper implementation of policy?

Colonel Corso. Yes, it could be done because it was done in two cases that I know of with the proper intentioned people wanting to do it; it was done.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, you speak of people wanting to do it. To what extent is this whole problem a matter of motivation, to extent would the problem be solved or moved toward resolution if greater stress were put on anti-Communist personnel for implementation jobs?

Colonel Corso. I think if you would put the stress on anti-Communist personnel to implement these jobs I think then something would start moving.

I think they would have gradually bulldozed and pushed the others out of the way even if you had no evidence on them.

You see, we are always talking here, Mr. Sourwine, about a frame of mind or belief of certain people which is imbedded within them for a certain number of years. A lot of them

ps 4

actually believe these things are right.

Mr. Sourwine. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Keating. All right. Thank you very much, Colonel.
We appreciate your appearance here. You have been very helpful
to us.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee
adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

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Vol. 1

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The United States Senate

4 OF 5

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws of the
Committee on the Judiciary

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 3, 1962

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape, Master Sheets, Carbon
and Waste turned over to Committee for
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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

Philip J. Corso,,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army.

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Pages at which material is to be inserted by the committee:

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1

Tuesday, April 3, 1962

United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 o'clock
a. m., in Room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas
J. Dodd, presiding.

Present: Senator Dodd (presiding).

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel of the Sub-
committee; Samuel Schott, Assistant Counsel; Frank Schroeder,
Chief Investigator, David Martin, Investigator; Robert McMillan,
Staff Member, and Jack McKenzie, Administrative Assistant for
Senator Scott.

Senator Dodd. Proceed.

Mr. Sourwine. The witness today is Colonel Philip Corso.

You have been sworn on a previous occasion, but enough time
has elapsed so that I think it would be well if you were sworn
again.

Senator Dodd. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony ou

shall give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel Corso. I do.

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP J. CORSO,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. ARMY,

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, we have called you back because, as you know, on the occasion of a previous appearance you offered to give further testimony if you were able to do so without the necessity of claiming executive privilege. We have called your attention and we call your attention now to the President's statement with respect to executive privilege, the burden of which is that only the President may claim this, and that no one not instructed to should claim it. Are you familiar with this statement?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. In view of counsel, this means that unless you have been instructed to make a claim of executive privilege here this morning you are not in a position to do so.

Have you been instructed to make such a claim, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. No, I have not.

Mr. Sourwine. You are not here under wraps, then?

Colonel Corso. No.

Mr. Sourwine. The Committee will then ask you to go forward with the presentation of the material which you indicated at your last appearance here would be available if a claim of executive

privilege were not required.

Colonel Corso. Mr. Chairman, my testimony today complements my previous appearance before this Committee. Over 15 years of my 20 years service in the U. S. Army has been as an intelligence officer. In order to present to my superiors a true intelligence picture, it was imperative that I deal in facts alone, always being careful to cull out irrelevant personal feelings or emotions.

An intelligence officer is asked many times to give his evaluation or opinion. This must be clearly labeled as such, and must never be confused with the main body of facts.

The two books that I have before me are a record of important events that transpired during my tour of duty as a professional staff member of the Operations Coordinating Board from 1953 to 1957. They deal in facts, my personal observations always as an intelligence officer, can be clearly discerned.

Mr. Sourwine. You say a record, you mean a record which you kept?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. These are books in the nature of diaries?

Colonel Corso. Diaries of day-by-day events.

Mr. Sourwine. Which you yourself kept?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. They have been personal and private to you?

Colonel Corso. Yes, completely so.

Mr. Sourwine. Go ahead.

Colonel Corso. I began to record these events because during my first year, my previous suspicions, of a pattern of paralysis and diversion of policy that I came to in Korea, were confirmed.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean your first year where?

Colonel Corso. This was 1953 to 1954, as a member of the Operations Coordinating Board.

My previous suspicions, I might explain, were brought out very strongly during my many tours as an intelligence officer during the Korean War, including when I was a member of the U. S. delegation at Panmunjom.

I will not attempt to regroup the items mentioned in my diary into subject matter. I would prefer to place these written items into the record in sequence. Later, I recommended that a study be made of the pattern they bring out. These items then can be employed as reference material or evidence to show a pattern of paralysis and diversion of policy.

Since policy is made and implemented by people, it is natural that a cast of characters be woven into the events as they transpired.

My findings were that a tactic of paralysis and diversion permeated the implementation of American policy. I make no attempt to classify the people involved, except where I found a strange philosophy foreign to the principles I had been taught to cherish and defend in our American way of life.

I typed the paralyzers and diversionists as obstructionists

and Marxists. I made no attempt to differentiate between kinds of Marxism. The reason I evaluated these people was that they continuously defended the Marxist system and would allow no positive action against it. This led to an almost complete paralysis of diversion of policy. It is my firm belief that some of these people fell into different categories of Marxism. As Lenin put it, into the 2nd International (Socialist), the 2nd and one half International -- between socialism and communism -- and the Third International -- (communism). Their actions led to this almost complete perversion of policy when against the Communists. I do not believe that this could have been accidental. Throughout my missions abroad and in Washington, it was too apparent that there was a general tolerance of communism and a deliberate attempt to paralyze or divert any policy which might hinder or stem the march of communism.

Although this information was compiled over five years ago, recent events have strengthened my analysis. This will be apparent in the references to Communist China and to Latin and South America.

Mr. Sourwine. You are now taking one of those books which you referred to as records in the nature of diaries?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Chronologically, is this the first of the two you kept?

Colonel Corso. This is the first of the two.

Mr. Sourwine. You are going to read from this record in the nature of a diary?

Colonel Corso. Yes. I wish to add that I was very careful not to insert any classified items. The inserts are my personal observations or based on leaks which appeared in the public print.

Mr. Sourwine. And you will tell us when or at least approximately when the entry was made?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. You will read the entry, and then explain, if there is an explanation needed what the significance of the entry is?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you going to read everything in the diary or only what you consider significant passages?

Colonel Corso. I will read the significant passages.

As I stated previously, I have culled out mere emotion, or items which I consider not directly pertinent. Of course, as I read, I shall insert the "of's" and "at's" and such words naturally left out in such recordings.

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, before you start reading from these diaries, you have placed these diaries before you now in the possession of the Committee, have you not?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I have.

Mr. Sourwine. And you have authorized the Committee to photostat each page of each of these diaries?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, this has been done. And the photostats of these pages are in the Committee files, and I presume it will be desired to make them an exhibit in connection with this hearing record, so as to establish the authenticity as a record currently kept, from which the Colonel is now testifying.

Colonel Corso. These entries begin before the Berlin and Geneva Conferences, 1954 and 1955, and previously, too, while we were negotiating for the return of our prisoners of war in Korea.

The first item is on page 4, I wrote: "Proposal of plan for Norberg, in exploitation of nonforcible repatriation of 22,000 prisoners of war."

The State Department said they were on top of the situation. This, to us, meant, do nothing. The plan was approved by the Operations Coordinating Board, and the meeting set at 2:30, tenth of January.

"C. D. Jackson gave me the responsibility to prepare a Sino-Soviet direction of the Indo-China war."

The next entry: "Atomic exploitation of the national plan, that I wrote, is being put in final form. We were convinced that we were in a dilemma on this subject, and must present a concrete proposal."

"Robert Bowie, of State Department, pulled a delaying tactic. His opposition was by discussing trivialities and tying up the meeting. Nothing was accomplished."

The next entry is on page 6. "I was given the final responsibility for the paper on exploitation of the Big Four Conference. C. D. Jackson was pleased. The paper was an aggressive, U. S. attack. Allan Dulles liked the paper.

We also were working on a paper to tell the truth about Korea, which included references to Indo-China, and how the Communists penetrated both countries."

Mr. Sourwine. Are you indicating, Colonel, do you plan to indicate when you move from one entry to another, or are you reading them as though they were all a single entry?

Colonel Corso. No, I will indicate when I go from one to another.

Next entry: "The Operations Coordinating Board liked the paper. They appointed a board. The board consisted of Joseph Phillips, State Department, as Chairman, Irwin, Executive Secretary, Kelleher, from Defense, and King from CIA."

Senator Dodd. Do you have the first names of any of these?

Colonel Corso. I don't have all the first names, but we can go over it later and possibly I can put the first names in.

"Paul told me that State's position was diametrically opposed, especially Graves, on the German desk, whom we learned was a German socialist type.

"Gave Craig a memo from C. D. Jackson that recommends that Defense immediately set up an organization to handle Communist prisoners in future wars, in order not to have a repetition of the Joje-Chegu riots."

Next entry, page 8: "Under-Secretary Smith and Dulles agreed to kill the Defense atrocity film until after the conference. State subordinates convinced them that the situation is delicate."

Senator Dodd. Which Dulles are you talking about?

Colonel Corso. John Foster Dulles. The item continues:

"Meanwhile, the Communists continued their attacks upon us. The entire staff is extremely upset over this decision."

Next entry, page 12: "At the prisoner of war exploitation meeting, the State people talked a lot. Sneider, of the United Nations Affairs Section, State Department, said that State has a maximum exploitation policy. Sneider stopped Mossman, State Far East Desk, for an explanation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission's majority report."

"Yeager tried to get in the 'delicate situation' theme." Sneider stopped him -- said UNA cannot consider Geneva Convention revision. Good anti-Commie act for Sneider???? Charley Norberg chaired the meeting well. Made four proposals for exploitation.

"I wonder if this is a stunt, he (Sneider) leaving for Japan, trying to cover his past activities by anti-communist aura."

The next entry, January 13:

"Much disturbed concerning State cable 2257 from Paris. Defeatist attitude. Claims we cannot influence French or others by psywar. Attitude of defeatism against interests of U. S. This stirred up our OCB Special Staffs, Roy, Deb and Pete. We will take the matter up with C. D. Jackson.

"Talked to Wally Irwin to back Jim Kelleher's proposal to begin propaganda now to influence Big Four."

The next entry, January 14:

"Wally and Wainhouse want story on PW's. David Wainhouse, UNA (State), name was found in the notebook of a Communist courier as a contact point.

Soviets unleashed violent attack by name on our Intelligence Operations in Germany. Wally brought up counterattack. I requested he take out (he did) defensive section. We should not defend, but attack by exposing their subversive system.

"Roy said Bedell Smith told Phillips -- laughable since latter is a Marxist -- that he wants committee to act, not watch. Wants contingencies. Looks as if John Foster Dulles playing it alone. His staff proposes policy against his statements. Jim not optimistic but we are still trying."

The next entry, January 15:

"The meeting on exploiting the release of PW's went well. State agreed, and we made concrete proposals to play up this principle world-wide, with speeches by Undersecretary Smith and

and Lodge. Our proposal was well received. State behind it, because policy is set. Sneider asked for copies of my papers on Soviet direction of Korean War, Soviet colonization, and Communist China. Hope they make use of these papers. In the beginning, he didn't think much of them. Now wants them to take to Korea.

"Checked Wally's proposal to Wainhouse for handling PW issue at UN.

"German info coming from CIA. Much material; needs to be interpreted."

The next entry, January 16:

"Went through State papers and prepared by their steering group, and those Joe Phillips gave to committee. Amazing how people with Ph.D.'s, etc., could write such a bunch of garbage. Papers take what is common knowledge and newspaper facts and put a ~~confidential~~ and ~~secret~~ classification stamp on them. This must be the reason we took such beatings in past conferences.

Paul, Roy and myself are preparing C.D.'s portfolio. It will have aggressive, new, headline material. Hope he uses it. Soviets will take notice."

The book refers to a compilation of background, analysis and interpretation, to be used at the Berlin conference.

The next entry, January 17:

"Worked Saturday morning on C. D. Jackson's portfolio. Lot of work for such a short time, but it will be ready."

"CIA contributed a mass of material, but such a mass is unuseable. We must condense it. This is the trouble with our Intelligence agencies. Thousands are collecting a mass of wheat and chaff, but no one is sorting it out or checking evaluation of use of it. Like running a business without efficiency experts.

"This defect is covered up by super-secrecy and classification."

The next entry, January 19:

"Kept working on CD's portfolio. Finished the Indo-China paper. Norberg took up PW petitions with Haggerty. Thought it was a good story for the President. (State was against it.)

"Wally wanted our papers to give to State, we objected. Don't trust them.

"One gap in CD's book was Espionage in West Germany. I told them I would take one last step at G-2, CIA, a supersecret outfit, will not give up anything. Same as was OSS. Believe they are covering inefficiency by super-secrecy."

The next entry, page 20:

"Found espionage material in G-2 library. Usual defect of Intelligence community. A mass of routine and trivialities, they cannot interpret the material they have in their hands.

"Violent discussion with Wally. We will not give our material to State. Don't trust them; believe they have ulterior motives. Wally said we were chasing ghosts. The same ghosts got us into the Korean War, and took us to the verge of disaster.

I think State representatives are afraid of our papers, since their own preparations by their vast staff is a bunch of garbage. OCB threatens their sovereignty. If CD shows Foster Dulles our file he might order an investigation. They can't produce similar material, since they do not think our way."

The next entry, January 21:

"Finished C.D.'s book and it was delivered to him at 5 p.m. We call it the Black Book because it is packed with dynamite. Hope he uses some of the items in Berlin.

"Jim said State agreed with our original paper, that we should begin a propaganda screen, but time ran out. Usual tactic.

"Disappointed with entourage going to Berlin Conference. McArthur of State, doing nothing. Bowie and McArdle are Kennenites, Fabian socialists, or Marxist. Strauss on the German desk is a Marxist.

"Wally still wanted to give our papers to State, but we held back important items because certain elements can't be trusted.

"Kept my fingers crossed until today. We finally have the POWs in our hands. Been in constant fear we would reverse our stand, and give in to the Commies."

The next entry, January 22:

"Ran in usual difficulties with State people at Norberg's POW meeting. FOA and CIA sided with them, saying Congressional

resolution was unimportant. Reminded them that this would be very important to USSR, because our purpose behind all our exploitation and PW stand was:

- "1. Deter Communist aggression,
- "2. If war, plant seed for psywar operations.

"Copy of the Black Book is wanted for Morgan. Morgan, career Foreign Officer in State. He's probably desperate to see the book. Suspect he is one of the Marxists. His wife an IPR Carter."

The next entry, January 23:

"Paul and myself pulled off a slight bit of sabotage in the book going to Morgan. Took a section out. We must do this in the interest of the U. S., or they will work up a plan to construct intelligence.

"Need to expose State, FOA, USIA, etc. Should show steady ~~Commie rise and U. S. prestige decline despite expenditure of~~ 40 to 50 billion dollars in eight years."

The next entry, January 25:

"Received my atomic study from Tokio. Intend to start a study to make proper officials realize that intelligence is not able to find atomic target.

"Wally told me CD said to give copies of my papers to USIA, Radio Free Europe and CIA.

"Berlin conference took the turn that we expected. State rejected our paper, but we knew what Commies were going to

do because as usual they telegraphed their punches."

The next entry, January 26:

"Milly Schwarz, CIA, called and told me George Betts said USUN (U. S. Mission to UN) is going to pot. No preparation at all for coming events. I will continue to throw material together.

"Charles Norberg reconvened PW meeting. (State obstructionists have some trick up their sleeves). State -- McKnight, Sneider, Mossman and Yeager -- were very sensible today. (Unusual) Stated we must not prosecute men that made bacteriological warfare confessions on basis of their confession. This will tend to destroy what we accomplished through the Mayo speech."

The next entry, January 27:

"Spoke to Pete about UN situation. He said our office doesn't have enough people to handle the job, but I told him that more than likely we would have to. I am preparing material. Pete said Lodge had taken up the matter with C. D. Jackson." Actually the matter was support for Lodge at the coming General Assembly by the Special Staff of OCB.

"Revised five of my papers. They went to CIA, USIA, and Radio Free Europe.

"Charley brought Pete the Joint Defense-State statement on the missing 944 American prisoners. I didn't like it. Charley also showed me what background info is required. I told him too

much is asked for. When the request collapses of its own weight, we will make it realistic."

The next entry, January 28:

"Jim showed me paper written by Montgomery, German desk, State. Very good, along our lines. Jim said our influence is showing up?? Proposal is to begin a big propaganda campaign. Exactly what we wanted, but we are three weeks late. Will have to salvage it, and turn it in our favor, when the Berlin Big Four breaks up.

"Jim showed me Claude Batchelor's statement on what the Chinese intend to do with the 21 who are staying in Communist China. Job of countering this -- have to do it."

