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DISPATCH

Chief of Station,

DATE

104-25132

Chief, SA via Chief,

22 Oct 59

ASPAKIN/BIOSKIN
ASPAKIN/5

Return photos to ASPAKIN/5

OFFRA-308

1. Comments regarding the continued participation of ASPAKIN/5 in your BIOSKIN efforts have been held pending customer evaluations of her reporting. With those in hand, we felt a more equitable judgment on our part could be made of her potential as a second short-term mounted KGB/INRA or as a long term resident asset in the USSR.

2. The CE implications of A/S's relationship with Gregory GOLOS and an assessment of A/S for utilization in a CE operation, have been summed up in CYP-3215, and it is generally agreed here at Headquarters that A/S would be unsuitable for this type of an operation. Depending on the end results desired of an operation, a relationship with Soviets outside by a prospective BIOSKIN traveler, could be viewed either positively or negatively. If, for example, A/S had been encouraged to further her liaison with GOLOS, then a trip to the USSR at some future date might have been recommended for the purpose of gaining additional information on HIS notes, records on home ground. On the other hand a trip for FI or PR purposes could, we feel, be limited by those contacts in that A/S would probably be subject to provocative cases inside or inhibited in performing her given tasks by heavy surveillance. Her relationship with GOLOS, however, is only one of the restraining factors in deciding on a repeat mounted trip for A/S.

3. The evaluation of A/S's FI production resulting from her first trip have provided some idea as to her potential as an observer and reporter of positive and operational intelligence. Her overall rating as an observer was "not stated". Customer evaluations of the one positive intelligence dissemination resulting from her trip are enclosed. CYP-3215 found it to be of slight or no value. BIOSKIN gave a slightly higher evaluation of value, of importance, but accuracy could not be judged. Vital details were notably lacking, the reporting was vague. BIOSKIN's comments and indications of basic observations which would have considerably enhanced the report (time of sighting, altitude of plane, name of airport, take-off time, etc.) indicate shortcomings of A/S's reports. In comparison with reports of other travelers with little or less operational briefing than A/S had, her overall rating was low. The long report on education, attributed to A/S's part, although supposed to represent a scholarly treatise on the subject was evaluated as fragmentary, general and based purely on A/S's own conclusions. It struck us as being naive to attempt to analyze such a broad field as Soviet education with so obviously little factual knowledge or intimate acquaintance with the subject. This report was not disseminated. The only portion of OFFRA-308 which is being considered for additional dissemination is paragraph 2 containing GOLOS's statements regarding BIOSKIN's personnel which A/S was "reluctant to put in her report," and which BIOSKIN included in his covering dispatch. A/S's reporting of her contacts was fair. All in all, we can say that A/S's production was not startlingly impressive, and justification for a repeat trip on this basis could be a little less.

4. Having a full personal access out of A/S, it is difficult to state categorically whether or not A/S should be considered for a trip on the basis of her qualifications. As a literature bearer, the possible count of a CE operation, A/S would have to have a comprehensive knowledge of the Russian language to cover both carrying it literature or distributing it. A/S does not have this fluency. A questionnaire test was run, as we have discovered this past summer from operations of this type, a few sharp individuals,

extremely knowledgeable on Soviet and American history, economics, and politics in order to effectively neutralize the well-trained Soviet agitators. Although apparently knowledgeable of current events and ongoing in number, we have nothing on which to judge A/S's articulation with the spoken word, her ability to hold her own in a debate with a trained provocateur, her potential for effectively introducing ideas or changing Soviet ways of thinking or her potential for starting the process. You have indicated that she has an ability to attract crowds, and that she was able to do so with a group of Soviets by singing American folk songs. This manner of learning from experience that this technique was more of an equational liability than an asset. Singing and playing attracted the much wanted crowds, but also invited the militia with the end result being confiscation of several pianos and application by the Soviets of stricter controls over all KROKIP travelers. Because of these incidents we have begun reevaluating our FP techniques and devising new ones for reaching our target groups. We hope to have a paper out for you in the near future, outlining some of our experience in our FP efforts utilizing KROKIP travelers during the past year and suggestions for the future. Our impression at this point would be that A/S would be somewhat limited in her capabilities along FP lines, and we would hesitate to encourage a trip for FP utilization.

5. As to A/S's successfully getting herself into the University of Moscow for a year's study, we do not regard the possibility with much hope. In every past instance, without exception, where Americans have attempted to make individual arrangements with Soviet universities for prolonged study, the Soviets have allowed them to make all the preliminary arrangements up to the final step. Just before closing the deal, the Americans have been told that they must become part of the American exchange program. Usually, by then it is too late to apply or the individuals do not meet the qualifications. The agreement for the Academic Year 1960-61 is not yet signed and sealed because the Soviets are displaying their usual cheapness. We do know, however, as of 12 October, the number of students to be exchanged was 15. There are no standard qualifications for applicants, but all applicants in the past have been 28 years or over, have been candidates for a doctorate degree and have been fluent in the Russian language. It is highly unlikely that the pattern of selection will change for the Academic Year 1960-61. A/S fits into none of the above-mentioned categories and it is doubtful she would be accepted. However, should she for her own interest wish to obtain information regarding the exchange, she may do so by directing a letter to:

Dr. David Sanford
Interuniversity Committee on Travel Grants
409 E. 117th St.
New York 27, New York

6. We have tried to vice a return trip for A/S from all possible angles, based on information we have here at Pool quarters and evaluations of her first performance, and, frankly, there just doesn't seem to be a positive back to latch onto at the present moment. However, we are open to any further ideas and suggestions which the field feels may justify sending her back on another mission. It is possible that some new opening will appear between now and January, when, we understand, A/S will be leaving Helsinki.

7. Enclosed are A/S's two color slides and the one black and white print which you requested be returned.

8. Traces on A/S's reported contacts, excluding the laborist guides, were negative. Although any of our travelers this summer ran into the same Soviet line after line, none of these four had come up before.

2 Enclosures:

- A. 1 Photos
- B. 1 Evaluation

DAVID T. SIMPSON

19 October 1959

Distribution: 1 - RI w/o serial.
2 - Main w/2 serials - RI w/o serials.
3 - SS w/2 serials

ROBERT E. CASPARI