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SK 5415

M. Harder ("Washington Post")

February 5, 1963

(1) The Tests

Harder closely follows the details concerning the discontinuation of atomic tests. From his contacts with the Administration, he has not received the impression that the Soviet concession concerning the inspections on the spot is considered as an exclusive propaganda move and that it has no substantial value whatsoever. This means actual progress.

The discontinuation of the talks in New York was unexpected by everybody. For the time being, it is believed that the Russians, since they have made a concession, wish to take as much advantage as possible in Geneva. However, the propaganda motives are not the only ones; there can be substantial progress in Geneva in spite of the fact that it is easier to progress when only three countries are discussing.

Probably, Khrushchev wishes to use the discord of the Westerners and that is why he is making such moves.

(2) The Problem USA-USSR

The problem existing between the United States and the Soviet Union will not be solved if Khrushchev decides to take advantage of the conflict de Gaulle-U. S. A. It will be bad if he tries to sharpen the conflict by exercising pressures. This would sharpen the cold war everywhere.

In addition, Khrushchev should realize that the domination of de Gaulle can end with Western Germany coming on top in Western Europe. Such a thing would not be in the interest of anybody.

According to information internally obtained, de Gaulle and the Russians have not yet concluded anything concrete; both parties wish to convey to the other nations the impression that an improvement of the relations between France and the Soviet Union is possible. However, this does not mean that France and the Soviet Union have undertaken concrete pourparlers; at least, that is not the case for the time being.

IMTHOR

It seems that there was nothing substantially new in the conversation Vinogradov-de Gaulle.

(2) Harder is increasingly worried about Cuba because there are many elements which can cause a new crisis.

(a) The internal political pressure related to Cuba is becoming increasingly strong and unpleasant for Kennedy. The attacks of those who affirm that the Administration has again minimized the Soviet strength in Cuba are becoming more and more convincing.

At the present time, the more moderate estimations point out that there could be about eighteen thousand Soviet troops on Cuba. Wild estimations of the Senate climb up to thirty-four or thirty-five thousand men.

(b) The question is for how long the Cubans can endure the flights of the American aircraft over their territory and the photographing of their land.

The Russians are training the Cubans in the manipulation of the antiaircraft armament. The Russians are probably doing so for the purpose of teaching the Cubans to shoot down the American aircraft.

(c) Such a thing could happen after the Russians leave Cuba and leave everything in Cuban hands.

(d) That is why the situation is very complicated. Namely, the United States cannot bear the presence of the Soviets on Cuba. On the other hand, an armed Cuba, without the Russians, could be less responsible.

Harder does not know how and whether all these problems will be solved. Harder knows that in the contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States (the meeting Kennedy-Kuznetsov, the meeting Rush-Fobrining which took place the day before yesterday, the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy which is still going on) concrete solutions of these problems are not being discussed.

(4) De Gaulle's veto was a hard blow to Great Britain and to the European Common Market; it also has deranged Kennedy's plans. And yet, there is no consternation either in the Administration or in the White House. The Administration and the White House do not conceive that de Gaulle's move is a blow

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (A)

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington  
To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

August 10, 1963

(1) Harriman did not come with anything new concerning Vietnam.

He was received by President Johnson for about 15 minutes.

Immediately thereafter, President Johnson had rather long briefings with Congressmen at which the positions explained on the occasion of the last press conference were repeated.

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(2) All the United States data and evaluations point to the fact that neither Viet Cong nor North Vietnam will be ready for negotiations before the end of the monsoon season.

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(3) According to internal conversations with William Bundy, Secretary of State Rusk's Assistant for the Far East, and with other functionaries of the White House and of the State Department, it seems that the minimum required by the United States for a solution in South Vietnam is a type of "Laos solution." The effects of this solution should last for at least some years.

This means the establishment of a neutralist government in which all the main forces of the country -- including the Viet Cong -- would be represented. It would be possible to maintain the formations of the Viet Cong as in the case of the Patet Lao formations.

(Gvertzman, blue card index)

**REPORT (B)**  
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**From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington  
To the Coordination Department - Belgrade**

**August 10, 1945**

The correspondents of the "Evening Star" inform today from the United Nations that the United States Government will announce on August 10 that it does not insist on Article 19. Consequently, the problem is being solved.

Allegedly, it will be announced at the same time that the Soviets have accepted the idea of donations.

According to information obtained by the above-mentioned correspondents, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed about this matter.

This would make possible the normal work of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(Gvertzman, blue card index)

K.

Avgust 19, 1957

Novinari vashingtonskog "Evening Star" javili danas iz Ujedinjenih Nacija da će vjeda SAD u ponedjeljak, 16. avgusta objaviti da odustaje od insistiranja na članu 19, te da se problem rješava; navodno će se istovremeno objaviti i vijesti da Rusi pristali na određeni vojni prilog. Prva njihovu informaciju je namu iz Ujedinjenih Nacija došla do

SAD - SSSR sporazuma oko ovoga. Ovo bi se omogućilo normalan rad Generalne Skupštine Ujedinjenih Nacija.

(Grestman, pl. k.)

K.

August 19, 1968

1) Hariman nije dobio ništa novo oko Vijetnama. Imao je Johnstoneov razgovor od oko 15 minuta. Jedna od ratnih zbirki Janson imao dve prijinge sa senatorima i Kongresnicima, na kojima u njegovom ponovljeni stavovi sa poslednje konferencije za štampu.

2) Sve američke osme i odlaci su da Vietnam i Severni Vietnam nisu da pregovore pre isteka monsunskog perioda.

3) Prema informacijama razgovorima sa William Bundy, pomoćnikom Rusk-a u Sjeveri Tok, i drugima u SD i Bijoj Kući, izgleda da je minimum koji bi SAD tražile da se vrati u Južnom Vijetnamu bilo jedno "Laosko rešenje" kao da izvestan broj godina. To znači jedna neutralistička vlada sa predstavnicima svih glavnih snaga u njoj (i Vietnam), uz eventualno odobrenje formacija Vietnamca kao što je slučaj sa Petet Lao.

(Gvestman, R. K.)

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (A)  
-----ELEMENTS FROM TALKS ABOUT PRESENT ACTION  
OF U. S. A. AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICYMax Frankel

(1) After two hours of debate and only by using heavily his personal prestige, President Johnson forced his Cabinet to send troops to the Dominican Republic. The Administration is far less united about the Dominican Republic than it is about Vietnam.

However, since this unhappy action has been undertaken in the worst possible manner, there is no choice but to support the President.

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(2) Frankel does not consider that the President's actions in the Congo, in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic are the result of his thoughtful strategy of the new "crusade" against communism. He also considers that these actions are not the result of the President's feeling of omnipotence because the President is very careful in avoiding a direct armed confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Frankel considers that the action in the Dominican Republic is the product of the following factors:

(a) The President is almost completely incapable of understanding the world and the international relations and of approaching rationally and systematically the international problems.

(b) The President is incapable of establishing and organizing in the White House and elsewhere a regular system for deciding about international questions especially when crises and emergencies are involved. This cannot be done because the President is constantly and almost completely confused about the international relations.

On the basis of this, Frankel is persuaded that the Administration in general does not know what to do as for instance when the Soviet Union, de Gaulle, Western Europe, etc., are involved.

(c) The President's sudden actions and his unilateral support on American power show that he is in a panic because he fears defeat and that he is frustrated in connection with international developments which he does not understand and in front of which he often feels powerless.

\* \* \*

(4) It is neither logical nor exact that the President has started a general offensive against communism.

First of all, he tries to keep normal relations with the Soviet Union.

Then, he does not even think of disturbing the Cuban situation.

Furthermore, the relations of the United States and Yugoslavia are normal.

Finally, it is a fact that the President's moves have heretofore been only reactions to situations where the United States was faced by unacceptable defeats (Congo, Vietnam, Dominican Republic). Actually, he had to defend himself from defeat and did not attempt to win new territories.

If a "crusade" were in question, the President himself would open new crises on new grounds.

\* \* \*



(5) One of the main reasons related to the President's behavior is his fear that any success of communism against the United States will jeopardize his internal political position.

\* \* \*

(6) As for Vietnam, the Administration is ready to use all the means in order to prevent defeat in South Vietnam.

If the current situation stabilizes, which is difficult, the President will not try to widen the military operations.

The Vietnamese crisis remains in the stage of controlled escalation.

\* \* \*

One of the essential elements in the calculations of the President and of his Administration are the very reliable evaluations regarding the wish of the Soviet Union to avoid participating in military actions in Vietnam or elsewhere.

Thus, the mutual avoidance of military confrontation of the two "superpowers" leaves enough ground for maneuvering.

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Robert McCloskey

He defended to the end the official and the published reasons of the United States action in the Dominican Republic.

However, it is interesting to note that he too emphasized that the President is particularly concerned about the factors related to the internal policies.

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Volkov

He believes that the dangers related to the United States actions (Vietnam, Dominican Republic) should not be overestimated. This is his fundamental thesis.

Consequently there is no danger for a confrontation of the United States with the Soviet Union.

The (Red) Chinese attack on the Soviet Union which occurred the day before yesterday came only two days after the heavy attack contained in the introduction of the book on Khrushchev's deeds. This book is mainly centered on the accusation that the United States and the Soviet Union "cooperate in a way" regarding Vietnam. This is no mere propaganda.

The (Red) Chinese show that this cooperation worries them. The Chinese feel and know that there is tacit tolerance between the United States and the Soviet Union and that there may even be more than that.

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Abraham Brumberg

Editor, "Problems of Communism" (USIA)

(1) He too considers that President Johnson is in a panic because he wishes to avoid a defeat. That is why he desperately undertakes actions which are costly and which are going to cost a lot<sup>to</sup> the United States.

No matter what the contradiction between the President's attitude and his actions may be, he would be extremely glad to develop relations with the Soviet Union and with Eastern Europe.

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(2) All of the above-listed people (Frankel, Volkov and Brumberg) more or less consider that Kennedy would have undertaken similar steps in similar situations. Kennedy's tactics and explanations would have been different.

However, Frankel (up to a certain point) and Brumberg (completely) consider that Johnson is more conservative than Kennedy (in spite of the fact that this is not the case regarding the vital internal questions of the United States). Frankel and Brumberg consider that the rightist groups and the military circles have somewhat more influence on Johnson than they had on Kennedy.

AKCIJA U SADANJIM AKCIJAMA SAD I LIFICI JOHNSONA:

Max Frankel:

1) Johnson tek ogromnim licnim pritiskom, posle dvosatne debate, naterao kabinet na momentalno slanje trupa u S. Domingo. Administracija nije oko Domingo uopste tako jedinstvena kao oko Vijetnama; medjutim, posto nesretna akcija preduzeta na najgori moguci nacin i posto se SAD "uvalile" to niko nema izbora nego mora da do kraja podrzava Johnsona.

2) Americke trupe mogu ostati u S. Domingu i mesecima.

3) Frankel uopste ne smatra da akcije Johnsona kao u Kongu, u Vijetna u S. Domingu proisticu iz neke njegove smisljene strategije novog "kratkog pohoda" protiv Komunizma. Isto tako ne radi se ni o osecanju svetoci, jer jako oprezan da se ne zapetlja u direktnu oruzanu konfrontaciju sa SSSR-om smatra da akcija kao na S. Domingo proizasla iz sledecih odredjujucih aspekata Johnsona i njegove situacije:

1) Skoro totalno odsustvo sposobnosti da se shvati svet, medjunarodni odnosi, da se racionalno i sistematski pridje medj. problemima.

2) Nesposobnost da se ostvari, obezbedi u Beloj kuci i inace iole sredjeni sistem donosenja odluka po medj. pitanjima, pogotovo kada re o krizama i emergencies. Bundy nije uspio da ovo obezbedi, a i ne moze za Pretsednikom koji stalno u skoro totalnoj konfuziji, sto se tice medjunarodnih odnosa. F. na osnovu svega ubedjen da ova Administracija uopste ne kada da radi, postupa na pr. prema SSSR-u, De Golu, ZR uopste i

3) Nagle akcije Johnsona, sa oslanjanjem na unilateralnu americku silu, pokazuju da on u panicnom strahu od poraza, da frustriran medjunarodni razvitkom za koji nema razumevanja a pred kojim ima cesto osecanje nemoci. Pored toga, cesto impliciticki gleda na mnogo toga kao na "komunisticku zaveru". Udatle su razoske fraze o "serifu", "komunizmu", "misiji SAD".

4) Nije poznato ni egzaktno da Johnson krenuo u neku opstu ofanzivu protiv "komunizma". Prvo, on nastoji da odrzi normalne odnose sa SSSR-om i da se ne razoske. Ono sto se dogodilo na nedavno prethodnoj akciji

inimiko i ne pomislija da uzreirava kubansku situaciju i dok Castro miran to je sustinska strategija SAD prema Kubi; odnosi sa Jugoslavijom na pr. normalni. Drugo, bez obzira na karakter i implikacije Johnsonovih akcija, cinjenica je da su one do sada uvek samo reakcije na situaciju gde on po sopstevnoj oceni bio pred neprihvatljivim porazom (Kongo, Vijetnam, S. Domingo). Prema tome on, za sebe, spasava ono sto ima, brani se od poraza, ne zauzima nove teritorije i oblasti. Da je rec o krstaskom ratu on bi ispočetka stvarao nove krize, na novim terenima.

5) Jedan od glavnih razloga za Johnsonovo ponasanje jeste i njegovo stazhovanje da bi svaku uspeh "komunizma" protiv SAD, na bilo kom mestu, bitno kompromitira ovco u pitanje njegovu unutarpoliticku poziciju.

6) Sto se Vijetnama tice tu je Administracija spremna da upotrebi sva sredstva i odluci se na sve da bi sprečila poraz u JV. Ukoliko se medjutim sadasnja rat-situacija bude stabilizovala, sto tesko da mozuće, onda Johnson ne bi isao na proslirivanje vojnih dejstava. Vijetnanska kriza je i dalje u stadiju kontrolisane eskalacije.

7) Jedan od bitnih elemenata za postupanje Johnsona i Administocije jeste stalno prisustvo sasvim pouzdanih procena da SSSR ne zeli da se unlete u vojnu akciju u Vijetnamu ili inace, te da uzajamno pokazivanje vodjenja racuna da ne dodje do vojne konfrontacije dve super-sile obezbedju dovoljan manevarski prostor.

Robert McCloskey:

1) Do kraja branio oficijelnim i objavljenim razlozima akciju u S. Dorin Medjutim, interesantno je da je i on istakao da kod Johnsona unutarpoliticki momenat skoro prevladjujuci.

Volkov:

Osnovna mu teza da ne treba precenjivati opasnosti sadrzane u akcijam SAD, odnosno u vezi oko Vijetnama i S. Dominga, jer nema opasnosti za konf taciju SAD SSSR, osim da Poslednji, prekjućerasnji kineski napad na SSSR

do koga dosio samo par dana posle testog napada u svocu u kuxy narednu knji: kompletnih dela Russova, a u kome je glavna i razradjena optuzba da SAD i SSSR ostvaruju svojevrstu "saradnju" oko Vijetnama i inace - nije samo propaganda. Kinezi pokazuju da ih ovo uznemirava i da i znaju i osecaju da izmedju SAD i SSSR-a celo vreme postoji bar precutna tolerancija, a mozd: i vise.

Abraham Brumberg, urednik "Problems of Communism" (USIA):

1) Također smatra da da Johnson u paničnom strahu da ne pretrpi poraz i zato se desperaterski odlučuje na akcije koje košta u a koje ce tek kostati SAD. Bez obzira na kontradikciju stava i akcija, on ubedjen da bi Johnson, da sita cija nirnija, i te kako razvijao odnose sa SSSR-om i I.E.

2) Svi sagovornici (Frankel, Volkov, Brumberg) vise ranje smatraju da bi Kenedi, sa drugacijom taktikom i objasnjenjima, poduzinao slicne korake u ovakvim situacijama. Medjutim, cenekle Frankel, a do kraja Brumberg, smatraju da Johnson konzervativniji (iako ne u bitnim pitanjima unutrasnjeg uredjenja SAD) i da kod njega vojni krugovi i desniji deo krupnog kapitala imaju nesto veci dostup no kod Kenedija.

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (B)

...We notice in the attitude of Andrews more flexibility than in January.

Namely, now, the State Department does not abandon the program of bilateral relations (with Yugoslavia) because of our policies. Now, some parts of the program are mentioned as possible, some parts will be discussed and some parts wait for a more favorable situation. No strings are attached, no part of the program is directly tied to our policies.

Briefly, the attitude is more flexible and the door to all the possibilities is kept open.

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(4) Kline (?) belongs to the White House, Bundy's office; he is the direct contact of the White House with the State Department and deals with Yugoslavia, among other things. He told us:

(a) Now, there are no problems between the United States and Yugoslavia except as to how to develop the concrete relations within the limits established by the Congress.

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(b) President Johnson does not<sup>have</sup>/to solve any particular problem connected with Yugoslavia.

The President works on the improvement of the conditions PL-480 in general. He is interested in the question of the spare parts and this is the concrete matter which the President is studying.

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(c) The President is preparing the project of the trade act East-West. This act may contain possibilities of interest to Yugoslavia.

He is evaluating whether something could be done with AID for "the communist countries." He believes that the current legal texts and the regulations of the Export Import Bank allow something in this regard.

If Yugoslavia has wishes, it could receive credits and loans for various purposes.

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 (d) As for the spare parts, it is calculated that 80% of our needs are covered through the usual commercial channels.

Now, it is looked for means for the remaining 20%, without changing the legal situation.

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 (e) The State Department has not yet sent to the White House any draft for Johnson's reply to Tito. It seems that this has been unnecessarily delayed because Johnson's principle is to reply the following day.

Eline is certain that the State Department has not yet sent the draft, because he would have seen it. Namely, he sees everything which is specifically forwarded to Johnson.

There are countries and personalities about which and about whom Johnson has to be informed even if matters of mere routine are involved. He wishes to give his personal instructions regarding these countries and personalities. Johnson wishes to know what is going on especially in the following countries:

- the USSR,
- Indonesia,
- France,
- Great Britain,
- Yugoslavia,
- India,
- the United Arab Republic, etc.

When Eline read Tito's cable addressed to Johnson, he immediately said that the cable is good, that it has substance and that it is very good because the last paragraph mentions personal meetings as useful; in their own evaluation, the passage before the last clearly explains what Yugoslavia expects and what it criticizes; however, this criticism is constructive and has no cheap polemic implications.



(f) Regarding the visits, he personally does not see the possibility that Johnson may visit Yugoslavia in 1965 because the President is already engaged with visits to Latin America and Western Europe. He cannot undertake three important visits in one year.

Kline does not believe that Johnson could visit either the Soviet Union or the countries of Eastern Europe in 1965, unless some completely unexpected events take place.

The President's visit to Europe could encompass Great Britain, France, Western Germany and Italy. He would not go to Holland and to Sweden. Yugoslavia could not be included in Johnson's itinerary because of obvious political problems.

Johnson would not tie his visit to Yugoslavia to his visits to the Eastern European countries because he does not wish to equalize these countries. Perhaps, his trip to Yugoslavia could be tied to visits to Greece, to Turkey, to the Near East, etc.

As for Humphrey's visits, the President will decide whether, where and when these visits should be made. Nothing in this regard has been decided as yet.

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(g) Kline knows with absolute certainty that Elbrick has not asked to meet Johnson; that is, the request from the State Department has not been forwarded to the White House.

Kline directly works on these matters. The procedure which is followed in such cases is that Rusk makes the request, and indicates the specific subject about which the Ambassador wishes to talk in order that Johnson may be prepared. Rusk has not addressed such a request.

Elbrick could have asked for the meeting with the President in the State Department and the latter may have concluded that, in this moment, he has nothing special to talk with Johnson.

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Kline did not raise any questions regarding the writing of our press, regarding our policies, etc.

Last year, he did so in a rather sharp manner.

Kline talked very calmly and constructively.

He almost joked when he said that there is no need to get upset about anything.

"If Sukarno wishes to get out of the United Nations, let him go; if Masser asks us to drink the water of the Red Sea, we will drink it." That is the way in which Kline spoke.

This time, Kline was less polemic than in the past. He treated our relations as a normal matter without raising particular problems.

s/ Micunovic

aimed at the destruction of the alliance.

Nobody yet knows what de Gaulle will do. The United States Government has not any alternative elaborated in details. However, the Government intends to continue all its activities "around" de Gaulle; the Government will avoid notionalless France (sic) while making the necessary adaptations requested by the new elements of the situation. This will last until there occurs a favorable change. This may mean a continuous pressure and the preparation of future positions (sic).

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Translator's Note: The original text is too much abbreviated and unclear.

M. PARODER (WAS - INJAN P. 57) - 5.11. 1963:

1) Prati detaljno razvoj oko testova. Iz svojih kontakata u Admini-  
straciji, nije stekao ~~ni~~ utisak da prošireno gledanje na sovjetsku konce-  
siju (oko inspekcije na licu mesta) kao na isključivo propagandnu taktiku,  
bez ikakve materijalne sadržine. To značilo materijalan napredak. Prekidanje  
pregovora u NY bilo neočekivano za sve; za sada se veruje da Rusi, posto  
učinili koncesiju zele da je što više kapitaliziraju u Ženevi, propagandno,  
itd, ali to nije isključivi cilj. Može doći do materijalnog napretka  
u Ženevi, iako to uvek ide bolje u pregovornu trojicu. Hrusčov verovatno  
zele da koristi i neologu i razbijenost Zapadnih, pa zato isao na takav  
korak.

2) Do nekog napretka u rešavanju problema između 310-330 neće  
doći ako se Hrusčov orijentise na postizanje agrobata 301-310. Bilo  
bi loše ako bi isao na produbljavanje kroz pritisak; to će zaoštriti hlad-  
no ratovsku situaciju na svim frontovima. Sam tog, trebalo bi da shvati  
da se dominacija De Gola može završiti pri atom Zapadne Nemačke u ZE,  
što nije u ničijem interesu. Prema onome što do sada interno poznato,  
između De Gola i Rusa nije još došlo ni do kakvih konkretnih razmatranja;  
i jedna i druga strana za sada zele da u oči drugih njihovi <sup>svaki</sup> ~~interesi~~  
odnosi budu prisutni kao mogućnost. Međutim, to ne znači da se o bilo  
čemu konkretnom dogovaraju, bar ne za sada. Iz leđa da ni u razgovoru  
Vinogradov-De Gol nije bilo nečeg substancijalno novog.

3) Kard ra sve više brine Kuba; postoji više elemenata koji za neko  
vreme mogu da dovedu do ponovne krize:

a) Sve je jaci i za Kenedija neugodniji unutrašnje-politički  
pritisak oko Kube, koji čest u porastu. Sve su ubedljiviji napadi onih koji  
tvrde da Administracija opet <sup>potencijalno</sup> razmer sovjetskog prisustva na  
Kubi. Sada o parani proračuni govore o oko 18.000 sovjetskih trupa; neki  
diviji proračuni u Senatu idu do 34.000-35.000.

b) Pitanje je koliko mogu Kubanci da podnose američko nadziranje, snimanje. Rusi uvezavaju Kubancu u rukovanju anti-avionskih oruzjina. Verovatno je da bi jednog dana Kubanci oborili avion.

c) To bi se desilo pre kad Rusi prodaju sve u ruke Kubanaca, a oni odu sa Kube.

d) Zato je situacija veoma komplikovana; SAD ne mogu da podnose takvo sovjetsko prisustvo na Kubi, a, s druge strane, Kuba, napruzana, bez Rusu, moze biti neodgovornija.

XX  
XX  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Marder ne zna kako ce se i da li sve ovo resiti; zna samo da se kontaktima SSSR-SAD (Kenedi-Kuznjecov, prekjuder Rusi-Debrinjin, povre na izmena pisana Hruscov-Kenedi, koja i dalje traje) XXXX ne razgovara o konkretnim nacinima kako da se sve ovo resi.

4) Iako je De Gol ranio tezak udarac svojim vetom oko VB i EEC i poremetio Kenedijeve planove, u Administraciji i BK ne vlada neka konsternacija, niti pretstava da se radi o fundamentalnom rusenju saveza. Niko jos ne zna sta ce da cini De Gol. SLD Vlada nema neku detaljno razradjenu alternativu; ali je orijentisana na nastavljjanje svih svojih aktivnosti "oko" De Gola, zaobilazeci nepomocu Francusku, do boljih vremena, sa neznim adaptiranjem novon elementa situacije. Vec samo to moze da bude stalni pritisak i izgradjivanje pozicija za kasnije.

TRANSLATION FROM S. BO-COATLAY

Max Frankel ("New York Times")

February 13, 1963

(1) RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND ALLIES

Kennedy knew about the "Skybolt" and about the State Department note addressed to Canada. He approved. Now, it is alleged that Kennedy did not know in order to keep formally safe the position of the chief of the country.

(a) De Gaulle

The official attitude of Kennedy toward de Gaulle is outlined in the editorial of the "Washington Post" which criticized Macmillan who wished to create an alliance of Great Britain and the Five against de Gaulle; actually, this attitude is merely a reflection of the lack of possibility of the United States to change anything for the time being; the United States also expects that changes will take place in France.

If de Gaulle were younger, if he had behind him a completely united France and if something could be done, the United States would not be "so benevolent and so calm" as it now is; things would be different and the situation would be similar to the one which now exists between the Soviet Union and (Red) China because de Gaulle's policies are in certain aspects fundamentally different from the attitude and the plans of the United States.

(b) Canada

The main and real reasons for the conflict Diefenbaker-United States is the question of nuclear armament and of the personal intolerance of Diefenbaker who wishes to exploit the anti-American line.

Questions like the attitude of Canada in Geneva, its trade with Cuba, etc., are not a matter for conflict and would not perturb the relations of the United States and Canada. In fact, Great Britain, Norway and other countries have many policies similar to those of Canada; namely, their trade with Cuba is of

a greater volume than the trade which Canada has with Cuba, Great Britain delivers planes to (Red) China, etc. In addition, the Canadian diplomatic mission in Cuba is of incalculably great value to the United States; it is one of America's most valuable channels.

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

(Frankel's Confidential Talks in the State Department and in the White House)

##### (1) Berlin

The United States and the Soviet Union are not discussing Berlin at all. A small number of high functionaries of the State Department and of the White House told the President that Khrushchev's speech in East Berlin furnishes the occasion for the renewal of talks. However, Kennedy refused to talk (Frankel believes that this is not good).

The subject of the internal discussions in the State Department mostly centered about the question of the presence and of the flag of the United Nations in West Berlin. The State Department considers that if the question of a *modus vivendi* comes to life, the presence of elements of the United Nations has to be merely symbolic; such would be, for instance, a yearly report of the American Commandant in Berlin submitted to the United Nations; the United Nations would not have the right to decide about the strength of the soldiers stationed in West Berlin, about the transfer of the soldiers, about their armament, etc. The Commander would not have to ask for the preliminary authorization of the United Nations for anything which is of a vital nature. (six illegible handwritten words)

Thus, the situation remains the same for the time being. The Administration considered since the very beginning that the building of the wall between East and West Berlin has eliminated a great number of Khrushchev's problems. Consequently, this was one of the reasons for which the Administration did not undertake any measures against this situation; this attitude considerably hampered the position of the Administration within the United States at the time of the construction of the Berlin wall. Khrushchev recognized this aspect of the existence of the wall (sic) only now, that is, after one year and one half of threats, movements of tanks, aircraft, etc. (sic). The fact that Khrushchev recognized this aspect only after the withdrawal from Cuba makes the Administration suspicious about Khrushchev's

intentions and tactics. (Translator's Note: The last two sentences of this paragraph are not clear at all in the original text.)

(2) The Tests

The prospect for regulating the question of the tests is very bad at the present time. No technical differences are involved (six handwritten illegible words). In fact, if eight inspections on the spot are enough for the United States in order to control adequately this matter, five or three of them would also be adequate. On the other hand, if the Russians are not afraid of espionage for three inspections, there is no reason to be afraid of five or eight inspections.

Actually, matters of political lack of preparation and political impossibility are to blame.

High functionaries of the United States Administration consider that the Russians are not willing to discontinue the tests and really do not wish to discontinue them. The reason for such a Russian attitude is explained in this manner (several unintelligible handwritten words): if the Russians are behind in nuclear armament and in rockets as it was believed that the United States was behind a couple of years ago, then it is clear that the Russians do not wish the discontinuation of the tests.

Suspensions of Russian tactics began when the Russians asked that the correspondence Kennedy-Khrushchev be published; there was not enough reason for such a request. The suspicions became firmer when the Russians discontinued the pourparlers at the moment when the United States asked that the modes of inspection be discussed in a more detailed manner. (According to Frankel's inside information, the United States was ready to accept five inspections.) However, the Russians insisted, as they always did, that the United States has to accept first the principle of three inspections and the modes of inspection would be discussed thereafter.

(3) According to information that Frankel has gotten from the State Department, the Soviet Ambassadors in various Western capitals constantly allude rather directly that the United States and the Soviet Union are continuously engaged in important talks related to Berlin, that the two countries are in substantial agreement, etc. This is not true at all. The Administration and the newspapermen do not clearly see whether



these allusions of the Soviet Ambassadors are aimed at creating suspicions among the Western countries or whether they wish to justify the Soviet policies concerning Berlin in front of the Soviet communist partners; namely, the Soviet policies concerning Berlin tend to avoid tensions. Finally, the Soviet allusions could also be aimed at showing to the nonaligned nations that the Soviets are "constructive."

#### (4) General State of Relations

The Administration and the White House consider that we are not either faced or in the course of negotiations and that we are not in the process of achieving anything.

The most significant result of the recent events is the fact that it is becoming more and more clear that the United States and the Soviet Union do not believe that it is worth resorting to war for the solution of any problem which divides the two countries. This fact first became apparent during the Korean War.

At the present time, there is no interruption of the cold war if we mean by interruption a rapprochement or a real lessening of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In Europe, there has been no cold war in a military sense for a rather long period of time. Namely, there were no threats and military preparations. In JAU (sic), we may mention only Vietnam.

De Gaulle considers that there is no longer war threat in Western Europe. Otherwise, he would not have adopted his current policies.

Furthermore and similarly, if Peking were not aware of the fact that the United States is not supporting CHIANG Kai-shek's aspirations toward the People's Republic of China and enabling him to become aggressive, China could not have embarked on its conflict with the Soviet Union.

It is certain that if the threat of war had not disappeared, Jupiter would not be withdrawn from Italy and from Greece. Actually, from the military point of view the withdrawal of Jupiter does not change anything because the Polaris is even more dangerous and efficient than the Jupiter. That is the reason why the Russians are already changing the direction

of their main propaganda blows from land bases to bases for supply of submarines.

I would be difficult to conceive the or to threaten with the reduction of the United States troops in Western Europe. (sic)

However, here, the warming up of the cold war is expected in Latin America within the next decade and a similar warming up will very probably also take place in Africa.

NY 70061(NYT)-13.II.1963

1) CRKSI SAD - SVEZICI:

Kenedi znao i za Stavbejt i za izjavu SD o Kanadi i odobrio.  
Sada se tvrdi da nije znao, da bi se formalno očuvala pozicija sefa  
države.

Javni  
a) DE GOL; Stav Kenedija prema De Golu, uvođnik "N. Posta" u kome se  
kritikuje Makmilan što zeli da stvori savez VB-Katolika protiv De Gola,  
sao izraz nevoli SAD da sada bilo šta izmene, kao očekivanja da  
dodje do promene u Francuskoj. Da je De Gol mladji, da iza sebe ima  
potpuno ujedinjenu Francusku, i da se nesto moze uciniti, SAD ne bi  
bile ovako "velikodušne" i "mirne" kao sada; morale bi onda doći do  
situacije kakva sada, recimo, između SSSR-a i Kine, jer politika De Gola  
u nekim aspektima fundamentalno suprotna stavu i planovima SAD.

b) KANADA: Osnova i stvarna razloga sukoba Difenbaker-SAD u pitanju  
nuklearnog naoružanja i licnoj netrpeljivosti Difenbaker, koji  
zeli da eksploatise izrazito anti-američku liniju. Takva pitanja kao  
stav Kanade u Ženevi, trgovina sa Kubom i sl. nisu uopšte predmet  
ovog sukoba, niti bi ometala SAD-Kanada odnose. Konkretno, VB, Norveška, i sl.  
imaju mnoge stavove zajedničke sa Kanadom, mnogo više trguju sa  
Kubom, VB sa Kinom (avioni) i sl. Seti toga, Kanadska diplomatska misija  
u Havani od neocenjive informativne koristi za SAD; to im je od  
najveće vrednosti.



~~meke za slučaj 5 inspekcije, onda nema problema ni za slučaj 5 ili 3.~~  
 Rec je o političkoj neoprednosti i neoprednosti. <sup>Prevladavajući u ovom</sup> Administracija <sup>je</sup> ~~u ovom smatra da Rusi ne idu na obustavu, niti je ustvari želja. Sak~~  
~~iti i jasno zašto: ako Rusi sada toliko zastali u nuklearnom naoružanju~~  
 i raketama kao što se pre dve-tri godine mislilo da zastale SAD, onda  
 se teško može pretpostaviti da bi Rusi išli na obustavu. Sumnja u  
 iskrenost ruske taktike počela kad Rusi tražili da se prepiska Kenedi-  
 Hruscov oko testa ova objavi, iako bez dovoljno malog potpuno uvrće-  
 ne kad Rusi prekinuli pregovore i to onda kada SAD tražile da se  
 detaljnije utvrde modaliteti inspekcija, bez obzira na broj. (Frankel  
 interno zna da SAD bile spremne na 5 inspekcija). Međutim, Rusi  
 insistirali, kao i uvijek, da SAD prihvate pre svega u principu tri  
 inspekcije godišnje, pa onda da se vide modaliteti.

3) Prema informacijama Frankela iz <sup>SD</sup> ~~SAD~~ sovjetski ambasadori u raznim  
 zapadnim prestonicama stalno čine dosta direktne aluzije na to da  
 se između SAD i SSSR vode celo vreme sadržajni razgovori oko Berlina,  
 da došlo do usaglasavanja i sl, što uopšte ne stoji. Administraciji i  
 novinarima nije jasno da li to čine zbog unosenja sumnji među  
 zapadne, ili time pred komunističkim partnerima opravdavaju svoju  
 politiku nezaostavanja oko Berlina, ili nastoje da se prikaze  
 konstruktivnim pred neangazovanima.

4) Osnovno stanje odnosa: Sada se ne nalazimo - i to preovlađujuća  
 ocena u Administraciji, SS - ni pred, ni u, nekom procesu stvarnog prego-  
 varanja, još manje postizanja nekih rezultata. Ogroman rezultat poslednjih  
 događaja je u tome što se sve jasnije, još od korejskog rata, vidi da  
 ni SAD ni SSSR ne misle da ijedno pitanje od njih njima vredno rata. To je  
 osnova sadašnje situacije. Ali ni ne znamo sada neki prekid, ili odmiranje

"Hladnog rata", ako se pod tim podrazumeva ostvarivanje ili približavanje nekog stvarnog detenta SAD-SSSR. Ustvari, hladnog rata u vojnoj sferi (pretnja, priprema) u Evropi već dosta vremena i nema; u JAU samo u Vijetnamu. Kada se Golu ne bi bilo jasno da nema više vojne pretnje Zapadnoj Evropi on ne bi ni san isao na svoju sadašnju politiku; na isti način, da Pekingu nije jasno da SAD ne podržavaju Čang-Kaj-Sekove aspiracije prema KIM, niti, mu omogućuju agresiju, ni Kima ne bi mogla ći na ovakav sukob sa SSSR-om. Svakako, da nema tog okira ne bi moglo doći, politički, do povlačenja Jupitera iz Italije i Srbije, iako se vojno ništa ne menja, <sup>č</sup>kolaris podornice još opasnije i efikasnije, pa Rusi već menjaju pravac glavnog propagandnog udara sa baza na zemlji na baze za snabdevanje podornica. Isto tako bi se teško i razmišljalo ili pretilo reduciranjem broja SAD trupa u ZB. Ali, ovde očekuju rasplamsavanje hladnog rata u Latinskoj Americi u narednoj dekadi, a vrlo verovatno i u Africi.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Division - Belgrade

January 28, 1964

(1) Rusk, Bundy, and McNamara are remaining with Johnson. There is no danger for Johnson to take some impulsive dangerous step because he does not make one move in the field of foreign policies without asking for the advice of the above-mentioned three people.

The source considers that the fact that Bundy remains is important for the relations of the United States and Yugoslavia because Bundy is a friend of Yugoslavia. He has great understanding for the interest of the United States in maintaining good relations with Yugoslavia.

\*\*\*

(2) Johnson's policies toward Cuba will be tough. He will try as much as he can to isolate Cuba and to make things difficult for Castro. However, Johnson absolutely will not undertake a military action; he is aware of the fact that that is not feasible and that it cannot politically help him.

He has a tough attitude toward Panama and he will not yield under pressure because it would leave the impression of weakness.

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(3) Johnson will look for arrangements with the Soviet Union. His attitude is not to insist on matters on which no agreement is possible (Berlin, Laos).

(Kilduff from B. K.)

January 28, 1964.

1. Ruski, Bandi, i.e. Namara ostaju sa Johnsonom. Nema opravosti da Johnson svojom impulzivnošću uspravi neki opasni korak iz neznanja i slično, jer u domenu spoljnje politike ne čini ništa više saveta gornje trojice niti išta protiv njihovih saveta.  
Izvor smatra da važno za odnose SAD - Jugoslavija što ostaje Bandi, jer on prijatelj Jugoslavije, ima veliko razumijevanje za interese SAD u održavanju dobrih odnosa sa Jugoslavijom.
2. Johnsonova politika prema Kubi će biti tvrdla, nastojati koliko god može da je izolira, stvara kastru situaciju, međutim nema govora da bi Johnson išao na vojnu akciju. Vidi da neizvodljivo i ne može mu politički koristiti.  
Prema Panami ima tvrd stav, naime, i ne pomišlja na popuštanje pod pritiskom, jer bi ostavljalo utisak slabosti.
3. Johnson će težiti aranžmanu sa SSSR. Stav: ne insistirati na stvarima na kojima sporazum nemoguće (Berlin, Laos).

Kilduff iz B. K.



TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

ITEM #1

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Division - Belgrade

February 12, 1963

The State Department is preparing for the discussions with Rome. According to these preparations, the State Department will not insist on the internal problems of the West.

Actually, the State Department maintains the basic conceptions of Kennedy but accepts the present-day stalemate as a reality. Until Erhardt's visit to Paris, there was some hope. After this visit, the State Department considers that it is not possible to do away with the stalemate in the foreseeable future.

In this connection, it also is considered in the State Department that the possibilities of Hume are limited because of the forthcoming elections; this too is accepted as a reality. It is particularly considered that Hume cannot give the obligation concerning the participation in the multilateral forces.

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The problems of the Common Market and the question of the forthcoming negotiations concerning the tariffs will be discussed.

However, only the acute problems will be discussed.

No spectacular solutions are anticipated. The State Department also does not expect that the existing differences will be ironed out.

The importance of Rome's visit is considered to be the establishment of closer personal contacts which allow the personal explanations of the various positions.

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The Americans will insist on:

- the trade problems with Cuba and
- the questions concerning the credits granted to the countries of the Eastern Bloc.

The Americans expect that the British will ask for definite support against Sukarno, if fighting resumes in Borneo.

As far as Cyprus is concerned, the British are more favorably disposed toward the Greek attitude related to the preliminary guarantee of integrity.

The Americans, on the other hand, consider that there is a certain degree of logic in the Turkish attitude. The Americans believe that the negotiations cannot be beforehand considered as doomed to fail.

\*\*\*

The conversations concerning the German plan will be of an informative nature.

Up to now, the plan involved was discussed at two meetings of the Committee of Ambassadors. On the occasion of the first meeting, Knapstein spoke about his basic ideas. At the second meeting, the Ambassadors expressed their opinions.

The plan contains some ideas from the so-called Eden's plan. It also contains Kennedy's proposals pertaining to the creation of the mixed commissions even about matters which are not connected with trade.

The plan is based on the principle of unity but it does not insist on common elections.

According to the American evaluation, the plan does not contain anything new and, in its current form, it does not open any prospects.

(Bob, on the basis of his conversations with the Western Ambassadors and Marton on the basis of his conversations with Tyles)

K.

February, 12, 1964

Posrijemoma SD u razgovorima sa Home-om  
više se insistirati na problemima unutar Evropskog  
saveta. SAD ostaju pri Kennedyjevim osnovnim konceptima  
rijama ali prihvataju kao realnost sadašnji rast. Do  
Eshardove posete Parizu gajene su još neke na-  
nade. Od tada se više ne smatra da je povećanje  
kennje rasta moguće u dogledno vreme. P tim u  
veri prihvata se kao realnost i to da su zbog post-  
stojećih izbora Home-ove mogućnosti ograničene  
a posebno da ne može dati obavezu ka većim u  
multilateralnoj smaki.

Razmatraće probleme Evropskog Tržišta  
(Common Market) i prikladnostojim tarifnim  
pregovorima, ali će detaljnije razmatrati samo u okviru  
problema. U očekuju prethodna rešenja niti  
prevarizacije postojećih razmnožavanja i važnost  
poseti gledaju više u uspostavljanju bližih ličnih kon-  
takata i da koristeju prilike ka lično obrađavanju  
stvorova. Amerikanci će insistirati na problemima  
trgovine sa Kubom i kreditne politike prema Kenji-  
ma Istočnog bloka, a očekuju da će Velika Britanija  
tražiti odnositinju podršku protiv Puharova u slučaju  
ponovnog otpočinjanja neprijateljstva na Borne-u.  
U vezi sa Kiprom Britanci su više na lonjemi grčko-  
stavu o prerasudnom garantovanju intergoviteta, dok  
Amerikanci vide izvesnu logiku u stavu Turcije  
da se ne može unapred isključiti neuspjeh pregovora.

Razgovori s takovskom njemačkom priama  
će biti informativni. Plan je dosad razmatran  
na dva sastanka komiteta ambasadora. Na prvom  
je Knajstein izneo osnovne ideje, a na drugom  
odgovorio na pitanja. Na sledećem sastanku se

ambasadori dati svoje primedbe. Plan sadrži neke ideje iz takozvanog Edenovog plana, kao i Kennedyjeve predloge o stvaranju mešovite komisija i van oblasti trgovine. Zasnovan na principu ujedinjenja ali ne insistira na kaj dnućkim izborima.

Po američkoj oceni ne sadrži ništa novo i u sadašnjem obliku ne obećava neku perspektivu.

(Beb na osnovu razgovora sa Zapadnim ambasadorima i Marton na osnovu razgovora sa Tylston.)

ans

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANIF 112

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Division - Belgrade

February 17, 1964

Speaking about the conversations Home-Johnson, Rusk told a limited number of newspapermen:

The conversations consisted of mere work. There was almost exaggeration in this regard. About thirty problems were discussed. Many very important things were agreed upon and much work was finished.

Dangerous situations were discussed.

Excepting the questions of communist trade, including Cuba in these matters, Home and Johnson were satisfied. There is complete mutual trust and the goals to be achieved are the same.

\*\*\*

The cooperation concerning Cyprus is close.

The counterpropositions of Makarios are greatly different from the Western propositions.

Home and Johnson worked on the basis of reports which were submitted each hour. Ball is with them in order to discuss matters and not for the purpose of rendering decisions.

The most important thing is to stop the fighting.

Rusk was asked how the United States allowed to be involved in the Cyprus problem.

Rusk replied "the United States considered that the proposed revision of the Constitution should be effected by the guarantors; thus, it was proposed that the United States play the role of 'junior partner.'"