The next entry, January 29:

"Dulles speech at Big Four very encouraging. Seems he is using our material in CD's book.

"Recognition! Pravda stated CD left for Berlin with material prepared by an American specialist in advance. Hope to hit them with a lot more advance planning. Wonder how Pravda found out.

"Talked over Italian Government crisis dilemma with ----. I will write to Italy and try find out the truth. Embassy in Rome, from my experience, was informed from cocktail parties and by broken down nobility. Don't believe situation is as bad as put forth.

"This shows inadequacy of CIA."

In explanation of this point, approximately three years ago I was called by the Pentagon. They stated that the Italian Government had asked if we had a copy of the file on Pietro Nenni. I told them that I had never made a copy of the file which I had seen in Italy. In 1947, the file, which was extremely damaging on Nenni, which showed his Communist connections and his connections with the Comintern and the Soviet Union, was in the possession of the Chief of Police of Italy, Ferrari. He had it locked in a safe behind his desk.

He brought the file out, gave it to me, and I read it in his office. I presume now that the file has been either stolen or destroyed.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall any details of this file?

Colonel Corso. Only that Nenni was in the pay of Moscow.

Mr. Sourwine. And this was thoroughly documented by the file?

Colonel Corso. Yes. The file, I would say, was at least six inches thick.

The next entry is February 1:

"Heard that Lodge spoke to CD to continue support like we gave him during the Eighth General Assembly. He wants to bypass UN Affairs (State). Hope so because it cannot be trusted to support him in anti-Communist activities.

The next entry, February 2:

"Finished study on Sino-Soviet directives for entry in Korean War. We have plan for its presentation at UN to shut up Menon and Nehru."

The next entry, February 3:

"Talked with ----. He will write speech for the Caracas Conference. Will tap CIA. I will work on International Communist Conspiracy. This a big job, but I will finish it in time. Must be kept between us."

John Foster Dulles used this material at Caracas. It was handed to him by C. D. Jackson. State advisers were not aware of contents until he made use of it.

The next entry, February 4:

"Meeting of P.O.W. working group. I got angry, but held my temper. Mrs. Dickey, CIA, inexperienced held up meeting by saying the 21 American turncoats were unimportant. Can't understand why they send a woman. I consider any attack on U.S. important. Tried desperately to pull the meeting to reality. On solution, I must work on the 944 missing PWs and 21 turncoats myself.

"Yeager, State, was going to write policy. I asked him how, with no plan or estimate yet in existence. He agreed."

The next entry, February 5:

"Letter from C. D. Jackson arrived. Everything going well in Berlin. We are giving Soviets a trouncing thanks to Dulles and Bidault. C. D. said he keeps fatherly eye over

press conference. This is swell. McArthur and McArdle can't hedge."

The next entry, February 8:

"Gathering all material on Latin American Communist conspiracy. Began to read up on situation. Looks promising. Talked with _____, who is getting material from CIA. We will compare notes in two weeks."

The next entry, February 9:

"Started work in earnest on Latin American Communist Conspiracy. Discovered it fits right into worldwide conspiracy. The only changes are adaptations to local conditions. The basic directives are all the same."

The next entry, February 10:

"Continued work on Latin American Communist conspiracy. Wealth of material is laying stagnant. What a story this will make!

"Talked to Jim Kelleher. He has been confused by our lack of stand on the 21 turncoats, taken by Secretary of Defense Wilson and Roger Kyes. Col. Todd, psywar, offered help of his staff. Must pull a bulldogging deal, writing program in detail, letting them fight over how it should be presented, not why."

The next entry, February 11:

"Continued work on compiling evidence of Communist international conspiracy in Latin America. Mountain of evidence

available.

"Found one of our great defects. CIA finds a lead that the USSR is financing Latin American Communist parties, but it does not follow this up. Its useless with no followthrough.

"Talked with civilian FOA man from Indo-China. Gave me the idea that solution there would be a Tydings Act for Indo-China. Should be introduced by French or Philippines. Instigated by us, because we got ourselves in this mess by our two billion hardware gift."

The next entry, February 12:

"----- and myself had a long talk on inadequacies of our entire intelligence system. ----- suggested we write a short study for C. D., outlining the shortcomings of CIA especially. It could be such a good outfit. Should be organized realistically.

"We also talked over what approach to take on the Caracas speech.

"I called Betts at USUN and asked him to come down. Menon again shooting his yap off. George said UNA is a paper-shuffling outfit, takes no action. He will come down next week. I would relish a fight with the Commies and the Indians over the PWs. We will jam it down their throats."

The next entry, February 13:

"Gave Jim my plan for discrediting the 21 non-repats. I suggested that Dr. Mayo should make another speech exposing the entire brainwashing technique."

The next entry, February 15:

"I called Betts in New York, asking him to come down in order to discuss our stand on the PW question which will arise at the UN, since the Commies have sent their atrocity medical report.

"Menon, the Indian Commie fronter, is shooting his mouth off against the U. S. on the 17 PWs supposedly to be tried by the Chinese Communists for murder.

"Will propose at PW working group that we prepare everything in advance."

The next entry, February 16:

"Sent Pete a letter on securing more info from Surgeon General's office on PW treatment.

"Latin American material coming along fine. ---- preparing speech.

"I prepared a paper on Sino-Soviet direction of the decision for entry into South Korea, and propose a plan for a background maneuver at UN to embarrass Menon. We will stop this Indian from parroting the Commie line of aggression by U. S. in Korea."

The next entry, February 17:

"Very much disappointed in the Berlin agreement to meet with the Chinese in Geneva. We can gain nothing by bargaining with godless murderers.

"Finished study, Commie Intelligence and Propaganda

Activities by Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington. Will send it for declassification and eventual release."

They were the Australian and English Reds with the North Korean Army.

The next entry, February 18:

"Held our internal OCB meeting on Caracas. Dick Hirsch and Taquay threw out a lot of proposals. Some good, some bad. But we need a definite program. I pointed out we cannot separate the political and economic. We need a plan to combat the agrarian reform theme. We should guarantee land development through the World Bank.

"POW Working Group met and agreed to my suggestion. Must support to the limit the Geneva editor who being sued by the Communists. This man supported the U. S. stand on the charges made by the Chinese Communists that we waged bacteriological warfare. The 21-turncoat plan is moving ahead."

The next entry, February 19:

"What a beating at Berlin! The Commies did not give up one cm. of ground. They remain firmly entrenched behind their iron and bamboo curtain and their worldwide Commie parties.

"They maneuvered us into the Geneva Conference. We must get out of this. To bad that while Dulles is a good, faithful, conscientious man, his advisors should be sent to some embassy in the middle of Africa. What a bunch of dueces in Policy Planning Staff (State).

The February 23 entry:

"C.D. briefed us on Berlin. He was enthused. This was unfortunate.

"We met with him in the p. m. and we gave him a rundown on realities. This was a shock to him, but he is a good man. He instructed us to prepare the program for Geneva. We got mousetrapped in Berlin."

The next entry, February 24:

"I prepared our first position paper on forthcoming Geneva Conference. It states we should prepare our position immediately since the Commies have already started.

"This is a showdown and unless we beat the Commies we are in bad shape. We must expose the Commies, and under no condition should China be treated as an equal. Under no conditions should we recognize this criminal state."

The next entry, February 25:

"Roy and myself were given the job of tearing down the Commie propaganda on Geneva. Most of this is prepared. Pete called Jack Shaeffer, CIA. He sent his man Faust to see me. They want to help, so we outlined a program.

"Betts called from N. Y. He wants a paper on agent provocateurs and Chinese entry into the war. I'll prepare this with a plan of action."

The next entry, February 26:

"The speech which Paul and myself worked on was given to

John Foster Dulles before his departure for Caracas.

"Met with Phillips Committee. Roy McNair gave an excellent talk to tear down the myth of a Chinese-Soviet split. I gave the intelligence estimate. We set back Fierst, Strauss, Bolten, etc. but they don't give up that easy.

"We presented a paper to explode the Commie propaganda that this is a Five-Power Conference."

The next entry, March 1:

"Attended State's OCB policy group. I stated my views and was surprised to hear that Walter McGonaghy and Jenkins agreed with my view. We can do business with these people. They are not 'agrarian reformers.' I will recommend that this group meets with CD, Pete, Staats, Irwin, McNair and Hirsch. Decided that situation is critical. Cable sent to Dulles in Caracas."

The next entry, March 2:

"Attended State's steering group meeting on Berlin. Had to fight Fierst (UNA), and Stegmier (FE). These people either stupid, naive or subversive. Attempt to becloud or delay matters. Very crude attempt at old Commie tactic of delay and victory by inaction. For us to take no action is a victory for the Communists. Roy McNair, Irwin, Handyside and Kelleher presented a united front. State backed away. Fierst did not want to call the USSR an aggressor. Hide the truth!

"I reminded them that the American people come before the

French, British, etc. This line, we must consult with our Allies, is constantly used as a delaying tactic."

The next entry, March 3:

"Wrote paper on what Commie propoganda is doing in reference to Geneva. Outlined our stand, and proposed U. S. strategy. Pete Craig approved the paper. Charley Taquey opposed it. He wanted to do nothing. I asked him if he thought he could manipulate silence."

The next entry, March 4:

"I was a little bitter over State attitude over our paper. They said it was strident. Cannot understand this attitude. They put the best interest of foreign countries and of Communist China over the U. S. Either they are advocates of super internationalist or are subversives.

"Joe Phillips is an older and smarter Marxist type. He rewrote the paper, and it is now substantially this attitude. If it goes out our so-called line for beating the Commies is to do nothing while they advance.

The next entry, March 5:

"Had showdown with Taquey. He wrote a paper and so did I. Mine was adopted, and we are sending it to the Saturday meeting between C. D. Jackson, Strieber of USIA, Phillips of State and Staats of OCB.

"Board (OCB) assistants decided everything should be in State's hands. No other governmental agencies should be

in included. The proposal was made by Radius of State, supported by Wayne Jackson, CIA. Two of a kind. If we let them get away with it, we will take another beating at Geneva."

The next entry, March 9:

"Joe Phillips called to say that State has decided not to contest our paper. They call the Geneva deal a two-sided affair, the aggressor including U.S.S.R. on the one side, we on the other.

"They must have decided upon a tactical retreat, but they held us up for three weeks. These people never quit."

The next entry, March 10:

"They were backed up against the wall, but ran into their holes. We can't burn the house down to destroy them, but have to smoke them out. Steigmier and Fierst wrote a paper, as policy guidance for propaganda exploitation pre-Geneva. This paper is glaring apparent. It's Titoism -- divide China from USSR, agrarian reform all over.

"Lecture given them was to no avail."

The next entry, March 11:

"Came to same finding that Herbert Fierst's front man established. Not to expose himself frontally, but to hold his position. Steigmier is a bright young man, must prove his mettle but is expendable. But these boys were not bright enough to write this paper. It is extremely clever. This must have been composed by no less than the Kennan Bowie types."

The next entry, March 12:

"Gave long lecture to Wally to give him my position. He inserted our comments. Roy and Jim Kelleher more furious than I am."

The next entry, March 13:

"Attended meeting of Geneva propaganda group. Same old story. Phillips basically neutral, a socialist bureaucrat. Fierst, Steigmier, obstructionists, Yeager inexperienced, Montgomery lackadaisical.

"Roy furious, we went to Jenkins and presented our case. He was surprised that Steigmier not following Robertson's line."

The next entry, March 17:

"C.D. gave Roy and myself the job of preparing a paper on Communist use of the truce as a weapon of war. I went to the Pentagon. Fortunately psywar had the foresight to collect truce violation data."

The next entry, March 18:

"Paul and myself worked out the manner to implement the Declaration of Caracas. I will take on the job of keeping intelligence data coming. Told Pete Craig that unless we make this work the declaration will be just words. State would like this."

The next entry, March 19:

"Gave C. D. the truce violation paper. Awaiting his reaction."

"Received declassification from Defense of three more papers."

"Don't know what we could have done without Kelleher on this declassification."

The next entry, March 20.

"Steigmier's paper came back from State with so-called integration of our comments. What a slick operation. State has been getting away with this so long that its tactics make you laugh.

"I told Wally Irwin, absolutely no, we don't compromise. He agreed."

The next entry, March 21:

"State retreated. Now more dangerous. Fierst and Steigmier are unreliable. Their position papers sound like mine. Montgomery saw light -- after maybe 20 years. They decided rewrite my papers in journalistic style for release.

"Someone must have cracked whip. Maybe our talk with Jenkins did it."

The next entry, March 24:

"CD liked our paper on truce violations; have to rewrite it and have it in his hands by Friday.

"Wonder what State will have to say about it. It is damaging to their cause, because it shows we cannot negotiate with Chinese Communists, guided by USSR."

The next entry, March 25:

"Had argument with Taquay. He is hopeless. I suppose he ran to Guillion for guidance or reassurance.

"Army G-2 to send cable to Far East asking for details on truce violations."

The next entry, March 26:

"Talked to Betts in N. Y. Lodge might use agent provocateur paper. We sent him Black Book for perusal.

"I cannot send material through UN Affairs (State), since Fierst and Co. would sabotage it. Fierst said unilaterally at Phillips meeting we should not send material to Lodge. So I send it anyway."

The next entry, March 27:

"Talked to Pete about Caracas. He agreed to get me contact point in CIA.

"Must make this work, because it can expand worldwide.

Would be terrific blow to entrenched International Communism."

The next entry, March 28:

"C.D. received finished truce violation study. It is ~~top secret~~, but spoke to Kelleher about breaking classification.

"Will start assembling Black Book for Geneva Conference soon.

"If Lodge goes to Geneva, we must prepare it for him. This means holding back some vital material until last minute.

The next entry, March 30:

"Lodge impressed with the Black Book. Wants the same thing

for Ninth U. N. General Assembly. He wants the same OCB group, not UN Affairs (State) to support him. (Good man, Lodge; could beat State with more men of his type.)"

The next entry, March 31:

"Attended Phillips Committee meeting on Geneva. We fought policy paper and Phillips decided kill it. Steigmier came out openly and said he would not change agrarian reform theme. He said State Department had approved it. When we asked who, he said Ken Young, whom we called Chief of Staff of agrarian reformers.

"They are such a compact group they use each other as reference, and go against their own chiefs. Example, Secretary Robertson is Steigmier's chief, but latter follows Kennan line. We beat them, but this is a little, local victory."

The next entry, April 1:

"Paul told me story of how combined State and CIA, Marxists of the Kennan, Bohlen types, killed off all attempts to exploit Stalin's death.

"Kennan stated in March 27 issue of the Nation that he wrote half of Dulles speech at Caracas. What a lie! We wrote the entire package including speech. This is one of the chief culprits leading our country to ruin. Found out he was recalled secretly to CIA by Frank Wisner. Small hope of CIA leading our exposure of the USSR. How cleverly they have entrenched themselves."

The next entry is April 2:

"Talked to Charley Norberg about Col. Ken Hansen's letter that Chinese Nationalists have 100 ex-PWs ready for speaking tours. Charley talked to State, Jessie McKnight and Co.; they said that they objected to these people speaking in the U. S. or in Europe! The 20 years of treason continues. Unless we uproot them, even our victories, like the non-repatriation of 22,000 Chinese Pws, will be lost."

The next entry, April 5:

"Prepared paper on how State, McKnight, Sneider, Jaeger and Co., attempted to kill or play down our bacteriological warfare atrocity presentation at UN. Despite their obstructionism, we beat them -- to defend the US and the Army.

"Their line: Don't ever do anything in defense of U. S. They sit back and take it until we are defeated by communism. They think they are a third force and that therefore communism and the U. S. must evolve their way so they can take over. What fools!

The next entry, April 6:

"Spoke to FBI about Declaration of Caracas. They seemed interested.

"Tracy Barnes called. Said Wayne Jackson had referred him to me about Declaration of Caracas.

"Have to be careful of my contacts in CIA. Many super-staters and Marxists around Allan Dulles. Men like Wisner,

Bissell and Wayne Jackson."

The next entry, April 7:

"Staats and Gen. Cutler told all members of OCB to read our paper on War by Cease-Fire.

"Talked to Schaeffer, CIA, about putting teeth into Declaration of Caracas. Agreed to help. I must try to make this work.

"Wrote a brief on Figleaf Policy. How State refused to publicize the intelligence that showed that Soviets were involved in Korean War and in Indo-China. Also that Chinese Communists were in both long before their open actual entry."

The next item, April 8:

"Read rewrite of my papers as used by other agencies. Lou Olum did excellent job as he promised. He is a good man in shaky position.

