

To: Joan

From: Dan Wedemeyer, Intern

Date: July 12, 1995

Re: Secret Service/Warren Commission Cross Referencing

The following is a summary of the information regarding the Secret Service found in the Warren Commission Report, Hearings, and Exhibits, found at the locations listed in the Meagher directory.

The first section contains the information located in the Commission Report, the second, information located in the hearings, and the third, information located in the Exhibits.

I was unable to locate two of the exhibit volumes, so the following exhibits related to the Secret Service are not included in this memorandum: CE 345, CE 1354, CE 1355, CE 1356, CE 1360.

#### Part I: Warren Commission Report

##### General:

Pp. 23-26 Conclusions: The Comm'n recognizes that the Secret Service's job varies in difficulty based on the individual serving as president, but the Secret Service must work within its limitations. The Comm'n recommends improvements:

- 1) The Secret Service should improve in developing or securing adequate resources of personnel and facilities.
- 2) Criteria and procedures to identify and protect against persons considered a threat to the president were not adequate prior to the assassination.
  - a) The Protective Research Section (PRS) lacked sufficient personnel and mechanical and technical assistance.
  - b) Prior to the assassination, the Secret Service failed to recognize the need to identify potential sources of danger to the president other than direct threats. The Secret Service largely relied upon other agencies to supply the information necessary to fulfill its preventative responsibilities.
- 3) The Comm'n feels there was insufficient coordination of information between the Secret Service and other federal agencies concerned with presidential protection. An example is that the FBI had no official responsibility under Secret Service criteria to refer to the Secret Service the information it had on Oswald.

4) Advance preparation for the President's trip was deficient in some respects.

a) Secret Service procedures at the time of the Dallas trip did not include well defined instructions as to the responsibilities of local police in protecting the President.

b) Secret Service procedures for detecting an assassin in a building along the motorcade route were inadequate. The Secret Service did not, as a matter of practice, check any building along the President's route. The job of observing windows along the route was assigned to local police and Secret Service agents riding in the motorcade.

5) The configuration of the presidential limo and the seating arrangements of the Secret Service agents did not afford them the opportunity to aid the President at the first signs of danger.

6) The above notwithstanding, the agents most closely responsible for the President's safety reacted promptly.

Recommendations: Prompted by the assassination, the Secret Service initiated a review of its total operations in a planning document dated 8/27/64:

1) A committee of cabinet members should be assigned the task of reviewing and overseeing the protective activities of the Secret Service and other federal agencies.

2) Determining if all or part of protective responsibility should be transferred from the Secret Service is a decision for the president or for Congress.

3) The Comm'n recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant to supervise the Secret Service.

4) The Comm'n suggests that the Secret Service completely overhaul its facilities devoted to advance detection of potential threats against the president. The Comm'n suggests:

a) Quick development of better criteria to define potential threats to the president that should be brought to its attention by other agencies.

b) The Secret Service should expedite plans to improve data processing techniques.

c) The Secret Service should enter into agreements with other agencies to insure receipt of desired information.

5) The Secret Service should improve protective measures followed in the planning and conducting of presidential motorcades, especially the attention given to buildings along the route.

6) The Secret Service should improve and formalize its relationships with local police in the area to be visited by the president.

7) The Secret Service should be provided with personnel and resources needed to implement the new criteria and procedures.

8) There should be a closer liaison between the Secret Service and other federal agencies.

#### **Advance Preparations Dallas Trip**

P. 29: Advance preparation for the Dallas trip was primarily the responsibility of Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, a member of the White House Detail, who acted as advance agent, and Forrest V. Sorrels, special agent in charge of the Dallas Office of the Secret Service.

As advance agent, Lawson was responsible for arranging the timetable for the presidential visit and coordinating local activities. His most important responsibilities were to take preventative action against anyone in Dallas considered a threat and plan security measures for the luncheon and motorcade.

Pp. 29-30: Lawson checked PRS files in Washington and found no one deemed to be of potential danger to the President in the Dallas area.

On November 12, 1963, he conferred with the local police and FBI Office about potential dangers to the President. He planned surveillance for those involved in the demonstration against Adlai Stevenson in October 1963. Police and FBI identified no one as potentially dangerous.

Pp. 30-31: Gerald Baker, agent in charge of the White House Detail asked Agent Sorrels to examine potential luncheon sights. The Trade Mart was eventually selected in spite of potential security risks. Security was arranged by Sorrels and Lawson.

Pp. 31-39: Motorcade Route. Lawson and Sorrels selected the motorcade route. Sorrels selected the route based on his experience in protection assignments in Dallas since 1936.

