

Date: 02/21/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10414-10123
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE

Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 53320 Date:
06-26-2017

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : NOTES ON KEY DOCUMENTS IN OSWALD FILE
DATE : 01/01/1900
PAGES : ~~38~~ 26

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/25/98
COMMENTS : JFK-RH07 : F130 : 1998.08.25.10:53:30:840128 :
CORRECTED TO 38 PAGES VICE 27.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10414-10123

investig on Oswald
FBI reports NOT in CIA's possession, before
22 Nov 1963.

(b) Report dated 7 March 1961. Title:
Lee Harvey Oswald. by ^{SA} John W. Fain,
Dallas Office of the FBI. 10 numbered
pages. [This report is a chronological
account of Oswald's life from
birth to his departure to the USSR and
indicates he was contemplating
return to the US. (We received this
report on 2 Mar 1961)]

(a) Report dated June 3, 1960. to the
Office of Security of the Department
of State. ¹⁹⁶⁰ Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald
Refers to Foreign Service Report no. 234
of 2 Nov 1955 and ^{includes} other reporting
on the case and draws attention to
the fact that background check
could be made of Oswald's
the health certificate surrendered
by Oswald to the Soviets. (We
received this report on —
1975)

(c) Report dated 10 July 1962. Title:
Lee Harvey Oswald. By ^{5th} John W.
Fair, Dallas office. 14 pages
• & Civil Background info re
subjects stay in USSR and
records subject denied the
recruitment by Sov. IS. or any
deal with the Soviet government]
(We received this report on 9
March 1964.)

(d) Report dated 31 October 1962.
Title: Lee Harvey Oswald - Early
life in New Orleans and
activities for Fair Play for
Cuba Committee. Report by
St. Milton R. Kaack. 16
pages. (We received this by
letter from T. Edger Hoover on
9 March 1964.)

Notes

1. Circumstantial Facts: from late Sept - 22 Nov the case was handled as a matter of ordinary business in both Mexi and in Hqs. Handling was by the book, bearing in mind @ Mexico Station had a large on going case load. and @ LHO, was identified (by acc) and reported (8th Oct) to Hqs^(9th) and disseminated (10th) was a Navy and FBI case under the delimitation agreement. @ Views & conclusions proffered by Mexi 22/9/47 ^{in 1947 meet to what was credible part of the time} leaving the matter open to further facts. (See Helms 10/25/47)

2. Criticisms can be sustained against Mexico Sta and Hqs concerning handling between 27 Sept and 22 Nov:

- (1) Mexico Station erred in its forwarding of LO identification on 8 Oct (based on Voice intercept only) on 10 Oct with ~~an arbitrarily selected description of an individual who entered the USSR Emb. some days~~ ^{on a ship which departed from the USSR Emb. some days}. On the evidence there was no reason to believe the person identified by voice intercept made any visit that day. Conclusion: there was no reason to believe he had it or could not have. ^{But ultimately the logic was weak; only individual who would have met. who was not mentioned.}
- (2) Hqs. disseminated the Mexico info on the 8th on the 10th including the audio ^{copy} based on the photog of unidentified individual.
- (3) In its reply to Mexi on 11th, however, Hqs. gave Mexi a correct description of (Henry) O which was at clear variance with the description of the unidentified individual and should have been sufficient, normally to break any evidential connection between the two facts.
- (4) Mexico Station though asked by Hqs. did not press or secure an identification or followup on LHO before the 22nd of Nov. (i.e. locate where he had stayed, what he had done, when he had arrived or when he had left. NB: neither did

27-10-47
Hqs. can be criticised for not following up on the voice intercept to be sure for as present.

the legal advisor or the Mil. representatives or the Embassy (which was informed by the 16th Oct).

