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**SendTo:** CN=Tom Samoluk/O=ARRB @ ARRB  
**CopyTo:** CN=Eileen Sullivan/O=ARRB @ ARRB  
**DisplayBlindCopyTo:**  
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**From:** CN=Douglas Horne/O=ARRB  
**DisplayFromDomain:**  
**DisplayDate:** 11/13/1997  
**DisplayDate\_Time:** 10:45:08 AM  
**ComposedDate:** 11/13/1997  
**ComposedDate\_Time:** 10:38:30 AM  
**Subject:** Next Week's Press Release on Military Documents  
I would like one more chance to lobby for inclusion of the 1/31/64 document into your press release package for November 18th.Perhaps when you see what I have drawn arrows next to on that one, you will agree with me. It is the only indicator in our pile of 6 (5 plus 1) documents for the media that the entire debate in 1963 changed from "overt military intervention" based on a long shopping list of pretexts, to "contingency plan for a(n) (instigated) coup," in which the only acceptable pretext becomes a military coup, and "contingency plan" means military intervention, on some scale. That evolution in thinking by the Cuban task force (ICCCA) is a big part of the story.  
**Body:**  
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**DeliveryReport:** B  
**ReturnReceipt:**  
**Categories:**