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12 February 1964


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBANG/1

1. I saw AMBANG/1 on 1 and 2 February 1964 and later called him by telephone in San Juan, Puerto Rico on 5 February. The main items of interest from this meeting follow:

A. Loss of Cache - AMBANG/1 voluntarily raised the subject of the loss of the cache of material on the island of Caja de los Muertos. The loss arose from a failure to cache these materials on an island south of Cuba in the area of Camaguey Province. The JURE controlled ship, the M/V VENUS, sailed from Puerto Limon during the month of January with the intent of caching these materials, including some 200 lbs. of the C-4 which had been made available to A/1. On reaching the cache area the ship was surveilled by a small, commercial-type aircraft, resulting in a decision on the part of the VENUS Captain to proceed to Puerto Rico rather than risk the loss of the materials to the Cubans. A/1 stated that he interviewed each member of the crew separately and each told essentially the same story. Upon arriving in the area of Ponce, Puerto Rico, a cache was made on the island previously mentioned with the intent of retrieving the materials in about three days after the ship was refueled and certain repair work done. The location of the cache on Caja de los Muertos, which is normally inhabited only by turtles, but unfortunately, a Puerto Rican searching for turtle eggs spotted the disturbed sand covering the cache, and eventually the cache, which he reported to Puerto Rican authorities. According to A/1 the materials recovered are believed to be in San Juan, Puerto Rico, now in the hands of the Puerto Rican police. A/1 has talked to Governor Munoz Marin's bright, young, right-hand man, Polanco ABREU, Speaker of the House, who will do what he can to return the materials to A/1. It is A/1's opinion that he stands a 50/50 chance of retrieving the materials. It is A/1's opinion that the JURE had not been implicated in the cache and that the crew of the VENUS have kept appropriately silent.

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B. JURE Purchase of One Ton of Pentolite - A/1 informed me that the JURE had purchased a ton of Pentolite, a high explosive, which is not as desirable for use as C-3 or C-4; but nevertheless, a good material for them. My first reaction was to ask where A/1 had this material. I reconsidered this request, stating that I hoped it was well hidden. A/1 assured me that it was. I gathered from my conversation with A/1 that this material was not in place in Costa Rica.

In view of WAVE's report via ANTAUP/2, specifically in WAVE 1463 (IN 11718), Para. 4, "Alanis said large sum money has been spent in purchase modern C-3 explosives and some C-4 which was in CISNEROS' home there subsequent from Costa Rica," I discussed this matter of explosives with COS, WAVE. This discussion was predicated actually on my telephonic discussions on this same subject with C/SAS. On the basis of this background, on 5 February 1964, I called A/1 in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Based on a carefully prepared line which Shackley and I had agreed on, I told A/1 that he had better move all such material immediately out of the United States, including Puerto Rico. In speaking of Puerto Rico, I advised A/1 that despite his influential friends, he was bound to get into trouble if he did not get out of that area and move his operations to Costa Rica without further delay. I also warned A/1 that the setting up of communications, that is, a radio station in Miami, would almost certainly get him into trouble with United States authorities and result in the confiscation of his equipment. A/1 was obviously unsettled by my statements and asked me if I could not intervene with appropriate authorities for time to move the materials. I told him that I could not so intervene as each arm of the Government had its role to play and its duties to fulfill and these could not be influenced. A/1 stated that he would move as fast as humanly possible to take the materials out.

C. JURE Plans - According to AMBANG/1, he plans the infiltration of two teams into Cuba within the next six weeks. The first team, of from two to four individuals, was projected within the next two weeks as of this date. This team is to infiltrate in Las Villas Province and will head for the area of the city of Santa Clara. The second team, approximately four weeks later, will be infiltrated into Oriente Province. Each team will carry a supply of weapons and high explosives and communications

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equipment. They will also carry the first 20 of 60 radio receivers and one transmitter. It is intended that the remaining 40 receivers and one additional transmitter will be infiltrated later. The equipment is to be used in sabotage ops in Oriente, Las Villas, and eventually Havam Provinces. According to A/1, the first two teams infiltrated will not be met by JURE personnel on the inside of Cuba; but will proceed on their own to establish their contacts once inside.

D. JURE Strength Inside Cuba - I asked A/1 if it were true that four members of the executive council of the JURE were actually inside Cuba. He stated that of the nine principal officers of the JURE, four are inside Cuba and five are outside. It should be noted here that we have information to the effect that the executive council of the JURE is so divided and located. A/1 indicated to me that the JURE has made contact with

06 [redacted] who is presently [redacted] 08

[redacted]. In addition A/1 stated that he has likewise made contact with his former [redacted] an individual whom he did not identify; but who, according to him, still maintains an important position in the Cuban government. A/1 advised me that [redacted] had indicated his continuing sympathy and apparent willingness to participate in a program of resistance to Castro. A/1 informed me of these developments inside Cuba in a matter of fact way.

E. The ELC Joins the JURE - A/1 gave me a copy of the ELC statement joining the JURE. The ELC, according to A/1, is now dissolved and becomes a part of the JURE. This accord, reached on the 17th of January 1964, brings into the JURE the best former rebel army officers in exile and should give the JURE a military background and support second to none in the exile community. A/1 advised me that the ELC did not bring any great sum of money into the JURE, but it did bring a certain number of arms and equipment.

F. A New Drive for Funds - A/1 gave me a bond, number 3590, which is presently being used in a campaign to raise additional funds by the JURE. For \$92 the donor receives one of these bonds with the understanding that the JURE will purchase a rifle and ammunition to be used in the fight for the liberation of Cuba. A/1 stated that this campaign has been inordinately successful and that they are expecting to raise a sum between \$40,000 and \$70,000.

