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INTER-AGENCY STAFF STUDY

Problem

To determine the factors and courses of action relating to U.S. intervention with force preferably with token Latin American support in Cuba in the event of Castro's death in order to ensure the replacement of the Castro regime with a friendly government.

A. Factors

1. Present Situation

(a) Cuba

Castro Cuba, dominated by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, poses a serious threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Within Cuba, the Castro regime is encountering currently serious economic difficulties. If the regime maintains its present firm political control of the island, however, and if there is a continued high level of Bloc assistance, conditions could begin to improve after 1962. (See Annex A)

(b) Latin America

Nine Latin American nations no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. The more important Latin American nations, however, maintain relations and are for a variety of reasons still reluctant to break relations with or join in collective action against Cuba. (See Annex B)

(c) United States

Restoration of the Castro regime and of the Communist apparatus is in the U.S. national interest.

(d) Sino-Soviet Bloc

Provides political and economic and military support to the Castro regime to promote Bloc objectives in Latin America. We do not believe the Sino-Soviet Bloc would defend Cuba militarily, although they have the capability to do so.

(e) Rest of World

Asian and African neutrals are generally split on the Castro issue while NATO and SEATO allies share U.S. evaluation of the problem but regard it as a U.S. responsibility.

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2. Assumptions

2. Assumptions

(a) Situations in event of Castro's death

(1) Cuba

The Communist Party would maintain control. Fortinos would probably continue as President and Raul Castro would probably assume the Premiership. The Cuban militia, the largest and most effective armed force in Cuba, would respond promptly to Raul's orders and would exterminate whatever scattered outbreaks of resistance may have occurred. The subsequent reign of terror would quickly establish the successor regime in control and would crush any hope of effective U.S. intervention short of a massive assault. The defense of Cuba under Raul would probably be ruthless and pushed to even greater extremes than under Fidel. The successor regime would, regardless of U.S. actions, blame the U.S. for Castro's death and would launch a violent anti-Castro propaganda campaign. There would not be an attack against Guantanamo. (See Annex C)

(2) Latin America

Latin American Governments and public opinion would generally believe that the U.S. was responsible for Castro's death. Latin American Governments and important sectors of the population would nevertheless, not publicly challenge our statement of innocence. Communist and pro-Communist elements as well as extreme nationalists and opportunistic political opponents of the existing governments would undoubtedly launch anti-American campaigns, with anti-Government overtones. These campaigns would probably include demonstrations and attacks against U.S. official installations. There would be no significant change in the number of nations which do not maintain relations with Cuba. (See Annex D)

(3) United States

The popular desire for vigorous action against Cuba would increase as a result of the Cuban regime's likely actions following Castro's death.

(4) Russ-Soviet Bloc

(4) Sino-Soviet Bloc

The Bloc would increase the propaganda campaign against United States, possibly including threats of military support which the Bloc would not supply.

(5) Rest of World

The Communist-inspired propaganda campaign would probably be echoed by a majority of neutralist nations. The U.S. would be widely blamed for Castro's death.

(b) Situation in event of U.S. invasion

(1) Cuba

The regime would mobilize all its forces and would attempt to rally public support. Most of the people would passively wait to see what happens. Many persons would defect from the Castro forces and the underground would become more active. The elements committed to the regime would fight, and numerous individuals and groups would resist until physically eliminated.

(2) Latin America

Although many Latin American Governments and important segments of the population would privately welcome the elimination of communism from Cuba, they would publicly decry U.S. military action as intervention and consequently a flagrant violation of U.S. commitments in the OAS (for these commitments, see Annex B). The Communist and pro-Castro elements, as well as extreme nationalist and opportunistic political opponents of the existing governments would intensify their anti-American campaign and would succeed to the extent of seriously threatening the stability of some governments and/or obtaining public denunciation of the U.S. followed in some instances by measures against U.S. national interests in these countries, including private American investments and the Alliance for Progress program. One or more Latin American nations might propose OAS action adverse to U.S. interests, which the U.S. could probably delay.

(3) Sino-Soviet Bloc

(3) Sino-Soviet Bloc

The Sino-Soviet Bloc would not use military force in Cuba but might apply pressure in other areas. Communist propaganda apparatus would attack U.S. on world-wide basis. The Bloc would introduce or support in the UN a resolution condemning the U.S..