- (5) Though requested by Mexico Station Hqs. asked the Navy for a photo of HD, but did not persist and secure a photo before the error.
 - (6) Mexico Station did not match the 1 Oct radio intercept with its radio intercept (of 27th and 28th Sept) until after the 22nd Nov event, when it did so with alacrity.
 - (7) Mexico Station did not match its 1 Oct coverage of the unidentified individual with its coverage of the same individual on 4 Oct in front of the Soviet Embassy and on 15 Oct. in front of the Cuban Embassy until after 22/11.
 - (8) Despite the discrepancies in description, Mex Station put the 1 Oct photos into the chain of evidence on 22 Nov. 2200 hours. Ultimately the decision having been made by the ^(council) Ambassador and the Division Chief. In effect, being faced with a fait accompli.
(Thomas notified)
 - (9) No photo coverage was obtained at any time of HD in Mexico city. The introd. of the unidentified individual - in good faith by COS - was disastrous and compromised the operations in the long run, though every effort was made to satisfy the requirements of the Commission and the security of the operations.
 - (10) Two members of Cuban Int. known to have dealt with HD: Silvia Amson and Counsel Aguirre. Both left & replaced on 7/9/205-1968. named.
9. The thrust of Hqs. investigation after the 22nd Nov event was against the USSR agents rather than the Cubans. Coverage very early however, turned up at least one unguaranteed intercept:

(a) The Cuban Collection, Conversations - affluence of the 22nd which seems not to have gone to the ... in November? or this must be checked

and (b) the ^{two} Brothers - Ramos through telephone calls on the — and — ,

and (c) ambiguous references by Jugoslav ambassador Vlahov -

4. Mexi. coverage after 20th based on ^{length} technical coverage, and close utilization of liaison. The two signif. challenges are:

(a) Were the Soviets & Cubans aware of the coverage received & audio before 20th?

(b) Did Sovs and/or Cubans have penetration in the Bohemian which would have permitted them to blunt the thrust of the ~~top~~ succession of major leads which were investigated tending to show a larger degree of contact between UFD than the ~~presently known~~ substantive details of the intercepts?
viz: [?]

(1) Case of Gilcherts, Alameda Ugoite - Nica.
requiring walk in 26 Nov. investigation protected through Dec.

(2) Restrictions of the amount of detail given by Silva Duran. (Can hear later in May 1967) → statements to confid. source he trusted? If so there is also reason to review the Clara Carras de los details -) S. Duran was not subjected to a thorough dictionary examination based on what we know or could surmise from the intercepts.

(3) Ylario Rojas Villanueva case (in broadcast tape & logbook). [This appears to have been submitted.]

(4) Case of Elena Garro de Paz, see the successive reports of Hqs Dept Officer, Thomas. This case suggests the possibility that Cuban sources in 60s/60s were in a position to manipulate and circumscribe the Idena Bureau and other heads affecting themselves, including the Alvarez matter: note the extraordinary points these two attacks have in common - the presence of a red headed negro. (According to Alvarez in the Cuban compound, according to Elena Garro, in attendance at Cuban Bureau's party)

(5) Observations by Elis, Colette de Mass (Betty Moran) who had ^{visited} accompanied Theodore Fee on his Cuban trip for FDFC org. 28 Dec 62 - 21 Jan 1963. LHO's relationship to FDFC activity is totally unclarified and unbelievable on its face unless it can be assumed that FDFC and Cubans themselves were more aware of what he was doing than they have acknowledged.

she was on return flight

(6) Case of Oscar Contreras, to Am. Cons. Tampa's inquiries in May 1967, relative to LHO alleged contact with pro-Castro student groups at U.S. Mexico & his attempt to secure their support for visa concessions.

(7) Betty Moran

5. Acknowledging questionable aspects of LHO's whole Mexico City initiative:

(a) He denied he had made ~~such a trip~~ and got wife to remain silent about it.

(b) He was there 4 full days, 2 partial: 11 1/2 hours in all. Assuming 1/3 time at rest, there are 7 1/2 hours of full time activity unaccounted for. He says on day he left early and returned

To
lets: 77 hours.

Can it be concluded that if he had contact with either Soviets or Cubans or both, that went beyond the transit-union aspect one into that he was told to assassinate Pres. Kennedy? or anything of that kind? (Consider in this context his subsequent letters to USSR Int. Washington after return from Mexico). Operationally it makes more sense to conclude that his relations were in an elective, developmental stage and that LHO's effort to redefect was bona fide. (Note the symbolic identity between his suicide attempt in Moscow in 1953, which tipped the balance in his favor of remaining in the USSR, and the assassinations as his ultimate self-proving (and self-determining) "donations".)

