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Orlando

3 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMWHIP-1 Meeting, New York City, 19 February 1965

1. Meeting/Time/Place and Purpose: This meeting was held in the offices of AMWHIP-1 from 1350 to 1610 hours. Purpose of the meeting was to attempt to satisfy requirements levied by Nestor Sanchez, WH/SA/SO, on events which took place during AMWHIP-1's most recent sojourn in Europe (January-February 1965) in company with AMLASH-1. Meeting was also used to determine AMWHIP-1's willingness to participate in the "discord program" using UNSNAFU-19 as the unwitting recipient of certain rumors, the details, of which are covered in subsequent paragraphs.

2. It might be noted for the record that this meeting was scheduled for the morning of 18 February, but due to AMWHIP-1 missing the scheduled flight from Miami, the meeting was postponed until the above time.

Details of the Meeting

3. The following information on the various topics as indicated concern basically those requirements which have been intended for, and levied on, AMLASH-1. However, due to the fact that AMWHIP-1 was together in Europe with AMLASH-1, AMWHIP-1 was debriefed on the requirements on the outside chance that he might have some complimentary information on them.

a. Orlando Blanco, Cuban Diplomat in Bern, Switzerland. AMWHIP-1 was unable to give any additional information on Blanco as he had not met the man in Europe and does not remember having met him in Havana. (AMWHIP-1 stated that AMLASH-1 claimed that he (AMWHIP-1) had in fact met Blanco a number of years ago in Havana, but AMWHIP says he truly does not remember the man.) He stated that any additional information on Blanco would have to come from either AMLASH-1 or AMLASH-3. In approaching Blanco for cooperation, AMWHIP strongly suggested that it would be best to use AMLASH-3 for the initial contact. AMWHIP stated that BLANCO knew AMLASH-3 well and that he was a trusted representative (and therefore anti-Castro) of AMLASH-1. AMWHIP-1 was told we were looking into Blanco and also into QUHOPS-1, Attache Cuban Embassy, Madrid.

b. In discussing QUHOPS' desire to cooperate, AMWHIP stated that QUHOPS would do what he could to help but that in exchange for this he wanted to get his wife, two children, and his mother-in-law to the United States along with himself. AMWHIP-1 stated that QUHOPS' plan in brief was to accept the guard duty on Sunday thus making probably only himself and the wife of code clerk present in the embassy. We thanked AMWHIP for his information and suggestions and stated that they would be conveyed to the appropriate parties concerned.

c. Gustavo GONZALES. (AMLASH-1's "cousin") AMWHIP-1 stated that he had no information on Gonzales, in whom Nestor Sanchez has an [redacted] with regard to his (Sanchez') pending PCS to Caracas, Venezuela.

d. "Venezuelan" Returning from Moscow. Regarding the Venezuelan who has reportedly to have just come from Moscow and returning to Cuba, AMWHIP-1 stated that he had no information to contribute about the man. He did say, however, that one time during his recent trip to the Cuban Embassy Paris talking with UNSNAFU-19, the Ambassador had interrupted their conversation in order to talk to two men (about 30-35 years old). AMWHIP-1 met them briefly and was told by one of them that they were from Oriente Province. AMWHIP-1 stated that he could tell immediately by their accents that they were not Cuban. In order to confirm this he asked them where in Oriente they were from because one of the Cuban officials in Paris was from Oriente and always wanted to chat with any people from Oriente who passed through Paris. After a brief stumbling exercise, groping for a name of a city in Oriente, the "Cuban" confessed that they were not Cubans but Venezuelans. AMWHIP did not have sufficient time to learn more about them. The two Venezuelans spent about thirty minutes talking with UNSNAFU-19 while AMWHIP was there. He did not know how much longer previous to this thirty minutes that the Venezuelans had been in the Embassy or to whom else they talked. AMWHIP-1 suggested that UNSNAFU-9 might be able to obtain the names of the two Venezuelans in question.

e. UNSNAFU-19's Membership in the "Gaslight Club". As a support service for a Paris Station operation to get UNSNAFU-19 membership in the Gaslight Club where it would be attempted to run a highly desirable female agent against him. AMLASH-1 stated that he had been unable, due to UNSNAFU-19's busy schedule, to get the latter down to the Gaslight Club and enrolled as a member. AMWHIP stated, however, that he could do the job just as well by taking out a gift membership for UNSNAFU-19 through the Gaslight Club in New York City, and sending UNSNAFU-19's membership card and key to him in Paris. We encouraged AMWHIP-1 to do this and to keep us advised of his progress.