(4) Rest of World

A majority of the neutral nations as well as important sectors of the population would publicly condemn the U.S.. Most of the neutrals would support a Bloc-inspired UN resolution charging the U.S. with having violated its commitments to the UN. (For these commitments see Annex 2)

* * * * * IMPORTANT - HOUSE PRELIMINARY

(c) Minimum Desirable Military-Political Conditions for Putting Plan into Action

(1) Cuba

The events stemming from Castro's death would create a chaotic situation where (a) the successor government would perpetrate widespread atrocities against its own people; (b) resistance would be open and widespread; (c) dissidents would take and appear to be in a position to hold for several days some Cuban territory; and (d) a substantial group of dissidents would call for outside assistance.

(2) Latin America

Latin American Governments would be in a position to resist internal pressures to undertake significant anti-U.S. measures both domestically and/or in the OAS.

(3) Sino-Soviet Bloc

The Sino-Soviet Bloc would not engage in major military action.

(4) Rest of the World

(4) Rest of the World

Remaining friendly governments would be in a position to resist internal pressures to undertake significant anti-U.S. measures both conventionally and/or in the U.S.

(5) United States

U.S. Congressional and public opinion would generally support the President's action. The U.S. armed forces would have five days notice before being ordered to intervene in order to assemble requisite force to accomplish its mission.

3. U.S. Resources to Accomplish Objective of Replacing Castro Regime with Friendly Government

- (a) U.S. military
- (b) Cuban exiles
- (c) Cuban underground
- (d) Diplomatic influence
- (e) Economic resources to assist friendly government
- (f) Psychological warfare
- (g) Favorable minority of Latin American countries
- (h) Favorable minority in rest of world
- (i) Possible but improbable token military support from L.A.

4. Obstacles to Accomplishment of Objective

- (a) Cuban forces, Cuban Communist apparatus, and partial public support
- (b) Communist international apparatus (apart from military intervention in Cuba)
- (c) Possible worldwide military and paramilitary pressure
- (d) Denunciations in international organizations of U.S. intervention
- (e) Communist-inspired demonstrations in Latin America against Americans and against anti-Communist governments

B. U.S. Steps to Accomplish Objective

1. Pre-Invasion

- (a) Create the above-described minimum desirable conditions in Cuba (see 2(c), page 5 above)

ACTION: CIA, DOD, State-USAID

SECRET-EYES ONLY

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- (b) Make known world-wide the creation of the minimum desirable conditions as they occur, as well as progress toward them.

ACTION: State-CEIA, CIA

- (c) Sound out the Chiefs of State of two countries regarding possible use of token forces with due regard for security. (Annex G)

ACTION: State

- (d) Evaluate and designate among Cuban exiles and underground groups those individuals who could best participate in the formation of an initial Cuban national, provincial, and municipal government.

ACTION: State (exiles), CIA (underground)

- (e) Review and improve as necessary existing structure for liaison and coordination within the Executive Department to insure that CINCLANT is kept aware of all aspects of the political and military situation. Augment CINCLANT's staff, as necessary.

ACTION: State, Defense, CIA

- (f) Lay groundwork for psychological warfare and press information programs for invasion support.

ACTION: State-CEIA

- (g) Keep key members of Congress progressively informed regarding general situation in Cuba.

ACTION: State

2. Invasion Planned

- (a) Invade Cuba with U.S. forces under CINCLANTFLT.

ACTION: DOD

- (b) Inform L.A. Governments that invasion is underway and warn them they can shortly expect Communist-directed violence in their countries. Invite their support and offer them assistance.

ACTION: State

(c) Organize

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

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- (e) Organize participation of anti-Castro forces and coordinate their activities with CINCSPAN.

ACTION: DOD, CIA, State

- (d) Launch all-out psychological warfare and propaganda campaign for all sectors, stressing the morality of the intervention.

ACTION: State-NSA, CIA and DOD

- (e) Use diplomatic action to reduce criticism of U.S. action insofar as possible.

ACTION: State

- (f) Organize civil government with participation of designated Cubans.

ACTION: DOD, State, CIA

- (g) Provide program for immediate emergency assistance to civil populace.

ACTION: DOD, State

- (h) Arrange for participation and support by other L.A. forces which may be induced to join.

ACTION: DOD, State

3. Post Invasion Phase

- (a) Seek out and eliminate pro-Communist resistance.