~~"Phillips Committee unanimously agreed to forward recommendations to Dulles that all papers be released in speeches by Bedell Smith or the Secretary of State.~~

"State representatives tried to stop paper, belatedly, with minor administrative arguments, such as definition of word colonialism. They brought up that Ken Young said the Chinese were giving the orders at Panmunjom. I took exception, proving Soviets were in control, and silenced them, since I was the intelligence officer at Panmunjom."

The next entry, April 9:

"Had long talk with McDonald. He agreed to take up the Steigmer paper with Staats. This paper, although greatly improved with our comments, still contains the agrarian reform theme of dividing China from the USSR.

"I will write a memo outlining our position. They never give up. These people are those Spruelle Braden refers to as Young Soviets."

The next entry is April 12:

"I wrote a furious letter about State policy: policy paper. Talked it over with Jim and Roy. Decided we won 90 per cent of battle, but must be careful. They will use this now as a protection, since no one knows how we forced their hand to change it.

"They will attempt to kill it in the implementation stage.

"We must get our papers out. This would give us a 100 per cent victory."

The next entry is April 13:

Talked to Col. Kai Rasmussen at G-2. Told him to be careful of State, they are very shrewd and cunning. If they get to G-2 they will ruin a stalwart support of the government which they haven't been able to contaminate. Gave him names in Office of Intelligence Research (State), of Armstrong, Truehart, Polyzoides, Yager, Mose Harvey.

"Discovered, for example, Yager in Division of Far East Research is a direct descendent in line of Owen Lattimore,

John Paton Davies, Stelle and Yager. They, for example, box in Robertson, of Far East Division. Intelligence goes to Bowie, Stelle in Sp, only then to Robertson."

The next entry, April 14:

"General Willems, G-2, very much impressed with my recommendations. If he implements them it will be a great step forward.

"We were tipped off that State said our papers were lousy and that Bedell Smith said so. Roy was furious. He called Joe Phillips, who said it was all a lie. Bedell said they were good, but wouldn't speak because of his position at Geneva.

"They sent them to USIA. They would get lost there, but Jim is taking steps for Defense release."

The next entry, April 15:

"Very encouraging news. J. Edgar Hoover sent his White House liaison officer to see me, and FBI is willing to help put teeth in the Declaration of Caracas.

"Have to be careful. Monsa and Radius opposed. Seems like George Morgan got to Staats. They are skeptical, saying they will go along if OCB Assistants approve the setup. Did some lobbying and they will back me. We have to make this work.

"Strange that State opposes a policy laid down by their own chief. Strange why John Foster Dulles doesn't dispose of them?

"But we will back the old man in the interests of the

U. S."

The next entry, April 16:

"Strange thing that OCB Assistants passed the Caracas paper with little opposition. Seems they didn't realize its importance. I asked everyone to keep my intelligence coordination secret. This is the key. As soon as they realize it, I will be cut off from CIA and State. But I always have two faithful stalwarts, Defense and the FBI.

"Lindbeck, (ISA), State, called and wants our paper, War by Cease Fire declassified before Wednesday. They wish to present it to the press, Walter Lippman, etc. Called Jim, who said it will be declassified. What a break if we can swing this, but not to Lippmann. Also called Betts. Must get to Lodge, to expose group before they do more harm to U. S."

"You may note that I have initials here that you probably have not heard before. They are I. S. A. This was our pet name for the Marxist types. We meant by this, International Socialists Anonymous. As a matter of fact, I have these initials written a great number of times in these diaries, but I am leaving them out in my testimony to avoid confusion."

The next entry, April 18.

While at the OCB here in Washington, I compiled a list of names and a list of organizations that I called respectively dynasty and chain evolvement. By dynasty, I meant the people who in succession influenced and helped bring about the loss

of China, and are still influencing policy favorable to the Communist Chinese. By chain involvement, I meant the organizations where most of these people had what I called their incubation period.

In my diary, I put both lists into columns, and in between, I put the persons who I felt tied the State Department and CIA together.

On this sheet of paper, which I am presenting, are these lists as I copied them from my diary.

"State

CIA

Far East Research

Chain

Evolverment

Dynasty

Pink

↓
Lattimore - - - - - Hiss

OSS Red

Davies

Kennan (Bohlen)

Strategic Services Unit

State Dept Control (ISA)

Stelle

Central Intelligence Group

Adds up to:

Yager - - - - Rusk

Wisner -----CIA Pink & ISA

Park Armstrong
Trueheart

Helm
Sichel

"Same group of interlocking International Socialists

Anonymous. Both agencies seem to want to destroy our American institutions."

The next entry, April 19:

"Bedell Smith decided to use my papers on new Soviet colonialism in Berlin. Undersecretary of Defense Anderson wants these papers and the one on War by Cease Fire for his Army Day address.

"Some consolation, not much. State policy paper on pre-Geneva exploitation came out. I wrote letter in opposition, but decided to let it go; maybe we could do some good. It reflected 90 per cent our view. Has Steigmier and State name on it. Does not show how we fought for five weeks. They can cleverly exhibit this paper if accused of obstructionism or subversion. We won a local victory, but they will block us in the implementation."

This same paper was later used by State security to suspend Herbert Fierst on charges of impeding U. S. policy.

The next entry, April 20:

"Talked to Betts and Bragiotti. Outlined State program of defeatism to them, and how they would throw Lodge a curve ball.

"They are close to Lodge now and that is good. Have to bypass Fierst and UN Affairs (State), if we want to use UN. Betts told me he wrote ten points from my material on why China shouldn't be admitted, in Lodge's speech to the UN.

The next entry, April 21:

"Met Ambassador Lodge. Outlined our difficulties last year. He said he realized this and told me I had a direct line to him at any time. I told him we want to furnish him material

to attack. He agreed, and thanked me.

"We have to make the Ninth General Assembly a real defeat for the Communists. If Lodge keeps this up he might be President some day.

"Lodge not receptive to exposure at present. He said he can only clean UN Affairs (State). Perhaps later."

The next entry, April 22:

"Another meeting of Phillips Committee. Jim wants to release two papers at Defense. Even after OCB approved, State wants to send cable to Geneva. This will be a loaded cable, from Steigmier to Ken Young. I could write the answer. These people want to whitewash Red China.

"They keep getting away with it. John Foster Dulles could get wise, but I doubt it. These boys stacked the deck against him. What a pity. The U. S. slowly goes down the drain."

The next entry, April 23:

"Amory, CIA, told Morgan I said CENIS was pro-Communist. I really stated to Faust (CIA) only that I wasn't sending their pamphlets to the Geneva Committee because they were slanted. They were written by Schwarz, Rostow and Co. who are still spreading agrarian reformer theme at taxpayer's and U. S. expense, \$270,000 worth in this case.

"They started to smear our special staff Roy and myself -- saying we are against academic freedom."

The next entry, April 26:

"Had long talk with Pete about CIA attack on me. I told him to let them come if they want a fight. I am aboveboard, in the interests of the U.S. Their money is going to finance International Socialism and these boondoggling, academic research units.

"They must have guilty consciences to be so sensitive about a simple statement made about their M.I.T. boondoggle."

The next entry, April 27:

"Found out that Ken Young's cable from Geneva was not cleared with Defense or the rest of the delegation. The usual tactic. A loaded cable went to their man, the agrarian reformer type, and he sent back a virtually prearranged answer to stymie our entire effort. The damage is done.

"Ken Young even fooled Robertson, who cleared him for Geneva. The cable was signed Johnson. He had never seen the answer.

The next entry, April 28:

"Met with ----. CIA also infiltrated with so-called 'liberals' or ISAS. A dangerous group. Applied with Kennanites -- Wisner, Bissell, Amory, Tracy Barnes. Our foreign policy throttled by these new types, since they control the intelligence estimates.

"OCB's Special Staff met with Staats on support at UN. We told him we would not sit on a State-chaired committee. We don't want a committee. We will support Lodge without one.

Morgan made a flip-flop to our position. This was a cover."

The next entry, April 29:

"Emergency session of Phillips Committee called. Decision made to release War by Cease Fire, unattributed, also to release two other papers. Also, the truth about USSR involvement in Korea, and Communist Aggression and Barbarism, all unattributed. Ken Young must have loaded these cables."

In explanation of the above, it should be recognized that Geneva was a high level conference. A statement released under our delegation's name would have impact. Merely unattributed, it is just verbiage and without effect.

"Hamilton (USIA) sent desperate cable to release the Indo-China material. I met with Steigmier, Higgins, Phillips, afterwards, to map out release dates. The barn door is open and the horse gone. Too late."

The next entry, April 30:

"Prepared my letter to send to FBI, Defense, State, CIA, FOA on Caracas.

"Still no action on releases to support Geneva. Looks as if they have won again. They have delayed to a point where all our work is ineffectual, since the enemy has broken through. Release of papers now would be like singing the song too late. The man is dead."

The next entry, May 1:

"Steigmier called me at home four times. Perhaps he is

desperate, trying to salvage the harm he, Young, Fierst, Yaeger, Montgomery and their superiors have done. They will survive, since John Foster Dulles and Ike etc., are blind to this.

"I must be hurting. The do-nothings are against me."

The next entry, May 2:

"Almost ashamed to read the newspapers. What a diplomatic, moral and propoganda defeat we are taking. We tried desperately, but State did an excellent or superior job of bottling us up. Feel sorry for the old man, John Foster Dulles. When will he get wise and eliminate the Bowie's - Bohlen's, Steele, and other Kennanites who are destroying us?"

The next entry is May 3:

"Talked to Pete. I was bitter. He took my little note which reflected my feelings to Staats. All the desperate work for the U. S., and they (State) were able to stop everything. A desperate cable came from Geneva to release anything at our discretion. Perhaps if the defeat reaches appalling proportions, this weak administration will get some stamina.

"I will concentrate on Caracas and the Ninth General Assembly. I want no part of Geneva. I talked to Betts at USUN. We will begin our program."

The next entry, May 4:

"The entire OPC Special Staff met with Pete. We expressed my feelings that changed from shame to bitterness, to disgust

to rage. I feel soiled, since some of the grime of State rubbed off on me. I refuse to do any more on Geneva. Pete said Bedell will wield a club. I told him he will have a broken Hammer, since the same staff will be there to advise him. The Ken Youngs, Bonsals, Bowies, McArthur will still be there. Paul was of same opinion. Roy said there was some hope in Dulles' exit from Geneva.

"I claim we lost our pride and dignity. Taquay for once agreed. We could do some good, but need unlimited authority and at least 30 days.

"The vultures still reign supreme. If not only Dulles or Eisenhower would get wise to this or will they ever?"

The next entry, May 5:

"The collapse seems complete. We even got word that the Geneva delegation said not to release the War by Cease Fire paper because the French asked them not to. This is just what State wanted. Now our defeat in the implementation stage is complete. We fought them tooth and nail, but they are too firmly entrenched."

The next entry, May 6:

"Found out from Joe Phillips that they cannot release anything merely on the say-so of Hamilton (USIA) at Geneva. They stop everything too, on word from Ken Young. The reason is they want to stop things.

"Asked MacDonald to call Jenkins, PA, FE. He is an

honorable man and a patriotic American. Perhaps we can make some headway dealing with the good men at State, and not those who pad the committees."

The next entry is May 7:

"Met with Jenkins. He was very much surprised at all this sabotage. He agreed that U. S. pride and dignity was at stake. He asked me if they gave any reason. I said no and that that is the amazing thing. We fight them, beat them, then at the implementation it all adds up to zero.

"He promised me that he would talk to McConogoughy and Martin, and he would give us reasons, if no action is taken. (These are good, honest men and I believe them.) Told Jenkins I would like nothing more than to work with State, but under present conditions I could not."

The next entry, May 10:

~~"Sent out my letter on the implementation of the Caracas~~
declaration. State does not want this done but I will fix it so they have no alternatives. This will be a blow to the do-nothings. Also met with FBI man. Showed him letter. He approved. Talked to Enyart on a check list of subjects for an Inter-American Board which could be set up, so we could feed our material through it.

"If we can swing this deal it will be a major blow to Communist ambitions in South America. State will be furious."

The next entry, May 11:

"Betts (USUN) came to see me. We outlined a plan for the Ninth General Assembly. I proposed three major actions: 1, on the PW issue; we to open it instead of waiting for the Commies. 2, Colonialism, Soviet style. 3, Indictment of Commie China through the UN Charter and International law. He liked these, and said he would take them up with Lodge. I told him Lodge must initiate them, since UN Affairs (State) will do its best to kill it.

"Good example of this initiative was when Betts wrote the ten points against entry of China in UN into Lodges speech. UN Affairs passed the speech because it thought it contained only what was in the original memo to USUN from Fierst which was to do nothing, or to whitewash. The memo was mislaid purportedly by Betts. John Foster Dulles wanted to know where the material came from. Fierst took credit, then cussed me because I sent it up outside UN Affairs channels."

The next entry, May 12:

"Formation of OPC Committee for support of Ninth General Assembly came up. I stated I was not interested, because I intended to do the work anyway, despite blocking activities of some subversives in UNA. George told me Sneider and Fierst had warned Moseley against me, and they in turn have warned USUN. What a bunch of little backstabbing smear artists.

"The refugee problem came up. Our trickle of Soviet defectors has almost stopped. Main cause is State and CIA

bunglers. This whole affair should be investigated."

The next entry, May 13:

"My study on Soviet advisers in Indo-China released by State. Do-nothings frightened, especially Steigmair, State, worried. I told State to quit worrying that we can handle this. It is in our favor. Good press coverage.

"Much repercussions on my Caracas letter from CIA and State. I had expected that when this hit, or soaked in, the semi-subversives would scream. Penniman told me State was furious."

This Caracas letter should not be confused with the paper prepared for the Caracas Conference that was handed to Dulles prior to his departure, when he was getting on the plane in Washington. This letter contained the details on implementation of the Declaration of Caracas, and went from OCB by normal routine to all interested agencies.

"Betts called from USUN. Indonesian delegation wants a study on Soviet advisors. Good! These people are fine targets for this sort of study."

The next entry, May 14:

"Jenkins to sit in on Phillips Committee. This is good. Will stymie obstructionists if the honest people at State are there to check them. McConnoughy ordered the study, War by Cease Fire, to be given to Time. The Public Affairs officer didn't do so. Lindbeck, Far East (State), told Lambert that

FE desk didn't agree with our paper because it didn't show Nationalist Chinese violations, and they didn't agree with the Indo-China section, because they said the Communist bloc wanted to negotiate and make peace, so as to turn to the internal construction." Lambert was shocked. This is subversion of the worst sort, especially when this study was approved by OCB and the National Security Council's Planning Board."

The next entry, May 15:

"Defense released study, Truth about USSR Involvement in Korea, and Chinese Communist Aggression and Barbarism in Korea. Good press coverage. Defense getting inquiries from many."

The next entry, May 17:

"Began leave.

"Good newspaper report by Congressman Reece's investigation of Foundations which preach Internationalism, Welfare State and Socialism along with Commie appeasement. The same crew is in CIA and State. This entire thing must be exposed, but compiling evidence will be difficult, because they are powerful, rich, shrewd and clever. But they must be beaten."

The next entry, May 19:

"Betts called me at home and said Lodge will ask for Wally Irwin to chair committee. Also the good news that he was very enthusiastic about my Colonialism, USSR Style, exposure. I thought this would be the hardest to sell. Instead it was the

easiest. What a blow this will be to the Marxists."

The next entry, May 20:

"Jim wrote a paper on a Defense-USIA tie-in case of war. Bissell, CIA, doing a slick job of keeping info media in hands of State and CIA."

The next entry, May 21:

"Soviets came back with violent reaction to my three releases. This is good, although we were not effective in the pre-Geneva Conference period. This will still have effect on the Latin American, European and Asiatic peoples. These releases will strike at the Soviet policymakers, and perhaps make them take notice that we are not as weak or foolish as we appear."

The next entry, May 24:

"Went to office. Staats ordered recall of my Caracas letter. Radius got to him. Felt sorry for Staats, a good, honest hardworking bureaucrat who can't get much done. The vultures frighten him so easily."

"Debevoise (OCB) rewrote the Caracas letter. It is O. K. I have started so much momentum that they won't dare obstruct now. They hope to stop it in the implementation stage. We shall see."

The next entry, May 25:

"U. S. News and World Report published an entire article, 'The Truth About Soviet Involvement in the Korean War. Good

story, and State tried to make me keep on the fig leaf for nine months. I have some satisfaction of victory. They said eight months ago this was not news, and that everyone knew it. These vultures make 1,000 excuses to whitewash China and the USSR.