NB: This allows for LHO having said ^{propaganda} that was self-compromising in his dealing with Soviets and Cubans, including threats against the lives of prominent anti-Soviet and anti-Castroists which the Soviets nor Cubans can admit after the events of 22 Nov, they knew.

6. What is the probative value - without factual collateral relating to Mexico and Dallas events - of Castro's statements as reported by AP, on 7 Sept 1963 at Brazilian Embassy receptors? Note that VPI version would require element of the AP statements. Without factual collateral its probative value is only as a conditioning factor, which could have operated powerfully on a homicidal individual like LHO. Therefore Castro must bear a significant historical weight for what he said & whether the nature and degree of ^{his} knowledge of plotting against

him, his alibi and JFK is dead. Does one endorse
an act of assassination where it may have been a
conditioned response by a psychotic person, as
"justifiable homicide". Or worse, do you now conduct
an investigation in such a way as to suggest that
the assassination was, indeed, a justified retaliation, again,
in the absence of factual collateral that goes beyond
what we do know, namely, that LHO was the killer
of JFK and Officer Tippett and that he did it alone.

Ask the same questions of the Santis' observations* to
his Dutch F.O. interlocutor: what signif. coincidentally
can be attached to what he said? (Admitted the
remarks gave me some insight & psych. insights.)

On question of lack of supporting evidential collateral
also recognizing that these were two defector sources
who came out immediately after the assassination, one
Soviet (Nosenko) and the other Cuban (whose info
through of ranging compartments ^{protest} consisting tools
both Soviets and Cuban intelligence & security services
off the book

*NB: On 5 Jan 62 a brief source had reported CFB cell London
MORSE Benita Zaborin as having said to the cell that
"JFK" would be within the present year, 1962" -

7. There is every reason to be unhappy with the work of Penn
in on the foreign Commission aspects, but it is no benefit @
to shift blame ^{now} on CIA ^{by the US Govt} for allegedly not revealing what the
anti-Castro files were doing, assuming they know. Else for
I know the policy was to deal with the Cubans
but NOT to encourage or to become directly involved
in their anti-Castro plotting. @ not recognizing that the
bias of the Commission leadership & US Govt in 1963 was
clearly against such a theory in the absence of credible
evidence to the contrary. What was to be done: draw
the conclusion vis opus of the absence of credible
evidence?

(Note that C/WB specifically complimented C/S May for handling by his reporting blundered the terrible aspects of foreign involvement.)

In fact at the working level in CIA — what the FBI's position was or is not known to me — it was felt that the ^{we} report did ^{was more explicit and} could have left a larger opening for further accumulation of evidence relative to the foreign conspiracy aspect. Mr. DeLoach was or advised by C/S Staff at the time. In any case this is a matter of measure or shading and ~~there~~ we are talking here of degrees of emphasis, because the Report properly read does leave the question of ultimate responsibility of LHO as a singleton killer open.

What did the Commission Staff itself do to formulate the questions necessary to cover all aspects of the case and to get them investigated — in this instance, by the FBI

8. Status of info developed abroad after assassination & possible direct bearing on assessment of the foreign conspiracy theory.

- 1964
- Ⓐ Castro WBI defector (M May 61) — info passed
 - Ⓑ Novak's — early 1964 — info passed in substance
 - Ⓒ Sergeevskiy — walking Br. Emb. Moscow, (28 Aug. 1964.) Allegedly knew O & info at Gorki 1960. Mental case.

~~What further info has been developed about the case. Is it to be pursued?~~
~~Sergeevskiy~~

- Ⓐ No evidence that topic has been pursued with later defectors, including Vostok, Hidalgo and Bereng. (extrapolating)

9. Helms on record re full disclosure of field
facts held by Agency in sworn testimony Wed. May
6, 1964 (See Vol II: 120-129, and by affidavit
Exhibits 868 and 869). Also he announced ^{21 Feb} 1965
that in no instance was any doc. withheld
from public domain if it had a direct bearing
on the assassinations.