ACTION: DOD, CIA

- (b) Continue occupation in force and replace, as feasible, military government installed during invasion with provisional Cuban government.

ACTION: State, CIA, DOD

- (c) Provide plan for long-range economic assistance.
(See Annex H)

ACTION: State, AID

(d) Take

SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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(d) Take measures to control entry into Cuba.

ACTION: State

(e) Re-establish a U.S. Country Team in Havana.

ACTION: State

C. Evaluation /Note: This evaluation is based upon the assumption that the above-described minimum desirable political-military situation has been achieved.

1. Suitability

The United States steps proposed above are suitable for the quick eradication of the Castro regime and its replacement by a friendly government. We can foresee no way other than invasion to accomplish the objective as stated in the problem.

2. Feasibility

The proposed steps are feasible. The logistics problem is simplified because of the proximity of Cuba to the United States and its great distance to the Bloc. We have the preponderance of military and economic power to carry out the task quickly.

Cuba is not believed to be important enough to the Soviet Union to justify the risk of a major war. Moreover, the USSR cannot supply a significant force over long sea distances against the hostile navy. Therefore, the USSR will not intervene militarily. The USSR may increase its pressure in Berlin, Laos or other parts of the world, but will stop short of a direct major confrontation with the United States.

3. Acceptability as to Cost

(a) Military

Castro's armed forces now have the ability to inflict significant losses upon an invading force. We believe, however, that losses would be acceptable given the size and power of the forces we plan to bring against Cuba. Our forces in other parts of the world must be prepared to handle increased brush-fire actions generated by the Soviet Bloc.

(b) Economic

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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(b) Economic

The Nation's economy can sustain any armed intervention in Cuba and the subsequent program of rehabilitation in Cuba.

(c) Political

The political penalties which the U.S. will suffer as a result of having invaded Cuba in violation of U.S. international commitments, including those to the UN and OAS, are severe, but can be borne. The serious criticisms of the U.S. which will be aroused by this illegal and interventionist act will be offset by the reservoir of good will which the U.S. enjoys throughout the Free World. Although the U.S. cannot defend this action as justified under international law, we can stress the morality of the action on the basis that a chaotic, near civil war situation exists off our shores where millions of Cubans are seeking freedom by throwing off the Communist yoke and have requested our assistance.

The disappearance of Castro from the Cuban political scene under widely-known conditions of chaos and open resistance to his regime will to a large extent destroy the Castro myth and the appeal his regime has had for the peoples of many underdeveloped nations.

The destruction of a Communist regime and its replacement by a friendly government will remove a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere and will weaken the belief that the Communist bloc is the eventual winner of the world struggle and should therefore be placated rather than opposed.

Our relations with friendly nations will remain good, after perhaps a slight deterioration in certain instances. American investments will not suffer in the long run. The Alliance for Progress program will not encounter serious obstacles as a result of this action. If the operation is quickly and successfully accomplished, the political damage will be correspondingly reduced.

Widespread organized Communist disturbances will occur immediately but the more quickly the Castro regime is

crushed

SECRET - EYES ONLY

crushed the greater the difficulty the Communists will encounter in maintaining existing disturbances and in mounting further disturbances. A successful invasion may strengthen the will of Latin American Governments to destroy the Communist menace in their own countries.

The Congress and the people of the U.S. will applaud the action.

4. Recommendations

(a) That upon news of the death or other elimination of Castro from the Cuban scene, you order that the U.S. armed forces prepare immediately for armed intervention in Cuba in a manner that these preparations are kept from public knowledge and are subject to immediate halt.

(b) That before intervening in Cuba, you determine on the basis of reliable intelligence whether the minimum desirable political conditions in Cuba exist.

(c) That, if you determine that the minimum desirable political conditions exist in Cuba, you review the international situation and determine that the danger posed by the Castro regime to the U.S. national security is of such an order of magnitude as to justify intervention in Cuba by U.S. forces, which would be contrary to international law, including the UN Charter and OAS commitments.

(d) That, if after reviewing the international situation you determine that armed intervention in Cuba is in the overall national interest, you order intervention in Cuba with the use of U.S. armed forces.

ARA:OMA:RAHarwitch/ynd

11-9-61

cc: ARA - Mr. Coerr
ARA - Mr. Wollam
Defense - Mr. Briggs
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CIA - Mr. Davis
CIA - Mr. Barkely