"Lodge made a major speech in Chicago. He blasted the Commie Chinese, using my material. At least we are giving them a setback along this line."

The next entry is May 26:

"Went in to help Wally compile OCB recommendations for the Ninth General Assembly agenda items. We made up six. These are to be sent to OCB Assistants. These people from the various agencies, expend a lot of wind, but are just as definitive as a high school debating society.

"Lodge and Keys will be asked to sit in next OCB meeting to resolve support for Ninth Assembly USUN.

"When Kennan left State, he asked Wisner, CIA, to take care of some of his boys, among whom is Fierst."

The next entry, May 27:

"State is furious over Lodge letter wanting Wally as Chairman of OCB's Ninth General Assembly Committee. This is a major issue with them because:

"Hiss formed the U. N. Affairs Section in State for a power grab. Now we are threatening to make U. N. Affairs (State) impotent. Radius is working furiously on Staats. He is closely aligned with Bowie and Stelle of State's

Policy Staff, who are aligned with Wisner and Bissell in CIA.

"If we make the U. S. position at the Ninth General Assembly a success, like Eighth, without U.N. Affairs (State), then they will become impotent. They will do everything to block us. Staats (State) and Wayne Jackson (CIA) and Co., are filling Staats, a bureaucrat, with the idea our Special Staff, OCB, shouldn't prepare intelligence. They have been frightened by our studies and papers and will do anything to block future ones. I will not listen to their weak leadership."

The next entry, May 28:

"Chiefs: Staats and Morgan, Marxist types. One a State man, the other weak. Wonder if Staats will ever get wise and bolster his spine. With strength he could become a power, but the opposition works on his weakness."

The next entry, May 29:

~~In order to get the true information to Ambassador Lodge,~~
in order to make the Ninth General Assembly a victory for the U. S., it was necessary to get information from the Department of Defense and the FBI and channel it to him direct. The reason for this was that State, specifically in this case the United Nations Affairs section, would block, stall or paralyze any communication with Lodge, especially if the U. N. Affairs man from State chaired the OCB working group on the UN. This entire situation was explained to Ambassador Lodge.


I have here a chart that I've just drawn up to show

what I mean by the above. If information to Lodge came through normal channels, CIA-State through UN Affairs to Lodge, he would be immobilized by the committee system of compromise, delay and reducing all elements to the least common denominator. As a result our only hope, which was explained to Ambassador Lodge, was that we would gather information from G-2 ONE and Air Force Intelligence, and other Defense agencies, and the FBI, and we would circumvent the normal State-CIA machinery and get the data directly to him.

In looking at this chart, the arrows should be followed not only from top to bottom, but from the bottom to the top. When you come down from the top, no hard information would reach Lodge. If from the bottom, we went through our Ninth General Assembly Committee chaired by UNA (State), then he also would be deprived of hard intelligence. Therefore, our only chance was to follow the arrow at the bottom from the Special Staff (OCB), direct to Ambassador Lodge.

Here is the chart that I've been describing.

(The chart referred to follows:)



"Talked to Pete, told him no matter what decision was made on Ninth Assembly OCB Committee, I would prepare material and get it to Lodge. Talked to Betts in N. Y. Lodge very enthusiastic about Soviet Colonialism item. I will begin working on this and make it the biggest possible. Will have to keep plans secret so we will not be stymied by UN Affairs (State).

"CIA Staff tried to get FBI to send Caracas letter info through them. Allan Dulles said no. All letters went through OCB."

The next entry, June 15:

"Talked to Paul. I think Asia is No. 1 Commie priority, because they are in a war situation. No. 2 priority is Latin America. Hope our present plans don't go wrong, but if we don't begin to pro-U. S. propaganda, Commies will accuse us of all sorts of imperialism. Talked to Charley. He is going to try to bring up my plan in Latin America working group (OCB). State handling of entire Latin America conspiracy should be looked into, beginning with 1945 and Hiss era."

The next entry, June 16:

"Most apparent low, dishonest trick by State, especially Radius (research associate, IPR). Staats reports Murphy told OCB that Lodge wasn't interested in coming to talk to OCB, but was satisfied with present arrangements.

"We know Lodge was never consulted. These people will

stoop to no end to gain their points. This proves to me more than ever that I have to go direct to Lodge if we are to make Ninth General Assembly work."

The next entry, June 17:

"Talked to Charley Norberg about Guatemala. I told him that there was an explosion pending. We were caught in the middle. The Soviets have again outmaneuvered us. If we do nothing, it is a thorn in our side; if we do Soviet propaganda makes fools of us. I insisted we start a campaign immediately to counter this. Charley said he would consult the Committee."

The next entry, June 18:

"Woodward wants us to hurry intelligence of Latin America. But CIA is not producing. I will try my best. But even if I had intelligence, it still has to be put in context and declassified."

"FBI came through with their material. What a difference between the FBI, which is efficient and loyal, and CIA, which is full of leftwingers, and super-intellectuals drunk with inflated ego and a false sense of power. This strain was planted by Kennan, Lattimore and Acheson and still runs State and CIA."

The next entry, June 21:

"Lodge given a curve ball again by State. I had to see him on the floor of the UN with no material. I had it all ready. Braggiotti said they sent for me, but the message never reached me through State. They -- Fierst and Co. do not want me to get

to Lodge with intelligence material.

"Pete told me about Roy (OCB) being suspended. They're as low as snakes. They are attempting to destroy the credibility of a number 1 witness against them on the China issue."

The next entry is June 22:

"I went into Pete and told him I held the whole crew, in contempt. Roy's empty chair was a sign of weakness of OCB, and a symbol of treachery. I told him I could not remain and be loyal to an outfit which did not protect its own. If Roy didn't return, I would have to leave, because the code of principles by which I live cannot allow me to remain. So I will have to continue my fight from elsewhere. I would fulfill my commitment to Lodge, then leave."

The next entry, June 23:

"The campaign I predicted in Latin America is starting in full swing. The orders went from Moscow to Prague to Toledano in Mexico, and now an anti-American campaign is in full swing and we did nothing about it. It is always the same story. I was told by USUN, State people went to New York and had nothing to offer Lodge. They must be purposely keeping the material from him. They can't be this stupid."

The next entry, June 24:

"Talked to Bragiotti. I told him that we were running into the same difficulties in getting things to Lodge, and that

it was a treacherous conspiracy. They feel that Lodge is going against their policies, and they say his program would lead us to war. This is their line. They don't want the Soviets criticized or condemned, but they tolerate attacks on us. Like the recent burning of the U. S. flag in Chile."

The next entry, June 25:

"Talked to Flynn, head of Security at State. I outlined the whole series of obstructionism, from bacteriological warfare, atrocities, Berlin, Caracas, Geneva and now the General Assembly. He knew about it, and the people who are doing this. He admitted it is hard to get at them, but they will try. He told me Radius is connected with Hiss. He asked if I would help, and I said that in the interest of the U. S., I had to try my best to help get at this crew."

The next entry, June 26:

"CIA told us they would give us nothing. This through Shaffer, upon orders from Wisner. These boys do not want to fight Communism. They obstruct at every turn. They are firmly entrenched and our super-intelligence agency will be working against the interest of the U. S. if they aren't routed.

"The coming investigation will be a farce. Too bad, because I think General Clark is a good man. The cards will be stacked against him. He can't get to the heart of the trouble. Left-wingers and semi-subversives will welcome this administrative investigation. It will be a good cover for them."

The next entry, June 28:

"Talked to Woodward, Under-Secretary for Latin American Affairs. He wants me to prepare material to present at Rio Conference.

"I told him we would have material ready for him. He said this was not a duplication.

"I will give him the material I had ready for Lodge and condense the FBI material."

The next entry, June 29:

"Prepared all Latin American material. Worked all day. This material reveals conspiracy leading from Moscow to Prague and Mexico, then Latin America."

The next entry, June 30:

"Pete came in and went into a violent harangue about Wisner. I wonder if this was for my benefit.

"He told me of Wisner's meeting with C. D. They talked of recapped tires for Piper cub planes in Guatemala!

"It is a shame our entire covert workings are in the hands of this man, whom I believe follows Kennan's lead. This is one reason why nothing has been done against the Soviets."

The next entry, July 1:

"Secretary Woodward went after CIA. He asked why, after 27 days, they sent my Caracas letters to OIR (State). He told them this could have been done direct. CIA people hedged, and said they couldn't decide themselves in their own agency."

The next entry, July 2:

"Wally showed me the letter from Wadsworth to Keys, U.N. Affairs, and Mosely's answer. Just what I expected. I told George Betts, when he conveyed this to Lodge, that their line would be:

"1. Don't put it on agenda, only use material if occasion arises.

"2. It would be anathema to Latin American countries.

"3. Worry about our Allies, Britain and France. Always the same old story, do nothing but wait. But Lodge likes this Red Colonialism item, and I will take it to him.

"The Gold Dust Twins, Radius and Wayne Jackson are trying to kill our information briefs."

Entry of July 6:

"Talked to Pete about support for Lodge. Pete seems only remotely interested. He is beaten. I told him I am working on assumption we will get no help from CIA, and besides, I do not need their help.

"Read George Morgan's paper on the long haul. This was a masterpiece -- very insidious -- not written by him.

"Told USUN they had better get together with Senator Knowland, because State might slip him a Mickey on Communist China's entry into the UN."

The next entry, July 7:

"Had a call from George Betts. He said Lodge will make

another speech and wants ideas. I gave him the context. Put China material in three categories: Crimes against humanity, international crimes, violations of the UN Charter.

"Had a long session with Parrott, Flynn's man from State security. Gave him all the dope on how attempts were made to obstruct the bacteriological and atrocity speeches. He said they are after 25 of these types at State."

The next entry, July 8:

"Went to meeting at Defense (Psywar), on how we should use Defense's final atrocity report. I suggested they prepare a book like the interim atrocity report, and that we use it at UN.

"I had a long talk with Lou Olum. I outlined strategy to use in our Red Colonialism line. Told him how Streibert, USIA Chief, could play the theme which I am developing for Lodge.

"I think George Morgan's Long Haul Analysis For U. S. policy generally, presented to N. S. C., was written by Lattimore."

The next entry, July 11:

"Went to Pete and asked him if there was any use asking CIA for aid in our Ninth General Assembly and Latin American programs. Told him I wanted to talk to some defectors. Lou Olum will fix it up with Barmine.

"Continued to Pete that I am working on the assumption that

CIA does not exist. He said we might as well work that way, since it is doubtful we can get help.

"I reminded him we don't even have the dignity of an answer to my 4 February letter on the defector Rostvorov."

"ISAs still reign supreme at CIA. Wish Allen Dulles would get wise."

The next entry, July 12:

"Find out Hovell (FOA), Staats and even Bill Godel, for a change put up quite a battle last Friday at OCB Assistants' meeting for my info briefs. Only opposition came from the Gold Dust Twins, Radius and Jackson.

"We won this battle, but they will try some other way to stop the program.

"Lou Olum called me to see if I could help Dickey, USIA Chief Counsel, to get some material for the coming International Lawyers Conference."

The next entry, July 13:

"I gave Dickey what I could on short notice.

"Talked to General Willems at G-2. He said it is difficult to stick their necks out again to help Lodge. They have to be careful about undermining State. He said they helped last year because of me being part of G-2. He would like to work through the Intelligence Advisory Committee, but this can't be as long as CIA and State sit on it."

The next entry, July 14:

"Lodge wrote to Keys and told UN Affairs the reason he wants to place the Soviet Colonialism item on the agenda is precisely the reason they objected. State's staff, (Fierst & Co.), said colonialism was anathema to Latin America and Asia. Lodge said this is true, and is why he wants to pin colonialism on the Soviets.

"These boys never give up. I am going to tell Lodge again that this guy Fierst must go. This clearly reveals their tactics in getting a poor front man like Mosely to sign the letter to Keys."

The next entry, July 15:

"Wrote outline of how we should approach the Communist Chinese and Soviet Colonialism items. This was sent out to OCB Committee members and USUN. This will mean lot of work.

"Morgan leaving in two weeks, going to Japan. Looks as if they are assembling in Japan."

The next entry, July 18:

"OCB's Ninth General Assembly meeting. I did not attend. My outline was discussed and approved. Olcott Demming, a Fierst man, said that although Lodge wants the Soviet Colonialism item, Secretary Robert Murphy might not. I told George Betts this is not true. The final showdown will have to be between Lodge and Foster Dulles.

"Outlined my entire plan to Betts and told him I must go to N. Y. in September. I sent Lodge a personal letter

telling him about the Guatemala question, and recommended how the resolutions should read on the Communist Chinese and Red Colonialism items."

The next entry, July 19:

"Got a call from N. Y. I gave them material to rebut Tsarpskin's disarmament speech. Wally Irwin wanted to know what I gave them. I told him I don't deal with UN Affairs. He said he has to live with them, but I don't.

"This is clear example why Soviets usually beat us with their lies. We do not even have an apparatus to present the truth. Wonder when someone with some brains and ingenuity will get in the government.

"With correct setup, and rid of Soviet sympathizers, we could give the Communists a beating easily."

The next entry, July 20:

"State opened up on providing intelligence for Lodge. Their contribution was very little and not too useful. Wonder why this change of heart. Now is the time to be wary because this is not like the IPR boys -- Allan Evans, Radius, Bennett -- to act this way. I wish we could tie this daisy chain together."

The next entry, July 21:

"Saw CIA paper prepared by Kennan. This was an eyeopener. Reveals to me the sad situation in CIA. There never has been a coordinated, enthusiastic collection of Intelligence on the international Communist conspiracy. As long as people

like Wisner and Amory remain; there never will be, because they believe in killing the Soviets with kindness. These people follow the Kennan line, which is leading U. S. to disaster."

The next entry, July 22:

"Talked to Rasmussen about Stalin's death and defectors. There hasn't been an induced defector for years. There won't be as long as the people in charge have no intention of inducing defections, since they follow the line of not making the Soviets angry, even when they vent their venom at us and advocate our destruction.

"This is typical. Despite high planning in the OCB, there was no exploitation of Stalin's death.

"Yalta, Korea, Berlin, Geneva, all sellouts."

In my diary, I wrote these places one under the other.

The next entry, July 23:

"CIA closed to us. Schaeffer (CIA) told Deb that they are not in the business of supporting OCB. This is good, because I have everything I need. These people are malicious.

"Met with O'Conner. I told him Kirsten and Lodge should get together on Soviet Colonialism. He said he would get me and Kirsten together."

The next entry, July 26:

"CIA opened up; asked us what we need. Wayne Jackson called, said he found our letter of 4 February. Wonder why he

lost it for six months. Schaeffer said orders to cooperate came since Friday. Puzzling.

"Asked ----; he said this is typical. Now that they have done their damage at Geneva, instead of being anti-anti-Communist they are putting on a big show of anti-Communism as a cover. Morgan is typical of this."

The next entry, July 27:

"State cable an insult to Lodge. They are trying to kill the Red Colonialism item.

"-- believes there is a IRP ring still operating in State. If we could uncover it, the country would be much better off.

"I think the next move of the Soviets is Japan, because the IPR group in State are being assigned to the U. S. Embassy in Tokyo."

The next entry, July 28:

"C. D. Jackson on USUN staff. I wonder if this is reason State and CIA opened up to give me intelligence, to keep Jackson from finding out.

"President Eisenhower pounded the table and wants all agencies to support OCB."

The next entry, July 29:

"Talked to Bragiotti about State's cable. I said it was an insult to Lodge. Bragiotti said they will approach the British and French in a routine fashion, only to inform them on the Soviet Colonialism item.

ps fls ws

"Now that they lost Indo-China for us, they are all -- Wisner, Wayne Jackson, Radius, George Morgan, Bowie, etc. -- all putting on a semblance of anti-communism. They will be in good position when the next Commie move comes to give aid and comfort."

The next entry, July 30:

"Gold Dust Twins in form. They succeeded in delaying Striebert's paper on Red Colonialism.

"Seems like they got to G-2. Asked who have I been antagonizing? Gen. Willems wanted me to go through IAC. This slow-moving, ponderous red tape agency could never react fast enough to fight Communism. These bureaucratic agencies are a godsend to the Communists and their protectors, in State and CIA."

The next entry, August 2:

~~"Wrote to John asking him to watch Sneider and Morgan, because if these people are part of the IPR nucleus in State, then the next Soviet move will be against Japan. State and CIA will try to make Japan go Socialist. They will try to stop all US moves to block the Commies.~~

"Intelligence estimates confirm my suspicion. Commies are penetrating the Socialist Party in Japan."