10. In general the Oswald case file shows a
minimum input from Wove and no concern
with the implications of statement/warning by
Coster on 7 Sept 1963. [Query: what was reaction
within WH & at highest level to that statement?
This should be traceable in Telling file, if
not Wove, Malin and Hqs.]

11. Re Malin O's test. (Vol. I): she asserts her intent was
not to go to USSR but to get to Cuba & stay there, somehow
get her to join her.

12. Note the persistent interest in control of Cuba:

① Delgado testimony, ^(Vol. III) re Marine Corps period in LA
area of contact with Cuban Consulate. One
visit from unid. individual & mail receipt.
Early identification with Castro revolution.

NB: The presumption here is that they would have
been Cuban Consulate reporting on LHO going
back to 1959 which he was still in the USMC

② See also FHTZ testimony, Vol IV: 224, 228, 239
who is hooked up by WADE, Vol V: 235

③ See Mahrenschmidt testimony, IX: 267,

④ Carlos Bringer testimony concerning phoned
sequence of events beginning on 5 Aug 63 when

NB: The
retirement
units (RMS) found

contacted him, requested to buy, offered to train
into better contacts for info, and attempted to
give him money. This happened on 9 Aug when
Bungie found LHO's housing unit, wearing a
sign, & using name of Hidell on behalf of FPCC.
On 12th there was a municipal court action
for which LHO pleaded guilty & paid 11th. On 16th
he was passing out handbills in some houses. Bungie
went a friend of LHO's house on 16th. On 21 Aug. there
was a Radio debate. Pr. also reports photo of
Ed. both of info learned of the American.
(See also GERACI & Blalock testimony)

NB: it is remarkable that no one apparently focused
on the ~~WATER~~ pervasion O had attempted

① What does one make of the Andrews testimony,
of the Peña testimony, Ernesto Rodriguez testi-
mony.

② What are the implications of O's alleged subplots
activities in N.O. on behalf of the FPCC? Can
one accept the idea he had no guidance or
contacts, after he had begun to write & labor
con. by Los Angeles from El Toro camp?
What does a chronic record of his known
act. & movement look like starting with the
file & pictal procedure dates?

See
Delgado test

③ Report does not note the AP report by Hooker, on
9 Sept 1963, nor was testimony taken on this
point, though the version that appeared in
Times Picayune must have been seen by him.
It reflects main lines however: p. 412 ff.

Notes

- Soviet reactions to the issuance of the Warren Report were inquiries in surrounding buildings, to ascertain available opt specs. This noted by Station on 7 Oct 1964. Coverage continued & operating by June of next year but U.S. visitors had become notably fewer and rarer. This decrease U.S. visitors attributable directly to exposure of the photo.

- Elena Garro de Paz. This is a persistent account noted by COS in MORA on 12 Oct 1964. Reported by her to Emb. Political officer, Charles Thomas 10 Dec 1965; she added that in Nov 63 she was inhibited by an official in the Gobernacion from going to U.S. Embassy with her story. Story was then reported [Mapi 562 of 16 Dec 1965] 25 Dec 1965, she was reinterviewed and complimented & corrected her earlier accounts. [NB: Elena Garro is cousin of Horacio Duran; cousin-in-law of Silvia DURAN.] NB: Garro was interviewed by Legat on 17 Oct 64 - furnished similar info but not substantiated by inquiries. Legat reported his disengagement to COS on 27 Dec 65 & to Ambassador on 23 Feb 1965. Further memo of conversation by Thomas with Elena Garro on 13 July 1966, additional detail on her attendance 30 June 1966 at Embassy function. On 13 Oct 66 Legat confirms that Elena Paz had been registered 23 Nov 1963 at Hotel Vermont, 25-26 & 28-30, as she had claimed. 7 Feb 67. Memo of Conv. between Thomas and Elena Garro on her continuing vicissitudes with Cuban 28 Aug 1967. State Dept transmits package of Garro de Paz materials as compiled by Charles William Thomas.

Examples of Repeated & Continuous Gross mis-
use of Labor Involvement at heresy or speculative
level - continued:

③ Fundacion Misdegnaty bulletins.

