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FORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Introduction

1. The Cuban foreign intelligence service, the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia - DGI), in discharging its function of protecting Cuban interests and security and promoting the policies of the Cuban Government, employs agents of many nationalities. Although its activities extend to Europe and Africa, its principal agent strength is in Latin America. Agents have in general two types of assignments: collection of information on the local government and the local situation, and promotion of revolutionary activity, including guerrilla warfare. All DGI agents abroad are therefore divided into two basic categories according to function: intelligence agents charged with collection of information and penetration of local governments and organizations, who are truly clandestine, i.e., are not known in their target countries as Cuban agents; and guerrilla warfare and sabotage agents, charged with directing and supporting revolutionary activities, who are often known as Cuban agents to the local Communist and leftist groups with which they work. The two types of agents are trained separately and are controlled by different departments in the DGI headquarters in Havana, intelligence agents by the Illegal Department (Departamento Ilegal, called Ilegal) and guerrilla agents by the LN or National Liberation Department. (Departamento Liberacion Nacional).

Agent Selection

2. The DGI employs some agents of Cuban nationality, as opposed to staff members working abroad. They function as intelligence agents, i.e., clandestine agents under the Illegal Department, and are

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
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



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
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recruited by that department. Of three known agents in this category, one was a member of the Cuban internal security service, the Department of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del Estado - DSE), Julio Damaso Vasquez. He was a trained parachutist at the time of his recruitment. Two other known agents, Rafael Guzman and "Chino" (name unknown), were recruited because they were friends of one of the Illegal Department officers, Saul Gonzalez. One criterion for recruitment is that the agent shall not have a wide circle of acquaintance.

3. Agents of other nationalities are usually recruited by agreement between a DGI officer and the local Communist or leftist organization to which the person belongs, but there are other possible sources.
 - a. Foreigners visiting Cuba. Most foreign visitors to Cuba are handled by the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples (Instituto Cubano del Amistad con los Pueblos - ICAP), which arranges for their travel to Cuba; their itineraries, lodging, and entertainment while there; and their return travel to their homes or other destinations. The DGI has an arrangement with ICAP under which members of the DGI MO Department (Department of Illegal Centers - Departamento Centros Ilegales) meet and interview foreign visitors for the purpose of extracting any information of value to Cuba and of assessing them as potential agents. Contacts are so well camouflaged as normal ICAP courtesies that few of the visitors realize that they are in touch with an intelligence agency. The DGI does not deal with foreign diplomats, who are the responsibility of the DSE, but it has access to any other foreigners. If the MO Department considers any visitor a potential agent, especially if he shows a Marxist or extreme leftist attitude, it reports his name and whatever it has learned about him to either the Illegal Department of the DGI, which handles intelligence agents not in contact with local Communist or leftist groups, or the LN Department, which works with guerrilla agents in contact with such groups. Referral is made on the basis of membership in or attachment to an organized group. In no case does the MO Department recruit the agent; that privilege is reserved for the operational departments.
 - b. Foreigners resident in Cuba. The BC Section (Colonial Bureau - Buro Colonial) of the SI Department (Department of Information Services - Departamento Servicios de Informacion) of the DGI is responsible for screening foreigners residing in Cuba (except diplomats) for potential agents. Like the MO Department, the BC Section makes no actual recruitments, but reports potential agents to the Illegal or LN Department, according to whether they are or are not affiliated with an organized group.
 - c. Persons volunteering information from abroad. The MO Department is also responsible for screening letters from persons abroad who volunteer information or support to the Cuban Government. Its principal aim is to extract any useful information from such letters, but it also notes any persons who appear to have agent potential and refers them to the proper operational department for consideration.
 - d. Members of Communist Parties and organized leftist groups in Latin America. The group recommends to a DGI contact--an officer on a trip to the area, a local representative or agent,

or a headquarters officer in Cuba if a group official is visiting them--any of its members as candidates for guerrilla training in Cuba or in their own country. The DGI and the group agree on which of the candidates are most suitable. A DGI agent working with the group may also recommend members for training, generally as guerrilla fighters but possibly also as clandestine intelligence agents; in the first instance, the recommendation is known to the group, but in the second is kept secret from it.