The next entry, August 3:

"Working full blast on my Chinese material for Lodge.

"---told me Radius wrote a letter saying State was against

ps 2

the Red Colonialism item, and that they said evidence cannot verify it."

The next entry, August 4:

"Gen. Bullock, Chief Psywar, sent for me. Wanted to know what was behind move to rescind two NSC papers pertaining to Psywar. I explained this was typical of CIA and State, to cut defense off. Since they cannot control Defense they want to cut them off. I advised him to bring pressure high up to Adm. Radford, Secretary of Defense Wilson, or C. D. Jackson, so as to make President aware of what is going on.

"He asked me about Gen. Mark Clark's investigation of CIA. I told him, I hate to see Gen. Clark mixed up in this, because they will use this as a cover."

The next entry, August 5:

"Talked to Gen. Bullock again. Told him he is vulnerable on his 2.75 million research project. State-CIA will get him if he is not extremely cautious.

"I told him about Ekstein, Moseley, and CENIS, etc. 2.75 million is a drop in the bucket to CIA, but Defense can be investigated, and CIA will spill to Congress to get even."

I recall that he agreed, and later the project was changed.

The diary resumes:

"Talked to Betts, Lodge received my letter. Wally will give me the answer. Talked to Jenkins (FE). We will get together on my China material. This will bypass UN Affairs

ps 3

when they try to nit-pick. Asked him to fit in the POWs from Taiwan with Lodge's China Project."

These were the five Chinese P.O.W.'s from North Korea on a speaking tour of the U. S.

The next entry, August 6:

"Wrote letter to Staats on Radius, Soviet Colonialism answer. Toquay following the same line. He got it from Guillion, Stelle and Bowie. I wrote a letter protesting against their crude line. Pete agreed. Will talk to Staats Monday.

"Info briefs program approved by OCB. This makes me feel good, since I initiated this way of fighting Communism.

"Betts called and said Menon will bring up the P.O.W. item. We are ready for this. We will give them another defeat.

"Finished new papers on Soviet Colonialism and Latin America.

"C. D. Jackson called the president on the suggestion I had made to Bullock. The NSC papers were not rescinded. This is a major defeat for the ISA's."

Mr. Sourwine. What is this system you are talking about, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. The information briefs -- there are examples of them here. This was a system devised under which classified intelligence material was written up under certain headings, such as "Treaty and Truce Observance, Communist Style",

ps 4

"War by Cease Fire", "Soviet Subversion and Espionage in Germany", "Violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement", "Chinese Communist Aggression", "Barbarism and Criminal Activity", "Forcible Detention of Prisoners of War", and "Soviet Assistance to North Korean Forces Subsequent to 1948". These were developed from classified intelligence, and then were sent back to the appropriate agency for declassification. Once they were declassified, they were used as source material for speeches and pamphlets.

Mr. Sourwine. Was there opposition to this program?

Colonel Corso. There was tremendous opposition to this program, mainly by Wayne Jackson of CIA and Walter Radius of the State Department.

Mr. Sourwine. But you were successful in getting the program approved?

Colonel Corso. We were.

Mr. Sourwine. These examples of the briefs, the material you prepared, may we have these?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. I offer them for the appendix of this record.

(The material referred to will be found in the appendix of the record.)

Colonel Corso. I might say that we were successful in keeping this program going through the efforts of C. D. Jackson

ps

and Ambassador Lodge. Forty of these papers were prepared to support Lodge against the entry of Communist China into the U.N.

Mr. Sourwine. Were any of these used?

Colonel Corso. Yes, the entire group was used.

In here we show how these were put into Lodge's speeches.

Mr. Sourwine. By "in here" you mean in your diary?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

And also in the diary, in one spot, is where a series of these were prepared for C. D. Jackson, which he took to the Berlin Conference.

The next entry, August 10:


"Talked to Roy about the IPR hard core still operating in State and CIA."

I have here in chart form an illustration of how the Institute of Pacific Relations influences U. S. policy. There are three columns. The first column shows Soviet policy in the Far East, Manchuria and Eastern Europe. Then we move over to the center column which shows that the I.P.R. influences U. S. government-policy to U.S.S.R.-advantage. The third column directly across shows U. S. policy in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, and how they were lined by the I.P.R. to Soviet advantage. Then I drop down to the second horizontal line and show that Korea, Indo-China and Formosa are still being influenced in favor of the Communists by the same I.P.R. hard

ps 2

core in the government. Specifically this was done, as shown in the chart, at Panmunjom, Geneva and of course Formosa. The bottom of the chart shows the three divisions of the I.P.R. At top are honorary titles. The middle shows the real brains, the research associates, and of course, at the bottom, are all the rest that I refer to as the dupes. Over at the right are research associates of the I.P.R. still in government.

This is the chart:



IPR	
HONORARY TITLES	
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (REAL BRAINS)	
DUPES	

This dangerous group still in gov'n't. Examples: Barnett, Allan Evans, Radius, Frederic/Schultheis, Armstrong, Trezice, etc.

The next entry, August 11:

"Had run-in with Pete over CENIS. Told him this CIA project is spreading IPR line throughout the government. Believe this group is the center of underground IPR operations in the government."

ps 3

"My papers, entitled New World Colonialism Soviet Style are finished. USIA wants to put them out. State IPRs are dragging their feet, as usual."

USIA did finally put out New World Colonialism in a packet

The next entry, August 12:

"Taquay has started his ISA line on my Soviet Colonialism papers.

"Talked to Staats on Radius letter that said there was no evidence of Soviet Colonialism. This man is the typical IPR type."

The next entry, August 13:

"Jesse McKnight, State, to be suspended on 7 September."

The next entry, August 16:

"Saw Gen. Bullock. He asked about CIA investigation by Gen. Clark. I told him Gen. Clark had all the cards stacked against him. The Wisners, the Amory's, the Bissels, the Schultheis's, the Bundys, are too firmly entrenched. I gave him some ideas of the boondoggling and the un-American activities of the CIA-State-Lattimore cliques, and how Kennan practically runs CIA's covert operations."

"He is going to Clark and asked if I would help."

The next entry, August 17:

"Rasmussen, G-2, asked me to come and see him. I told him how we could fight to keep Defense self-sufficient, free of the State-CIA-Lattimore setup."

"Talked to Penniman, and he told me all about a psywar project called Raft, and how the first test project, on Indo-China, listed nine leftwing, Commie references.

"I believe Lattimore still is running the show, Morgan's long haul letter to MSC's Planning Board is an example."

The next entry, August 18:

"Sent Pete a memo on the flood situation in Communist China. Roy gave me the idea. Pete immediately took it to Staats, who took it to OCB. They received it enthusiastically, and I have to meet with the working group tomorrow.

"I received a call from Bragiotti that Lodge needed a speech. We called Lodge in Beverly, Mass., and gave him an outline. It was well received. I had just the material declassified.

"Speech is for Amvets on the 28th. Gave him (Lodge) material to use in this American Legion speech."

The next entry, August 19:

"Went to the China Working Group (OCB) with Pete. We got the flood paper approved, and this will give the Chinese Communists a blow. It is a pleasure to work with McConoughy, Jenkins and Martin."

"Took copy of China book we had sent Lodge to Psywar, and straightened them out on Chinese Communist ties with USSR."

The next entry, August 20:

"OCB Assistants approved the Chinese flood memo. I also

ps 5

found out they decided to rewrite Streibert's memo on Red Colonialism taking out the word Colonialism. State ISA's will not let us use any potent weapon against the Commies. They want to temper down everything.

"Found out Gen. Doolittle is conducting an investigation on Plans and Policy, CIA. This is a typical cover in anticipation of Clark report.

"Congressman Judd asked State to prepare a White Book on China, and even offered to secure appropriations. They turned it down. I think they don't know what to give him. Also, IPR men like Allen Evans and Yager are still in command of intelligence, and will not let the truth come out.

"I called McConoughy, and told him I have all the material needed to fulfill Judd's request. He was interested and said we should get together on the subject.

"Checked wally's draft of material that I had given him for Lodge's speech. Looks good."

The next entry, August 24:

"Talked to Gen. Bullock about CIA investigation by Gen. Clark. Told him the Doolittle deal was a flanking movement to neutralize any adverse findings by Clark.

"I explained to him about the chart I had prepared on the State-CIA tieup and how they interlock."

I have a copy of the chart here. It is a very simple chart. It shows on the top the Lattimore, B, Kennan control


ps 6

flowing into CIA and State. On the right are the research groups and their flow into State and CIA. Under the different section titles are the names of the people in positions of influence at the time.

At the bottom of the chart, I have this comment written:

"The above are the hard core of people who have caused the U. S. to get to the point of disaster."

This is the chart:



The next entry, August 25:

"The OCB turned down our Chinese Nationalist aid project for flood victims in Communist China. Radius and Godel winked at each other throughout the debate.

"Someone got to Washburn, USIA. Radius as usual hoodwinked Bedell Smith. Godel got to Anderson. Only one stood up for it; this was Gen. Caball of CIA.

ps 7

"Four hours later, this ~~top secret~~ decision hit the press. This reveals how security risks are still in our midst, and that no government secret is safe."

The story appeared in Reston's column in the N. Y. Times.

The next entry, August 26:

"Saw Gen. Betts, CIA. They are going to give me defector reports.

"Gen. Bullock showed me the names of the Doolittle Committee members. I will see what I can find out about them.

"Talked to Col. Todd, Psywar, about getting IPR publications out of his research project. He agreed and took action.

"Received a letter from the IPR group is active in Japan. They have to be watched, or they will give Japan over to the Commies."

The next entry, August 27:

"Went to OCB Assistants meeting. When Pete threw Reston's press release of the OCB meeting on the table, Godel and Radius laughed. When Pete said it was leaked Radius with a sly smile winked at Godel. I saw this myself.

"Discussion of word Colonialism came up. I spoke up that this must stay in. They never give up trying to whitewash the Soviets.

"Charley Taquay is desperately repeating this same line. He received his guidance from State policy, and follows it blindly."

ps 8

The next entry, August 30:

"Talked to Milly Schwarz; I am very concerned that they are eliminating her from CIA, because her heart is on our side. Found out Saltzman, Deputy Under Secretary for Personnel, State, is living in Wisner's home. This means Kennan controls all personnel and security in State. These types can keep their people in and eliminate any opposition. They have the control."

The next entry, August 31:

"Met Max Bishop. He asked me to give him names I know of suspects in State, so he can pass them on to Herbert Hoover, Jr., who he said wants to clean out 150 State people. He is FSO I, now, but explained to me that Kennan held up his promotion."

The next entry, September 1:

"Talked to ---- about the study that was written some time back on how we hadn't done anything to harm the Soviets or expose communism. This went to the White House -- Cutler gave it to Allen Dulles. He appointed a Committee to implement it, as follows:

"Max Millikan,

Randy Zander,

Bissel, and

Francis Stevens.

"This Committee is rigged to end up with nothing.

"Saw another report from the Indo-China working group that

ps9

is trying to solve what the President said was a mess. Paul said the lineup read like the cast for a dance macabre. After they did all the damage they could, they are putting on a show of anti-Communism."

The list of names here reads as follows:

"Chairman, Ken Young, Members, Bonsal, Guillion, Wisner, Bissel, McDonald. The IPR reigns supreme. The plan of action will be written by Ken Young, Radius and McDonald -- no action can possibly result."

The next entry, September 2:

"Sent Gen. Bullock word on the Doolittle Committee. What an ingenious play. General Clark doesn't have a chance."

The next entry, September 3:

"Schwinn, of State Public Affairs opposed the words Soviet Colonialism and forced USIA to remove them. This man has replaced Philips. He is another one of the same crew.

"The Marxists are more firmly entrenched now than they have ever been. I feel sorry for Eisenhower. He means well. He and Nixon can't see that these Marxists-Socialists control the Executive foreign policy decisions almost 100 per cent. They are only waiting to get someone like Stevenson or Kennan in as President; then they will implement their Marxists-Socialist theories internally. Just as they are applying them externally now.

"Deb held a meeting of CIA and OIR, State people over the

ps 10

paper on Southeast Asia that CIA prepared for me. Even CIA desk people were amazed at how State representatives followed the party line. They were led by Hamilton. They started with the line that we might give Southeast Asia the impression that the Commies are too strong, or we might give the Communist Chinese ideas by putting out intelligence on the Thai autonomous force.

"They will not let anyone expose communism."

The next entry, September 8:

"Secretary Woodward admitted that he has never read the Communist Party, USA, paper. He was told that in my anti-Communist fervor, I dream up these things. He was surprised when told the material came from FBI and CIA reports. This shows how an Assistant Secretary can be fooled. It seems certain elements at State will go to any end to protect the Communists.

The usual tactic of Radius, Yager and Co. Since they can't knock down the material they are trying to smear me."

I will have to find the entry on this letter by Yager to Woodward.

Mr. Sourwine. At that point, Colonel, this is the paper that I am holding that was referred to, which you were supposed to have dreamed up as a result of anti-Communist fervor?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. This is a paper that was printed by the Department of State, and is marked "Distributed in Implementatio

ps 11

Of The Caracas Resolution Against International Communist Intervention In The Americas"?

Colonel Corso. That was also translated into Spanish, and sent to Latin America.

Mr. Sourwine. This is a 16-page pamphlet.

May the whole paper be put into the record at this point, including the illustrations, which can be reduced in size to fit the page of the hearing record when printed.

(The material referred to follows:)

(COMMITTEE INSERT.)

ps 12

Colonel Corso. There is reference to a letter in the diary from J. Edgar Hoover, which states that he was very pleased about this paper, and which says that if we do more of this, we can make some powerful inroads against the Communists.

Mr. Sourwine. Was this paper given the distribution you felt it should have, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. Yes, when we channeled it through Assistant Secretary of State Woodward and the Deputy Secretary of State, at that time Herbert Hoover, Jr.

The next entry, September 9:

"Max Bishop explained to me how his promotion was held up by Kennan and others from 1945 to 1950.

"They are putting a man named Thayer in OCB. He promoted the organizing of a Socialist refugee group in Paris. He's one of the top Kennan-Lattimore men."

The next entry, September 10:

"Communist China material almost ready for UN use. Told Col. Ross (OCB) to place our denial of backing for the Nationalist Chinese in status report, since some day there may be a day of reckoning on all of this anti-U. S. plotting. Warned him of these connivers.

"Air Force will not declassify the paper proving that Communist Chinese and Soviets planned their entry into the Korean War on 14 Aug. 1950."

The significance of this this item is that we had set a

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much later date for their entry into the Korean War.

The next entry, September 13:

"Send word to Gen. Bullock that two NSC papers in Psywar are being rewritten in the Bureau of the Budget by Schwarzwaider. This man helped Hiss write the plan to take over the State Dept.

"Taquay is writing a memo like mad to try to get NSC's Planning Board to consider Kennan's plan on Germany. Found out that when Taquay was sent to Corsica by the OSS, he immediately surrendered to the Germans.

"Found out that all the soft types in OIR, State, had their incubation period in G-2 in 1944. They were all taken to State by a character named Col. McCormick. These include Park Armstrong, Stelle, Rusk, Yager, Polyzoides, etc. These all managed to get into vital spots to control the intelligence field.

"The War College seminars are led by State men. Our next crop of Generals may be indoctrinated.

"Lou Olum called and told me that State had decided to do nothing at the UN. Not to stir up anything. We would keep on the defense and try not to get the Soviets angry. This is typical. We have lost our heritage. Those characters are sapping our strength and courage.

"Bonsal is Far East adviser, and Moseley also is on Cosmos project."

"Ken Young is now chief of Philippines and South East

ps14

Asia Section, State, SEATO doesn't have a chance with his type guiding policy.

"Roy was cleared by Bedell Smith, but Salzman did the SIA dirty work by keeping an administrative sword over his head. He is one of the most faithful Americans being crucified by these people because he knows too much.

"CIA also has the party line that we shouldn't stir up anything at the UN.

"Wisner is going on a tour of the Far East.

"Just about finished the Communist China project. Sent off a copy to USUN in N.Y. Also getting a study ready for them on USSR weapons in Korea.

"Max Bishop asked me to give him info on Ken Young, so he can give it to Herbert Hoover, Jr. I'll give it to him and see what he does with it. He showed me a letter he wrote in 1950, when Sebald, of State, wanted to play footsie with the Japanese Socialists.

