

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

SECRET

A-16-88-46

ROLANDO MAEFERRER, JR.

BUSINESS:

Subject is the Vice President of Sales at the following Corporation:

A168762 - Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

UNCL. SECRETED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/E.O. Request No. E-17-260

Document Description: _____

Dated: 27 May 77

Document Located By: DDO
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: _____

*Security info. would
be in interest
of CIA.*

RECOMMEND:

- Release in full-text
- Release in sanitized form
- Deny in toto
- Defer decision to _____
- Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	<u>FOIA</u>	<u>PRIVACY</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1) (f)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1) (c)
* <input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HR-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

(Redacted) DDO
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

May 77

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN: [illegible]

DATE: 22 July 59

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT: Interview with Walter Joe, former patient at St. Hubert Hospital, Detroit

1. Walter Joe, born as Widmer, M.F., 17 May 19, called the Detroit Ward Office on the afternoon of 16 Aug 59, and requested an interview. He said he has information as to whom "would help us". In response to his request, a SAC called on him this afternoon at the hospital.

2. Physically, Joe gave the appearance of having been down on his back for some time. He is reported to be Venezuelan citizen, and his wife and two children live in Maracaibo. He is a sugar operator by profession. He arrived in Cleveland via ship from his farm in Maracaibo on or about 11 August, and has been at the Detroit United Hospital since that date. He carries passport no. 850700, re-validated at Maracaibo, Venezuela on 17 Jul 59. Joe has a sister-in-law, Anna Rodriguez, whom he describes as a full-time newspaperwoman of Maracaibo, and a member of Partido Democrata. The following is the gist of what he said in the course of the two and a half hour interview.

3. Communist-based Anti-Imperialist Movement through his sister-in-law, Joe met in 1958 a Latin newspaperman by the name of Ferna, a reporter for the Diario del Occidente of Maracaibo. Ferna introduced him to people connected with an anti-Imperialist Communist activity of Nicaraguan origin in Venezuela. Joe makes the impression that they would have employed him, but he found out the movement was backed by the Communist Party of Venezuela, and so he dropped them.

4. Shortly after his meeting with the anti-Communist, Joe came in contact with a professor [illegible], Director of the College Jose Martí, and head of the Comité Revolucionario "El Libertador". This latter was under the impression that Joe was an ex-Communist, and expressed an interest in using him to run arms into Cuba, to supply the Castro forces. This was prior to the Batista overthrow of January 1959.

5. Joe took a job in Miami, working on contract on a trekking operation. In Miami in July 1959, he met a man [illegible], who introduced him to [illegible], leader of an anti-Castro group. [illegible] took Joe into the group and let him know they would like to employ him with his job in the trekking operation. [illegible] according to Joe, was the agent who dispatched the "trekking force" consisting of [illegible] and [illegible], all of whom were caught and executed shortly after their landing in Cuba. Joe says [illegible] and [illegible] would not stay in Cuba, but a third person was raised in connection of the trekking operation. Joe says [illegible]. [illegible] did not use, however, [illegible] Joe and [illegible] would be sent in with the trekking group and [illegible] arrived there, he [illegible] contact the trekking group and [illegible] [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Gue's opinion of Miraflores' manager is not clear. He stated Rodriguez is an immigrant, who is only allowed to work in the sugar industry and for the money he can get out of it. Rodriguez told Gue he was a partner in Cuba with 200,000 pesos. He told Rodriguez to Gue that he was a member of the group who attacked the Cuban Consul in the Consulate in Miami. The report received that Hanzo, Fuller and Thompson were the executioners of the Palmers is a "hoax story".

7. When Gue was waiting for food and he was finally available to enter the Masferrer group camp. He had a follow-up on some of the group members, in the company of Antonio and Antonio Masferrer. Antonio is Rodriguez's brother and works with a much more pronounced camp than does Hanzo. Harry had an office in the same building as the Cuban Consulate, and seemed to act as a translator for Masferrer, as well as a provider of weapons to a small scale. Harry apparently had serious Marxist views, since he had swindled two of the members of the Masferrer militia out of \$100 each on the pretext of taking their chests from home to have them cashed for them.

8. Murder of Russ Masher When Masferrer started actively recruiting Americans for his group, he did not make any effort to check them out. Among them were Russ Masher, who claimed to be an ex-police officer formerly in the service of Castro. One night he was in a bar next to the Masferrer task force's barracks at 1097 West with Masher, Juan (also known as El Indio) and a former member of the Castro secret police, who he could not name. There were many other Cubans and Americans as well. Juan was a Portuguese who claimed to have entered the US legally at Key West after jumping the Havana-Hay Key Ferry. His nickname derived from his musical talents; he also claimed to have had no military experience, but he proved to adopt an military tactics that he later became second in command of the task force. The former Castro secret policeman was in an early 20's, about six feet tall, husky build and claimed to have been a schoolteacher. In the course of the evening at the bar, one of the three - Masher, Juan, or the ex-secret policeman - made the remark that, on the occasion of their leaving in Cuba, they should break away from the Masferrer group and try to join up with some other. Gue overheard the remark and reported it to the task force leader, though he said he could not identify which of the three had made it. The ex-secret policeman was promptly thrown out of the task force, but Masher was also strongly suspected of being the author of the dissident remark. As a result of this suspicion Masher was not allowed to take any firearms with him when the group went into training on No-Haz Key. Gue, however, was allowed to take a .25 pistol. Besides Gue's weapon, the only other firearms at No-Haz initially were a 12-gauge shotgun and a .22 rifle. Masher was unable to keep up with the rigorous physical training schedule of the group, and so absented himself from that part of the training. Masher dropped the habit of rising early in the morning and going out to hunt in the woods. Masher managed somehow to appropriate the .22 rifle. Because of his general attitude toward the training, plus the suspicion that surrounded him as the possible author of the dissident remark in the Miami bar, an acute bitterness grew between him and the group leader at No-Haz, Gue, also known as El Indio. Gue was a former Batista police sergeant who had been tried and condemned to death in absentia. Gue proposed shooting it out with Masher, but Masher declined the invitation. Masferrer visited No-Haz once in the company of Juan ---, an ex-C.I. who had served in Havana. Masferrer brought with him a .45 service automatic and a Garand-rifle. These guns were left by Masferrer, upon his departure the next day. In the company of Juan in Guayama, who had been a B-17 man in Batista's army and claimed to have killed several B-17 pilots. Companero was married to an American, a priest who lived in Miami. Masher arose early the morning and went hunting. According to his custom. About breakfast time, the man in the camp heard shots, and then heard

M. H. 7 2 20

CONFIDENTIAL

of arms cache. One of them was left in a group before the payoff. The group was at Westman, and was paid for arms, hoping to reach a "payoff" camp there. The group was disappointed, apparently, they ended up instead in Miami, where they were arrested and sentenced to 30 years each. Gee adds unnecessarily that one of the six was a woman. Another small group of the ex-convicts made a last attempt with the intention of sailing to Cuba. They were picked up by Westman before they got out of the harbor.

12. Anti-Castro Mercantile Activities, in the Miami area, according to Gee, is under the direction of Arnold Rosenberg, of the Cuban organization. His residence is on S.W. 1st and 15th Aves., Miami. Gee says she provides, or makes, boxes and sees to their delivery on cargo.