④ Joe I LASAGO, paper, sent to White
House: "Prohibit foreign. Motivation in the
area. J. Lee. Kennedy"

⑤ American Sec. Council Int. Staff: "bodyguard
for assassinate" - analysis of Moscow
request.

⑥ Ralph de Toledo, Hidden Side of the Oswald
Case.

⑦ Cash Joe Benizera reported by FBI to be
writing a book on linking LTV with FC.
(DBA - 70147)

⑧ Detailed analysis by BILLION - Imp. by Allen & Scott.
of LTV, activity in Soviet Union, under KGB control

⑨ Ex. Amb. Henry J. Taylor did a series in Nov 67
of articles on Oswald as a Sov. agent.

- Beginning with 25 Nov. Mexi had a succession of exceedingly fine examining and reporting work related to alleged Cuban participation:

25/11-05/12:
Iron - info in memo

- ⓐ Alvarez investigation (was this for real?)
- ⓑ ^{Villanueva} Lopez Cortes
- ⓒ ^{Alvarez} Lopez Cortes
- ⓓ Old Day allegations
- ⓔ Oscar CONTRERAS (1967)
- ⓕ Robert Edward Ballard - ^{South American (Latin) passport} (N.B. The passport was issued in Mexico City, Mexico)

- Soc. reactions was unimpaired in Mexi as well as the link for business and stayed off the phone. There were calls in by regular and by Oak (B). The former contained speculative suggestive language of personal level. In general all talk of news avoided.

✓ - The Cuban reaction was of suggestive interest only in the case of Luisa Calderon.

- The work was specific ref. in connection to Mexi or anywhere else that related the details under investigation or being "ported" to Cuban retention after alleged participation or knowledge of anti-Castro assassination or direct action in the preceding summer or fall. The reason seems obvious - the one and true perpetrator could not be coincidentally linked with either the Cubans or the Soviets. Additionally: Was not their a matter of direct concern to the FBI (see their DBA-77161) ^{Silberia}

- The interviews with Duran was not structured against the ^{hypothetical} schedule of LHO contacts. The account is therefore incomplete and poor in (detail/chronology).

- Total inadequacy of reporting and coverage from Miami station for the period after 22 Nov.

- Note Mexico station reported various this travel movements in Nov-Jan. pertaining to name Oswald "which were blind leads - but which had to be reported."

Apeman

and phone:

Mexico 6453 of 9 Oct (red work, 9th): reported
 1 Oct info complete with data on a photo of an
 individual who had entered USCo Camp. on 9 Oct
 and his description. Some individual photos going
 out of USSR Emb. on 4 Oct and entering Cuban
 Emb. on 15 Oct. None of these photos were forwarded
 Work. Hq. design. of 9 Oct info: to Hq. before
 22 Nov.
 (this found reported 23 Nov, Mex 7019)

Work. reply 74830 of 11 Oct to Mexico, gave correct
 identifi. request for middle name and a correct
 description (which did not match that of the
 photos individual reported in Mex. 6453. This
 info passed to Amb. with copies laterally on 16 Oct.

Mexico 6534 of 15 Oct 83. asked for photo of O.
 Hq. went out to the Navy with a request for a ^{period} photo. 24 Oct. Navy was requested on ^{24 Oct}
 No photo had been sent to Mexico station by 22 Nov.

Mexico 7044 of 22 Nov: reported 2188 photo ^{period}
 & indicated it was forwarding photo of 1 Oct of
 only visitor who could be identical.

In ^a personal note of telephone conversation with wife brief
 asked permission to give legat copies of photo
 also Amb. who ^{at 6 PM 22 Nov} decided was right message to
 take copies to Dallas by hand of legat, who
 flown up by N.A. Also legat would mail copies
 to Hq. from Dallas. 68 photos, 4 in black
 sheet, 4 in white. Also provided via H.M.M.A.
 22533 which included the 2 photos of same
 person exiting Cuban Embassy. Legat left Mexico
 city at 2000 22nd for Dallas. Hq's first request
 all photo has flown loc (84821 of 23 Nov) but
 cancelled it by summary following cable
 (84822) as press wire photos of Oswald clearly
~~not~~ available. Air 84888 of 23 Nov. clearly ^{with}
~~not~~ available. ¹⁰⁰⁻²²² ~~not~~ available on T. charts 0.1 ~~not~~ available

First phase

USSR T Call #1? NO: possible that LHO made call at 10:37 or thereabouts for visa for Odessa. Call was in Spanish & went to proper consular number.

