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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Newark, New Jersey

August 19, 1969

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.SECRETESPIONAGE - CUBA

NK T-1, a Cuban refugee who is in a position to furnish reliable information, advised as follows:

On [] 1969, the source was contacted by telephone at his place of employment in []

requested the source to meet him at [] 1969, []

Avenue, Bronx, New York. The source went to designated meet area on [] 1969, arriving at approximately [] No attempt to contact source was made during that interval.

On [] 1969, source's wife received a telephone call at the source's home, in [] from an individual who did not identify himself. A message was left for source which instructed him to appear at the previously mentioned meet location at [] 1969.

The source arrived at the meet site at the intersection of [] Bronx, New York, at approximately [] whereupon he was immediately contacted by [] who had been waiting in a parked car on [] and source proceeded on foot a short distance toward the []

[] took out from a small handbag which he was carrying a [] Tape Recorder which measured approximately 9 inches by 4 inches by 3 inches. The tape recorder was placed between the two on the grass as they talked. The source observed approximately 20 small reels of tape in the bag carried by []

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GROUP 1

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201-816438

535-CC-47
#5615

(this seems to be a different source than the prior Cuba-47 thing)

[REDACTED]

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During the ensuing conversation which lasted from [REDACTED] the source counted three or four reels of tape utilized by [REDACTED] and each reel would record for about one hour, or approximately thirty minutes on each side. [REDACTED] whose true identity had not been revealed to the source, requested him to call him [REDACTED]. Referring to a report prepared by source and [REDACTED] 1969, [REDACTED] stated that the report had been poorly prepared and lacked necessary detail. He directed the source to be more specific and thorough in answering any questions for future reports.

[REDACTED] proceeded to review with the source the information furnished by source in the previous report. [REDACTED] was quick to cite any small discrepancy between the information contained in the report and that which was furnished by the source during their conversation.

[REDACTED] queried the source in connection with individuals in Miami with whom the source had been familiar. The questions concerning these individuals included their current addresses, general background and sympathies, activity in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations, etc.

✓ [REDACTED] displayed a photograph of (First Name Unknown) [REDACTED] and asked source if he recognized him. [REDACTED] was described as male, of Caucasian race, who appeared to be Cuban, 32-35 years old, husky build, dark hair and dark eyes. The source could not recognize the individual photographed.

[REDACTED] made several inquiries about [REDACTED] a non-existent individual who the source intentionally included in his prior report as a principal agent for CIA. The source advised [REDACTED] that he met [REDACTED] on only two or three occasions and knew nothing more specifically about him.

While the source was answering a question concerning an individual named [REDACTED] inadvertently referred to [REDACTED] which the source knew as the true name of [REDACTED] is known by [REDACTED] to have been previously connected with CIA

Source of Cuba-20

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[REDACTED]

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operations in [REDACTED] as well as the Miami area. He was especially interested in whether the source knew any dates of forthcoming infiltration runs into Cuba in which [REDACTED] might be involved.

[REDACTED] mentioned [REDACTED] and asked the source if [REDACTED] is the brother of [REDACTED]. He further questioned the source whether or not [REDACTED] is still a CIA instructor in the use of explosives. The fact that [REDACTED] was in any way connected with instruction in the use of explosives was never mentioned previously by source in his report and must have been obtained by [REDACTED] from other sources.

The source happened to mention [REDACTED] a nickname for a past team member for infiltration runs into Cuba. Referring to [REDACTED] Espinosa interrupted and stated [REDACTED] Source had forgotten the true name of [REDACTED] and said that this identity must have been furnished to [REDACTED] through other sources.

Also asked of the source was whether [REDACTED] a colleague of source, was still operating for CIA. The source replied he did not know, inasmuch as he had been too long removed from Miami area to be accurate in his reply.