13. Suarez-Mackel anti-Batavians Plot: (Gee says that he gave the following information to the FBI in response to his phone call sometime early this year to the FBI Office in Miami.) Sometime early this year, Gee is vague about the time, he met a man named Howard Davis, who upon hearing that Gee was interested in returning to his family in Caracas, introduced him to one Luiz Phillips Prado of 4955 Collins Ave., Miami. Prado arranged an interview for Gee with a General Casanova, who was instructed to act as the head of the anti-Batavians movement in Miami. Casanova asked Gee and Davis if they would - on 30 days notice - organize and arm a group of 400 ex-B.I.'s. He offered Gee and Davis that unlimited cash would be at their disposal for the task. Casanova said all kinds of arms would be needed, including machine and flame throwers. He was most interested in whether or not Gee and Davis had any channel for procuring the arms. He assured Casanova they would raise the 400 men and obtain the desired arms and equipment. Casanova said he had already arranged transportation for the force via commercial airlines, that they would be flown to a mountain site "Miami" Jamaica. Having the US disguised as tourists, and they would be given 30 days rigorous training under the direction of English-speaking Venezuelan army officers. Casanova explained that the tentative plan was for an attack by the 400 on Caracas, simultaneously with an Army revolt within the city and at other unspecified points. The attempted coup in early 1961, involving an attack on Fiala Rustin, resulted in the arrest of several army officers involved in the Casanova plot, and according to Prado, necessitated an indefinite delay. Prado told Gee, however, that Perez-Jimenez was still interested in the plan, and that it would be carried out.

14. Contacts with armsmen: Thomas J. O'Donnell, who lives with Rafaela, a relative of the subject, Gee met Sam Adams, former owner of the hotel Adams in Miami. Adams told Gee that, if he were provided with one thousand dollars cash for expenses, he would go to Belgium and buy any kind of arms needed, and he would guarantee delivery to any part of the world. Another gun-runner with whom he came in contact was Charles Adams, 1040 N. 9th Ave., Miami, telephone number MA 4-2464. Adams told Gee that he could obtain, for \$25.00 cash on minimum orders of one thousand, a weapon described as Anti-Lite (Maichita), with NATO ammunition. Another arms dealer whom Gee contacted was Mal Castle, 2211 SE 1st St., Miami, telephone CR 4-629. He provided Gee with a list of surplus US arms which he could obtain in any quantities desired.

HH-780

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

JAMES EARL RAY

711-1800

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F 97-260

Document Description: _____

Dated: _____

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: _____

RECOMMEND:

- Release in full-text
- Release in sanitized form
- Deny in toto
- Defer decision to _____
- Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

only info on 4/18
fragmentary

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
() Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
() Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
() Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
() Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
() File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
() Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
() Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1) (b)
() FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
() Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1) (f)
() Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
() Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1) (c)
* () Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE
May 77

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The general contents of reports affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, and information of a confidential source, the disclosure of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

14-00000-1-3-10-7-1-1-1

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	US PRISONERS IN CUBA; 1st Lt. ...	DATE DISC.	
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO	3/1/60	<i>Eduardo Suarez Riviera</i>	
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Embassy, Havana, Dec 1959	<i>4766 Alton Road,</i>	

THIS IS UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION *Miami, Fla.*

SOURCE

1. The following US citizens were in Circular 52, Isle of Pines Prison, as of 24 Dec 59:
 - a. Robert John Gentile, age 23-00, 6'2", 150 lbs, brown eyes and hair, divorced; home address: 13517 Lakota Ave, Cleveland, Ohio. He was caught in the Copacabana Hotel, Miramar, Havana, in December 1958 for being a counterrevolutionary. He allegedly belonged to a secret anti-Castro movement. He was supposed to have helped in an uprising in the Escambray Mountains in early 1961. He is serving a 15-year prison term. He is in urgent need of medical care, has a stomach ulcer, and is losing weight daily. He has lost 70 lbs since he has been in prison. I saw him before I left. He is nothing but skin and bones.
 - b. Eustace Eubank, age 37-10, 6'0", 150 lbs, dark brown eyes and hair; married; home address: 3215 Bondfield Blvd, Baltimore, Md. He was caught on north coast of Cuba because of counterrevolutionary activities in 1961 traveling in a yacht with seven or eight other Americans. He is serving a 15 to 20-year prison term. He has lost some weight but otherwise is doing fine. I saw him and talked to him before I left.
 - c. Peter Leichter, age 21, 5'10", 175 lbs, dirty blond hair, brown eyes and nose; home address: Nassau, Bahamas. His father is an American residing in the Bahamas; his mother is English. He was an airplane pilot and water skiing and skiing instructor in the Bahamas. He was caught in the Pinar del Rio Mountains, in the summer of 1960 fighting with a group of anti-Castro guerrillas. He is not a very intelligent boy and keeps to himself. Walks with a limp caused by an airplane accident.

14-00000-1-3-10-7-1-1-1

GROUP 1
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08/01/01

... of

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

another US citizen in the Dept or St Johns Hotel in Havana in 1961 planting a telephone and wire recorder in the wall between his apartment and that of a Chinese diplomat. The engineer, I believe, was either James [unclear] or Joe Green. He is also serving a 15-year term at Isle of Pines.

3. James Lenoir, 35-40, 5'9", 175 lbs, brown eyes, black hair; home address: Box 40, 127th St, Franklinville, North Carolina. He may be the engineer who was caught with Hernandez mentioned above. He also kept to himself. His health is fair. He is also serving a 15- to 20-year term.

4. Joe Green, 30-35, 5'8", 160 lbs, brown hair and eyes; home address unknown. He is very quiet, soft-spoken, well-educated, keeps to himself. He may have been the electrical engineer who was caught with Hernandez. He is also serving a long prison term.

5. Leonardo [unclear], 41 years old, 5'8", 150 lbs, dirty blond hair, blue eyes; high school graduate; home address unknown. He is very healthy, quiet, played chess all the time, sure with the US group. He was one of the seven caught in the yacht with the US citizens on the north coast of Cuba with Dumbrant. He is serving a 15- to 20-year prison term for counterrevolutionary activities.

6. Alfred Gibson, 40-45, 5'8", 150 lbs, fair health, Southern accent, fair education. Kept with the rest of the US citizens. I believe he has also caught in the same yacht with Dumbrant. He is also serving a long prison term.

7. Richard Allen [unclear], 30-35, 5'8", 150 lbs, dark brown hair, blue eyes; home address unknown. He is completely crazy, of irrational behavior, tried to escape in one of the big trash cans. Had several ears, fits. He has been in the hospital several times. Two prisoners who are psychiatrists have been trying to help him, but in vain. He urgently needs psychiatric help. He was allegedly caught in the Esmeralda [unclear] and arrested for being a counterrevolutionary. He was caught in late 1960 or early 1961, is serving a 15-year term. Sometimes goes around all day talking to himself.

8. Walter [unclear], 35-40, 5'8", 160 lbs, brown eyes and hair, naturalized US citizen (Cuban parents). Korean War veteran. His wife (Daisy) and two daughters are residing in Miami. He is in fair health, lost a lot of weight. He was arrested in Havana in 1961 for being a counterrevolutionary.

9. Richard [unclear] (last), 30-35, 5'8", 150 lbs, light brown hair, blue eyes, Korean War veteran, a Southerner, high school education. He was also caught in the yacht with Dumbrant, who was allegedly working for Rolando [unclear]. He worked in a New York resort center before getting to Cuba.

10. These are all the US citizens that I know about who are at the Isle of Pines Prison now.

SA 5174
1163

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F-17-260

Document Description: CONFIDENTIAL

Dated: 10/2

Document Located By: DCD
OFFICE DESIGNATION

Document referred to DDO for review by: _____

RECOMMEND:

- _____ Release in full-text
- _____ Release in sanitized form
- _____ Deny in toto
- _____ Defer decision to _____
- _____ Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	<u>FOIA</u>	<u>PRIVACY</u>
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
() Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
() Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
() File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
() Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
() Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
() FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
() Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
() Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* () Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HQ-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Richard Smith
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE
DCD
May 77

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


Information reported in this report is the result of the confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency, and is not to be disseminated outside the Agency.

