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27 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OPS/SovSat

ATTENTION : Mr. Miller

FROM : WE/1 - Granquist

1. On the afternoon of 28 October 1959, Jane Roman asked me whether we had any addresses for TIKRAMA/1 in the United States. She indicated that Mr. Fanich was interested in this and that the FBI might want to consider surveillance of T/1 in the U.S. at any place where he was known to us to be. One of the reasons for such surveillance would be to check on the possibility of fraud on his part.

2. The information which follows has been taken from the tapes of the conversations between T/1 and the Swedish Desk case officer. If it is incomplete, it is nevertheless the best we can do:

a. Some of the people whom T/1 expects to see on the West Coast during the approximate period 27 October to 5 or 6 November 1959 are:

- [redacted] Santa Monica, Calif.
- [redacted] Sierra Madre, Calif.
- Mrs. [redacted] U.S.
- [redacted] Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, Calif.

T/1 also planned to spend a day at Death Valley, Calif., but did not know in advance where he would be staying.

b. On 5 or 6 November he will return to Washington and contact us, probably staying at the Roger Smith Hotel. (Note: T/1 surveillance of hotel might pick up our case officer or others in contact with him, hence would be undesirable.)

c. After 9 November T/1 will stay with his friend, [redacted] in New York City. Corley's address is not known to us at this time, but can be provided. The New York Metropolitan Area telephone directory lists only one [redacted] and he at [redacted] Bronx.

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3. With respect to the practicality or wisdom of surveillance, we feel that the FBI decision should be made after due regard to the considerations already made known to them in connection with the monitoring of the New York City phase of the operation. The pros and cons would seem to be the same. As for the possibility of fraud, we are inclined to doubt that T/1 would be tempted in this direction. He was told by his case officer that he must be prepared to outline to his Soviet case officer in convincing fashion and in detail every effort he makes to fulfill the requirements given him. Furthermore, on the basis of past performance we believe he is truthful in what he tells us as far as this operation is concerned. However, in the opinion of the case officer, it is not unlike him - in strictly personal matters - occasionally to exaggerate if his own reputation would be enhanced thereby. It is problematic whether this tendency would ever extend to outright deceit.

4. In the interests of consistency, I thought this reply to Mrs. Roman ought to be channeled through you.

5. We would appreciate hearing from the Bureau what decision they make regarding surveillance of T/1.

Distribution:

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1 - CI/LSA
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