"Recommendation that John Paton Davies made to put Benjamin Schwarz of Harvard and others like him into O.P.C. (CIA), under CIA in N.Y. or Boston, has finally been carried out by State-CIA. The group's name is now CENIS."

The next entry, September 20:

"Spoke to Dr. Lilly (OCB) about the Nixon to Bedell Smith letter referring to Lowry's proposal to get U. S. support behind religious, to hit Communism in Southeast Asia. I

ps 15

told him to leave the church and the religious alone. They are fighting communism. Our interference would only hurt them."

The next entry, September 21:

"Dr. Lilly told me the religious campaign has been dropped. This is good. I don't want to see OCB Assistants get their claws in this. This could be a good program, and strike at the heart of Communism, but never with bunch we have now.

"An NSC --- group says the time to roll back Soviet power is in the future. When? When they take Washington and my home. Some day this gang will answer."

The next entry, September 22:

"Bill Godel is desperately trying to find out who testified against McKnight. Godel, C. D. Jackson, Hirsch, etc., are accusing each other. I spoke to Parrott, told him I didn't care, but to protect his sources."

The next entry, September 23:

"They tried get me to pull back the Communist Chinese-USSR ties paper. State sent the agrarian reform over. I want their comments written out.

"USUN at N. Y. thought a lot of my slave labor paper, and are sending me a commendation."

The next entry, September 24:

"USUN approved Soviet Colonization presentation and I

ps16

will go to work on it.

"Got declassification from CIA for a paper on religious persecution in Communist China, and also on the extortion of money from Chinese in the U. S. The China book for Lodge is now complete.

"New Soviet intelligence instructions on Party-agent control make it almost impossible for the FBI to expose an agent like Hiss in the government. This bodes ill? We will have to keep our eyes open.

"Received the final atrocity report from Defense."

The next entry, September 28:

"Polish defectors from Formosa were to arrive in N. Y. last Friday. This would have taken the wind out of Vishinsky's sails. He accused us of piracy off Formosa, and, that we coerced these sailors. The Poles were supposed to be in the Polish Day parade. This would have been a beautiful one-two punch, but someone sabotaged the whole deal."

The next entry, September 29:

"Found out a fellow named Tom Davies from State Security went to Immigration and to the McCarran Committee, and used the excuse that the bringing of Poles into this country against the law. This is typical of the way subversives operate in our government."

"Soviet intelligence in New York must be well tied in to our subversives. This must be one of two nets said to

ps 17

be still operating in the government. The play was perfect coordination, in order to let the Soviets get a vital point across."

The next entry, September 30:

"Found out this entire refugee problem is an old one, dating back to 1947. Kennan set it up, and the government financed it in order not to make any refugee program work. Money gives control. Lenin preached refugee dynamics was important to subvert a country. Kennan placed Wisner in CIA to make sure there would be no refugee dynamics to assist this country against the USSR."

The next entry, October 1:

"Herb Fierst still giving orders to prevent these Polish sailors from coming to this country. Dawson and his FOA crowd all formerly worked under Fierst. This man is dangerous, but the security people can't get at him because he is protected by Kennan, Wisner and Salzman."

The next entry, October 6:

"Had a long talk with C. D. Jackson. Suggested to him what we should do about Vishinsky's piracy charge. He accepted the plan and I promised I would get the intelligence, but that he would have to intervene with the President because the State types were dedicated not to let these defectors arrive here."

The next entry, October 7:

ps 18

"Took my outline to C. D. He dictated a letter to Allen Dulles outlining the entire situation. He asked my approval and instructed me to deliver the letter personally to Dulles."

The next entry, October 8:

"Met with McConoughy, Stein, Blake and Martin over the piracy issue and outlined the entire plan as approved by Jackson. Stein, UN Affairs, as usual tried to voice caution, but the decision was made to look at the intelligence first."

The next entry, October 9:

"Met with Williams and Glazier at their FOA office and they agreed to help on the Polish sailor situation."

"Delivered C. D. Jackson's letter to Dulles. But still their entry into the U. S. is blocked. The pro-Communist sympathizers are powerful and firmly entrenched."

The next entry, October 10:

"Col. Enyart said our Latin America working group approved my paper on the Communist Party in the U.S."

The entry for October 18:

"Top secret decision on Rio Conference appeared in the Washington Post. The subversives leaked this, because their decision was being overruled. They decided to let the Latinos know, and so create an unfavorable atmosphere."

"Allen Dulles ordered Wayne Jackson to make a study on Communist Free Thai units and get it to USUN in New York. State will take this setback, but will try to minimize the

ps19 issue. The word will go from Ken Young to Fierst, to Demning to Bonsal, to minimize this in the U. N."

The next entry, October 19:

"Wrote a paper for C. D. Jackson on what the Soviets think of the UN, and how they hope to replace it. Max and myself went to see McConoughy and I outlined the weak position we will be in if we return the tanker Taupse.

"The easy way is to give it back and the Soviets will then reopen the lifeline for the supply of jet fuel to Communist China. The hard way is to have courage, and keep this line cut. We would save U. S. lives by doing so."

The next entry, October 20:

"C. D. Jackson called me and wanted material to counter the Czech resolution against warlike propaganda. I got him a tape of Khrushchev's speech at Prague.

"CIA gave us an estimate on the Communist Free Thai movement. We forced their hand, but they still hedged by saying hard documentary evidence is not available. This is typical of their hedging."

The next entry, October 21:

"Gave Max the entire story on the tanker Taupse. He was going to see Herbert Hoover, Jr. Roy also wrote a proposed cable for State to send out, which completely explodes the State theory concerning the present Sino-Soviet agreement on Port Arthur. They follow the British line.

ps 20

"Roy explained that Nehru's Pan-Asian concept is the neutralism proposed by Malenkov before Stalin died. If these neutrals keep this so-called third force concept it will help the Commies. Lodge will lose all his votes at UN."

The next entry, October 22:

2OCB still fumbling on Indo-China. What are they trying to do now, after State sold the country down the river at Geneva."

The next entry, November 4:

"Radius tried to stop my trip to New York. Made Staats jittery."

The next entry, November 5:

"Sat in OCB Assistance. The discussion was on the collection of information on the International Communist Conspiracy. What a farce, with a CIA (ISA) man, Bolton, then Trezice, Schwarzwald, Bundy, Wayne Jackson, Radius, Bissell and Fisher Howe! What a bunch of obstructionists!"

The next entry, November 8:

"Went to New York. Had a run-in with McSweeney on the Polish seamen. This is another of the ISAs. He was charge d'affairs in Moscow when Kennan was Ambassador."

The next entry, November 9:

"Met CD and we had a long talk on the three items brought up by the Communist bloc against the U. S., under the headings of propaganda, aggression, and piracy. He agreed to follow

ps 21

my plans. He sided with me against McSweeney."

The next entry, November 12:

"Parrott, of State Security, came to see me. He said McKnight who was suspended has 200 affidavits in his support that CIA employes were pressured into channeling through Wisner. They had to conform or lose their jobs.

"Bedell Smith persuaded by Radius to kill the policy hindrance charge against McKnight.

"McKnight and Morse, now at State, placed Judith Copeland in her job at Justice when they were there."

The next entry, November 15:

"Gave copies of my papers on Soviet Expansion, ITS control Mechanism, and Training of Soviet Colonists, to Sayles. He will put them in shape to present as a white paper to counter the Soviet aggression item against US."

The next entry, November 16:

"Max Bishop called and Roy and myself went to State and presented him with papers on Communist China, which he was going to take up with Herbert Hoover, Jr. They were concerned about the move to recognize Communist China."

The next entry, November 17:

"Received declassification from Navy and Army on my Piracy paper. This is swell, because now we can type the Soviet piracy item as having military implications.

"Max Bishop called me on the Soviet charge in UNESCO of

PS 22 U. S. war-mongering propaganda. Told him we will take this up with Moseley, since it is the same as their UN accusation."

The next entry, November 18:

"A concentrated effort is being made at the NSC Planning Board to recognize Communist China and admit it to the UN. Robertson made an appeal against it. Soon as he left, Bowie changed the line. Flemming, ODM, said, 'I hear the voice of Joseph, but the hand is the hand of Asab.' (In other words, he called Bowie a double-crosser. An effort is being made by Samuel Andersen, of Commerce, and the Federal Trade Bureau to put this over. The Chamber of Commerce is behind this. They would sell out their country for dollars."

The next entry, November 19:

"Saw the paper presented by Samuel Andersen, Deputy Under-Secretary of Commerce, a real greedy paper against the interests of the U. S. The 35,000 killed in Korea are forgotten.

"This is typical first bringing up anti-Communist points, then the joker -- recognize Communist China. Sherman Kent (CIA) to make the estimate. This is laughable. His boss, Amory will tell him what to put in it.

"The only consolation is that the Chinese Commies will never accept two Chinas. The ISA's are blinded to reality by their fervor to cover up and recognize Communist China."

The next entry, November 22:

"Finished the study on Communist Propaganda Apparatus.

ps 23

This material is intended to counter the Czech accusation at the U.N.

"Bowie stated at the NSC Planning Board that we would know if the Soviets came into a harbor with a ship containing an atom bomb because they would unload the cargo and crew first. This is the kind of person we have on our highest Planning Board!

"Met with Moseley, Buchanan, Creghton and Apter on the UNESCO war propaganda item. We will play the same line as in N.Y."

The next entry, November 23:

"Our 9th General Assembly working group met today. Mosely outlined progress, and I outlined future activities on the three Soviet items.

"Met with the Indo-China OCB Truce Violations Committee. The meeting was on the request of Father McQuire, representing Cardinal Stritch, on their book on the treatment of refugees by Viet Minh.

"I brought up the question of Soviet defectors from the Taupse. Ferguson (CIA), another softie answered only 'peace'."

The next entry, November 24:

"Talked to George Betts and he said CD wanted to see the Soviet film Silvery Dust. Made arrangements to get it, and will deliver it to New York.

"Much disturbed about Chinese Communist condemning our

ps 24

13 POW's as spies. I told them a year ago this would happen. Lack of courage and foresight caused this."

The next entry, November 25:

"Thanksgiving. Worked at home on USSR Propaganda all over the world."

The next entry, November 26:

"Prepared the study on Communist Propaganda all over the world. Talked to George. I will go up Tuesday with the film.

"I went to talk to Moseley and brought him more material. I read the first draft of C. D. Jackson's speech on war propaganda, but was not too much impressed. It can be fixed up.

"Sent copy of all my papers to Gen. Cutler and Maurer, head of the Soviet section, CIA.

"Pete said Cutler thought the papers were superb."

The next entry, November 29:

"USIA Security officer called on me to ask about Linbeck. I told him he attempted to discredit my War by Cease Fire paper. I told him that if USIA hired him, I would not deal with him.

"I picked up the film, Silvery Dust from CIA for delivery to New York."

The next entry, November 30:

"Arrived in New York. I heard C. D.'s opening speech on the Czech Propaganda item. I didn't like it, and expressed

ps 25

my opinion to Siscoe and Moseley that I thought it aided the enemy and would make no news.

"Siscoe reported me to Irwin. I told Irwin that I meant no personal reference to Siscoe, but my views were still valid.

"Siscoe reported my conversation to Jackson. Siscoe must have had a guilty feeling, since he convinced CD to water down the material I sent him."

The next entry, December 1:

"At a working group meeting C.D. explained to me that he was to blame for watering down the decision. I explained my views that I thought the Czech minister's speech was extremely well done, and hated to see C. D. outdone. C. D. asked me to sit behind him at the debate.

"CD gave a hard-hitting speech that afternoon, and then asked if I liked it. At least I got this on the right track.

"Bragiotti told me Lodge was going to see the President on the 13 POW's condemned by the enemy.

"Lincoln White knows I gave testimony against McKnight. This means all of that crowd know."

The next entry, December 2:

"I sat at the UN all day behind Jackson. The Iraq delegate gave an excellent speech. CD wasn't going to speak. I urged him to do so. He gave another excellent, hard-hitting speech.

ps26

"Vote was 35 - 5 - 9 in our favor.

"UN Affairs (State) - Popper, Stein, Siscoe, tried to obstruct our presentation all the way. These boys still control implementation."

The next entry, December 3:

"We held a meeting on the Piracy item. I gave CD my views and he was pleased. State policy paper was measly mouthed.

"I wrote a paper for Lodge on the approach to take and why in the case of the sentencing of the 13 POW's. Stein is all ready in N. Y. to block this one. I hope they accept my views."

The next entry, December 6:

"Kept working on my papers to use on the Communist aggression item. There is small chance of getting to use them, since the clique in U.N. Affairs (State) still has control.

"I am still against using the UN to intervene in the POW case. This is exactly what they want us to do. We are on our way to another propaganda defeat, because the sympathizers and dupes in our government want it that way."

The next item, on December 7:

"Braggiotti called and wants me to come up to N.Y. since they don't have anything to use on this P.O.W. case.

"I called CD and asked him if he wanted me to to to N.Y. He said to do so, and bring my material with me.

"I sent a memo to Staats. He called Godel. State is

ps 27

alarmed because they say they have everything.

"I don't want to go, but Staats wants me to. Col. Monroe is coming with me. This is only to make the best of a bad situation."

The next entry, on December 8:

"Flew to N. Y. I sat in on the POW debate. What a farce. The map they are going to pass out is erroneous. I tried to tell them, but Wally got panicky when Lodge announced that the map would be passed out. He became angry when I urged them not to put it out.

"They did. I went to Adm. Struble. He went to Lodge. We made a new map.

"The initial aggression speech given by CD had my material in it."

The next entry, December 9:

"I sat part-time in the anti-U.S. aggression debate. CD had to go to Washington. Ambassador Wadsworth took his place, and was bored with the proceedings. (The U. S. is accused of aggression, and he represented the U. S. and he is bored.) Fortunately our Allies, as usual, came to our rescue.

"George told me that Lincoln White and the others know I testified against McKnight. This works to my advantage, as I can see the look of apprehension on the faces of this clique when they meet me because they fear for their little jobs."

The next entry, December 10:

ps 28

"We won the vote on the POWs. Now the U. N. Secretary General is to plead for us. What a degrading position for us to be in! Have we lost all our courage?"

"I am going to take off. This whole UN is disgusting. The internationalists have sure trapped us in this phony, three-ring carnival called the UN."

The next entry, December 13:

"CD used all my material on the Piracy item. We exposed them, and the Soviets didn't like it. This item presages an attack on Formosa. A firm stand will stop them for the time being."

The next entry, December 14:

"The Soviets did not even push the vote on their Piracy item. They did not wish us to expose their plans before the world."

"The Captain of the ship Praca conducted himself admirably before the press. I am glad that I set this up."

"Sisco and McSweeney were very unhappy because this was using a refugee in a dynamic way."

The next entry, December 15:

"George, at my insistence, planted with the Chinese Nationalists here the idea that they should publicize the Taupse Soviet defectors."

"They called Washington. Wisner (CIA) and State gave orders that no American would go near them."

ps 29

The next entry, on December 16:

"I have the job of preparing the Indo-China truce violations for eventual release.

"Ken Young and Godel doing a good job of obstructing the activities of our South Vietnam ally.

"Why should they ask for an exhaustive appraisal of friendly strength, capabilities, etc. in Indo-China?"

The next item, December 17:

"Found out CIA is backing the police against the army in Pakistan and Thailand. This is typical of Wisner. The police is the Ministry the Commies take over to control a country.

"CIA is not in the espionage business; they get others to do their work, and bank on the chance of getting information this way."

The next entry, December 20:

~~"I have decided to take it easy after the UN ordeal. This would be a good time to write my observations of the UN. My thoughts run along the following lines:~~

"1. The biggest 5th column ever conceived against U. S. institutions and heritage.

"2. It is what Hiss planned when he formed the UN Affairs Office in State.

~~"3. How the U.N. Affairs Office was staffed at State."~~

Mr. Sourwine. Can you go from here to the next book?

Colonel Corso. From here I will continue to the next

ps 30 book.

The next book mainly covers Formosa and Korea.

Mr. Sourwine. During what period, now?

Colonel Corso. This is right after the Korean War, 1954-55.

Mr. Sourwine. And this book follows pretty closely after the first one that you read from?

Colonel Corso. Yes, it does.

Mr. Sourwine. And these two diaries were consecutive?

Colonel Corso. They were consecutive.

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Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, in that connection I show you a news story from the Washington Daily News of Monday, April 2, 1962, and ask you for your comment.

And may this story be inserted in the record at this point.