SECRET

COUNTRY ORIGIN	REPORT NO.	
CLASSIFICATION: Information on Cuban Activities and Operations in the Hemisphere, Office of the Director in Havana	DATE DISTR.	March 31/76
DATE ACQ.	NO. PAGES	2
DATE ACQ. REPORT	REFERENCES	<i>Beatron V...</i> <i>A-12-356-261</i> <i>Go No</i> <i>...</i>

UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

SOURCE



- The majority of the Cuban employees in the Dominican Embassy were benéfice winners of the Communist regime. However, during the time I served as secretary of the Embassy I observed that some men and women of dubious reputation entered the Embassy as political refugees. The following are those whom I consider to be undesirable: Manuel Peña, organizer of the G-2 activities in the Isle of Pines and who caused many opponents of the regime, entered the Embassy to avoid being arrested for Cuban money activities and embarrassment of public funds. Peña is an accomplished bully and terrorized the rest of the employees with his reckless display of weapons he brought into the Embassy. As far as I know he is still in the Embassy.
- Don Garza Montenegro, a hired killer who was one of the most notorious members of the army known as "Los Tigres" led by former Senator Rolando Masferrer; Evangelina Garza Masferrer, a professional gambler, who organized gambling within the Embassy of her son Enrique Garza, Jr. Garza and his son are in Miami. Manuel del Real, a notorious gambler who was in Amirio Tambo's bar and the operation of it. Enrique del Real. These two Garzas have been in Miami for some time.
- Among the suspected G-2 agents were: Wladimir Izor, an outdoor photographer of the G-2 agents, who was arrested at 377 N.W. 4th St., Miami, Florida. Donato Juan [Name obscured] was arrested in the Communist Party who is presently in the United States. Antonio [Name obscured] former member of the Communist Party also in Miami, Florida. Enrique [Name obscured] [Name obscured] and [Name obscured] who operated a business in Miami, Florida. Don Juan was a Communist organizer in the Las Vegas in Miami. Captain Willy [Name obscured] former Fidel Castro bodyguard who entered the Embassy because of his participation in the submarine Yaguajay. Enrique [Name obscured] radio host who was involved with a view of the Embassy communications. He is pilot of commercial pilot.

SECRET

Handwritten signature or initials.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

1. Isidoro Guillen, a member of a working family from Carolina de Cuba, served as president of the union during the early days of the Revolution and sent many children to the dining room. This man and his family are residing in Miami. Juan Rodriguez, a naturally unbalanced female who kept the G-2 informed concerning the employees' activities.

-cont-

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E 77-260

Document Description: CONFIDENTIAL

Dated: 5/7/77

Document Located By: DCD

(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to EDO for review by: _____

RECOMMEND:

- Release in full-text
- Release in sanitized form
- Deny in totu
- Defer decision to _____
- Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

Handwritten signature/initials

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	<u>FOIA</u>	<u>PRIVACY</u>
() Classification	(b)(1)	(b)(1)
() Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
() Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
() Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(2)(b)
() Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
() File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
() Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
() Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(2)(b)
() Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
() Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
() FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(2)(b)
() Privacy of other individual	(b)(5)	(j)(1)(f)
() Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
() Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
() Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HM-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Handwritten signature

SIGNATURE OF REVIEW OFFICER'S OFFICE
DCD
May 77

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/FICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

SUBJECT: Plan to Unite the Cuban Exiles

DATE: 5 April 1963

CLASS - 100

1. At their request, Luis S. Rodriguez met with Dr. Ricardo Rafael Sardinas, secretary of the Cuban Bene Planners Association in exile and with Juan ~~_____~~ Cuban Senator and editor of the Spanish language weekly newspaper "El Periodico del Exilio". ~~_____~~ advised that they have been working with several personalities of the exile colony in an effort to organize all the exiles into a single group which will represent all the exiles regardless of former affiliations.
2. They feel that after the sorry specifics provided by the Cuban Revolutionary Council, they must avoid getting involved in matters which are in conflict with the policies of the US Government. Therefore, they would like to discuss this project with Mr. ~~_____~~.
3. The following personalities have been approached and have indicated their desire to cooperate to the fullest extent in an effort to unite all the Cubans in exile: Antonio Manuel de Vargas, Dr. Julio Escarot, Dr. Carlos Erio, Dr. Carlos Manuel Sterling, Carlos Maria, Jose Ignacio Riquelme, Jose Alvarado Diaz, Jose ~~_____~~, Marcelino Sanchez Ortega, Luis Quiles Aguirre, Nemesio Ariza, Rosario ~~_____~~, Rosario Lizaso, Orlando Sergio Galceran, Jose Ignacio Pardo, Walter Gomez, Alfonso Aguilar, Walter Gustavo Gomez Rubio, Leobardo Diaz, Santiago Alvarez, Aban de Leon. Also included in this roster are General Genaro Gomez Arque, veteran of the War of Independence, and Fernando Rivas, leader of the Transportation Workers, because both are Negroes.
4. Representatives of the Medical Association, Bar Association, Teacher and Newspaper Associations and the Students Directory have also been contacted and indicated their desire to assist in this endeavor.
5. Arce and Sardinas stated that former President Erio indicated that former members of the Castro regime who are exiled in the US should also be invited to join because their presence in the organization will indicate to the people of Cuba that the aim of the organization is not the return to certain conditions that prevailed before 1 Jan 58. Dr. Erio pointed out that with former Nichols joining the organization the members of the Armed Forces and the militia plus the Government bureaucracy will not fear reprisals if and when the Castro regime is ousted. Dr. Erio added that with names such as Felipe Larra, Jose ~~_____~~, Rosario, Paul ~~_____~~ and even controversial Manolo Ray, the chances of success by members of the Armed Forces will increase.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E 17-260

Document Description: _____

Dated: July 1977

Document Located By: DCD

OFFICE DESIGNATION

Document referred to DDO for review by: _____

RECOMMEND:

- _____ Release in full-text
- _____ Release in sanitized form
- Deny in toto
- _____ Defer decision to _____
- _____ Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	<u>FOIA</u>	<u>PRIVACY</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1)(E)
<input type="checkbox"/> Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1)(c)
* <input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Parsons

DCD

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER'S OFFICE

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

May 77

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

16-88-46

Chief, Washington Field Office

12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OCS)

A-168946

A-168762

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Happer/Masulin telecons

A-127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of Dun and Bradstreet report as requested on Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Boston, Virginia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III. Werbell is a former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. This Agency, as well as other government agencies, have considerable information on Werbell. He is an old and unsavory, unsolicited, contact of the Miami Field Office dating from 1959. He is of dubious character and reputation who had and has been involved in grandiose schemes and international arms deals. He has had perpetual financial difficulties.

3. Werbell was involved with Rolando Masferrer Senior, in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion in 1967. This may throw a different light on possible source development of young Rolando Jr. Any approach to him should be executed with some degree of caution. We do not desire to get involved with Werbell. However, we cannot foresee any objection to planned debriefings of Masferrer Jr., following his trips to Latin America and other areas, in pursuit of FPI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment

114

cc: Services Division (Control)

FILED: BR 23880

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

CLASSIFIED BY 42-1445

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE BY (1), (2), (3) or (4)

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Control / Paul
C. Washington
28 Jul 72
Jhr

16-88-46

7 July 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

A 158846

SUBJECT: Assessment of Recruitability - Rolando Masferrer, Jr.
Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corporation
and Associated with Defense Systems Incorporated

A168762

1. Subject seems to have inherited that particular Latin American penchant for involvement in covert political activities. However, the Subject's involvement is not merely pastime or recreation but it is instead intimately connected with his chosen profession as an arms salesman. Here the phrase "for fun and profit" seems aptly suited. He seems to be a man of action with the ability to exploit an opportunity, rather than a towering intellect.

2. Subject has excellent contacts and access in Latin America. This access developed from his extended family, professional appointments, and his involvement with Cuban exile groups. His family is well-known (infamous) throughout many sectors of Latin America and opens many doors for him (although it also closes others). It should also be mentioned that his family has recently developed a rather checkered association with this Agency. The particular nature of his military products gives him contact with high military, police, and security officials throughout Latin America. He seems to be well versed on the status of various arms deals (both official and under-the-table) in the countries he travels. He has been involved with several Cuban exile political and para-military organizations.