- e. Recruited agents sent to Cuba for guerrilla warfare training. DGI officers observe guerrilla warfare and sabotage agents during their training in Cuba and select those of special potential for recruitment as unilateral intelligence agents.
 - f. Agents of other intelligence services. The DGI sometimes recruits as double agents employees of hostile intelligence services with whom it comes into contact. Such agents may also be turned over to the DGI by the DSE if it has recognized and recruited them.
4. When an agent candidate is proposed, the Illegal or LN Department reviews the available information about him. If he is in Cuba, it may request the DSE to conduct an investigation; the DGI Inspection Department (Departamento Inspeccion), which deals primarily with DGI staff personnel, has forms for submission to the DSE requesting an investigation. Since the DGI does not reveal the identities of its intelligence (illegal) agents to the DSE, not all agent candidates are thus investigated. The operational departments select their agents on the basis of all the available information or a personal recommendation from a DGI staff member or trusted agent. The candidate is then recruited. Cuban agents are aware of the government agency for which they are working, but agents of other nationalities are not: guerrilla agents are recruited to work for their own organization, ostensibly, and intelligence agents are usually aware only that they are working for the Cuban Government. They may believe that they are under the jurisdiction of the Cuban army because military personnel give some of the instruction, and the more sophisticated may believe they are under the DSE, which is widely known as an intelligence organ.

Preliminary Training Arrangements

5. When a Cuban agent is recruited, a schedule for his training is arranged in such a way that he can continue his normal manner of living. If he is employed in an office or factory, he continues in his regular job, and the training is set up for his free time. If he is unemployed, he goes on living just as he has before, and the training is scheduled for hours when his absence from his usual haunts is not noticeable.
6. Agents from foreign countries are usually brought to Cuba for training in either intelligence or guerrilla-sabotage activities. The DGI is notified of the agent's selection through channels from the field, and the Central Processing (Tramitacion) Section of the LN Department handles arrangements for this travel to and from Cuba. Normally the agent candidate uses his own travel documents, but sometimes the group to which he belongs provides a passport belonging to a fellow citizen who has already been to Cuba. He must obtain his Cuban visa through the nearest Cuban

consulate.² Since there are no official Cuban missions in Central America, the agent normally makes his way to Mexico and obtains his Cuban visa there.³ In order to keep secret from the authorities in his own country that he is going to Cuba, the agent candidate gives another destination, and the Cuban consular offices help by issuing his Cuban visa on a separate sheet of paper instead of stamping it in his passport.⁴ The agent candidate may pay his own passage, but usually he is supplied funds or an airline ticket through a local DGI agent or the leftist group to which he belongs; the funds are issued by the Central Processing Section. Whether he is issued a ticket or given money to buy his own, the funds originate with the DGI and are forwarded to the candidate's area through the DGI representation in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

7. DGI officers attached to Cuban consulates are alerted to assist agent candidates in their travel. The agent is given a password, which varies from place to place; agents from El Salvador, for example, are told to mention "Mauricio." When a DGI officer at a consulate interviews visa applicants, he expedites the visa for anyone using the proper password; if the password is not used, he stalls the applicant for several days while he cables Havana for authority to issue a visa. If the visa is issued in Mexico, the agent trainee is given a plane ticket on Cubana, the Cuban Government airline, and is told when he is to leave. Accommodations and subsistence are provided if the trainee has to wait for passage. Agent candidates from British Guiana sometimes travel to Cuba by small boats, not regular shipping service.
8. Agent trainees going to Cuba use a variety of cover stories. For the local authorities, their travel is to some other destination, often as tourists, students, or laborers. For their own group, no cover story is required; for their families and friends, tourist or student travel is the usual explanation. For persons outside the group, if Cuba is known as the destination, the cover story is a scholarship for study at a Cuban school or university. Groups of trainees from the same leftist organization often travel together from their own country to Mexico and thence to Cuba, but intelligence agent trainees always travel alone.
9. Upon arrival at the Havana airport, trainees are met by DGI officers appearing as ICAP officials. The DGI has an arrangement with the Cuban immigration authorities under which persons of DGI interest are cleared through entrance formalities without complications. The trainees are placed in hotels while final training arrangements are made, then are transferred to the schools where their training will be given, or to private houses or apartments if they are intelligence trainees. The case officer from the DGI department which will thenceforth control their activities is responsible for them during their stay in Cuba. Using the funds allotted by the department, he provides them lodging, food, personal expenses, medical care, and anything else they need during the training period; shoes, clothing, and personal items are drawn for them from the DGI warehouse.
10. As far as possible, DGI trainees live the normal life of students and use the cover story that they are studying on Cuban Government scholarships. Their movements in Havana are not restricted, except that arrangements are made to keep them away from fellow-citizens visiting or living in Cuba. Since most of their training is given in Havana, and the course is intensive, they do not