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G. Other Preparations Being Made by the JURE - A/1 showed me a chart which was in essence a work schedule, which is a guide line for the preparation of their communication facilities to be used between Latin America, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.A. This chart also included the development and preparation of all the electrical gear to be infiltrated into Cuba. The chart was an orderly presentation of the work to be done, the time in which to do it, the cost involved, the equipment needed, and man hours required to finish the job on time. The time span of the chart covered December 1963 through March 1964, causing me to believe that, if it were adhered to, the JURE should be in reasonably good shape so far as its electrical explosive plans in general are concerned.

H. AMBANG/1's Considering Aerial Re-Supply - A/1 had many questions at this time regarding the feasibility of eventually using an aircraft to re-supply his efforts in Cuba. He wondered about radar effects and potential on low flying aircraft. I mentioned to him that there were various fine commercial type aircraft which had unusual potential for clandestine operations, but that I knew of none that had the capacity for a round-trip from points as far away as Puerto Rico and Venezuela to Cuba. A/1 advised me that he had the pilots necessary to engage in such missions and that he was most interested in considering this capability; not only because of the purpose it could serve in re-supply, but also in the psychological effect that such operational independence would give their movement.

I. A/1 Asks for Whatever Guidance is Possible on Cuban Radar Capability - A/1 indicated a great interest in receiving any information we can make available regarding radar capability along the Cuban coasts. I advised him that I would attempt to provide this information but that I could not be sure that we knew the location of every radar site available on the Cuban coasts.

J. Documentation for A/1's Return to Cuba - I took with me to this meeting four documents prepared by TSD for A/1 in order that he might sign these before returning them for TSD authentication and aging. A/1 was most pleased with this material and agreed to furnish additional photographs in different poses and clothing in order that final documentation be made.

K. Reply to Questions Raised Regarding High Explosives and Electrical Equipment - I reviewed with A/1 detailed replies by TSD to questions raised by A/1 regarding the

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characteristics of Thermite, Thermate, grenades, as well as the problems involved in the use of electrical firing devices. A/1 has an obviously good grasp of radio devices, and of the characteristics of explosives; but at the same time it is obvious that he depends upon more technically competent personnel for working with these materials. He stated that he has engineers in the JURE who have a familiarity with radio and explosive materials.

L. A/1's Continued Negotiation with the Second Front of the Escambray - A/1 stated that while he remains in contact with Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo, he has not as yet reached the point in his negotiations which will bring that group into the JURE. A/1 indicated his opinion that within approximately six weeks he will have worked out a program perhaps bringing this groups into the JURE.

2. Comments - Insofar as the activities of the JURE in U.S. territory are concerned, I believe it is important to point out certain facts.

A. Whereas various AMTAUP/2 reports have indicated various activities and statements on the part of the JURE representative in Miami, Rogelio CISNEROS, against this Agency, there has not been any overt proof of these activities. Nor has there been any overt proof of a propaganda drive, black letters of any sort, adverse radio propaganda, or even a program based on a person-to-person basis. We should take note of the fact that CISNEROS's talking has been restricted to his own little coterie of clandestine cronies. I discussed the matter of AMTAUP/2's reporting at great length with Tony Sforza and Warren Frank. I indicated an interest in proof that CISNEROS is behind a denigration program against the Agency telling them that we would not tolerate such a program, if in fact, we could prove its existence. I specifically pointed out the case recently reported of the choice of one Dionisio SUAREZ Esquivel, who reportedly has been chosen to go to Latin America and carry out a program of denigration of the Agency in universities, as a case which we could and should follow in order to satisfy ourselves that the JURE is working against us.

B. The AMOTS and the JURE - I satisfied myself in talking to Tony Sforza that the AMOTS in general are politically opposed to the JURE and that the reporting of this group, to which AMTAUP/2 belongs, must be considered in light of its prejudices and lack of objectivity insofar as the JURE is concerned.

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
C. The Position of Rogelio CISNEROS - Despite what may be the nature of AMTAP/2's reporting, and we must admit that he appears to report pretty much what he hears, the activities of Rogelio CISNEROS in Miami will sooner or later, unless my warning to AMBANG/1 has some effect, involve the JURE with U.S. authorities. This development is something that we should expect and the time may be here when it becomes necessary to tell AMBANG/1 that CISNEROS had better leave the U.S.A.

3. Financial Matters - AMBANG/1 received a total of 35 thousand dollars. Ten thousand of this sum is understood to be for the assistance of those elements not aligned with JURE but with a capability to take action against CASTRO. While AMBANG/1 specifically mentioned Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo in this context, I advised him to use the money where it would do the most good in getting the fight going inside Cuba. AMBANG/1 submitted 35 thousand worth of bonds as receipt and also signed ten (one thousand dollar) bonds he had not signed during the last meeting.


Alfonso Rodriguez
SAS/SO

Col. Walter

1. HH
2. Col. Walter
3. SE
4. N.S.
5. JLC H/1 & JUNE.



Sample Bond
Attachment to Memo for the Record
dated 12 Feb 64




JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA CUBANA

Certificado N^o 3590


Hemos recibido de

la cantidad de \$72.00 (Noventa y dos dólares) destinados a un rifle con su parque para la guerra contra la tiranía comunista.

TESORERO:


J. J. Marabotto

FOR LA DIRECCION NACIONAL


Manuel Ray

FONDO INSURRECCION EXCLUSIVO PARA EQUIPOS INDIVIDUALES DE COMBATE — RECAUDADO DE DICIEMBRE 1963 A ENERO 1964

POR UNA CUBA CUBANA