LHO recap at Mexico City:

27 Sept 1963: arrives c. 10:00. Went at least

twice to Cuban Cons: and talked with Silvia Ursua
Cuban #1 VISIT (presumed) and at least once to Soviet Cons., in between his

two Cuban Cons: visits. Second trip to Cuban Cons: OSSR #1 VISIT (presumed) was c. 1:00 (just before closing). After this

Cuban #2 + telegraph. visits were sometime before that dinner and his arrival & check in time.

We do not know who he talked to at Sov. Consulate,

though Silvia Ursua talked with at least 2 different sources about

28th Sept 1963 (Saturday): core fact.

813-5571 (see on Silvia)

Cuban Consulate was home

~~LHO #1~~
USSR #2 (6) This part is not done. LHO went first thing Sat. morning to Sov. Cons., spoken to a Consul, but had forgotten his address.

~~He then went to the Soviet Consulate to find out where the Consul was.~~

Cuban #3 LHO goes c. 11:51 to Cuban Cons., gets his address from Silvia Ursua [!] and has her call today to USSR Consulate. Soviet says why not come back with it?

USSR #3 LHO presumably made second ~~call~~ visit (presumed) USSR Cons. with his address. (Apparently he was told Soviets would send a telegram to Washington)

29 Sept 1963 (Sunday) No activity registered

30 Sept 1963 (Monday) No activity registered
LHO made reservation for space in Mex City - Avenida Cuzco, leaving 20:00

1 Oct 1963 (Tuesday). [LHO made reservation for Grayhound from Mexico City to Dallas]

USSR T Call #1 (tel. call) LHO at 10:31 calls on base shift on 28th and talk with woman promising work. telegram. anything new? Give her number to call.

USSR T Call #2 LHO at 10:45 calls on OLGA KOROV to whom (Tel. call) identifies self by name for first time. Reports since of prior call. Given name KOSTIKOV

anything new? Nothing, read but they have been sent. Obed. honey, my.

Question: from above it is clear that LHO contact Sept on 1 Oct limited to telephone. Why did Win assume he'd find anything corroborative on his film coverage? There is no suggestion in these conversations that LHO had any reason or intent to enter the installation.

NB: Identity with called on 27th & 28 Sept not made until Mexi had taken from Hqs, on its out part reporting details of 1 Oct event. (An that been a comparison made with copy of earlier files. This explains why it was done on 10 Oct but not earlier. Development of 27th & 28th on 10 Oct)

2 October 1963 (Wednesday) No activity

Registered. [LHO departs c. 0830 for Laredo - Dallas.]

3 October 1963 (Thursday). At 1539 There

was a call to Sov MA line (Some one used by LHO one USSR Call #1) by individual speaking broken Spanish and then English. Wants a visa for USSR. Directed to call 15-60-55. This is probably not a LHO call.

- Coll:
- ① LHO left Mex City 0830, 2 Oct
 - ② Substrance in constant with status
 - ③ Broken Spanish not his boy.

Only the 1 Oct who had been disclosed & his minutes (prior to 22 Nov. based developed in some form, Summary:

- ① All coverage by CIA during 27 Sept - 2 Oct period was technical, no line source collection
- ② "LHO" identified self by name only on 1 Oct.
- ③ D. made at least three entries to Cuban Embassy, 1 on 27 Sept and 1 on 28 Sept. He made at least 3 entries to the Soviet Embassy, 1 on 27 Sept and 2 on Sat, Sept 28th. He made at least 2 telephone calls to Soviet Consulate on 1 October, per evidence of entry. There was no photo coverage of D at any time. He was missed on 27th. Coverage was off on 28th & 29th (Saturday and Sunday) which were non-working days. LHO did not enter during of the installation on 30th.