usually travel to other parts of Cuba during the instruction period, unless they are taken by the school to participate in national campaigns for which all students are drafted, such as cane-cutting and coffee-picking. After the training course is completed, if there is any delay in returning students to their own country, they may travel outside Havana; trips are arranged and financed by the DGI liaison officer in ICAP. During delay periods, however, they are at the disposal of the school, which may use them in "voluntary" campaigns or other ways. Guerrilla agents of the same nationality are kept together if they belong to the same organization, but trainees from different organizations of the same country are separated. Trainees of two nationalities are never put together, and foreigners are never grouped with Cubans. In both living quarters and training, the illegal intelligence agent is separated from guerrilla agents. All trainees are encouraged to have as little contact as possible with persons outside the school.

11. Upon arrival in Cuba, each agent is assigned a pseudonym, which he uses throughout his training.⁵ Actually, within the guerrilla schools, students in either large or small groups use their real names, since their identities are usually known to their fellows from earlier association or traveling together. The pseudonym is primarily a means of protecting the student from identification by persons outside the school. For a time, the DGI used the pseudonym only during the training period and assigned another pseudonym when the agent returned home, but the confusion of keeping separate files was so great that the training pseudonym was adopted as permanent. Sometimes, however, pseudonyms are still changed, for security reasons, when the student leaves Cuba or after he has returned to the field.

Training of Guerrilla Agents

12. The LN Department, and specifically the case officer in charge of a group of agents to be trained as guerrillas, arranges for their instruction in the EE Department (Department of Special Schools - Departamento Escuelas Especiales) of the DGI.¹ The case officer himself does not conduct the training, which is entirely an EE Department responsibility. The student group is assigned to one of the EE Department schools in Havana, by nationality; training groups are as large as 25 and as small as three or four persons. Courses last three to six months, depending on the type of training and the ultimate mission of the agents, but in special cases may last as long as a year (two Guatemalans were trained that long). The instructors are all military, drawn from the Cuban army; there is one for each military specialty, and a political instructor.
13. Training covers all aspects of guerrilla warfare, weapons handling, explosives, sabotage, demolition, military tactics; combat engineering, etc., as well as means of countering anti-guerrilla activities. Weapons are of both American and Communist-Bloc provenance. Some specialized training is given; for example, there is a school for frogmen at the mouth of the Jaimanitas River in Barlovento, west of Havana, and two Guatemalans and a Dominican were trained as frogmen during 1963. Guerrilla agents do not normally, however, receive any communications training (secret writing, radio, etc.); when they return home, their channel of communication for sending information and receiving instruction and support is through the organized group to which they belong.