(The newspaper story referred to follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

Containment Theory
Containment Theory Now Behind U. S. Defense Policy

Time Is on the West's Side in Cold War, Officials Feel

By RAY CROMLEY
Newspaper Enterprise Association

President John F. Kennedy's statement that the United States under some circumstances would not hesitate to turn a conventional war into a nuclear war is the result of a



first strike threat. But they don't want it to be so obvious a threat that Khrushchev becomes convinced the United States will inevitably strike first. For this might trigger a war.

The measures outlined above are aimed at holding the line against a global war. But for United States...

ps 32

Colonel Corso. Within the diary you will find that Kennan and Rostow were both supposedly out of the Government during 1954 to 1960. In reality both were in the employ of CIA. They instigated, from outside the Government, the policy which they are expounding today.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean the policy of containment?

Colonel Corso. No, in this case it is the policy of the split of Communist China and the Soviet Union, the fragmentation of the Communist Parties, and the "time is on our side" theme. This was exactly the same policy that they worked up in research groups at MIT and Princeton as far back as 8 or 9 years ago. The word fragmentation is a new one in their political vocabulary.

Mr. Sourwine. The MIT was CENIS?

Colonel Corso. Yes. I have one entry in my diary noting where CENIS received \$270,000 from CIA in 1954 to finance Rostow, John Fairbanks, Harold Isaacs, and John Carter Vincent in research to justify these theories.

Mr. Sourwine. That sounds a great deal like a group which was once recommended by John Patton Davis. Are you familiar with that recommendation?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I am.

Mr. Sourwine. This committee uncovered that, you know.

Colonel Corso. Yes. I inserted that in my previous testimony.

ps 33

This is exactly the same line that they were putting forth 8 or 9 years ago. Presently it is a slightly different version of the same thing which they worked out while they were at the universities doing this research. I have seen no hard intelligence which verifies fragmentation of the Communist Parties all over the world, or a rift between the Soviets and the Chinese.

Mr. Sourwine. When this theory of time being on our side was first advanced, 9 years ago or thereabouts, was it correct then?

Colonel Corso. In my opinion and in the opinion of other intelligence officers I talked to, no.

Mr. Sourwine. Is it correct now that time is on our side?

Colonel Corso. I am of the belief now that it is even less so. Look at the steady advance of communism.

Mr. Sourwine. All right, go ahead with your reading.

Colonel Corso. I would like to put one item in the record on this presumed fragmentation of the Communist Parties. As of today, there is intelligence available that the Soviet espionage, subversion and intelligence system is more closely knit and effective than it ever has been. The control emanates from Moscow, and it embraces the Chinese Communist system, the satellites, and, we believe the Yugoslav system, too.

And since subversion and intelligence are not an end in themselves, this is largely the control system that they

ps 34

exercise over the Communist Parties of the world. Today there are over 300,000 Communist operators in Europe alone and 500,000 throughout the world. This containment theory of 1947, evolved into the evolution theory in 1955. This is a theory of changes being brought about in the Soviet system by evolution instead of revolution. Today there is a new version of this same theory, called escalation, meaning escalation into a general nuclear war. The containment policy paralyzed all our actions against the Soviet Union 14 years ago. Evolution, as you can see from these diaries, paralyzed us for the period from 1955 to 1960. And now in my belief, this escalation theory of general nuclear war is already doing the same thing. These are only different variations of the same containment theme which means that we will take no positive action against the heart of Communist power.

And the two men named here were actually architects of this policy when they were assumed to be out of the government.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean Mr. Rostow and Mr. Kennan?

Colonel Corso. Yes. And when they devised this policy, they were both technically out of the government, but actually CIA employees, not direct employees, but financed by CIA money.

Mr. Schott. Colonel Corso, is this a reasonable assumption, that the containment policy, or containment theory, was first expounded or put forth by George F. Kennan in his article in 1948 in "Foreign Affairs" as "Mr. X"?

ps 36

Colonel Corso. Yes, as Mr. X. Later it became National Security Council policy. I read the National Security Council paper on this.

The next entry, January 19:

"Penniman told me about George Morgan's activities. He thinks he is more dangerous and smarter than Kennan.

"Butterworth is in London doing the thinking for Aldrich. He is clever, and is a Marxist type."

The next entry, January 20:

"Taquay returned from France. He went to Radio Free Europe and sat in with the policy makers. Upon his return he went to Princeton and reported to Kennan."

The next entry, January 21:

"Gave Olum copies of my studies. He took them to USIA policy people. They might use them. With their big staffs they could turn out this stuff by the bushel, but with Marxist types like McCracken Fisher in policy positions, they will be shunted aside."

The next entry, January 24:

"Max Bishop called and wants me to assist McConoughy in implementing the NSC paper on Formosa. This will be difficult because of the people in State dedicated to selling Chiang out to the Communists."

The January 27 entry:

"Clark committee on CIA is doomed to ineffectiveness. What

ps 37

a clever trap they were led into."

The next entry, January 28:

"State-CIA and USIA elements have combined in a working group regarding the Afro-Asian Conference. Defense and OCB were left out of the group.

"This group is bound to be ineffective since Stelle is writing policy."

The next entry, January 31:

"Our Formosa plan is a hopeless mess. We are falling perfectly into a Commie trap.

"I told them over and over that we would lose a lot of American lives if the Commies make their move against Formosa."

The next entry, February 1:

"Saw a special national intelligence estimate by CIA. I gave Pete my comments. What a mass of confusion. This NIE

shop, headed by Sherman Kent and Amory does not turn out estimates based upon intelligence."

The next entry, February 2:


"Found out that during Panmunjom we were led into compromising situations by Stelle, Joe Phillips, Kennan and Bowie."

I inserted a flow chart in my diary here on how instructions were sent to Panmunjom during the truce negotiations. For example, when the American delegation wrote a position paper, it was sent to G-3, Far East Command, then to G-3 at the Pentagon, from there to the Policy Planning Staff in the State

ps 38

Department, and from there to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, back to G-3 in the Pentagon, G-3 Far East Command, thence back to Panmunjom. Our positions were passed upon in the first days by a special Joint Chiefs of Staff's group in State. Later the Policy Planning Staff of State made all the decisions.

Here is the drawing.



The next entry, February 3:

"Delivered my study of vulnerabilities of Satellite Armies to Generals Bullock and Smith. This could counteract the Millikan crowd's theory of evolution.

"This plan outlines a method for attacking Commie armies by psywar."

The next entry, February 4:

"Received comments from State. The letter was signed by Lindbeck, concurred in by Wertime, Osborne and Friedman. God help our country with such people in State. They are leftwingers,

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dupes and fools."

The next entry, February 7:

"Found out that Col. Dwan was one of the men influenced by Stelle to soften all our positions at Panmunjom. He went from G-3 to OSD-ISA section, and now is in the Collins group in Formosa. One of these manages to get into every delicate set-up.

"Chou En-Lai's recent statement is confirmed by evidence that their game is to get us to fire on them, and then accuse us of aggression."

The next entry, February 8:

"Today I went to a conference invited by Gen. Bullock. I talked to Father de Jaeger and Mr. Soderbom who lived most his life with the Mongols. These men hope so hard to help the Chinese and Mongols throw off Communism.

"Soderbom gave the true facts about Outer Mongolia, which prove Lattimore a liar."

The next entry, February 9:

"Reston, New York Times leftwing correspondent, wrote a story he said was given to him by a Foreign Service Officer.

"Robertson, of State, had to personally write a cable to Rankin denying that US would send a UN observer mission to Formosa, as Reston had written.

"Dwan addressed our Indo-China working group for Gen. Collins."

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The next entry, February 10:

"Harold Isaacs, who went to Mme. Sun Yat-Sen's Marxist school in China, was brought by Kenneth Landon to talk to Staats. Isaacs preached the Marxists line and recommended sending leftwingers like Bunche, Bowles and Adlai Stevenson to Africa and Asia. He advocated getting rid of Nixon and Knowland. He wanted Staats to go to Rockefeller. He advocates getting rid of Rhee."

The next entry, February 11:

"Harold Isaacs is supposed to be a reformed Communist. He claims to have broken with the Chinese Reds because they are Moscow-controlled. The truth of the matter is that he still is a confirmed Marxist making our policy through CENIS."

The next entry, February 14:

"Pete gave me a paper written by a man named George Elliot and Prof. Kissinger, both from Harvard. These men are proposing a psychological approach which is not practical. They view and think of other peoples and societies being the same as our own. These men deal in the stratosphere. Our so-called intellectuals have forgotten what simplicity means."

The next entry, February 15:

"USIA is incorporating my China material in their publications, and might send it to India."

The next entry, February 16:

"I sat in the Indo-China working group. Met Ken Young,

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Hoey, Bunting. Heard them plan to give away 130 million. I might go to Indo-China on truce violations.

"Amory, Steigmeir, Ken Young, McArdle, McArthur and Godel are going to Bangkok."

The next entry, February 19:

"I have been looking into the background of what brought about the Korean debacle. This was caused by slanted National Intelligence Estimates made by the Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA, and later National Intelligence Estimates, also CIA. The people mainly responsible are:

"CIA - Robert Amory,

Sherman Kent,

Paul Eckalls,

Hunington Sheldon,

"State - Armstrong William Park, Jr.,

Steele, Charles Clarkson

Trezise, Philip H.

Harvey, Mose

Yager, Joseph Arthur

Wertime, Theodore Allen

Howe, Fisher

"The CIA Office of Reports and Estimates issued two reports before the entry of Communist Chinese troops into Korea. These two were:

"1. Consequences of recognition of Communist China.

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"2. Status of Formosa. Paul Eckalls was called by Jessup and told to produce false estimate on the importance of Formosa in Sino-Soviet Relations.

"Once Communist China entered the war, then they produced NIES papers on the Korean. These held up the specter of Soviet intervention.

"The slanted estimates covered:

- "1. That Korea was to be an inconclusive operation.
- "2. Fear of Soviet intervention.
- "3. If we continue we must be prepared to accept general war.
- "4. No reliable intelligence regarding the role of the Soviet Union in Korea.
- "5. An attack on Manchuria would carry with it the probability of developing into a general war.

"6. Chinese 'Titoism.'"

During the Korean War, as chief of the Special Projects Branch, Intelligence Division, Far East Command, US Army, I made official intelligence reports which proved the following estimate material wrong. I later found out that these erroneous estimates were guiding our policy.

I resume reading my diary, the erroneous estimate conclusions.

"The following four points would create grave danger of Soviet counteraction and increase the danger of general war.

- "1. Aiding anti-Communist forces in China.

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"2. Use of Nationalist Chinese troops.

"3. Blockade and bombardment of ports, railroads and industry.

"4. Continued maintenance of U.N. military operations in Korea.

"I can prove that the above were false estimates and assisted the Communists. My intelligence studies in Tokyo of Soviet troops in North Korea disprove the above.

"The strange thing is that all these men who compiled the estimates are in the same or higher positions today."

The next entry, February 28:

"CIA is using all my material prepared for the Afro-Asian conference. They sent a man over to interview me on how to deal with the Communists. I gave them the best I could from my experience at Panmunjom.

"State trying again to give the oiler Taupse back. I called Bishop and asked him why doesn't State let a dead dog alone.

We beat State once on the issue. But Stelle and Co. always want to embarrass Chiang."

The next entry, March 1:

"Pete and Staats all excited about my Indo-China truce violation paper, and wanted me to write a brief on how it differed from the IAC paper. It was to be discussed before the OCB.

"They want me to copy the list of Indo-China truce viola-

ps 44

tions so we can present them to the International Control Commission. This is a joke, with an Indian and a Pole on it."

The next entry, March 2:

"I received a copy of the ICC report on its activities in Indo-China. This is a typical Indian paper, and perfect for the Commies, since it is a whitewash. They can keep violating the Geneva agreement until they get ready to break it again."

The next entry, March 3:

"I had a long conference with Max Bishop over the Formosa policy paper. I will use his notes on my draft to get our points across. I called Osborne and told him about Max's changes.

"USUN wants a paper on Soviet travel restrictions."

The next entry, March 4:

"I got the paper, the Pattern of Aggression in SEA, back from State. It had five pages of nit-picks. This shows the weakness of people like Wertine, Trezice and Armstrong. They try to kill such intelligence, but when pressure is applied they have to backtrack, because their phony reasons do not hold up in the face of facts."

The next entry, March 7:

"Finished the Formosa paper. If this goes through it will be the first hardhitting policy paper on Formosa that we have ever sent out to our missions all over the world.

"Finished my POW study. I will try to get this approved,

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so we can destroy the propaganda usefulness of the sentenced POW's to the Communists and get them back."

The next entry, March 8:

"Pulled out an old paper by Prof. Kluvholm of Harvard. An academic fuzzyhead. The conclusions he makes on the USSR are dangerous. The Air Force gave him \$933,000 for research. This was divided among seven professors. They advocated nothing except Marxism-Socialism."

The next entry, March 9:

"The OCB wants a paper on truce violations in Indo-China, and a pamphlet or book on the POW question."

"I will meet with CIA on the truce violation paper, and give an outline to the OCB Working Group on the POW pamphlet."

The next entry, March 10:

"I met with Pete, Staats, Landon and McDonald on the truce violations and POW papers."

"I heard the same argument that we shouldn't stir up anything, but keep things on an even keel. I spoke up and told Staats that I had heard these arguments twice before, and they were not valid then, and also not now."

"Max called me and we had a conference. They want to replace people from State who drag their feet in working groups."

The next entry, March 11:

"Parrot came over and they are going to try to eliminate

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Fierst and McKnight. This all comes from Loy Henderson, a good American. McKnight was reinstated because of Saltzman. Radius said McKnight did what he told him, and Bedell Smith told Radius what to do. If this is true, Bedell Smith was taken in by Radius."

The next entry, March 14:

"Parrott came over and showed me the Fierst file. This man was in charge of administration for occupied areas in 1948. His adviser was Ray, who wanted to give the Chinese Communists UNRRA aid in 1948.

"I went to the POW working group and was the only one that held out to do something to get the POW paper released.

"I went to the OCB Formosa policy meeting, and it was a surprise when the POW paper was approved. This has to be placed in final form. Wonder how they will try to kill it."

The next entry, March 15:

"Found out that one of the men who would know how the Office of Research and Estimates was used adversely before the Chinese entered the Korean War is a CIA man named Montague. He is still there.

"After I pulled out of our Geneva Working Group, Fierst reported there was no propoganda value in accusing the Chinese Communists of narcotic traffic."

The next entry, March 16:

"OCB decided to release a complete roundup of the POW

ps 47 story.

"I think Charley Stelle influenced the release of the Yalta papers to Reston of the New York Times. I was told most of these papers have been censored. There is a sinister motive behind this forced release. It will embarrass the U.S."

The next entry, March 17:

"Met with OCB's Indo-China Truce Violation Working Group. They wanted to do nothing. I insisted that the Commies were accusing us of being the main violators and aggressor while we set back chickenhearted. The group changed from 100 per cent negative to a positive approach."

"Thought Purnell was O.K., but he is Ken Young's man. Purnell said Policy Planning (State) said we should not publicize truce violations. They sent Gen. Snow along to speak about legality, since the U. S. is not a signatory of the Geneva pact. This is a typical trick."

The next entry, March 18:

"USIA released all my Communist China material in a packet for worldwide distribution."

"Have a luncheon engagement with Hipplesly and Parrott, State Department Security, next week."

The next entry, March 21:

"Osborne called and wanted me to go over the final Formosa paper."

"Met with Hipplesly and Parrott. These men are good"

ps 48 Americans. We hit it off very well. They are fixing it up for me to see Henderson. This is the best news yet. Perhaps they can ease the obstructionists out of their positions. Fierst and McKnight will be the first two to go."

The next entry, March 22:

"Heppesly told me that because of the McKnight case, Radius was removed from his job."

He was transferred from Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to Bonn.

"Jim came and got the Bacteriological Warfare and Atrocity papers from me, and wrote a seven-page memo for Under Secretary Anderson in Defense, on how State attempted to obstruct the UN operation."

The next entry, March 23:

"Met with General Dale Smith. He showed me a paper written by William S. Kaufmann at Harvard. The typical Marxist line.

I got a rundown on Kaufmann from Penniman, and he said he is a fuzzyheaded liberal."

The next entry, March 24:

"Saw cable from Gen. Collins saying not to expose the truce violations by the Viet Minh or the Communist Chinese. This is a repetition of the Marshal Mission of 1946. Gen. Collins' staff must be packed with the 1955 version of Davies, Vincent and Carter."

The next entry, March 25:

ps 49

"Gen. Bullock wants me to help them with ideas on anti-Communist measures which we can send directly up to Anderson. I will give him two to start. Soviet Colonialism, and Detachment of a Satellite."