3. Politically, Subject is a staunch anti-Communist. This position is probably ingrained from his family, but also reinforced from his various political and professional activities. He has voiced a particular hatred for Cuban Communists. He seems to view them not as respected enemies, but as hated traitors. He is vehemently anti-Castro.


1c

4. Subject has developed what could be interpreted as a certain patriotism for this country. During conversations he referred a few times to "my country" meaning the U.S. I believe that the fact he volunteered for U.S. military training reflects not only the selfish motives of becoming Special Forces qualified but also a sense of duty. I also believe that his recent statements to me regarding international security matters is not merely empty loquacity but is evidence of his desire to contribute something and become involved in the national interest.

5. Subject would need sober briefings on the responsibility of any Agency association as well as subsequent careful handling. He would need to get away from the "Flagler Street Commando syndrome" of visual and verbal bravado. He would need instruction to discern rumor from fact, to identify sources, and to assess the reliability of acquired information.

6. I am sure that the Subject is recruitable. The question is what degree of association with the Agency would be appropriate. If the decision is made to approach the Subject, may I suggest that his association be initially limited to Agency briefings and debriefings before and after his trips to Latin America. Once his reliability is established and the accuracy of his reporting is proven then further utilization may be possible. Since his financial situation seems to be secure I am sure he could be handled on a non-pay basis.

7. Subject is scheduled to leave on a two-week business trip to Venezuela and Colombia beginning in early August 1972. He claimed to have appointments with a Venezuelan Air Force General and with Venezuelan national security officials in DISIP.



Chief, Washington Field Office

16 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

Rolando Masferrer, Jr. - Possible Source Lead

1. Attached for your information and whatever interest you may have in this source lead from WH/3/Venezuela

2. On the basis of the information submitted, Mr. Masferrer, Jr., may be a useful source of FPI.

3. Suggest you arrange contact to obtain routine biographic data to initiate security checks; determine his intelligence potential and explain the DCS mission, without revealing in any way the past relationship with Mr. Peterson. Subject's personality profile appears to be very interesting.

4. It appears that the Clandestine Service is not repeat not interested in subject's operational potential at this time. We leave this in your capable hands to determine what course of action you may wish to contemplate in this matter.

JAMES R. MURPHY

[redacted] /daa
cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed: HH 23880

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
DATE: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER, Jr.

1. Please be informed of a possible future contact--Rolando MASFERRER, Jr., recently promoted to Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Washington D.C. office, 905 L' Enfant Plaza, #4020. He is also associated with Parabellum Corporation, another military weapons firm. Subject, born approximately 1945, in Habana, Cuba, is believed to be a naturalized citizen.
2. Subject makes frequent sales trips to Latin America. Because of the nature of his main product(machine pistols with silencers) he has good access to top Latin American governmental officials and military and security officers. He has personally met many Latin American presidents. He should be a good source of information on the current status of arms sales in Latin America; internal security, military armament levels, order-of-battle, and internal politics in host countries; and, if needed, status of Cuban exile movement. He is presently on a sales mission to Colombia and is scheduled to return in mid-June.
3. MASFERRER, Jr. has been a Miami resident since 1959 and more recently lived in Atlanta. He will permanently locate in the Washington, D.C. area when he returns from his Colombian trip.
4. Subject is not to be confused with his father by the same name, the infamous Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER y Rojas(201-42669). Masferrer Sr. was a former Cuban Senator and leader of a dreaded private army of Batista enforcers called "Los Tigres(The Tigers)". He is presently serving in a U.S. federal prison for attempting to organize a 1957 invasion of Haiti in order to set up a base of operations against Cuba. Masferrer Sr., violently anti-Castro, was involved in numerous Cuban exile operations against Cuba during the last decade.
5. I was Subject's Commanding Officer in the Florida National Guard and sometimes saw him socially while in Miami. Although Cuban by birth, he now feels that he is an American. Politically anti-Communist, he joined the National Guard(while not under duress from the draft) to become a "Green Beret." He is polite and correct in his social relationships. I received a letter from him, 7 June 1972, informing me of his impending move to the Washington, D.C. area. He

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

solicited my aid in finding a local army reserve unit.

6. If you are interested in exploring this possibility further, please feel free to contact me at any time. I could suggest cautions and method of contact or introduction. Subject is unwitting of my Agency employment.



WH/3/V

Orig. & 2

SECRET

SECRET

Chief, Washington Field Office

28 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

B-67-52

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead

168846

REFERENCES: A) Memorandum for the Record dated 12 June 1972; Same Subject
B) Van Happer/Masulin telecon

1. In regard to referent telephone conversation of recent date, we asked [redacted] (WH/3/Venezuela) for additional information regarding [redacted], Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Headquartered in Georgia.

2. [redacted] is a young "career trainee" who has been with the Agency for about six months. He met Masferrer in Miami, Florida, where both belonged to a Florida National Guard Unit. [redacted] knows Masferrer socially as well having met frequently for "snacks and beer".

3. According to [redacted] based on his observations, subject is a personable, intelligent, individual who appears trustworthy, and of sound mind and judgment. He is a solid citizen completely assimilated in the American mainstream; intensely interested in the U.S. political processes. Politically, he is of moderate conservative persuasion. He is an astute businessman of demonstrated ability and integrity. To highlight this point, [redacted] mentioned that Masferrer spurned lucrative cash offers for "under the table" deals to engage in illegal weapons trade in Latin America. He refused these offers to operate in legitimate business circles.

4. Young Rolando takes a sociable drink; has no known bad habits. He has a keen eye for attractive females, but no more so than all healthy males. [redacted] said he would not hesitate to recommend subject for a position of trust and confidence.

5. Rolando Masferrer, Jr. served with the Green Berets, elite U.S. Army unit whose members require special security clearances by the military.

6. [redacted] underlined his previous statement that Rolando should not be confused with his father, Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious "Los Tigres", the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

-2-

7. [] believed, and we are inclined to agree, that Bolando Jr., may be a good candidate for source development. He will be located at 905 L'Enfant Plaza, Washington, D.C., as the representative of Military Armaments Co. He will also represent Parabellum Corporation another military weapons firm.

8. Dun and Bradstreet reports were requested from New York and a copy will be forwarded when received.

JAMES R. MURPHY

[]/lla
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HH 2380
23880

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS																											
FOR FIELD USE ONLY										FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY																	
A. FIELD OFFICE				B. REQ. CODE				C. CASE NUMBER		FORWARDED			REPORT NO.			J U O											
1	2	3	4	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	MO.	DA.	YR.	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	21	22	23
X M I M				00400						07103			2026573														
D. SUBJECT AND AREA															EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD		RELEASED										
Guillermo Iglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Allied Agency Auspices															37 38 39		MO. DA. YR.			74 75 76							
(Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala)																	07163										
E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)										INDIVIDUAL NO.		45 TYPE OO-E		46 NOT DISSEMINATED													
Rolando MASFERRER 6080 W. Flagler Avenue Miami, Florida												GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER															
F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)										ORGANIZATION NO.		SUBJECT			AREA												
Same												1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN			51 52 53 54												
G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)										INDIVIDUAL NO.		5 S O C		4. OTHER/MISC													
												6 G E O		5. COMBINED WITH													
H. METHOD OF COLLECTION										EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM		USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)		RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS													
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INTERVIEW <input type="checkbox"/> TRIP REPORT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER DOCUMENT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (specify below)												NO															
												TO USSR		WH													
												FROM USSR															
DIRECTED TO					ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER		HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS																
					X						HH 25263 WH/CG/OS 49 46 ANN CIVIS 40/KMS 1-040 Yglesias is certainly a fraud and should come to the attention of the FBI and police authorities. Masferrer should also be known to your office since we sent some background info on him to Miami F.O. He is a slick operator. Being cautious in your dealings with him.																
FIELD COMMENTS										C. CHIEF					DIVISION/STAFF/DESK												
Our [redacted] colleagues wish us to report on Iglesias and record these developments.										DEW					[Signature]												