14. Practice in guerrilla warfare and weapons and explosives handling is given on the school premises in Havana. In addition, both during the course and near its conclusion, groups of students are taken to the Escambray Mountains in Las Villas Province to put their training into practice and to learn to live off the country. They are integrated into regular Cuban army units for short periods and take part in any military activities then in progress. During 1963, for example, a group of Guatemalans and a group of Salvadorians were taken separately to the Escambray and participated in the operations then being conducted by the Cuban army against anti-Castro guerrillas in the area.
15. Guerrilla students are required to meet a standard of complete familiarity with all the information and material forming part of their instruction. Examinations are given regularly; students who fail them are required to repeat the instruction. A student may have to repeat the entire course if he cannot pass the necessary examinations. There are many failures. An agent candidate who proves completely incapable of mastering the course is removed from the school, and an effort is made to find him a special job elsewhere. During the course, the instructors issue monthly reports to the school administration, both on the course as a whole and on the performance of each student. A copy is sent to the case officer. Reporting on students covers personal attitude, discipline, capability in study, political level, etc.
16. While guerrilla training is in progress, two special preparations for the future are made. The first is the arrangement of the agent's travel to his target area, either his own country or another. Passports and other documents are prepared for his use on the return trip; funds are allocated for his future activity, and provisions are made for his carrying money or possibly special equipment back with him if that is required. The second thing is the assessment of the trainee for other possibilities. Throughout the course he is observed and evaluated; if he shows more than usual aptitude and ability, he comes under consideration as a potential intelligence agent for collection of information or penetration of his home government. If a trainee is assessed as suitable for intelligence-agent work, he is removed from the guerrilla course and receives special instruction for more clandestine and more complicated tasks.

Training of Intelligence Agents

17. Intelligence (illegal) agents, from whatever source they are drawn (foreigners visiting or resident in Cuba, contacts of DGI agents or organizations abroad, or guerrilla trainees selected for superior abilities), come under the DGI Illegal Department, which is responsible for their recruitment, training, and subsequent handling. Since they are truly clandestine agents, their relationship with the DGI requires special security from its inception. They travel to Cuba alone rather than in a group, and in Cuba they are kept apart from other persons of their own nationality and from one another. Agents of Cuban nationality are also kept apart from other nationalities and during training lead normal lives as far as possible. Both Cubans and foreigners are kept from contact with the Cuban Government or official circles to avoid suspicion of any government connection. As with guerrilla trainees, agents are assigned pseudonyms for use with the general public in Cuba and for use in field operations later. Agents are not allowed any knowledge of any DGI installations

except the ones to which they are specifically assigned for training, and never enter any DGI official establishment or the case officer's home.

18. A foreign agent candidate arriving in Cuba is first debriefed by the case officer on his background and qualifications, since up to that time the DGI has only advance notice of his selection and knows little about him. The interview is recorded, but without the trainee's knowledge. On one occasion in early 1964 a case officer arranged to meet a new trainee in a Havana restaurant for the preliminary interview. The case officer provided himself with a pocket tape recorder, which he tested in advance and found was in good order. When he started to record the interview, however, he discovered that he had either forgotten to adjust the mechanism after he had tested it, or he pushed the playback instead of the record button: the restaurant was suddenly electrified by a voice saying: "Testing, one, two, three; testing, one, two, three." The interview was hastily concluded and was rescheduled the next day in the safehouse where the agent, a Guatemalan, was lodged; in this case, of course, the agent was aware that it was being recorded. The results of the interview are entered in a biographical questionnaire covering all aspects of the agent's family situation, political views, background and education, employment experience, connections, and intelligence potential; the document forms the basis of the agent's DGI personal file. In addition, the agent is required to write a complete report on the operational situation in his country, including types and styles of dress, eating habits, working hours and holidays, location of public buildings and places of entertainment, the press and its type and circulation, urban and rural transportation, educational facilities, airlines, personal documents for identification, and local linguistic idioms.
19. In cases where an intelligence agent is selected from among guerrilla trainees, he may remain under the jurisdiction of the LN Department, which retains him as a guerrilla agent but arranges for his training as an illegal agent also. Training for intelligence work, however, is always separate from guerrilla training and is not revealed to the Communist Party or leftist group sponsoring the agent, who becomes, in effect, a semi-overt Cuban agent in guerrilla activities and a clandestine agent in intelligence reporting or other functions. One such agent, trained in Cuba in 1963, was returned to the Dominican Republic about mid-1963; he carries on revolutionary activities with the Dominican Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Dominicano - MPD) as a known Cuban-trained guerrilla and at the same time works as an illegal agent (under the LN Department), without the knowledge of his MFD colleagues, as a penetration of the MPD.
20. The case officer from the Illegal Department arranges for the complete support of the agent during training, providing him lodging in a private house or apartment, supplying his food and clothing and personal equipment from the DGI warehouse as is done for guerrilla agents, and keeping him in pocket money. If the agent is married, the expenses of his dependent family are also covered by the DGI. The case officer does not give any instruction, but arranges with the MI Department (Department of Technical Operational Support) of the DGI for training the agent in the skills he will require for his future mission. The MI Department has no schools or regular training sites but uses private houses or apartments, which are procured and maintained by the DGI General