Rusk was asked whether the United States can participate along with the troops of the Commonwealth.

He answered: "we are not members of the Commonwealth but we will stick to our offer; we did not invite ourselves and will not exclude ourselves."

He was asked about the United Nations.

He replied: "somebody wishes to use the United Nations for the purpose of cutting across the treaties; the most important thing is to stop the fight; a mediation will be indispensable."

see

Rusk was asked about disarmament.

He answered: "we have analyzed the Soviet moves and we have seen where the Soviets are sharply opposed, where they are slightly indifferent and where they have given their counter-propositions; it is anticipated that Butler's visit to Geneva will give new incentive to the negotiations."

see

Rusk was asked about Cuba:

He replied: "the differences concerning the policies toward Cuba have been established; we have explained our attitude in details and why we consider that the Hemisphere is threatened; the trade between Great Britain and Cuba will probably increase this year; the same will happen with the Soviet Union; however, with the Soviet Union, even Great Britain has problems because the Soviet Union is not ready to pay 6.5% as interest."

Rusk was asked whether the British attitude in trade reflects the differences concerning the conceptions of the cold war.

He replied: "No; the differences involved exist since 1949; there are no new British evaluations concerning its relation with the communist Bloc; we are in agreement regarding the relations toward the communist Bloc."

\*\*\*

Rusk was asked how many concessions had to be made to Great Britain for the purpose of achieving unanimity regarding Southeastern Asia.

He replied: "the United States has supported Malaysia in the past and Great Britain has also supported the United States in Vietnam; the well-known British expert on guerrilla warfare, Thomson, is in Vietnam with his whole experience which he acquired in Malaysia."

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Rusk was asked whether France was discussed.

He replied: "very little; we only discussed whether the recognition of (Red) China is the reward for its fighting policies and we asked ourselves whether the recognition will strengthen these policies."

\*\*\*

As far as the neutrality of Southeastern Asia is concerned, Rusk said that "there is no difference between Great Britain and the United States especially if neutrality means that the West has to get out."

In the end, Rusk was asked how went the talks between Johnson and Hoze.

He replied: very well because one is a farmer from Texas and the other a farmer from Scotland.

Bob

K.

February 17, 1964.

Ruski pregovori s Flomom - Johnsonom na bridžingu  
na ograničeni broj novinara:

Pregovori bili radni. Skoro se pretvaralo. Razina =  
tamo oko 30 problema, istovremene veoma važne  
oblasti sporazuma. Njogo se svršilo. Pretvorilo  
opasne situacije i ispitati da li su prišli na istoj  
liniji. Bili su, osim u pogledu komunističke trgovine  
uključujući i Kubu, Flom i Johnson rado vojnici.  
Postoji potpuno uzajamno poverenje da se ide istim  
ciljevima.

Tamo se saraduje u vezi sa Kiptom. Makario =  
sevi kontrapredlozi se bitno razlikuju od zapadnih.  
Radilo se na bazi izveštaja koji su primljeni sa =  
kog rata. Ball je tamo da diskutuje, a ne da  
donese odluku. Najvažnije je da se prekine sa borbu.

Na pitanje kako su SAD dovele da ih se unna =  
neviše u problem Kipta: "SAD su smatrale da  
predloženu reviziju ustava treba da ostvare garan =  
tori i u toj vezi predloženo da i SAD igraju ulogu, ma =  
o bez partnera."

Na pitanje da li SAD mogu biti uključene ako  
će biti Krije Komonvelta: "Nismo članovi Komun =  
velta, ali ostajemo pri našoj ponudi. Ili se nismo  
pozvali, niti ćemo sami sebe uključiti."

Na pitanje o OUN: "Voleli da koriste OUN  
da bi imao mogućnost da pređe preko ugovora  
(to cut across treaties). Najvažnije obustaviti borbu.  
Bile neophodna medijacija."

U pogledu razgovora: "Razmotrili x."



sovjetske, potde i ocenili gdje je oštro oclinjeno, gde je bezna indijerentnost, a gde su dati sovjetski protu, recidori. Biskup se da li Butier-ov boravak krajem meseca u Ženevi dati novi, statističaj pre = govornica."

U pogledu Kube: "Utvrdene su razlike u politici prema Kubi. Američka strana je detaljno objasnila svoj stav i razloge kašto, matra da je u pitanju opasnost za hemisfjru. Više se radi o razlikama u politici nego u suštini. Verovatno će se ove godine povećati trgovina Velike Britanije sa Kubom, a i sa SSSR mađa tu i Velika Britanija ima probleme usled nespremnosti SSSR da plati šest i, 10 procenta na ime kamata."

Na pitanje da li britanski stav prema trgovini odražava razlike u prilazu hladnom ratu: "Ne, te razlike postoji od 1949. Ne radi se o svojoj britanskoj oceni odnosa sa komunističkim blokom. Glavno se u tome gde stojimo u odnosu na komunistički blok."

Na pitanje koliko je trebalo ići ususret Britanijama da se postigne saglasnost u pogledu Južno Istočne Azije: "SAD su već ranije dale podršku Maleriji, a Velika Britanija ta iste podržavala SAD u Vijetnamu. Poznati britanski stručnjak za gerilska ratovanja Thomson sa svojim iskustvom iz Malaje nalazi se u Vijetnamu."

Na pitanje da li razmatrana Francuska: "Više malo, samo pitanje da li prihvatanje Kine predstavlja dividencu Pekingu za svoje borbeno politiku i da li će prihvatanje još povećati tu borbenost."

u pitanju neutralnosti Južno Istočne. trije nema  
razlike između Velike Britaniji i SAD, posebno  
ako neutralnosti misli da Zapad treba da ide."

Na pitanje kako tekli pregovori između John-  
sona i Houma-a: " vrlo dobro, jedan je farmer  
iz Texasa, a drugi je farmer iz Floride."

Bob

CABLE (1)

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Division - Belgrade

March 17, 1964

(1) The enthusiasm for work has considerably declined in the State Department because it has become clear that Johnson reads very little of the State Department material.

On a couple of occasions, Johnson has returned to Bundy some analyses of the State Department and has asked Bundy why he sends them to him, telling him that he merely reads the summaries.

When Kennedy was President, the State Department had the feeling that the current important matters were actually prepared for the President. This gave particular incentive to the functionaries of the State Department.

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(2) The prevailing opinion in the State Department and elsewhere is that Rusk has not "filled the vacuum" in foreign policies left by Kennedy and by Johnson's lack of experience.

Up to now, the internal speculations mention Bundy and even more often McNamara as Rusk's successors.

T. Mann is lately mentioned as the most likely successor, no matter what his attitude may be. Obviously, Mann has not the capacities required for the position of United States Secretary of State.

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(3) Rostow, with whom Johnson has repeatedly been in contact, has also been partly eliminated.

Rostow no longer has the direct contact with the President and the men around Johnson. He had such contacts during the Kennedy Administration.

- 8 -  
- 8 -

Eady is not in too close contact with the President but as a link between the President and the State Department he has a stronger position because Rusk is a "weak" Secretary.

From the President's side - Washington

to the State Dept. s/ "Jack" - Washington

March 27, 1960

(1) The subject's position has undoubtedly declined in the State Department since it has become clear that Eady's role is very limited in the State Department's activities.

As a result of the subject's position has become very limited in the State Department and it is not clear that Eady is still willing to do the job he was doing in the State Department.

With Kennedy's appointment, the State Department and the feeling that the subject is still willing to do the job prepared for the President, there have been particular interest in the functioning of the State Department.

etc

(2) The prevailing opinion in the State Department and elsewhere is that Rusk has not "filled the vacuum" in foreign relations left by Kennedy and by Johnson's lack of experience.

Up to now, the internal operations within Eady and with more active Johnson as Rusk's successor.

R. Eady is largely excluded by the very liberal members, no matter what his attitude may be. Obviously, Eady has not the capabilities required for the position of United States Secretary of State.

etc

(3) Eady, with whom Johnson has repeatedly been in contact, has also been partly eliminated.

Eady no longer has the direct contact with the President and the new approach Johnson. He has been eliminated during the Kennedy administration.

- X -  
- X -

K.

March, 17, 1964

- 1) Volja za rad i entuzijazam u SD znatno opali, jer postalo jasno da Johnson čita malo ruskovih izvornih materijala, a par novata vatio Bundy-u analize SD-a sa primisbom kako se to njemu šalje, on treba isvod. Za vreme Kenedija imali su taj da važnije i aktualnije stvari radi sa Predsednikom, što mnogo vredi.
- 2) Prevodnjačka scena u SD i inače da Ruski nije "ispunio vakuum" iz koga došlo odlaaskom Kenedija i neiskustvom Johnsona u spoljnoj politici. Do sada su u internim spekulacijama kao naslednici Ruska najčešće pominjani Bundy, ili još više, Mc Namara. Međutim, u poslednje vreme se sve više pominje J. Mason koji bez obzira na svoje stavove, očigledno nije čovek formata ministra inostranih poslova u SAD.
- 3.) Rostov, sa kojim Johnson ponavljano razgovara, takoste delom istisnut, naima nema ovaj direktan odnos sa Predsednikom i ljudima oko njega, kao što ga imao za vreme Kenedija. Bundy u manje bliskim odnosima sa Johnsonom, ali kao transmisija između Predsednika i SD ima jači položaj, jer Ruski bled.

" Jack "

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANCABLE (2)

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Division - Belgrade

March 17, 1964

(1) Johnson will probably not be able to freeze the question of Cuba until the elections. Neither will he succeed in pushing it back to a less prominent place.

The Republicans will do all they can for the purpose of defeating him with the Cuban question. Cuba will remain an acute question as long as Castro is in power.

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(2) In connection with Cuba, the events may develop in the following manner.

The United States intelligence services allegedly have the information that the Russians could announce within a couple of months that they are withdrawing all their troops from Cuba. The Russians would take advantage of the incidents of the two United States planes downed over Eastern Germany and of the new A-11 plane to justify leaving the "surface to air" missiles in Cuba.

Up to now, Russian crews manipulated the rockets involved. When the Russians leave, the Cubans could down some of the U-2 planes which are continuously reconnoitering over Cuba. The United States considers that this reconnaissance and the photographing of the Cuban territory actually is part of the practical and tacit Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement since there is no direct inspection of that territory.

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(3) If the Russians do withdraw from Cuba, the United States will insist that it has the right to the U-2 flights. Otherwise, the United States cannot know whether some Russians have remained in Cuba, what they are doing and, whether they are installing larger rockets, etc.

That is why, in case of the use of "surface to air" missiles by the Cubans against the American planes, a critical situation may occur.

In the meanwhile, it may be noticed that Castro himself has recently become very cautious.

April 17, 1962

The Russians will probably not be able to derive the maximum of value from the U-2 flights. Jack will be required to maintain a certain level of activity.

The Russians will be able to use the planes for the purpose of identifying the Cuban missile sites. This will result in some questions as long as Castro is in power.

see

(5) In connection with Cuba, the events are developing in the following manner.

The United States intelligence services already have the information that the Russians could have within a couple of months that they are withdrawing all their troops from Cuba. The Russians would take advantage of the absence of the US Armed Forces planes coming over Eastern Europe and the US will have to justify leaving the country to such missiles in Cuba.

Up to now, Russian crews intercepted the rockets involved. Both the Russians and the US have made use of the U-2 planes which are constantly reconnoitering over Cuba. The United States considers that this reconnaissance and the photographing of the Cuban territory are part of the practice, and the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement also shows it is a direct inspection of that territory.

see

K.

March, 17, 1964

1) Johnsonu verovatno neće uspjeti da doispitunje Kube na leđu sve do izbora, ili da ga bar gurne na manje prominentno mesto. Republikanci će učiniti sve da ga tuku po Kubi, koja će ostati akutna stvar sve dok Kastro na vlasti.

2) Tu mogući sledeći razvrtak: američke obavetajne službe imaju navodne informacije da bi Rusi sa mesec-dva mogli da objave da povukli sve svoje vojne snage sa Kube; istovremeno bi incidenti sa dva američka aviona nad Istranom. Većina i američki novi A-11 avion, kao opravdanje kaže bi Kubi u tom slučaju o stavili spremu i rakete zemlja-vazduh, sa kojima bi Kubanci, bez ruskih posada koje do sada rukovale time, mogli da obore neki od U-2 aviona kojima SAD stalno istražuje izvištanje nad Kubom. Ovo američko slobodno nadletanje i snimanje Kube, kako to shvataju SAD, jeste u stvari vrlo praktičnog i preciznog sporazuma Kennedy-Khruščov u slučaju inspekcije na licu mesta u samoj Kubi.

3) SAD će u slučaju povlačenja Rusa sa Kube insistirati na svome pravu da nadleće U-2, jer inače neću da li nešto Rusa ostalo, šta rade, da li instaliraju ponovo neke druge, veće rakete i sl. Isto bi u slučaju kubanske upotrebe raketa zemlja-vazduh protiv američkih aviona mogla da nastane kritična situacija.

Učiova se međutim da sam Kastro veoma oprezan u poslednje vreme.

"Jack"



att 27

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington  
To the Coordination Division - Belgrade

March 21, 1964

The State Department and the CIA have unconfirmed information that Tito may meet Khrushchev in April.

This meeting does not worry either the State Department or the CIA. The report of Vlahovic at the VI Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communists' League of Yugoslavia was particularly noticed. Tito's recent statements were also noticed; they indicate that Tito has decided that Yugoslavia should fully develop its own policies.

Thus, it is evaluated that Tito is developing his own decisive attitude and if Khrushchev wants his cooperation, it must be based on the acceptance of Tito's conditions and methods.

s/ "Volkov"

Beograd, 21. 1967.

SD i CIA imaju informacije koje nisu do kraja proverene da bi moglo doći do biatrućnog susreta Tito-Kruščić negde u aprilu. Procenjuje da formiracija u saopštenju o odlasku Predsednika Tita na Brijuni u kojoj je u istoj blizini formiracija "ponaloga lekara", vrlo proračunata i ima veze sa pitanjima eventualnog podizanja na vlasti nekakvog Komunističkog Partija u Budimpešti ili inače. Budući eventualni sastanak Tito-Kruščić ih ne uključuje; VI Plenum CK Lavra Komunističke Jugoslavije na kome naravno pažljivo izlaganje Trajkovića; te Tita istapanje u poslednje vreme, te da pripremu VII Kongresa ima indikacija da Tito odlučio da Jugoslavija punom parom razvija svoju politiku, filozofiju i praksu, iako Kruščić izgleda trudio da se priča da se nebi u odludnom momentu dozvala munificija Kruščića na liniji njegove kompletne revizije marksizma i slično. Međutim procenjuje se, da Tito nastavlja sa svojim odlučnim stavom da ako Kruščić keli njegovu saradnju onda to mora da bude bazirano na privatanju njegovih uslova i metoda.

"Volkov"

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Department - Belgrade  
 April 24, 1964

(1) The crisis related to Cuba is becoming sharper. The Republicans wish to make it an important electoral issue.

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(2) According to the Congressional circles, the Republicans are asking that the Soviets withdraw not only their troops but also their rockets from Cuba. President Johnson wishes to separate the Cuban crisis from the question of the United States relations with the Soviet Union; his whole electoral campaign is based on lessening of tension and peace.

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(3) The Administration has notified the Russians that American planes will continue to fly over Cuba because there is no inspection of the Cuban bases. Furthermore, the United States has stressed that it will consider any shooting of an American plane as a most serious matter.

\*\*\*

(4) The situation of the Administration is unpleasant:

(a) because it does not wish any military complications in connection with Cuba in general and particularly not before the elections;

(b) it cannot stop the U-2 flights in general and particularly not before the elections; the formal justification for the U-2 flights is the possibility that big rockets could again be sent by the Soviets to Cuba; in fact, the U-2 flights are a pressure against Cuba which ruins Castro's prestige.

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(5) Castro himself has made his own position more difficult by publicly declaring that he will not tolerate the U-2 flights.

688

For the time being, it cannot be seen how the problem, which is becoming more and more tense, can be solved because the attitude of both parties is so sharp. This is a dangerous matter.

It is most probable that the United States is trying to impress the Soviet Union in order that the Russians might in turn impress Castro about the seriousness of the situation.

The administration has decided to suspend the U-2 flights in order to avoid any military complications in connection with this is general and particularly now before the election.

689

The administration has decided to suspend the U-2 flights in order to avoid any military complications in connection with this is general and particularly now before the election.

689

(6) The situation of the administration is unpleasant:

(a) because it does not wish any military complications in connection with this is general and particularly now before the election.

(b) It cannot stop the U-2 flights in general and particularly now before the election, and cannot justify the U-2 flights in the possibility that his requests could make as much by the Soviets to Cuba, as first, the U-2 flights are a procedure against Cuba which raises Castro's prestige.

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K.

April, 24, 1964

1) Zaostrevanje krize oko Kube nastalo, posredom  
 mogućnosti da Kubarci dobiju u svoje ruke rakete sa  
 i barunji aviona kada se povuče preko vojno aso vlje  
 i da obore U-2 avion koji sada nadleću Kubu.  
 Kriza verbalno i politički zaostrena sve jačim insisti-  
 ranjem Republikanaca i najviše desnice u SAD, koja  
 od Kube nikako želi da učini proizvodivno i izborno  
 pitanje.

2) Prema kongresnim kongovima republikanske stranke  
 vrši se jači pritisak na Johnsona da kaštava od Rusa  
 da se trupa povuče sa Kube i antiavionske rakete.  
 Administracija se ovome odupire. Johnson, koji čitavu  
 predizbornu kampanju zasnovao na paroli mira i koji  
 bez obzira na izbore želi da nastavi i razvije sadašnji  
 proces „detent-e“ u odnosima SAD - SSSR, želi da odvoji  
 kubansku situaciju od odnosa SAD - SSSR (naime da  
 se ne dopusti takav razvitak oko Kube koji bi doveo  
 u pitanje „detente“) dok desne snage guraju upravo  
 na zaostrevanje prvog i kvarenje drugog.

3) Administracija predala note SSSR-u i Kubi kojima  
 upozorava da će nadletati i dalje (s obradbešenjem da to  
 pravo SAD dok nema inspekcije na licu mesta), upozorava  
 da bi wako ometanje, obaranje bilo smatrano najtežim  
 korakom itd.

Postoje usaglašeni operativni planovi za postepanje  
 u slučaju obaranja U-2. Prvo, oštra nota upozorenja;  
 za slučaj daljeg obaranja bombardovanje svih punktova  
 sa antiavionskim raketama na Kubi. (Isto kaže da  
 desni kongovi Pentagona izražavaju sumnju da bi  
 Administracija bombardovala sve punktove; „boji“ se  
 da bi se stalo na nekim polovičnim mjerama.)

- 4) Johnson i Administracija u nezgodnoj situaciji:
- a) ne bi želeli nikakovo vojno kažnjavanje ako Kuba pre izbora, ni inače;
  - b) ne mogu da obustave pre izbora nadletanje U-2, a ni inače, jer im nadletanje (ka koje formalan izgovor mogućnost, ponovnog tajnog slanja velikih raketa od strane Rusca) sretstvo, pritiska na Kubu, razaranja prelika Kastroa, mobilizacija Latinske Amerike na ovom pitanju i slično.
- 5) Kastro sebi otežao situaciju u ovom pitanju jer je javno obavestio da neće tolerisati nadletanja. Za sada se ne vidi izlaz iz procesa kažnjavanja stavova dve strane, što nosi u sebi potencijalno opasne elemente. Najverovatnije da SAD pokušavaju da kod Rusca izazovu dovoljnu zabrinutost, radi dejstva na Kastroa i oprednog postupanja ako izboru momenta, nadležnosti i sl. predavanja pomenutog tipa razmatranja.

" Jack "

## TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

June 16, 1964

K.

Today the American Embassy from Bonn has urgently reported as very confidential information to the State Department that the article by ELEGANT from Bonn (Washington Post, issue for June 16) was directly inspired in the Bonn Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ELEGANT, with whom they spoke at the Embassy, has shown that data concerning the unfavorable aspects of the JOHNSON-ERHARD meeting were received from high officials who accompanied ERHARD. It still isn't definitely explained whether they had ERHARD's direct consent for leaking things to ELEGANT, but initial information indicates that ERHARD must have known.

2) Insofar as ELEGANT's own report is concerned, as well as his story of disagreement and difficulty in talks, they are correct, especially because--

a) JOHNSON rejected any diplomatic initiative of Western powers regarding unification of Germany with the explanation that it would be pointless, hopeless, and would merely aggravate relations, thwart the gradual realization of a detente between East and West, U.S. and USSR, and make more difficult U. S. positions in Europe.

b) JOHNSON, in spite of ERHARD's request, insisted on U. S. readiness and determination to achieve partial results and agreements with the USSR in Europe and otherwise, regardless of whether these are tied conditionally or otherwise with parallel steps toward unification of Germany as West Germany is planning them.

c) In the context of rejecting all of ERHARD's concrete proposals for a new initiative re unification (declaration, note to USSR, proposal for a permanent conference, etc.) concerning unification, this was unequivocally made plain to ERHARD that in a practical sense between the USSR and the U. S. there exists some kind of tacit agreement that the present division of Germany can be maintained indefinitely. (In the State Department and the White House there is ever greater understanding for KHRUSHCHEV's essential interest:

not to allow Germany in any way, even potentially, in the life of several generations, for any danger to threaten the USSR and Eastern Europe.

d) Because of that, ERHARD insisted, on his part, on Germany's freedom of determination of West Germany to participate or not to participate in, to support or not to support certain arrangements between the U. S. and USSR, East and West, in accordance with his estimate whether they hold back or advance the cause of unification. In accordance with this key issue the communique included positions of both sides because there was no compromise.

e) The atmosphere at the meeting was the coldest so far in any meetings of an American president with a German chancellor.

4) This element is in the process of ever deeper differences and ever more frequent clashes of U. S. and West Germany on certain basic issues of European policy as well as in East-West relations. Such development, which will progress, will push ERHARD more and more into De GAULLE's arms.

5) Because of the sensitive situation regarding this the State Department (TYLER, RUSK's assistant) has stopped the circulation of the ERHARD-JOHNSON meeting's minutes so that only the top USIA echelons may see them though not the German press attache.

[MCGOWAN].

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June 19, 1964

K.

1) Even tho at the beginning it was somewhat disturbed the American Embassy in Belgrade arrived at the conclusion that in the TITO-KHRUSHCHEV meeting there occurred no essential changes of Yugoslavia's position.

2) This is after careful perusal of communiqués, TITO's appearance at the airport upon return from Leningrad, and even after devoting certain attention to the fact that TITO spent less time in Leningrad than it was announced he would remain (two days) [sic].

3) The latest analysis and conclusions of the Embassy differ from BINDER's alarming report in the New York Times of ~~XXXXXX~~ June 12, in which BINDER writes, on the basis of a communiqué, that TITO made a fundamental and substantial



concession by consenting to a conference of Communist Parties and the "monolithic unity of the movement under USSR leadership as well as by completely adopting KHRUSHCHEV's platform. The Embassy as well as the analysis section at the State Department at once showed that BINDER has incorrectly quoted the version of the communique ("monolithic unity"), while the Serbo-Croatian version reads "unity and monolithism", which is something wholly different.

4) The Embassy likewise concluded that the meeting passed off "as could be expected, minus any new incidents and changes, whereby TITO expounded to KHRUSHCHEV his viewpoint and vice versa, that there exists a high degree of understanding and agreement, but both substantially maintained their positions in spite of their intentions". With this also the State Department agreed.

5) Meanwhile, detailed analyses of the Leningrad communique in the State Department show one passage as sounding that Yugoslavia is associating itself with criticism of Rumania which in this case would very much surprise them. Likewise there are differences in the Slovene and Serbo-Croatian versions of the communique.

6) The State Department judges that Yugoslavia could eventually take part in a conference of the CP's, especially if a conference would be held outside of Moscow to preclude any geographic seal of the CP-SU leadership and the most direct pressure to follow the USSR line. This would in every way be a significant modification of present positions.

(MCGOWAN and POLYANSKY, USSR Desk at State Department)

June 10, 1964

11.

1) Američka Ambasada iz Bona danas nitno javila, kao veoma relevantnu informaciju, SD-u da članak Eleganta iz Bona (Washington Post od 11. juna) direktno inspirisan u bonskom ministarstvu inostranih poslova. Elegant, sa kojim u Ambasadi razgovarali, dočeka da roditi smisljivoj i apertivnoj sustuzi Johnson - Erhard dobio od visokih funkcionera koji pratile Erharda. Nije do kraja još razjašnjeno da li inu ali iskrit, pristanak Erharda da "curenje" Elegantu, ali pove informacije ukazuje da, po svemu i Erhard znao.

2) Što se samog Elegantovog izvještaja tiče njegovog prikaza razmimoilaženja i težina u razgovorima, oni tačni, a posebno:

a) Johnson odbio vrlo kakvu stvarnu diplomatsku inicijativu zapadnih sila oko ujedinjenja Nemačke, sa obradboženjem da bi bila besiljna, vrnaditna i samo razstravara odnose i onetala postepeno ostvarivanje detenta između Istoka i Zapada, SAD i SSSR i otčala SAD, pokicije u Istočnoj Evropi.

b) Johnson, nasuprot zahtevima Erharda, insistirat na spremnosti i odlučnosti SAD da se SSSR-om ostvari razvijalne rezultate i aranžmane u Evropi i inače, bez obzira na to da li ovi povezani uslovno ili inače sa paralelnim koracima da ujedinjenja Nemačke kako in Zapadni Nemački razmišlja.

c) Ovo u kontekstu odbijanja svih konkretnih predloga Erharda za novu inicijativu oko ujedinjenja (deklaracija, nota SSSR-u, vedioj stalni konfrenacije, itd.)

sko ujedinjenja, pokazalo nedovršeno Erhardu da praktično između SSSR-a i SAD postoji neka vrsta prične saglasnosti da sadašnja podeljenost. Nemačke može da se odbrana u nedogled. (U SD i Berlinskoj sve veća razumljivost da bitni interes Francuza da ne dovedu da Nemačka ni na koji način ni potencijalno u životu nekoliko budućih generacija ne postane opasnost za SSSR i Istočnu Evropu.

d) Erhard radi svega toga insistira, sa svoje strane na odlučnosti Zapadne Nemačke da učestvuje ili ne, podržava ili ne, pojedine sporazume između SAD i SSSR, Istoč-Zapad ne preuzima svojoj oceni da li isti unapređuju ili unapređuju stvar ujedinjenja. Po ovom ključnom pitanju komuniste uključio stavove obe strane, jer kompromisa nije bilo.

e) Atmosfera na sastanku bila najprikladnija u dosadašnjim sastancima američkih predstavnika i njemačkih kancelara.

4) Sve ovo element u procesu sve dubljih razlika i sve češćih sukobljavanja SAD i Zap. Nemačke u nekim osnovnim pitanjima evropske politike, a i inače u odnosima Istoč-Zapad. Evakav razvoj koji se napredovati: izgled Erharda više u misli de Gaulle-a.

5) Izog ostjive situacije vis ovog, SD (Tijer, pomoćnik Ruska-a) osustvrio situaciju raznim sastancima Erharda i Johnson, tako da ga videli samo vrhovi u SIA, ali ne i referent za Nemačku.

(Mc Gowan)

June 19, 1964

1) Iako u početku bila do izvine mere usmirenana, Američka Ambasada u Beogradu dosta dugo =  
kijučica da u susretu Tito-Kruščev nije došlo  
do neke bitnije promene stavova Jugoslavije.

2) Ovo posle pažljivog čitanja komunika, Titovog istupa na aerodromu po povratku iz Leningrada, a i posle pridavanja izvesne pažnje činjenici da Tito ostro menja u Leningradu nešto što bilo objavljeno da će ostati (dva dana).

3) Posljednja analiza i reakcije Ambasade se razlikuju od Binderovog alarmantnog izveštaja u New York Times-u od 12 juna u kome Binder piše, na osnovu citiranja komunika da Tito načinio principijelnu i bitnu koncesiju pristajući na konferenciju Kompartija i „monolitno jedinstvo“ pokreta pod rukovodstvom SSSR-a, te da usvojio potpuno Kruščevljevo „iatjornu“. Ambasada a i analitičica odeljenja u SD, odmah ukazala da Binder netačno citirao verziju komunika kao da reče „monolitno jedinstvo“, dok u srpsko-krvatskoj verziji u stvari stoji „jedinstvo i monolitnost“ što svakako osetnije drugačije.

4) Ambasada takođe reakcijala da susret prošao „onako kako se moglo očekivati, bez nekih novih momenata i promena, odnosno Tito izneo Kruščev svoje gledište, Kruščev Titu svoje, postoji snatan stepen razumevanja i saglasnosti, ali oba ostali

u sustini na svojim pozicijama i na svojim namjerama." Za ovim se slozilo i odbijanje u SD.

5) Međutim, posebne analize Lenjingradskog komiteta u SD, pokazuju da jedan pasus koja kaže da se Jugoslavija pridružuje sovjetskoj kritici Rumunije, što se ina čuje veoma računljivo. Isto tako postoji razlika u slovenskoj i srpsko-hrvatskoj verziji komiteta.

6) SD procenjuje da bi Jugoslavija eventualno mogla učeti više na konferenciji kompartija, pogotovo ako se konferencija bude održavala van Moskve, na nevišelo i geografskog prišta rukovodstva Komunističke Partije Sovjetskog Saveza i najneposrednijeg utiska skretanja liniji SSSR. Ovo bi svakako bila značajna izmena dosadašnjeg stava.

(M. Gowan, i Polyanski, odeljenje SSSR u SD)

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs - Belgrade

November 13, 1964

(1) The moves made by the Soviet leaders up to now do not allow to see their concrete position in the international relations.

For the time being, they are obviously trying, with caution, to patch up the conflict with the Chinese and that is almost their main concern. It seems that calm with the Chinese is necessary to the Soviet leaders for the purpose of alleviating their burden and of giving them the possibility to take the initiative regarding other questions.

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(2) The analysts of the State Department are paying great attention to the manner in which the new Soviet leaders are treating Stalin.

Since the replacement of Khrushchev, "the cult of the person" is often being attacked, including the past "cult of the person." However, Stalin is not mentioned by name.

The analysts in question carefully follow the campaign which glorifies Sorge. Now, it is less mentioned than in the past that Stalin did not take into consideration Sorge's information.

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(3) The absence of a great, centralized, general Party campaign concerning the further program of development, etc., shows that no such program has been established heretofore and that the leaders have not yet coordinated their positions.

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(4) According to information received from Western Europe, it seems that Brezhnev did not affirm himself as a definite and adequate chief.

The delegations of the Western European communist parties returned from Moscow with the impression that Brezhnev is rather colorless. The delegations are not impressed with Brezhnev's leadership.

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(5) All the information from Eastern Europe agrees that, up to now, the result is merely the strengthening of the independence tendencies, within the frame of the fundamental discipline of the Bloc.

However, the information from Eastern Europe cannot yet be evaluated as to whether and in which manner the changes which occurred in Moscow will affect the personal positions of the Eastern European leaders.

The representatives of the United States have nowhere, except in Poland, felt a cooling, a spacing of contacts with the officials or a decrease of interest in the development of relations with the United States.

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(6) The reports from Belgrade indicate that the Yugoslav leaders remain worried.

It is evaluated that the position of Yugoslavia has, at least for the time being, become weaker because the influence of Yugoslavia on Khrushchev was a strong Yugoslav position.

(SV-5 and Matusek, Officer in Charge of Eastern Europe and of Yugoslavia in the Department for the Analysis of Information)

K.

Novembar 13, 1964.

1) Inicijative, a tuda se nije takog rukovodstva ne omogućavaju da se odrediti sagleda njihovo konstantan nastup u međunarodnim odnosima. Za sada očigledno da više ovakve pokušaji da smire sudu sa Kinezima i da to kroz centralni napost. Tegleda da im smirenje na tom frontu potrebno da rasterećenje i omogućavanje inicijative na drugim pitanjima.

2) U analitičkim odličijima SD sacla sve veći pažnju poklanjaju načinu na koji novo rukovodstvo tretira Staljina. Od smenjivanja Kruščeva se isto napada "kult ličnosti" i to i "naj iz prošlosti" ali se Staljin manje promijenio poimenu. Pažljivo prati kampanju savjetnika George-a u kojoj se sada manje no pre promijenio da Staljin nije uzimao u obzir njegove informacije.

3) Otvorilo je jedna veike, centralizovane, opšte partijske kampanje na daljem programu izgradnje i slično ukazuje da takav naglašen program još ne postoji i da rukovodstvo nije usaglasilo stvarove.

4) Prema informacijama iz Zapadne Evrope izgleda da se Brežnev nije afirmisao kao deljiv i adekvatan šef delegacije zapadno-evropskih komunističkih partija se vraćaju iz Moskve sa utiskom da Brežnev dosta siv, neimprionirane njime kao liderom.

5) Sve informacije iz Istočne Evrope - iako još



ne mogu da odrede na koji način i da li se  
promeni u. Nosioci uticati na njenu poziciju  
lidera u Istočnoj Evropi - govore o tome da  
dosadašnji rezultat samo jačanje tendencija  
samostalnosti, naravno u okviru osnovne  
disciplinane bloka.

Pretpostavljajući SFD nisu nigde, sem u Poljskoj,  
osetili razrišćenje, prema njima, teževaranje  
kontakata sa evaninim njima i u manji  
interes za razvijanje odnosa sa SFD.

6) Izveštaji iz Beograda govore da je  
jugoslovensko rukovodstvo i dalje zabri-  
nuto, a ocena je da bar za sada pozicija  
Jugoslavije u tom delu donekle oslabljena  
je uticaj koji ona imala na Kruščeva  
bila njena pozicija snage.

( SV-5, i Matusik, referent za Istočnu  
Evropu i Jugoslaviju u Odeljenju za analizu  
obaveštajnih informacija )

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANHarder

(1) Johnson has made the right step. Naturally, in his motivation, there is a great deal of endeavor to present the United States in a favorable light and achieve a success in propaganda and in prestige.

However, his whole action is not merely limited to that.

\*\*\*

(2) The United States evaluated that it cannot start the negotiations while it was faced by a complete defeat and by a situation which was catastrophically deteriorating. Thus, the United States had to improve its situation and to acquire a "position" which would enable it to act. Consequently, the United States resorted to the intensification of its military action and to the bombings.

Now, the United States believes that it has acquired the "position" in question. More or less everybody is by now aware of the fact that the United States has not been militarily defeated in Vietnam. Thus, the United States has evaluated that it can take the initiative contained in Johnson's speech.

\*\*\*

(3) The United States waited for a suitable moment to take the initiative. The appeal of the seventeen nations was considered as a suitable moment to start the diplomatic action.

\*\*\*

(4) It is not excluded that the United States may discontinue the bombings for a few days.

However, it would be altogether unrealistic to expect that Johnson could have announced the discontinuation of the bombings and politically survived in this country.

\*\*\*

(5) Now, all is concentrated on the reply from Hanoi.

For instance, if Hanoi declares that it is interested in negotiating but cannot do it under the bombing, it would be a dialogue.

Then, the United States could say: "all right, however, if you are going to set conditions, you too have to do this or that." Or the United States could agree to stop the bombings for a couple of days in order to see what North Vietnam will do.

In the meanwhile, soundings may be made through diplomatic channels, etc.

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

Frankel

(1) President Johnson and his Administration consider that the bombing of North Vietnam is equivalent to the military activities of the Vietcong and to the infiltration of the men and of the armament from North Vietnam.

No matter what people may think about it, President Johnson cannot stop the bombings as a preliminary condition for the negotiations.

\*\*\*

(2) The interpretation that President Johnson has accepted the proposal contained in the Appeal as a matter of tactics is erroneous. He did not accept the Appeal because he believed that the other side will reject it and that he would thus appear as more constructive.

\*\*\*

(3) President Johnson has done a great deal and has exposed himself by accepting the Appeal. Senator Dirksen, who has an enormous influence, has already attacked the President for yielding, for being scared, etc.

The American newspapermen in Washington have been discussing the whole day whether Hanoi will interpret the President's acceptance as an act of weakness.

\*\*\*

(4) It is not reasonable to expect the President to make new steps while the other side is doing absolutely nothing.

As long as North Vietnam asks that the United States troops be withdrawn from South Vietnam, President Johnson cannot do anything.

\*\*\*

(5) Since the end of the Belgrade Conference of March 15, only one single new element was brought into the situation by the United States, namely, the gases; the use of gases was discontinued.

Otherwise, the bombings began on March 2. The Appeal has asked for "unconditional negotiations" after the bombings.

\*\*\*

(6) According to his information, when the Appeal was being prepared, the Administration had the intention of gently rejecting it.

However, the colder reasoning prevailed and the Appeal was used to complete the military operations with diplomatic political moves thus furnishing the occasion to the other side to reply somehow. However, the other side still believes that it can inflict a military defeat.

\*\*\*

(7) According to the information obtained in the State Department, the Yugoslav representatives in the United Nations have already asked that the bombings be stopped.

Such a request is completely unrealistic and it is not constructive in the least. It is not objective to ask continuously from the President to make concessions while the other side shows no will to do anything.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

Leacacos

(1) He spoke to me in the same manner as he did two months ago.

After the military escalation undertaken in order to prevent the erosion of the American situation and for the purpose of convincing North Vietnam that it cannot have a military victory, President Johnson opened the door to the political diplomatic possibilities.

\*\*\*

(2) Thus, the first phase was the disruption of the American position. The second phase is the American military escalation as a reply to the offensive of Vietcong and of North Vietnam.

In about six to eight weeks (since both sides know that a military solution is not possible), political diplomatic actions will be undertaken. There will be discussions for the purpose of obtaining the positions as favorable as possible for the negotiations.

The negotiations will take place after the "usual prestige rites" which precede each armistice. All shall be done in order to make/appear that "I did not give up first."

## Marder:

1) Johnson učinio stvarni step; naravno da u motivaciji ima i dobar deo nastojanja da se SAD pretstave u boljem svetlu, postignu propagandno-prestizni poen, ali se citava akcija ne svodi samo na ~~xxxx~~ to.

2) Posto su SAD ocenile da ne mogu na pregovore sve dok pred totalnim porazom, sa situacijom koja svaki sat znacila sve katastrofalniju eroziju, te da moraju da izravnaju ~~xxxx~~ situaciju bar do te mere da i one imaju jednu "polugu", jednu "poziciju" sa koje mogu da djestvuju - isli na jacanje vojne akcije i bombardovanje.

Posto sada zakljucuju da tu "bazu", "polugu" imaju, da ~~xxxx~~ vise manje svima jasno da nema jednostavnog vojnog poraza SAD u Vijetnamu, onda ocenili da sadašnji trenutak pogodan za inicijativu saizranu u Johnsonovom govoru.

3) Cekali na pogodnu priliku za ovo i apel 17 zenalja, 4 aprila, ocenjen kao takav dobar povoda da se "zakaci" diplomatska akcija.

4) Nije nemoguće da SAD privremeno, za ~~xxx~~ nekoliko dana obustave bombardovanje. Ali bi bilo totalno nerealno ocekivati da bi ~~ta~~ to Johnson mogao da javno izjavi i da ovde politicki prezivi.

5) Sve se sada koncentrises na odgovor Hanoja. Ako bi Hanoj, recimo, rekao da zainteresovan za razgovore, a da ne moze dok se bombarduje, onda bi to vec bio dijalog; tada bi SAD reklo "u redu", ali i vi morate, ako postavljate uslove, da ucinite ovo ili ono. Ili, dobro, obustavljeno za par dana, da vidimo sta cete vi govoriti ili ciniti: u medjuvremenu, preko diplomatskih kanala se vrse sondiranja i sl.

## Frankel:

1. Cvrst je prilaz Administracije i Johnsona da je bombardovanje ~~xxx~~ Severnog Vijetnama ekvivalentno vojnim akcijama Vijetkonga i infiltraciji ljudi i oruzja iz SV. Bez obzira sta se o tome misli, kada Johnson i vlada krenuli na bombardovanje ne mogu obustavljati to kao "preduslov za pregovore".

2. Pogresno bi bilo protumaciti da Johnson prihvatio predlog Apela samo kao trik ili taktiku ili ~~samo~~ zato sto bi se ocenjivalo da ce ga druga strana odbaciti, pa onda SAD ispadaju konstruktivnije pred svetoz.

3. Ko god bilo sta razume o politickoj situaciji u SAD (Kongres, vojni krugovi, mnogi ratoborni saveznici Johnsona), itd, zna da se jucerasnjim istupom znatno izlozio. Ipak on prvi, a ne druga strana, pokrenuo "eskalaciju diplomatije". Vec ga je Dirksen, koji ovde ima ogroman uticaj, zgrabio za gusu da popusta, da se uplasi i sl. Vec ~~to~~ kod ~~svih~~ americkih novinara u Washingtonu ~~se~~ citav dan diskutuje da sa zabrinutoscu da li ce Hanoj prihiti istup Johnsona kao akt slabosti.

4. Nerazumno je ocekivati da Johnson moze posle jucerasnjeg krupnog koraka, i danasnjeg odgovora na Apel, da cini nove korake ~~na~~ ~~svih~~ stranah samo da ne ~~ima~~ ~~ista~~, nego nema apsolutno nikakve

indikacije da zainteresovana za recipročnu diplomatsku akciju. SY bi ~~1965~~ sada da kaže da zainteresovan za pregovore, pa neka kaže šta ih četa i sl. Ali, dok Hanoi kaže da nema pregovora dok SAD ne izađu iz Vijetnama - Johnson ne može ništa.

5) Od završetka Beogradske konferencije 15 marta samo je jedan nov element bio unesen u situaciju od strane SAD; gasovi, i to je ~~1965~~ obustavljeno. Inace, bombardovanje bez obzira na retalijaciju je otpocelo vec 2 ~~1965~~ marta. Prema tome Apel je ~~1965~~ i posle toga trazio, kao operativni stav, pregovore bez preduslova.

6) Iza početke da prva reakcija na Apel, dok jos nije bio preden, ovde u Administraciji bila da ga se glatko odbije. Medjutim, prevladale hladnije razmisljanje da ~~1965~~ daje priliku da se vojno dejstvo komplementira politicko-diplomatskim, u nadi da ce druga strana na neki nacin odgovoriti - ukoliko se i dalje ne zanosi idejom da moze da nanese vojni poraz.

7) Prema informacijama u SO, pretavnici Jugoslavije u UN (Njujork) na zasedanju Komiteta za definiciju agresije danas ujutro vec trazili od SAD, od Johnsona da ide dalje, da obustavi bombardovanje i to objavi. To je totalno nerealno i nekonstruktivno; to je neobjektivno bazirano i nerealno stalno teranje samo SAD i Johnsona da cine ustupke, dok druga strana ne pokazuje nikakvu volju ni za sta.

Leacacos:

1. Kao sto mi govorio prije dva mjeseca (sto bilo tacno op. m. C. J.) za oko osam nedelja, poslije izvrsne eskalacije vojnih dejstava SAD da bi se bar donekle spretilo erodiranje americke situacije i SV ubedio da ne moze da ostvari vojnu pobjedu - Johnson otvorio vrata politicko-diplomatskim mogucnostima.

2. Prva faza je, znaci, bilo propadanje americke pozicije; druga faza je bila americka vojna eskalacija, kao odgovor na ofanzivu Vijetnonga i SV. Moze se reci da ~~1965~~ sada u "polu-finalu" izmjesnog otvaranja. Sada ce, jedno 6-8 nedjelja, obe strani nastojati, znajuci da vojno resenje ne moze, da mogu samo obe da izgube, biti i vojne i politicko-diplomatske akcije i nadmetanja, u nastojanju da se ostvari povoljnija pozicija, sto maksimalnija, za pregovore. Do pregovora ce doći kada se obavi "uobicajeni prestizni ritual" svakog primirja i sedanja za stol: da se to tako izvede kako ne bi izgledalo da "moja" strana prva popustila.