FORM 7-69 25

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

(20-41)



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. []

DATE

COUNTRY Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala

NO. PAGES 2

SUBJECT Guillermo Iglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Alleged Agency Auspices

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

1. On 26 June 1973 the [] Office responded to a call on the listed line from a man who identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. Mr. Masferrer requested to meet with [] of the [] Office. Mr. Masferrer said that he had some information concerning one Guillermo Iglesias (subject of [] that would prove to be of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency. Rolando Masferrer lives at 6080 W. Flazler Avenue, Miami, Florida. As a result of his request [] and [] of the [] Office responded to the call and met with Rolando Masferrer that afternoon.
2. Mr. Masferrer related details of his relationship with one Guillermo Iglesias, age about 38, an individual on whom there are other Agency references. According to Masferrer, Iglesias approached him in late March 1973 and identified himself as working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Iglesias said that he was trying to raise a large sum of money to finance secret CIA operations. Iglesias said that CIA funds have been tied up as a result of the Watergate affair. He referred to these operations as black operations. Mr. Masferrer said that he knew several high ranking government officials in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Masferrer contacted several of these friends in South America and asked them to aid the Central Intelligence Agency in raising funds for secret operations in South America and the Caribbean. Masferrer has contacted Manuel Vega, a retired Colombian army colonel and presently head of the Colombian Internal Police. He has also contacted one Alvaro Vargas, who is an advisor in arrements to the Colombian National Police. Masferrer also passed Iglesias the name of Carlos Chari, head of the Venezuela Internal Police. Iglesias showed a great interest in small arms of all types. Masferrer said that he personally turned over five M-26 fragmentation hand grenades, one M-16 automatic rifle, one AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, and several handguns 38 caliber type. Masferrer was led to believe that the weapons would be used in a secret CIA operation in Puerto Rico. This operation was described by Iglesias as a black operation.
3. During our conversation with Masferrer, he raised an additional point. Masferrer said that he contacted Manuel Vega in Colombia and that Vega agreed to help all that he could. Vega expressed deep concern to

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

Classified by: 007627
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(7). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

SECRET

-2-

Manferrer because, according to him, any time the US Embassy people in Bogota were passed information the Colombian guerrillas were somehow informed. Vain told Manferrer that he believed a leak had developed in the US Embassy and that the "Embassy boys" could no longer be trusted.

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

SECRET



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. [redacted]

DATE 26 May 1973

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

NO. PAGES 1

SUBJECT Possible False Recruitment Effort

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

1. At 1700 hours on 14 May 1973 the [redacted] Office received a telephone call on the listed line from an individual who ultimately identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. It is believed that Masferrer is identical with former Cuban senator and Batista associate Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is of dubious reputation and is well known for several nefarious actions in Haiti, Guatemala and perhaps elsewhere. Rolando Masferrer was convicted of conspiracy to invade Haiti in 1967. It is believed that there are extensive Agency files on Rolando Masferrer.
2. Masferrer was very reluctant to provide details, but finally said he could be reached at local telephone 261-3689. A separate check reveals this number to be registered to Daniel Bermudez, 6080 W. Flagler, Apartment #17.
3. In any event the listed line caller indicated that he had been approached by one Guillermo Iglesias and asked to engage in certain activities which he did not further describe. According to Masferrer, Iglesias carried credentials or other identifying material which seemed to link him with the U.S. Coast Guard in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Masferrer said, however, that Iglesias indicated also that he was in some way representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Masferrer then said that the purpose of the telephone call was to check on the bona fides of Guillermo Iglesias.
4. Masferrer was told that the name Guillermo Iglesias meant nothing to the [redacted] Office and was otherwise given a rather non-committal response.

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

Classified by: 007672
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: 1B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONFIDENTIAL

16-88-46

Chief, Washington Field Office

12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

A-168846

A-168762

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Happer, [] telecons

A 127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of Dun and Bradstreet report as requested on Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Powder Springs, Georgia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III. Werbell is a former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. This Agency, as well as other government agencies, have considerable information on Werbell. He is an old and unsavory, unsolicited, contact of the Miami Field Office dating from 1959. He is of dubious character and reputation who had and has been involved in grandiose schemes and international arms deals. He has had perpetual financial difficulties.

3. Werbell was involved with Rolando Masferrer Senior, in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion in 1967. This may throw a different light on possible source development of young Rolando Jr. Any approach to him should be executed with some degree of caution. We do not desire to get involved with Werbell. However, we cannot foresee any objection to planned debriefings of Masferrer Jr., following his trips to Latin America and other areas, in pursuit of PFI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment

[]/11A

cc: Services Division (Control)

FILED: HM 23880

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

CLASSIFIED BY 42-1445

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE BY (1), (2), (3) OR (4)

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F 77-260

Document Description: _____

Dated: 10 June 1977

Document Located By: DCD

(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: _____

RECOMMEND:

- _____ Release in full-text
- _____ Release in sanitized form
- _____ Deny in toto
- _____ Defer decision to _____
- _____ Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1)(f)
<input type="checkbox"/> Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1)(c)
* <input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HX-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Rev. 9/24/77 DCD
 SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE
May 77

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PIGC)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Chief, Washington Field Office

16-88-152
16 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

Rolando Masferrer, Jr. - Possible Source Lead *A*

1. Attached for your information and whatever interest you may have in this source lead from HH/3/Vcaezuela
[redacted]

2. On the basis of the information submitted, Mr. Masferrer, Jr., may be a useful source of FPI.

3. Suggest you arrange contact to obtain routine biographic data to initiate security checks; determine his intelligence potential and explain the DCS mission, without revealing in any way the past relationship with [redacted]. Subject's personality profile appears to be very interesting.


4. It appears that the Clandestine Service is not repeat not interested in subject's operational potential at this time. We leave this in your capable hands to determine what course of action you may wish to contemplate in this matter.

JAMES H. MURPHY

[redacted] /das
cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed: HH 23880

SECRET



UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F 77-260

Document Description: _____

Dated: _____

Document Located By: DCD

OFFICE DESIGNATION

Document referred to DDO for review by: _____

RECOMMEND:

- Release in full-text
- Release in sanitized form
- Deny in toto
- Defer decision to _____
- Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release.

Administrative review

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
(*) Classification	(b) (1)	(*) (1)
() Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
() Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
(*) Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
(*) Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
(*) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
(*) Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
(*) File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
() Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
(*) Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
() Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1) (b)
() FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
(*) Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1) (f)
() Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
() Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1) (c)
*() Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HM-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Red 5/11/77

 SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE
DCD
May 77

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PIGG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

SECRET

Chief, Washington Field Office

28 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

B-67-52

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead

A #
Y68846

REFERENCES: A) Memorandum for the Record dated 12 June 1972; Same Subject
B) Van Hopper, [redacted] telecon

1. In regard to referent telephone conversation of recent date, [redacted] (info/summary) for additional assessment information on Rolando Masferrer, Jr., Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Georgia.

2. [redacted] is a young "career trainee" who has been with the Agency for about six months. He met Masferrer in Miami, Florida, where both belonged to a Florida National Guard Unit. Peterson knows Masferrer socially as well having met frequently for "snacks and beer".

3. According to [redacted] based on his observations, subject is a personable, intelligent, individual who appears trustworthy, and of sound mind and judgment. He is a solid citizen completely assimilated in the American mainstream; intensely interested in the U.S. political processes. Politically, he is of moderate conservative persuasion. He is an astute businessman of demonstrated ability and integrity. To highlight this point, [redacted] mentioned that Masferrer spurned lucrative cash offers for "under the table" deals to engage in illegal weapons trade in Latin America. He refused these offers to operate in legitimate business circles.