Administration Department. The same safehouse is used for successive agents, but only one is trained there at a time. Following the agent's operational plan as laid down by the case officer, the MI Department provides instruction in the necessary skills through its own sections and various departments of the DGI outside the operational departments.

21. All illegal agents are trained in normal tradecraft elements such as clandestine meetings, election and use of dead drops, recruitment of agents, establishment and operation of agent nets (only for agents specifically intended for network direction), use of informants and collaborators, photography, and some form of communication. Practice in operational techniques such as surveillance and counter-surveillance and servicing dead drops is given in appropriate sections of Havana. Each agent in addition is instructed on matters relating to his particular mission, and is given whatever communications training he will need. Communications receives special emphasis because all arrangements must be made during the training period. Techniques include secret writing, codes and ciphers, radio transmission and reception, microdots, and microfilm. Only a few agents are trained in the latter two techniques, and not all are trained in radio, but almost all receive instruction on secret writing, which is the most widely used means of communication between agents in the field and their case officers. The type of communications training the agent will receive is usually discussed with the case officer by the MI Department, but sometimes the MI Department decides without consultation and sometimes it consults the SI Department for operational background on the country where the agent will work.
22. The ST Section (Technical Section - Seccion Tecnica) of the MI Department has the main responsibility for agent communications training and itself conducts the training in secret writing. It first requests the LG Section (Chemical Laboratory - Laboratorio Quimico) of the MI Department to devise and prepare a secret writing system for the agent's use. Most systems depend on sympathetic inks made with salt, blood, urine, and other materials; the type assigned the agent is determined by his mission and operational situation. Each agent receives a different system, although two agents working in the same operation use the same system. An agent normally learns two systems, one for incoming correspondence, development only, and one for outgoing correspondence, preparation only. In addition, if he is to direct an agent network of his own which requires internal clandestine communication, he is taught a third system, both preparation and development, for use in the network. The case officer not only does not participate in the training but knows very little about the secret writing systems, since the processing of messages from agents in the field is handled by the ST Section and he receives only the developed text, and the ST Section, for reasons of security and compartmentation, refuses to tell the case officer anything specific about communications.
23. The ST Section trains the agent thoroughly on the materials and methods he is to use and gives him practice in processing messages under direction, then in preparing test messages and in developing and interpreting test messages prepared by the instructor. The training period varies according to the complexity of the system and the requirement for competence from the agent. In cases where communications are of special importance, the instruction may continue for two or three months with great detail, and the

agent is expected to attain a high standard of performance. An agent who fails the course may have to repeat it, if the operational plan requires it and his schedule permits. Training normally continues until the agent has achieved the desired proficiency; an evaluation of his ability is included in his personal file. Actually, however, secret writing training has not been uniformly successful in DGI experience; in some cases, communications from the agent in the field could not be read at headquarters because the secret writing was improperly prepared, and agents have also had difficulty in deciphering messages sent to them.