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f. Cuban Air Force Comandante DICLOIS. Regarding DICLOIS who had allegedly arrived in Paris from Algeria during the time that Sanchez and AMWHIP-1 were there, AMWHIP-1 said that he did not know the man or did he have any information on a Comandante with that name or a name that sounded like that. He said that he had heard something about a Comandante with a strange name but he could not contribute more than that. He suggested that AMLASH-1 might be able to identify the man.

g. Security man with Che Guevara. AMWHIP-1 was asked if he had any information on a man called "Bernis" reportedly one of the men who accompanied Che Guevara on his African trip, and probably also the one to China as a member of his security force. AMWHIP said that the name did not register with him and he had no other information to give. He again suggested that AMLASH-1 might be able to help. One thing more AMWHIP said was that he did not think that any of Che's security men were named Bernis, and he thought this was not a correct name. He did say, however, that while he was in Paris there had been two security types there who were guarding two or three dark green trunks about the size of foot lockers and four or five suitcases. AMWHIP said that they both had pistols, one a Soviet machine pistol and the other a 32 calibre. AMWHIP does not remember the exact date that they left Paris for Madrid but he remembers that the flight left at 4:50 in the afternoon and took place about two weeks ago (ca. 5 February). AMWHIP says that UNSNAFU-9 knows both of these men and could be contacted for their names and a better description.

will identify know

h. Carlos Franqui. AMWHIP-1 had no additional information on Franqui except to say that he knew he was not happy. He also believed that AMLASH-1 had additional information on Franqui.

i. B & L Locomotives. With regard to the requirements concerning security measures on the shipment of locomotives to Cuba, AMWHIP said that he had no additional information to contribute. AMWHIP also stated that he had obtained no additional information from FISSOLA, the engineer concerned with the shipment, to, and the use of, these locomotives. AMWHIP stated that he thought AMLASH-1 might have some additional information. AMWHIP also stated that he thought "Americo" talks too much and that maybe "Mario" would be best to assist in the operation. (Comment: See Ronis for further edification of the subject.)

j. AMLASH-1's Accommodation Address Arrangements.

AMWHIP-1 stated that he had reviewed accommodation addresses with AMLASH-1 and had given appropriate instructions to AMWHIP-2 in the event of the receipt of letters from Havana signed by AMLASH-1 or signed by a "Cuban" whom AMWHIP-2 did not know. (Comment: it was a good thing we reviewed accommodation address with AMWHIP-1, see below.) For the record AMLASH-1 will address his letters to AMWHIP-2 either in care of his business address in Rome which is:



Roma

or to AMWHIP-2's business address in Geneva (which incidentally is identical with his home address, as AMWHIP-2 operates in Geneva from his apartment): [redacted] Geneva, Switzerland. (It should be noted that AMWHIP-2 intends to open a proper office in Geneva in the near future. However, this is no particular reason for changing the accommodation address in Geneva.) AMWHIP-1 stated that he had given the undersigned's postoffice box in Washington (William A. Thompson, P.O. Box 7224, Apex Station, Washington, D.C. to AMWHIP-2, believing that this would expedite our receipt of letters from AMLASH-1. AMWHIP-1 was told that his concern for rapid transmittal of the letters was certainly appreciated, but that for security sake, it was much better that they be forwarded in a cover envelope to AMWHIP's address in New York City, preferably, his business address. AMWHIP-1 was also told to remind AMWHIP-2 that he should handle the letters he received from Havana as little as possible and put them in cover envelopes and send them as quickly as possible to AMWHIP-1 in New York City. In this connection it remains the problem of obtaining these letters on an expeditious basis when AMWHIP-1 is, for example, out of town for a prolonged absence. It is suggested that William Thompson's accommodation business in Washington be given to AMWHIP's father so that he may forward AMWHIP-2's letters to Washington without undue delay. (This is an excellent example of a break-down in compartmentation in Cuban operations.)

k. Paris Embassy Personnel. According to a telephone call on 18 February from AMLASH-1 in Paris, AMWHIP-1 stated that AMLASH-1 had said that UNSNAFU-8 and, perhaps, UNSNAFU-9 would be out of jobs in the near future in accordance with the present economy drive by the Cubans. AMLASH stated that UNSNAFU-8 most certainly would be ousted, while UNSNAFU-9's case was more uncertain.