4. Young Rolando takes a sociable drink; has no known bad habits. He has a keen eye for attractive females, but no more so than all healthy males. [redacted] said he would not hesitate to recommend subject for a position of trust and confidence.

5. Rolando Masferrer, Jr. served with the Green Berets, elite U.S. Army unit whose members require special security clearances by the military.

6. [redacted] underlined his previous statement that Rolando should not be confused with his father, Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious "Los Tigres", the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

-2-

7. [redacted] believed, and we are inclined to agree, that Rolando Jr., may be a good candidate for source development. He will be located at 905 L'Enfant Plaza, Washington, D.C., as the representative of Military Armaments Co. He will also represent Parabellum Corporation another military weapons firm.

8. Dun and Bradstreet reports were requested from New York and a copy will be forwarded when received.

JAMES R. MURPHY

[redacted] 11d
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HM 2380
23820

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: Memo

Dated: 12 June 1972

Document Located By: DCB
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

7 July 1972 (2)
6 July 1972

Document referred to DDO for review by: _____

RECOMMEND:

- ____ Release in full-text
____ Release in sanitized form
____ Deny in toto
 Defer decision to W.H. Duce
____ Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	<u>FOIA</u>	<u>PRIVACY</u>
() Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
() Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
() Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
() Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
() File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
() Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
() Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
() Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1) (b)
() FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
() Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1) (f)
() Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
() Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1) (c)
* () Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5343, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Paul Cliff
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER'S OFFICE

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET TOP SECRET

6 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

1. On Monday, 3 July 1972, from 2100 to 2400 hours at Clyde's Bar, Washington, D.C.; and Tuesday, 4 July 1972, from 1800 to 1900 hours, poolside, 7625 Matera St., Apt. 201, Falls Church, Virginia, the undersigned talked with Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

2. I mentioned to Masferrer that my superiors (supposedly in the State Department) were interested that some responsible U.S. Government authority be informed of his story regarding U.S. citizen involvement in drug trafficking and guerrilla training in Mexico. Masferrer said that last February he told the story up to that date to Miami, F.B.I. Agent Bob Dyer, and also certain information to U.S. Customs Bureau Agent Buchanan (fnu). Masferrer said he had not informed any government entities of events subsequent to February. I mentioned that such information was not necessarily within the unique purview of the State Department, but that my superiors would probably be interested in anything further.

3. Rolando Masferrer, Jr., related to me four different occasions when an insurgent organization, "Force Seven", comprised of American adventurers in Mexico, was brought to his attention.

4. The first time the Subject heard of "Force Seven" was from Francisco BRAVO (or Brabo) [NFI], Chief of Judicial Police, State of Morelos. Subject had met Bravo "a few years ago". They met again in Atlanta, Georgia, late December 1971, when Bravo came for a weapons demonstration at the Military Armament Corp, Powder Springs, Georgia, some 20 miles outside Atlanta. Bravo told Masferrer of the insurgency problem in the Mexican states of Morelos and Guerrero. Bravo mentioned the existence of "Force Seven". Bravo indicated his police

CLASSIFIED BY...51-1391

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652, EXCEPTION CATEGORY:
EX(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)

25880

needed weapons to fight the insurgents and subsequently invited Masferrer and Arnaldo Alliegro (son of a former Cuban Senator, naturalized citizen, and Masferrer's partner in Farabundo Corporation) to come to Mexico. Bravo promised to introduce Masferrer and Alliegro to Mexican police authorities competent to purchase firearms.

5. Subject again heard the name "Force Seven" in Miami, January 1972, from Otilio CASTANEDA Pais, former First Vice-President of the Guatemalan Congress. [Castaneda was head of the Guatemalan civilian counter-insurgency forces in the Zacapa region during 1957-60, and, according to Masferrer, the chief of the Mano Blanco. Castaneda was killed 12 June 1972. The Guatemalan insurgent group, F.A.R., "took credit" for the killing.] Castaneda was travelling to the U.S. with Messero, Sandoval and Figarola. [Probably Mario SANDOVAL Alarcón, President of the Guatemalan Congress and head of the U.L.M. party; and Aivaro CUEVAS Figarola, Castaneda's predecessor as First Vice-President of Congress. Several TRCS reports during January and February 1972

indicated Cuevas Figarola was trying to smuggle arms from the U.S. to Guatemala supposedly for a planned coup in Costa Rica] Masferrer said Castaneda was trying to arrange the release from U.S. Federal prison Rolando Masferrer, Sr. Castaneda wanted Masferrer, Sr., to emigrate to Guatemala to become involved in state security matters and also to organize an anti-Communist army. Castaneda mentioned to Masferrer, Jr., the growing insurgency problems in the Peten area of Guatemala. Castaneda mentioned that U.S. insurgents operating under the name "Force Seven" entered the Peten from Mexico. The Guatemalan Army's Mariscal Zavala Brigade had been dispatched from Guatemala City to the Mexican border in Peten province to counter the infiltration, but had recently been shifted to the border adjacent British Honduras. Masferrer said Castaneda believed that former U.S. "Green Berets" were involved with the insurgents. Castaneda said that a list of all U.S. Special Forces-trained Guatemalans had disappeared when the U.S. military training mission was terminated. Now the guerrillas in Guatemala are pinpointing those U.S. trained, local military personnel with uncanny accuracy. From that evidence, Castaneda believed that "Force Seven" must include some of the U.S. "Green Berets" that had originally trained the local Guatemalan military.

2
SECRET

23880

3

6. During the first three months of 1972, Subject made two trips to Mexico. During his first trip, three weeks in late January and February, Masferrer travelled with Allegro and Mitchell Werbell (Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, 261-259010, former GIC member in S-2-1 in World War II; former President of Military Armament Corporation; and presently associated with Defense Systems Incorporated, Pender Springs, Georgia.) In Mexico City, Francisco Bravo introduced the Agent to Mexico City Police Chief Santos (Daniel GUTIERREZ Santos) and Miguel NAZAR Hero, "Chief of Political Police". [Actually Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, DFS, a political and intelligence organization working within the Secretariat of Government.] During conversations Nazar admitted Mexico's insurgency problems and specifically named "Force Seven". Masferrer mentioned that both Nazar and Gutierrez Santos were angry with President Echeverria because of the Mexican Government's policy of light criminal punishment and short prison terms for bandits and/or guerrillas painstakingly captured by the police.

7. Bravo took the three to Cuernavaca where he showed them a house on the outskirts of the city that the police used for unofficial detentions and heavy-handed interrogations. Bravo complained that the local Catholic Archbishop was implicated with the insurgents as well as certain U.S. film personalities who vacation in the American community in Cuernavaca. Bravo also implicated a professor that was kidnapped in Guerrero in late 1971. Bravo believed that the professor [Jaime CASTREJON Diaz, Rector of the University of Guerrero] actually conspired with the insurgents for his own kidnapping in order to raise the ransom money for the insurgent movement. [The ransom was finally paid by President Echeverria.]

8. Subject travelled again to Mexico in March 1972 with Bernardo DE TORRES. [Mexico 2038, 4 December 1969, mentions that LYTENPO-12, WH/MIAMI, received a phone call from one Bernardo De Torres regarding a supposed Swiss contraband arms dealer in Mexico City.] Nazari had invited Masferrer to return to Mexico to go on a "hunting party", that is, to participate in an actual counter-insurgency operation. Masferrer and De Torres arrived in Acapulco and were met by Bravo. They travelled by police vehicle for about an hour east of Acapulco to an area near La Treintas (NFI).

- 3 -

SECRET

23850

SECRET

Just before they arrived they heard on the police radio that the Army had just "shot down" a twin-engine Beachcraft. When they arrived, a search of the wreckage yielded a few weapons. A short firefight (about 15 minutes) ensued with insurgents that left two soldiers dead. Masferrer said he did not know the number of insurgent casualties. One insurgent was captured along with his .45 caliber pistol.

