

## Memorandum

TO: Jeremy Gunn  
FROM: Eric Scheinkopf  
RE: Church Committee Documents - Box 37, Folder 1 - Interview with Andrew Goodpaster  
FILE No. 4.0.2 Goodpaster

The Church Committee staff interviewed General Andrew Goodpaster on July 15, 1975. While General Goodpaster is known for his service in the Eisenhower Administration as Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower and as Defense Liaison Officer at the White House, he also served a carryover term of two months in the new Kennedy Administration as an advisor for the setting up of the new White House staff.

The memorandum deals with both the division of responsibility and the decision making process in the Eisenhower Administration, as well as the issue of assassination discussions, Presidential communication with DCI Dulles and the issue of plausible deniability/circumlocutions.

According to the memo, General Goodpaster indicated that Eisenhower was "not prone to using 'back-channels' of communication." The memo writer, Frederick Baron, said that Goodpaster mentioned the general rule of decision-making in the Eisenhower White House - "Issues discussed by each in the presence of all." The non-concurrence would have had to be expressed clearly as an official could not sit in silence with the hope of raising a dissenting view later with the President.

With regard to assassination discussions, Goodpaster stated "I can say flatly that I have no recollection whatsoever of the matter of assassinations ever coming from the President or being raised in his presence...I never heard that assassination was discussed even as a general proposition." Baron felt that General Goodpaster was reluctant to speculate about the President's possible reaction to a suggestion of an assassination plan. But Baron did write that Goodpaster said he thought Eisenhower would not have anything to do with an assassination.

Goodpaster also talked about Eisenhower's relationship with Allen Dulles. He said that as far as he knew Dulles didn't meet privately with Eisenhower. The only reason for such a meeting would have been to discuss a senior-level personnel problem. In addition, Goodpaster said Allen Dulles did not have the same "one-on-one" relationship to the President as did his brother John Foster. Goodpaster said the President "used Allen Dulles as his intelligence man," and not as his "confidant." However, Goodpaster did not recall an 11/25/60 meeting where Gordon Gray left and therefore did leave Allen Dulles and Eisenhower alone for 10 minutes, supposedly to discuss Tibet and Cuba. According to Goodpaster, this would have been unusual.

With regard to the issue of plausible deniability, Goodpaster said that “I guarantee you that circumlocution from Allen Dulles would not have been tolerated by Eisenhower at this time on an operation of this kind (assassination plot).” It was Goodpaster’s contention that Eisenhower was especially cautious because certain of the safeguards on the U-2 operation had not worked. Goodpaster said if there was even a passing reference to assassination, the President “would insist on a full explanation.”

FILE NAME (goodpast.er)