- A geographical and structural description of the route and of Dealey Plaza.

- P. 39: Arrangements were made for crowd and traffic control with the Dallas police. No arrangements were made to inspect buildings because the Secret Service did not make such requests.

P. 71: Under the advance plan of the Secret Service and Dallas police, police officers were to keep unauthorized people away from the Stemmons Freeway area.

### Motorcade, Participation in

Pp. 43-46: The order of vehicles in the motorcade and the occupants and duties thereof.

### Reaction to Shots

Pp. 50-52: Reaction of Special Agent Hill to the shots and his actions keeping Mrs. Kennedy in the car.

The reactions of other agents: Special Agent Ready attempted to run toward the presidential limo, but was called back. Most of the others simply drew their weapons.

No agents stayed at the scene; they remained with their assignment per procedure. Sorrels was the first Agent to return to Dealey, around 20-25 minutes after the shooting.

### Security Measures Parkland Hospital

Pp. 57-58: Once the President was in the trauma room, agents positioned themselves in strategic areas around the room. Lawson insured that Dallas police kept the public and the media away from the hospital.

Agents stationed at posts farther down the motorcade route from Dealey were redeployed.

Agents in charge of security at Love Field secured the area.

Agents arranged for LBJ to travel from Parkland to Love Field.

### Preventative Intelligence and Protective Measures

Pp. 428-33: Adequacy of PRS.

- The duties of PRS
- The volume of threatening communications handled by PRS up to November 1963.
- PRS asked the White House mailroom to forward to them any communication that in any way suggested that someone wants to harm the president.

Pp. 430-31: Summary of the procedure PRS followed to bring risky individuals to the attention of the White House Detail.

Pp. 431-32: Secret Service requests to other agencies for info were similar to the White House mailroom procedure in broadness. Agencies interpreted this to require disclosures of only overt threats.

P. 432: Comm'n believed these procedures to be inadequate and felt that efforts were too largely directed to "crank" threats.

PRS should have investigated the Stevenson demonstrators to determine if they would be a threat to the President.

Pp. 440-44: Nonreferral of Oswald to the Secret Service. Robert I. Bouck, Special Agent in charge of PRS said that they would have watched Oswald had the FBI shared their information on him with the Secret Service.

P. 441: FBI Agent Hosty said that even if he recalled that Oswald worked at the Texas School Book Depository, he would not have informed the Secret Service because in interpreting his instructions on referral, he did not see Oswald as a threat.

P. 444: Comm'n said that although the FBI's referral instructions were inadequate, the Secret Service bears principal responsibility for the communication failure.

### **Violation of Regulations (The Cellar)**

Pp. 449-52: Nine off duty Secret Service agents drank alcohol at the Fort Worth Press Club, but none became intoxicated.

P. 450: Seven of the nine moved on to the Cellar. No agents drank alcohol there and they all returned to their rooms between 2:45 and 5 am.

The agents on the midnight shift went to the Cellar for their half-hour break. This was neither in accordance with or violative of regulations.

Each of the nine that visited the Press Club or Cellar had assignments with the motorcade the next morning beginning at 8:00 am. Each reported on time fully capable of performing their duties.

P. 451: Although the use of alcohol in any quantity while on duty was violative of regulations, Secret Service Chief Rowley did not take any action against the agents because he did not want to infer that their indiscretions contributed to the assassination in any way.

The Comm'n chastises the agents, but finds no connection between their indiscretions and the failure to prevent the assassination.

## Investigative Work After the Assassination

Pp. 96-97: Mentions that the Secret Service participated in May 24, 1964 tests conducted in Dealey Plaza on the trajectory of the shots fired from the TSBD.

## Part II: Warren Commission Hearings

### Advance Preparations Dallas Trip

Volume 2, Pp. 107-10: Agent Kellerman: discusses the inquiry made to PRS regarding the Dallas trip. He did not make it, but assumes that it was made.

Discusses how PRS did not relay much info to him and how he was surprised at this based upon Dallas being a large metropolitan area.

Volume 4, Pp. 319-26: Agent Lawson: discussing his role and observations of preparing for the Dallas trip.

Pp. 333-46: Agent Lawson: discussing arrangements at Love Field and at the Trade Mart, PRS, and coordination with local authorities.

Volume 5, Pp. 465-66: Chief Rowley: discussing the new PRS criteria developed after the assassination.

Volume 6, p. 250: Dallas Police Officer Foster: discussing his orders to keep all unauthorized personnel off the overpass; he allowed workers on anyway.

