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# SECRET RETURN TO CIA

2 0 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

70 01-77

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Operations

(Anti-Pinkerton Act)

- 1. Reference is made to a memorandum dated 28 May 1975 captioned "Alleged Illegal Domestic Activities (Private Investigating Firms)," which was prepared in response to the Director's testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 23 May 1975 concerning specific instances where the Agency has utilized private investigative firms, attached hereto as Tab A.
- 2. In conducting the original research into those instances where private investigative firms have been utilized by the Agency, specific attention was directed at the use of private investigative "firms" and did not include the Agency's use of individual private investigators. In view of the above additional research has now been conducted. It would be appreciated if the following information could be considered as an addendum to referenced memorandum:
  - a. Since 1950 the Office of Security has engaged in a program whereby a number of qualified individuals throughout the United States have been employed as independent contractors to conduct background investigations on behalf of the Agency. This program, known within the Office of Security as the Confidential Correspondent Program, is almost totally comprised of retired U.S. Government investigators. The majority of these individuals have entered secondary professions following their retirement covering a broad spectrum to

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include law, real estate, construction, and private investigations. By virtue of their former federal investigative backgrounds, these individuals are able to conduct investigations on behalf of the Agency in geographical areas which are remote from existing Office of Security field offices and also provide the Office of Security with the ability to expand or contract its investigative capability as requirements dictate. Each Confidential Correspondent is carefully selected and security approved before any investigative tasks are assigned.

Primarily the use of Confidential
Correspondents has been limited to their conducting background investigations with an Agencyissued U.S. Government credential, although in
some cases correspondents have been provided
with the same commercial cover credentials used 0%
by staff investigators of the Office of Security
to conduct covert investigations. However, in
a limited number of instances, individuals working
independently as private investigators have been
employed as Confidential Correspondents. In view
of their private investigative positions, they
have been allowed to use their own "natural cover"
to conduct covert investigations on behalf of the
Agency.

This latter type of situation has been extremely limited during the twenty-five year history of the Confidential Correspondent Program. In all such cases Headquarters approval was required before permitting the individual to use his own cover. Further, this type of Confidential Correspondent was generally not issued any U.S. Government credential, in order to prevent the possibility that a Confidential Correspondent might misuse such a credential in the conduct of his own business activities. Our research indicates that the last instance where a private investigator was a Confidential Correspondent and utilized his own "natural cover" to conduct Agency investigations occurred circa 1969.

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b. It should also be noted that Robert A. Maheu, who has already been the subject of extensive reporting to the Senate Select Committee, was in 1954 operating his own private investigative company known as Robert A. Maheu Associates. As has been reported, Mr. Maheu had been utilized by the Office of Security in connection with several sensitive assignments during the period 1954 through 1962.

While the review of Mr. Maheu's Office of Security file does not disclose specific data regarding any background investigative activities which he may have conducted on behalf of the Agency, it would appear probable from available information that Mr. Maheu had on occasion conducted such investigations. Mr. Maheu's file does reflect that from approximately February through July 1954, the Office of Security paid a monthly retainer of \$500.00 per month to Robert A. Maheu and that following July 1954 he was to be reimbursed on a "case-by-case" basis.

As evidenced herein and in the referenced memorandum, instances where the Office of Security has contracted with private investigative firms and/or private investigators to conduct investigations on our behalf has been quite limited. Primarily, Covert investigations by the Office of Security OX have been conducted through the use of a private investigative cover mechanism for our own employees or through the use of a proprietary investigative firm. Further, your attention is invited to a memorandum for the Director dated 4 June 1975 (attached hereto as Tab B) which advises that the Office of Security has researched the future need for the Agency to retain the legal authority to hire private investigators and/ or firms to conduct investigations on our behalf. As indicated in Tab B, the Office of Security interposes no objections should the Director decide that in the future the use of private 08 investigators will be restricted to proprietary firms and/or the use of private investigative firms as cover for our own employees.

5. In view of the above, no further research into this matter by the Office of Security will be undertaken unless advised to the contrary.

Director of Security

Atts

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