I. Cuban Government Financial Straits. (Ref. PARI 9067, IN 73872, 4 February 65) AMWHIP-1 added some additional comments on the silver payments cited in ref. AMWHIP-1 stated that the Cubans were apparently very anxious to sell the silver cited in Ref. Actually AMWHIP-1 stated that the total amount of the payments would be in the neighborhood of \$350,000 and this included antiques, postage stamps, silver bullion, and "worked" silver articles. AMWHIP also stated that he had been asked if he would be willing/buy \$100,000 worth of silver on the spot, the cash to be placed in a reputable international bank. This discussion had been carried on by international telephone with Pepin Sanchez, brother-in-law of Celia Sanchez, and Jose Iglesias Lopez, good friend of AMWHIP-1 and former Havana jeweler. AMWHIP-1 talked to the above in Havana from the Cuban Embassy, Paris. This \$100,000 was a part of the total \$350,000 mentioned above. AMWHIP-1 turned down the sale, stating that he did not normally deal in silver, and was not sure of the value of the worked items offered for sale. AMWHIP-1 stated that this sale was to be executed on behalf of Castro personally and did not necessarily reflect the overall financial picture of the Cuban government. AMWHIP-1 stated that AMFLASH-1 had told him that such an action was typical of Castro, who in many instances, conducted business arrangements of his own, without regard or without consultation, with the members of his government normally involved in Cuban national finances. AMWHIP-1 stated that UNSNAFU-19 also had intimated the above. AMWHIP-1 stated that he believed that this money was needed for the downpayment on two factories which had been purchased by the Cubans in Great Britain. He also stated that he believed these factories were for the processing of agricultural products of some type. Also, concerning the silver, according to AMWHIP-1, that 30% had been reduced to bullion and that the rest consisted of "worked" silver articles (antiques, art treasures, jewelry, etc.) AMWHIP stated that this entire offering of silver antiques, etc. had eventually been sold on the spot in Havana for cash to an unknown person of Turkish/Italian background. AMWHIP tried to find out the identity of the person but neither UNSNAFU-19, in person, nor Iglesias, by phone, would reveal the identity of the buyer. AMWHIP-1 offered to write or ask Iglesias for the name, but we cautioned against it as showing undue interest in the matter. AMWHIP-1 was told that if he ever saw Iglesias in person and could safely ask him he should do so together with any details he could obtain about the transaction, as it was related to Cuban financial problems. AMWHIP-1 stated that on his return to

the Paris Ambassador's conference in Madrid, UNSNAFU-19 carried a very large trunk in his car. It was so heavy that the rear of the car was clearly weighted-down. AMWHIP speculated that this trunk had been brought to Madrid by Arnold RODRIGUEZ Camps and was turned over to UNSNAFU-19 prior to the latter's return to Paris. In connection with this, AMWHIP-1 received a phone call from AMLASH-1 from Paris stating that UNSNAFU-19 was going to Geneva on the 18th of February and had invited AMLASH-1. AMLASH-1 declined the invitation, due to his desire to return to Havana via Madrid on the 23rd of this month. On the morning of the 19th of February AMWHIP-1 received a call from AMWHIP-2 stating that UNSNAFU-19 was driving to Geneva on the 19th. He had with him some \$11,000 in silver articles. AMWHIP-2, who saw the items, said that the "stuff was cheap" (meaning inferior workmanship and quality).

m. AMLASH-1, Morale and Finances. We then broached the topic of AMLASH's attitude and present frame of mind after our refusal to give him \$10,000 that he requested for operational uses. AMWHIP-1 stated that he thought AMLASH-1 was not overly disturbed by this, but that in general he was somewhat upset by the fact that he had even entered into negotiations with AMBIDDY-1, objecting to his "political mentality". It might be noted that AMWHIP-1 also stated his reservations about AMBIDDY-1. From this, we derived the feeling that AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 both had strong but unspecified reservations about the motivation and morality of AMBIDDY-1. AMLASH said that due to this reservation of AMLASH-1's, and due to the relative newness of the contact, AMLASH-1 was extremely reluctant to take any money from AMBIDDY-1, which, of course, in the end he did not. AMWHIP-1 stated that AMLASH felt that he had been pushed by the Americans into a basically unwanted relationship with AMBIDDY-1. AMWHIP-1 stated that he, as well as AMLASH-1 were still baffled at the American reluctance to deal across the board on all matters with AMLASH-1. He stated that AMLASH-1 had received certain items from AMBIDDY-1 that he was not able to obtain from the Americans. AMWHIP-1 made it a point to state that AMLASH-1 noted immediately and pointedly that the items provided to him by AMBIDDY-1 were not homemade nor apparently one-of-a-kind items. (the inference here being quite clearly conveyed to the undersigned was that these items obviously came from commercial sources.)

n. The Subject of the Funds Requested by AMLASH. AMWHIP stated that these were absolutely necessary for AMLASH to keep people of his choice in particular jobs where they could be of