P. 255: Dallas Police Officer White: states that he had same instructions as Foster.

P. 256: Dallas Police Officer Murphy: same as above.

Volume 7, pp. 334-41: Agent Sorrels: pp. 334-45: discussing preliminary plans the Secret Service follows for presidential visits and for the Dallas visit specifically.

Pp. 336-38: discussing motorcade composition and route.

Pp. 338-41: discussing PRS issues as exercised in Dallas (including cooperation of local officials).

Pp. 577-87: Dallas Police Captain Lawrence: discussing the plan for traffic control and security on the motorcade route as discussed with the Secret Service. Also discusses the Secret Service involvement (or lack thereof) in investigating the officers stationed in Dealey Plaza.

Sorrels Exhibit 4: November 30, 1963 memorandum by Sorrels outlining the preparations taken in Dallas.

### Preventative Intelligence and Protective Measures

Volume 1, p. 200: Marguerite Oswald: states that the FBI and Secret Service had a list of people in Dallas that should have been watched and that L.H. Oswald was not on that list.

Volume 2, pp. 109-10: Agent Kellerman: references the lack of attention given to the Stevenson protestors by the Secret Service before the Dallas trip.

Volume 4, pp. 295-314: Agent Bouck (head of PRS): describes the functions, practices, and purposes of PRS.

Volume 5, p. 97: J. Edgar Hoover: covers the question of whether Oswald was ever associated with the FBI; no mention of Secret Service here.

Pp. 120-21: McCone and Helms: discussing the alleged connection of Oswald to the CIA; no mention of Secret Service here.

Volume 12, p. 23: Assistant Dallas Police Chief Batchelor: states that he realized that the Secret Service does not want the president's route to become public with too much advance notice.

### Motorcade, Participation in

Volume 2, pp. 64-70: Agent Kellerman: describes the physical layout of the presidential limo from photos;  
discusses the bubbletop and its potential effectiveness in deflecting bullets;  
discusses the conversation with O'Donnell where it was decided to remove the bubbletop;  
discusses the types and locations of cars in the motorcade and the occupants thereof.

P. 116: Agent Greer: discusses his positioning of the limo and the speed at which it was traveling before the shots.

Pp. 135-37: Agent C. Hill: describes his location and actions and the

location of others prior to the shots.

Pp. 147-48: Agent Youngblood: his testimony.

Volume 4, pp. 130-32: Governor Connally: identifies Secret Service agents in the limo, describes how Secret Service agents shielded crowd from limo when it stopped.

Pp. 326-28: Agent Lawson: describes Secret Service and police coordination of motorcade security.

Pp. 335-36: Lawson: discussed the special NY practice of motorcade security.

Pp. 349-51: Lawson: describes the events of the motorcade as they occurred.

Volume 5, p. 561: LBJ: discusses being accompanied by Secret Service agents to meet JFK when he landed at Love Field.

Volume 7, p. 342: Agent Sorrels: discusses his observations of buildings along the motorcade route.

Pp. 439-40: Senator Yarborough: affidavit describing the location and reactions of Secret Service agents during and after the shooting.

P. 446: Kenneth O'Donnell: discusses the number and location of Secret Service agents in his car and the location of the Secret Service follow up car.

P. 473: Powers (Special Ass't to JFK): same as O'Donnell, but also mentions Agent Hill protecting Mrs. Kennedy.

P. 474: Carter (Ass't to LBJ): rode in vice-presidential follow up car and discusses the location of Secret Service cars in the motorcade.

### **Violation of Regulations (The Cellar)**

Volume 5, pp. 451-62: Chief Rowley: says that four of the agents out the night before the motorcade were in the motorcade, specifically in the follow up car. He says that there was no sign that their performance was inadequate or lead to the assassination;

discusses the allegations made by an agent charging that he was framed because he wanted to talk about how the agents out the night before did not perform adequately;

discusses the two year period rule (where an agent not hired from the gov't must be assigned to the White House Detail within two years or he will be dropped);

discusses a similar situation in Hyannis where agents may have used alcohol



while on duty;

more discussion of the situation in Dallas.

Volume 15, p. 422: Powell (an employee of Ruby): she refers to the Cellar as “where the Secret Service men go.”

### Reaction to Shots

Volume 2, pp. 73-77: Agent Kellerman: says he heard the first shot and heard JFK say “My God, I am hit,” describes the reactions of the other occupants, and his assessment of the direction from which the shots came.

Pp. 117-21: Agent Greer: describes his reaction to the shots. Says that he could see Connally, but not JFK. Discusses the location of the limo when each shot was fired and his recollections of radio communications in the limo.