[REDACTED] made inquiries on the following individuals with whom the source had been thought to associate in Miami area; specifically, he wanted to know any background information and whether or not the individuals were being directed by CIA:

Otto (Last Name Unknown), previously of operational interest to CIA in the Miami area.

Javier Souto, previously a principal agent in the Miami area for CIA.

Edgar Sopo, active in anti-Castro radio broadcasts to Cuba from the Miami area.

Manuel Artimes, a leader in Bay of Pigs Invasion and subsequently connected with anti-Castro organizations, including MRR.

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[REDACTED]

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✓ [REDACTED] performed infiltration operations into Cuba with source. [REDACTED] specifically indicated that source was to attempt to make contact with [REDACTED] to get any information of value when in the Miami area.

✓ X Dr. Rafael Molinas Salvuado, previously attached to anti-Castro movements and alleged to be of operational value to CIA.

✓ [REDACTED] known by [REDACTED] to have participated in CIA directed operations in Africa. Source was directed to specifically contact [REDACTED] for any information of value pertaining to CIA activity when in the Miami area.

✓ X Caridad Gonzalez Machin, involved with exfiltration runs from Cuba.

✓ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is thought by the source to be a communist. ✓

Source furnished little information regarding the above individuals and used as an excuse that although he was on close terms with most of them, he has had little or no contact with them since leaving the Miami area.

✓ X Of all the individuals named by [REDACTED], he appeared most concerned in obtaining any information on [REDACTED] Both individuals had been associates of the source in Havana and [REDACTED] had worked with the source in Havana. He advised [REDACTED] that although both are known to be anti-Castro, he did not feel either had any connection with CIA.

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[REDACTED]

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On at least three occasions, [REDACTED] asked the source about the degree of fluency of the latter's spoken and written English and asked if he is able to relate with Americans. He was seemingly impressed when the source answered affirmatively and explained that he had attended night school [REDACTED] area.

[REDACTED] queried the source about some infiltration runs into Cuba that the source had led. [REDACTED] mentioned specific runs in which the source participated which had not been mentioned previously by the source. He seemed to be very well prepared and gave the impression that he knew the answers to all the questions directed at the source. He was interested in any problems that the source's team might have experienced when entering and leaving Cuba during CIA operations.

He inquired about the control methods of CIA infiltration teams, whether members of the teams were ever surveilled in the United States, the chain of command for a team, and to whom team leaders report. The source answered that each member was responsible only to himself. Concerning security rules on the mother vessel during infiltration and exfiltration operations, the source stated that each team leader was responsible for the performance of his team and each team member was held responsible for each piece of equipment issued to him.

Source was requested to identify any mother vessel, the bases from which they operate, and the crew members. The source stated he could not answer these questions due to the length of time passed since the source was connected with CIA operations in Miami.

The source was further questioned regarding the methods of infiltration into Cuba, the role of the mother vessel, intermediary vessels, landing crafts, and the establishment of intelligence nets inside Cuba. Apparently noting that the source was not furnishing full details of the question, [REDACTED] interrupted and requested the source to verify [REDACTED]'s explanation. [REDACTED] proceeded to relate concisely the plans and methods utilized in CIA operations.

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[REDACTED]

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Asked how teams were able to build sheds and living quarters in the mangrove swamps inside of Cuba without being noticed by natives in the same area, the source replied that everyone in the vicinity of the infiltration points were sympathetic to the teams. The source explained that one person in charge of an observation post approximately one mile away from one infiltration point cooperated with the teams and was later taken out of Cuba by the source.

[REDACTED] asked if there are still any collaborators or persons sympathetic to the United States Government on the Cuban coast with whom the infiltrators worked. Source replied that to his knowledge all those who were of assistance have been either jailed or killed.

[REDACTED] was also concerned about the employment of CIA personnel in the Keys off of Florida and asked the source as to why CIA would maintain personnel in that area. Source stated he did not know unless it was to guard against infiltration by Cuban fishing vessels.