The next entry, March 28:

"I found out that a big dope-smuggling ring involving CIA might break in the Far East. A Commie said he can give the names of 1,100 Americans involved in this and other similar activities.

"The Chinese in the Far East are bragging that they can control U. S. intelligence."

Mr. Sourwine. Did you put the information that you had in that connection in the hands of the appropriate authorities, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Who were those authorities?

Colonel Corso. If I remember right, I made a report on this and sent it over to Anslinger's men.

Mr. Sourwine. The Bureau of Narcotics of the Treasury Department?

Colonel Corso. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you any report back from them as to what they did with it?

Colonel Corso. No, I haven't.

The next entry, March 29:

ps 50

"Pete called me in and said General Trudeau, Nelson Rockefeller and Staats were interested in implementing the Declaration of Caracas. I reminded Pete that we stirred up the whole town by our letter to implement this, but State's Policy Planning Staff decided it was not going to be implemented."

The next entry, March 30:

"I got out of the files at Alexandria the ORE that Jessup asked Paul Eckalls to fake estimates on Formosa in early 1950. This estimate said Formosa would fall before the end of 1950. Army, Air and Navy dissented, yet this document was still printed."

I would like to add here that when I called CIA to check on this estimate, I was told by the library that such a document did not exist. Later I got it out of the G-2 archives at Alexandria.

The next entry, March 31:

"We received a letter of appreciation from J. Edgar Hoover. He stated that if we went after the Communist menace together, it would help. I wonder how much he knows about the Marshmellow Curtain in our government."

Mr. Sourwine. You mean that is something you wrote in your diary?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a copy of the letter that Mr.

ps 51

Hoover wrote, that you referred to there?

Colonel Corso. No, I don't. It is in the OCB files.

The next entry, April 4:

"Saw a cable signed by Gen. Babcock as acting chief of USUN. This man went to Korea with Dean, who thinks like Ken Young. Bragiotti told me that Babcock tried to stop the plane incident accusation against the Soviets, that Lodge brought up in the U.N."

The next entry, April 5:

"Lipschultz, CIA, arranged and picked up the tab for a socialist conference which Clement Atlee attended a few years ago -- 1948 -- in the Far East."

The next entry, April 6:

"I saw the USIA guidance paper on Communist China. This is the first one written in five years. It was written by Meikeljohn. This man was UNRRA chief in China. He wanted to give our relief aid to the Chinese Communists. The cable was full of hidden jokers. It was approved by Lindbeck and Fierst."

The next entry, April 7:

"Had lunch with Ed O'Connor. He told me that the Herbert Hoover Commission, which had Mark Clark on it, had recommended the elimination of CIA."

The entry of April 11:

"Met with the Formosa working group. Met Stein, Fierst and Sisco in the elevator. Nothing much happened. The

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Formosa instruction paper is still not issued.

"We had a discussion about Nanyang University. A new State man named Rockwood Foster, in charge of the Malaya desk, was present."

The next entry, April 12:

"The papers carried a N.Y. Herald Tribune story that Don Irwin was appointed one of Nelson Rockefeller's aides. This is a Princeton man with Marxist ideas. ---- told me over a year ago that Don thinks as a Marxist.

"Rockefeller might quit. His whole situation is hopeless of his own making, because of his staff."

The next entry, April 13:

"Saw a letter which contained verbatim extracts from a speech given by Rostow. This letter confirms all that I previously heard.

"Max Bishop called and wanted to know the names of the Marxists in CENIS.

"I was told that Hawley, who was in charge of external research at CIA, is going to Policy, USIA."

The next entry, April 14:

"Pete wanted to know what I thought of the Broger-Hansen, Gen. Young JSPD plan for Japan. I told him my opinion that the plan is doomed to failure, since it offers nothing realistic to Japanese youth.

"The cables coming from London on disarmament reveal to

ps53

me a dangerous trend. Why do we even talk disarmament when it is impossible with the Soviets. One of these days the Marxists in our government will assist the British left-wingers in trapping us into unilateral disarmament."

The next entry, April 15:

"Drew Pearson had an article saying Sam Rayburn told President Eisenhower to be careful, or his staff would make a prisoner of him. How true these words are."

The next entry, April 18:

"Saw outline plan on Pakistan. Says we should exercise restraint on Pakistan foreign policy toward India and Afghanistan, to reduce the likelihood of Pakistan employing armed forces aggressively against these countries. Also said we should attempt to implement the Pakistan military assistance program in such a way as not to increase Indo-Pakistan tensions."

The next entry, April 19:

"Our government seems fascinated by these mystics, the Indians. Since they are Socialist brothers, we are not able to say a word against them, even if Nehru acts as broker for Communist China."

The entry of April 21:

"Paul told me Yugoslavia cannot be trusted. Refuses to receive refugees, and no one can inspect the slave labor camps in Yugoslavia."

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The next entry, August 1:

"Allison, at instigation of Morgan, is blaming the Army for conditions in Japan.

"The Gen. Trudeau episode - how the frame-up came about."

The next entry, August 5:

"Japan is really in bad shape. Estimates are it is in the same condition as China before it fell.

"Paul told me Amory gave an estimate at the Planning Board on Communism in the Satellites, that was completely lacking in facts. This man is head of Intelligence Production at CIA."

The next entry, August 8:

"Had a long talk with Max over possible reorganization of OCB. It did not bridge the gap between policy and implementation. Gen. Trudeau told me that Bohlen accused him in Berlin of subverting the U. S. because he said time was against the U.S. Kennan visited him on 9 March and brought up the subject. (9 March was two days after Gen. Trudeau's Latin America trip).

"Roy explained how socialists play against their own country, to keep the U. S. and Communism in balance, so they can eventually take over.

"John Paton Davies is now working for CIA in Peru."

The next entry, August 9:

"State is trying to rid itself of CIA men like McClintoch

ps 55 and Thayer.

"Gen. Trudeau was relieved today. This reveals the power of these people. He was relieved without a hearing."

The next entry, August 10:

"Have a letter signed by Wisner which definitely establishes him with Bohlen-Kennan mentality. He states that Bohlen and Kennan claim there is no international Communist conspiracy."

"Kintner and Drain argued with Herbert Hoover, Jr., that we should apply the evolution theme instead of revolution in the U.S.S.R. and satellites, as the basis for our policy and propoganda."

The next entry, August 11:

"Found out that Allen Dulles went to the President who said he would oppose to the death any Joint Congressional Committee which would watchdog CIA. Also find out that Wisner has been trying to destroy Ghelan in Germany. To cover his tracks, he accused Trudeau."

The next entry, August 12:

"Found out Kersten's unsuccessful election campaign centered around the Kennan issue in Milwaukee. This while Kennan was in CIA employ."

The next entry, August 15:

"Allen Dulles left for Europe, probably for Germany, but Tracy Barnes will be waiting for him. Dulles will never control

ps 56

Gehlan, and doesn't realize his own subordinates are trying to destroy Gehlan's outfit.

"CIA lost its hold over the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of National Defense because of Tachen. They forced Chiang to move in 2 divisions to protect CIA's Western Enterprise. Then forced him to take out the divisions."

The next entry, August 16:

"Found out Henderson is trying to get all CIA men out of State. A good move.

"John Paton Davies is now working for CIA in Peru, yet this country is the least Communistic of all in South America. This shows the power of unlimited money that Wisner controls."

The next entry, August 17:

"The briefing cards that Trudeau handed Adenaur were photostated and given to CIA. There are Socialists in the Germany Embassy in Washington who cooperate with their counterparts in CIA."

The next entry, August 18:

"Saw Sichel's Communist tieup and record. Three typed pages, yet he is a member of CIA, in a very sensitive position, under Wisner and Helm."

The next entry, August 19:

"Max showed me an NSC Planning Control Group idea, that we should force the Soviets to invite U. S. labor leaders. The AFL executive council has rejected this already, and says

ps57

it would aid the Kremlin line. Nelson Rockefeller was taken in by Koons, Drain, Kintner and Wayne Jackson."

The August 24 entry:

"State took the new annex to an NSC paper and added their pet phrases, that our policy toward the satellites should be peaceful and evolutionary. This was approved by Foster Dulles. This ties our hands so that we cannot perform any activities against the Soviet orbit."

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, that concludes the reading of entries in your two diaries?

Colonel Corso. Yes, it does.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you made mention in connection with one of the entries in the second diary of certain leaks. Have you made a particular study of some leaks that you know to have occurred?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us about that? Do you have examples of the leaks or the news stories which resulted from the leaks, I think?

Colonel Corso. Well, once a new policy was put into the NSC structure, it was apparent that sooner or later it would be leaked. And it would appear in the columns by Reston in the New York Times, and the two Alsop brothers. I feel that these were deliberate, to put across their new view and new point.

ps 58

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who was responsible for these leaks, or any of them, Colonel?

Colonel Corso. No, I don't. One specific case I can think of, was in the diaries, in which I was personally involved. I was sent by C. D. Jackson to a State Department policy meeting on Formosa. We were going to give assistance to the Chinese Nationalists, to drop leaflets and rice in Communist China during the famine and floods.

Once the OCB made a decision, since many people were against Chiang Kai-Shek, this was leaked within four hours to Reston. The main purpose of the leak was to destroy the effectiveness of the action.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who was involved in this leak?

Colonel Corso. No, I don't. I have my suspicions, but that would only be opinion, and I would rather not give it.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have examples of certain news stories which resulted from leaks of this nature?

Colonel Corso. Yes, I do.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you want to offer those for the record at this point?

Colonel Corso. The news stories?

Mr. Sourwine. The news stories with such comment as you care to make with respect to the leak.

Colonel Corso. I have here 12 examples of news stories

ps59

and columns which were actual leaks as to sensitive policies and negotiations at the time.

Mr. Sourwine. May those be accepted for the appendix of the record?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

(The articles referred to will be found in the appendix of the record.)

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether these various leaks, which were exemplified by these stories, were investigated?

Colonel Corso. The information that came to me was that they were investigated.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know if it was discovered where these leaks originated, or who was responsible?

Colonel Corso. Not a one.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any basis for expressing an opinion on whether leaks of this nature continue?

Colonel Corso. I don't have access to National Security papers as of this moment. But I do have access to numerous Intelligence reports. And it is my opinion the leaks are continuing.

Mr. Sourwine. The leaks are continuing?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any idea who is responsible?

Colonel Corso. No, I don't.

Mr. Sourwine. The final thing in the record, Colonel,

ps 60
you have mentioned in these diaries a great many names. Have you compared for our own use any sort of a summary of these names, or an arrangement of these names, attempting to organize the material that is in the diary?

Colonel Corso. The key names I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have that paper with the key names on it?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you offer it for the record with whatever comment you have written there?

Colonel Corso. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Should there be any oral comment to go with this, or can it be made a part of the record?

Colonel Corso. My comment is that over a period of four years, this was my experience of the actions and activities of the people that I name here. The names come first, and the actions and activities come next.

Mr. Sourwine. This is a characterization by what they did rather than a characterization of them?

Colonel Corso. Yes, it is.

Mr. Sourwine. Is this in a form so that it can be offered for the record?

Colonel Corso. Yes, it is.

Mr. Sourwine. I offer it for the record, Mr. Chairman.

(The material referred to follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

ps 61

Mr. Sourwine. Colonel, we thank you for coming here this morning, and for being frank with the committee. As you were advised initially, this hearing is classified ~~secret~~, and your participation in this should be treated with the same observance of security as it would be if there were any other material similarly classified.

Colonel Corso. In my previous testimony, Senator Dirksen gave me the right to go over the printed record after it is typed. And I would like to have that right again.

Mr. Sourwine. I am sure that right will be accorded you, Colonel, it is always accorded by the committee to any witness, and particularly since there might be questions of security involved, the committee would be as anxious as you to have you go over it.

Colonel Corso. Yes, I would like to go over it, because ~~the only thing that does tie me down is security. Therefore~~ I have to go through it.

Senator Dodd. We will recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1380241-001

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UNITED STATES GOV

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TO : A. H. Belmont *WAB*

DATE: 5/25/61

FROM : W. A. Branigan *WAB*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5/30/84 BY

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY - SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

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Re memo Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Belmont dated 5/17/61 reporting the receipt from the Committee of testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso, U. S. Army, on 5/15/61. Two Photostats of Lieutenant Colonel Corso's testimony were attached to referenced memo.

A review of Lieutenant Colonel Corso's testimony disclosed he is assigned to the Intelligence Branch of the office of the Chief of Research and Development, Pentagon, Department of the Army. He indicated he has had 15 years experience in Army intelligence, including service in Rome, Italy, during World War II and in Korea during the Korean War. He also indicated he has served as a professional staff member of the Operations Coordinating Board handling among other things the National Security Council.

During his testimony before the Committee, Lieutenant Colonel Corso was highly critical of U.S. Government policy since 1947 as it pertained to the Soviet bloc. During his testimony he made reference to cooperation his office had received at one time from the Bureau wherein he was furnished information concerning communism in the U.S., which he was subsequently able to include in a pamphlet and distribute to Latin America. At no point in his testimony was he critical of the Bureau.

In his testimony, Lieutenant Colonel Corso discussed nothing new regarding Soviet intelligence techniques or Soviet intelligence targets in the U. S.

ACTION:

For information.

REL:ams
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- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Branigan
- 1 - Sizoo
- 1 - H.M. Anderson
- 1 - Lenihan

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: April 24, 1962

FROM : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY - SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

CD DeLoach

The following volume of testimony has been received from the Committee and sent to Mr. Sizoo of the Domestic Intelligence Division for appropriate review and return to my office to be returned to the Committee:

Volume 1, April 3, 1962 - ~~Secret~~

Testimony of: *Philip Corso, U.S. Army*

Philip X Corso, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-12-80 BY

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- 1 - Mr. Sizoo
- 1 - Mr. John Foarde, Room 849 RB (w/enclosure)

CDD:ejr
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Foarde

Original returned to DeLoach 4/26/62

MEMO Smith to EX-115

58 MAY 10 1962

REC-33
REC-30
EX-115
Philip T. Corso, U.S. Army
Testimony before Senate subcommittee
Security Subcommittees
No Additional Info
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RESEARCH

Classifying

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
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- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: May 2, 1962

FROM : R. W. Smith

SUBJECT: LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIP J. CORSO, U. S. ARMY
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE INTERNAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

Handwritten: J.A. Steele (632)

Re memo Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Sullivan dated 4/24/62 captioned "Testimony - Senate Internal Security Subcommittee" which reported the receipt from the Subcommittee of testimony by Corso on 4/3/62 marked "Secret." Two Photostats of Corso's testimony (127 pages) were attached to referenced memo.

In his testimony, reviewed by the Central Research Section, Corso stated he had been an intelligence officer for over 15 years of his 20 years in the U. S. Army. He testified that he had been a professional staff member of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) from 1953 to 1957.

Corso's testimony consists primarily of his reading into the Committee's record the entries from two personal and private office diaries he kept during his service on the OCB. His testimony criticizes certain U. S. Government policies as well as certain Government officials and nongovernment individuals in regard to American opposition to communist moves throughout the world since World War II. His several references to the Director and the Bureau, however, are favorable.

Corso's entries in his diaries criticizing individuals and policies were apparently the basis of allegations and material regarding "Fabian socialists" which General Arthur S. Trudeau brought to the Bureau in 1955 following his removal as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army. General Trudeau advised at that time that Corso was one of his trusted men who had gathered the information regarding the charges that certain individuals influencing American policy were "Fabian socialists."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-12-80 BY [redacted]

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - J. J. Foarde

EX 101

4 MAY 7 1962

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55 MAY 9 1962

Memo: Smith to Sullivan

Re: LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIP J. CORSO, U.S. ARMY
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

Bureau files were reviewed on some 122 individuals named in material furnished in 1955 by General Trudeau and Corso and there was insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the allegations re "Fabian socialists." However, there was derogatory or unfavorable information concerning the security backgrounds of many of the individuals. Bureau files indicated that proper dissemination had been made previously of the results of our investigations or other identifiable derogatory information on these individuals.

The two copies of Corso's testimony consisting of 127 pages each are bulky and are being routed to file for future reference.

RECOMMENDATION:

That no further action is required since allegations in Corso's testimony are merely a repetition of allegations by General Trudeau and Corso in 1955 which have been checked out already by the Bureau and since proper dissemination has been made previously of information in Bureau files concerning the individuals named.

J *DEMB* *of* *Q* *we* *purp* *ERC* *V.*