April 8, 1965



SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (A)  
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From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

June 11, 1965

## C A B L E

(1) Up to now the State Department has not <sup>been</sup> alarmed about the visits of President Tito to Czechoslovakia and to Eastern Germany.

The Department continues to be considerably irritated in connection with the proposals for united action in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic against the United States.

A greater attention is paid to Tito's trip to the Soviet Union especially because this visit follows the heaviest Yugoslav direct attacks on the United States.

In this connection the White House and the State Department are somewhat emotionally upset because the United States situation in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic is not good.

The Regional Section and the Section for Analyses of the State Department consider that the relatively cold reception of Tito in Czechoslovakia will not build a position of strength for Tito's visit to the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, Tito's exceptional reception in Eastern Berlin has impressed everybody, including the American observers, and it will probably be an asset for Tito.

\*\*\*

(2) In connection with the Sino-Soviet conflict, there is great interest in Tito's visit to the Soviet Union.

Since the incident with the Chinese students around the United States Embassy, the Soviets have not directly attacked the Chinese in their press.

However, the press has published Fashidov's conflict with Peng (?) on the occasion of the celebration of the 14th anniversary of the Communist Party in Djakarta. Now, the press has published Tito's visit.

Perhaps, the Soviets consider that a complete silence is not suitable because they lose too much ground in the international communist movement.

(Volter) — Leon VOLIKOV ✓

(E. Ford said that the first day of Tito's visit to Eastern Germany was "bearable" from the point of view of the State Department.)

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (B)  
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## C A B L E

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington  
To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

June 11, 1965

(1) Because of the tense situation related to Vietnam and the the Dominican Republic, the American diplomats have much less opportunity of maintaining useful contacts in Eastern Europe. The value of the American information from Eastern Europe has considerably declined. This is particularly true for the information emanating from Poland.

The same holds true for the situation in Washington regarding the American contacts with Eastern European and with Soviet diplomats; the exception is the contact Thomson-Dobrynin which is still somewhat maintained.

\*\*\*

(2) That is why, the efforts of the CIA, of the Bureau for Analyses of the State Department and of other organizations are intensified. These organizations are trying to learn the situation from published material, from events and similar matters. Particular efforts are made to learn the situation of the relations between the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A score of things is not clear in this connection as for instance:

- the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs,
- Kadar's visit to Moscow,
- the news regarding the forthcoming visit of Gomulka to Moscow,
- Tito's visit, etc.

\*\*\*

(3) The situation in Sofia is not clear. It is known that the Putsch was defeated.

Nevertheless, it seems that the situation is difficult because when Zhivkov received Suslov he publicly said that Suslov had come for the purpose of "settling for us the situation and the relations."

It was noticed that Suslov was accompanied by several Soviet experts on Romania.

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(4) The analyses show differences in the position of various Soviet leaders.

Suslov's speech in Sofia was especially interesting if compared to the speeches of the other Soviet leaders. Namely, Brezhnev said that "all necessary aid should be given to Vietnam." On the other hand, Suslov said that "the burden of armament is considerably felt by the Soviet people."

It was noticed that, on the occasion of the parade of May 9 in Moscow, Brezhnev had great pains to persuade Kalinowski to take the stand near him and Kosygin.

There is the impression that the Soviet leaders are discussing the essential questions (Vietnam) under considerable pressure.

The "Newsweek" editor in charge of foreign policies was in Moscow where he spoke with Zhukov, Cicetkina (sic- a woman) and other editors of "Pravda" and of "Izvestia."

Only Cicetkina, who belongs to the old NKVD personnel, defined Khrushchev's disengagement from Vietnam as "anti-socialistic." All the editors were silent when the assertions that Khrushchev was more realistic and less harmful for the USSR-U.S.A. relations were made.

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(5) There are not yet enough indications showing the new pro-Stalin course is affirming itself in the Soviet Union.

The invitation to Tito to visit Moscow does not agree with the affirmation of the new pro-Stalin course.

Some analysts of the State Department even notice that the NKVD is mentioned more often and that it has greater recognition. The NKVD was constantly attacked under Khrushchev; consequently, the young people refrained from joining it; perhaps, the recognition of the NKVD is due to the difficulties of recruiting new and young personnel.

Čepren

June 11, 1965

K.

1) Procenjujući cisto sa stanovista americkih interesa i odraza na americko-jugoslovenske odnose, do sada u SD nije bilo nekog "alarma" oko dosadnjeg toka poseta P. Tita u CSR i IN. Nastavlja se znatna iritacija radi poziva na ujedinjenu akciju protiv SAD u Vijetnamu i DR, ali se konstatuje da se, po formulacijama, antiamericki stavovi ne zaostavaju i da postoji izvesno nijansiranje. ~~Naiznast~~ Mnogo veća pažnja se poklanja putu u SSSR; dopusta se mogućnost slabe reakcije u SAD na istu, <sup>samo</sup> <sup>od direktnih</sup> ~~iz~~ <sup>dolazi</sup> nekoliko nedelja posle najtežih napada na SAD u jugoslovenskim izjavama. U tom pogledu u BK i u vrhu SD situacija i dalje donekle emocionalna, i sve se teže prima jer situacija SAD & u Vijetnamu i DR nije dobra.

Relativno hladniji prijem u Pragu i CSR uopste, procenjuju u regionalnom odelenju i odeljenju za analize SD, neće biti "pozicija" snage" u odnosu na posetu Moskvi, a ni inace. Medjutim, vanredan doček u Istocnom Berlinu impresionirao svih, pa i americke posmatrace, i verovatno dobro dolazi Titu.

Kao i do sada, konačne ocene ce cekati zavrsetak posete Moskvi gde ce sve zavisiti od toga kako se P. Tito bude postavio.

2) Sa sireg aspekta, najveca paznja se poklanja sovjetskom pozivu Titu u kontekstu sovjetsko-kineskog sukoba. Okl incidenta sa kineskim studentima oko americkie ambasade u sovjetskim javnim izjavama i stampi nije bilo direktnih napada na Kinu. Rusi nisu sami objavili direktno izvorne vesti o tome da Kinezi sprekuvaju om tati dotur naoruzanja u Vijetnam, vec to "procureli" zapadnoj stampi, bez ikakvog objavljivanja u sovjetskoj. Ovakav stav ~~marksa~~ <sup>SSSR</sup> se visplatio kod AA zemalja, posebno u kampanji oko prisustva AA konferenciji.

Medjutim objavljivanje u sovjetskoj stampi sukoba Rašidova sa Pengom na proslavi 14 godisnjice KPI u <sup>Dakari</sup> Indonezi-ji, i sada objavljivanje posete Tita, sto za Kineze "crvena krpa", <sup>Rusi</sup> indiciraju da mozda procenjaju da im kopletno cutanje i neodgovaranje ne odgovara jer previse gube u medjunarodnom kompokretu, gde Kinezi sticu poene, posebno xxx na pitanju Vijetnama.

(Volter. Inace, i na nivou referenta u Odelenju za <sup>(E Fond)</sup> Nemacku nam govorili da prvi dan posete IN-u, sa njihovog stanovista, "podnosljivo" protekao)

1. (opisno)

June 11, 1965

K.

- 1) Radi zaostrevanja atmosfere oko Vijetnama i DR americki diplomati u IE imaju mnogo manje prilike da odrzavaju korisne kontakte; vrednost americkih informacija iz IE po svim linijama znatno opala za poslednja dva meseca, a najvise iz Poljske. Ista situacija i u kontaktima sa IE i SSSR predstavnicima u <sup>Vashingtonu, sem donekle Tomson-Dobrinjin.</sup> pretstavnicima u
- 2) Zbog toga udvostrucen napor u CIA, Birou za analize SD, po institutima da se iz objavljenih materijala, dogadjaja i sl. pokusa nazirati kretanja, posebno u odnosima IE zemlje-SSSR gde niz stvari nejasno (sastanci VP, ministara inostranih poslova, poseta Kadara Moskvi, vesti o najskorijoj poseti Gomulke u Moskvi, poseta Lita, itd.)
- 3) Nije jasno kakva situacija u Sofiji, sem da puc porazen; medjutim, izgleda da situacija teska jer Zivkov docekujuci Suslova javno govorio da S. dolazi <sup>(sovjetskih specijalista za komuniju)</sup> "da nam sredi situaciju i odnose". Zapazili da u pratnji Suslova bilo niz
- 4) Analize zapazaju razlike u stavovima pojedinih sovjetskih rukovodilaca. Govor Suslova u Sofiji bio posebno interesantan, kad se uporedi sa govorima



ostalim. Dok Breznev <sup>govorio</sup> ~~na~~ u poslednjim izjavama o "svakoj potrebnoj pomoći Vijetnamu, dotle Suslov da "teret naoruzanja znatno pada na pleca sovjetakog naroda". Posmatraci primetili da prilikom vojne parade u Moskvi 9 maja, Breznev jedva nagovorio Malinovskog da stane na tribinu pored njega i Kosigina. Ima se utisak da se u rukovodstvu SSSR-a diskutuje pod znatnim pritiskom (Vijetnam) o bitnim pitanjima, tako da se to mora odrazavati i u njihovim istupima. Spoljno politicki urednik "Njuzvika" bio u Moskvi gde govorio sa Zukovim, Cicekinom i drugim urednicima u Pravdi, Izvestijama, itd. Sa Cicekine, koja stari kadar NKVD, i koja dezorganizovan Hruscova iz Vijetnama nazvala "so<sup>ne</sup>cialistickim", svi sutnjom presli preko tvrdnje da stav Hruscova bio realisticniji i manje stetan za odnose SSSR-SAD.

5) Nema jos dovoljno indikacija da se u SSSR-u reafirmira neki novi pro-staljinisticki kurs. Poziv Titu se ne bi mogao sa ovim uskladiti. Pojedini analitickari u SD cak dopustaju mogucnost da se NKVD vise pominje, da mu se odaju veca priznanja zbog toga sto posle stalnog napadanja na njih, pod Hruscovom, doslo do odvracanja mladjih kadrova, pa mozda doslo i do problema dovoljnog reputovanja.  
(Volter.)

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (A)

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington  
To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

August 10, 1963

(1) Harriman did not come with anything new concerning Vietnam.

He was received by President Johnson for about 15 minutes.

Immediately thereafter, President Johnson had rather long briefings with Congressmen at which the positions explained on the occasion of the last press conference were repeated.

eee

(2) All the United States data and evaluations point to the fact that neither Viet Cong nor North Vietnam will be ready for negotiations before the end of the monsoon season.

eee

(3) According to internal conversations with William Bundy, Secretary of State Rush's Assistant for the Far East, and with other functionaries of the White House and of the State Department, it seems that the minimum required by the United States for a solution in South Vietnam is a type of "Laos solution." The effects of this solution should last for at least some years.

This means the establishment of a neutralist government in which all the main forces of the country -- including the Viet Cong -- would be represented. It would be possible to maintain the formations of the Viet Cong as in the case of the Patet Lao formations.

(Gvortzman, blue card index)

**REPORT (B)**  
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**From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington  
To the Coordination Department - Belgrade**

**August 10, 1955**

The correspondents of the "Evening Star" inform today from the United Nations that the United States Government will announce on August 18 that it does not insist on Article 19. Consequently, the problem is being solved.

Allegedly, it will be announced at the same time that the Soviets have accepted the idea of donations.

According to information obtained by the above-mentioned correspondents, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed about this matter.

This would make possible the normal work of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(Gvertzman, blue card index)

K.

August 19, 1955

Saradnici vašingtonskog "Evening Star-a" javili danas iz Ujedinjenih Nacija da će vjeda SFD u ponedjeljak, 16. augusta objaviti da odustaje od insistiranja na članu 19, te da se problem rješava; navodno će se istovremeno objaviti da Rusi pristali na dobrovoljni priilog. Prema njihovim informacijama iz Ujedinjenih Nacija došlo do SAD - SSSR sporazuma oko ovoga.

Time bi se omogućio normalan rad Generalne Skupštine Ujedinjenih Nacija.

(Gwertiman, pl. K.)

K.

August 19, 1968

1) Hariman nije doista ništa novo oko Vijetnama. Imao sa Johnsonovim razgovor od oko sat do 15 minuta. Jednak ratim Johnson imao duže briefing sa senatorima i Kongresmenima, na kojima uglavnom ponovljeni stavovi sa poslednje konferencije sa štampu.

2) Sve američke strane i podaci su da Vjetcong i Severni Vijetnam nisu za pregovore pre isteka monsunskog perioda.

3) Prema informacijama razgovorima sa William Bundy, pomoćnikom Rusk-a za Daleki Istok, i drugima u SD i Bijoj Kući, izgleda da bi minimum koji bi SAD tražile za rešenje u Južnom Vijetnamu bilo jedno "Laosko rešenje" bar da se izvestan broj godina. To znači jedna neutralistička vlada sa predstavnicima svih glavnih snaga u njoj (i Vjetcong), uz eventualno održavanje formacija Vjetconga kao što je slučaj sa Patet Lao.

(Gwertzman, R. K.)

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (A)  
-----ELEMENTS FROM TALKS ABOUT PRESENT ACTION  
OF U. S. A. AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICYMax Frankel

(1) After two hours of debate and only by using heavily his personal prestige, President Johnson forced his Cabinet to send troops to the Dominican Republic. The Administration is far less united about the Dominican Republic than it is about Vietnam.

However, since this unhappy action has been undertaken in the worst possible manner, there is no choice but to support the President.

\* \* \*

(2) Frankel does not consider that the President's actions in the Congo, in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic are the result of his thoughtful strategy of the new "crusade" against communism. He also considers that these actions are not the result of the President's feeling of omnipotence because the President is very careful in avoiding a direct armed confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Frankel considers that the action in the Dominican Republic is the product of the following factors:

(a) The President is almost completely incapable of understanding the world and the international relations and of approaching rationally and systematically the international problems.

(b) The President is incapable of establishing and organizing in the White House and elsewhere a regular system for deciding about international questions especially when crises and emergencies are involved. This cannot be done because the President is constantly and almost completely confused about the international relations.

On the basis of this, Frankel is persuaded that the Administration in general does not know what to do as for instance when the Soviet Union, de Gaulle, Western Europe, etc., are involved.

(c) The President's sudden actions and his unilateral support on American power show that he is in a panic because he fears defeat and that he is frustrated in connection with international developments which he does not understand and in front of which he often feels powerless.

\* \* \*

(4) It is neither logical nor exact that the President has started a general offensive against communism.

First of all, he tries to keep normal relations with the Soviet Union.

Then, he does not even think of disturbing the Cuban situation.

Furthermore, the relations of the United States and Yugoslavia are normal.

Finally, it is a fact that the President's moves have heretofore been only reactions to situations where the United States was faced by unacceptable defeats (Congo, Vietnam, Dominican Republic). Actually, he had to defend himself from defeat and did not attempt to win new territories.

If a "crusade" were in question, the President himself would open new crises on new grounds.

\* \* \*

(5) One of the main reasons related to the President's behavior is his fear that any success of communism against the United States will jeopardize his internal political position.

\* \* \*

(6) As for Vietnam, the Administration is ready to use all the means in order to prevent defeat in South Vietnam.

If the current situation stabilizes, which is difficult, the President will not try to widen the military operations.

The Vietnamese crisis remains in the stage of controlled escalation.

\* \* \*

One of the essential elements in the calculations of the President and of his Administration are the very reliable evaluations regarding the wish of the Soviet Union to avoid participating in military actions in Vietnam or elsewhere.

Thus, the mutual avoidance of military confrontation of the two "superpowers" leaves enough ground for maneuvering.

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Robert McCloskey

He defended to the end the official and the published reasons of the United States action in the Dominican Republic.

However, it is interesting to note that he too emphasized that the President is particularly concerned about the factors related to the internal policies.



Volkov

He believes that the dangers related to the United States actions (Vietnam, Dominican Republic) should not be overestimated. This is his fundamental thesis.

Consequently there is no danger for a confrontation of the United States with the Soviet Union.

The (Red) Chinese attack on the Soviet Union which occurred the day before yesterday came only two days after the heavy attack contained in the introduction of the book on Khrushchev's deeds. This book is mainly centered on the accusation that the United States and the Soviet Union "cooperate in a way" regarding Vietnam. This is no mere propaganda.

The (Red) Chinese show that this cooperation worries them. The Chinese feel and know that there is tacit tolerance between the United States and the Soviet Union and that there may even be more than that.

Abraham Brumberg

Editor, "Problems of Communism" (USIA)

(1) He too considers that President Johnson is in a panic because he wishes to avoid a defeat. That is why he desperately undertakes actions which are costly and which are going to cost a lot of the United States.

No matter what the contradiction between the President's attitude and his actions may be, he would be extremely glad to develop relations with the Soviet Union and with Eastern Europe.

\* \* \*

(2) All of the above-listed people (Frankel, Volkov and Brumberg) more or less consider that Kennedy would have undertaken similar steps in similar situations. Kennedy's tactics and explanations would have been different.

However, Frankel (up to a certain point) and Brumberg (completely) consider that Johnson is more conservative than Kennedy (in spite of the fact that this is not the case regarding the vital internal questions of the United States). Frankel and Brumberg consider that the rightist groups and the military circles have somewhat more influence on Johnson than they had on Kennedy.

REZIME IZ GOVORA O SADANJIM AKCIJAMA SAD I POLIFICI JOHNSONA:

Max Frankel:

1) Johnson tek ogromnim licnim pritiskom, posle dvosatne debate, naterao kabinet na momentalno slanje trupa u S. Domingo. Administracija nije oko Domingo uopste tako jedinstvena kao oko Vijetnama; medjutim, posto nesretna akcija preduzeta na najgori moguci nacin i posto se SAD "uvalile" to niko nema izbora nego mora da do kraja podrzava Johnsona.

2) Americke trupe mogu ostati u S. Domingu i mesecima.

3) Frankel uopste ne smatra da akcije Johnsona kao u Kongu, u Vijetna u S. Domingu proisticu iz neke njegove smisljene strategije novog "krstasko pohoda" protiv Komunizma. Isto tako ne radi se ni o osecanju svenoci, jer jako oprezan da se ne zapetlja u direktnu oruzanu konfrontaciju sa SSSR-om. On smatra da akcija kao na S. Domingo proizasla iz sledecih odredjujucih aspekata Johnsona i njegove situacije:

1) Skoro totalno odsustvo sposobnosti da se shvati svet, medjunarodni odnosi, da se racionalno i sistematski pridje medj. problemima.

2) Nesposobnost da se ostvari, obezbedi u Beloj kuci i inace iole sredjeni sistem donosenja odluka po medj. pitanjima, pogotovo kada rec o krizama i emergencies. Bundv nije uspeo da ovo obezbedi, a i ne moze za Pretsednikom koji stalno u skoro totalnoj konfuziji, sto se tice medjunarodnih odnosa. <sup>F.</sup>na osnovu svega ubedjen da ova Administracija uopste ne zna kada da radi, postupa na pr. prema SSSR-u, De Golu, ZR uopste i

3) Nagle akcije Johnsona, sa oslanjanjem na unilateralnu americku silu, pokazuju da on u panicnom strahu od poraza, da frustriran medjunarodni razvitkom za koji nema razumevanja a pred kojim ima cesto osecanje nemoci, uored toga, cesto impliciticki gleda na mnogo toga kao na "komunisticku zaveru". Odavde i magoske fraze o "serifu", "komunizmu", "misiji SAD".

4) Nije poznato ni egzaktno da Johnson krene u neku opstu ofanzivu protiv "komunizma". Sve, on nastoji da odrzi normalne odnose sa SSSR-om i

reagovalo na nedavno ... sa ...

...in; niko i ne pomislija da uzemirava kubansku situaciju i dok Kastro miran to je sustinska strategija SAD prema Kubi; odnosi sa Jugoslavijom na pr. normalni. Drugo, bez obzira na karakter i implikacije Johnsonovih akcija, cinjenica je da su one do sada uvek samo reakcije na situaciju gde on po sopstevnoj oceni bio pred neprihvatljivim porazom (Kongo, Vijetnam, S. Domingo). Prema tome on, za sebe, spasava ono sto ima, brani se od poraza, ne zauzima nove teritorije i oblasti. Da je rec o krstaskom ratu on bi is pocetka stvarao nove krize, na novim terenima.

5) Jedan od glavnih razloga za Johnsonovo ponasanje jeste i njegovo stazhovanje da bi svaku uspeh "komunizma" protiv SAD, na bilo kom mestu, bitno kompromitira ovce u pitanje njegovu unutarpoliticku poziciju.

6) Sto se Vijetnama tice tu je Administracija spremna da upotrebi sva sredstva i odici se na sve da bi sprečila poraz u JV. Ukoliko se medjutim sadasnja pat-situacija bude stabilizovala, sto tesko da moguće, onda Johnson ne bi isao na prosirivanje vojnih dejstava. Vijetnamska kriza je i dalje u stadiju kontrolisane eskalacije.

7) Jedan od bitnih elemenata za postupanje Johnsona i Administracije jeste stalno prisustvo sasvim pouzdanih procena da SSSR ne zeli da se uplete u vojnu akciju u Vijetnamu ili inace, te da uzajamno pokazivanje vodjenja racuna da ne dodje do vojne konfrontacije dve super-sile obezbedju dovoljan manevarski prostor.

Robert McCloskey:

1) Do kraja branio oficijelnim i objavljenim razlozima akciju u S. Domin. Medjutim, interesantno je da je i on istakao da kod Johnsona unutarpoliticki momenat skoro preovladjujuci.

Volkov:

Osnovna mu teza da ne treba precenjivati opasnosti sadrzane u akcijama SAD, odnosno u krizi oko Vijetnama i S. Dominga, jer nema opasnosti za konfrontaciju SAD i SSSR, kao poslednji, prekjučerasnji kineski napad na SSSR

do koga desio samo par dana posle teskog napada u uvodu u kexy narednu knjicu  
 kompletnih dela Kruscova, a u kome je glavna i razradjena optuzba da SAD  
 i SSSR ostvaruju svojevrstu "saradnju" oko Vijetnama i inace - nije samo  
 propaganda. Kinezi pokazuju da ih ovo uznemirava i da i znaju i osecaju  
 da izmedju SAD i SSSR-a celo vreme postoji bar precutna tolerancija, a mozd  
 i vise.

Abraham Brumberg, urednik "Problems of Communism" (USIA):

1) Također smatra da da Johnson u paničnom strahu da ne pretrpi  
 poraz i zato se desperaterski odlučuje na akcije koje košta u a koje ce  
 tek kostati SAD. Bez obzira na kontradikciju stava i akcija, on ubedjen da  
 bi Johnson, da sita cija mirnija, i te kako razvijao odnose sa SSSR-om i  
 IE.

2) Svi sagovornici (Frankel, Volkov, Brumberg) vise manje smatraju da bi  
 Kenedi, sa drugacijom taktikom i objasnjenjima, poduzimao slicne korake u  
 ovakvim situacijama. Medjutim, cenele Frankel, a do kraja Brumberg,  
 smatraju da Johnson konzervativniji (iako ne u bitnim pitanjima unutrasnjeg  
 uredjenja SAD) i da kod njega vojni krugovi i desniji deo krupnog kapitala  
 imaju nesto veci dostup no kod Kenedija.

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SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (B)

...We notice in the attitude of Andrews more flexibility than in January.

Namely, now, the State Department does not abandon the program of bilateral relations (with Yugoslavia) because of our policies. Now, some parts of the program are mentioned as possible, some parts will be discussed and some parts wait for a more favorable situation. No strings are attached, no part of the program is directly tied to our policies.

Briefly, the attitude is more flexible and the door to all the possibilities is kept open.

see

(4) Kline (?) belongs to the White House, Sandy's office; he is the direct contact of the White House with the State Department and deals with Yugoslavia, among other things. He told us:

(a) Now, there are no problems between the United States and Yugoslavia except as to how to develop the concrete relations within the limits established by the Congress.

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(b) President Johnson does not<sup>have</sup> to solve any particular problem connected with Yugoslavia.

The President works on the improvement of the conditions PL-480 in general. He is interested in the question of the spare parts and this is the concrete matter which the President is studying.

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(c) The President is preparing the project of the trade act East-West. This act may contain possibilities of interest to Yugoslavia.

He is evaluating whether something could be done with AID for "the communist countries." He believes that the current legal texts and the regulations of the Export Import Bank allow something in this regard.

If Yugoslavia has wishes, it could receive credits and loans for various purposes.

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(d) As for the spare parts, it is calculated that 80% of our needs are covered through the usual commercial channels.

Now, it is looked for means for the remaining 20%, without changing the legal situation.

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(e) The State Department has not yet sent to the White House any draft for Johnson's reply to Tito. It seems that this has been unnecessarily delayed because Johnson's principle is to reply the following day.

Kline is certain that the State Department has not yet sent the draft, because he would have seen it. Namely, he sees everything which is specifically forwarded to Johnson.

There are countries and personalities about which and about whom Johnson has to be informed even if matters of mere routine are involved. He wishes to give his personal instructions regarding these countries and personalities. Johnson wishes to know what is going on especially in the following countries:

- the USSR,
- Indonesia,
- France,
- Great Britain,
- Yugoslavia,
- India,
- the United Arab Republic, etc.

When Kline read Tito's cable addressed to Johnson, he immediately said that the cable is good, that it has substance and that it is very good because the last paragraph mentions personal meetings as useful; in their own evaluation, the passage before the last clearly explains what Yugoslavia expects and what it criticizes; however, this criticism is constructive and has no cheap polemic implications.



(f) Regarding the visits, he personally does not see the possibility that Johnson may visit Yugoslavia in 1965 because the President is already engaged with visits to Latin America and Western Europe. He cannot undertake three important visits in one year.

Kline does not believe that Johnson could visit either the Soviet Union or the countries of Eastern Europe in 1965, unless some completely unexpected events take place.

The President's visit to Europe could encompass Great Britain, France, Western Germany and Italy. He would not go to Holland and to Sweden. Yugoslavia could not be included in Johnson's itinerary because of obvious political problems.

Johnson would not tie his visit to Yugoslavia to his visits to the Eastern European countries because he does not wish to equalize these countries. Perhaps, his trip to Yugoslavia could be tied to visits to Greece, to Turkey, to the Near East, etc.

As for Humphrey's visits, the President will decide whether, where and when these visits should be made. Nothing in this regard has been decided as yet.

(g) Kline knows with absolute certainty that Elbrick has not asked to meet Johnson; that is, the request from the State Department has not been forwarded to the White House.

Kline directly works on these matters. The procedure which is followed in such cases is that Rusk makes the request and indicates the specific subject about which the Ambassador wishes to talk in order that Johnson may be prepared. Rusk has not addressed such a request.

Elbrick could have asked for the meeting with the President in the State Department and the latter may have concluded that, in this moment, he has nothing special to talk with Johnson.

see

Kline did not raise any questions regarding the writing of our press, regarding our policies, etc.

Last year, he did so in a rather sharp manner.



Kline talked very calmly and constructively.

He almost joked when he said that there is no need to get upset about anything.

"If Sukarno wishes to get out of the United Nations, let him go; if Masser asks us to drink the water of the Red Sea, we will drink it." That is the way in which Kline spoke.

This time, Kline was less polemic than in the past. He treated our relations as a normal matter without raising particular problems.

s/ Micunovic

Broj: \_\_\_\_\_ 1963 god.

9

Poslana \_\_\_\_\_  
Primljena \_\_\_\_\_

kao normalan, bez iznenadjenja, sa uobičajenim tretiranjem odnosa prema pojedinih oblastima.

( Mi zapazamo u ovakvom postavljanju Andrews razliku od krucnog stava koji imao u januaru. Sada ne proizilazi da SD napušta program bilateralnih odnosa radi zase politike i sl, nego se delovi programa poninju kao aktuelni, rezavali bi se na neki nacin, za neke se ceka odluka, a SD ih zagovara, za neke treba videti da li postoji povoljna situacija da se radi na njima tokom 1965 - sve bez direktnog uslovljavanja, odnosno povezivanja sa nasom politikom. Ovo je dan fleksibilniji stav, bez formulisanja direktnih, neposrednih akcija, ali uz ostavljanje otvorenih svih mogucnosti.)

4. U daljnjem razgovoru Klaja (B. kuca, u Bandjevom aparatu, direktna veza BK i SD po pitanju Jugoslavije, izmedju ostalog) nam govorio sledece:

1) Izmedju SAD i Jugoslavije sada nema nekih problema, sem kako razvijati konkretne odnose u granicama koje postavlja Kongres, ...  
... u skladu sa interesima ...

b) Pred Predsednikom Johnsonom se ne nalaze neki problemi koje treba resavati u vezi Jugoslavije zasebno i posebno. Predsednik radi na poboljsavanju uslova za PL-480 uopste, ~~xx~~ celo vreme bio zainteresovan za resavanje pitanja rezervnih delova, i to konkretne stvari oko Jugoslavije kojima se bavio.

c) Predsednik priprema nacrt zakona o trgovini Istok-Zapad, kreditima i sl. koji ~~ne~~ moze ~~sadrzavati~~ sadrzavati mogucnosti koje iz Jugoslaviju interesantne. Procenjuje se da li da se ponovo nesto radi sa AID za "komunisticke zemlje". Nije sasvim siguran, ali je ubedjen da sadasnji zakonski tekstovi i interni pravilnici Exim banke omogucavaju ovoj, ako se to jako zeli, da Jugoslaviji <sup>obezbedi</sup> ~~ima~~ kredite i zajmove u razne svrhe, ne nuzne samo garantovanje kredita za pojedine fizicke projekte. A i ovde ima raznih mogucnosti, kako se vidi iz rumunske transakcije.

d) Sto se rezervnih delova tice, izracunali su da 80% nasih potreba moze zadovoljiti i zadovoljava obicnim komercijalnim putem, a sada se radi na tome da se bez menjanja pravne situacije <sup>još</sup> nađe način i za preostalih 20%.

e) SD ~~još~~ nije poslao Beloj kući nikakav nacrt ~~sig~~ Johnsonovog odgovora

Broj: \_\_\_\_\_ 1964 god.

11

Poslana \_\_\_\_\_  
Primljena \_\_\_\_\_

Titu; tu se se izgleda bespotrebno zateglo, jer je princip Johnsona da odgovori odmah sledeceg dana, kao sto bilo ucinjeno sa svim ostalim. Klajn siguran da SD jos nije ostavio odgovor, jer bi ga on video. Odgovor Titu bi mu prosao kroz ruke jer to tako sa svim onima koji traze specifican uvid Johnsona. Ima zemalja i licnosti u cijim potezima, telegramima Johnsonu, pa makar bili najrutinskiji, ili o odsustvu istih, moraju automatski da ga licno obaveste i dobiju njegovu izricitu direktivu za postupak. To spadaju one zemlje za koje Johnsonu narocito stalo da zna sta se ~~xxxx~~ sa njima desava. To su, pored ostalih, SSSR, Indonezija, Francuska, VB, Jugoslavija, Indija, UAR i sl.

Kad procitao telegram Tita Johnsonu, Klajn odmah rekao da dobra i sadrzajna, da veoma dobro sto poslednji paragraf pominje licne susrete kao korisne jer to i njihova ocena, da pretposlednji pasus sadrzajam, jasno postavlja ono sto Jugoslavija ~~ima~~ <sup>moze</sup> od SAD, ali konstruktivno, bez polemicnog tona.

f) Sto se poseta tice, ta on licno ne vidi mogucnosti za posetu Jugoslaviji tokom 1965, jer Johnson se vec obavezao prema LA i Zapadnoj Evropi, a ne moze

u jednoj godini tri vazna putovanja da cini. On isto tako ne smatra, sem ako ne bude kompletnog iznenadjenja i neocekivanih obrta, da bi Johnson 1965 putovao bilo u Moskvu, bilo u IE zemlje. U posetu Zapadnoj Evropi, koja bi, recimo, obuhvatila, VB, Francusku, ZN, Italiju, a ne bi isao u Holandiju, Svedsku, ne bi se mogla ukljuciti Jugoslavija, iz ociglednih politickih problema. Johnson isto tako ne bi spajao posetu Jugoslaviji sa posetom IE zemljama, jer nece da jh izjednačuje sa njima. Mozda u okviru neke posete Grackoj, Turskoj, Bliskom Istoku i sl. Sto se Hamfriga tice, tu Pretsednik treba da odluci da li, kada, gde i sl. a o tome jos nema nista.

g) On sasvim sigurno zna da Elbrick nije <sup>nikada tražio sastanak sa Johnsonom, ok R4</sup> Te stvari radi Klajn direktno. Procedura takva da takav zahtev postavi Rask, sa naznakom o cemu ambasador specificno zeli da razgovara, kako bi se Johnson pripremio. Takvog zahteva nije bilo. Druga je stvar ako Elbrick takav zahtev interno postavljao u SD, pa zakljucili da u ovom momentu nema nesto specificno da govori sa Pretsednikom.

( Klajn nije uopste postavljao neke probleme oko pisanja nase stampe, nase politike i sl, ~~pa~~ sto prosle godine par puta ostro radio. Postavljao se vrlo konstruktivno, mirno, skoro u sali govoreci da se ne treba oko nicega uzbudjivati!

Broj: \_\_\_\_\_ 1963 god.

13

Poslana \_\_\_\_\_  
Prihijena \_\_\_\_\_

"Ako Sukarno zeli da ide iz UN, neka ide; ako nas Naser upucuje da pijemo  
vedu iz Crvenog mora, u redu picemo je!" (Ovog puta se postavio manje  
polemicki, vise tretirajuci nase odnose kao normalne, bez posebnih problema, nego  
sugovornici u SD.)

M i c u n o v i c



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SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (B)

May 6 (?), 1965

**SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT REACTIONS  
TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ACTION IN  
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC****(a) The Press**

"New York Times" - In the beginning, the paper was much more cautious than when the Vietnamese crisis started. Now, it sharply attacks the intervention and its motives.

"Washington Post" - It does not support the action in the Dominican Republic as strongly as it does the intervention in Viet Nam.

"Christian Science Monitor" - After some initial hesitation, it supports the action.

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**(b) The Commentators**

Lippman - Actually supports President Johnson.

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**(c) The Congress**

The opposition is smaller than against the intervention in Viet Nam. Morse sharply criticizes. Fulbright and Church support. Mansfield, McGovern and Gruening are silent.

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**(d) Movements and Organizations**

Heretofore, there were no protests. There is no fear that a wider conflict may be involved in the Dominican Republic; such a threat exists in Viet Nam.

6. V. 1965

NEKI BITNIJI MOMENTI IZ DOSADASNJE REAKCIJE UNUTAR SAD NA JOHNSONOVU AKCIJU U S. DOMINGU;

a) Stampa:

Njujork Times je u početku mnogo opreznije no oko Vijetnama, ali danas do kraja ostro i frontalno osuđeo intervenciju i motivaciju. Clanci i Restona i Sulzbergera predstavljaju ustvari zamerke ili kritiku "Johnsonovoj doktrini", iako Reston, sa svojim hladnoratovskih pozicija, dopusta mogućnost da akcija i doktrina neizbežna.

Vashington Post ne daje onako cvrstu podršku oko S. Dominga kao oko Vijetnama. Stampa daje podršku jakim pisanjem o "komunističkom" elementu u S. Domingo događajima. Ali dosta prenosi i napade na SAD u svetu i UN.

Krisćen Sajens Monitor posle početnih sumnji i rezerve sada daje podršku, ali na liniji velikog dela štampa koji sada daje podršku akciji Administracije da se OAS privoli da da svoju legitimaciju akciji SAD, kao jedinog načina da se SAD izvuku iz vrlo teske političko-diplomatske situacije.

b) Komentatori:

Lipman, iako i on vidi nedoslednosti i problematičnost položaja i dosadašnje motivacije akcije, ustvari daje podršku Johnsonu na liniji sustinskog antikomunizma i svoje stare velikosilaske koncepcije o politici interesnih sfera.

c) Kongres:

Javna i poznata opozicija manja no oko Vijetnama. Do sada samo Morse ~~restoko~~ kritikovao. Pulbrajt na putu i podržao. Church podržao. Za Mansfielda, Grueninga, McGovern se ne zna, izgleda da <sup>novi</sup> cute. Johnson izvršio aktivan pritisak traženjem i dobijanjem dodatnih kredita.

d) Pokreti, organizacije: Do sada nema proglašenja, protesta, piketa i sl. oko Vijetnama. Pitanje je da li će ovo biti pokriveno Vijetnam ili će se pokret protesta ~~možda~~ ojačati stimulusom akcije u S. Domingu.

Iako se otvorenije i cinicnije u štampi, itd komentariše da SAD izolovane, da iskrcavanje marinaca predstavlja 19 vek, i sl.



utisak je, bar za sada, da je, bez obzira na nazivanje akcije pravim  
imenom, opozicija akciji manje jaka, izrazena i direktna nego akciji u  
Vijetnamu. Sagovornici nam govorili da to zbog toga sto mesanje u LA  
poslove poznato i tradicionalno, sto jaka psihoza antikomunizma jos jaca  
kad rec o "obalama SAD", sto se ima iskustvo sa Kubom, te sto ocigledno nema  
straha da bilo sta u S. Domingu nosi u sebi bilo kakvu opasnost sireg  
konflikta, za razliku od Vijetnama.

U tom smislu, relativno, Administracija u laksem poloza ju u sprovođenju  
i priznato  
akcije za koju opste poznato da prijavija. (Cesta uporedjenja sa sovjetskom  
akcijom u Madjarskoj).

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANITEM #1

CONVERSATION BETWEEN EDWIN C. PANCOAST, USIA OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS, AND CVIJETO JOB, PRESS ATTACHE AT THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY

The Cuban Crisis

1)

The United States action has to result in the dismantling of the bases in Cuba. Pancoast personally and on the basis of his understanding of the situation does not believe that the exclusive condition for the lifting of the blockade is the complete dismantling of the bases; in addition, he does not believe that the complete dismantling should take place immediately. The discontinuation of the sending of rockets to Cuba, the stopping of the further construction of the bases, some international inspection etc., could solve the first phase of the crisis; however, the solution of the second phase should not be too long delayed.

It seems that the Brazilian proposal concerning the "denuclearization" of Latin America and Africa has attracted the greatest attention as a kind of solution.

2)

The reaction of President Tito was moderate and calm; consequently, there are no objections in this connection. It is true that he made reproaches to the United States by saying that the United Nations could have been more thoroughly used; many people are of this same opinion in this country; however, he did not call for a fight against "aggressive imperialism." It can be seen that President Tito has thoroughly mastered the art of most coldly expressing his thoughts concerning the situation and of constructively saying what, in his opinion, should be done.

270  
12  
282

It is a pity that the press has not published President Tito's statement because it would have shown to the American public the true attitude of nonaligned Yugoslavia, a constructive and independent socialist country.

(Pancoast's remark that the statement was not published in the press is correct. Pancoast did not know that on the very day of the statement, it was broadcasted on radio and on television.)

### The Clause of the Most Favored Nation

1)

The USIA too (sic) expects to receive and has asked for the statement of the President concerning the clause of the most favored nation. The USIA considers that it is in an extremely difficult position in front of the Yugoslav public opinion. The USIA is afraid that our public opinion may interpret the discontinuation of the clause of the most favored nation as a punishment inflicted by the United States on the Yugoslav people.

There are no arguments for propaganda in Yugoslavia; there are not even arguments for a good defense. That is why the USIA and the Embassy have been told that they have to emphasize as much as possible that aid will still be given, that the President has been authorized to continue aiding the communist countries and the countries which are in trade relations with Cuba.

2)

The whole situation which has developed in connection with Cuba can deteriorate even more and become worse because of the anticommunist attitude of the Congress.

However, the Administration will try to re-establish the clause of the most favored nation.

Panceast, referent za Jugoslaviju USIA - Jobus

Kubanska kriza

1) Akcija SAD mora da ima za rezultat demontiranje baza na Kubi. Liscno, iz svega ste razume u situaciji, ne misli da isključivi uslov za suspenziju blokade kompletno demontiranje baza, niti da toga mora biti sasvim ~~raz~~ oimah. Pouzdano i dovoljno bezbedjeno stopiranje dotufanja raketa, dalje ingradnje baza, uz neku inspekciju i prisustvo kod baza medjunarodnih posmatraca, inspektora i sl. moglo bi biti resenje za prvu fazu, s tim sto se druga ne bi suviše odložila. Po svemu, trzisiski predlog o demuklearizaciji LA i Afrike privlaci najveću pažnju kao forma izvodjenja.

2) Reakcija Predsednika Tita umerena, hladnokrvna, ne mogu joj sta zavriti. Tacno da napravio prigovore SAD-u (mogle se više iskoristiti UN, sa cime se i mnogi u ovoj zemlji slazu), ali nema poziva na borbu protiv "agresivnog imperijalizma". Vidi se da je do kraja usao u to da na najhladniji nacin izrazi ono sto misli o situaciji i konstruktivno izlozi ono sto po njegovom misljenju treba da predstavlja potrebnu akciju. Steta sto stampa nije dala publicitet toj izjavi, jer bi to javnosti u SAD pokazale stvarni stav i lik Jugoslavije kao neangazovane, konstruktivne, nezavisne socijalisticke zemlje. (Panceast ~~staza~~ Naved Panceasta da izjava nije dobila publicitet u stampi tacno; nije mu bilo poznato da je na dan izjave ista ~~izj~~ na TV i radiu u New Yorku ~~velika~~ ~~izj~~)

K.N.P.

1) I USIA je ocekivala i trazila izjavu Predsednika o K.N.P. Zaključili su da su krajnje teskom položaju pred jugoslovenskom javnoscu; beje se da n sa javnost ne shvati da SAD kaznjavaju jug. narod povlacenjem K.N.P. Nemaju argumenata za prepagandni nastup u Jugoslaviji, cak ni za debru defanzivu. Zato su perucili USIS-u i Ambasadi da sto je moguće više isticu da ce pomoci ici, da Predsednik <sup>do K</sup> ~~do K~~ ~~do K~~ ~~do K~~ nastavlja pomoci komunistickim zemljama, kao i drugim zemljama koje trguju sa Kubom.

2) Citava nastala situacija oko Kube moze da jca više zasitri ~~antikomunizam~~ antikomunizam u Kongresu. Najjuti, Administracija ce ici na vratanje K.N.P.

ITEM #3

October 25

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THOMAS BRIMLOW, COUNSELOR OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY, AND CVIJETO JOB, PRESS ATTACHE AT THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY

1)

Great Britain points out that by installing bases in Cuba the Soviet Union intended to change the balance of power; it was a blow to the United States and a provocation at the same time; the Soviet Union erroneously believed that the United States was not ready to fight.

The United States was compelled to react. If the Soviet Union had succeeded, the situation would have been worse.

The attitude of Kennedy and of the United States Government was that the Soviet Union has to be definitely stopped and that the Russians must be compelled to withdraw. These are the actual facts; all the moral and legalistic debates cannot change them and are anachronisms.

2)

Great Britain knows that Kennedy has selected the means, that is, the blockade, which allows the greatest length of time for diplomatic discussions. Kennedy has purposely selected the blockade because he wanted to give time. This is the second vital fact that Great Britain is taking into consideration in evaluating the situation.