Questioned again about his reasons for cooperating [REDACTED] the source replied that he is an individual completely independent of any political belief. He said that he was initially motivated against the regime of Fidel Castro because he had seen his parents work hard and save for 40 years in order to afford a few luxuries in their later lives, only to see the Cuban Government intervene and claim possession of everything, including their home. He further explained that it appears the United States will never force Castro out of Cuba but that the fact remains he is Cuban and Cuba is his fatherland. He said he is willing to cooperate only to the extent that his parents will receive fair treatment from the Cuban Government.

[REDACTED] had information that the source was suspected at one time by Cubans in Miami of possibly being connected with the Cuban G-2, which information caused a United States Government investigation. Source replied that this was probably due to his number of successful runs into Cuba without incident which prompted others to suspect he had to have connections with G-2.

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[REDACTED]

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On one run, the source was out of contact with CIA for ten days which added further to the possibility that he had either defected or was working with G-2. Most of the rumors were quelled however when he submitted to a CIA lie detector test which resulted negatively. He credited his ability to avoid ambushes and misfortune to the experience he had in infiltration exercises as well as extensive CIA training.

Approximately one half hour of the meeting between the source and [REDACTED] entailed ascertaining the proficiencies of the source in the training of demolitions radio operation, weaponry, seamanship, etc., which he received from CIA. Nothing was mentioned concerning any intentions by [REDACTED] to utilize the source in connection with any of his previously mentioned fields of training.

The source informed [REDACTED] that he had been contacted since their last meeting by [REDACTED] ✓

[REDACTED] an anti-Castro organization. The source has been designated by [REDACTED] to lead the military faction of the organization. It was explained to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] has goals of ultimately [REDACTED] at New York City by means as yet not disclosed to the source. The source was instructed that in the future he is to spend as much time as possible with [REDACTED] in determining that organization's plans of action against the [REDACTED] and Government of Cuba.

At different times throughout the meeting, [REDACTED] was observed to lean back on the ground which exposed a weapon tucked inside his trousers at the waist, which was described by the source to be a black [REDACTED] Automatic Pistol.

At a point of about two hours through the interview, [REDACTED] took the source on foot to the [REDACTED], where each bought a fountain drink. While the source sat at the bar, [REDACTED] went into one of the two telephone booths located nearest the rear wall of the luncheonette. He was in the booth about 30 seconds but did not make a call. He did not indicate his reason for entering the booth. Finishing their drink, they returned to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and continued their discussion. At this point the source noted for the first time a person of Cuban appearance sitting on a nearby park bench who remained in the area through the entire meeting. The source suspected this person as being connected with counter surveillance of the meeting.

[REDACTED] instructed the source to prepare in report form the answers to the second portion of the list of questions furnished to the latter on [REDACTED] 1969. The answers in report form are to be placed in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The source is to return to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] asked the source if he would be agreeable to go to Miami for a month in an effort to contact friends and ex-associates of CIA. The source stated he was not, in view of his family and employment obligations, but agreed to go for a short period, possibly three or four days. [REDACTED] told him that while in Miami, the source's mission would consist of determining current activities of the CIA, identities of any new CIA teams, identities of Government vessels currently in or out of service, new principal agents, CIA instructors, and any CIA activities including the deployment of Cubans to South American regions for CIA operations.

The date agreed upon on which source will go to Miami is [REDACTED] 1969, but the source will indicate to [REDACTED] in the report to be left at the next drop that he will delay his departure until [REDACTED] 1969, in order to pick up his next pay check, and will not return until [REDACTED] 1969. The source was instructed by [REDACTED] to meet him following his return to New Jersey at [REDACTED], 1969, at the intersection of [REDACTED] Road and [REDACTED] Road, New York, at which time results of the Miami mission will be disclosed.

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The source suggested that the next meeting take place in New Jersey, to which suggestion replied he does not like to schedule meetings in New Jersey unless absolutely necessary.

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