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20 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT

104-10183-10006

AMMIIP/1 Meeting, New York City Thursday, 14 November 1963

1. <u>Meeting Time/Place</u>. This meeting was laid on by phone from Washington on 13 November. It took place as scheduled using an office/work-room in A/l*s jewelry factoryshowroom at 31 W. 47th St., New York.

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2. <u>Purposes of Meeting</u>. This meeting was scheduled in order to obtain information and identifications from A/l revelant to the AMLASH Operation. We were particularly interested in determining AMLASH's present attitude toward the Operation and any details of or names of likely confederates which he may have discussed with A/l after Ontrich's departure from the scene. We were also interested in using A/l as a check against the list of likely AMLASH confederates which had been compiled by the MIAPRON group.

3. <u>Finances</u>. The undersigned was prepared to give AMMHIP/1 sufficient funds to cover his expenses and those of AMLASH during the recent three-weck sojourn in Europe which A/1 made at our request. However, A/1 refused to accept any remuneration whatsoever, stating that the money we had given him for his round-trip_ticket (\$950,00)was enough. This, for the record, represents an outlay conservatively of some \$1200 to \$1500 by A/1 from his own pocket on KUBARK behalf, not to mention the lost time from his own business. We believe this gesture should be remembered in future dealings: with A/1.

4. <u>General</u>. A/1 was feeling poorly as the result of a flu-type cold when we met. He stated that he would not have come in at all were it not for our scheduled meeting. Nevertheless, he spent willingly several hours with us, going over the points in which we were interested. The meeting terminated at 1530 with no incidents of a security nature noted.

5. Details of Meeting. Collecting information for the AMLASH operation constituted the principal of discussions during this meeting, and may be found as attachment A to this report. A copy is filed also in the AMLASH 201.

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	ATTACHMENT A TO: AMMIN	NEHO OF MEET	ING OF 14 NOV	1963		
	The following informatio from A/l during the abov		tions wore obt	ained		
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Land And States And And And And And And And And And And	Of the <u>above</u> , A/l felt ti and <u>ALMEJEIHAS</u> were the which <u>Juan ALMEIDA</u> could In addition to the above asked about Major <u>DIAZ-AM</u> Major Faure CHOMON. A/l and his brother " <u>Tin-Tim</u> <u>CASTEL</u> and <u>CHOMON</u> , on the in the initial efforts by successful, they could be period which followed. "inher-sanctum", however <u>MIRET</u> , Rodiles PLANAS, and stated that <u>PLANAS</u> could fit into the CASTEL CHOM friendly with LASH, could loyalty was to FIDEL CAS	most dependab be trusted w <u>names which</u> <u>RGUELLES</u> , <u>Maj</u> stated that <u>b</u> could be us o other hand, y AMLASH, but e counted on They would ne . When asked and <u>Chrique EM</u> never be uti <u>DN</u> category, d not be trus	le. The degree as questioned if A/1_volunteere or Tony CASTEL he felt DIAZ-A ed and were tru would not be , if his effor to support LASI ver be taken in about Eajors I BBONET Comez, A lized, DonBONE and VIRET, tho	e to by A/1. d, he <u>and</u> <u>and</u> <u>astworthy</u> ; utilized ts were t in the hto the Pedro A/1 J would ugh		
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3. Concerning Majors William GALVEZ Rodriguez, Viotor BORDON Machado, Crescendio PEREZ (Montano?), and Antonio LUSSON (LUZONO) Batlle, A/l stated that he did not know these types well and therefore had little to say regarding them. He did say that he did not cure for GALVEZ personally and that he was a little "psycho"; BOREON was OK; (PEREZ) was an older man, ca. 60 years, who was a nonentity who had his rank because he had guided the GRAMMA group into the hills at the beginning of the fight against Batista: (LUSSON) was probably too loyal to Reul CASTHO to be considered for any initial action.