9. The captured insurgent turned out to be a U.S. citizen, white, male, approximately 27 years old. (Masferrer claimed he forgot the prisoner's name, but that he had it in Miami.) Bravo did not trust the Acapulco or the Guerrero state police and had his men take the prisoner to the detention house outside of Cuernavaca. Masferrer said he witnessed the interrogation in which the prisoner's head was repeatedly dunked in a rain barrel to make him talk. The prisoner eventually revealed the following information about "Force Seven": participating Americans were ex-ranger, airborne, Marine or Special Forces types, many with Vietnam combat experience. They were armed with CAR-15 (M-16) rifles and some had M-79 grenade launchers. Other Americans operated elsewhere in Latin America. "Force Seven" provided training to the insurgents and, whenever possible, supplied weapons. In return, the Americans were paid in money and drugs, mostly marijuana, but some cocaine. Masferrer said no heroin was mentioned. The prisoner said the insurgents used the money from the drug smuggling to finance operations. Bank robberies had become increasingly difficult since the Army began posting armed guards at area banks. The prisoner said he had worked under Genaro VASQUEZ [Mexico's infamous bandit-turned-guerrilla; killed in a car accident last February]. The prisoner put guerrilla strength at about 2,000 men. Masferrer, however, said Bravo felt that figure to be high. The prisoner also mentioned that some of the insurgents had previously received guerrilla training in North Korea.

10. Masferrer said that later, upon Nazar's orders, the American prisoner was shot and killed. The whole affair was never reported in the local press because, according to Masferrer, such information, if revealed, would damage the area's tourist trade.

SECRET 23880

SECRET

12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER, Jr.

1. Please be informed of a possible future contact--Rolando MASFERRER, Jr., recently promoted to Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Washington D.C. office, 905 L' Enfant Plaza, #4020. He is also associated with Parabellum Corporation, another military weapons firm. Subject, born approximately 1945, in Habana, Cuba, is believed to be a naturalized citizen.
2. Subject makes frequent sales trips to Latin America. Because of the nature of his main product (machine pistols with silencers) he has good access to top Latin American governmental officials and military and security officers. He has personally met many Latin American presidents. He should be a good source of information on the current status of arms sales in Latin America; internal security, military armament levels, order-of-battle, and internal politics in host countries; and, if needed, status of Cuban exile movement. He is presently on a sales mission to Colombia and is scheduled to return in mid-June.
3. MASFERRER, Jr. has been a Miami resident since 1959 and more recently lived in Atlanta. He will permanently locate in the Washington, D.C. area when he returns from his Colombian trip.
4. Subject is not to be confused with his father by the same name, the infamous Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER y Rojas (201-42669). Masferrer Sr. was a former Cuban Senator and leader of a dreaded private army of Batista enforcers called "Los Tigres (The Tigers)". He is presently serving in a U.S. federal prison for attempting to organize a 1967 invasion of Haiti in order to set up a base of operations against Cuba. Masferrer Sr., violently anti-Castro, was involved in numerous Cuban exile operations against Cuba during the last decade.
5. I was Subject's Commanding Officer in the Florida National Guard and sometimes saw him socially while in Miami. Although Cuban by birth, he now feels that he is an American. Politically anti-Communist, he joined the National Guard (while not under duress from the draft) to become a "Green Beret." He is polite and correct in his social relationships. I received a letter from him, 7 June 1972, informing me of his impending move to the Washington, D.C. area. He

SECRET

SECRET

solicited my aid in finding a local army reserve unit.

6. If you are interested in exploring this possibility further, please feel free to contact me at any time. I could suggest cautions and method of contact or introduction. Subject is unwitting of my Agency employment.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WR/3/V

Orig. & 2

Central / same
cc Washington
28 Jul 72
LHM

16-88-46

7 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

A 168846

SUBJECT: Assessment of Recruitability - Rolando Masferrer, Jr.
Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corporation
and Associated with Defense Systems Incorporated

A 168762

1. Subject seems to have inherited that particular Latin American penchant for involvement in covert political activities. However, the Subject's involvement is not merely operative or reactionary but it is instead intimately connected with his chosen profession as an arms salesman. Here the phrase "for fun and profit" seems aptly suited. He seems to be a man of action with the ability to exploit an opportunity, rather than a towering intellect.

2. Subject has excellent contacts and access in Latin America. This access developed from his extended family, professional appointments, and his involvement with Cuban exile groups. His family is well-known (infamous) throughout many sectors of Latin America and opens many doors for him (although it also closes others). It should also be mentioned that his family has recently developed a rather checkered association with this Agency. The particular nature of his military products gives him contact with high military, police, and security officials throughout Latin America. He seems to be well versed on the status of various arms deals (both official and under-the-table) in the countries he travels. He has been involved with several Cuban exile political and para-military organizations.

3. Politically, Subject is a staunch anti-Communist. This position is probably ingrained from his family, but also reinforced from his various political and professional activities. He has voiced a particular hatred for Cuban Communists. He seems to view them not as respected enemies, but as hated traitors. He is vehemently anti-Castro.


6-139

4. Subject has developed what could be interpreted as a certain patriotism for this country. During conversations he referred a few times to "my country" meaning the U.S. I believe that the fact he volunteered for U.S. military training reflects not only the selfish motives of becoming Special Forces qualified but also a sense of duty. I also believe that his recent statements to me regarding international security matters is not merely empty loquacity but is evidence of his desire to contribute something and become involved in the national interest.

5. Subject would need sober briefings on the responsibility of any Agency association as well as subsequent careful handling. He would need to get away from the "Flagler Street Commando syndrome" of visual and verbal bravado. He would need instruction to discern rumor from fact, to identify sources, and to assess the reliability of acquired information.

6. I am sure that the Subject is recruitable. The question is what degree of association with the Agency would be appropriate. If the decision is made to approach the Subject, may I suggest that his association be initially limited to Agency briefings and debriefings before and after his trips to Latin America. Once his reliability is established and the accuracy of his reporting is proven then further utilization may be possible. Since his financial situation seems to be secure I am sure he could be handled on a non-pay basis.

7. Subject is scheduled to leave on a two-week business trip to Venezuela and Colombia beginning in early August 1972. He claimed to have appointments with a Venezuelan Air Force General and with Venezuelan national security officials in DISIP.



7 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Conversation with
Rafaelo Masferrer, Jr.

1. On Sunday, 2 July 1973, from 1800 to 2000 hours at the Shanghai Restaurant, Arlington, Va., I met with Rafaelo Masferrer, Jr. (Masferrer is admitting of my former employment. My cover story is that I am a Program Officer with the State Department. I supposedly work in a research capacity for the American Republics Area until the time I can be programmed to enter the next Foreign Service Institute class.)

2. Masferrer and I, old National Guard comrades, had not seen one another for 5 months. We had dinner and later went on a tour of apartment sites in the District and northern Virginia. During the course of the conversation, he related the events of his trips to Mexico and his recent trip (June 1972) to Colombia in the course of his job as Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corp.

Mexico: Subject mentioned the trouble the Mexican Government is having with leftist guerrillas, particularly in two western states. He claimed the rebels were being trained in part by U.S. adventurers who claimed to be ex-ranger, airborne Marine or Special Forces types, many with Vietnam experience. The Americans were training the rebels in return for money and marijuana and a piece of the drug smuggling action. The Americans operated under the non de guerre "Force Seven". This same "Force Seven" claimed to have connections and affiliations in Guatemala. Subject claimed even to have participated in a small firefight with the Mexican Army and the Judicial Police against the guerrillas in an effort to prove the worth of his particular military products.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY 51-1391

SECRET

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652, EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE (1) (2) (3) or (4) (with one or more)

23880

SECRET

Colombia: Subject mentioned Colombia's increasing alarm with the problems of drug trafficking within the country. While in Colombia he claimed to have spoken in the house of his family friend MG Jaime FERNANDEZ, Chief of Staff of the Colombian Army.