④ Deleted by the info on change and info on the back

13. Report does not consider Oswald's sequence of activity as a ^{possible} ~~questioned~~ continuum in which both Cuba and Cuba's more involved ~~in~~ their secret services than they can afford to admit. The Commission report should have left ^{a matter} ~~open~~ on this aspect because:

- ① there was ^{very} reasonable argument and some facts to conclude dissemination, ~~over-~~ment and handling of LHO ("Red Room") in the Sov. Union and his Cuban interests, included an unresolved contact (Belgrade testimony) which went back to El Toro. And if there ~~is~~ any doubt, Nozales's testimony in KGB file is conclusive.
- ② The material furnished by the USSR and Cuba (via Swann) fell far short of anything that fact and reasonable inference suggested.

(This is not to say LHO was under instruction or control.)

14. In addition to the implicit ~~allegation~~ ^{acknowledgment} of preknowledge ~~alleged~~ suggested by the ~~house~~ [Caldwell] intercept - she is identified by a ~~traveler~~ ^{traveler} ~~report~~ as having been associated with the DGE during her ~~stay~~ ^{stay} in Mexico - these are

① the ~~Central~~ wife - ~~Benitez~~, reported after the court - end 1962?

Ricardo L. ~~Alfonso~~

② ~~the~~ Santos ~~report~~ from ~~Walter~~ ~~Land~~ ~~Swann~~ 7 Nov 1963 - but reported after the assassinations' (NB: Santos was known at one time as "El hoc" and eventually was ~~removed~~ ^{removed} from the ~~Blague~~ by his government (WFO press & suddenly ~~removed~~ ^{removed} Aug. 1964.)

Wasserman, ~~report~~ ^{report} ~~got~~ ^{got} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~information~~ ^{information} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~file~~ ^{file}

Notes

O file - 289248 - was opened on 9 Dec 1960 under the subject: OSWALD, Lee Henry. Departed to USSR in October 1959.

Note that in our TS to Roanoke 19 Feb 1964 "Inform developed by CIA on the activities of Lee Henry Oswald in Mexico City, September 27 to Oct 3, 1963," para 4, sub 3, we stated:

"^{P. 2}
3. From all the evidence on hand we deduce that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on the afternoon of 27 Sept 1963 and again sometime on 28 September 1963. There is no evidence that he visited anyone other than once on the days mentioned, but we cannot exclude these possibilities. The wording in para seven of our report, on page four and five, is based on the statement of Silvia Huesca and means that Oswald was at the Consulate at least once after his initial visit, and this later visit was on the afternoon of a day on which the Cuban Consul telephoned the Soviet Consulate about Oswald's main problem. This may well have been 29 Sept., but we cannot be certain of the conclusion."

Warc Miami reported by its 8045 of 22 Nov 2242 Z, that AMHINT 53 reported AMSPOLL delegate had radio date sanction in Aug. 63 on N.O. status w DSV. Summoning AMSPOLL files; includes to receive pass release 1300 on 22 NOV.

H-MINT -22533 of 22 Nov 1963 forwarding photos & envelope current file has envelope containing only one photo of Oswald on 4 Oct. No notation on memo of envelope.

Valerij Vlad. KOSTIKOV is identified KGB operationally believing
to be a 13th Dept operative, being known to have worked
in matters of involving sabotage. Whysters of open installation
on ostensibly non clandestine matters known to be at the
time an accepted doctrinal point at least among GML.
NB: we passed to FBI unind. (2) NW) detail on Kostikov and
3 finished papers bearing on topic - of these two were
concerned with Sov. use of kid. & drugs. Esp. Act. (Aug 61)
& the other, Sov. Inst. Esp. Act. (Oct 61)

Dir 84915 of 23 Nov 63 2206Z distrib. to FBI only
the gist of supplementary info reported by Mexi re "North
American on 23rd aft. full file review

Report from Santiago Club 23 Nov re Cuban hub. reactions
indicated unind. reactions that assess. was "you know a
CIA", Extreme right & segregationist to blame. This
was charge Pedro Martinez PIER. Several times he denied
that assassin was involved in FPCC insisting that this
person only suspect of extreme rightist & segregationist
is to blame. (This Santiago 6153 IN 67147,
23 Nov 63)