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4. <u>Khen</u> questioned about the identities of followers of Major ALMELEINAS, A/l stated that it would be better to refer to AMASH, as he (A/l) could only give information that was three years old and hence not very accurate. We did not press the question, nor suggest names, as it was evident that he felt that his answers would simply not give a true, current picture.

5. A/l provided the full name of a possible lead which he had discussed earlier with Ontrich: Culc 5 Art. 453. Apt 6, Vedado Havana. is an assistant to "Director of Sports" For the National Govt In navana.

In addition to the above information, the 6. undersigned discussed various aspects of the AMLASH case, and in particular, questioned A/1 about AMLASH's frame of mind and future plans which he may have revealed to A/I . after Ontrich departed the scene. A/l made several points, which basically boiled down to the fact that AHLASH was still not pleased with the support he was getting from the USG side. The visit with DAINOLD, who acted in the capacity of a representative of high levels of the Govt concerned with the Cuban problem, satisfied AMLASH as far as policyy was concerned , but he was not al all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operational plan as he saw it. A/l said that AMLASH dwelt constantly on this point. He could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the USG gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their inoffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to A/1, AMLASH feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials

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from USG technician, he will probably become fed-up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date. A/l stated that AMLASH now has his feet wet vis-a-vis cooperating with USG and has accepted the fact that he will work profitably and securely with it. It is this that we stand to lose with our procrastination. AMLASH also talked about going to the French terrorist group, the OAS, in order to get the materials and guidance he needs. It is believed that he was talked out of this idea, after the dangers involved were discussed with AMLASH.

7. With regard to the radio gear, AMLASH stated that he did not feel that he wanted to take one in with him, particularly in view of the recent arrests in Cuba of agents carrying concealed radios. He was not opposed, however, at this time to having a radio cached for him, to be recovered by him later.

8. According to AMMIP, if there is any interest in having AMLASH link up with other trusted assets in Cuba, these names would have to be given to him before he returned; otherwise he would not trust any other means used later inside to get him to initiate or respond to such contacts.

9. A/l stated that AMLASH talked about getting aid from, or at least discussing his position, with Manolo RAY. However, he stated that he questioned whether this was the best idea, since if RAY came to Paris while he (LASH) was there, people would conclude that there was something between the two, Another spot would be better, thought AMLASH.

10. At the time of A/1's departure, AMLASH said that he would contact "Jack" (Red Stent, Paris staffer) upon his return to Paris. (This he subsequently did on the 15th of November, according to info received from Paris-somewhat belatedly).

11. When AMLASH, A/1, and VENEGAS were together in Rome and Italy, VENEGAS told AMLASH that people were betting that LASH would not return to Cuba. Some had also questioned his mother on this point. AMLASH reportedly told VENEGAS to cover all the bets he could as he would be a rich man. (It was at this time, according to A/1, that AMLASH decided that he had better return to Havana

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a little sconer than he intedded, in fact almost as scon as possible.)

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12. AMLASH talked about the two possibilities of re-taking Cuba - either thru invasion by US troops, or his way. He also realized, however, that invasion was not to be considered seriously at this time. Also, AMLASH talked about his ability to take some man into the hills of Las Villas Province and taking the small towns of Trinidad and Topes de Collantes. He said that he and his men could last no more than 15 days in the hills as the anti-guerrilla fighters now employed by the Regime were ex-guerillas themselves and knew the way to fight and wiahin the hills. Also the Soviet equipment made the govt forces much more formidable than in Batista's time. AMLASH apparently was discussing these ideas with the impression that this was the way to set up a provisional robel govt and thereby invite and gain US support, By the way A/1 tolked, it is fairly certain that AMLASH realized that this was not the kind of a plan which could even remotely be expected to receive USG aid. It is hoped that he does realize that llavana must first be taken... or failing that, a truely sizable piece of land (say, almost an ' entire province) which could be a true rallying point and staging ground under complete Rebel control, from which the rest of the island could be wrested from the Fidelistas and the Communists.

13. In summary, the talks with A/1 led the undersigned to believe that AMLASH is again entering one of his skeptical woods, one which our actions have done little to dispel. Too little and too late.....

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