JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION Released under

AGENCY : CIA

RECORD NUMBER : 104-10088-10052

RECORD SERIES : JFK

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 80T01357A

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 53199

Date: 06-12-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA

FROM : ACTING CHIEF, SR DIVISION

TO : ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

TITLE : CONTACT OF LEE OSWALD WITH A MEMBER OF SOVIET KGB

ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT

DATE : 11/23/1963

PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS : KGB

ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER CLASSIFICATION : SECRET RESTRICTIONS : 1B

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/11/93

COMMENTS: JFK28: F1: 1993.08.11.19:09:10:340031: LABELED PAGE

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10088-10052

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23 November 1963

LX-25550

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

FROM:

Acting Chief EDINAMON (Section)

SUBJECT:

Contact of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KCE

Assassination Department

- l. According to an intercepted phone call in Mexico City, Lee OSWALD was at the Soviet Embassy there on 28 September 1963 and spoke with the Consul, Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. This was learned when OSWALD called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, identifying himself by name and speaking broken Russian, stating the above and asking the guard who answered the phone whether there was "anything new concerning the telegram to Washington." The guard checked and then told OSWALD that a request had been sent, but nothing had as yet been received. (MEXI 6453, 9 October 1963) The FBI liaison officer, Mr. Pappich, told me on 23 November that the Bureau has reason to believe that OSWALD's visit was to get Soviet support for a U.S. passport or visa matter perhaps the new passport mentioned in the press articles.
- 2. KOSTIKOV is an identified KCB officer. He was a case officer in an operation which is evidently sponsored by the KCB's 13th Department (responsible for sabotage and assassination). This operation, which is controlled by the FBI under the cryptonym TUMBLEWEED, involved a German-national resident of Oklahoma who was recruited in Europe, and met this year with KOSTIKOV in Mexico City and shortly thereafter with a known 13th Department officer, Oleg BRYKIN, in New York. The instructions given him known the two officers, (pinpointing objectives for sabotage) and the simplementarings of the involvement in the case, left no doubt that both of them were working for the same KCB component, the 13th.
- 3. Of course it is not usual for a KGB agent on a sensitive mission to have such overt contact with a Soviet Embassy. However, we have top secret Soviet intelligence documents, describing Military Intelligence doctrine, which show that very important agents can be met in official installations using as cover for their presence there some sort of open business: Vice Admiral

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for FOIA Review on . APR 1976

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 1 6 APR 1976

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L. BEKRENEV, in a top secret lecture to a Soviet Military Intelligence course at Military-Diplomatic Academy, 1960, said,

"Case officers who usen Soviet Trade Representation, TASS or Sovinformbu assignments as backstopping for non-cleration agents whose particular activities andestine meetings with certain agents whose particular zerivities officially associate them with the previously mentioned Soviet institutions. However, de officially associate such non-clandestine meetings within a legal residency should be restricted to a minimum both as to place and time. Meetings of this type should be carried out only in exceptional cases with tested and reliable agents in order to avoid provocation by the local counterintelligence service against the Soviet installation being used as cover. Such meetings are held as a rule in the work offices of the case officer or of the agent during working hours. It is necessary that such meetings be conducted naturally, that they do not attract the attention of outsiders, and that the receipt and transmittal of intelligence matters, properly camouflaged, be carried out discreetly. In setting up such meetings, measures against tapping must be taken. One must bear in mind that a meeting with persons outside official premises and during non-working hours usually signifies a relationship between the two parties that is above and beyond official matters D

Also, such contact in official Installations has beingused by the agent's own carelessness. Again Admiral BEKREVEY speaks:



"Some agents, because of interpretate or because of deliberate violation of the rules of security through peculiar personal rashness,.... approached our case officers at places not stipulated as operational meeting sites, others telephoned the case officer at his Soviet installation and discussed personal contact arrangements, while others still showed up personally at the Soviet installation in order to contact the case officer."

4. I called the above connections to the attention of Mr. Pappich by phone to his FBI office at 1030 hours on 23 November.

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SUBJECT: Valoriy Vladinirovich KOSTIEGY (201-305052)

restincy, who was proposed in Moscow, was assisted to the Soviet Educated The Loty as Vice Consult on 19 deptember 1961.

A fluent Spanish specifical to had thevelled abroad at least three times before this permanent medicanent; moreover, in 1959 NOSTIKOV applied for a visa to accompany Premier Bikita Sergeyo-vich KHBUSHCHEV's party to the United States as an official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but we have no record of his having come to this country at that time. KOSTIKOV served as an interpreter at international conferences at Madrid and Barcelona in 1958 and 1959. In late 1959 and early 1960 he attended Soviet exhibitions in Maxico City and Havana; he is known to have been in Tuba from 6 January to 7 March 1960 (Accounts of Maxico) in the physical description of KOSTIKOV with accountely fits

The physical description of KOSTIKOV raite accurately fits that of a Soviet case officer who nearly a year ago met in Hexico as FSI-controlled double agent. This double agent's Soviet case officer in the United States has been Cleg Danile-vich BEYKIN of the Thirteenth Department, KGB First Chief Directorate, occupying the overt position of translator-trainee, U.H. Secretariat, New York City. BRYKIN was stationed in New York City from December 1960 to July of this year.

Since arriving in Mexico, KOSTIKOV is known to have travelled three times outside the capital: In March 1963 and again for the first two weeks of September he went to Tijuana, Emsenada, and Mexicali, estempily for the purpose of purchasing cotton. The U.S. Department of State, however, has reported that during these trips KOSTIKOV mot local representatives of Movimento Liberation Mational and Central Compesing Independents, both large Communist front organizations. In addition, according to PEI sources, KOSTIKOV and Represented on the September trip by Ivan Gavrilowich ALPERYM, the provided the Ensenada several persons including Communist my partitions of the September trip had been easocieted with Soviet of Departments of the Mexico City.

ALFERIEV, a PRAVDA correspondent la fixico, vas in close contact with Cuban diplomata and local communist leadure during a Fabruary 1962 visit to Quito.

11/29/63 deal at MSA showed hydrof flate Diseated from Typiana deles 10/10/63 which stated souther who have reforted embed with CET 4MLN later raid the way is wrow, airs There was no record of shipment of exposibility of entire,

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