Any other action would have had tougher momentary and lasting consequences and would have unavoidably led to physical confrontation, that is, to the bombing of the Cuban bases and to the killing of Russians or to invasion. On the other hand, a blockade allows the postponement of the conflict and the withdrawal of the Russians with less loss of prestige.

3)

The third vital fact is that the United States has first and immediately raised the question in the United Nations.

The fact that the Security Council of the United Nations was faced by a fait accompli is not of a vital nature; the main thing was that the machinery of the United Nations was put in motion, that there was possibility for pourparlers, that there was time and that there was room for "effective diplomacy."

This means that there was an additional element, namely "the dimension of the situation" (sic) and not only a bare physical confrontation of two powers in a vacuum (sic).

4)

Brinelow personally foresees these diplomatic developments: Security Council, veto, General Assembly with long discussions because it is too large, thus, possibly summit meeting of two, of three, etc. However, he immediately said that a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting would be very difficult after all that happened.

In his predictions, Brinelow is guided by the evaluation that the Soviet Union does not wish a showdown in Cuba.

In case of a conflict of ships, the United States will be extremely "tough."

5)

It can be said that the United States Government is clearly aware of the fact that the Russians cannot be compelled to abandon completely the Cuban bases if mere formal declarations concerning prestige and face-saving are made.

The Americans have to make some concessions which must have some material significance. However, the news published in the press and related to the reciprocal dismantling of United States bases do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the United States concerning the concessions involved.



Brimelev, savetnik VB Ambasade Jobua

1) VB polazi od toga da SSSR, bazom na Kubi, isao na izmenu ravnoteze snaga, izazov SAD, nanosenje udara SAD-u, polazeći i od pogradsne teze da SAD nesprema da se bore. SAD morale reagovati; da SSSR uspe došlo bi do još teže situacije. Raspoređenje Kenedija, vlade SAD takvo da isli na odlucno zaustavljanje, s tim da se Rusi materaju da se ovdje povuku. To je materijalna cinjenica situacije, i sve moralno-legalisticke rasprave je ne menjaju i vec anahronizano.

2) Britaniji je poznato da je Kenedi izabrao sredstvo, nacini akcije (blokada) koja daje najvise vrednosti za efektivnu diplomatiju. Kenedi je i izabrao ovaj put upravo za to da da to izvesno vreme. To je druga bitna cinjenica koju VB uzima u proceni situacije. <sup>xx</sup>

3) Treca bitna cinjenica jeste da su SAD odmah, prve predale stvar UN; nije tu sada bitno sto je postavljanjem blokade SB stavljen pred gotov cin. Osnovno je da UN masinerija pokrenuta, da se pregevara, dobija u vremenu, sto sve daje prostora za "efektivnu diplomatiju". Postoji ~~ostava~~, znaci, jos jedan element, dimenzija situacije, a ne samo gola fizicka konfrontacija dve sile u vakuumu.

4) On licno predvidja ovakav tek situacije na planu diplomatije: SB, veto, GS koja preglomazna pa dugo raspravlja, pa zato, eventualno, Summit, dvojice, trojice i sl. Medjutim, odmah naglasava da bi susret Kenedi-Kruscev posle svega, odnosno u ovakvoj situaciji, bio veoma tezak. <sup>XXX</sup>

5) Moze se reci da Vladi SAD jasno da se Rusi ne mogu materati na totalno povlacenje baza sa Kube, samo uz formalno covanje prestiza kroz formalne, deklarativne klouzule, vec mora doći do nekih koncesija koje i materijalno nesto znace. Medjutim, vesti u novinama o uzvratnom demontiranju nekih SAD baza ne cirkavaju nikakve ideje Amerike o tome.

<sup>xx</sup>  
Svaka druga akcija bi imala teze momentalne i figuracne posledice i predstavja li bi neminovnu fizicku konfrontaciju: invazija ili bombardovanje Kube (baza) bi znacilo pucanje na, ubijanje Rusa. A ako blokada neguje odlaganje susreta, silektivna promena, povlacenje Rusa sa nanje gubitka prestiza i sl.



ITEM #2

October 25

CONVERSATION BETWEEN EDWARD R. RATTIE, COUNSELLOR OF THE  
CANADIAN EMBASSY, AND CVIJETO JOB, PRESS ATTACHE AT THE  
YUGOSLAV EMBASSY

1)

Rattie emphasizes the same things which were emphasized in the British Embassy. He says that the United States has chosen the least dangerous measures, that is, the blockade. He also says that the Canadian Government was encouraged by the fact that the United States has resorted to the United Nations and that the last paragraph of the American resolution proposes pourparlers with Russia.

2)

He emphasizes, just as it was emphasized in the British Embassy, that it is interesting and important as a precedent that the United States for the first time asked the United Nations for action in the Western Hemisphere.

3)

He has the impression, like the people in the British Embassy, that the United States Government has not yet decided what measures to undertake in connection with the dismantling of the bases; namely, it has not yet decided whether to sharpen the blockade, whether to resort to bombing, whether to invade Cuba, etc.

4)

The impression at the Canadian Embassy is that the blockade can be lifted, at least temporarily, and that it will not be strictly tied to the dismantling of the bases (Translator's Note: This passage is unclear in the original).

For the time being, great attention is devoted to the Brazilian proposal concerning the "denuclearization" of

Latin America; this "denuclearization" could be a good solution. In addition, from the formal point of view, the dismantling of a Cuban base is requested and not the dismantling of a Soviet base.

5)

The Canadian Embassy also has not the impression (Translator's Note: It is probably implied that a similar impression prevails in the British Embassy) that U Thant's proposal will succeed.

6)

All actually depends upon the "behavior" of the Russian ships. A physical confrontation should not be excluded.

Any Russian act against West Berlin will certainly lead to war. The United States is absolutely determined in this regard. Only a kind of limited blockade of West Berlin, and its limited character should be immediately announced, could be a step which would not automatically and instantaneously put in motion the armed forces and would not immediately cause an armed conflict. The situation of Berlin is such that no limited war can be fought there, that is, a war with conventional weapons. Any shooting around Berlin would mean war.

6) (sic)

According to the first reactions of the State Department, the United States will not accept U Thant's proposal. This does not mean that the proposal should not have been made or that new proposals should not be submitted.

7)

According to the information at the disposal of the Canadian Embassy, the United States Government has not yet adopted a decision concerning its action toward Cuba, if diplomacy does not succeed and if the problem of the dismantling of the bases is not solved in due time.

It is true that Kennedy has said that the blockade could be a mere beginning; however, for the time being, it has not yet been decided whether it will be followed by bombings or by invasion.

8)

The British believe that it is possible that Gromyko did not know how far the arming of Cuba with rockets had advanced. The British cannot discuss the question why Kennedy did not speak about the rockets to Gromyko; Lippman reproves Kennedy for not having spoken about this matter; however, Lippmann's reproval that diplomacy is discarded is not correct because the United States has offered the possibility for diplomatic discussions.

25. X. 62.

Savtnik kanadske ambasade Retti-Jobu:

- 1) Kao i u Ambasadi VB istica da SAD kuabrale najmanje opasnu neru-blokadu i daje slične razloge. Iste tako kaže da Kanadska vlada ankurazirana time što i SAD nije na UN i što u rezoluciji koju SAD predložila, u posljednjem pasusu, stoji traženje pregovora sa Rusima.
- 2) Kao i VB Ambasadi poivlaci da interesantno, i kao presedan vama, što SAD prvi put zatražili mjestvo UN u Zapadnoj Hemisferi.
- 3) Kao i u VB ambasadi, iznose utisak da Vlada SAD jos nije odredila precizan kurs akcije oko demontiranja baza, te da nema jos odluke za invaziju, bombardovanje, strozu blokadu i sl.
- 4) Njihov utisak da ce se nekad otrejiti blokada, bar privremeno, suspenzija, ed obavljenog uklanjanja baza, kao maksimuma. Za sada poklanjaju paznju brazilskom predlogu denuklearizacije LA; to bi mogao biti istar izlaz. Porod estalog, formalno, radi se o uklanjanju kubanske baza, a ne sovjetske.
- 5) Ni oni nemaju utisak da bi mogao uspeti U Tantov predlog.

25/1

6) I dalje sve zavisi od ponasanja ruskih brodova. Fizička konfrontacija nije isključena. Svaka ruska akcija na Zapadni Berlin sigurno znači rat. SAD apsolutno rezano. Jedino ~~je~~ ~~to~~ ~~je~~ ~~to~~ ~~je~~ takva ograničena blokada ZB, čija ograničenost bi otišla bila i deklarirana, može biti korak koji ne bi možda stavio otišah pokret oruzane snage, odnosno izazvao njihov sukob. Inace, takva je situacija oko Berlina, da ne može biti ograničenog rata, konv. oruzjen. Svaki pacanj oko Berlina bi značio eskalaciju u rat.

6) Prema prvim reakcijama iz SO, SAD neće prihvatiti U Tantov predlog. To ne znači da ga nije trebalo napraviti, ili da ne treba činiti nove.

7) Prema njihovim informacijama Vlada SAD do sada nije donijela odluku o tome kakvu će akciju voditi prema Kubi ako se ne uspe sa efektivnom diplomacijom, ako ne dolje u odgovarajućem vremenu do resanja pitanja uklanjanja baza. Tačno je da je Kennedy govorio da blokada može biti samo početak, ali nema jes odluke o tome da će mu slediti bombardovanje, ili invazija.

8) Britanci dopustaju mogućnost da Gromiko nije znao dokle se na Kubi desilo sa raketama. Ne mogu da ulaze u to kakvi su razlozi Kennedija što mu nije to rekao, a što Lipman pregovara. Frigover Lipmana da je diplomatija suspendovana nije tačan, jer je SAD bas dala mogućnosti za to.

Xk xxx Polazi u tone od procene da SSSR neće showdown oko Kube; u slučaju da dođe da sudara brojeva SAD bi bile jako "tough".

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANConversation of January (?) 21, 1963

Dr. Karl Keysen, the Assistant of McGregor Bundy, Special Adviser of Kennedy for questions of national security and foreign policies

(1) The White House and the State Department were somewhat excited about President Tito's trip to the Soviet Union. Up to now, they have come to the conclusion that Yugoslavia is now nearer to the Soviet Union than it was five years ago; in this rapprochement, the Soviet Union has changed its attitude more than Yugoslavia.

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(2) It was explained to Keysen that Khrushchev and the Soviet Union are more willing now to accept Yugoslavia as an independent and nonaligned nation. In this connection, Keysen has not expressed any disagreement and has not made any comments.

Keysen's attitude remained the same when it was explained to him that President Tito was favorably impressed by the development of the Soviet foreign policy and activities in general; President Tito was favorably impressed by Khrushchev's role in the solution of the Cuban crisis, by our (Yugoslav) interest in establishing better relations with the Soviet Union, by Khrushchev's influence on the events of great significance which are taking place in that part of the world, etc.

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(3) He (Keysen) was astounded to hear that the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia are in a very difficult phase and that they perhaps are at their lowest point since 1949. He said that this is not his opinion and evaluation.

He did not say anything when he was told that the relations in question are, for the time being, in a state of constant deterioration.

He completely understands the significance that we attach to the clause of the most favored nation. He agrees that this has become the main problem of the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia. He repeated that the (United States) Administration has done everything for the purpose of avoiding the passing of the amendment; however, he said that an important Trade Act was involved. He affirmed that the Administration is determined to ask the Congress for the rectification of this situation.

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(4) He was particularly interested in hearing about the accumulation of negative events caused by Americans which have been occurring in the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia; namely:

(a) after the visit of Dulles, not a single one of the most prominent members of the United States Government has visited Yugoslavia; Nixon, Eisenhower and Johnson were very careful in avoiding it;

(b) they (The Americans) never arranged the visit of President Tito to the United States;

(c) they (the Americans) allowed anti-Yugoslav emigrant demonstrations to take place in New York when President Tito was there; this did not happen to President Tito when he visited other Western countries (London, Paris), although Yugoslav emigrants also live in these countries;

(d) the (American) reaction to the Belgrade Conference and the hard and rude memorandum which was addressed to the Yugoslavs in this connection; our (Yugoslav) reply was strong but constructive;

(e) the discontinuation of the clause of the most favored nation is, in addition to other things, also an insult because Yugoslavia is treated like a second-class country; this discontinuation coincided with the unsatisfactory attitude of the Common Market and this has all the more affected Yugoslavia which increasingly needs markets for Yugoslav goods;

(f) the attack on our (Yugoslav) mission in Western Germany and the murder of Popovic have not provoked any reproval of this act and any support of Yugoslavia.



Keyson said that it was particularly useful for him to hear all these things. No matter how the situation really is and no matter what the United States will or will not do, he has become aware that this in fact is an accumulation of unsatisfactory occurrences.

He commented on them and categorized them. He said that it is clear to him that they were mostly due to their (American) wrong moves in the field of "personal relations."

Keyson added that Tito is considered in the White House as being a very courageous and independent leader.

As for the Belgrade Conference, Keyson said that the Americans can understand the motives of our attitude at the Conference involved and he hopes that we (the Yugoslavs) can understand their motives for such a reaction; he did not wish to elaborate for the time being whether it was wise to send us "such a memorandum."

The clause of the most favored nation is quite clear. They (the Americans) can understand that it was particularly hard because of the difficulties with the European Common Market. However, he added that the American policies are aimed at opening the European Common Market and at avoiding discrimination as much as possible.

In the end, Keyson spoke about the attack in Bonn. He said that the Americans have nothing to do with it. They (the Americans) transmitted to Adenauer an official and confidential remark stressing that it is very unfortunate that such a thing could have happened.

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(5) In connection with the clause of the most favored nation, Keyson again emphasized the strength of the public opinion, the fact that the Administration cannot issue orders, etc.

I pointed out that the Administration is not quite helplessly confronted by a monolithic anticommunist wall; I reminded him of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, of the change of attitude concerning Hungary in the United Nations, of the aid granted to the communist nations, etc. I recalled that, as a matter of rule, the Administration had got the things which it most wanted.



Keyesen replied that the distribution of the forces, of the authority and of the power in the Congress should be taken into consideration, etc. He also added that the clause of the most favored nation is by no means the first problem of Kennedy. If for instance he had the choice between the passing of the tax law and of the clause of the most favored nation, he would chose the tax law which is by far his most important legislative proposal.

However, Kennedy will anyway ask for the re-establishment of the clause of the most favored nation; the outlook is now considerably more favorable than it was last year. The United States has by no means "stricken out" Yugoslavia and its relations with Yugoslavia.

I pointed out that some of the things which do not seem to be of paramount importance in a given moment can be of capital importance in the following moment when various implications and consequences of various questions are taken into consideration. I particularly emphasized my profound worry concerning the development of the relations if the clause of the most favored nation is not re-established. The present-day situation prevents useful initiatives from both sides. I indirectly said that the solution of the question of the clause of the most favored nation is awaited and that some things stand behind this solution.

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(6) While talking about the attitude and the conceptions of Kennan, Keyesen particularly stressed that "Kennan's outlook is dark and pessimistic because he considers that his job in Belgrade is tough." Keyesen spoke about this matter in a manner that clearly showed that he considers that Kennan's attitude is influenced by personal considerations.

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In the end, Keyesen said that: our support of the Soviet Union, the statements that we have common aims with the USSR (the victory of socialism), the declarations that we agree with the Soviets regarding the most important questions, etc., cause a particularly negative reaction in the United States because Khrushchev has stated that his aim is "to bury the United States," that is, the present-day social system of the West. Kennedy never said such a thing about the USSR. They (the Americans) consider that communism is a problem of the communist countries. These countries can occupy themselves with communism.

Kennedy has especially emphasized his attitude in his "State of the Union" message.

The United States has nothing against any lines of Yugoslav foreign policy as long as these lines are suited to the Yugoslav interests. Suspicions are aroused only when some of these lines follow the interests which are not Yugoslav.

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(8) Finally, he said that Bundy has approximately the same opinion about all these things.

Dr. Karl Keyser, zaveznik McGrezor BUN Y-a, spec. savetnika Kancelija  
za pitanja nacionalne bezbednosti i spoljne politike:

1) Bilo je (u BK, SD) izvesnog uzbuđenja oko puta Predsednika Tita u SSSR; do sada su dosli do zaključka da smo blizi SSSR-u no što smo bili pre 5 godina, s tim da SSSR onaj koji više menjao svoj stav, a ne Jugoslavija.

2) Keyser, bez nekih posebnih komentara i bez nekog neslaganja saslušao izlaza nje o tome da H. i SSSR sada više spremni da nas priime kao nezavisne, neangazovane, o povoljnim utiscima Predsednika o daljem kretanju sovjetske spoljne politike i akcije uopste, o priznanju H-u za ulogu u rešavanju kubanske krize, o našem interesu da obezbedjujemo što bolje odnose sa SSSR-om, svoje prisustvo i uticaj u događajima od ogromne važnosti koji se desavaju u tom delu sveta, itd, itd.

3) Sa iznenađenjem i primedbom da to nije bila i njegova procena primio konstataciju da odnosi SAD-Jugoslavija u vrlo teskoj situaciji, na taci koja možda najniza posle 1949. Nije imao primedbu na konstataciju da se, za sada, stalno pogorsavaju. Razume potpuno znacaj koji pridajemo KNP, slaze se da to postalo centralno pitanje odnosa. Ponavlja da Administracija pokusala sve da ne dodje do amandmana, ali se radilo o krupnom Trade Exp. Actu. Tvrdi da Administracija resena da trazi od Kongresa ispravljanje.

4) Sa posebnim interesovanjem pratio navodjenje primera akumulaciji negativnih stvari u nasim odnosima, sa njihove strane: a) posle Dullesa nijedan od najistaknutijih clanova Vlade SAD u Jugoslaviji; Nikson, Ajzenhauer i Djonson je pazljivo obisli; b) Nikad nisu obezbedili ostvarenje posete Predsednika Tita SAD-u; c) dopustili anti-jug. emigrantske demonstracije kad Tito bio u N.Y., sto im se nije desilo u drugim zapadnim zemljama, gde je takodjer ima (London, Pariz); d) reakcija na Beogradsku konferenciju i tvrd i grub memorandum koji nam uputili, a mi odgovorili cvrsto ali konstruktivno; e) KNP, koja pored svega i uvreda, jer znaci tretman kao

neke drugorazredne zemlje, a to koincidiralo sa nepovoljnim održavanjem Zajedničkog Trzista, pa utoliko teže pada što nam sve potrebija trzista za našu robu; f) Napad na našu misiju u ZN, ubistvo Popovica, bez javne podrške nama, odnosno osude akta.

K. rekao da mu posebno korisno da ovo čuje; bez obzira kako stvari zaista stajale, i šta SAD uradile ili ne, vidi da ovo bila akumulacija nepovoljnih momenata. Kategorisuci ih i komentarisuci ih posebno rekao da mu jasno da se dobrim delom radilo o slabim njihovim potezima u ~~внннн~~ domenu "ličnih odnosa" (personal relations), ali dodaje da Tito kod njih, u BK, uziva ugled veoma hrabrog, samostalnog lidera; što se Beogradske konferencije tiče, oni mogu da razumeju naše razloge za stavove na ~~našoj~~, <sup>našoj</sup> njihovim razloga za onakvu reakciju, "ne ulazeci sada u to da li je bilo pametno upucivati nam onakav memorandum". KNP je jasna stvar; shvataju da nam posebno tesko palo radi teskoca sa EEC, ali treba dodati da citava njihova politika da EEC ucine otvorenim, sa što manje diskriminacije. Na kraju, napad u Bonu: oni nemaju ništa sa tim; zvanično i poverljivo su Adenauerovoj vladi preneli svoju primedbu da je veoma nesretno što se tako nešto moglo dogoditi.

5) K., u vezi KNP, ponovo naglasava snagu antikomunističkog ~~мнннн~~ ~~мнннн~~ teskoce Administracije koja ne može da naredjuje, itd. ~~мнннн~~ Kada mu izneseno da nam niz primera (Truscev u SAD, promena stava o Mađarskoj u UN, održavanje pomoći "komunističkim zemljama") <sup>itd.</sup> govori da, posebno u domenu spoljne politike, Administracija nije bespomocno suocena sa nekim monolitnim antikomunističkim zidom, i da ~~мнннн~~ <sup>po pravilu</sup> postizala što jako htela, K. rekao da treba imati u vidu raspored snaga, vlasti, sile u Kongresu i sl. Takodjer, da KNP nije prvi problem za Kenedija; ako bi, recimo, doslo do dileme da li progurati Zakon o porezima, koji mu daleko najvažniji legislativni predlog, ili KNP, uslovljeno, jasno je da bi se

opredelio za Zakon o porezima kao vazniji.

Medjutim, trazice svakako vracanje KNP i izgledi su sada dosta bolji no prosla godine. *SAD nisu nikada "otpravali" Jugoslaviju, ni odnose njenu.*

Primetio sam da ono sto ne izgleda "najvaznije" u jednom trenutku, moze da bude i te kako kapitalno vazno u sledecem, posebno obzirom na implikacije i posledice raznih pitanja. Posebno sam naglasio duboku zabrinutost za razvoj odnosa ako se ne vrati KNP; sada snje stanje onemogucava korisne inicijative ~~od~~ i jedne i druge strane; indirektno sam rekao da se ceka KNP i da neke stvari stoje radi toga.

6) U razgovoru o stavu, pogledima Kenana K. narocito naglasio da "Kenan mozda gleda ~~na~~ crno i pesimisticki zato sto smatra svoj posao u Beogradu teskim". K. o ovome govorio na takav nacin da bilo jasno da ~~se~~ smatra da Kenanov stav licno obojen.

7) Kysen na kraju, ~~izjavljivanjaj~~ kaze da nasi stavovi podrške SSSR-u, izjavljivanja da imamo zajednicke ciljeve sa SSSR-om (pobeda socijalizma), da se slazemo u najvaznijim pitanjima, itd, izazivaju posebno negativnu reakciju u SAD zato sto istovremeno Hruscov govori da mu je cilj da "shrani SAD", odnosno danasnji drustveni poredak Zapada. To Kenedi nikada nije rekao za SSSR; oni smatraju komunizam pitanjem problemom komunistickih zemalja; neka se one bave komunizmom. Ovakav stav je Kenedi posebno istakao u svojoj "Poruci u stanju Nacije". SAD nemaju nista protiv nijednog jugoslovenskog stava u spoljnoj politici, sve dotle dok ti stavovi su na liniji jugoslovenskih interesa; sumnje pocinju ondsakoda bi neki stavovi bili opredeljeni i brigom za interese koji nisu jugoslovenski

8) Na kraju ~~chak~~ da i Bundy o ~~svemu~~ *otprilike isto misli.*

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

To the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs  
(Belgrade)

The State Department believes that for the time being the most important thing is to have contacts between Yugoslavia and Western Germany which would not be mere protests, mutual accusations, etc. The United States is working on this matter but it is rather skeptical. It succeeded last year. However, it seems that the whole matter is now postponed because a new explosion has come.

The United States has similar difficulties with the relations between Greece and Bulgaria. The United States had just succeeded in persuading the Greeks to negotiate with the Bulgarians in order to normalize their relations and stabilize the whole region when Papandreu fell and the spy process took place in Sofia. Thus, there are no results for the time being. The Greeks had even agreed about a date concerning the start of the negotiations with the Bulgarians.

(Andrews of the State Department to Job.)

s/ Micunovic

(Handwritten note:  
Do not send.

s/V.H.

1/15/64

J

---

DSIP:

Po oceni SD-a sada najvažnije da između Jugoslavije i ZN dodje do kontakata čija jedina sadržina ne bi bili protesti, uzajamna optuživanja i sl. Na to <sup>na</sup>SDU rade, iako sa dosta skepse, jer svojim uticajem kod obe strane to uspelo prošle godine, ali se izgleda problem samo odložio, jer opet doslo do eksplozije. Sličnih teskoca imaju sa odnosima Grčka-Bugarska. Tamo su bili nagovorili Grke da idu na pregovore sa Bugarima da bi se normalizovali odnosi i time dalje doprinelo stabilizaciji celavog područja, kad doslo do pada Papandreua, spijunskog procesa u Sofiji, pa za sada ostalo bez rezultata. Grci se već bili složili i sa datumom otpocinjavanja pregovora sa Bugarima.

(Andrews, SD Jobu)

M i c u n o v i c

*me slati -  
U.M.*



SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Division - Belgrade

March 3, 1964

BRUBER  
sec p 9

I

(1) The discontinuation of military aid to Yugoslavia is actually a rather symbolic matter.

It is true that the President does not usually cancel such a decision within a period of a couple of months.

However, as far as B. knows, the Yugoslav Government has not either here or in Belgrade officially asked the United States for explanations about the practical meaning of President Johnson's decision regarding the spare parts. The Yugoslav Government has not asked whether the decision means that the United States Government has no possibilities or whether it does not wish to furnish the parts involved.

Consequently, the Americans probably do not know whether Yugoslavia still needs the spare parts.

As far as we are concerned, we certainly have the right to criticize the decision as negative and arbitrary.

However, the necessity of rendering this actually symbolic decision is the result of the American evaluation of the United States political realities and of the need to apply the rather clearly expressed wishes of the Congress. Johnson has evaluated that he should have acted the way he did.



Yugoslavia too has its political realities. Yugoslavia too does sometimes things which are criticized by the United States.

However, all this does not necessarily mean that the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia are not good. These relations were stabilized after the re-establishment of the clause of the most favored nation and they can be further developed.

\*\*\*

(2) The selection of Elbrick, one of the most eminent and most able American Ambassadors, is the direct result of Johnson's and of Rusk's care for the relations with Yugoslavia. This selection reflects the importance which is attributed to the relations involved. Actually, this selection reflects the importance which is attributed to Yugoslavia in general.

(The sending of Elbrick after seven months is merely due to the bureaucratic procedures and to the difficulties which followed the assassination of Kennedy --/Translator's Note: This paragraph has been stricken out in the original text./)

\*\*\*

Johnson's telegram addressed to Tito reflects the line of policy of the United States which is explained above. In Rusk's speech, the passage treating Yugoslavia reveals that he much cares to show the American public what are his policies toward Yugoslavia. Before making his speech, Rusk had told Johnson about its main elements and Johnson had immediately endorsed them.

Johnson is persuaded and so are the men in the White House -- such as Bundy -- that the relations with Yugoslavia are good and that there are no particular problems.

In the relations with almost each country, there are today good and bad things. For instance the activities of certain organizations and individuals against the Consulate in Chicago are a bad thing.

However, we must be persuaded that the United States, the State Department and the White House are paying the most serious attention to this state of affairs. They do all they can for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations of the United States and in order to protect us from attacks.

The fact that they cannot always achieve results in this regard is due to the realities of the United States.

Kennedy himself said on one occasion that a division has to fight in order that one American citizen may register at an American university. This is a deficiency of the United States but it is a reality that the Americans are fighting.

Actually, the situation in Chicago is an isolated one and it should not influence the relations between the two countries.

\*\*\*

For instance, if Johnson were asked now about the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, he would reply that they are good. These relations are not listed as a problem on the crowded agenda of the President.

Johnson would also say that he is continuing the Kennedy (Translator's Note; This last word has been stricken out and in its place it is marked) policies which were heretofore applied toward Yugoslavia.

\*\*\*

(3) The Yugoslavs should be very satisfied if they analyze Johnson's voting related to Yugoslavia during the whole time that he was in the Senate.

Recently, Goldwater attacked Johnson's votings in the Senate as being more leftist than those of the liberal Humphrey.

\* \* \*

## II

B. said that from his conversations with Johnson, from the meetings of the National Security Council, from the evaluations of Bundy, from the material which he reads and from the analysis of Johnson's votings, he may say that Johnson has definite conceptions of the world, of the foreign policy philosophy, of the role of the United States, of the possibilities of the United States, of peace, of war, etc. These conceptions are similar to those of Kennedy in many of their vital elements.

Johnson, like Kennedy, considers that the world must be varied and that, in that sense, the world must be "coexistent." Johnson does not want to change regimes in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, etc., by force.

The thing that Johnson would like most and for which he most feels is peace; he wishes to discard war. That is why he energetically favors disarmament. He wishes to continue the policies inaugurated by the Test Ban Agreement.

As far as Johnson is concerned, he would like to take off the agenda -- the world crises of Laos and Vietnam. However, he does not wish to withdraw and to be defeated only because (Red) China and North Vietnam have chosen to fight a guerrilla war.

Like Kennedy, Johnson is for the United Nations. Like Kennedy, he does not wish to see the United States burdened with new responsibilities in the United Nations against its will.

Consequently, the basic foreign political conceptions of Johnson do never vitally differ from those of Kennedy.

His style and his methods are different.

Johnson is a little less wordly minded or fashionable than Kennedy. He is a little more accentuated as a nationalist than Kennedy but this is more a matter of form than of substance.

In this connection, he asks more from the others. However, this is a nuance and not the essence.

\* \* \*

### III

Here are some moves of the United States:

- Cyprus - The United States followed Great Britain. The solution within the NATO did not succeed. Thus, there was a change of attitude.

- Zanzibar - First, it was characterized as communist. Then, it was recognized when their representative was thrown out.

- Cuba - The first evaluation was that the fishing boats were part of a large Cuban offensive in connection with Panama. Then, the whole matter was reduced to the size of a mere technical police incident.

The impression of confusion in the work of the Administration and in the work of the President in the foreign policies is created. Then, the Americans defend their errors.

We wish to emphasize three things:

(a) The world and the United States are undergoing a fast and strange series of crises during the last three months.

(b) Johnson is in no hurry to render decisions and he, up to a certain point, leaves the events to develop. He does it because he wishes to learn the things first, to get thoroughly acquainted with them and then to make decisions entailing permanent obligations or to formulate vital positions.

Kennedy, too, needed three years to arrive at his speech at the American University.

Johnson wishes to be the undeniable and unique chief in general including the foreign policies. Johnson still does not wish to tackle the details and he will do that when he gets acquainted with the matters as his subordinates are acquainted.

Naturally, during this phase, the subordinates are more independent, they decide because they have to decide.

(c) Consequently, such and similar situations and the American reactions do not convey the impression that Johnson is directing the foreign policies.

Taking a look at the specific situations, we see:

- Cyprus - The only wish of the United States is to avoid the crisis and the war between two allies, Greece and Turkey. The Americans believe that the fastest and the surest way was through the NATO. This did not succeed. However, the United States is neither in principle nor otherwise opposed to the solution through the United Nations if it can be done.

- Zanzibar - The Americans followed the British and this limited the freedom of their maneuvers. However, the United States has no direct interest in Zanzibar but Great Britain has; thus, it is logical that the British should have taken the initiative.

- Cuba - In the first moment, the Americans thought that something significant was undertaken. As soon as they became aware that it was not the case, they immediately acted in accordance.

\* \* \*

#### IV

I pointed out that one can receive the impression that the United States is becoming increasingly conservative because:

it tries to solve the Cyprus problem out of the United Nations,

it (Rusk) expressed reserve toward the General Secretariat of the United Nations a few weeks ago,

it endeavors to keep the status quo in the field of the relations of the developed and of the underdeveloped countries (the Conference for Development and Trade);

it more and more directly links its help to foreign aid; etc.

I said that in the past, the United States had been a radical, anticolonial and progressive force in the United Nations and elsewhere.

B. replied that the United States is by no means becoming increasingly conservative. The contrary is true.

He said that a few years ago, the Test Ban was inconceivable and so were the present-day relations with the Soviet Union.

He added that the coffee agreement is extremely significant and that it establishes a most significant precedent in the economic relations. This agreement was concluded two years ago but it could have been concluded ten years ago.

Five or six years ago, it was felt in the United States that the postwar period and the time when the United States was "an imperial power" was a thing of the past. He said that now the United States is stronger than ever before; perhaps, it was the strongest power in the past but it had less possibility for influence.

New forces exist in the world today and they are strong. That is why the United States is more cautious in spending its resources and that is why its goals are more limited. The United States is more realistic than in the past and it understands that its allies are not going to do what it (the United States) considers to be good and progressive. Now, the United States asks for less and intervenes less.

For instance, the United States did not publicly criticize the armed French intervention in Gabon because it would immediately be interpreted that the United States is taking over the responsibility for peace and for welfare in Gabon; this is not the wish of the United States and it cannot do that. In addition, de Gaulle does what he wishes.

Consequently, it is no longer realistic to characterize the actions of Great Britain, France or Western Germany as "United States activities, activities of the Western Alliance, activities of the allies of the United States" etc.

On the other hand, the United States does not qualify the policies of Laos and of Vietnam as "Soviet," because it knows that the situation between the Soviet Union and China has greatly changed.

All this does not mean that the United States is assuming a gradually more regressive attitude. The contrary is true.

\*\*\*



(We are forwarding this cable through the K line because Brubeck is Bundy's assistant in the National Security Council. Brubeck is particularly responsible for Africa and for international economy. His conversation with Job was previously arranged.

We are sending this detailed cable because it represents Brubeck's arguments on the serious remarks which we made to him and because he spoke rather openly.

(The direct evaluation of his remarks and his sources will be separately treated. /Translator's Note: This paragraph has been stricken in the original text./)

In spite of the fact that Brubeck tried to show the United States policies in the most constructive light, it must be said that he did not hesitate to recognize the American errors.

(It also is important to note that Brubeck feels the need to speak in this manner in general and particularly with us. /Translator's Note: This paragraph has been stricken from the original text./)



P. March 3, 1964.

K.

I.

1) Ukidanje vojne pomoći Jugoslaviji je, materijalno, više simbolična stvar. ~~to~~ <sup>Fair</sup> ~~centrosocijalizma~~ da, politički, Predsednik obično ne ponatava za mesec-dva takvu odluku ~~to~~ i formalno vraća situaciju na prethodno stanje. Međutim, koliko ~~on~~ <sup>B.</sup> zna, jugoslovenska vlada nije ni ovde ni u Beogradu (formalno zvanicno) pitala SAD da daju objašnjenje šta odluka Johnsona praktično znači u pogledu rezervnih delova, da li to znači da vlada SAD nema mogućnosti ili odbija da obezbedjuje dalje potrebne nabavke. ~~to~~ <sup>delu</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>interese</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>interes</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>postoji</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>postoji</sup> kod nas za rezervne delove.

~~Jugoslovenska strana~~ <sup>M.</sup> je svakako u pravu da sa svog stanovista kritikuje ~~ovu~~ <sup>ovu</sup> neru kao negativnu, arbitrarnu, kao što to čine i vlade drugih zemalja. Međutim, nužda donosa ~~nja~~ <sup>o</sup> ova, materijalno <sup>o</sup> ~~simbolične~~ <sup>o</sup> odluke, rezultat američke procene američkih političkih realnosti i onoga što Administracija mora da radi <sup>o</sup> ~~dosta~~ <sup>o</sup> jasan nalog Kongresa: Johnson ocenio da ovako morao i trebao da postupi. I Jugoslavija ima svoje političke

realnosti radi kojih neki put cini stvari koje SAD kritikuju - ali ni jedno ni drugo ne mora da znaci da odnosi SAD-J.nis" dobri, posle odbrane KNP stabilizovani i da se ne mogu razvijati.

2) Izbor Elbricka, kao jednog od njihovih najsposobnijih i najuglednijih ambasadora direktan rezultat Johnsonove i Ruskove brige za odnose sa J. i odraz znacaja koji se tim odnosima pridaje, odnosno znacaja koji se pridaje mestu Jugoslavije uopste. ~~(Stanje posle 7 meseci sa americka birokratija, i teskoce posle ubistva Kennedija)~~ Johnsonov telegram Titu takodjer na ovoj liniji. Ruskov govor, pasus o Jugoslaviji, pokazuje do koje mere im stalo da SAD javnost shvata politiku prema Jugoslaviji,

Uverenje je Johnsonova i ljudi u BRK (Bundy) da su odnosi sa J. sada dobri i da nema nekih posebnih problema. Rusk, pre govora, izneo Johnsonu glavne elemente onoga sto ce reci i Johnson se odmah slozio. U odnosima sa skoro svakom zemljom postoji danas mesavina boljih i gornih stvari, dobrih rezultata i iritacija. (Na pr. aktivnost organizacija i pojedinaca u Cikagu protiv naseg konzulata. J. strana treba da bude uverena da SAD, SD, BK pridaju svu potrebnu ozbiljnost ovome, i cine sve sto moguće da odgovore

jami obavezama SAD u pogledu zaštite od nasilja. Sto ne mogu uvek sve da postignu rezultat je i realnosti u SAD. Sam Kenedi jednom rekao da trebalo da jedna americka divizija udje u borbu da bi se jedan americki gradjanin upisao na americki univerzitet. Ovo jeste nedostatak i slabost SAD, ali i realnost protiv koje se bore. Medjutim, <sup>(kao drustvo)</sup> ~~Cikaga~~ <sup>situacije u</sup> je izolovana stvar koja ne <sup>bi trebalo</sup> ~~može~~ da utice na odnose dve zemlje.)

Kad bi neko pitao Johnsona kakvi odnosi SAD-J. on bi odgovorio da dobri. <sup>stare</sup> ~~ta~~ <sup>dozadostojan</sup> ~~ima~~ <sup>politikom</sup> ~~prema~~ J. na njegovom prenapunjenom dnevnom redu kao neki problem. Takodjer bi rekao da nastavlja sa ~~imati~~ <sup>politikom</sup> prema J.

3) Jugosloveni bi trebalo da budu veoma zadovoljni kad analiziraju glasanja Johnsona za sve vreme dok bio u Senatu po svim pitanjima koja doticala Jugoslaviju. <sup>Wootlow</sup> ~~Goldwater~~ napao Johnsona da njegova glasanja tokom godina u Senatu cak levija od liberala Hamfrija.)

## II.

Iz svojih razgovora sa Johnsonom, sa sastanaka Nacionalnog saveta bezbednosti, iz ocena Bundy-a, materijala koje cita, te analiza Johnsonovih glasanja, B. kaze da sa sigurnosom

*postoji jedan osećeno*  
 može da kaže da Johnsonovo shvatanje sveta, spoljno-politička filozofija, ideja  
 o ulozi SAD i mogućostima, o miru i ratu, itd. ~~je slična~~ *možda ličnim elementima* slično Kenedijevom.  
 Ono sadrži sledeće elemente: I on, kao i Kenedi, shvata da svet mora biti raznovrstan i  
 u tom smislu "koegzistentan"; ni on ne želi da silom menja režime u SSSR-u, IR i sl.  
 Najvažniji osećaj, motiv Johnsona, zadetak koji jako oseca i stvar koju bi najviše  
političkoj politici kao Predsednik želeo da ostvari jeste obezbeđenje i unapređenje  
 mira, uklanjanje opasnosti rata. Zato ~~je za~~ *željno* za napredak u razoružanju, za ~~ponovno~~  
 mere, za nastavljjanje onoga što započeto Test Paktom. Sto se Johnsona tice, on bi  
 želeo da skine i Laos i Vijetnam sa dnevnog reda svetskih kriza - ali nije za to da  
 se povuce, trpi poraz samo zato što su Kina i Severni Vijetnam izabrali da vode ge-  
 rilski rat. Kao i Kenedi i on je za UK, ali ni Kenedi nije bio za to da se većina u GS  
 donosi <sup>one</sup> odluke mimo SAD koje znače tovarjenje novih odgovornosti na SAD.  
 Odatle, osnovna spoljnopolitička koncepcija se Johnsona <sup>nigde lično</sup> razlikuje od  
 Kenedijevog. <sup>jestu</sup> Njegov stil i način drugaciji, Johnson je <sup>nesto</sup> manje <sup>u meštinu</sup> konzervativan od Kenedijevog  
 i ima <sup>had uspehe u isto</sup> više izrazen nacionalizam i na toj liniji više zahteva od drugih. *Ali to nijouse,*  
*a ne sustina.*

## III.

Ako takve situacije kao i potezi SAD kao: Kipar <sup>SAD</sup> (sledile VB, neuspela orijentacija na resavanje u okviru NATO, na protivna stava); Zanzibar (prvo ga proglasili komunistickim, zatim ga priznali onda kada ih izbacili pretstavnika); Kuba (prva ocena da ribarski canci deo velike Kastrove ofanzive u vezi Paname, zatim svodjenje citave stvari na tehnicko-policijski incident) - stvaraju ~~kao drugih~~ utisak konfuzije u radu ~~Administracije, Predsednika u spoljnim odnosima, onda to~~ <sup>primio, isto pravilo: greške i</sup> ~~Administracije, Predsednika u spoljnim odnosima, onda to~~ <sup>u</sup> tri momenta prvenstveno relevantna:

a) I svet i SAD u poslednjim par meseci zaista prolazi <sup>e</sup> kroz jednu brzu seriju i cudnu kombinaciju kriza srednjeg i manjeg dometa;

b) Johnson se ne zuri sa odlukama, donekle pusta da dogadjaji teku, jer zeli da prvo upozna stvari, da zaista vlada materijom, pa da predje na takve odluke i korake koji znacili preuzimanje trajnih obaveza, formulisanje bitnih stavova. (I Kenediju trebalo tri godine da dodje do govora Americkom univerzitetu). Johnson, koji ~~je~~ <sup>hoće</sup> ~~da~~ <sup>da lude</sup>

*primio, isto pravilo: greške i*

*da lude*

6

*uvrste se*  
 nesumnjivi i jedini šef u rukovodjenju i spoljni odnosima, neće da prelazi, još  
 uvijek, na detaljno rukovodjenje dok ne zna stvari kao i podređeni. Dok ta faza traje,  
 osecaju se, naravno, veća nezavisnost i odluke drugih, koji *možu da* dejstvuju.

c) Očigledno, pomenute i druge situacije i američke reakcije ne daju *ustvari* osnovu *da se neć*  
~~lazenje jedne linije, jedne taktike i strategije~~ *neć formulise neta* opsta karakteristike njegovog vodjenja  
 spoljne politike. ~~vezanost, razlika, razlika, razlika, razlika, razlika, razlika~~

Rec je i o specifičnim karakteristikama svake od ovih situacija:

Egipt: Jedina briga SAD da se izbegne kriza, rat između ~~deca~~ saveznika, Turske i  
 Turske. Cinilo im se najbrže i najbolje kroz NATO. Nije uspelo. SAD nisu ni u principu  
 ni inace protiv resavanja, ~~ako ostvarljivo, kroz UN.~~ *kroz UN, ako ostvarljivo.*

Zanzibar: Ovde sledili Britance, što im svakako ogranicilo slobodu manevra. Ali,  
 SAD imaju na Zanzibaru neposredne interese, VB ima, pa zato logično nastupili.

Kuba: Jednostavno im u prvom momentu izgledalo da rec o nečem većem; cin se  
 uverili da nije, ~~da~~ postupili prema tome.

