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30 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Operational Comments relating to AMWHIP and AMLASH Matters

REFERENCE: Contact Report on 22 & 23 June
Meetings with Carlos TEPEDINO

- 1. Friends of Carlos TEPEDINO may be useful in securing information from or establishing contact with Cubans connected with the regime, including those residing in Cuba, travelling outside or stationed outside. Carlos should report on such possibilities so that we may evaluate them and follow through when appropriate. Pand pas examples, might furnish leads.) Persons of possible interest inside Cuba such as Comandante (NIEVES) (Luis SOTO) and (Marcelino ARTIME) probably would be useful targets only if their use could be compartmented completely from the AMLASH operation. (See page 1, paragraph 1 and page 8 paragraph 4 of reference.)
- 2. In evaluating reports or considering operations, we should be mindful of Rolando's mistrust of ARTIME and respect for RAY. (See page 6 paragraphs 16 and 17.)
- 3. The expectation that an assassination of Fidel CASTRO may be attempted on 26 July 1965 coincides with that of ESPINOSA. Although neither has hard current information, an intelligence dissemination attributed so as to disguise the sources may be in order. Reporting after the fact would not be impressive. (See page 7 paragraph 18.)
- 4. The confirmation of Rolando's disenchantment with the Agency is all the more reason to be wary of him and his close cohorts. They well might attempt to make good on the previously expressed threat to blame the Agency if their plans fail and they are caught. Any unnecessary contact with disgruntled members of the group increases the risk that the charges could stick. (See page 10 paragraphs 37 and 38.)

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- 5. Copies of the reference possibly should be sent to Paris and Madrid not merely because of their general interest but also because of information which concerns current or proposed operations. For example, the reflection of TEPEDINO's views on his own contacts with CARRILLO (pages 8 and 9 paragraphs 29 and 30 of reference) and the leads concerning CARRILLO's mother-in-law in Paris and U.S. employed aunt in Madrid (See page 9 paragraphs 31 and 32) might be useful reminders. The denial of contact with CANTILLO in Madrid and the denial of smuggling are in conflict with a Madrid report. (See page 10 paragraphs 37 and 38.)
- 6. LCFLUTTER arrangements are in process. No operator is available until 8 July and the Spanish speaking operator is on transfer from Miami to Headquarters where he will arrive on or about 6 July. Coupled with Carlos' own workload and travel plans, the foregoing makes an examination in the Headquarters area on 8 July seem the best arrangement. I shall be available. Mr. (Webster) is contacting Carlos. (See page 10 paragraph 40.)

Harold F. Swenson WH/C/SP

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