24. Agents never write directly to DGI headquarters; all their mail in both directions goes through accommodation addresses, usually in another country. Instruction in selection and use of accommodation addresses is given by the MS Department (Department of Legal Centers - Departamento Centros Legales), which handles DGI field stations and their correspondence, because accommodation addresses are usually in countries where Cuba has official representation and the field station services the letter drops. Outgoing communications to agents go by diplomatic pouch to the field station and are mailed from there to the agent. Agent letters to headquarters go to an accommodation address, where they are picked up by the field station and forwarded by diplomatic pouch. The country used for incoming communications is usually different from that for outgoing; an agent in El Salvador, for example, may send his reports to Havana via Mexico and receive headquarters directions and replies via Paris. The MIS Department controls the assignment of accommodation addresses. Since the DGI believes that there is less danger of exposing the agent if his cover letters containing secret writing are as realistic and natural as possible, the agent is briefed not only on the accommodation address to which he is to write, but also on the persons who actually live there--ages, background, relationships, etc.--so that he can refer to birthdays and personal interests or family events. The agent is also taught selection of plausible but not genuine return addresses for his outgoing communications.
25. Agents who are to learn codes and ciphers and radio transmission and reception are trained by the ST Section, which has its own radio transmitter for instruction purposes. The radios the agents use in training are procured in their own countries and are adapted for clandestine use by the ST Section; most such equipment is Western-made, and much of it is American. The agent learns transmission and reception and also is taught how to adjust a commercial radio to his individual requirements and how to make minor repairs on it. He may learn the standard Morse code but usually is taught a numerical code arranged in groups. As with secret writing, the case officer knows little about the actual mechanics of the radio communications arrangements because radio messages are processed outside the operational departments and reach him only in the form of clear text, and because compartmentation keeps him from acquiring technical knowledge. Similarly, he knows little about the proficiency required of the agent and sees only the final evaluation report prepared by the ST Section for the agent's personal file.
26. If the agent is also to receive training in microfilm and microdot techniques, the ST Section arranges with the LF Section (Photographic Laboratory - Laboratorio Fotografico) of the MI Department for the use of equipment and the assignment of a system and then itself gives the training. The LF Section has

all the necessary equipment. Only a few selected agents are given such instruction. One clandestine agent in the Dominican Republic, who spent a considerable time in Cuba and was extremely well trained, was provided microfilm and microdot equipment for preparing and developing messages, but his case is exceptional. He was also taught how to make devices for transmitting microfilm and microdot material securely. The preparation of concealment devices and instruction in their use are handled by another section of the MI Department, the EMB Section (Concealment Devices Section - Seccion Embutidos), which also prepares for the agent any devices he will need for carrying materials or codes back to his own country when he returns.

Final Briefings

27. When guerrilla agents have completed their training, the LN Department case officer briefs the group on its mission in its home area, which is usually support of local revolutionary activities. The briefing includes assignment of tasks, explanation of what support the group may expect and how it is to be supplied, directions for reporting to the sponsoring group, advice on security and self-protection, and the travel route to be followed. In addition, the group leader receives a special briefing on means of communication with DGI headquarters, special arrangements for supplying the group or its sponsoring organization, and perhaps the transportation to its home area of propaganda or sabotage materials from Cuba. Although agents are allowed to take notes during their training, they are not permitted to carry any compromising material on their return home. All final instructions are given orally and are memorized by the agent. Actually, however, guerrilla agents do not always observe security precautions about materials. One Salvadorian guerrilla agent succeeded in hiding in his luggage a copy of the Manual of Guerrilla Warfare he had used in his training course, even though the case officer inspected the luggage while it was being packed. The case officer commented that unless another inspection was made at the time the agent left his quarters to depart the country or at the airport just before boarding the plane, it was impossible to prevent agents from carrying off such classified matter.
28. Illegal agents receive a more intensive final briefing. The case officer reviews with the agent the general mission and specific tasks he is to undertake, all of which have been covered during training, such as collection of information on his home government or specific organizations, penetration of official organs in the country or perhaps the local Communist Party or a leftist group, assistance in communications and forwarding of material, etc. The briefing includes advice on security and self-protection, refresher instruction on accommodation addresses for secret writing correspondence, an explanation of the travel route for the return journey and the documents to be used, and specific instructions for reporting to a group or commencing his assignment after arrival, with a schedule for initiating communications, depending on his mission and his return itinerary. Illegal agents receive their final instruction on communications two or three days before leaving Cuba. Instructions about frequencies, which are assigned by the MI Department, and codes for radio communication, procurement and preparation of secret writing materials, etc., are photographed and prepared for the agent to carry with him in a concealment device. One agent returning to Salvador received his