IV

## IV.

Na primedbu da se zbog nastojanja da se Kipar tretira Van UN, rezervi prema GS UN u Raskovom govoru od pre nekoliko nedelja, zalaganju za status kvo u oblasti odnosa razvijenih i nerazvijenih (Konferencija za razvoj i trgovinu), sve direktno vezivanja pomoci SAD kao direktnog orudja spoljne politike, i sl. moze stvoriti utisak da SAD sve konzervativnija sila, za razliku od nekadasnjeg radikalnije antikomunizalnog stava i programivnosti prema UN, i sl. - B. rekao da SAD ne postaju sve konzervativnije vec naprotiv. Pre nekoliko godina bio nemoguc Test Pakt i sadasnji odnosi sa SSSR. Sporazum o kafi, koji vanredno znacajna stvar i kapitalan presedan u skoro najvaznijoj oblasti, koji zaključen pre godinu, <sup>ne samo</sup> <sup>dana</sup> bio takodjer ne moguc pre deset i sl. <sup>to je proces ne uspeh situacija u SAD</sup>

~~SAD, taj proces traje~~ <sup>SAD</sup> Vec 5-6 godina, ~~sve vise stvari~~ <sup>da prolazi</sup> posleratna epoha kada <sup>bile</sup> "imperijalna sila", <sup>cija</sup> zelja, bar u sopstvenom savezu, bila cesto stvarnost. Sada SAD, za sebe, jace no ikada pre, moжда najjaca sila sveta, ali sa manjim mogucnosti a uticaja, jer u medjuvretenju nastupile nove, ~~osnovne snage~~ <sup>druga</sup> jake sile. Zato SAD suzdrzljivije u trosenju svojih sretstava, <sup>manje</sup> nastoje, jer nerealno,



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da njeni saveznici rade onako kako se njoj čini da dobro i progresivno, postavljuju manje zahteva i manje se uplicu. (Nisu zauzeli prvni kritički stav prema francuskoj oruzanoj intervenciji u Gabonu, jer bi odmah bilo shvaćeno da SAD onda preuzima ju odgovornost za red i blagostanje Gabona a one to ne žele i ne mogu.) Očigledno, više nije realno postupke VB, Francuske, ZN i sl. kvalifikovati kao postupke "SAD", "zapadnog saveza", "saveznika SAD" i sl., kao što ni SAD ne identifikuju kinesku politiku u Laosu i Vijetnamu sa sovjetskom, jer znaju da se situacija duboko izmenila.

Sve ovo ne znači da u važnim pitanjima, problemima sadašnjice SAD zauzimaju sve regresivnije stavove, već <sup>ustvari</sup> naprotiv.

(Saljemo linijom K. jer Brubeck, članik Bundy-a u Nacionalnom savetu bezbednosti, u aparatu Bele kuće. Brubeck posebno odgovoran za Afriku i medj. privredu. <sup>0</sup> Razgovor u Joba sa njim se dogovorili <sup>Q</sup> Saljemo opirno jer predstavlja razradjenu <sup>ništa ni</sup> kritičku argumentaciju na ozbiljne prijedbe koje su učinili, i jer Brubeck bio dosta otvoren, ~~direktna izvornost njegovih informacija i onna trazi posebna tretmana, bez obzira na to što nastojao da prikaze njihovu politiku u što konstruktivnijem svetlu. Od značajn~~ <sup>ali se nije libio da prizna i greške.</sup> i to, što oseca za potrebno da to čini, posebno prema n. a.)



SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (A)

N O T E

CONCERNING THE CONVERSATION OF JOB WITH ANDREWS  
(LUNCH - JANUARY 8, 1963)

(1) Andrews asked with a certain implicit dissatisfaction why the Yugoslav press has not commented on President Johnson's State of the Union Message (except the comments of Radojicic and Milic). He said that, from the point of view of the direct Yugoslav interests, the Message is satisfactory.

He added that he does not see how the part of the Message related to the foreign policies could represent a problem for the Yugoslav newspapermen. He believes that Yugoslavia is waiting to see the reaction of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries in order to write.

I replied that the Message was made only four days ago and that we have not yet received the newspapers published at that time.

Andrews said that the United States Embassy would have informed if there had been editorials concerning the Message.

I told him that they (the Americans) know that we assume our attitudes independently and that he should leave to us the evaluation of such an important document. In our practice a period of four or five days and even a longer period of time is not unusual.

see

(2) In accordance with the instructions of our Embassy, I mentioned that the Ambassador is back from the Eighth Congress and that, naturally, the policies of Yugoslavia regarding the United States remain the same.

For the time being, it does not seem that the Yugoslav State Secretary of Foreign Affairs will visit the United States. Consequently, the Yugoslav Ambassador will probably ask to visit the State Department which is quite normal and which he always did after returning from Yugoslavia.

The passage of the Message which treats the development of trade indicated that, from the political point of view, the ground for our 1965 program is more satisfactory.

see

(3) Andrews pointed out that the situation related to trade is now somewhat different because:

(a) Andrews told Walker (after his conversation with Job) about the sending of a delegation to Yugoslavia.

Walker expressed the opinion that Andrews should not have talked in that manner because some people and the Congress will not be willing to change the Foreign Aid Act.

(b) I asked whether Walker has actually opposed the proposal related to the sending of the delegation.

Andrews replied in the affirmative. However, he added that Yugoslavia has the possibility of receiving the wheat on a credit of twenty years and the credit of the Poles is merely five years.

He said that as far as the credits of the Export Import Bank are concerned, the Bank is empowered to grant private credits and the Yugoslav enterprises can work on this matter.

(c) He said that they are preparing the action to ask the Congress to authorize them to grant the clause of the most favored nation to the countries of Eastern Europe.

(d) He said that Yugoslavia enjoys a far better treatment than any other country of Eastern Europe. These countries are asking for the same treatment; the Congress and the President are favorably inclined in this regard.

see

(4) I said that it seems that, after the State of the Union Message, the Congress will not have the possibility to do anything for the purpose of developing the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia. I added that, in fact, the Congress can only arrange for the development of the relations with the other Eastern European countries.

Andrews said that recently some difficulties have appeared. He stressed that it does not make sense for the

State Department to submit proposals to the White House and ask for the action of the Congress regarding Yugoslavia. He emphasized that even some people in the State Department itself do not share the same opinion and that he cannot say more about this matter and "explain away everything."

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SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

(5) I remarked that nothing has changed on the Yugoslav side.

Andrews said that he will tell me<sup>a</sup> few things since I am insisting:

(a) The last Yugoslav action in the Congo has created great concern. Tito declared in Cairo that Yugoslavia may possibly send armament to the insurgents.

The Leopoldville Government does not directly attack Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia did not act in this manner even with Tirana and Peking despite the fact that Albania and China are directly attacking the Yugoslav national interests. The Yugoslav action in the Congo was particularly tough for Elbrick.

In this instance, the Yugoslav rigid attitude has collided with the American attitude which has become rigid by now.

(b) The Yugoslav press continues its anti-American campaign and propaganda by stressing that all the world evils are caused by American imperialism or by some American reactionary circles.

The Yugoslavs do not take into consideration that, for instance, in Asia, the United States confronts the Chinese imperialism which would suffocate, if it could, also Yugoslavia.

This is gradually angering Washington.

(c) The Russians are not criticized at all. Such criticism would be a help in the Congress as an indication of

nonalignment. For instance a statement that the USSR has to pay its debts to the United Nations as Yugoslavia is doing; such a statement would help (Andrews emphasized that he is expressing a purely personal opinion).

(d) Instead of being objective up to a certain point, the Yugoslav press continuously gives some "dumb" advice to the effect that the United States has to withdraw immediately from Vietnam.

\* \* \*

(6) I replied:

(a) Nothing is as "dumb" as the American war in Vietnam.

(b) All the explanations furnished by Andrews do not actually explain the change of the American attitude toward Yugoslavia.

The policies of Yugoslavia have not changed. The Americans should read the New Year message of President Tito and the interview of the Yugoslav State Secretary of Foreign Affairs given to the Soviet newspaper "The New Time."

Yugoslavia cannot "send tanks to attack Moscow" for the purpose of improving the opinion of the United States Congress or of the Administration.

Our interest is to have good relations with the United States.

Actually, the whole matter is related to the American policies in Vietnam which are unacceptable, obsolete and have become worse in some ways.

The "Yugoslav-American problem" concerning the Congo is easy to solve. Just let Africa settle the matter and stop supporting Tshombe.

We are vitally interested in this matter because we are a small country and we oppose the intervention of the big powers.

(Andrews said that perhaps the American policies were not the best in the Congo two or three months ago.)

On my own behalf, I asked him whether it is not true that the attitude of the United States is more rigid now in some respects. This attitude is based on the American evaluation that the United States is from the military and from the economic point of view stronger than the Soviet Union. That is why the United States can allow itself a more rigid attitude.

I said that I would like to know what I have to conclude in connection with the change of the American attitude toward Yugoslavia; this change has taken place during the last few weeks.

\* \* \*

(7) Andrews then talked about the "economic aspect of the new difficulties."

He said that some of the people in the State Department have the impression that the Yugoslav economy was not directed as it should have been during the last year. Yugoslavia could have avoided the deterioration of its balance of foreign payments.

He said that the reputation of Yugoslavia as a solvent partner which fulfills its obligations is now seriously threatened.

That is why the State Department is asking itself whether it should save the Yugoslav economy before the Yugoslavs themselves undertake the necessary measures for the purpose of settling their economic situation. Under these circumstances, Yugoslavia was lucky to receive the loan of seventy million dollars from the International Bank.

I said that a couple of months ago he himself (Andrews) and the State Department in general recommended

to the American businessmen to trade with Yugoslavia whose economy is fundamentally stable. I asked how this situation can change to such a degree in a couple of months.

I asked why the program for 1965 cannot be fulfilled. I asked him to explain the following contradictions:

- why has the economic situation of Yugoslavia suddenly become an obstacle? I asked whether a Yugoslav change of policies concerning the Congo, Vietnam, etc., would bring changes in our economy?

- I said that if the Yugoslav foreign policies are an obstacle, then a positive change in our balance of foreign payments would not mean anything.

\* \* \*

(8) I said that Andrews himself had stressed in the paper submitted to Fulbright that, due to various restrictive actions of the United States Congress in 1963 and in 1964, the position of the United States was weakened in Yugoslavia.

I said that good relations between the two countries are a matter of mutual interest. The Americans have enough experience with us; do they think that we are going to change our foreign policies?

\* \* \*

(9) Andrews said that the fundamental attitude of Yugoslavia in foreign policies is known. Yugoslavia has three positions, namely toward:

- the nonaligned countries,
- the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and
- the United States, Western Europe and Canada.

The Americans do not believe that the attitude of Yugoslavia is such as Max Frankel described it in his article.



One of the difficulties is the fact that, recently the attitude of Yugoslavia and of many of the nonaligned countries is more and more similar to the Soviet attitude. Consequently, the Americans conclude that there are not three but only two positions in the Yugoslav foreign policies, namely toward:

- the Soviet Union and the nonaligned countries (and this position is often anti-Western) and
- the West.

I remarked that there is nothing wrong if the position of Yugoslavia and of the nonaligned countries is similar to the position of the great power which advocates real coexistence. If the position of the Soviet Union has positively changed through the years, it is a good thing.

Andrews emphasized that the United States too is participating in this whole business of coexistence, lessening of tension and improvement of relations with the nonaligned countries. Without the United States, there would be neither coexistence nor cooperation.

However, this is not reflected in the Yugoslav attitude, in the Yugoslav statements and in the Yugoslav evaluations of the whole and complex policy of the United States.

It is characteristic to note that Andrews ended the conversation by saying that we shall not get too excited about the matters which we discussed. The communications between the State Department and the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, which are maintained through the Embassies and otherwise, are good and open.

Andrews said that the possibilities of Yugoslav trade with the United States are still good.

The situation concerning the private credits is the same (General Electric Co.).



The second half of the agricultural program is on its way.

The Fulbright Program is developing well.

\* \* \*

(10) Job told Andrews that he has not contributed to the creation of a good atmosphere with his remarks.

In accordance with his (Job's) agreement with the Ambassador (Micunovic), Job spoke "about the consultations in Belgrade, the determination to proceed (sic) in 1965 and the visits."

Andrews said that he has not heard anything about the visits.

s/ C. J.

*Handwritten notes and signatures at the top of the page, including the name 'SABELSSA' and other illegible scribbles.*

o razgovoru Joba sa Andrewson, 8.1.1965, na rusku.

1) Sa izvesnim nepoverenjem i implicitnim negodovanjem pitao zasto da sada nema Jugoslovenskog komentara, uvodnika u štampi, na Johnsonova Poruku o stanju unije, sa izvestajima Radjicica i Milica. U njoj nema takvih formulacija i stavova koje bi, sa stanovista direktnog Jugoslovenskog nacionalnog interesa, bile neprihvatljive, vce obratno. Na one taze u kojima Jugoslavija najkriticijnija prema SAD (Afrika, Vijetnam i sl) Predsednik upotrebio dosta mirne, konstruktivne formulacije, sa dosta konstruktivnih elemenata. U pogledu orijentacije na dobre odnose sa SSSR (zajednicki rad na smanjenju zategnutosti, novi aranmani posle Test Band, saradnja) i IB zenilje, Jugoslavija moze samo da pozdravi. Upote spoljno politicki deo nije specifican i ne vidi zasto bi predstavljao poseban problem za nase uvoznice da nesto napisu. Jedina njegovo licno iznecenje jeste da Jugoslavija ceka reakcija SSSR i lagera i neangazovanih zenilja, pa da onda ona da svoja.

Onde mi odgovoreno, da sada 8. januara, da Poruka bila pre cetiri dana, da nismo dobili jos nasa stampa sa datuma posle Poruke (Andrew ubacio da bi ia njihova Ambasada javila da bio uvodnik), da, kao sto sa na kazu, bili izvestaji raznih dopisnika iz SAD. To sto ne tice datuma i sl. Inace, oni znaju da ni nase stavove sauzimamo i objavljuje samo samostalno i da, bez spekulisanja, preputi nama, nasin novinama da osene jedan tako ozbiljan dokument, na nacin i u momentu koji izabera. Ssa toga, dok razgovaramo, noma se pojavio upravo neki uvodnik. U nasej prakti razmak od 4-5 pa i vise dana nije upote neobicajna.

2) U skladu sa dogovorom u Ambasadi, Job pozemuo da se Ambasador vratio, da posle VIII Konbrea inao uobicajne konsultacije sa visocim, da naravno smernice nase politike prema SAD i inace ostaju iste, pretstoji pred nasa program za 1965 i dalje. Ukoliko, kao sto sada izgleda, Drzavni sekretar ne bi sada dolazio, onda ce verovatno Ambasador traziti da razgovara u SD kao sto uvek radio normalno po povratku iz zenilje. Nesto u Poruci o stanju unije o prosirenju trgovine i saradnje naznacuje politicki povoljniji teren za ispunjenje naseg programa za 1965 i dalje, o kome je Andrew govorio poslednjih meseci: krediti, investicije, dugovi, PL-480 za dizare, tehnicka saradnja, itd), a poslednji put pominjao kad govorio o potrebi da se o kompleksnoj materiji novih kredita, odaganja duzva i sl. predje na slanje jedne nase delegacije, jer materija trazi konkretniji tretman nego, kao do sada, kroz kontakte ambasada.

(3) Andrew primjetio da na situacija u ovome sada nesto drugacija, a naine:

a) Kada rekao Walkeru, posle razgovora sa Jobom, da Jobu ~~znano~~ izneo ideje o slanju delegacije, Walker mu rekao da nije trebno tako da razgovara jer isa nialjanja u SD i inace da Kongres nece biti voljan da uradi potrebno u ovoj oblasti, jer treba menjati Foreign Aid ~~Act~~ Act, itd, bez cega EXIM banka ne moze da daje kredite kao recimo 50 mil. dolara za dev. reforme vec samo garantuje privatne kredite. Na pitanje Joba da li, znaci, Walker "polio vardeno vccca" predlog o delegaciji, A. odgovorio: "Tako je".

b) A. Anctario: Velike su sumnje da li ce kongres biti upote voljan

da ... isplac

bilo sta iz toga, kao i gornjeg, pokazati Kongresu. Uostalom, Jugoslavija ima mogućnost da dobije i to na dolaraki kredit do 20 godina, dok Poljaci samo do 5 godina.

Sto se kredita za razvoj i sl. tiče tu naravno ostaje ~~sigurnost~~ sposobnost EXIM banke da garantuje privatne kredite i tu je na Jugoslovenskim predstavnima da ih dobiju.

c) Pripremaju akcija da dobiju od Kongresa ~~sigurnost~~ slobodne ruke da zemljana IB daju tretman MFN.

d) Stvar u tome da Jugoslavija ima mnogo toga (bolji tretman, olaksice) koje može da koristi, a koje IB zemlje nemaju. Ove zemlje iako zainteresovane da ovde smanje razmak ili dobiju sto više jednakog tretmana, a Kongres i Predsednik povijno na to gledaju.

4) Na primjedbu Joba da izgleda iz svega sto govori proizilazi da, po njegovoj oceni, sada, naglo, bez objašnjenja i upozorenja, iznenadno, prozvanja da Kongres, koji liberalniji, neće biti u stanju da ponie ovakve Poruke unij, uradi ništa sto bi dalo veće mogućnosti za unapredjenje odnosa između SAD i Jugoslavije, te da jedino u stanju da onogici Administraciji da razvija odnose sa IB zemljama - Andrews rekao da u poslednje vreme doslo do izvesnih problema i teskoca kojih nije bilo. I nena smisla da SD podnosi Beloj kuci predloge za akciju u Kongresu i inaca oko Jugoslavije, kad i sam SD podneljenog nialjenja oko ovoga. Referada više ne može da ubedi živo ~~ništa~~ "explain away everything".

5) Na primjedbu da se sa Jugoslovenske strane nije ništa izmenilo, te da ovaj obrt sasvim nejasan, Andrews, rekavši "kad ne vec vucete sa jastik", odgovorio da rec o nekolicno strani:

a) Najviše zabrinjava poslednja akcija Jugoslavije u Kongru. Dok referada i ambasada u Beogradu presli preko one izjave Predsednika Tita u Kairu u kojoj se nagovestava mogućnost da Jugoslavija salje i oruzje u pobunjenicima, pretpostavljajući da to stvarno ne namerava da radi - to sada, posle povlacenja osoblja iz Leopoldvila, ovo pridaju drugaciji znacaj i to veoma teško. Poseban znacaj pridaju cinjenici da se povlaci obo blje iz Leopoldvila cija vlada ne napada direktno Jugoslovenski nacionalni interes, a slicno se nije radilo sa Tiranom i Pekingom, iako postupci ove dve zemlje prema Jugoslaviji, pogadnjaci direktno njm nacionalni interes, ispunjavaju sasat puta više sve kvalifikacije koje Jugoslavija iznela kao objasnjenje znsto povlaci osoblje iz Konga (ne može da odrzava normalne odnose i kontakte, Vlada Combea protiv Afrike i sl).

Ova akcija Jugoslavija posebno teško pao Elbrins.

Ovde se Jugoslovenski rigidniji stav sudario sada sa americkim rigidnijim stavom.

b) Iako nesto uzdrzanije no jula i avgusta 1964, Jugoslovenska stampa i Jugoslovenski istupi nastavljaju sa antiamerickom kampanjom i propagandom, pripisujući sva zla u svetu americkom imperijalizmu ili "nekim americkim reakcionarnim krugovima", nalazeci samo crne motive u svakoj pojedinoj americkoj akciji. Ne uzima se na pr. u obzir da se SAD u Aziji suprotstavlja kineskom imperijalizmu koji bi zadavio da može Jugoslavija, kao sto se svojevremeno suprotstavljale Japanskom imperijalizmu, u interesu mira u svetu. Akcija Indonezije, pod kineskim uticajem, protiv UN, koji poseban garant nezavisnosti Jugoslavije kao male zemlje, koja potseca na akcije Japana, Nemačke i Italije pre II svetskog rata, govori za sebe. Ovo postepeno stvarara sve veća sliqvolja u Vasingtonu.

c) Nema nikada nikakve kritične izjave na račun Kuba, što bi porogio u Kongresu, kao indikacija objektivnosti i neangazovanosti. Kao pr. jedna u usta Vladi SSSR-a ili jedna izjava da SSSR treba da plati dugove URS-u, kao što to čini i Jugoslavija. (Ovde naglašavao da govori "licno").

d) Umesto bar neke doze objektivnosti stalno se u našoj štampi daje SAD-u "glupi" saveti da se svista povuče iz Vijetnama.

6) Na gornje su, pored catalog, odgovoreni:

a) Ako je ista "glupo", onda je "glup" njihov rat u Vijetnamu.

b) Sve gornje su prethvalja stvarno objašnjenje njihove pozicije prema perspektivi i programu odnosa sa Jugoslavijom, kako je danas o njoj govorio. Politika Jugoslavije se nije izmenila. Ona potvrđena na Kongresu i inace. Mogu, kada bi rec bila zaista o tome, da procitaju novozdružnu poruku Predsednika Tita i intervju Drz. sekretara upravo "Novom Vremenu" (sovjetskom). Ta ista jugoslovenska spoljna politika i akcija postojala cijelo vrijeme za koje oni, i on u razgovorima sa Jobom, razradjivali i saopštavali program za 1965. Tek ga nista valjda pravili na osnovu pretpostavke da ceno menjati našu politiku i odnose prema SSSR-u, IR, Africi, neangazovanima, itd. Ne može sada "slati teškove na Moskvu" da bi Kongres o nama bolje mislio, ili Administracija. Zna se naša politika; naš interes za dobre i bolje odnose sa SAD, i mesto koje nasim dobrim odnosima sa SAD, dajemo u našoj koncepciji međunarodnog položaja Jugoslavije, je jasno i nedvosmišleno iznesen: Fulbrajtu i Tajleru kao i naša politika uopšte.

Rec je o njihovoj politici u Vijetnamu, Kuba koja je neprihvatljiva, zastarela i u ponocima i pogorsana. Lako je reciti "jugoslovensko-američki problem" oko Kuba. Ima i teopšte stvar Africi, i prestanu podrzavati Ccabea. Mi tu bitno zainteresovani nas zato što smo naša težnja, što protiv intervencija velikih, i jer je naša naša pozicija među neangazovanim esencijalna. (Ovde A. dopustao da naša politika u Kongru pre 2-3 meseca nija bila možda najbolja.)

Pitanje isključivo u svoje licno ime nije li stav SAD u nekima, ne avia, dimenzijama međunarodnih odnosa, danas rigidniji na osnovu njihove eventualne procene da ona vojno, ekonomski, itd, najjači, da SSSR, koji slabiji, ina teza probleme od SAD-a, da nerazvijeni nemaju snagu - pa sad SAD mogu da dozvole sebi kraci nastup. Citav svet interesuje da li ce nova Administracija voditi fleksibilniju politiku koja treba svetu i SAD-u, ili neku ~~novu~~ politiku. Sta da zaključim iz pomenute izmene u poslednjim nedeljama oko stava prema razvoju odnosa sa Jugoslavijom.

7) Andrews zatim pressao na "ekonomski aspekt novonastalih teskocaj Kaze da u poslednje vrijeme pojedinci u SD i inace sticu utisak da u poslednjoj godini jugoslovenska privreda nije vodjena onako kako je trebala i mogla da se izbegne dalje pogorsanje, do koga doslo, veoma ozbiljne situacije sa platnim debalansom, dugovima i sl. Imaju utisak da dosadnja reputacija Jugoslavije kao esencijalno solventnog partnera koji uredno odgovara obavezama, sada u ozbiljnoj opasnosti. Zato se pitali da li da spasavaju jugoslovensku privredu pre no sto sami jugosloveni preduzmu potrebno za sredjivanje ove situacije. Svakako bilo dosta sreće u dohicanju zajma od MB od 75 mil. dolara, upravo u Bostonu kada gornji utisak počeo da prevladava.

Job ovde odgovorio da ga čudi obrt i u ovome, jer pre dva meseca on licno (A.) i SD uopšte biznismenima ~~su~~ preporucivali ulazenje u ~~obstojansa~~ u sastini stabilnom Jugoslavijom koja uredno odgovara svojim

obavezna. To sadržavao i izveštaj trgovinske misije. Kako tada da se privreda jedne zemlje za dva mjeseca preobrati u obratno. To se tako ne događa sa fundamentalnim elementima privrede jedne zemlje. Niko nije pisao i izjavljivao da britanska funta kompletno zdrava i solidna, pa se onda probudili i konstatovali da slabo stoji. O takvom položaju funte se zna preko 10 godina.

Uostalom, neka izabere razlog zašto se ne može preći na ostvarivanje programa za 1965, jer ovako kontradiktorna:

- ili sad odjednom ekonomski položaj Jugoslavije prepreka, pa pada ne bi vredelo ni naze alaganje sa njima oko Kongo, Vijetnama i sl;

- ili naša spoljna politika prepreka, pa onda ni plaćati suficit ne bi vredelo.

8) Jednako na kraju ovog dela razgovora potsetio da sam Andrews rekao da u papir za Pulbrajta SD znao da usled raznih akcija Kongresa restrukturizacije tokom 1963 i 1964 pozicije SAD u Jugoslaviji oslabiljeće. Odnosi sa u obostranog interesa. Da li su indiferentni prema tom aspektu? Dobri odnosi nisu samo u našim interesima. Imaju dovoljno iskustva sa nama; ne misle valjda da ćemo menjati našu spoljnu politiku?

9) Na kraju je je Andrews govorio da referenda zna za osnovni položaj i spoljnu politiku Jugoslavije. Znaju sa prisustvo tri pravca u tome: prema neangarovanima; prema SSSR-u i lageru; prema SAD, ZB, Kanadi. Ali oni ne misle da to stoji onako kako iznio Max Frankel u svom članku iz Beograda. Jedna od teškoća u sada jeste to što se u posljednja vremena odnosi Jugoslavije, zajedno sa stavovima mnogih "neangarovanih", sve više identifikuje sa sovjetskim, tako da se često dolazi do zaključka da ~~ne postoje~~ postoje tri pravca u jugoslovenskoj spoljnoj politici već dva: ~~sovjetsko-angarovani~~ sovjetsko-neangarovani (koji često iscrpljen u antizapadnja) i odnosi sa Zapadom.

Na ovo sam primjećeno da nema ništa slabog ako se i kada se stavovi Jugoslavije i neangarovanih podudaraju sa stavca velikih sila kada se stavovi konkretni, date velika sila ove više približavaju stvarnoj politici koegzistencije. Ako se stav SSSR-a tokom godina menja u pozitivnom pravcu i ako ima bolji stava prema neangarovanosti na prvu, onda je to samo dobro. Andrews ovdje primjetio da da i SAD, od 1960 godine, nestaju u citavom ovom polju koegzistencije, predolevanja hladnog rata, smanjivanja zategnutosti, bolji odnosima sa neangarovanima. Ne bi bilo koegzistencije ni saradnje bez SAD. Ali se to ne odražava u jugoslovenskim stavovima, izjavama niti u procenama kompletne i kompleksne politike SAD.

Andrews karakteristično završio da se u vezi svega što razgovarali ne treba suviše uzbuđivati. Komunikacije između SD i DSIP, preko ambasada i inace, ostaju dobre i otvorene; oni rade, šalju papire, Departmenta poljoprivredu, oko druge transakcije vektora; ostaju dobre mogućnosti za jugoslovensku trgovinu sa SAD i privatne kredite (poslednja je sa General Electric); Pulbrajto program se dobro odvija.

19) Pri kraju razgovora Jed, napominjući da Andrews svim što govorio nije ni napravio dobru atmosferu, ali da se bas zato izneti ono sa čim dosao na ruzak, da se vidi razlika i naš prilaz, inace, prema dogovoru sa Ambasadorom, dogovoreno o daljnjim razgovorima posle povratka Ambasadora, o konsultacijama u Beogradu, o resenosti da se ide u 1965 dalje, i tu govorio o posetama. A. samo rekao da "nista nije bilo u posetama". (!)  
G. J.



TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (C)

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

March 30, 1965

The State Department received the text of the appeal of the Belgrade meeting of Ambassadors more than a week ago.

The State Department is watching the signing of the appeal by the chiefs of states and it knows about the delay and the reasons for the delay.

The text of the appeal is more or less all right. The appeal is not malicious and it more or less expresses the opinion of the majority of the participants in the Belgrade meeting.

The general principle of unconditional negotiations is also all right.

\*\*\*

However, from the point of view of the United States, the appeal has not been made at the right time. The United States objects in this connection.

The United States will bomb North Vietnam as long as North Vietnam continues to infiltrate men and armament in South Vietnam.

For the time being, neither side wishes to abandon its current course of action.

It can be said that the ultimate goal of the United States in Vietnam is the Korean solution.

\*\*\*

As for the communication of the Yugoslav Government against the use of gases by the United States, "it would be better to avoid mentioning it; it was remarked that the communication has used the expression 'war gases,' whereas the Yugoslav press used the expression 'poison gases.'"

Probably, such a communication is needed by Yugoslavia because we always are particularly sensitive to criticisms from the left.

(Andrews to Abot)

K.

March, 30, 1965

SD ima u rukama već preko nedelju dana tekst apela Beogradskog sastanka ambasadora. Takođe, prate akcije potpisivanja od strane šefova država i znaju za odlaganje i razloge odlaganja. Tekst apela je manje više uvedu, nije maliciozan, sadaje više manje konstruktivno postavljanje većine uslova i opšti principi pregovora već preduslova je uvedu.

Međutim apel ne dolazi, sa stanovišta SRD u pravo ili dobro vreme — i to oni pri- govaramu. SRD će prenositi bombardovanje na Severni Vijetnam dok Severni Vijetnam ne prestane sa ubacivanjem ljudi i oružja u Južni Vijetnam. Za sada nijedna ni druga strana ne pokazuje da želi da napusti svoj sadašnji kurs. Može se reći da krajnji cilj SRD u Vijetnamu korajsko rešenje.

Što se tiče saopštenja jugoslavenske vlade protiv SRD o upotrebi gasova, bolje da se to i ne pominje; ipak primičeno da saopštenje upotrebilo izraz „ratni gasovi“ dok jugoslavenska štampa dan pre pisala o „stovnim gasovima“. Verovatno ovakovo saopštenje treba Jugoslaviji radi toga što mi uvek posebno osetljivi na kritiku s leva.

(Andrews - Abot-n.)



SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

## C A B L E

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington  
To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

July 23, 1965

Confidential No. 1302

Subject: Harriman's Mission to Moscow

Kosygin and Harriman did neither negotiate nor consult each other. They merely talked.

The State Department evaluates that the results of these talks were neither optimistic nor pessimistic. The fact is that there was talk and that it was not negative.

Both sides explained their positions. The opinions of both sides remained what they were before the talks. The only difference is that now each side knows better what the other side thinks.

Both sides expressed the opinion that the regular and the other channels of communication concerning the exchange of views related to Vietnam must be kept open.

Harriman reiterated that the United States will undertake all the military steps which are necessary for the defense of its interests. The United States will not be thrown out of Vietnam. The aggressor is Vietnam and no "sanctuary" any longer exists. The United States is ready to talk without conditions. The other side is not ready to do that.

Kosygin spoke about the United States aggression and about the violation of the Agreement of 1954. He spoke against the bombing of North Vietnam and said that the Soviet

Union is ready to give all the necessary aid to a socialist country. He added that the United States cannot prevent the unification of Vietnam.

Kosygin did not accept any of Harriman's soundings regarding the mediation role of the Soviet Union.

However, both sides emphasized that they wish to maintain what they have achieved in their mutual relations.

Reserves were made regarding Vietnam. The problem of Vietnam was more stressed by the Russians than by the Americans.

The Russians emphasized that they ponder their own "escalation" in order to avoid undertaking something which is not absolutely necessary. They want to avoid an uncontrolled "escalation."

Both sides emphasized that they are ready for everything.

\*\*\*

If no unforeseen decisions are made by the White House and by the Kremlin, there is no switch in sight which would widen the war to the brim of a Soviet-American confrontation.

\*\*\*

The State Department considers that the talks Tito-Harriman would mostly treat the Vietnamese situation.

Unofficially, the State Department considers that, since Harriman will visit Belgrade after visiting Bonn, it would be normal to talk about the relations Yugoslavia - Western Germany.

(Polansky/blue card index/to Abot)

\*\*\*

Harriman's visit did not succeed.

The Russians did not have anything new to say.

Harriman has informed that the Soviets mostly wanted to learn from him about the intentions of the United States. As for them, they kept silent.

It was obvious not only that the Soviets do not wish to do anything about Vietnam but also that they cannot do anything in Hanoi.

There are indications that Hanoi seems to be somewhat more elastic than in the past. However, Hanoi is prevented from acting by (Red) China and by the Viet Cong which follows the Chinese line.

\*\*\*

Allegedly, the top officials of the State Department did not expect that Harriman could achieve something.

Harriman took the initiative for his visit to Moscow partly because of his personal prestige; namely, Harriman no longer has the power that he once had.

President Johnson agreed because he is interested in anything deriving from contacts with the Soviets.

(Independently from Harriman, the State Department has received some well documented material concerning the discussions in Moscow. According to these documents, the Soviets have not yet decided how much to give for defense in the new five-year plan; this is still the main subject of conflict.)

\*\*\*

There are unconfirmed rumors that Brezhnev had to meet Harriman and that this meeting did not materialize or, if it did, that it was secret.

There are also rumors that Harriman has mentioned the Multilateral Force, Germany and other problems concerning the security of Europe. Allegedly, Harriman has told the Soviets that as a matter of compensation for

the Soviet services regarding Vietnam, the Russians could  
get something in Europe.

eee

As for the meeting Tito-Harriman, it is  
mostly evaluated that the talks will revolve around  
Vietnam.

It is believed that Harriman will be mostly  
interested to know whether Tito and the nonaligned  
nations can again do something about Vietnam.

Harriman expects to be asked by Tito about  
his impressions related to his talks in Moscow.

s/ Volter - Leon VOLKO ✓



kako ne bi preduzele nešto što nije apsolutno potrebno, kako ne bi došlo do nekontrolisane eskalacije ~~u Sjevernoj Americi~~ - istovremeno naglašavajući da spremne, otkuda se svoje strane, na sve. Ovo bi govorilo, ukoliko ne dođe do nepredvidjenih odluka od strane BK ili Kusa, da <sup>voje</sup>ne predstoji principijelan zaokret na proširenje one vrste vojne eskalacije koja bi dovela na rub sovjetsko-američke vojne kontrole ~~u Sjevernoj Americi~~.

Inače, u SD se smatra da bi razgovori Karimian-Tito bila ~~dobro~~ najviše posvećeni vijetnamskoj situaciji. Smatraju, nezvanično, da ne bi bilo nenormalno ako bi se, obzirom na ~~to~~ da Karimian dolazi u ~~zemlju~~ Jugoslaviju iz Boma, razgovaralo o odnosima Jugoslavije ~~sa~~ ZN.

/Kolansky, pl.k. abotu/

~~SD~~ Karimianova misija nije uspjela. Rusi nisu imali ništa novo; Karimian javio da najviše oni njega hteli da ispitaju oko namera SAD, dok svi zatvoreni. Videlo se da ne mogu ništa ništa i ne mogu da djeluju na Hanoj. Ima indicija da bi Hanoj bio nešto elastičniji, ali ga sprečava Kina i to preko Vijetkongsa koji sledi kinesku liniju. Navodno vrh SD nije ni mislio da Karimian može nešto da postigne; inicijativa bila njegova, delom radi ličnog prestiza, jer više nema onu vlast koju nekada imao, a Johnson se složio, jer zainteresovan za bilo šta iz kontakta sa Rusima (Nezvanično od Karimiana, SD dobio dobro dokumentovane materijale o deblinama u rukovodstvu u Moskvi po kojima još uopšte nije rešeno u rukovodstvu koliko da se daje na odbranu u novom petgodišnjem planu, što glavni predmet neslaganja.)



Inače, ima neproverenih planova o tome da Braznjev tražio da se sastane sa Harimonom, pa nije, ili sastanak bio tajna. Isto tako da Hariman pominjao MLF i druge evropske probleme/<sup>čuvati</sup>okov bezbednosti, ~~čuvati~~ navodno dajući ovjetima na znanje da bi kao uzvrat za ~~uzvrat~~ unijeli oko Vijetnama mogli dobiti nešto u Evropi.

U vezi sporova Tito-Hariman prevladjuje ocena da će se razgovori voditi oko Vijetnama, i da tu Harimona može najviše da interesuje da li Tito i neangazovani mogu ponovo da urade nešto oko Vijetnama, ~~Hariman~~ Hariman bi očekivano da ga Tito pita o impresijama o razgovorima u Moskvi.

/Volter/

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (A)

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

August 20, 1965

Yesterday, the official representative of the State Department read the prepared reply of the State Department to be furnished to the newspapermen regarding the decision of the Administration to postpone the ratification by the Senate of the consular convention with the Soviet Union. However, just before the start of the press conference, Rusk called McCloskey and told him to leave this matter out of his replies because on that same day (August 19) President Johnson had to lunch in the State Department with Rusk and his aides. This is a new lunching practice.

Rusk wished to see whether the President has firmly decided to put off this ratification for this year.

It seems that the decision of the President will be the postponement in question because the Administration is afraid that a defeat or a victory of a few votes would greatly harm the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There is considerable opposition in the Senate as well as the campaign of the rightist organizations which was launched by J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the FBI. Thousands of letters of protest have already been received by Senator Fulbright, etc.

(McCloskey to Abot)



K.

August 20, 1955.

Zvanični predstavnik SD juče 19 ovog meseca imao je pripremljen odgovor na pitanje novinara u kome bi bilo rečeno da je Administracija odlučila da definitivno odluči proces ratifikacije u Senatu konvulzarne konvencije sa SSSR za iduću godinu. Nestetini, pred samu pres-konferenciju Ruski časnik Mc Closkey rekao mu da ostavi ovo neodgovorom u svom odgovoru, jer istog dana predsednik Johnson ima u SD ručak sa Ruskom-om i njegovim pomoćnicima (što nova praksa) na kome bi se vidjelo da li je predsednik definitivno zaključio da treba sve godine odustati.

Po svemu izgleda da će odluka predsjednika ipak biti sa odlaganjem, jer se boje da bi poraz ili pobjeda sa malim brojem glasova na ovom pitanju teško oštetili odnose SAD - SSSR.

U Senatu znatna opozicija, kao i kampanja desnih organizacija koju pokrenuo šef FBI Hoover. Već hiljade protestnih pisama stiglo Ellsdy senatoru Fulbright-u i slično.

(Mc Closkey Abotu)

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (B)  
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From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

August 20, 1965

(1) At the restricted and closed briefing of a group of diplomatic editors which took place last week, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that the withdrawal of the United States regarding Article 19 is extremely tough.

The United States wished to avoid such a withdrawal. This could perhaps have been done last year. However, he was of a different opinion last year and he changed his opinion now and advised President Johnson to support Goldberg's speech.

Rusk analyzed the other alternatives. They are:

(a) The defeat in the General Assembly of the United Nations (the majority voting against the application of Article 19).

(b) The adoption of the United States position and the real danger of the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the General Assembly which would be a hard blow to the United Nations; actually, this would make impossible the work of the United Nations and would adversely reflect on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(c) The continuation of the paralysis of the General Assembly. This would actually mean the paralysis of the United Nations and would not be suitable to the United States, especially in this moment when the United States is asking the United Nations for political diplomatic action regarding Vietnam. This was essentially a decision made by Johnson.

\*\*\*

(2) The withdrawal of the United States is, up to a certain point, a blow to the United States prestige.

It is not the result of any arrangement with the Soviet Union and there is no certainty regarding a corresponding Soviet concession.

Last year, when the last substantial conversation regarding Article 19 took place with Gromyko, this latter told Rusk that in case of the withdrawal of the United States, the other countries would find some means to grant donations which would not be specified. Thus, Gromyko affirmed that the United States would not have additional financial burdens but its current burden would in fact be alleviated.

At that time, the Soviet Union had adopted an Ethiopian resolution concerning the above-mentioned donations. However, this resolution was not used.

\*\*\*

(3) Now, the United States has no information whatsoever either from Moscow or from New York indicating that the Soviets will contribute something.

However, the State Department has noted that Morozov, after Goldberg's speech in the United Nations, did not display any cheap joy but even said that the gesture was "statesmanlike."

(McCloskey, blue card index, to Abot)

1

August 20, 1965

GS - UN (General Assembly of UN)

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text follows, appearing to be a letter or memorandum.]

... diplomatske ...

... izu SAD, nije ...

... nekog uzvratnog ...

K.

1) Na uzet i zatvorenom brifingu grupe diplomatskih urednika Rusk prošle nedelje otvoreno rekao da mu "uzmak" SAD na cl.19 itekako tesko pada, da zeli izbeci ovakvo povlacenje, da se to prošle godine uzda jos moglo; ali da je on imao drugacije misljenje koje je sada morao da promeni i da savetuje Johnsonu da podrzi stav dat u Goldbergovom govoru.

Rusk izneo analizu po kojoj preostale sledece alternative: a) Poraz u GS UN (u smislu plasanja vecine protiv primene cl.19); b) Usvajanje americkog stava i stvarna opasnost izlazenja SSSR-a iz GS, sto tezak udarac UN-u, onemogu cuje njihov rad, a narocito bi se tesko odrazilo na odnose SAD-SSSR; c) I dalje paralizovana GS, ustvari UN sto ne odgovara SAD u momentu kada se i formalno okrenule UN-u kaobitnom aretstvu u kompaniji oko politicko-diplomatke akcije oko Vijetnama, sto na vise odluka Johnsona.

2) Ovakvo povlacenje SAD, koje jeste izvestan udarac prestizu SAD, nije rezultat nikakvog pranzmana sa Rusima niti postoji izvesnost nekog uzvratnog

sovjetskog gesta, na pitanju UN ili inace. U poslednjem substancijalnom razgovoru o cl.19 prosle godine Gromiko rekao Rasku da ako bi SAD odustale, da bi druge zemlje nasle nacina da kroz dobrovoljne ~~priloge~~ priloge (koji ne bi bili namenski specificirani) daju toliko doprinosa da povlacenje SAD ne bi Americu dodatno finansijski opteretilo, vec i smanjilo dosadnji teret. Tada se SSSR bio pridruzio jednoj etiopskoj rezoluciji u tom smislu. Medjutim, to sve ostalo neiskoristeno.

?) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ni iz Moskve ni iz Njujorka  
 Sada nemaju nikakve informacije sa indikacijama od strane  
 Sovjeta da ce oni poprimiti nesto. Ali vrh SD zapazio sa interesom da Morozov u  
 UN posle Goldbergovog govora nije jeftino likovao, vec cak nazvao americki korak  
 "drzavnickim".

(McCloskey, pl.k.Abotu)

act 8/12

SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (A)

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

September 8, 1965

In the course of August, Rusk decided that it would not suit the United States to have a representative of the Eastern European countries elected as President of the XX Session of the United Nations and this included Yugoslavia.

This decision was dictated by internal political motives. It is considered that no Eastern European country nor Yugoslavia would be a good choice since the United States has withdrawn from its position concerning Article 19. In addition, there is the possibility of the recognition of (Red) China by the United Nations.

Consequently, it has been decided to support some Western European country and most probably it will be one of the Scandinavian nations.

Six weeks ago, the State Department was of the opinion that Yugoslavia would be suitable because it could engage the Eastern European countries. In this connection, many memoranda were written in the State Department; they were approved. However this position was changed and the above-mentioned decision was rendered.

This decision could be changed again only in case of a unanimous request of all the members of the United Nations that they want a Yugoslav President.

(Polanski, blue card index, to abot)



REPORT (B)

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

7. To the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs - Belgrade

(1) When the armed conflict India-Pakistan broke out, the Soviet Union, as could have been expected, attacked as a matter of routine "imperialism and colonialism" as being the cause of the conflict.

However, the voting in the Security Council of the United Nations and the subsequent more constructive statements of the Soviet Government (such as the offer of mediation and the endeavors for a cease fire) show that the Soviet Union is actually interested in stopping the armed operations.

This corresponds to the basic interest of the United States in that part of the world.

see

(2) The United States is publicly pressing both sides to stop fighting by telling them that it could stop aiding them.

In addition, the United States is most seriously considering the question as to how this aid could be actually stopped.

The United States is aware of the fact that such measures are risky and unpopular and that they, perhaps, would not produce the desired effect. However, the United States has no other means at its disposal.

see

It is unrealistic to expect any kind of effective action by the United Nations.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can directly intervene.