NB: There was no listening recorder on Sov. Emb. on 4 Oct.
(see Mexi 7023 - IN 67108). This cable relates the North Amer.
of the 28th calls to Oswald identified in call of 1 Oct, but
indicated no voice comparison could be done "because
first time would prior receipt of record call"

It is clear from context that FBI rep sent spec. to
Dallas afternoon 22nd carried 2 sets of six
photos each referring to Unind. bud. on 1 & 4
Oct. One set of each of these six, plus one each of
the photos taken 15th at Cuban Emb. were punched

Maxi provided full rundown of all probable calls beginning
the 7th in Odessa & including the 3 October call by the 7033
of 23 Nov 1963 (in 67232)

Maxi
Memoirs

Blank

23/4

According to C/LA 23 April 1975, the camera was down on 27 Sept for some mechanical malfunctions. He stated he and Shaw worked personally on repairs & subsequent photo trips. Was certain that malfunctions applicable or identical. Not a matter of human malfunctions (loading & unloading) either. Would attempt to bring elements of recall & consult Shaw on this point. We would get in touch.

Query: granted above, why did we not get 0 at the Custom installation on 27th 28th?

- Cuban Cruise - processed by the police. IR intercept worked out to nothing
- At various points - exposure of Cuban atmosphere oriented, processed by a Cuban. He also was doing other things. He did radio dispatching

Film collected about twice a week - collected processed & strip printed. Turn around time say for pick up on a Monday would be delivery on Friday
From Miles from

517 Feltman
Tom Keenan
Gene Goodpastor

3 photos have many atty ind...
in front - bus back
at sunset: night conditions

Agree that Mexico City station ^{within its} ~~was in~~

~~position to do anything~~

limitations and capabilities had done
that all it could, ~~work~~ in compliance with
Headquarters instructions: there were no

further contacts by Oswald to report ^{because} ~~because~~
he had left Mexico City, ~~therefore~~ ^{it was ultimately essential,} on 2 October

and ^{in accordance with} ~~with~~ ^{it would} ~~it would~~ ^{have} ~~have~~ ^{been} ~~been~~ ^{possible} ~~possible~~ ^{to make a positive} ~~to make a positive~~

identification ~~of~~ ^{in view of} Oswald's hotel
registration under alias.

Talk with Michael Jensen

1. Mexi 6453 (IN 36017, 9 Out, 00042 Fin)
Action to WWS.

2. Di 74676 to STAT, FBI & NW, 20.12.2

3. Mexi 74830 to Mexi, ref. Mex 6453
22092.

4. Mexi 6534, 15 Out 1963 In 40357
17302. (ref. for photo)

Who is:

NI Report in OA

Edward S. Butler - Ex. Director of the
Information Council of the Americas, New Orleans.
His was testimony not taken from this man -

Get (Sov) passed info by / for Ted to look at.

✓ Get copy of Assoc. West report for
Mc Gelin & forward via channels or
otherwise.

✓ Call Dunc on non-family of Cuban
side ex

✓ Call Eddie & tell him about 12th

✓ Get distribution copy of Alstern & Wt -

Check to see if there is a 201 on V. I. PETROV who
was allegedly arrested 11 Nov 1959 as KGB chief
Billigshimin SSK. The MVD man at this time was
A. N. AKSENOV.

Discussion given item with P. Hartman

Discussions with H. Phillips 28 April - it was
Cuban camera this was done. He does
not object to the use of the photo in any way
but would prefer freezing the background.
Can't explain failure of Sov. Emb. Council &
photo exp. CTR.

- Get Vols I & II of the 201

- Get pulled back the R&T Chron for end
1963 & first 18 months 64.

- We must fill in the sequence of discussion with
the Commission staff re the photo.

- Are there any papers - letters or unpublished
pieces relating to relations with the
Commission?

2/8/14

Mike Farmer - servicing of Sov Ent. Camera which
was automatic & clock operated - Cuban
device was down (Allen White), but was
normally operated.