radio frequency data on film, which was rolled and put into a false heel on one shoe, prepared by the EMB Section. Agents who are to use radios do not take sets with them; the DGI prefers to have them purchase their communications equipment in their own country and provides money for the purpose; the radios are thus not attributable to Cuba. The agent usually carries with him the funds needed for procurement of small equipment and may occasionally act as a courier carrying special messages or funds. Normally, however, large sums for the purchase of large equipment or arms for guerrilla operations are sent by diplomatic pouch or are carried by clandestine couriers. In September 1963, for example, the DGI sent U.S.\$25,000 concealed in the lining of a suitcase carried to Mexico by a diplomatic courier; there it was turned over to an agent for the purchase of arms to support revolutionary activity in Nicaragua.

29. If agents are not able to leave Cuba at once when they have completed their training, they remain under the orders of the school if they are guerrillas, or of their case officer if they are illegal agents. They are permitted to travel in Cuba or are assigned to public "voluntary" campaigns; the case officers try to keep them busy, partly, at least, as a security precaution. Delays in departure may be due to lack of suitable documentation, difficulties in arranging air schedules, special situations in the home country, or physical disability of the agent--one agent broke his leg while in Cuba and had to wait until he was able to travel.
30. The principal cause of delay in returning home is lack of suitable documents. The DGI case officer is responsible for procuring passports for his agents' travel, but he is often short one or two passports of the proper nationality, because procurement requires a longer time than the usual training period. For example, of a group of about 25 guerrilla agents from the Dominican Republic who completed six months of training near the end of 1963, about ten were still in Cuba in April 1964 because the DGI had been unable either to provide passports for their travel or to arrange for their return home illegally. At that time the case officer was trying to have additional passports collected and sent to Cuba via the DGI station in Mexico so that the stranded Dominicans could travel.

Return Travel

31. As noted above, while his training is in progress, arrangements are made to return the agent to his operational area. For guerrilla agents, this is their own country and sponsoring group; for illegal agents normally it is their own country, but occasionally, although rarely, one is assigned to another area. Guerrilla agents who have been trained together may travel back as a group; illegal agents always travel alone. All agents start their journey by air to Prague, on Cubana Airlines, using false Cuban passports, which they turn over to Czechoslovak authorities on their arrival in Prague.⁶ From there, agents travel on passports of their own or some related nationality, or even their own passports, containing entries carefully made to account for their period of absence from their country without showing any connection with Cuba. Both passports are provided the agent by the case officer at the time of the final briefing, when the travel route is also explained.