Anyway, all the proper authorities of the Administration are most seriously considering the exercise of pressure through a possible discontinuation first, of military aid and then, of economic aid.

The discontinuation of military aid would be more harmful to Pakistan and the discontinuation of economic aid would be more harmful to India.

(Polanski, blue card index, to Abot)

K.

September 3, 1955.

u toku augusta na nivou Rusk-a u SD je odlučeno da SFD-u nisi odgovarala položaj predsednika 20-tog zasjedanja Generalne Skupštine Ujedinjenih Nacija prikladne bilo kojoj Istočno Evropskoj zemlji, uključivo Jugoslaviju. Unutrašnji politički razlozi im diktilovali ovakvu odluku na osnovu ocene da ni Istočno Evropske zemlje ni Jugoslavija nisu dobar izbor u situaciji kada su SAD povukle na pitanju člana 13, a kada postoji mogućnost vrlo dobrog kompromisovanog postavljanja pitanja, existencijstva Kine u Ujedinjenim Nacijama. Odlučili su da to da podržavaju neku zapadno-evropsku zemlju, najverovatnije neku od Skandinavskih zemalja.

Pre mesec i pol dana mislili su da bi Jugoslavija odgovarala na liniji većeg uvažavanja i angažovanja Istočno Evropskih zemalja u Ujedinjenim Nacijama. U tom smislu napisano dosta memo sanduma u SD, koji bili prihvaćeni, ali se stav izmenio i došlo do gornje odluke koja se nevi menjala sem u nekou slučaju da u članstvu Ujedinjenih Nacija dođe do opšteg razteva da predsedničko mesto prikladne Jugoslaviji.

(Polanski, pl. k. - Aotm)

K.

September 5, 1945.

1) u prvim momentima vojnog sukoba Indija-Pakistan, SSSR, kako se moglo očekivati, očinski napras "imperijalizam i kolonijalizam" kao prvobitnog krivca za nastalu situaciju između dve zemlje. Međutim, glasanje u Savetu Bezbednosti U.N, te naknadne konstruktivnije izjave sovjetske vlade (nudenje dovitnih usluga, zalaganje za uestanak neprijateljstava) pokazuju stvarni interes da se izbegne nastavljanje i proširenje ratnih dejstava. Ovo odgovara očinskim interesima SAD u tom području.

2) SAD ne samo više javni kritičak na obe strane uključivanjem na mogući prekid ratnici, već se i najodvornije razmatra da li i kako da se ova mera primeni. Znaju da riskantno i nepopularno; da možda ne bi imalo željenog efekta; ali isto tako nema nikakvih drugih prostora ni sretstava za akciju.

Verovatno je očekivati da bi bila moguća bilo kakva efektivna akcija Ujedinjenih Nacija; isto tako ni SAD ni SSSR ne mogu da direktno intervenišu. U svakom slučaju se na svim nivoima u administraciji najodvornije razmatra više pritiska kroz eventualno stvarno radovanje pro vojne, na ratum ekonomske pomoći. Prekid ratne vi više pogodilo Pakistan, a druge Indiju.

(Poianski, pi. k. - Abotu)

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

To the Coordination Department - Belgrade

(1) The atmosphere at the meeting of the four Ambassadors with Rusk was very good; Rusk received them very cordially. The talk was substantial.

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(2) The only moment when Rusk was, for obvious tactical reasons, somewhat stiff, occurred when the Yugoslav Ambassador mentioned that one should contribute to the creation of such a situation which would make possible the negotiations. In this connection, the Yugoslav Ambassador mentioned the bombings of North Vietnam and the American military action and clearly implied that the United States should stop these bombings and such action.

Rusk retorted with an almost rhetorical question: "What would be the reaction of North Vietnam if the American bombings stop?" With this question, Rusk actually wished to say that the discontinuation of the bombings would be interpreted as a withdrawal and as a weakness of the United States and North Vietnam would thus only intensify its military action instead of accepting the negotiations.

\*\*\*

(3) The attitude of the four Ambassadors may be described as "benevolently idealistic" and the attitude of Rusk as "eminently practical."

In their appeal, the seventeen nations state that they:

- are deeply concerned with the situation,
- wish to do anything for the purpose of changing this situation (the four Ambassadors wished to see whether there is any change in the United States policies),

- hope that their appeal could influence the policies of the United States.

\*\*\*

(4) In the attitude of Rusk, one vital question was reflected: whether there is any hint of change on the other side and whether the other side is ready to change its course of action.

Thus, Rusk spoke at length about it "with rather profound diplomatic significance." He said that the hint of the other side has not to be public, that it can even be tacti, etc.

\*\*\*

(5) In Rusk's reply, the essential fact was that the appeal was received well on behalf of the United States Government. He promised that the appeal will be taken into consideration most seriously and that the reply will be given in the very near future.

(Yesterday, on the occasion of the briefing of the press, the official spokesman of the State Department declared that the United States will study the appeal with interest.)

Rusk also said that he will carefully follow the reactions of the other capitals to whom the appeal was addressed.

(Andrews said that this does not mean that the Americans will wait for the purpose of learning about the reactions of all the other capitals and only then reply to the appeal. However, the Americans will take into consideration all the reactions which will be known at the time of their reply.)

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(6) The appeal was received well by the United States Government and by the press because it does not accuse anybody and does not deal with unilateral moral reprovals.

Thus, the appeal was acceptable from the point of view of the prestige of the United States.

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(7) The appeal can produce a very important positive effect if it is taken into consideration by both sides.

In any case, together with all the other similar actions aimed at the creation of a more flexible situation, the appeal could play an important role and contribute to the finding of a solution, if not immediately, it can produce its effect within a couple or within six months.

\*\*\*

(8) The Americans have sent cables containing many of the above-mentioned elements to their Ambassadors in the countries of the signatories of the appeal, in the directly interested countries, in the NATO countries and to their Mission in the United Nations.

The note for Ball has been prepared. Ball will be back on Monday.

\*\*\*

(9) The public reactions, direct and indirect, are definite because of the concern that something less definite could be interpreted as a weakness by the other side.

---

(Andrews to Abot. Andrews met Rusk.)

K.

1. Atmosfera na sastanku 4 ambasadora sa Ruskom bila vrlo dobra; Ruski ih naglaseno srdačno primio. Razgovor bio substancijalan.

2. Jedini momenat kada Ruski bio, iz očiglednih taktičkih i sustinskih razloga, nešto kruni kruni, bio kada jugoslovenski ambasador pomenuo da treba doprinesti stvaranju takve situacije koja bi bila pogodna, omogućavala, pregovore ili kretanje ka pregovorima, pa u tom kontekstu pomenuo američko bombardovanje SV i američka vojna dejstva u jasnom smislu isticanja potrebe da SAD to obustave. Tada Ruski uzvratilo pitanjem; koje bilo skoro retoričko pitanje: "Kakva bi bila reakcija SV na obustavu američkog bombardovanja?" - konstatujući tim pitanjem ustvari činjenicu da se ne zna ne bi li SV obustavu bombardovanja protumacio kao povlačenje i slabost SAD i krenuo na još jaču vojnu akciju umesto na pregovore.

3. Ako bi se uslovno opisivali stavovi Apela i 4 ambasadora s jedne i Ruska sa druge strane, onda bi se prvi mogao nazvati "dobronamerno



"idealističkim" a drugi eminentno "prakticističkim". Stav Apela 17 zemalja odražavaju sledeće:

- njihov8 tesku zabrinutost situacijom;
- zeljom da se bilo sta ucini da se ona promeni; zeljom 4 ambasadora da nazru neku promenu kod SAD;
- nadu potpisnica da njihova akcija moze uticati u tom pravcu.

4. U stavu Raska bitno bilo pitanje da li se kod druge strane nazreva bilo kakva promena i spremnost na menjanje kursa. Zato je Rask, vrlo substancijalno i ne bez dubljeg diplomatskog znacaja, govorio o tome da znak druge strane ne mora biti jasan, da čak moze biti precutan i sl. .

5. U Raskovom odgovoru bilo bitno sto dobro primio Apel u ime Vlade SAD i obecao najozbiljnije razmatranje kao i "vrlo skori odgovor". (Zvanični predstavnik SU na jucerasnjem brifingu stampi rekao da ce SAD razmotriti Apel sa "interesom".)

Zatim Rask rekao da ce sa paznjom pratiti reakcije drugih prestonica gde Apel urucea. (A. dodao da to ne znaci da ce cekati da vide sve reakcije drugih da bi tek odnda odgovorili na Apel, ali ce uzeti u obzir sve reakcije koje se do tada



pojave ili saznanju.)

6. Apel je dobro primljen od strane vlade i stampe zato sto ne okrivljuje ni jednu stranu, ne ulazi u <sup>jednostrane</sup> moralne osude. To ga ucini i prestižno prihvatljivim za SAD.

7. Apel moze da izvrši svoje veoma vazno pozitivno dejstvo ako bude delovao na obe strane. U svakom slucaju, zajedno sa svim ostalim sličnim akcijama koje nastoje da ucine situaciju fleksibilnijom i da je premeste na drugi kolosek moze da odigra vaznu ulogu i doprinese nalazenju izlaza; ako ne odmah, onda za tri, šest meseci.

8. Telgram sa mnogim gornjim elementima, kao i sadrzajem apela, vec poslali svojim ambasadama u zemljama potpisnicama, u direktno zainteresovanim stranama, misiji u OUN, NATO. Zabiljesku pripremili za G. Balla koji se vraca u ponedeljak.

9. Javne reakcije, direktne ili indirektno (kao na pr. Predsednik Johnson) su cvrscce zbog bojazni da se bilo sta drugo pogresno ne protumaci na drugoj strani kao slabost (Andrews, koji bio na sastanku kod Raska, Abotu)

Broj: \_\_\_\_\_ 1963 god.

Poslana \_\_\_\_\_  
Priljena \_\_\_\_\_

TSIF: Poseta Predsednika:

- Kao rec o odnosima SAD-J. i njihovoj perspektivi, onda bi osnovna namena i rezultat susreta Tito-Kenedi trebalo da bude postizanje i unapredjenje takvog medjusobnog razumevanja koje ce biti osnova na kojoj ce dugorocnije pocivati odnosi dve zemlje; Kenedi ce biti predsednik SAD vise od 5 godina.

- Ako rec o tome sta po njima jedna od bitnih stvari, koja nužno da bi se ova namena ostvarila, onda oni misljenja da bi za ovu jedinstvenu priliku dragoceno bilo ako bi Predsednik Tito u neposrednom, licnom razgovoru upoznao Kenedija sa pozicijom Jugoslavije u medjunarodnim odnosima i njenom spoljnom politikom onako kako je formulise Jugoslovensko najvise i najautoritativnije mesto. (U. Bracke de, promisljaj, pa bi se u DTK rekao da po njihovim misljenjima najvise mesto. da Tito misli da ovaj susret treba da se odrzava, da se uspostavi to odnosa, ulazi...)

~~- Od 1948. SD, FK, administracija uopste (svaki i sada, uz podrsku Pentagona) zastupaju liniju da u nacionalnom interesu SAD postojanje nezavisne (po sopstvenom izboru i socijalisticko) Jugoslavije, u prilici cega ponoc SD i normalni odnosi u to vise vremena. Argumentacija za to bila i ostala: a) nezavisna J. faktor sta-~~

9/19/63  
8

~~najvažnijim međunarodnim pitanjima identični. Nedjutin za mnoge političare ovde, a da se o njemu javnosti i ne govori, to obično znači zauzimanje stava protiv američkih stavova. Ne ulazi se u specifične okolnosti, mogućnosti, potrebe i sl. po se samo zbraja koliko puta bio Tito u SSSR-u, notira odlazak Čosnjaka i sl.~~

- Predsedniku Kenediju su Rask, Friman, Kenan, a sada ce i Rodjes, govorili o poziciji ni politici J, značaju dobrih odnosa dve zemlje za nacionalne interese SAD, kao sto gore formulisano. Konacno, Kenedi ~~je~~ dobio licnu poruku od Tita. Sve to predstavlja i Kenedijev stav, uverenje i to on i aktivno zastupa. Sve to, nedjutin, ne moze da umanji znacaj onoga sto ce na ove teme Kenedi licno da cuje, u neposrednom kontaktu, od Tita kao sefa jugoslovenske drzave. Jedno afirmativno izlaganje o tome ~~je~~ <sup>leslo</sup> ~~polazi~~ i polazice od svoje neizmenjene nezavisne pozicije, da nezavisna i socijalisticka, da njena međunarodna akcija ne sadrzi u sebi nista sto bi bila pretnja interesima SAD - bilo bi od najveceg znacaja. Ovo ni na koji nacin ne znaci da Kenedi nije prihvatao tvrdnje svojih ~~službenih~~ saradnika <sup>ve</sup> ono sto mu do sada receno ili pisano, ali, poznato je da nista ne moze da zameni <sup>direktan</sup> ~~licni~~ susret odgovornih lidera.

Broj: \_\_\_\_\_ 1963 god.

Poslana \_\_\_\_\_  
Primljena \_\_\_\_\_

- Na ovaj ili onaj način ce doći do razgovora o politici SSSR-a, odnosno Istok-Zapad. Kennedy ce svakako interesovati impresije i sl. Tito posle dvonedeljnih razgovora sa Brusovom.

- Od papira sa koje ce se u pripremanu u SD najviše oslanjati, verovatno ce na prvom mestu biti zapisnik razgovora Kennedy-Koca Popovic, maja 1962. To ce referada upotrebljavati kao "reference paper"; razgovor Tito-Kenedi bi mozda mogao da ima neke zajednicke crte sa ovim.

~~Referada za J. u SD Andrews, privatno Jo'u u~~  
~~sa sada ni nije bilo velike negativne reakcije oko posete Tito Vasingtonu,~~  
~~iako negodovanja vec pocela; referada za J. u SD dobila 2-3 pisma iz srpskih~~  
~~eparhija protiv, niko a i pojedini kongresmeni daju negativne izjave, najavlju-~~  
~~ju kicije i sl. Nije svega toga, ali koliko do sada bili u stanju da procene,~~  
~~ne ocekuju neke <sup>neke</sup> kampanju u vidu ponavljanja 1957.~~

(Referent za J. u SD Andrews, privatno Jo'u)

M i c u n o v i c

(~~... ..~~)

*Amick. prev*  
*Andrews ref. SD:*  
*16. P. ...*  
*17. P. ...*  
*9/19/63*

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

No. 2853  
May 11, 1963

N O T E

Concerning the Conversation with Cvijeto Job  
About the Washington Operative Center

*R. C. H.*  
Comrade Job was in Belgrade in connection with  
Rasko's arrival and he stayed there from May 3 to May 11, 1963.

His visit was not planned. Consequently, no  
preparations were made for the complete reporting of  
comrade Job in accordance with the regulations. However,  
his stay was used for the purpose of discussing the following  
questions:

- the conditions of work and
- the contacts who are rather well developed.

In the Center, Job works in the political sector.  
In the Embassy, he is in charge of the press.

\*\*\*

Job has achieved a pretty good business success.  
He has created the contacts through whom he conveys our  
suggestions and he publishes articles in the United States  
press.

Job has regularly forwarded his information through:

the Coordination (Division) of the Secretariat of  
Foreign Affairs and the Information Department.

Job said that during the last four months, he  
forwarded 52 messages.

Until the arrival of Ambassador Micunovic, he had forwarded more cables through the Coordination Division. After Micunovic's arrival, he has been sending more messages through the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and through the Information Department because the Ambassador considers that the messages which do not emanate from "information" sources should be conveyed to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.

He stressed that this problem should be solved or that it should be taken into consideration on the occasion of the evaluation of his work.

Job also emphasized that he has forwarded many cables which did not bear the indication that they were sent by him.

ooo

Job said that lately the Center has not analyzed the work conditions in Washington. These conditions were barely considered.

Rafaj told him that he should report that it was essential for the Center to settle after the great changes, to start working and to establish with which problems it will have to deal.

The Center is of the opinion that the deterioration of the relations between Yugoslavia and the United States has influenced the attitude of some of the contacts and the creation of new contacts. This was felt because:

- many contacts did not reply to the congratulations for New Year and to the gifts;

- this year, the comrades were not invited on the occasion of "Thanksgiving" as was the case in the past.

It was established that:

- The real image of the present-day situation of the Center is known; the Center has problems with the Embassy which heretofore was burdened with acute bilateral problems.

DITHOR



The deterioration of the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia has influenced the work of the Center; all these difficulties were taken into consideration.

- Considered as a whole, the informing of the Center as well as of the Embassy was bad. The orientation was mainly centered on the bilateral relations which were good; however, the other matters were neglected and this was bad. Before the arrival of Micunovic, we received several cables which evaluated our work as good; these cables were related to various problems; this is a proof that the Embassy can follow the problems, even under the present-day conditions, in more precise and active manner.

- However, the Ambassador has started the practice of uniting in one single cable several data; it could not be seen who made this remark. This practice has its good sides; however, in some cases, some data remain unused and lose their timeliness.

- From the cables of the Embassy, it cannot be established which operator has talked with the contact from whom the information was obtained. Under the present conditions of the Center, this matter is important for the purpose of following the individual work. This can be remedied; the cables have to indicate the name of the operator who has obtained the information. There is no reason why this general practice of our Embassies should not be applied in Washington. In addition this should be also used as an incentive for work in general and particularly for the work of the young comrades.

- The question of canalizing the messages to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs or its various divisions and departments has been discussed with Rafaj. Sharp criteria have to be applied when information messages are forwarded; their mere contents have to be the logical reason why they have to be treated as information messages. Tom particularly is not certain about these criteria. The contact Amigo is of an information nature (Translator's Note: It appears that "information message" and "information nature" actually mean "espionage message" and "espionage nature") and so is the

contact Bob, etc. Then, as a matter of rule and for the purpose of keeping the secrecy of the contact, the messages have to be conveyed through the informative line. The development of the contacts should be recorded in notes which will show this development and the notes have to be written in conformity with the Regulations Concerning Writing.

\*\*\*

Recently, the work conditions were probably more difficult and this fact should be taken into consideration.

However, Rusk's visit will at least partly improve the climate.

In addition a part of the information of the Embassy shows that the present-day conditions are hampering but do not make impossible the normal following up of the problems and the reporting about them.

\*\*\*

Recently, a driving force is being felt in the Center which tries to set in motion and coordinate everything. With the time and with the normalization of the affairs of the Embassy, this driving force will indubitably give more results.

\*\*\*

The exploitation (sic) of some of the sources is inadequate. This is due to the fact that there are no personal relations with some of the contacts.

This is not true for all the contacts. Such is for instance Bob who is not afflicted by any complex (sic) in spite of the fact that he likes to contact the Ambassador (he had a very good talk with the Ambassador).

The development of the personal relations with such contacts should not be discarded; however, we believe that this is a problem which has not been sufficiently studied regarding the preparation for talks with such contacts.

\*\*\*



More attention should be paid to the diplomatic body because significant visits of statesmen take place in Washington every day. These activities indicate the attitude which the United States is assuming toward various countries.

Rafaj's orientation toward the diplomatic body has already given some interesting results. These results should be widened also by the other operators.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANTHE WELL DEVELOPED CONTACTS

The following objectives are assigned to Job:

- State Department
- White House
- press
- diplomatic body

Job contacts only one member of the intelligence organization and namely:

the selected contact "Jack" - Fall 1959

see

On the occasion of his transfer, comrade Drndic left a note indicating that "Jack" is a kind of collaborator. Drndic put this indication in parentheses.

"Jack" was absent for several months. He was sick.

Then, Job re-established the contact with "Jack." In the beginning, "Jack" declined two times to be contacted. Four months ago, he agreed to come to a lunch. On this occasion, "Jack" was cold and gave cold answers. Moreover, he acted in an inquisitive manner toward the operator (Translator's Note: The operator seems to be Job).

The operator mentioned comrade Drndic, but "Jack" did not react at first. When the operator mentioned Drndic for the second time, "Jack" said that he does not know Drndic or if he knows him, their acquaintance is superficial. Obviously, "Jack" was very cautious.

Information has to be squeezed out of "Jack."

On the occasion of the New Year, no gift was sent to "Jack" in order to avoid conveying the impression that we wished to speed up the matter.

The behavior of Jack improved during the second meeting. He was not stiff like the first time. His production was better.

On the occasion of the third meeting, his behavior was even more free and he furnished more freely his information. The operator aided him in writing comments for his newspaper (Translator's Note: It appears that Jack is a newspaperman). In these comments "Jack" inserted many of our suggestions.

Now, "Jack" works on questions related to the Near East.

see

Lately, he began speaking more openly with the operator. He freely speaks about himself.

Good personal relations have been established with "Jack." The earlier problem of relations has been overcome. "Jack" does not any longer furnish exclusively editorial information.

He can be used for writing about Yugoslavia.

see

"Jack" has a very weak character. He likes to eat and drink. He is vain; he likes to be considered as an important man who has affirmed himself and who is well known. He likes that people listen to him when he speaks.

His stay in Yugoslavia has left a good impression on him. He has acquired a feeling of friendship toward our people and toward our country.

His financial situation is not known. The operator evaluates that he has enough means to live well. However, according to the American standard of living, his financial condition is poor because no matter how much money he has, it is not enough for him and he asks for more.

see

**Plan for Further Work**

"Jack" and the operator have agreed to go to a night club.

The development of the friendly relations with "Jack" should be continued. That will also develop the operative relations and the production. The relations with "Jack" should be as varied (sic) as possible.

As a beginning, the operator should give him some book, some reproduction of a painting or something of that kind.

The operator should give him suggestions for his articles and at the same time be cautious to avoid compromising him.

The operator should forward notes to the Organization on the occasion of each meeting.

**Objective: State Department**

**McGovan**

The contact with McGovan was established in 1962.

The meetings are arranged in restaurants, in his office and in the apartment of the operator, twice a month.

During his stay in Yugoslavia, he acquired the respect for our country.

The operator has succeeded in establishing good personal relations with McGovan. Even their families have met.

The difference of age does not create difficulties.

McGovan easily agrees to meet. We received much information from him. Up to now, he gave about ten data. His production and his sincerity toward us depend on his relations with the operator.

Up to now, three bottles of wine (or liquor) were sent to him. He normally received these gifts.

His financial situation has not yet been studied.

eee

**Plan for Further Work**

The social and friendly relations should be developed. In doing so, the operative must regularly ask about McGovan's daughter whom he loves very much; any interest in and praise of her is appreciated by him.

On the occasion of the birthday of his daughter, a suitable gift should be sent to her.

In developing the personal relations, the production of McGovan should also be improved.

He should be used for questions pertaining to the relations between the United States and Europe and the relations between the USSR (?) and Yugoslavia.

ooo

The card index concerning McGowan has already been sent.

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(Translator's Note: The photograph of this page is not altogether clear.)

**Objective: State Department**

Ramsey

The contact with Ramsey was established in December 1952 on the occasion of the reception at the Soviet Embassy.

He is an old functionary of the State Department.

There is no work cover (?) with him. Meetings are held in restaurants once a month. He responds to the meetings and there is no problem in this regard.

He does not freely furnish the information which has to be pulled out of him in the course of the conversation.

He tells us that he is informed, capable and mature. He is aware of our intentions and he knows what we wish to get out of him. Heretofore, we received six data from him.

Our relations with him are still in the development stage and the ascending line is felt.

\*\*\*

At the last meeting with our operative, Ramsey took a note from his pocket containing the monthly plan of his family budget. On this occasion, he stressed that he has financial difficulties.

It is normal to see functionaries of the State Department having financial difficulties and complaining about them. However, Ramsey is an exception in this regard because he is so precise. The operator believes that this is more a sign of confidence than an indication that Ramsey is ready to accept money which would have to be characterized as corruption. However, Ramsey would gladly accept material services which would ease his movements in society.



Ramsey is not completely opposed to the Soviet Union. He is not merely a criticizer of the USSR but he understands the Soviet Union and positively evaluates some of its things.

oos

**Plan for Further Work**

Develop the diplomatic and personal relations.

Study his financial situation. Establish how much this situation could be used for the purpose of developing the operative relations and obtaining a better production.

Gradually oblige him with small gifts and material services such as lunches, theater, etc.

Regarding production, use him in following the bilateral relations between the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Europe on the other

oos

The card index of Ramsey has been written.



**Objective: State Department**

**Stearman**

His assignment is the wide sector of the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe.

He is a Republican.

He lives like a cosmopolite. His wife and his child live in Vienna.

He considers himself to be an expert on communism and he gladly talks about communist problems. That is why his contact with us is interesting for him for the time being.

His attitude toward the operator is that of a missionary; namely, he wishes to enlighten the operator. The operative tolerates this attitude because he has profits regarding the production.

He does not lie and the things he says are correct and have value.

Heretofore, he has furnished three data.

He is conceited. He much insists that the operator should read his book. He fights for unpopular positions.

The contact with him is still underdeveloped. Up to now, two meetings took place in his office and three at lunches. It is not hard to contact him because he gladly accepts meetings.

His financial and family situation have not yet been studied.

eee

**Plan for Further Work**

The relations have to be further developed on the social and on the diplomatic level. During that time, study the elements for a further development of relations.

As far as production is concerned, use him for the relations of the United States on the one hand with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the Eastern European countries on the other.

see

His card index has already been sent.

**Objective: White House**

**Malcolm Kilduff**

The contact with him was established in 1962.

He worked in the State Department for fourteen years. Actually, he still is a functionary of the State Department but he has been lent to the White House.

The contact with him was established in connection with business.

Kilduff immediately accepted a meeting in town. According to the operator, he gave on that occasion extraordinarily useful information.

The operator sent to him as a gift some wine (or liquor) on the occurrence of the New Year.

The operator had arranged to see Kilduff again in town. However, during the last three months, problems in contacting him have arisen. The operator tried many times to arrange a meeting but without success. Two times, he postponed the lunch.

It is significant to note that Kilduff accepted the meetings on Wednesdays right at the time when Kennedy was holding press conferences.

During the last fifteen days, the operator tried two times, through Kilduff's secretary, to phone to him. Both times the operator received the reply that Kilduff was absent.

It seems that Kilduff avoids the contact in an inconsiderate manner. Actually, he began declining the meetings from the moment when the gift was forwarded to him.

Now the problem is how to contact him. The true reasons why he declines the meetings are not known. Political questions cannot be involved.

He can be contacted for business purposes.

\*\*\*

**Plan for Further Work**

After his return to Washington, the operator must try to establish social contact with Kilduff.

If the operator does not succeed, he should not such insist. The operator should then visit Kilduff in connection with justified business matters. On this occasion, the operator should not say that he is worried because Kilduff no longer wishes to have social contacts; this is the proposal of the operator himself. The operator should judge the attitude of Kilduff and evaluate why he has been declining the meetings. The operator should learn whether Kilduff is very busy or whether there is some other reason for his behavior.

\*\*\*

The card index of Kilduff has been sent.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

Karl Kayser

• He works in the White House.

The contact with Kayser was established in 1952 in accordance with Wilduff's recommendations. The operator (Translator's Note: Probably Job is called the "operator") called him by phone and Kayser immediately agreed to meet.

Contacts with Kayser take place twice each month.

The conversations with him are of a purely political nature. He is acquainted with all the material of the State Department concerning Yugoslavia and also with the reports of the United States Embassy in Belgrade. From the contacts with him, not much can be expected. However, since general conversations about political themes are involved and since he is well acquainted with the matter and is an analyst, these conversations can be of great use. The strategic political plan of the United States can be deduced from these conversations.

He promised that he would take the operative and his (the operative's) wife for a drink.

The contact with him should be continued.

\*\*\*

His card index has been sent.

Objective: White House

August Murcher (?) *HECKSCHER?*  
-----

He is a special advisor of the President for questions of art.

For the time being, he is merely an acquaintance of the operator.

He can be used for social and diplomatic contacts and for cover purposes of other contacts with the White House.

\*\*\*

His card index has not been written.

(Translator's Note: It is impossible to read the last name of this man.)

General Objective

Stephen Rosenfeld, Newspaperman  
-----

The contact with Rosenfeld was established in December 1952.

He is about 32 years of age. He is married.

He writes editorials about Yugoslavia. Politically, he is very developed.

The report of the State Department operator (Translator's Note: The operator who preceded Job seems to be involved) stressed several times that the contact with Rosenfeld should be established because he writes articles about Yugoslavia.

The contact with Rosenfeld is logical and the business itself is its cover. The operative meets him in his office and in town. They are in good personal relations. The families meet each other. The operative took him to a concert. The contact is intense (sic).

A gift of liquor should be made to Rosenfeld.

Rosenfeld has good possibilities for furnishing information and for publishing articles. Up to now, information obtained from Rosenfeld was forwarded through the line of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.

Rosenfeld can get information emanating from reports of the State Department.

He can be influenced in the writing of his articles about Yugoslavia. Up to now, he wrote about a series of matters which were suggested to him.

The personal and the family friendship with Rosenfeld should be continued in the future. In doing so, he should be used for furnishing the information which he can obtain.

\*\*\*



His personal data have to be completed.

His card index has been written.

There are grounds to indicate him as a "developed contact."



General Objective

J. Lighter, Newspaperman  
 -----

The contact with him was established in October 1962.

He is close to <sup>Rogv</sup> [redacted] (masculine first name). He is one of the most eminent newspapermen covering the State Department.

Working relations are established with him; in addition, social relations are also developed. He came to the operator's house. There also are private contacts, lunches, etc.

Up to now, he received a package with liquor and a book of our reproductions was given to his daughter because she like art. He thanked for the gifts.

Contacts are maintained every 15 days.

His production is regular and reliable in spite of the fact that it does not always contain details.

Personal and family relations should be continuously developed with him. He should be used for information accessible to him. The elements which could tie him more closely to us should be studied.

We should see how we could take advantage of his interest in an interview with our President.

\*\*\*

His card index has been written.

There are grounds to indicate him as a "developed contact."

## General Objective:

MAX  
 Max Frankel, Newspaperman  
 -----

He was Kalenic's contact in the past. Job established the contact with him in November 1962.

The business as well as the personal relations are being developed well. Heretofore, the operator had five lunches with him. The meetings are held in his office. Very often, when talking about business, contacts are made by phone.

He likes society. He is very witty. He has great poise and talks about everything. He is very ambitious.

Liquor was sent to him as a gift.

He is used for placing news about Yugoslavia.

He furnishes confidential information emanating from the State Department; on these occasions, he mentions that it is secret information and that it should be used with caution. During the last five months, he furnished five data of high quality.

Further development of the personal and of the family relations is possible. More variety (sic) should be given to this contact. He should be used for information as heretofore.

The possibilities of stimulating him financially should be explored.

\*\*\*

His card index has been written.

There are grounds to indicate him as a "developed contact."

**General Objective**

**Bernard Gwartzman, Newpaperman**  
 -----

In the past he was in contact with Kalozic. Job established the contact with him in October 1962.

The personal relations as well as the relations between the families are well developed. Contacts take place in restaurants, at his home and in the home of the operator. An evening party has been planned.

From time to time, he has been used for production. He furnished information which he got at internal briefings of the State Department. He cooperated directly with writings about Yugoslavia published in his paper. Heretofore, he has published three articles.

Recently he has become the correspondent of his paper for Eastern Europe, Central Europe, etc.; this means a rather significant promotion in his position. He said that because of that he will have to have more frequent and stronger contacts with the State Department. In the past, he used to write the weekly review of events.

He is about to be married. He promised to the operator that he would invite him to his wedding. Later, he promised that he would visit the operator at his home.

His wedding should be used for the purpose of giving him a suitable gift.

The relations with him should be developed in various forms. He himself asks for contacts which is a rare occurrence.

His working place should be developed (sic) and so should his position and his contacts with the State Department.

\*\*\*

His card index has been written.

There are grounds to indicate him as a "developed contact."

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN**General Objective****Karl Meyer, newspaperman****Old and developed contact of Kalezic.**

Job is in good relations with him. The contact was intense by the end of 1962 and in the beginning of 1963. However, the working orientation was more directed toward newspapermen writing about Yugoslavia because of the needs of the Embassy (Translator's Note: It seems that Meyer does not write about Yugoslavia).

Nevertheless the contact with Meyer has not been neglected.

He should be used for the production concerning international relations and East-West matters.

Liquor was sent to him on the occasion of the New Year.

Contacts with his home and family should be established.

There are grounds to indicate him as a "developed contact."

ccc

His card index has been written.

**General Objective**

**P. Wilkinson, Diplomatic Body**

The operator (Translator's Note: This name seems to indicate Job) renewed contacts with him as soon as he arrived in Washington. He showed readiness to maintain contacts. He invited several times the operator to his home and introduced him to Americans.

He produced from time to time and his production is good.

His anti-American feelings can be particularly useful.

Photograph records could be given to him.

There are grounds to indicate him as a "developed contact."

ooo

His card index was written in London long ago.

**General Objective**

**H. Brooks (?), Diplomatic Body**

The relations with Brooks are good and they are being constantly developed.

No additional data about him can be furnished. All that is known is contained in his card index.

There are grounds to indicate him as a "developed contact."

**CONCLUSIONS**

- In the future, the Center has to take into consideration the facts which are mentioned in connection with the forwarding of information.

- The Center must evaluate regularly the general considerations of work. Recently, certain actions of rather great significance in the bilateral relations have influenced the conditions of work; we should be regularly informed in this connection.

- In informing about the members of the intelligence organization, the Center must observe the Regulations. Organizational notes should be forwarded for each contact.

- It has been established that Job has seventeen active contacts in all of the objectives for whom card indexes have been written. Job himself has created seven of these contacts and he has inherited the other ten.

These contacts are in the following objectives:

**Objective: State Department**  
-----

In this objective, Job has five contacts and he himself created four of them.

It was pointed to Job that his orientation in this objective was not quite good. He was instructed to develop the relations with the contacts with whom he has not to solve business problems. He has neglected the Press Division where he has only one inherited contact.

The operator should concentrate more on this objective in the future and create contacts with whom he has the business cover.

**Objective: White House**  
-----

In this objective, Job has two contacts and one acquaintance. This is good as a beginning.



Objective: Congress

He has no contact whatsoever with the Congress. Generally speaking, the Center has few contacts with this objective.

The operator Sobulic has made a plan which includes the other operators and which is aimed at the creation of contacts with the Congress. However, for the time being, no satisfactory results have been obtained.

In the further plan of its work, the Center has to encompass this objective.



**GENERAL OBJECTIVES: THE PRESS AND THE DIPLOMATIC BODY**

---

The operative has ten contacts in the general objective and all of them are registered (sic). Eight of these contacts are newspapermen and the other two are members of the diplomatic body.

The attention of the operator was drawn to the fact that his orientation toward this objective was not altogether correct. Actually, he has eight contacts with the newspapermen and five of them belong to the "Washington Post," whereas he only has one registered (sic) contact with the "Monitor," one with the "Washington Star" and one with the "New York Times."

The operator must widen the circle of his contacts with the other newspapers.

With the diplomatic body, the operator has merely two contacts: E. Brooke, the Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington whom he met when he was serving in London, and Wilkinson who also belongs to the British Embassy.

The operator was told that he has to create more contacts with the diplomatic body.

\*\*\*

It was established that, aside from the above-listed people, the operator has created many contacts with other people for whom card indexes have not been written. These people have no significant elements which would indicate the necessity of speaking about them for the time being.

It was evaluated that the operator is very active and dynamic in creating and in maintaining contacts.

For the time being, the operator has been more concentrated on obtaining information than on detecting the intelligence elements. He pays much more attention to these elements.

The frequency of the meetings with the contacts is satisfactory.

The attention of the operator was drawn to the fact that he ~~must~~ improve his information concerning his contacts. Heretofore, this information was not complete and regular.

The card indexes of the persons as well as the complements of the data were written on March 24 and 25, 1963. This shows that it was a "campaign" work which has been done with great delays after the meetings.

The good thing about the "registered" contacts is the fact that with most of them the relations are in continuous development. The exception is Kilduff with whom the development of relations is still uncertain.

We have no data concerning the production of the contacts because the information that they (the contacts) have furnished were conveyed through the line of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.

In the future, the Center has to inform us about the number of data furnished by each contact, about the nature of the data and about the line used to forward the data.

This information should be furnished in the organizational note which must contain:

- the number of furnished data,
- the subject of the data,
- the evaluation of the data made by the Center.

It is not necessary to write about the contents of the data.

\*\*\*

On the basis of the material which was received and of the conversation with Job, seven of his contacts fulfill the conditions of "developed contacts." They are:

Max Frankel,  
Karl Meyer,  
Bernard Gartzman,

J. Hightower,  
Rosenfeld,  
Crocco and  
Wilkinson.

The operator should add the description of the contact which must contain indications such as:

- personal and biographic data,
- characteristics and possibilities,
- financial stimulation,
- frequency and security of contacts,
- use of contact in the intelligence and in the operative field,
- value of the contact in the information and in the operative field,
- plan of further work with contacts.

Belgrade, May 11, 1956.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANEXECUTION OF THE PROGRAM OF WORK FOR MAY 1963

(During one half of the month of May, he (sic) was in Belgrade)

\* \* \*

(1) In accordance with the talks and with the conclusions made in the I Department of the Direction in Belgrade, the first assignment was to try renewing the contacts with the White House; that is Kilduff and Kaysen.

This was done. (There were three contacts with Kilduff: lunch, White House and cocktail party. There were two contacts with Kaysen: dinner at his home and cocktail party.)

I have to write special operative notes for Belgrade on this subject.

The production was forwarded to Belgrade.

\* \* \*

(2) The development of the relations with Gwertzman and Hightower was continued.

The production was forwarded to Belgrade.

\* \* \*

(3) Business contacts were made with:

Friendly (Washington Post),  
C. Kilpatrick (Washington Post) and  
Miental (Newsweek).  
Cables forwarded to Belgrade.

\* \* \*

(4) Had lunch with Bernsdale after my return from Belgrade. This was in line with the normal business contacts of Press Attache with (one unintelligible word).

\* \* \*

(5) Invited a few related people to our Pan-American cocktail party. Most of them responded:

Kilduff,  
Gwertzman,  
Hightower,  
S. Rosenfeld,  
Earl Voss and  
McGowan.

\* \* \*

PROGRAM OF WORK FOR JUNE

(In conformity with the assignments from Belgrade)

\* \* \*

(1) Develop as many as possible varied contacts. For that purpose, contact:

Voss,  
Harder,  
Frankel,  
Rosenfeld,  
D. May, (the press)  
McGowan (State Department) and  
J. Ramsay (State Department)

\* \* \*

(2) Renew the contacts with:

L. Brady, USIA; Ruzic asked for it.

\* \* \*

(3) In the beginning, cultivate more intensely the legal contacts of the assigned sector in the Department of State:

News Division and similar matters (renew the contact with J. Reap and the new employees working in his Division),

again contact Foster (Public opinion: D. Montenegro, Public Services).

\* \* \*

(4) Pay more attention to diplomatic body.

For that purpose, continuously renew contacts with the British Embassy, in conformity with the conditions.

Also establish contacts with colleagues from:

United Arab Republic,

Norway and

France.

s/ Abbot

PROGRAM RADA (IZVRŠENJE) ZA MAJ 1963. GODINE

(Polevinsu meseca maja bio na putu za Beograd.)

1. Prema razgovorima i zakljucima u I Odjeljenju Uprave u Beogradu prvi zadatak je bio da se pokuša obnoviti kontakt sa vezama iz Bole face, Kilduffom i Kaysenom, što je i učinjeno. (Sa Kilduffom 3 kontakta: ručak, Bela Kava, koktel; sa Kaysenom 2: kod njega kući-vecera, na koktelu). O ovome treba da učinim posebne operativne dup zabiljeske za Beograd. Produkcija poslana u Bgd.

2. Nastavljeno je razvijanje veze sa Gwertzmanom i Nightowerson: produkcija poslana u Bgd.

3. Pored toga održani su poslovni kontakti sa: Friendly (WP), C. Kilpatrick (WP), McEntal (Newsweek). Depese slane u Beograd.

4. Isao ručak sa Barnsdale, posle povratka iz Bgd, na liniji normalnog poslovnog kontakta press-atachea sa referadom.

5. Pozvao nekoliko odgovarajućih svojih veza na na nas, Panamerikan koktel, od kojih dosla vecina: Kaysen, Kilduff, Gwertzman, Nightower, S. Rosenfeld, Earl Voss, Mc Gowan.

PROGRAM RADA ZA JUNI: (Prema zadacima iz Beograda):

1. Razvijati što više i razlovrsnije izdvojene i bolje, razvijenije veze; u tom cilju treba kontaktirati: Vossa, Gardnera, Frankela, Rosenfelda, D. Kay-a, (stampa), McGowana (SD), J. Ramsay (SD).

2. Obnoviti kontakt sa L. Brady-~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ USIA, na što upozorio Ruzic.

3. Više icipa u pocetku legalne veze svog sektora u SD: News Division i sl. (obnoviti kontakt sa J. Keenan i nove u njegovom odjeljenju) kontaktirati ponovo Rostera (Public Opinion); B. Antenegro, Public Services

4. Obratiti vecu paznju diplomatskom koru; u tom cilju stalno onavljati kontakte sa vezama u VB ambasadi, prema uslovima; takodjer, uspostaviti kontakte sa kolegama: UAR, Norveska, Francuska.

Abbot



TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANAbbot (JOB)

## O P E R A T I V E   R E V I E W

(I) Assignments for the Period Since May 1963

The work program for June 1963 which was sent to the Direction by mail and the "Conclusions of Abbot's Work" of June 1963 which were written on the occasion of the meeting S. Drndic, O. Ruzic, D. Rafaj and Abbot, contain the following assignments:

- (1) renew and develop contacts with the White House,
- (2) take over and continue work with part of Ruzic's contacts which are destined for Abbot,
- (3) intensify contacts with State Department and USIA,
- (4) intensify work with "Jack" and
- (5) pay more attention to contacts with the diplomatic body.

\*\*\*

Voss

A + 3

pages 1, 6-8 + 1



**(II) Execution of Above Assignments****(1) Renewal of Contacts and Developments of New Ones with the White House.**

(a) The contact with Malcolm Kilduff, the assistant of Pierre Salinger who is in charge of the press relations in the White House, has been renewed. (See about the circumstances related to the temporary break of the contact and its renewal in the blue card index of June 9, 1963, July mail of the Center addressed to the Direction /Uprava?.)

After that, a more or less normal relationship was established with Kilduff. Abbot saw him just before the visit of the President. He also had two business contacts in his office, and one lunch.

Kilduff responded to the Ambassador's invitation to the reception given in honor of the IPU (?) delegation.

A lunch for next week has been arranged for the purpose of "comparing the information and the impressions concerning the meeting 'Tito-Kennedy.'"

Up to now, the contacts have been productive and the reports have been sent to the Direction.

A problem still remains as far as Kilduff is concerned and the question is how to make secure the meetings which are not connected with the business. Kilduff has declined several invitations for suppers in town by saying that he has to travel. He has accepted Abbot's invitation to have supper at his (Abbot's) home.

(b) Abbot has established the contact with William H. Brubeck, one of the assistants of McGeorge Bundy. Brubeck partly takes care of the job formerly performed by Karl Kayson, one of Abbot's contacts. (Karl Kayson has returned to teach economics at Harvard and has remained Kennedy's special consultant for questions of national security. Kilduff has introduced Brubeck to Abbot.)

In the course of this year, Brubeck has been transferred to the White House. He was Rusk's special assistant and the executive Secretary of the State Department. In the White House, he is Bundy's assistant and he directly advises Kennedy on matters pertaining to Africa and to economy.