2. The entire conversation was kept on the level of buddies swapping war stories. Subject, however, swore to the veracity of his statements. I mentioned that the State Department was currently interested in the problems of drug trafficking in Latin America and maybe there would be some interest in pursuing the matter further. I also indicated I would ask my superiors at the State Department if they had ever heard anything about the existence of a "Force Seven" or anything of the various activities of U.S. adversaries, drug smuggling, and leftist guerrilla movements in Mexico.

3. On Monday, 3 July 1972, I coordinated with the following people at Headquarters:

[redacted], Acting Desk Chief, Colombia
RICHARD WOODRIF and John Murray, Branch 1, Mexico
[redacted], C/WH/PI
[redacted] WH/NARC

Their collective suggestions and instructions were:

- a. Go slow on efforts to elicit information so not to arouse suspicions of Agency involvement.
- b. Find out any information regarding the Colombian Army's E-2 battalion, U.S. citizen's involvement in drug trafficking in Latin America (names, dates, and places), Cuban involvement in cocaine traffic, and any ties between leftist guerrillas and drug smuggling.
- c. Write a memorandum and Subject evaluation (where he works, where he goes, who he meets, and an assessment of recruitability).

- 2 -

SECRET

23880

SECRET

4. I made arrangements to meet McFerror again
the evening of 3 July 1972 and the afternoon of 4 July
1972.



SECRET

23880

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/EE Request No. E-17-260

Document Description: 7-15-1977

Dated: 21 May 1977

Document Located By: DCD

OFFICE DESIGNATION

Document referred to DDO for review by: _____

RECOMMEND:

- Release in full-text
- Release in sanitized form
- Deny in toto
- Defer decision to _____
- Coordination with _____ prior to above denial/release

*as per the CIA request
to request for info on the
subject*

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Classification	(b) (3)	(b) (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (c)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1) (L)
<input type="checkbox"/> Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1) (c)
* <input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HM-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Robert Elliott DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE
May 77

Document No. _____
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

F-16-88-46

SECRET

OSS-820-73
31 May 1973

Chief, [redacted] Office

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Support Division/OSS)

Rolando Masferrer

REF :

[redacted]

ROLANDO MASFERRER

1. Attached for your information and background orientation is some material pertaining to Rolando Masferrer, who appears to be identical to subject of reference.

2. Subject should not be confused with his uncle by the same name, the infamous Rolando Masferrer y Rojas (erroneously reported as father of subject). The elder Masferrer was imprisoned in 1967 for organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Haiti. Young Masferrer may be engaged in dubious activity and contact with him should be viewed with cautious circumspection. He may be on a "fishing expedition" to obtain some information on Guillermo Iglesias; or he may be seeking to cement an affiliation with the Agency via the Miami Field Office. Masferrer may not be the good guy that the attached material represents him to be. He is known to be a wheeling and dealing fast dollar artist. Should he volunteer any information in the future, please note it, and send it to Headquarters. Of specific interest would be any information he may provide on narcotic trafficking and those involved in this illicit trade.

3. DDO has no interest in young Masferrer. If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

JAMES R. HUPPHY

Attachment

[redacted] ds

cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed HH 23880

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

DATE 25 May 1973

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

NO. PAGES 1

SUBJECT Possible False Recruitment Effort

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

1. At 1750 hours on 14 May 1973 the [REDACTED] Office received a telephone call on the listed line from an individual who ultimately identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. It is believed that Masferrer is identical with former Cuban senator and Batista associate Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is of dubious reputation and is well known for several nefarious actions in Haiti, Guatemala and perhaps elsewhere. Rolando Masferrer was convicted of conspiracy to invade Haiti in 1967. It is believed that there are extensive Agency files on Rolando Masferrer.
2. Masferrer was very reluctant to provide details, but finally said he could be reached at local telephone 251-3639. A separate check reveals this number to be registered to Faustel Bernades, 6030 N. Flagler, Apartment 917.
3. In any event the listed line caller indicated that he had been approached by one Guillermo Iglesias and asked to engage in certain activities which he did not further describe. According to Masferrer, Iglesias carried credentials or other identifying material which seemed to link him with the U.S. Coast Guard in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Masferrer said, however, that Iglesias indicated also that he was in some way representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Masferrer then said that the purpose of the telephone call was to check on the bona fides of Guillermo Iglesias.
4. Masferrer was told that the name Guillermo Iglesias meant nothing to the Miami Field Office and was otherwise given a rather non-committal response.

- end -

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY				FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY																											
A. FIELD OFFICE				B. RECORDS				C. CASE NUMBER				D. FORWARDING				E. J. U. O.															
1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38				
XBBIH				00400				07103				2026373																			
D. SUBJECT AND AREA												EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD				RELEASED															
Guillermo Yglesias/Attempts to Raise Money Under Agency Suspense												3/30/35				MO. DA YR. 20 41 42 43 44															
(Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala)																07/1/3															
E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)												INDIVIDUAL NO.				TYPE CODE				FOR DISSEMINATED											
Rolando MASPERER 6030 W. Flagler Avenue Miami, Florida																GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER															
F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)												ORGANIZATION NO.				SUBJECT				AREA											
Same																1. SUPPORT CENTER				51 52 53 54											
												INDIVIDUAL NO.				C. E. U. O.				1. S. O. V.											
																1. S. A. I.				2. P. I. N. T.											
																2. P. O. L.				3. D. S.											
																3. H. I. L.				4. E. T. H. E. R. / M. I. S. C.											
																4. - - -				5. C. O. M. B. I. N. E. D. W. I. T. H.											
																5. S. O. C.				6. E. T. H. E. R. / M. I. S. C.											
																6. G. E. O.				7. E. T. H. E. R. / M. I. S. C.											
																7. H. I. O.				8. E. T. H. E. R. / M. I. S. C.											
																8. - - -				9. E. T. H. E. R. / M. I. S. C.											
																9. Y. I. S.															
H. METHOD OF COLLECTION												EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM				USSR ONLY EXCEPTS (CHECK ONE)				RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS											
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INTERVIEW																ND				WH											
<input type="checkbox"/> TRIP REPORT																TOUSSR															
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER DOCUMENT																FROMUSSR															
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify Below)																															
DIRECTED TO												ALIEN				CIS				SOV				INT				CASE OFFICER			
																X															
FIELD COMMENTS												HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS																			
Our [] colleagues wish us to report on Yglesias and record these developments.												HH 25263 WHICOG/OS - 4D 46. ATTN. CHIPS HOGKINS - 040 Yglesias is certainly a fraud and should come to the attention of the FBI and police authorities. Masperer should also be known to your office since we and some background info on him to NY F.O. He is a phony operator. Be very cautious in your dealings with him.																			
CA												F.C. CHIEF				DIVISION															

F-16-88-46

SECRET

Chief, [] Office

OSS-820-73
31 May 1973

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Support Division/OSS)

Rolando Masferrer

REF :

[]

ROLANDO MASFERRER

1. Attached for your information and background orientation is some material pertaining to Rolando Masferrer, who appears to be identical to subject of reference.

2. Subject should not be confused with his uncle by the same name, the infamous Rolando Masferrer y Rojas (erroneously reported as father of subject). The elder Masferrer was imprisoned in 1967 for organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Haiti. Young Masferrer may be engaged in dubious activity and contact with him should be viewed with cautious circumspection. He may be on a "fishing expedition" to obtain some information on Guillermo Iglesias; or he may be seeking to cement an affiliation with the Agency via the Miami Field Office. Masferrer may not be the good guy that the attached material represents him to be. He is known to be a wheeling and dealing fast dollar artist. Should he volunteer any information in the future, please note it, and send it to Headquarters. Of specific interest would be any information he may provide on narcotic trafficking and those involved in this illicit trade.

3. DDO has no interest in young Masferrer. If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment

[] ds

cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed HH 23880

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

SECRET