

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET//SIAM

PROCESSING ACTION

TO Chief, WI Division		XW	RANKED FOR INTELLIGENCE NO HADING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED USE CAR RIDE EXCEPTING
INFO			
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			SECRET//SIAM
SUBJECT LIFET Report/August, September, October 1963			REF ID: A6422

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: DGA-22169

Action: For your information

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with COMINT-P 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. EXPLOITATION OF LPAM

(1) LIFET/Cuban In the course of the reporting period LIFET covered two targets of ZKMTK interest. One of these lines was considered productive of operational leads, but was temporarily discontinued for operation reasons. Coverage of the second line was terminated for lack of production. The only lead produced from this line was reported on in DGA-22169. LIFET is continuing to cover two lines in connection with the ANGULUS operation. The product of this coverage is of interest to Special Affairs Staff and JMWAVE as the take is forwarded weekly to these customers. Recently this particular coverage has provided information of interest on the relationships within the family of Fidel CASTRO and the continuing deterioration of these relationships. Coverage of the home phone of a Cuban official was instituted at the request of Special Affairs Staff officer to support the sensitive ANGULUS operation.

(2) LIFET/Soviet LIFET continued its coverage of the home phones of two known Soviet intelligence officers. Product and use continues as reported in reference. Coverage of one of these lines was discontinued during the recent absence from Mexico of one of these targets. This coverage is now being reinstated.

(3) LIFET/Polish Recent LIFET information from coverage of this target has indicated that a senior Polish official in Mexico is conducting an affair with the wife of another Polish official. The LIFET lead was the basis for further Station action in this case. LIFET has increased its coverage in support of this possible future recruitment attempt. Also in the Polish file LIFET provided coverage of a suspected Polish illegal residing in Mexico.

(continued)

Distribution:
J - C//SIAM

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	DGA-22169	29 November 1963
	SECRET//SIAM	50-6-38/3

(4) LIFCAT/Czech LIFCAT activity in this area has been limited to coverage of the home phase of a Czech intelligence officer. Unfortunately to date little of operational value has turned up on this line other than biographical data of interest.

(5) LIFCAT/Paris LIFCAT's continuing coverage of EXARY-1 has provided information of interest to EXARY on L-1's planned travel and the delays to that travel as well as his future type and place of employment. Coverage of [redacted] provided the lead on which the recruitment of LIFCAT-1 was based. L-1 was recruited as an access agent to PERIOD for possible future recruitment attempts of her. This coverage has also enabled this Station to advise another station of the possible susceptibility to recruitment of a Communist from the country of concern to that station.

(6) LIFCAT/PCN In addition to the [redacted] coverage mentioned in paragraph 1.A. (5) above, coverage of a member of the PCN [redacted] [redacted] has yielded good information on the pro-Cuban/pro-Soviet infiltrating in the PCN as well as target analysis information on various PCN officials.

(7) LIFCAT/American Communist Group in Mexico (ACM) The information provided to the local COMINT office from the coverage of [redacted] and [redacted] has been evaluated as valuable by that office. It is particularly useful in covering movements of American leftists and Communists who travel to Mexico and frequently on to Cuba.

(8) LIFCAT/Miscellaneous LIFCAT coverage of a former SMITH agent is of interest to COMINT Headquarters and the senior COMINT officer in Mexico. This and the coverage of a related line enable the interested customers to maintain a check on the former SMITH agent's activities which are against the best interest of PARADE.

B. PROCEDURE OF TIME

No change.

C. PERSONNEL

LIFCAT-1 has managed to extend his "commission" as investigator of personnel for the [redacted] company. See SECURITY section below.

During the reporting period special drug was provided by Headquarters for the treatment of a child of LIFCAT-5. This drug was not available locally and LIFCAT-5 was most grateful for the assistance of his "friends" in obtaining this material.

D. LIABILITIES

No change from previous reports.

E. SECURITY

LIFCAT-1's efforts to extend his investigative commission to cover employees of the [redacted] has proven successful. This greatly increases the assets of LIFCAT and somewhat reduces the security threat to the LIFCAT [redacted] and control can when working on installation, repair or removal of [redacted]. This latter can not be fully negated since it is now apparent that in his retired status LIFCAT-1 can never provide the personal back up protection to these LIFCAT personnel that he could prior to his retirement. Although the risk inherent in a LIFCAT type operation can not be completely eliminated, it is felt that it can be reduced to a workable level.

The coverage of the Tugolev/Britain lines has been assumed by LIFCAT. Therefore LIFCAT will not have to run the particular risk of re-establishing the coverage. It uses the necessarily complicated "trap" from one control room to another that alerted the telephone company crew to check the tap line reading of this coverage described in paragraph 1.B. of reference.

P. TACTICAL

No change from previous reports.

2. The coverage provided by LIDDET during the reporting period totaled 24 separate lines. A breakdown by target is as follows:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. 4, 5 and 6. Polish Embassy and Commercial Office
7. and 8. AMERTEX Operation
9. [redacted] of a Cuban Commercial Attaché
10. [redacted] of a Czech intelligence officer
11. and 12. Homes of suspected Polish IB agents.
13. and 14. Targets of ZELINK interest
15. and 16. [redacted] and related line
17. and 18. [redacted] of SSOCH agent and related line.
19. Disrupted Czech IB agent
20. [redacted]
21. [redacted]
22. [redacted]
23. [redacted]
24. [redacted]

3. During the reporting period a number of messages were prepared by the Station for passing to local GACID and USISW based in whole or in part on LIDDET provided material.

Further, the following B&G were based on LIDDET provided information:

B&G-7576	B&G-7746
B&G-7576	B&G-7757
B&G-7596	B&G-7758
B&G-7597	B&G-7762
B&G-7603	B&G-7763
B&G-7618	B&G-7766
B&G-7634	B&G-7738
B&G-7643	B&G-7764
B&G-7664	B&G-7827
B&G-7667	B&G-7873
B&G-7876	B&G-7879
B&G-7639	B&G-7828
B&G-7692	B&G-7908
B&G-7721	B&G-7822
B&G-7727	B&G-7952
B&G-7732	

William C. O'BRIEN