32. The second stage of the journey, from Prague to the agent's own country, is arranged by the DGI Central Processing Section. The agent's departure from Cuba and the first leg of the trip, to Prague, are arranged by ICAP, where the DGI has a liaison officer, pseudonym "Ricardo", to handle such matters. When guerrilla agents are preparing to depart, the case officer notifies "Ricardo", personally, by telephone, or by official document, and allocates the funds they will need during the rest of their stay in Cuba and for their travel. The case officer instructs the agents to go to ICAP and establish contact with "Ricardo", who thereafter is responsible for them as long as they remain in the country. If they are delayed, he arranges for travel in Cuba, and in any case he provides them subsistence and pocket money. He also, through ICAP, procures their required immunizations; an ICAP request for vaccination for a traveler is an indication that the person is of interest to the Cuban intelligence services, since the ordinary departing visitor or resident secures his immunization through normal civilian channels. "Ricardo" also obtains airline tickets and flight reservations; the DGI reimburses ICAP for any funds expended by "Ricardo" for agent travel and handling.
33. The processing of illegal agents is somewhat different from that of guerrillas. They do not go through ICAP or come into "Ricardo's" hands; the case officer, working through the DGI Central Processing Section, takes care of procuring their immunizations, plane tickets, and reservations. They are thus not exposed to any Cuban agency outside of the DGI. The agent travels via Prague to Western Europe and thence to his own country. At the final stage of his journey, he may enter his own country illegally. As soon as he is back and established, he is ready to initiate communications with DGI headquarters in accordance with the instructions he has received and using the schedule he carried with him in a concealment device, which is opened only when he reaches home.
34. A Cuban sent abroad as a DGI agent is considered an illegal agent and does not go through ICAP processing for travel. He may leave Cuba illegally: if he departs legally, he uses the normal route via Prague but travels on a passport of another nationality than Cuban. Of three known Cuban agents prepared for assignment abroad, one was scheduled to go to Mexico during 1964; the assignments of the other two were not known. A Cuban agent abroad uses the same sort of communications channels as an agent of another nationality, according to the training he has received in Cuba. He is reimbursed through the usual channels--funds sent through a DGI field station, which for Latin America is always Mexico; and in addition his family is supported by the DGI during his entire period of overseas service. An agent of foreign nationality, once trained, is not expected to return to Cuba and is considered an independent operator with no communication with Cubans except through his clandestine channels, although in an emergency he is permitted to appeal to a DGI officer in an official establishment if one is available. The policy regarding agents of Cuban nationality had not been decided in early 1964, since no such illegal agents were then operating abroad. It was not certain, for example, how long the Cuban was expected to remain in place abroad nor whether he would be allowed access to DGI officers in the field.
35. From 1959 to 1962 the Cuban foreign-intelligence service made considerable use of shipping for sending its agents out of Cuba,

especially into the Central American area and to the north coast of South America. Since 1962, however, the practice of sending agents home as crewmen has materially declined and in 1964 was used only occasionally.

Effectiveness of Training

36. The capabilities of both guerrilla and illegal agents trained by the DGI vary greatly because of differences in background, native capacity, and adjustment to discipline. The DGI has successfully trained a few highly efficient agents, but some of its trainees have not come up to expectations. One agent with an excellent training record, of whom the case officer had high hopes, was arrested for participation in illegal activities after only a short period of operation following his return home. Several agents who were considered promising proved disappointing when released from training supervision; one who was given funds to purchase a radio spent the money on himself and was in trouble with the group with which he was affiliated because of his lack of discipline; another was accused of having misused funds entrusted to him for arms procurement and was also distrusted by his group as cowardly and spiritless. As noted above, instruction in secret writing has not always been productive of readable reports. The main difficulty appears to lie not with the quality of the training but with the lack of discipline and loyalty of the trained agent.

Headquarters Comments

1. For a discussion of the organization of the DGI and the functions of its departments, from the same source, see CS-311/00115-64.
2. Cuba has diplomatic relations, and hence consulates, in Latin America only in Mexico and Jamaica (relations were maintained with Brazil until May 1964, with Chile until July 1964, with Bolivia until August 1964, and with Uruguay until September 1964). Visas for Cuba can be obtained only in those countries; most are issued in Mexico, because that country has the only direct air connection with Cuba.
3. Cuban handling of visas and documentation is discussed at length by the same source in CS-311/00866-64.
4. During 1963, many travelers from Latin America were taken to Cuba on chartered flights by Cuban aircraft arranged to bring delegations to and from Cuba for Cuban celebrations and for the convention of the International Union of Architects in Havana in September. For the latter occasion, the Soviet ship NADEZHDA KRUPSKAYA called at Santos, Brazil, to embark passengers for Havana. Among the traveling delegations were Cuban agents.
5. Source Comment. All DGI officers are also assigned pseudonyms, which they normally use in all their professional work; even close colleagues do not always know their real names.
6. Headquarters Comment. The Cubans have also used special and charter flights from Cuba to return agents to their

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own countries, as, for example, those arranged for the
International Union of Architects in September 1963.

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