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MEXICO CITY COVERAGE OF OSWALD VISIT

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Intelligence Sources on Oswald's Visit
to Mexico City in 19631. Unilateral Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened in April
1947 until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in
1955, the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit

leads ~~from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.~~ ~~Unilateral~~

~~two (1947-1955) and a third line phone tap with~~
~~photo phone intercepts, surveillance team and a rail intercept~~
~~coordination.~~

~~7-1 phone taps (LIPSTICK) were placed by~~
~~the local telephone company and handled by a Station case~~
~~officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the avail-~~
~~ability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language~~
~~(English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transmitters.~~

~~Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican American individuals.~~

~~Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case~~
~~officer assisted by technicians from Headquarters who~~
~~advised the Station on the best types of~~
~~cameras to use. The photographic sites were under project~~
~~LIPSTICK (namely, LIMITED, LILY, and LIPSTICK) and were at a~~
~~fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Embassy (on~~
~~street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian entrance. The~~

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~~gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the~~
~~Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across~~
~~double lined street on the southeast corner of that block (See~~
~~attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photographic base and opera-~~
~~ted strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This~~
~~base however, was closed when the Station ascertained that the~~
~~photograph of the "subject" was being released by the~~
~~Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photographic base.~~
~~It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the~~
~~same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of~~
~~the block south. It had a private view of the front gates of the~~
~~Soviet Embassy. LICALIA, the third photographic site, was located~~
~~in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet~~
~~Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the~~
~~Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get~~
~~good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three~~
~~photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a~~
~~Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father~~
~~(deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and~~
~~LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then developed and~~
~~printed into 2 x 10 contact print strips. LICALIA film was ori-~~
~~ginally processed in the Station but in early 1969, due to the~~
~~resignation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and~~
~~LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent.~~

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Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers supervised a team of six recruited agents who conducted mobile surveillance of a panel truck. The panel truck was identified by radio from the UNITED States whenever it passed in front of the gates of the Central Embassy. These agents were aware of the UNITED States and they had been given UNITED photographs for identification purposes.

The Central mail intercept operation, ALDRICH, which was headed by an American staff officer. A recruited Mexican agent who had a semi-official status obtained selected letters from a sub-agent employed by the Mexican postal service.

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Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican government at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which we conducted liaison, was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their agents were cruel and corrupt. A staff officer trained a number of them in radio training and travel control.

At the time of the operation of a Mexican official, we telephone tap operation was in existence. The operation,

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which became known as LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer.

The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The

transcription was staffed by Mexican Army officers. In

1951 because of mismanagement by the Mexican principals,

the Station Chief, himself, became the project case officer.

A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the

listening post and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes.

There was also an American technician inside the listening post.

3. Coverage.

In mid 1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY

(the joint tan operation) asked the American officer at the

LIENVOY listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet

Cuban and Satellite Embassies in anticipation of possible cover-

age. The Station immediately disconnected all of the unilateral

teletype taps on these Embassies so that they would not be dis-

covered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans

soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines,

three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At

the listening post, a five monitor made short summaries of con-

versations of interest which were then included in a daily re-

sume for the Chief of Station. Later when a reel was completely

recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station;

however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels

which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or

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English were taken to another location for translation and typing. Mr. Boris Paraseff did the Russian translations but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations were about a week behind the date of the conversation. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only those two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts for operational reads.

Soon as the Station learned that an American identifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week, but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film did so on a night time basis. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

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~~It came to the attention of [redacted]
[redacted] of the Soviet [redacted] It was picked up and
[redacted] the caller
[redacted] there was some delay because
[redacted] to review the photographs substantially
[redacted] the typed transcript~~

4. ~~Admiral Gromov~~

~~It was discussed at T-1~~

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