In spite of the fact that he occupies a high position, Brubeck does not directly work on questions affecting Yugoslavia (in the Biographic Register of the State Department, Brubeck is listed as one of the "principal Officers").

Brubeck agreed to establish the contact. Abbot lunched with him before the visit (Translator's Note: Presumably Tito's visit to the United States) which resulted in useful production. Brubeck also has freely explained to Abbot the organizational elements of Bundy's apparatus in the White House and in the National Security Council.

(c) Abbot has renewed the contact with David Klein who is an assistant of Bundy at the White House. Klein has no direct contact with Kennedy like Brubeck.

The close contact with Klein was established by Kalezic (see the blue card index). Klein works on European matters and also on Yugoslav questions.

Kilduff has connected Abbot with Klein.

The first meeting -- which was a lunch -- was a good thing and produced information about the relations of the United States with Yugoslavia and the President's visit; this information was forwarded to Belgrade by special cable.

Other meetings with Klein are planned. However, we have not contacted him for more than one year.

(2) Heretofore, Abbot has successfully contacted and continued the relations with:

Bowden,  
Tiers,  
Eclade and  
Volkov.

(See the blue card indexes about all of them.)

Lunches were arranged with all of them and useful production was obtained. The results were sent to the Direction by cables.

(b) The following should be specified about each one of them:

- Bowden

He will remain in the United States for about six months. He has been transferred to Rio, Brazil. He will inform you on time about his tying with the Center in Brazil.

Until that time, we will intensify our relations with him.

- Timms

He was very glad to be contacted after Ruzic's departure.

The psychological and the other analysis of comrade Ruzic about Timms and about his wish to have diplomatic relations has proved to be right. We have the impression that all will be well between Timms and Abbot.

- Volkov

The contact with him proved to be good in general and particularly on the occasion of the President's visit.

He gave valuable information on several occasions and especially about the questions that Kennedy was going to ask the President. This proved to be correct.

Abbot "helped" him in informing him about our positions. Volkov used the material for writing a good analysis in the "Newsweek."

Volkov and Abbot have arranged that Abbot supply him liquor at lower prices.

- Larry McLade

He was very agreeable on the occasion of the first contact which took place at a lunch. He immediately agreed to maintain contacts.

However, he also was considerably cautious. Thus, Abbot did not look for the elaboration of the production on that occasion in spite of the fact that McLade had furnished useful information about the preparation of the material in the office of Nitze; this material was related to the President's visit.

- Charles Vetter of the USIA

Abbot did not yet meet him.

- Ben Zook of the Direction for Analysis of the Soviet Bloc, State Department

Abbot did not yet meet him.

Vetter and Zook are both contacts of Ruzic and should be approached by Abbot.

\* \* \*

(3) Drndic's Contacts Taken Over by Abbot

Abbot has renewed the contact with Robert Haeger of the "United States News & World Report" and arranged to have other meetings with him.

Frances Stevens of the same magazine has not yet been contacted.

\* \* \*

(4) Widening of Contacts with State Department and USIA

After a rather long period of time, the contact with Robert McClosky, the special assistant of R. Manning, was re-established. Manning is Rusk's assistant for matters related to the press and to propaganda. McClosky also is temporarily the official spokesman of the State Department.

Mirko Zaric was in good relations with McClosky in the past (see the blue card index).

The relations with McClosky are being developed well. His information is detailed and makes very good production. He often quotes the source of his information and comments rather freely.

He was the first to invite Abbot at his home for supper. He easily agrees to meet.

see

The contact with Leslie Brady has been re-established and developed. He is the Assistant Director of the USIA for the sector of the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe.

In the past, Kalezic maintained contacts with him.

Brady is interested in meetings. He came to dinner to Abbot's home.

On two occasions, he furnished very good production.

see

All in all, Abbot has fifteen active contacts with the State Department. Thus, the "balance" of Abbot's contacts has been obtained.

(8) "Jack"

A rather intense contact was established between "Jack" and Abbot during Drndic's visit (see our cable No... of...).

Abbot was at the home of "Jack" for a drink. On that occasion, Abbot took a case of whisky to "Jack."

"Jack" and his wife were at Abbot's home for dinner; seven couples were invited on that occasion. "Jack" and Abbot also had two lunches.

"Jack" was directly asked for information about the President's visit to Latin America and about the evaluation of the State Department concerning the forthcoming visit of the President to the United States. He had promised that he would furnish this information but he never did. He either evaded the contact or, in the case of the President's visit to the United States, he said that his acquaintances at the State Department are particularly cautious and decline to tell him anything.

"Jack" actually has given ~~one~~ information which was used. Even this information was of a general and not particularly confidential nature; it was related to the preparations which were under way in the Congress against the visit (Translator's Note: Presumably, Tito's visit to the United States is involved). This information was forwarded to the Direction.

He also has furnished a valuable information concerning his conversation with Rostov.

We should worry about the fact that he declines to furnish information which is directly requested from him about subjects in which we are directly interested and at the time which we indicate.

**(III) Plan of Work for November 1963****(I) Operations (Contacts, Corruption)**

In maintaining and developing his contacts with the White House in the future, Abbot will have to find the means to maintain and develop the contact with Karl Kaysen. This can be done through Harvard and Washington.

Since we have learned from Kilduff that Ralph Dungan works in Bundy's office on matters related to Latin America, Abbot should use his contacts and get in touch with Dungan. Then, Dungan should be switched to the member of the Center who is in charge of Latin America, that is Foznanovic.

\*\*\*

As far as corruption is concerned, this should be accomplished:

- Volkov should be supplied with liquors;
- the relations with "Jack" should be continued in the same manner as they have been maintained up to now;
- explore whether McClosky would respond to such advances;
- do the same with Kilduff;
- the grounds for major gifts for Christmas -- New Year -- should begin to be prepared right now;
- Abbot should establish the relations with the remaining contacts of Ruzic and of Drndic, namely:
  - Ben Zook, State Department
  - C. Vitter, United States Information Agency,
  - F. Stevens, "U.S. News and World Report."

\*\*\*



In the field of production, it is vital to learn the American analysis and conclusions concerning the President's visit to the United States. To that effect, contact:

in the State Department:

- McClosky,
- W. Stearman,
- H. Andrews, the new official for Yugoslavia with whom Abbot must establish informal and rather close relations,

- McGowan,
- Greenfield,
- Tiams and
- Zook;

in the USIA:

- Brady and
- Vetter;

in the White House:

- Kilduff,
- Kayson and
- Klein;

in the press:

- Frankel,
- Rosenfield,
- Volkov,
- Gvortzman and
- "Jack."

(typewritten signature)  
Abbot

October 30, 1963



Abbot

OPERATIONAL REPORTI. Zadaci za period od maja 1963:

Prema programu rada za juni 1963 (koji je poslat postom Upravi), te "Zakljucima u vezi rada Abbota" od 9 juna 1963, donesenim na sastanku sa S. Drndicom, O. Ruzicom i D. Rafajem i Abbottom - u periodu od maja 1963 do sada su zadaci bili sljedeći:

1. Obnoviti i razviti kontakte u Bijeloj Kuci;
2. Preuzeti i nastaviti rad na dijelom Ruzicevih veza, koje su odredjene za Abbota;
3. Prosiriti i intenzivirati veze u State Departmentu i LSIA;
4. Nastaviti sa intenzivnijim radom sa "Jockom";
5. Obratiti vecu paznju vezama u diplomatskom koru;

II. Izvršenje gornjih zadataka u periodu od maja 1963:

I. Obnova kontakata i razvijanje novih veza u Bijeloj kuci:

a) Obnovljen je kontakt sa Malcolmom Kilduffom, pomoćnikom Pierra Salingera, šefa Odjeljenja za štampu Bijele kuće. (Vidi o okolnostima privremenog prekida kontakta i njegove obnove u dopuni pl.k. od 9 juna 1963, u Julskoj postu Centra Upravi). Posle toga je nastavljen više-manje normalne frekvencije kontakt sa njim; Abot je

- 2 -

ima neposrednije pred posetu Predsednika, u toku prvih priprema, jedan ručak sa njim, dva poslovna kontakta u njegovoj kancelariji, Kilduff bio pozvan i odazvao se prijemu Ambasadora za delegaciju IRL, sa kojim su Abbot posebno odneo sliku, Ugovoren ručak za sledeću nedelju radi "upoređivanja informacija i izmene o stvaru Tito-Kenedi". Dva dana pred posetu, su dali korisnu produkciju koja je poslana Upravi. Sa Kilduffom, koji veoma često putuje (na Kenedijem u Evrop., na Zapadnu obalu SAD i sl.) ostaje i dalje izvestog problema kako obezbediti kontakte van poslovnih; nekoliko inicijativa za izlazak u grad uvečer nije prihvatio pod izgovorom putovanja; prihvatio Abbotov poziv za večeru kod Abota kući.

b) Abbot je uspostavio prvi kontakt sa William H. Brubeckom, jednim od zakonika McGeorge Bundy-a, koji dolomice pokriva mesto koje pre zauzima Karl Kayser, Abbotova veza. (Karl Kayser se vratio na mesto profesora ekonomike na Harvard, a tim sto je ostao specijalni konsultant Kenedija za pitanja nacionalne bezbednosti. Sa Brubeckom je Abbot povezo Kilduff.)

Brubeck je tokom ove godine sa mesta specijalnog pomocnika Ruska i sa mesta izvršnog sekretara State Departmenta, presao u apart Bijele kuće, gdje, kao pomocnik Bundy-a, direktno savetuje Kenedija u pitanjima Afrike i privrede.

Iako vrlo visokog položaja, ne radi direktno na pitanjima vezanim za Jugoslaviju, (Brubeck je u Biografskom registru SD klasifikovan među "glavne, visoke funkcionere" u posebnoj glavi/principal officer/), Brubeck je prišao na uspostavljanje veza. Abbot je sa njim imao jedan ručak pred posetu, koja dao korisnu produkciju. Brubeck je također slobodno izlagao Abbotu elemente organizacione scene Bundy-ovog operata u Bijeloj kući i Nacionalnom savetu bezbednosti.

- 3 -

c) Abbot je obnovio kontakt sa KLEIN DAVIDOM, koji u aparatu Bundy-a i Brubecka u Nijeloj kući, kao posćenik Bundy-a, ali u funkciji visok referenta, bez neposrednog kontakta sa Kenadijem kao Brubeck. Međutim, D. Klein, sa kojim svojevremeno Mirko Kalezić uspostavio blizak kontakt (vidi pl.k.), radi na evropskim pitanjima, te, između ostalog, i na pitanjima Jugoslavije. I sa njim je Abbota povezo Kilduff.

Prvi sastanak (ruoak) je dobro protekao; produkcija o odnosima SAD-Jugoslavija, poseti Pretsednika poslata posebnom depesom. Dogovoreni dalji kontakti. Inace, Kleina nismo kontaktirali preko godinu dana.

#### 2. Ruziceve veze koje preuzima Abbot:

a) Abbot je do sada uspesno kontaktirao i nastavio odnos sa Bordenom, Limom, McLard i Valkevom (vidi za sve njih pl.k.) Sa svima njima su otrzani ruckovi koji su odmah davali korisnu produkciju. Lo-ja slata depesama Upravi.

b) Specifična za svakog od njih treba ovdje napomenuti sljedeće:

- Borden ce ostati u SD jos oko pola godine; prenjestan je za Brazil (po pola godina u Braziliji i Rio). Javiceo pravovremeno sa povezivače sa centrom u Brazilu, a tim sto ceo do tada imati sa njim intenzivniji odnos.

- Lim je bio vrlo zadovoljan sto je kontaktiran posle Ruzicevog odlaska. Psiholoske i druge analize Ruzice o njegovoj zelli sa diplomatskim kontaktima se pokazale i ovde tacnom, inace utisak da ce iznadju njega i Abbota dobro ici.

- Kontakt sa Valkevom se pokazao posebno dobrim i plodnim

oko posete Predsednika i inace, kao je veoma vredne informacije u nekoliko navrata, posebno o tome sta ce Kenodi pitati Predsednika, sto se pokazalo tacno i izvornim. Abbot mu je "pomogao" obavestjenjima o nekim stavovima i sl. sto je Volkov direktno iskoristio za pisanje pred posetu u dobroj analizi u "Newsweeku", sto nam takodjer koristilo. Sem toga, Volkov i Abbot se dogovorili da ga Abbot povremeno snabdjeva pismom po nizim cenama.

- Larry McLade je na prvom kontaktu, rucak, bio licno jako prijatan, odmah pristao na stalno odrzavanje odnosa. Me, bio je i dosta oprezan, tako da Abbot tom prilikom nije isao na razradjivanje produkcije, iako je McLade dao i jednu kracu korisnu informaciju o pripremanju materijala u kabinetu WITZE-a za posetu Predsednika.

- Abbot se jos nije sastao sa Charles Vetter (USIA) i Ben ZOOK (SD - prava za analize sovjetskog bloka), od Ruzicevih veza koje treba da kontaktira.

wx2d

### 3. Drndiceve veze koje preuzima Abbot:

- Abbot je obnovio kontakt sa Robertom Heegerom (United States News & World Report), dogovorio se njim nove kontakte. Nije jos kontaktirao Francis Stevema iz istog lista.

### 4. Prosirivanje veza u State Departmentu i USIA:

- Uspestavljen je, posle duzeg vremena, ponovni kontakt sa Robertom McClosky-om, specijalnim asistentom R. Manninga (posocnik Raska za pitanja stampa i propagande), koji je privremeno i zvanični apsolvent State Departmenta. (Sa McClosky-om je svojevremeno isao dobar odnos Mirko Zeric, ridi pl.k.) Odnos sa njim se dobro razvija;

- 5 -

njegove informacije su bile detaljne, specifične i izvorne i stalno predstavljaju vrlo dobru produkciju. Često citira izvor (materijal SP-a) i dosta slobodno komentariše. Prvi zvali Abbota na večeru kući, iako se odaziva za nove kontakte.

- Osnovljen je i dalje razvijen kontakt sa Lealie BRADY, pomoćnik direktora u LSIA za sektor SSSR-a i Istočne Evrope. Svojevremeno kontakt sa njim održavao Kalazic. Brady pokazuje interes za kontakt, bio na večeri kod Abbota, i u dva navrata dao vrlo solidnu produkciju.

- Sa ovom dvojicom, plus do sada ostvarene Abbotove veze u SD, plus preuzete Kuzinove veze u SD, čine ukupan broj od 15 aktivnih veza koje Abbot održava u SD, čime se, u odnosu na objekt br. 1, uravnotežio raspored Abbotovih veza u odnosu na novinarske i ostale.

#### 5. "JACK":

Posle uspostave intenzivnijeg kontakta Jack-Abbot, do čega došlo u vreme po poseti Drndice, i razvoju odnosa kako javili nasom posebnom dopisom Upravi (vidi broj.....od.....), Abbot bio kod Jackove kuće na drinku, odneo mu sanduk viskija, Jack sa ženom bio kod Abbota kući na večeri (7 parova) i imali dva rucka. Iako od njega celo vreme direktno tražene informacije o ocenama posete Predsednika LA, te procenama u SD o pretatoj poseti Predsednika SAD, i on isto obavešno, Jack nije dao tražene informacije, ili izbegao kontakt u pravo vreme, ili se, kao što bio slučaj u vezi posete SAD, izgovarao da njegove veze u SD posebno opravne i neću ništa da mu kažu. Za ovo vreme Jack je dao jednu upotrebljivu, iako dosta uopatenu i ne posebno

- 6 -

poverljivu informaciju o pripradi protesta u Kongresu protiv posete (koja poslana Lepavi), te vrednu informaciju o razgovoru sa Rostovim. Medjutim, zabrinjava njegovo de facto odbijanje da nastavi i da informacije, koje se direktno traze od njega, o temi za koju mi direktno zainteresovani, i u vreme koje mi direktno specificiramo kao nužno za odrzavanje kontakta i prenos produkcije.

### III. Plan rada za novembar 1963 godine:

#### I. Operativa (kontakti, veze, korupcija):

- U daljem odrzavanju i razvijanju ostvarenih i novih veza u Bijeloj kući, Abbot ce trebati da nađe nacina da preko Harvarda i Washingtona odrzava i razvija kontakt sa Karlom Kungenom.

Boste od Kilduffa i Brubecka saznali da na pitanjima LA u Bundy-evom aparatu radi Ralph Dungan, sa kojim se jos nismo povezali, to bi trebalo da Abbot iskoristi svoje veze i poveze se sa njim, a tim sto bi Dunga na onda trebalo prebaciti na člana Centra koji radi LA pitanja (Poznanovic).

- Sto se korupcije tice tu treba uciniti slijedeca: obezbediti Volkevu jednu kolicinu pice; nastaviti kao do sada sa "Jackom"; videti da li bi McClenkey bio otvoren za ovakav nastup; isto vazi i za Kilduffa. Vec sada poceti pripremati teren za ste efektivnije poklone za Bozic (Novu Godinu).

- Uspostaviti odnos sa ostacim veza Ruzica i Drndica sa Abbotta: Ben Zook u SD, C. Vetter u USIA, F. Stevens u "US New & W. Report".

- Na planu produkcije bitno je saznavanje americkih analize i



- 7 -

zaključaka o poseti Predsednika SAD. U tu svrhu kontaktirati: u SD: McCloskog, W. Stearmana, N. Andrews (novi referent za Jugoslaviju sa kojim Abbot treba da uspostavlja blizi neformalni kontakt), McGowan, Greenfielda; u CIA: Timmsa, Zooka; u USIA: Brady-a i Vettera; u Bijeloj kući: Kilduffa, Kaysena i Kleina; od novinara: Frankola, Rosenfelda, Volkova, Gvertzmana i Jacka.

Abbot.

30 oktobar 1963.

A.A.6

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

Operative: Abot (JOP)

Sector: Political

## OPERATIVE REPORT

## I

Since the last operative report (March 12, 1964), Abot increased the number of the developed connections, with whom he actively works, from 23 to 27. If we take into consideration that two of the developed connections were transferred (L. Brady - USIA and R. Tims - State Department), the increase amounts to six persons. According to the objectives, the situation appears as follows:

## STATE DEPARTMENT

In the past, we had five connections:

- McGovan,
- Stearnan,
- McCloskey,
- Andrews and
- Tims (who left).

Now we have seven connections since the following people have been added:

- Ben Zook, Department for Analyses of the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe in the State Department and
- S. Poliansky, Officer in Charge of the Soviet Union, Section of the Bilateral Relations in the European Bureau of the State Department.

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WHITE HOUSE

The number of our connections has not changed; we have three of them and they are:

- Kilduff,
- D. Klein and
- W. Brubeck.

\* \* \*

GENERAL OBJECTIVE

The number of selected, of developed and of social contacts has increased from nine to fourteen.

Aside from:

- Hightower,
- Gvertzman,
- Fzankel (?), Fzankel ?
- Rosenfeld,
- Harder,
- Volkov,
- Dudman,
- Price Day and
- Jack (who is no longer a newspaperman),

we now have:

- Foizie (1)
- Warren Unna,
- R. Bratenstein,
- Karl Meyer,
- Crosby,
- Moyes and
- Joel Blocker.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

**Subject: Abot's Operative Report**

USIA

Abot worked pretty much with Abraham Brumberg (?) who belongs to the USIA and is the editor of the USIA magazine entitled **Problems of Communism.**

Abot also worked pretty much with C. Dizard who belongs to the Department for Political Planning of the USIA. The relations with Dizard were started by Prestbarger.

(See the blue card indexes of all the above-mentioned selected, developed or social connections. If new connections are involved see the new blue card indexes.)

From all the above reported, we may say that the widening of the organization, that is of the net, the adequate covering of the most important objectives and the finding of substitutes for the transferred connections is satisfactory. This covers Abot's obligations in the field of production of political information.

It also covers the need for an adequate number of connections with whom Abot actively works for the purpose of finding the favorable conditions for a possible establishment of an information relationship of the higher type.

\*\*\*

II

As far as the production of political information deriving from the above-listed people is concerned, we have the following situation: // 342

From April 1964 to October of the same year, that is five months (one month is subtracted because of the annual leave of the Operative), Abot's connections produced 27 reports forwarded through the 'K' line.

During the last period, that is from June 1963 to March 1964, there were 26 reports conveyed through the 'K' line.

This means that the frequency of reports through the 'K' line has considerably increased.

From this number, 28 (sic) reports were evaluated as 4 - B and C. This means that the relation of B to C was 1 to 3.05.

The Department has evaluated two reports as 'without grade' and one of the reports should have been sent through the line of the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

## JOB'S OPERATIVE REPORT

(C o n t i n u a t i o n)

We have not yet received the evaluations of 7 reports which were forwarded during those last months (July, August, September).

During that same time, Abot forwarded 19 political reports through the line of the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and 13 political analyses regarding the writing of the United States press about Yugoslavia.

In all, Abot forwarded a total of 59 political cables, that is 12 cables per month (about 3 political reports per week).

During this period and in accordance with the verbal remarks of the Group for Analyses, Abot tried to furnish more rounded information of a more analytical nature and containing data deriving from several sources.

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As far as the contents of the production are concerned, these were some of the more significant matters:

- exact and timely information about Rusk's letter to Schreuder (Ben Zook);
- pretty good coverage and predictions of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and between the United States and the Eastern European countries, especially in connection with the situation preceding the elections;
- realistic communications of elements regarding the American internal evaluations and analyses of the moves within the International Workers' Movement;
- securing of White House reactions to Yugoslav policies and attitude of White House toward Yugoslavia; in the personal contact with the White House source, the source has avoided some formal considerations and made possible a greater liberty of more direct informing;

- securing, mainly through contacts with newspapermen, of some general elements of the United States strategy in Europe, in JIA (sic) and in Cuba just as these newspapermen learned the information through their contacts with the Administration; this information proved to be correct.

Abot did not succeed in learning through a higher grade of informative relationship the following:

- the concrete measures that the Administration was going to undertake toward Yugoslavia, especially the unfavorable measures;

- the form, the frequency and the concrete contents of the constant exchange of messages between Khrushchev and the President of the United States;

- the details of the conclusions and of the analyses of the Department for the Soviet Union and of the Department for Eastern Europe.

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Translator's Note: The above-mentioned abbreviation "JIA" could mean "Jugoslavocna Azija" - "Southeastern Asia."

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN**JOB'S OPERATIVE REPORT**  
-----**(Continuation)**

III

Aside from the circumstances reported in the last operative report (March 12, 1964), the salient circumstances under which the operative worked during this period are:

(a) Since two years of work have elapsed, the operative is now in a period of stabilization. He knows better his environment and his possibilities. In addition, during these two years, the operative's connections know him better by now, they have more definite impressions about him and they also have a certain confidence and interest in him.

Since there is no information organization of the type of an agency, this plays a decisive role (aside from the activities, from the corruption, etc.) in securing the kind of connections and of contacts which can furnish information of a higher quality than the regular diplomatic information.

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(b) The summer season, that is the absence of the operative from Washington for one month, has resulted in the usual discontinuation of information.

However, due to the fact that a so-called 'dead season' does not exist in Washington because the Administration, the press, etc., continue to work more or less with the same tempo, the discontinuation is related exclusively to the period of vacation.

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The electoral campaign always results in rather great disturbances. The issues discussed by the Administration, by the press, etc., switch from the international to the internal field. Naturally, the proper administrative organizations continue to do their jobs and to follow their tasks. However, the concrete moves in foreign policies are mainly reduced to reactions and to the performance of the indispensable work.

All this takes place under the constant psychological pressure of the electoral issues in all political conversations, etc.

The general objective, the press, feels the effects of the electoral campaign in a most strong manner. The electoral issues dominate the press. The stimulus for detailed articles concerning the foreign policies is diminished; often, there is no such stimulus at all and many papers exclusively write about the elections.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN**JOB'S OPERATIVE REPORT**

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(Continuation)

However, even under such circumstances, the operative succeeded in intensifying the production of some of the selected and of the developed connections. The information produced was more varied, more frequent and of better quality.

At the same time, our (Yugoslav) arguments appeared in various articles in the press.

For instance, during this time, the operative established the closest contact with Rosenfeld, the editor of the "Washington Post." Abot's wife regularly drives Rosenfeld's wife and child; gifts for the child were bought, Abot was a guest of Rosenfeld's parents, he also contacted Rosenfeld's brother in New York, Abot took the whole Rosenfeld family on picnics twice, etc.

This resulted in some exceptionally favorable editorials which appeared in the "Washington Post."

As for Volkov, Abot took him to expensive dinners. Volkov (SV-5) paid particular attention to our (Yugoslav) positions and comments in furnishing his information. Abot helped SV-5 in New York (at the office of the publication); consequently, SV-5 gave better and better information and indicated good sources.

Abot had closer and more frequent contacts with:

- N. Andrews,
- BILL (sic) Stearman and
- BEN (sic) Zook of the State Department.



This resulted in more concrete and confidential information.

Caution and patience were used all the time for the purpose of developing personal relationship. Gradually, some of the obstacles caused by the frame of mind, by security considerations, by professional caution, etc., were eliminated and concrete results were achieved.

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Abot is now trying to develop very cautiously such a relationship with Phillip Polzie (?) the editor for foreign affairs of the "Washington Post." His sister is Dean Rusk's wife (Rusk is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the United States.) (sic)

In spite of the fact that Polzie insists that he does not report the opinions and the evaluation of Rusk, he is inevitably under the influence of the information and of the evaluations of the State Department. Polzie says that he often sees Rusk. Furthermore, BROOM (sic) reports that both men can be often seen together and that they are very close to each other.

It also is very important and probably true that some of the (Yugoslav) well prepared things are told by Polzie to Rusk.

The contact with Polzie is particularly interesting and should be especially cultivated.

The contact with Polzie may serve as an illustration of the possibilities which arise when the operative has wider freedom of movements and gets closer to his contacts.

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#### IV

The operative has remarked that in the cases of small material corruption, the tendency to repay exists. Such are the cases of:

- Rosenfeld,
- Brumberg,
- Polzie,
- Marder,
- Frankel, etc.

This proves that a definite caution exists and it points at the political, moral and basic strength of most of the contacts.

(On the occasion of a cocktail party given by our Embassy, Mudd, the former official of the State Department in charge of Yugoslavia who now temporarily works in the Pentagon, stressed that Abot's predecessor had quite erroneously interpreted the American environment, that he did some stupid things and that there were objections in this connection.)

This shows that the operative should be particularly cautious and that he must take into consideration the exceptional environment in which he moves. Security measures should be strictly observed.

The patient development of personal friendship, the discreet financial aid, various personal services, the possibility to help the contact with information and comment, the knowledge of some definite field of international relations, etc., are the necessary tactics in attracting and in getting closer to a contact.

Such tactics should be used whenever the character of the contact has no obvious weaknesses such as low morale, readiness to direct corruption, etc.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

**JOB'S OPERATIVE REPORT**  
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(Continuation)

It is worth recalling that the experience of the operative shows that certain elements of Bloc ideology or inclinations can be used, if they are set to work with adequate elasticity. This was not the impression of the operative during his first year of work in Washington.

Actually, the ideologic interest should be set in the widest possible frame, that is, it should be interpreted in the widest possible manner. The ideologic interest should not be limited to direct harmony with our variant of socialist system with all the nuances of our foreign policies, etc.

In his work, the operative has rather often found, among the newspapermen and even in the State Department in a way, men who are leftists and who criticize in a leftist manner the American realities, the positions of their newspapers, the positions of the United States foreign policies, antisocialism in the United States, etc.

The murder of Kennedy has increased these criticisms.

This criticism is also expressed in the dissatisfaction caused by the inadequately wide and altruistic United States policies toward the underdeveloped countries. This is particularly expressed when speaking about countries like Yugoslavia and nations similar to it which play a positive role; thus, it is considered that such nations should be considered with more understanding and that, in case of need, they should be supported.

When these matters are properly used, they have played and still play a definite positive role in the work with Rosenfeld.

These matters are particularly emphasized (they even dominate) in the developed relationship with Joel Blocker, the assistant editor for foreign policies of the "Newsweek." Abot met him through Volkov. Abot is developing the contact with Blocker by meeting him often in New York and in Washington.

Blocker has rather accentuated leftist views and a certain sympathy for the role of Yugoslavia, in spite of our "errors." He also has a certain bitterness related to the situation in the United States in general. He is particularly bitter because it is not possible to manifest any important socialist tendencies; these tendencies exist in the United States; however, since the end of the war, they are being pushed away.

All these things are important foundations on which Abot has developed his relationship with Blocker. Abot has thus succeeded in obtaining a better treatment in the "Newsweek" which otherwise does not favorably look toward Yugoslavia.

What is more, Abot was thus enabled to learn from Blocker some of the internal positions of the Administration which Blocker has learned through his connections.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANJOB'S OPERATIVE REPORT

(Continuation)

V

In his operative work, while keeping in mind that he has to furnish the largest and most useful political information, the operative has primarily paid attention to the following:

(a) He knows from experience that he has to be thoroughly acquainted with certain parts of the international relations. Aside from the knowledge of the policies of his own country, the operative has to know certain international relations in order to be interesting for his interlocutors.

Thus, Abot particularly concentrated on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, on the relations between the United States and the Eastern European countries and on the relations East-West in general.

In addition, the operative concentrated on the developments within the International Workers' Movement.

The operative concentrated his work on these matters because he had already studied them in London and in the Group for Analyses of the Information (?) Department of the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (?).

The operative also maintains the connections related to this sector in the State Department, in the USIA and in the press. These connections were formerly maintained by O. Ruzic.

We shall bear in mind that the Yugoslav comments related to this sector are often interesting in this country.

The connections which Ruzic and Presburger passed to the operative (E. Garthof of the State Department, expert for military matters related to the Soviet Union, R. Dizard of the USIA, Department for Planning) were widened by the new connections which the operative himself created.

The new connections of the operative are:

- Poliasky, who works on Soviet matters in the State Department,
- Owen, Deputy Director for the USSR in the State Department,
- Matusck, in charge of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia in the Department for Analyses,
- Abraham Brumberg, the editor of "Problems of Communism" in the USIA, and
- Marvin Kalb, CBS expert for Soviet questions.

The operative has been in constant contact with these men. This has created such a situation that Abot is received by these men as the person who is in charge of these problems and discusses with them all the matters related to the above-mentioned sector.

In his production of political information, the operative's main assignments are:

- to cover the above-mentioned sector for the Center (political section),
- to secure the most complete and the most reliable information possible and
- to analyze the obtained information.

\* \* \*

(b) The information concerning the bilateral relations (between Yugoslavia and the United States) is obtained:

- through the connections with the employees of the White House
- by developing the best possible relations with Andrews, the Official in charge of Yugoslavia in the State Department, and
- through several good connections pertaining

to the general objective such as: newspapermen, diplomatic correspondents, State Department connections who are following the relations United States - Yugoslavia.

These people are acquainted with the attitude of the United States toward Yugoslavia and with the actions that the U. S. A. undertakes in connection with our country. The operative gives his full attention to these matters; naturally, this is limited by the fact that the operative has not his own agency (Translator's Note: It seems implied that if the operative had this agency, he would be much more effective).

\* \* \*

(c) The production of the operative has also been centered on all the questions which are of interest to us and which the operative learns from his connections in the White House and from his general objective, that is, the newspapermen.

\* \* \* \* \*

We believe that this kind of work of the operative is satisfactory and that it is most suitable to the capacities of the operative and to his assignments.

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## VI

In the last operative report, it was established that the following developed connections actually belong to the category of selected connections:

- Bill Stearman, State Department,
- McGowan, State Department,
- Hightower, AP (general objective),
- Volkov, "Newsweek" (general objective),
- Ben Zook, State Department,
- Abraham Brusberg, USIA, and
- Joel Blocker, "Newsweek" (general objective).

October 16, 1964

Operativac : ABOTSektor: politickiOPERATIVNI IZVEŠTAJ

## I.

U periodu od posljednjeg operativnog izvještaja (12 mart 1964 g) je Abot povećao broj veza sa kojima aktivnije radi, odnosno razvijeni: veza sa 23 na 27. Kada se uzme u obzir da dvije razvijene veze u međuvremenu prenestene (L. Brady-USIA) i R. Tins-SD) onda povećanje iznosi 6. Po objektivu to izgleda ovako:

STATE DEPARTMENT:

Sa prijašnjih 5 (McGovan, Stearnan, McCloskey, Andrews, te Tins koji otisao) na sadašnjih <sup>vidjeti</sup> 11 (11), postoje prethodnom broju dodati: Ben Zook-Odeljenje za analize SSSR-a i IE u SD; ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~; S. Foliarsky, referada za SSSR (sektor bilateralnih odnosa) u Evropskom birou SD; ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

BELA KUĆA:

Ovdje je broj ostao neproizmenjen: 3, i to: Kilduff, D. Klein i W. Brubeck.

OPŠTI OBJEKTI:

Broj selektiranih, razvijanih i društvenih veza povećan sa 9 na 14, odnosno pored Nightover, Gwertzman, Frankel, Rosenfeld, Hardera, Volokova, Dugnat, Price Day-a i Jack-a (koji uspeo u rovinstvo), uvrsteni Polzie, Warren Unns, R. Bratenstain, Karl Meyer, Crosbe



Noyes, Joel Blocker.

USIA:

Iz ove ustanove Abot aktivnije radio sa Abrahamom Brubresom, urednikom magazina USIA: "Problems of Communism" i C. Dizardom, omlenje za politicko planiranje USIA, sa kojim odnos otpoceo Presburger.

(Za sve gore pomenute selektirane, drzvijene ili drustvene veze vidi prilozene dopune plavih kartona, ili nove plave kartone ako rec o novo-uspostavljenom odnosu.)

Na osnovu gornjeg moze se reci da je temp<sup>o</sup> prosiravanja mreznih organizacije, odnosno mreze, ravnomernijeg zastupanja najvaznijih objekata, te nalazenja adekvatnih zavlaka za one koje su premjestene i sl. zadovoljavajuci i da obezbedjuje kako Abotove obaveze iz oblasti produkcije politickih informacija, tako i odrzavanje, razvijanje, odnosno fluktuaciju dovoljnog broja veza sa kojima aktivno radi, u cilju iznalazenja povoljnih prilika za eventualno uspostavljanje obavestajnog odnosa viseg tipa.

II.

Sto se produkcije politickih informacija ~~ti~~ koju su u proteklom periodu dale gornje kategorije, to, statisticki, stoji ovako:

Od aprila 1964 do oktobra 1964, znaci za pet meseci (jedan mesec otpao na godisnji letor operativca) Abotove veze dale 27 informacija koje slane K. linijom, dok je u prethodnom periodu, od juna 1963 do marta 1964 bilo 26 K. informacija. Znaci da je frekvencija informacija za K. liniju znatno povecana.

Od ovog broja 23 ih je ocenjeno i to: 4 - B i 14 - C. Znaci da odnos B:C informacijama bio 1:3,05. Uprava je oznacila dve infor-

kao "neocenjene" a jednu je trebalo slati linijom DSIP-a.

Jos nisu dobili ocene za 7 informacija iz poslednjih meseci (Juli, avgust, septembar).

Za ovo isto vrijeme je Abot linijom DSIP-a poslao 19 politickih informacija, kao i 13 kratkih politickih analiza pisanja americke stampe o Jugoslaviji.

To sve zajedno cini 59 politickih depeša, odnosno oko 12 mesечно, sto znaci oko 3 politicke informacije nedeljno. U ovom periodu je Abot nastojao, posle usmeno prenesene dobre primjedbe grupe za analizu, da daje zaokruzenije i konciznije informacije analitickog karaktera, sa podacima iz nekoliko izvora.

Sto se sadržaja produkcije tice moze se reci da slijedeci bili neki od izrazitijih momenata:

- tacna i pravovremena informacija o pismu Raska Sreteru (Ben Zook);
- dosta dobro pokrivanje i antiopiravanje glavnih, pa i detaljnijih tokova odnosa SAD-SSSR, SAD-IE zenije, posebno u vezi i okolnostima predizborne situacije.
- Realno saopstavanje elemenata americkih internih procjena i analiza kretanja u MRP.
- Obezbedjivanje izvornih reagovanja iz Bijele kuce na politiku Jugoslavije i njenog stava prema Jugoslaviji, u licnom odnosu koji izbegao neke formalne obzire zvanicnog kontakta i omogućio vecu slobodu neposrednijeg informisanja, sto i specificka metoda aparata BK u SAD.
- Dobijanje, poglavito preko novinarskih veza, pojedinih opstijih elemenata strategije SAD u Evropi, JIA, oko Kube, kako ih oni saznavali preko svojih veza u Administraciji. Ove informacije se pokazale kao tacne u retrospektivi.

Ono što nije uspjelo da se postigne u produkciji, odnosno što nije bilo omogućeno jednim višim stepenom obavestajnog odnosa između Abota i njegovih veza, je bilo uglavnom slijedeće:

- Saznavanje unaprijed konkretnih mjera Administracije prema Jugoslaviji, u konkretnoj oblasti bilateralnih odnosa, i to onih koje su nepovoljne.

- Saznavanje forme, učestanosti i konkretnijeg sadržaja stalne razmjene poruka Hruscov-Predsjednik SAD.

- Detaljnije iznesene teze i zaključci, odnosno materijali sa tim, iz analiza Odjeljenja za SSSR, odnosno za analize SSSR-a i IE.

### III.

Za okolnosti u kojima je operativac radio u proteklom periodu, pored onih koje date u prošlom operativnom izveštaju (12 mart 1964), karakteristično je bilo slijedeće:

a) Operativac je istekom druge godine rada na svom mjestu usao u period stabilizacije, odnosno boljeg poznavanja sredine i mogućnosti, s jedne strane, a, s druge strane, proteklo vrijeme je omogućilo da ga njegove veze bolje upoznaju, steknu jedno određeniije misljenje i utisak o njemu, izvjesno povjerenje i interes. Može se reći da, u odsustvu postojanja obavestajne organizacije u smislu agenture, ovo igra presudnu ulogu (pored same aktivnosti, korupcije, itd) u obezbjeđivanju takve vrste veza i kontakata kroz koje se može nabavljati informacija koja kvalitetnija od redovne diplomatske.

b) Letnja sezona, ustvari odsustvo operativca iz Washingtona kroz mjesec dana, unela uobicajan prekid. Međutim, obzirom na to da u Washingtonu nema nikakve "ljetve sezone", te da Administracija, štampa, itd radi više-manje stalnim tempom, to se prekid odnosi zaista samo

na trajanje odmora.

c) Izborna kampanja unosi cijelo vrijeme veći pore ecaj, kako zbog izvjesne, prijetljive i u Administraciji, kod stave, itd, dekoncentracije sa konkretnih međunarodnih tema, na unutrašnje. Ne radi se ovdje, naravno, o tome da određene administrativne jedinice ne prate svoje sektore i svoja pitanja, ali je samo konkretno izvođenjem spoljne politike da Velike Sjere svedeno na reagovanje i obavljanje neophodnog, uz stalan psiholoski pritisak izbornih tema u svim politickim razgovorima i sl. Kod opsteg objekta (stampa) je efekat utoliko jaci ukoliko izborne teme dominiraju na stranicama stampe, imaju vanje stimulusa da ~~zaključuju se detaljno bave~~ se detaljno bave spoljnopolitickim temama, a cesto nisu prisutni jer se uključuju u pisanje o izborima.

Medjutim, i u ovim okolnostima operativac je sa pojedina selektiranim i razvijenijim vezama uspio da intenzivira licni i produkcionni odnos, da ga obogati i da mu raznovrsniju i prisniju sadrzinu koja se održavala kako na ucestanosti i kvalitetu informacija, tako i ostvarivanju usluga u smislu zastupljenosti nase argumentacije i podataka u pojedina vamim napisima u štampi.

Tako je na pr. sa Rozenfeldom (uvodnicar W. Posta) upostavio najblizi odnos (zena Abota vozi redovno zenu i dete Rozenfleda na pregled, kupljeni pokloni za dete, Abot bio u gostima kod R. ovih roditelja, povezao se sa njegovim bratom u Njujorku, vodio citavu porodicu dva puta na piknik i sl), sto imalo uticaja u nekim izricitim povoljnijim uvodnicama R-a u W. Postu. U slucaju Volkova (SV-5) Abot ga izvodio na skupe vecere, poklanjao posebnu paznju u informisanju o nasim stavovima i komentarima, ponjao mu kod redakcije u Njujorku, tako da SV-5 davao sve bolje i sadrzajnije informacije i uposivao

na dobre izvore. Ustanovi kontakt, i prisnije postavljanje u kontaktima sa N. Andrews, BILL Starnan, i BEN Zook iz SD, obzbedilo Jos vecu konkretnost i sadržajnu poverljivost dobijanih informacija.

Kroz sve ovo se pokazalo da pazljivo, strpljivo razvijanje licnog odnosa, sa davanjem dosta vremena, da se postepeno uklanjanju neke od barijera koje postavljaju mentalitet, bezbednost, pun profesionalni oprez i sl, moze da da konkretne rezultate.

Ovakav odnos Abot sada pokusava da veoma oprezno forira sa Phillipom Polizijem, urednikom spoljnopoliticke rubrike Washington Posta, cija sestra je zena Beana Ruskog, ministra inostranih SAD. Iako Polizie insistira da ne iznosi misljenja i ocene Ruske (sa kojim se po njegovim recima, a i informacijama od BROOK-a, cesto vidja i u veoma intimnim odnosima), neizbezno je da citavo vrijeme pod delstvom informacija i ocena sa tog mjesta, a veoma vazno je i to da neke dobro tespirane stvari vjerovatno on sa svoje strane u razgovoru sa Ruskom iznasa ili pokrene. Bez pretjeravanja mogucnosti ove veze, moze se reci da je opravdan nas specifican interes za nju te da se na nju treba posebno orijentisati. U svakom slucaju je i ona ilustracija izvjesnih mogucnosti i prilika do kojih se dolazi jednim sirim i donekle stabilnijim kretanjem, kada operativac postaje do izvjesne mjere sve manje "nepoznanica" za svoje veze.

#### IV.

Sa druge strane operativac prijecuje da je do sada bio cest slucaj da kod sitnije materijalne korupcije postoji tendencija da se uzvraca (Rozenfeld, Aruzberg, Polizie, Harder, Frankel, itd) sto ukazuje na postojanje odredjanog opreza i politicko-moralna osnovna cvrstina najveceg broja veza. (Na jednom koktelu u nasoj Ambasadi bivsi referent za Jugoslaviju u SD, Mudd, koji sada privremeno u Pentagonu

sa posebnim naglasanjem počinjao, nosno "obnavljao uspo enu" da  
 Abotov prethodnik "potpuno pogresno iz protunacio americku sredini  
 i pocinio gluposti koje su za Jerili".) Ovo, svakako, ukazuje na  
 potrebu narocitog opreza i uzivanja u obzir jedne skoro izuzetne  
 specificne usmjerenosti sredine, u kojoj se operativac krece, na  
 pitanja sustinske bezbjednosti.

Strpljivo razvijanje licnog prijateljstva, nenaglaseno izlazenje  
 u susret u materijalnim potrebama, cinjenje raznoraznih licnih usluga,  
 ogucnost da se vezi oprinde sopstvenom informacijom i komentarom,  
 sopstvena afirmacija kao poznavoca odredjene oblasti medjunarodnih  
 odnosa i sl. - sve to pretstavlja najadekvatniju taktiku postavljanja  
 zblizavanja i privlacenja, kad ne postoje ociglednije prisutni  
 elementi, pukotine u karakteru, potrebama i sl. veza koje bi se  
 mogle dublje i brze iskoristiti. (Kritnija moralna posuvracenost,  
 spretnost na neposrednu i голу korupciju, i sl.)

