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Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, envelop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division ~~for~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~for~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other Division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is the procurement of ~~the~~ code and cipher materials, ^{and information concerning such materials} in accordance with requirements issued on the clandestine services, primarily, by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. Background:
needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in direct touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: JFWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. JFWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the [redacted] by the Chief of Station [redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half ~~he~~ ^{she} was contacted ~~in~~ ^{by} sporadically by CS [redacted], in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by JFWIN. On ~~September~~ ^{October} 1961

Q Jwin annual salary :	\$ 7,200
Travel + ops expenses for	
Q Jwin + other agents & agent candidates :	2,000
Fees for services by and	
standby of agents and	
agent candidates :	2,000
Travel of staff employees &	
engaged in Zorible activity :	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles	
and other operational expenses :	1,000
	\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

1) Legal, ethical → morals, operational problems; political: non-attach-
ment.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (+ effect on DDP) and experience
w/ KGB (Coorsup, Bandiera groups, Khodakos) → require most
professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable,
CE-recognized ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient
search & ^{with} ^{minimum} ^{high} ^{respect} ^{for} ^{operational} ^{security} ^{he} ^{should}, ^{documents} ^{are} ^{all-important}.

3) Maximum security:

a. Khabak only (i.e., what does foreign ^{agency} know?); no approach to other Aust. agencies

b. Within Khabak, one focal point for control,
search, tracking, case officering, etc - DDP without
in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially closed

c. Max. security cable common for incoming
cables only; no restrictions on travel; prohibition
of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with
own own (non-station) common word of mouth &
no backchannel re traps

d. No PA's ^(except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officer
from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign
govts.

f. No use of any agent who
ever recruited for a U.S. Govt. agency. Train-
ing opposition must never

g. Use of already tested agents only
in the search

h. Stand-by list of Khabaks who can

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretent: Not to be / D. revealing this established.
- j. No discussions in stations. No "team" with ready to go if.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visas.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; single ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization ^{e.g., Hellfire} criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Above mentioned - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for

planning house or beach in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following: security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. The nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; others will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have phony 201 in RI to backstop this, & document therein forged & falsified. Should look like a CE file.

10. Possible use of staff for the action.

11. Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

freed into travel

Legal, operational + ethical → morale problems.

- 1) Maximum ^{high not secure enough} security + within KGB only (e.g., how many does Liraques know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering + deciphering. Absence of Liraque object.
- 2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandate (Process one-man control base with own (non-station) command).
- 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no self-start. PA's.

Non-attributionality:

4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officer who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g., Quinn) has been examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Greeks) in case of blow — is it above essential?

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) Contacts recommended. ~~Selections~~ could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (as archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ~~All~~ ^{all} ~~sub~~ ^{sub} personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silhouette & stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals who selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~For~~ Danger of standbys.

6. No other agencies
7. No projects or papers
except for cover.
8. Principal Agent - ~~1~~
AF - Project Dept LCH -
ticket 1500 - from RB.
Mark spot agent. Still at
project - see Shabo
9. Important -
10. Targets under review -
Military Bureau -
see also report -
11. Case appearing
12. Cover file - Create to prove
RIS are active - non-sens
13. Had clearance of RIS counter
action to monitor if they
are active -
FBI list - Remember