critical value to AMLASH in any plans he would formulate. (AMWHIP cited, for example, Comandante Nieves, comandante of the Port of Havana, who in his position is of great value to AMLASH-1 for obvious reasons.) AMWHIP-1 stated that this subsidy money permitted these people to remain in place by providing an addition to their incomes, who otherwise due to the high cost of living today in Havana, would be compelled for economic reasons to seek employment elsewhere. The undersigned then asked the rather pointed question of whether or not AMLASH-1 got any of the money that he needed. AMWHIP said, "Yes, I gave it to him". We asked him how much and he hesitated. After a little discussion and a direct question, he stated that he had given \$7,000 to AMLASH-1. AMWHIP-1 stated that AMLASH-1 did not, in fact, have the money yet and that the money would be given to him probably this weekend (20-21 February) in Paris by AMWHIP-2. AMWHIP-1 stated that AMWHIP-2 had become involved in the transaction because he had to appeal to him for help in raising the money in a fairly confidential manner. Arrangements to give AMLASH-1 money during his stay in Madrid had fallen through, AMWHIP had learned, thus the reason for AMWHIP-2's being forced to go to Paris in order to give it to him this weekend. AMWHIP-1 also stated that AMLASH-1 had asked Jose Iglesias in Havana for some 3,000 pesos. Iglesias was not able to raise the sum at the time requested. Whether or not he is attempting to do so now, or has succeeded in doing so during AMLASH-1's absence, is not known at this time. It should be noted that during discussions concerning the AMBIDDY/AMLASH relationship, AMWHIP stated that AMBIDDY had told AMLASH of at least some portion of his connections with the Americans. AMWHIP-1 stated that he had sat in on the discussions during which time AMBIDDY purportedly made this statement. AMWHIP also stated, as he had done in previous meetings, that neither he or AMLASH could understand why the Americans did not make further use of AMLASH-3 and AMLASH-2. He also felt that there were many bits and pieces of the whole picture that were not tied into a neat bundle and utilized to their full extent by the Americans. The undersigned at no time admitted that he was aware of any AMBIDDY/American relationship as alluded to by AMWHIP-1.

o. For the record, AMWHIP-1 again stressed the fact that he felt that he could produce more information and better serve KUBARK interests if he had a case officer who knew all aspects of the AMLASH complex and the cast of other Cuban characters in Europe in whom there was an interest and to whom AMWHIP-1 had access. He emphasized that Paris case officer [redacted] (and presumably other European-based case officers) with whom he has dealt) was very helpful and that he enjoyed their relationship, but that there was an obvious lack of depth of knowledge of all aspects of an AMLASH-AMWHIP operation and also of those principally

involving only AMWHIP. He felt that he could be more effective with continuous guidance and direction during his European sojourns. (AMWHIP also implied that the case officers were understandably busy with their many local problems and could not devote as much time as possibly was desirable to AMWHIP-1's case. On the other hand, AMWHIP-1 delicately submitted that if he was willing to take the time for the operations, and if in fact they were worthwhile and necessary, we should make every reasonable effort to glean the most benefit from his efforts. In summary, if feasible, he prefers to deal with one case officer on all aspects of his operational activity.

AMLASH-1. According to AMWHIP-1, he and AMLASH-1 have established an open code for signalling his desire for exfiltration or to inform AMWHIP-1 when the date of his Attempt will be. Exfiltration involves the use of birthday greetings to Loretta and Sylvia indicate exfiltration from Matanzas or Miramar, respectively. AMBIDDY-1 presumably has the details for execution once he is informed of the keyword by AMWHIP-1. The Attempt is to be noted by any mention of the name SIMON, together with a date, which is IT..

P. Deception Ploy (Rumor plant with UNSNAFU-19).

In response to the request for his opinion on this subject after it had been outlined as agreed upon at Headquarters, AMWHIP-1 stated that he thought that he could carry this off without UNSNAFU-19 being suspicious. He stated that this type of information would have to come forth at the right moment in a natural manner, and during a rather lengthy personal meeting. He felt that to do this by telephone or letter would be totally out of keeping with his normal relationship with UNSNAFU-19 and that it should not be done in that manner. In response to the suggestion, however, he said that it could be done if his stopping off in Paris to see UNSNAFU-19 took place as a part of a normal business trip to Europe. He also stated that he felt he had to have something upon which to peg the story. AMWHIP-1 agreed with the feasibility of the suggestion of putting him in touch with a reputable businessman in New York, who has good connections in Government circles in Washington and whom he conceivably could have known for some time as a result of a normal business relationship. AMWHIP-1 agreed to return to Europe in two or three weeks especially to perform this task. He was in agreement with the undersigned's idea that, in order to play it as safely as possible, this meeting with UNSNAFU-19 should not take place at least until after the 24th of February, the expected return date of AMLASH-1 to Havana. Both for this

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reason and for AMWHIP's own business matters, we will program his return to Europe for sometime during the first or second weeks of March 1965. AMWHIP-1 was told that arrangements would be made for him to know about, or actually to meet, the ostensible source of this information in New York sometime during the last week of February or the first week of March. He was told also to keep in touch with the undersigned in the event of any news received from Europe concerning AMLASH-1 or any of the cast of characters in this memorandum.

4. The meeting terminated at 1610 hours and there were no incidences of a security nature to be reported.

WH/C/PI/TC