Treba napomenuti da iskustvo operativca pokazuje, sto nije bila  
 njegova impresija u prvoj godini rada u Washingtonu, da postoje i da se  
 mogu koristiti i izvjesni elementi ideoloske bliskosti ili sklonosti,  
 kada je ista dovoljno elasticno ili specificno postavljena. U stvari  
 ideolosko interesu ili izvjesnoj povezanosti, treba dati najsirni  
 okvir, odnosno najsirni interpretaciju, ne suzavajući to na neposredno  
 slaganje, recimo, sa nasom varijantom socijalistickog drustvenog  
 sistema, nasom ukupnom spoljnom politikom i svim njenim akcijama, i sl.

Operativac je u svojoj dosadrasnjoj radu sa novinarima (pa cak  
 donekle i u SD, iako na drugaciji nacin) nailazio dosta cesto na  
 ljude koji se postavljaju levo, levicarski u kritiku americke  
 stvarnosti, pozicija njihovih listova, americke spoljne politike,  
 anti-socijalizma u SAD. Distvo Kenedija je ovo pojacalo. Isto tako  
 ovo moze biti izrazeno u nezadovoljstvu zbog nedovoljno siroke,  
 altruisticke politike SAD prema nezavijenim zemljama (narocito u

ili u nesto sires smislu da se ije kao Jugoslavija i sl.  
i raju neku pozitivnu ulogu i da na njih treba gledati sa vise  
razumijevanja i po potrebi davati im podrsku.

Ovi i slični momenti, kadikozaxhriaxunix adekvatno koristenii,  
su igrali igraju odredjenu pozitivnu ulogu u radu sa Rozenfeldom.  
oni su posebno izraziti, cak dosimpatni, u razvijanim odnosima sa  
Jcelom Blockerom, zna pomocnikom spoljnopolitickog urednika "Newsweeka"  
u Njujorku, sa kojim Abot ostvario vezu preko Volkova i razvijao je  
je cestim susretima u Njujorku i Vasingtomu. Izrazitija leva gledanja  
Blockera i izvjesne simpatije za ulogu zemlje kao Jugoslavija  
(bez obzira na nase "greske"), te cak izvjesna ogorcenost situacijom  
u SAD, posebno radi odsustva mogucnosti za bilo kakvu znatniju  
ispoljavanje socijalistickih tendencija koje prisutne ali od  
svrsetka rata tesko potisnute, su vazna osnova na kojoj Abot razvio  
odnos sa njim i povremeno obezbjedivao bolji tretman za Jugoslaviju  
u inace nenaklonjenca magazinu, ili doznavao od njega interne  
stavove Administracije, koje Blocker saznavao od svojih veza, a koje  
zbog ideoloskih rezervi, slobodnije iznosio.

V.

*Leje*  
U svom operativnom nastupu po objektima, sa ciljem obezbjedivanja  
sto korisnije produkcije politickih informacija, operativac se orijenti-  
sao najvise na slijedece:

a) Polazeci od provjerenog iskustva da je nuzno dublje i sigurni-  
je poznavanje odredjene oblasti medjunarodnih odnosa, da je u ovoj  
sredini potrebna bar izvjesna afirmacija da se pored poznavanja polit-  
ke sopstvene zemlje, poznaje do te mjere jedna odredjena tematika  
medjunarodnih odnosa da je operativac u stanju da bude interesant-  
za sagovornike. Abot se poglavito koncentrisao na pracenje odnosa

SAD-SSSR, SAD-IE ze lije, odnosa Istok-Zapad u uzca svijeta, te kretanja u NRP. Ovo zbog toga sto na to e radio u Londnu, sto to produbio u Grupi za analizu u Upravi, sto pricao veze sa ovog sektora SD-a, USIA i stanpe od O. Ruzica, te i zbog toga sto Jugoslove ski stavovi i komentari u ovome ovdje cesto od interesa. Veze koje je sam stvorio, zatim veze koje je dobio od Ruzica, pojedini od veza koje dobio od Prestburgera (R. Garthof, SD, strucnjak za vojna pitanja SSSR-a u SD; R. Dizard, delenje za planiranje u USIA), te nove ostvarene ili potencijalne veze u odjeljenjima SD koja rade na pitanjima SSSR-a i si (Poliansky, Owen pomocnik nacelnika za SSSR; Matussek, vo i IE i Jugoslaviju u odjeljenju za analize; Abraham Bruberg, urednik "Problems of Communism" u USIA; Harvyn Kalb, CRS strucnjak za sovjetska pitanja) i kretanje u kontaktima sa tim vezama, koje u stalnom medjusobnom kontaktu, stvorilo situaciju u kojoj Abot prihvacen kao onaj koji se bavi ovom problematikom, ina pristupa svim punktovima koji na njoj rade.

Pokrivanje ovog sektora produkcije za politicki sektor Centra, obezbedjivanje sto komparativna kompletnijih i pouzdanijih informacija i analiza iz ove oblasti kroz sve bolju obradu dobijenih informacija je osnovni zadatak operativca u radu na produkciji politickih informacija.

b) Veš pomenuto koristenje veza sa sluzbenicima iz aparata BK, te razvijanje boljeg odnosa sa Andrewson, referentom u SD za Jugoslaviju kao i niz dobrih veza sa opsteg objekta (novinari, diplomatski korespondenti, sa dobrim vezama u SD, koji prate odnose SAD-Jugoslavija), sluzi dobijanju informacija o bilateralnim odnosima, odnosno stavovima i akcijama SAD prema Jugoslaviji. Ovome operativac takodjer posvecuje punu paznju, sa, naravno, ogranicenjima koje namece odsustvo sopstvene agenture.



e) Procjenjuje političkih informacija po svim ostalim pitanjima od interesa za nas, koji operativac može da dobije od svojih veza u BK ili na opstem objektu (novinari), a po aktuelnim pitanjima od interesa za nas.

Naza se čini da je ovakav redoslijed i naglasak po važnosti i naporu koje operativac ulaze po gornji terena adekvatan, svrsishodan, i da najbolje odgovara njegovim mogućnostima i okolnostima i ostalim zaduzenjima koja ima.

#### VI.

U posljednjem operativnom izvještaju je prethodno za slijedeće tadašnje razvijene veze konstatovano da pripadaju kategoriji selektiranih veza: Bill Stegman-SD; McCowan-SD; Hightower-AP(opsti); Volkov-Njuzvik(opsti). Zbog razvijenosti i karaktera veze, te specifičnosti odnosa, u selektirane veze treba kategorisati još Ben Zock-SD; Abraham Brumberg-USIA; Joel Blocker-Njuzvik(opsti).

16.X.1964.

MAY 17 1963

285  
11 MAY 1963ZAPISNIK

o razgovoru sa JCB Celjatom, operativcem  
u centru Vašington.

Drag Job je po poslovnim pitanjima /radi dolaska Raska/ boravio u  
Beogradu od 3. do 10. maja 1963. godine. Njegov dolazak nije bio planiran, te  
iz tog razloga nisu vršene pripreme za njegove kompletne referisanje kako je  
to Pravilnikom predviđeno. Međutim, njegovo prisustvo je iskorisćeno za  
razgovor po sledećim pitanjima:

- Uslovi rada
- Razgovor o razvijaljin vezama

Job je u centru zadužen za rad po političkom sektoru. U Ambasadi je  
zadužen za štampu.

Postigao je relativno dobar poslovni uspeh. Stvorio je veze preko  
kojih sprema naše sugestije i objavljuje slike u američkoj štampi.

On je posebno slao informacije i na linijom Koordinacionog, DSIP-a,  
i CSIR-a. Navodi da je za poslednja četiri meseca po avia linijama poslao 52.  
informacije. Do dolaska Ambasadora Hidanovića više je dopela slao linijom Ko-  
ordinacionog. Međutim, po njegovom dolasku najviše šalje DSIP-u i CSIR-u, jer  
da Hidanović stoji na stanovištu da ove informacije koje nisu iz obavestajnog  
izvora treba da se šalju linijom DSIP-a. Ističe da ovaj problem treba rešiti  
ili pak usimati u obzir prilikom ocenjivanja njegovog rada. Takođe naglašava  
da je nis dopela poslao, a na njima nije navedeno da su od njega dostavljene.

Izvoštava da centar u poslednje vreme nije razmatrao i analizirao  
sadašnje uslove rada u Vašingtonu. Uslove su samo sagledavali. Najaj su radno  
da prinese da je centru bilo osnovno da se sredi posle velikih promena, vreme  
na posao i sagleda problematiku.

Međutim, u centru postoji mišljenje da je pogoršanje međudržavnih  
odnosa uticalo privremeno na stvar i odnos nekih veza i u stvaranju novih veza.  
Tako da se osetilo u sledećem: Mnoge veze ne šestlike na Nivu godišno i  
pokušano nisu odgovorilo. Ove godine da drugovi nisu bili pozitivni na "dan sa-  
hrvačasti" kao što je to bio slučaj ranijih godina.



- U radu centra u poslednje vreme oseda se mater koji nastoji sve da  
potrene i povera sto je vremenom nesumnjivo dati vise rezultata - uporedo sa  
normalisovanjem poslovanja u Ambasadi.

- Eksploatacija pojedinih izvora je slaba. Informacije pojedinih izvo-  
ra su na nedovoljnom nivou. Nekeone prihvatiti razlog jer sa pojedinaim vezana jos  
uvek nije ostvaren licni odnos, ali za sve veze to ne valj. Primer "Bob", koji  
ne pati od kompleksa, tako su kontakt sa Ambasadorom nesumnjivo konvenira /voo-  
na dobar razgovor sa Ambasadorom/. Ingradjivanje licnih odnosa sa ovakvim ve-  
zama ne odbacujemo kao problem, ali mislimo da nista nije reseno u dovoljnoj  
mari pitanje priprane sa razgovore o njima.

- Diplomatskom koru treba posvetiti vedu paznju, s obzirom da u Va -  
Singtonu svakog dana ima vise ili manje značajnih državnih poseta, kroz koje se  
mole pratiti aktivnost SAD prema pojedinaim zemljama, odavno regionima.

Rafajeva orijentacija u pravcu diktora ved do sada je dala neke inte-  
resantne rezultate, koje treba proširiti i praksom drugih operativaca.

REZUMIRANJE VEZAMA

Joe je zadužen za sledeće osobe:

- ID
- KLA KULA
- STANPA
- DIFICE

Na vezi drži samo jednog člana ob. organizacije i to:

Selektivna veza "JACK"

Prilikom prenešaja drug Bradić je ostavio belešku iz koje se vidi da je "Jack" neka vrsta saradnika /što stavlja u zagradu/.

"Jack" je nekoliko meseci bio stvran /put i bolest/. Tak pošto toga kontakt je sa njim uspostavio Joe. On je u početku odbijao kontakt. Pre četiri meseca prihvatio je kontakt za rukaz. Na ovom prvom kontaktu bio hladan, bezinteresno je prama operativcu postavljao, davao hladne odgovore.

Operativac je poverao drugu Bradića, ali "Jack" prvi put nije reagovao. Kad operativac i drugi put poverio ranije Bradiću, "Jack" stavio do znanja da ga ne poznaje, ili bar da je to poznavao. Čisto da je bio vrlo oprezan.

Na kontakte od njega treba cediti informacije.

Posled za Novu godinu nije mu poslat da se ne stane na njegovu stranu.

Na drugom kontaktu imao je bolje ponašanje. Nije se kao ranije nalijeno držao. Produkcija mu je bila bolja.

Na trećem kontaktu bio je još slobodniji u ponašanju i davanju informacija. Operativac mu pomogao da napiše komentar za svoj list, gde je umeo dosta naših sugestija.

Sada radi po pitanju Nizkog Istoka.

U poslednje vreme sa operativcem je postao otvoreniji, otkriva priča o svojoj ličnosti. Sa njim je uspostavljen dobar lični odnos, prevaziđen je neki problem odnosa. Prevaziđeno je da samo daje svodničke informacije, upotrebljiv je za pisanje o Jugoslaviji.

Kao karakter je vrlo slab. Veli da pojedje i pobje. Suptan je. Veli da mu se pridaje značaj da je afirmisan i poznat, veli da ga se sluša kad govori. Boravak u Jugoslaviji na njega je ostavio dobar utisak, stekao je dosta prijatnosti prema našem narodu i zemlji.

Imovno stanje je nepoznato. Po oceni operativca živio dobro. Medicinski, po američkom načinu života materijalno stanje mu je slabo i koliko god ima para njemu je malo i traži još više.

Plan daljeg rada:

- Dogovorimo da se operativcem izadje u nekadni lokal.

- Sa njim treba nastaviti u razvijanju što boljih prijateljskih

Tine da se unaprediti operativni odnos i produkcija. Očito razvijati raznostraniji.

- Za početak poslati mu neki poklon kao znak pažnje, reči

- Davati mu sugestije da objavljuje članke, a pri

se sa time ne kompromituje.

- Sa svakog sastanka dostavljati ovj

Report 11

Summary

The first part of the report covers the period from 1941 to 1944. It deals with the activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the report, and the results of their activities.

The second part of the report covers the period from 1945 to 1947. It deals with the activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the report, and the results of their activities.

The third part of the report covers the period from 1948 to 1950. It deals with the activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the report, and the results of their activities.

The fourth part of the report covers the period from 1951 to 1953. It deals with the activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the report, and the results of their activities.

In view of the fact that the above information is classified as confidential, it is being furnished to you on a confidential basis.

The information in this report is being furnished to you for your information only.

Key findings:

- The activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the report, and the results of their activities, are being carried out in a systematic and organized manner.

- The information in this report is being furnished to you for your information only.

- The information in this report is being furnished to you for your information only.

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Ustav. 18

Opis: 18

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Osoba: M

RAMF

Intervju je sa njim obavio u oktobru 1961. godine na putovanju u  
Euzer; osoba je iz oblasti SSSR. Radni poziv je u kontaktima sa  
Sastanci se obavljaju u okviru mesecne je posredstva. Priznava kontakte i sa nekim  
karakterističnim osobama.

Informacije su tako dobijene, ali da treba izvršiti neki poslovi.  
Sastanci su se obavljali sa je informisan, sposoban i izob. Sastanci su se obavljali  
sa kontaktima sa njim. On sada oc. njegovi kontakti s. informacije.

Osoba sa kime je još u kontaktu osoba se nalazi u Moskvi.

Na pitanje o sastanku sa operativnim osobama je odgovorio da dolazi  
na koje je bio dopisao neke stvari njegovog porodičnog života. On priznaje  
istakao neki od finansijskih poteškoća. Povećava da se aktivnosti SSSR tako sa  
finansijske poteškoće je normalna, ali u tome nisu praktični kao što je to što  
svakako predstavljaju izuzetak. Operativac odgovara da je ovo alibi za pove-  
ćanje nego njegove spremnosti na materijalne prijenos koje bi imala karakter ko-  
rupcije, ali isto tako da bi rado prihvatila materijalne naloge sa kojima bi se  
dovoljno društveno izdržava.

Osoba nije društveno nastrojen protiv SSSR-a. Nije samo kritičar,  
već i razmišlja mnogo poteškoće SSSR-a i čini izvesne pozitivne komentare.

Plan daljeg rada:

- Razvijati društveno-diplomatski i lični uticaj.
- Izučiti njegov finansijski status. Ispitati koliko se iz može  
koristiti za unapređenje operativnog radova i dobijanje bolje produkcije.  
Postepeno ga obavještavati sa situacijom političnom i materijalnim uslugama kao radak,  
pezariste i aliina.
- U pogledu produkcije koristiti ga za pitanje razvoja bilateralnih  
odnosa SAD - SSSR, Evropa.

Karton ličnosti je napisan.

Objekt: SS

STRAPAS

Zaduzen je za širi sektor: SSSR i Istočna Evropa.

Po uslojenju je republikanac. Lena mu sa detetom živi u Beču. On živi komopolitaki.

Smatra se stranjakom za komunisti i o ovim proleziama želi mnogo da razgovara. Za sada, radi toga interesantan mu kontakt sa nama. Prema operativcu se postavlja mislonaraki, želi da ga presveti. Operativac to svesno toleriše, jer ina koristiti u pogledu produkcije. Ovo što kaže uvek je vredno i tačno. Osnovno je da bude lagati. Do sada dao tri informacije.

Sujetan je. Mnogo insistira da operativac pročita njegovu knjigu. Bori se za nepopularne stavove.

Kontakt je još uvek neravnan. Do sada odriana dva kontakta u njegovoj kancelariji, a tri na ručku. Otrivanje kontakata nije problem, jer isto rado prihvaća.

Porodično i materijalno stanje još uvek neispitano.

Za njega je dostavljen karton ličnosti.

Plan daljeg rada:

- Kontakt i dalje razvijati na društveno diplomatskom nivou. Kroz te izdavati elemente za dalje produbljavanje odnosa.
- U pogledu produkcije koristiti ga za odnose SAS - SSSR, Jugoslavija i IBI.

Objekt: Bela kuća

KILDUFF Malcolm

Kontakt je uspostavljen u oktobru 1962. godine.

Ranije je radio 14. godine u SD, Ustavari i sada je službenik SD, ali pozajmljen na rad u Beloj kući.

Kontakt je uspostavljen po poslovnim pitanjima. Kilduff odmah prihvatio kontakt u gradu. Na kontaktu, po oceni operativca dao vanredno korisne informacije.

Operativac mu za Novu godinu poslao poklon u pisu.

Na njim je bilo dogovoreno da se ponovo nadju i zajednički izdju. Međutim, za poslednja tri meseca nastao problem u kontaktiranju. Operativac je više puta pokušavao da sa njim održi kontakt, ali su svi pokušaji ostali bez rezultata. Dva puta je odbio predlog operativca pod izgovorom da putuje u New York. Dva puta je odložio ručak. Karakteristično je da je na kontakte pristajao samo sredem i to baš u vreme kada Kenedi održava konferenciju za štampu.

Za poslednjih 15. dana operativac je dva puta preko njegove sekretarice pokušao da sa njim telefonom razgovara i uvek je dobio odgovor da je odsutan. Po svaku izgleda da kontakt izbegava i to na bezobzirna način. Kontakt je počeo da odbija od momenta kada mu je poslat poklon.

Kada se postavlja problem kako sa njim kontakt uspostaviti. Pravi razlozi zašto kontakt odbija nisu poznati. Politički širi razlozi ne mogu da postoje.

Poslovno ga se može kontaktirati.

Dostavljen je karton ličnosti.

Dalji plan rada:

- Po povratku u Vašington operativac treba da pokuša da sa njim uspostavi društveni kontakt.

- Čkoliko u tome ne uspe na tome se treba mnoge insistirati, već ga po opravdanim poslovnim pitanjima posetiti na radnom mestu. Na tom kontaktu operativac ne treba da izlaze svoju zabrinutost, kako sam predlaze, zašto Kilduff ne prihvata više sa njim kontakte u društveno; formi. Prema crtanju Kilduffa oceniti iz kojih razloga je do sada odbijao kontakt - da li je u pitanju nezainteresovanost ili nešto drugo.

KAYNES Karl

radi u Beogradu, Krdi.

Kontakt je uspostavljen u decembru 1962. godine po preporuci Kilduffa. Operativac ga nazvao telefonom a Karl odmah privatio kontakt. Kontakt se održava jednom u dva meseca.

Sa njim se vode čisto politički razgovori. On je upoznat sa svim materijalima SD i Ambasade u iz Beograda o Jugoslaviji. Iz kontakta sa njim se treba mnogo očekivati, ali pošto se sa njim vode opšti razgovori o političkim temama, a on upoznat i analitičar, to takvi razgovori mogu da budu od velike koristi. Iz istih se može zaključiti strategijski politički plan SAD.

Operativcu je obećao da će ga zajedno sa lenom pozvati na drug.

Kontakt sa njim treba nastaviti.

Za njega je dostavljen karton ličnosti.

Objekt: Bela Kosa

IZVODI ZAPISI

Na je specijalni savetnik Proceodina sa pitanja unistaviti. To je jed  
samo pismenosti. Nije polaziti na drustveno - diplomatska vezu i radi postiza  
druga vezu sa svag objekta.

Karim iznosi nije zapisan.

SECRET

ROSENFIELD Stepan - novinar

Kontakt sa njim uspostavljen u decembru 1962. godine.  
 Star je oko 52. godina. Pre izvesnog vremena se oženio.  
 Piše uvodnike o Jugoslaviji. Politički je vrlo razradjen.  
 Iz referade SB operativca više puta upadivali da se poveže sa Rosenfel-  
 dom, jer da on piše članke o Jugoslaviji.

Kontakt je sa njim logičan i poslovno pokriven. Odričava se na njegovom  
 računom mestu i u gradu. Sa njim je ostvaren dobar lični odnos. Porodično se pose-  
 duju. Operativac ga vodi na koncert. Kontakt je intenzivan.

Poslat mu paklen u p84u.

Rosenfeld ima dobre mogućnosti kako za davanje informacija tako i za  
 objavljivanje članaka. Do sada je davao informacije koje slate linijom DSIF-a.  
 Može da dodje do informacija sa referade u SS.

Na njega se može vršiti uticaj za objavljivanje članaka o Jugoslaviji.  
 Do sada pisao o nizu stvari koje su mi sugerirali.

Uбудuće sa njim nastaviti sa razvijanjem ličnog i porodičnog prijatelje-  
 stva. Kroz to koristiti ga za informacije koje su mu dostupne. Treba dopuniti podat-  
 ke o njegovoj ličnosti.

Način je karton ličnosti.

Ima nalovu da bude registrovan kao "Razvijena veza".

OPŠTI SAŽETAK

J. HIGHTOWER - novinar

Kontakt je nepostavljen u oktobra 1962. godine.

Bilješka: Rask. Jedan je od najpoznatijih novinara koji su akreditovani u SD.

Sa njim postoje radni odnosi, a razvijeni su kontakti i u društvenoj formi. Dolazio je kod operativca Rudi. Prihvata kontakte na ručak i slično.

Do sada su poslati paket u pifu i jedna knjiga naših reprodukcija sa njegovom klerom, koja voli umetnost. Sa poklonom se zahvalio.

Kontakt se održava jednom u 15. dana.

Njegova produkcija je redovna, razradjena i pouzdana, iako ne uvek detaljna.

Uvredbe sa njim nastaviti razvijanje ličnog i porodičnog prijateljstva. Koristiti ga za informacije koje su mu dostupne. Uočavati elemente koji ga mogu štetiti za nas vezati.

Ispitati kako da se iskoristi njegov interes za intervjue sa našim Predsednikom.

Napisan je karton ličnosti.

Ima naloga da bude registrovan kao "Društvo" "Razvijena veza"

OPŠTI OBJEKT

FRANKL Maks - novinar

Ranije veza Kalerifa. Job sa njim kontakt uspostavio u novembru 1966. godine.

Odnos se kako poslovni tako i lični dobro razvija. Do sada sa njim održano pet suslova. Sastanci se održavaju i u njegovoj kancelariji. Sa njim se vrlo često obavljaju poslovni telefonski razgovori.

Voli društvo. Vrlo je čuoovit. Slobodno se ponaša, razgovara o svemu. Jako je ambiciozan.

Poslat mu je poklon u plau.

Koristi se za plasiranje vesti o Jugoslaviji. Daje poverljive informacije iz SD-a, s tim da napomene da je to tajna iz SD-a i da se vodi računa kako da se podatak koristiti. U poslednja tri meseca dao 5. kvalitetnih informacija.

Kontakt je moguće i dalje razvijati u društvenoj i porodičnoj formi. Kontaktu treba dati vedu raznovrnat. Koristiti ga za informacije, kao i do sada. Izučavati mogućnosti da ga se materijalno stimuliše.

Napisan je karton ličnosti.

Ima uslova da bude registrovan kao "Razvijena veza".



## OPŠTI OBJEKT

GWERTZMAN Bernard - novinar

Ranija veza Kalerića. Job je sa njim kontakt uspostavio u oktobru 1962. godine.

Odnos lični i porodični dobro razvijen. Kontakti se održavaju po restoranima, u njegovoj redakciji, kod kuće operativca. Planiran izlazak uveče.

Korišten je za povremenu produkciju. Davao informacije koje saznavao na internim briefinsima u SD. Sa njim je ostvarena direktna saradnja oko pisanja o Jugoslaviji u njegovom listu. Do sada objavio članke u tri nasa. U poslednje vreme postao saradnik svog lista za Istočnu Evropu, Centralnu Evropu i sl., što veći napredak u poziciji. Rekao da će zbog toga morati da bude u Beogradu i izvršiti kontakt sa SD, jer pre uređivao nedeljni pregled događaja.

Nalazi se pred ženidbom. Operativcu obećao da će ga pozvati na svadbu, a posle da će operativca posetiti kod kuće.

Njegovu ženidbu treba iskoristiti da mu se uruči prigodan paklen. Sa njim treba razvijati odnose u raznovrsnim formama /on sam traži kontakte, što inače retko/. Treba razraditi njegove radne moste, položaj i nivo kontakata u SD.

Karton ličnosti je napisan.

Iza nalova da bude registrovan kao "Razvijena veza".

104-10219-10001


104-10219-10001

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE SOURCE ON 10/10/68. THE SOURCE HAS ADVISED THAT HE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED IN THE ATTACHED LIST AND THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THEY ARE CURRENTLY IN THE AREA OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

THE SOURCE HAS ADVISED THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED IN THE ATTACHED LIST ARE CURRENTLY IN THE AREA OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

THE SOURCE HAS ADVISED THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED IN THE ATTACHED LIST ARE CURRENTLY IN THE AREA OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

THE SOURCE HAS ADVISED THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED IN THE ATTACHED LIST ARE CURRENTLY IN THE AREA OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.



SECRET

P. GLENN - VIZIT

Operativul de la baza tehnice contacta cu seful de misiune la Washington de la  
pentru a afla informatii despre activitatea operativului de la baza tehnice  
si de a-l ajuta.

Operativul de la baza tehnice si seful de misiune de la Washington au  
discutat despre activitatea operativului de la baza tehnice si de a-l ajuta.

Operativul de la baza tehnice si seful de misiune au  
discutat despre activitatea operativului de la baza tehnice si de a-l ajuta.

Operativul de la baza tehnice si seful de misiune au  
discutat despre activitatea operativului de la baza tehnice si de a-l ajuta.

1977-1978

L. BROWN - Report

There is no data about the station service, but procedure, some  
details possible, but no one knows a certain amount.

The station is being registered for "East, West, and South"

ZAKLJUČCI:

- Centar ubuduće treba da vodi računa o konstatacijama koje su navedene o radu centra u pogledu slanja informacija.

- Centar treba da redovno uzima u razmatranje i procenjuje opšte uslove rada, naročito u poslednje vreme na koje su uticale izvesne akcije većeg značaja na planu bilateralnih odnosa, osim čemu nas treba redovno izveštavati.

- U izveštavanju o članovima obavestajne organizacije centar treba da se pridržava Pravilnika i sa svakog kontakta da dostavlja organizacione zabeleške.

- U pogledu aktivnih društvenih veza ustanovljeno je da Job na ovim objektima ima ukupno 17. veza za koje su napisani kartoni ličnosti. Od ovih, sedam je sam stvorio, a deset veza je nasleđio od ranijeg operativca.

Ove veze se nalaze na sledećim objektima:

Objekt: SD.

Na ovom objektu ima 5. veza od kojih je 4. sam stvorio.

Ukazano je da dosadašnja orijentacija operativca na ovom objektu nije bila sasvim dobra. Orijentisao se da razvija odnos sa vozača sa kojim mora da rešava radnu problematiku. Lemensario je odlučio za štampu, gde ima registrovanu samo jednu nasledjenu vezu.

Ubrzo operativac treba da se više orijentisao prema ovom objektu i da stvara veze sa kojima nikada ima i radno pokrivo.

Objekt: Bola Indes

Na ovom objektu ima dve veze i jedno penzionstvo. Ove je sa početak dobre.

Objekt: Kongres.

Ima nijedne veze. Centar upite ima slabe veze na ovom objektu. Operativac Petralid je pravio plan prema kojem bi se uključili ostali operativci radi stvaranja veza, ali se nada, kako nas je poznato, još nije postignuto dovoljno.

U daljem planu rada centar treba da obuhvati i ovaj objekt.

OPŠTI OBLASTI: STAMPA I ŠTAMPAR

Na opštem objektu operativac ima 10. veza, koje su registrovane i to: 6. među novinarima i 2. u dipkora.

Ukazano je da orijentacija operativca i na ovom objektu nije bila potpuno ispravna. Tako od 8. veza među novinarima 5. ih je iz lista "Washington Post", dok u redakciji listova: "Monitor", "Washington Star" i "New York Times" ima samo po jednu registrovanu vezu.

Operativac treba da proširi krug svojih veza među novinarima i iz drugih listova.

U dipkora operativac ima samo dve registrovane veze i to: E. Brecken, II. sekretara Britanske ambasade u Vashingtonu sa kojim se je upoznao još za vreme svog sluševanja u Londonu, i Wilkinsona, takođe iz Britanske ambasade.

Ukazano da i u ovoj sredini treba da stvara više veza.

- Pred evidenciranjem veza ustanovičeno je da je operativac ostvario mnogo više kontakata sa drugim vezama, ali za njih nisu napisani kartoni ličnosti, kod istih nema značajnijih elemenata radi kojih je bilo potrebno da ih se sa razmatrans.

- Očekuje se da je operativac vrlo aktivan i dinamičan u stvaranju i održavanju veza.

- Operativac se do sada u kontaktima sa vezama više orijentisao na dobijanju informacija, a manje na uočavanju obavestajnih elemenata, kojem pitanju upuduće treba da posveti mnogo više pažnje.

- Frekvencija kontakata sa vezama zadovoljava.

- Ukazano je da operativac treba da poboljša način izveštavanja o vezama, jer isto do sada nije bilo kompletno i redovno.

Kartoni ličnosti, kao i dopune podataka, napisani su 24. i 25. marta 1963. godine, što znači da je kampanjski radjen /i sa velikim zakasnjem/ posle održanih kontakata/.

- Za registrovane veze pozitivno je to što je uglavnom sa svima odnos u stalnom razreju. Izuzetak je Kilduff, gde je razvej odnos još neizvestan.

Međutim, o produkciji veza nemamo podataka, jer su informacije od njih dobivene sate linijom DIMP-a.

Ukoliko centar treba da nam šalje evidenciju koliko je koja veza dala informacija, po kojim pitanjima i kojim je sinijem postala. Najbolje je rešenje da se takva evidencija sastavlja u organizacionoj zasebnosti, gde treba navoditi samo broj dobivena informacija, po kojim pitanjima se odnosilo, njiavni osena od strane centra, a pri tome nije potrebno izlazati sadržinu dobivena informacija.

- Na osnovu prilaženog materijala, kao i razgovora sa Jozom, sajam njegovih veza ima uslove da budu registrovane kao "Razvijene veze". To su: FRASSEL Max, MERTZ Karl, Gwartman Bernard, J. Hantover, Rosenfeld, Brocke i sličnast.

Za ove razvijene veze, kao i za ostale veze, potrebno je da operativac da dodatne podatke kao: lične i biografске, karakteristike i mogućnosti, materijalno stimuliranje, frekvencija i bezbednost kontakata, korisnost veze na informativnom i operativnom planu, kao i plan daljeg roča sa vezama.

Beograd, 11. maja 1965. godine.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIANREPORT (B)

Jcb

## PLAN OF WORK FOR DECEMBER

General Remarks

Aside from the development of the existing contacts, new contacts should be established (see the execution in November).

Regarding production, special efforts should be made in connection with the relations United States - Soviet Union, the relations East-West and the bilateral relations. The reaction regarding the Congress of the Communists' League of Yugoslavia should be especially treated.

In connection with the transfer of Kline, the necessities should be made for the purpose of contacting the successor of Kline in the White House.

The sending of gifts for the New Year should be adequately prepared.

Particular attention should be paid to corruption which is a normal part of the contacts.

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(a) Production Contacts

State Department: Andrews (executed), Courtney (executed) Polansky, Zook, Godson, Stearns and R. Garthoff (new)

White House: Kline, Brubeck (declined to come to the theater last November)



USIA: Dizard, Brusberg

Newspapermen: Volkov, Hightower, P. Day, Foisie,  
P. Ward, P. Potter (new), Gsertzman

(b) Social Contacts (evenings)

Andrews (theater, supper - arranged)

Godson (home, supper - arranged)

Brusberg (concert - arranged)

(c) Production

See general remarks above

(d) Notes

Aside from the regular job concerning the press,  
etc., this month, particular care should be taken of:

the contacts regarding the treating of the Congress  
of the Communists' League of Yugoslavia (this matter is under  
way);

the lecture at the John Hopkins University, the  
seminar for diplomacy (executed);

the sending of the operative report to the Direction  
for Information (this report should encompass four months);

the preparation of the yearly report to the Direction  
for Information.

December 7, 1964.

Job.

PLAN RADA ZA DECEMBAR:

Opšte: Pored razvijanja postojećih, uspostavljati nove kontakte. (Vidi i izvršenje za novembar). U pogledu produkcije poseban napor oko odnosa SAD-SSSR, Istok-Zapad i bilaterale. Ovde posebno oko reakcija na Kongres SKJ.

U vezi razmestaja izvora poduzeti potrebno da se kontaktira naslednik Kleina u DK.

Obezbediti adekvatno i svrsishodno slanje poklona za IG.

Obratiti posebnu pažnju korupciji, kao normalnom delu kontakata.

a) Produkcioni kontakti:

SD: Anderson (izvršeno), Comptney (izvršeno), Polanaky, Zook, Udman, Sturman, Katzenhoff (novi)

DK: Klein, Bruback (koji otkazao pozoriste u novembru).

USIA: Dizard, Brunberg.

Novinari: Vukob, Hightower, P. Day, Sofia, P. Ward, P. Potter (novi)  
G. G. G. G.

b) Društveni kontakti (većer):

Anderson (pozoriste, večera) - dogovoreno.

Godson (kuci, večera) - dogovoreno.

Brunberg (koncert) - dogovoreno.

c) Produkcija: Vidi gore, u opštim napomenama.

d) Napomena:

Pored redovnih poslova oko stampe i sl. ovog meseca treba naglasiti: kontakti oko tretiranja Kongresa SKJ (u toku); predavanja na John Hopkins University, seminar za diplomatiju (izvršeno); konkretno poslati operativan izveštaj UPIN-u za 4 meseca; pripremati godišnji izveštaj za UPIN.

7. Decembar 1964.

Broj: \_\_\_\_\_ 1962 god.

Poslana \_\_\_\_\_  
Primljena \_\_\_\_\_

K.

Izvor: referent SD za Alžir.

~~Posebno~~ ~~Ben Bela~~ ~~ima~~ "karakter ispitivanja" i licnog upoznavanja Kenedija sa Alžirskim rukovodjećim ljudima. Otuda dosta vrane izgubljene u protkolarnim stvarima i diskusiji sa staru SAD prema Kubi, ~~umesto da razmatrana pitanja od vitalnog značaja za Alžir. Ben Bela~~ ~~inač~~ ~~uspeo~~ da izlezi Amerikancima ozbiljnost unutrašnjih teskoca Alžira (oskudica u stručnim kadrovima, pre svega nedostatak lekara i drugog zdravstvenog osoblja) ~~koje~~ ~~okra-~~ ~~likovno~~ ~~kao~~ "katastrofama". Međutim, nije trazio američku pomoć ~~niti pokušao~~ ~~da~~ ~~o~~ ~~to~~ ~~ne~~ ~~razgovara,~~ ~~već~~ ~~naknadno~~ objavljeno da će ove pitanje biti predmet posebnog razmatranja sa dvojicom alžirskih funkcionera koji uskoro treba da stignu u Vasington. Ben Bela uporne i "naivno" veruje da može odigrati ulogu posrednika između SAD i Kastro, naomenuvši da će (posle susreta sa Kastrom) poslati svoje emisare da o tome razgovaraju sa predstavnicima vlade SAD.

~~Za vreme boravka u Vasingtonu Ben Bela nije susreo nijetnog stranog diplomatu ili člana~~

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN**REPORT (A)**  
-----**Job****REPORT FOR NOVEMBER****(1) Contacts****(a) Production Meetings**

- (1) Two lunches with Volkov (SV-5) (see production below)**
- (2) Lunch with McGowan (renewal of contact because he is not transferred) (SV-4)**
- (3) Lunch with Klein (BK) (see production below)**
- (4) First lunch with Owen, Deputy Director of the Section for USSR in the State Department (new contact foreseen in my last mail) (see production)**
- (5) First lunch with Matusek, Analyses and Information Bureau of the Department of State (Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia). (see production)**

\*\*\*

**(b) Social Contacts (Corruption) (sic) - evenings**

- (1) R. McCloskey and wife (home drink, supper at restaurant, movies)**
- (2) Volkov and wife (supper in restaurant in connection with departure of J. Blocker)**

- (3) I. McGowan and wife (theater, supper in restaurant)
- (4) S. Rosenfeld (Washington Post) - supper in restaurant in connection with departure

\*\*\*

(c) Production

- Cable No. 1706 - The Fall of Khrushchev and the United States (Zook; SV-5; Rosenfeld, Frankel, Blocker, Gvertzman, McGowan)
- Cable No. 1719 - Evaluation of Events in Moscow (Bill; SV-6)
- Cable No. 1731 - United States Evaluation of Yugoslav Attitude (Andrews for Fulbright)
- Cable No. 1733 - Changes in USSR and Attitude of Yugoslavia (Polansky)
- Cable No. 1762 - Relations U. S. A. - USSR (SV-5; Owen)
- Cable No. 1796 - Changes in Moscow and the Eastern European Countries (SV-5 and Matusek)
- Cable No. 1856 - Relations U. S. A. - USSR Before the Meeting Gromyko-Rusk, U. S. A. - Yugoslavia (Klein)
- Cable No. 1871 - Program of Relations U. S. A. - Yugoslavia, Attitude of U. S. A. After Congo (Andrews)

\*\*\*

(d) Remarks

Aside from the regular and irregular activities related to the press, to the Congress of the Communists' League of Yugoslavia, to

the expositions, etc., the Operative has made three lectures to the American public in the course of November.

The Operative had to prepare these lectures.

Job.

## IZVEŠTAJ ZA NOVEMBR:

I. Kontakti:a) Produkcioni kontakti:

1. Dva ručka sa Vlokovom (SV-5); (vidi nize o produkciji);
2. Ručak sa McGowanom (obnova kontakta posto nije prešten) (SV-4)
3. Ručak sa Kleinom (EK) - (vidi nize o produkciji)
4. Prvi ručak (novi kontakt - predviđen nojom poslednjom postom) sa Owenom, pon. nacelnika Odj. za SSSR u SD, (v. produkciju)
5. Prvi ručak (novi kontakt - predviđen nojom poslednjom postom) sa Matuskem, Analitic. i ob. biro u SD (IB i Jug.) (v. produkciju)

b) Društveni kontakti (korupcija) - večeri:

1. R. McCloskey i žena (kuci drink, večera restoran, kino);
2. Volkov i žena (večera u restoranu povodom odlaska J. Blockera);
3. J. McGowan i žena (pozorište i večera u restoranu);
4. S. Rozenfeld (V. Post) večera u restoranu ppydya odlaska.

c) Produkcije:

- CONF No. 1706 - smena Hrusceva i SAD (Zook, SV-5; Rozenfeld, Frankel, Blocker, Gvertzman, McGowan).
- " " 1719 - Ocene događaja u Moskvi (Bill; SV-6)
- " " 1731 - Ocene SAD položaja Jugoslavije - za Fulbrajta (Andrews.)
- " " 1733 - Promene u SSSR-u i položaj Jug. (Polansky)
- " " 1762 - Odnosi SAD-SSSR (SV-5; Owen);
- " " 1796 - Promene u Moskvi i IB zemlje (SV-3 i Matusck);
- " " 1856 - Odnosi SAD-SSSR, pred Gorniko-Rusk, SAD-Jug. (Klein);
- " " 1871 - Program odnosa SAD-Jug. u 1955, stavovi SD, posle Konga (Andrews)

d) Napomena:

Pored ostalih redovnih i neredovnih poslova oko stampe, itd u vezi Kongresa SKJ, izložbi, itd operativac je tokom novembra održao tri posebna predavanja američkim auditorijumima, za koja se posebno pripremao.

7. XII. 1964.

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

From the Coordination Division - Belgrade

To the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington

February 9, 1964

When he reported in May of last year, Abot stressed that he had several contacts with informative prospects. We expected, as he himself had promised, that he would undertake operative steps and that these contacts would be more useful.

However, we did not receive any such information.

We would like to know whether Abot maintains his relations with these contacts and whether he develops them. Has Abot widened the fund of the contacts with informative prospects?

Send the detailed report with the plan of work for each one of these contacts by the first mail.



Od Koordinacionog odeljenja.

Februara, 9. 1967

Abot na spisunju maja prošle godine isticao da ima više veza sa obavestajnom perspektivom. Očekivali, kako zaključio i sam običao, da će prema njima aktivnije operativno nastupiti i efekat njihove korisnosti biti veći. Nestatim, od tada nismo dobili nikakvih obavestajnih izveštaja, a obavestajnih informacija od njih veza uopšte nema. Interesuje nas da li sa navrednim veza održava kontakt, kako se odnos razvija i da li je proširio fond veza sa obavestajnom perspektivom. Sa prvom poštom neophodno da pošaljete detaljan izveštaj sa planom rada za svaku takovu vezu.

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 HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MECILLA, TRAVEL

TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN

PLAN OF CONTACTS FOR JANUARY 1964

INCLUSIVE DATES: \_\_\_\_\_

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOC State Department and USIA

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

- (1) N. Andrews, Officer in Charge of Yugoslavia
- (2) McGowan, PA (sic) for the European Bureau of the State Department
- (3) McCloskey, Deputy Spokesman of the State Department (movies and dinner)
- (4) J. Reap, Assistant Director of the News Division (from last month)
- (5) G. Hoody, Chief of the Sector for Europe in the Bureau for Cultural Exchanges (from last month)

White House

- (1) Kilguff (from last month)
- (2) D. Klein

Newspapers

- (1) Max Frankel (from last month)
- (2) Price Day (B. Sun)
- (3) R. Brunn (Monitor)
- (4) R. Dahan (SLP)
- (5) Lightner (AP)
- (6) Henley (UPI)

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

A dinner at home for 6 foreign couples and 2 of ours.

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Proposed to Ambassador a dinner for contacts related to the cultural field.

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The Ambassador met the newspaperman; he had anticipated that.

(typewritten signature)

C. Job

documents -  
out-of-order?

## PLAN KONTAKATA ZA JANUAR 1954:

SD, USIA:

1. N.Andrews, ref. za J.;
2. McGowan, PA za Evropski biro SD;
3. McCloskey, deputy spokesman SD (izlazak u bioskop, vecera);
4. J.Reap, pomocnik naceinika News Division. (ostalo iz proslog meseca);
5. G.Moody, sef sektora za Evropu u Birosu za kult.razmenu (iz proslog meseca);

Bela kuca:

1. Kilduff (ostalo iz proslog meseca);
2. D.Klein;

Novinari:

1. Max Frankel (ostalo iz proslog meseca);
2. Price Day (3. Sun);
3. R. Brunn (Monitor);
4. R. Duncan (SLPD);
5. Hightower (AP);
6. Hensley (UPI);

---  
 Jedna vecera kod kuce za 6 stranih i 2 nasu paru.  
 ---

Ambasadoru dat predlog za jednu veceru veza iz oblasti kulture;  
 Ambasador imao i predvideo sastanke sa novinarima.

C.Job.