Pp. 138-39: Agent C. Hill: observed the motions of JFK after each shot, ran to the limo, shielded JFK and Mrs. Kennedy in route to Parkland.

Pp. 148-49: Agent Youngblood: discusses the location of LBJ’s limo at the time of the shots, its location in relation to other cars before, during, and after shots were fired, and his location when shots were fired.

Volume 4, p. 325: Agent Lawson: states that the job of the Secret Service is to get the president out of the area, not to apprehend the shooter unless it can be done without endangering the president.

Pp. 352-53: Lawson: his reaction to the shots.

Volume 5, p. 180: Mrs. Kennedy: describes her observations and reactions toward the shots. Mentions Agent Hill or Kellerman yelling to get to the hospital.

P. 561: LBJ: describes Agent Youngblood’s reaction to the shots.

Volume 7, pp. 346-47: Agent Sorrels: his reactions to and observations of the shots.

P. 440: Senator Yarborough: says he saw Secret Service men looking to the right rear during the shots. Says that he was shocked at the lack of instantaneous response by the agents once shots were heard.

P. 473: Powers: describes Agent C. Hill’s reaction to the shots.

Pp. 474-75: Carter: describes Agent Youngblood's vaulting on top of LBJ when shots began.

### Security Measures, Parkland Hospital

Volume 2, pp. 80, 96-97: Agent Kellerman: states that he positioned himself in the center of the emergency room, found a phone and called Agent Behn in Washington, set up security posts around the emergency room, and spearheaded the removal of JFK's body from the hospital.

P. 126: Agent Greer: positioned himself in the treatment room and only allowed medical personnel and priests in or out.

P. 142: Agent C. Hill: started in the emergency room, then moved out to call Washington to make arrangements for removal of the body.

Pp. 151-53: Agent Youngblood: secured a room for LBJ and his party and arranged for unmarked police cars to evacuate LBJ. Also discusses the trip from Parkland to Love Field.

Volume 6, p. 43: Dr. Baxter (Parkland staff): says that he did not investigate JFK's remains as thoroughly as he would had it been an average victim because the Secret Service was there and ordered the room cleared. The staff deferred to all of the wishes of the Secret Service.

Volume 15, pp. 76, 80: Kantor (reporter at Parkland): states that a Secret Service agent prevented his entrance into the hospital.

### Investigative Work After the Assassination: Reports Withheld

Volume 2, p. 163: Robert Jackson (photographer): says that he never discussed the events he witnessed re seeing a gun.

P. 199: Worrell (witness at scene): discusses changes in recollection since he signed his affidavit.

Volume 3, p. 148: Brennan (present at Texas School Book Depository): spoke with an agent regarding his reasons for not initially identifying Oswald.

Pp. 348-49: B.J. Davis (witnessed Tippit murder): mentions an affidavit he gave to agents on December 1, 1963.

Volume 6, p. 17: Perry (attended JFK at Parkland): states that he had spoken previously to Secret Service agents prior to speaking to the Warren Comm'n.

P. 57: RC Jones (attended to JFK at Parkland): says that he had discussed his knowledge with agents prior to testifying before the Comm'n.

P. 75: Diesecke (attended JFK at Parkland): see Jones.

P. 94: Shaw (treated Connally): same as above.

P. 103: Gregory (treated Connally): same as above.

P. 112: Shires (treated Connally): same as above.

P. 119: Standridge (head nurse at Parkland): same as above.

P. 123: Wester (nurse at Parkland): same as above.

P. 124: Ross (operating room technician at Parkland): same as above.

Volume 9, p. 159: Gregory (acquaintance of Oswald): mentions a conversation he had with a Secret Service agent on November 23, 1963 re Oswald.

### **Investigative Work After the Assassination: Other**

Volume 3, pp. 363-64: Dr. C. Carrico (Parkland staff): states he was interviewed by two Secret Service agents a week after the assassination.

P. 387: Dr. M. Perry (Parkland staff): states he was interviewed by two Secret Service agents a week after the assassination.

Volume 4, p. 199: Chief Curry (Dallas P.D.): mentions conversations between himself and Agent Sorrels and between Sorrels and Ruby.

Pp. 356-58: Agent Lawson: discusses Sorrels' interrogation of Oswald.

Volume 5, p. 134: Agent Kelley: describes tests conducted in Dealey on December 5,

1964.

P. 249: Henry Wade (Dallas D.A.): discusses the lack of Secret Service cooperation in investigating the murder of Oswald.

P. 451: Chief Rowley: mentions the investigation of the conduct of the "Cellar" agents.

Volume 6, p. 221: J. Hill (employee at Texas School Book Depository): says he directed men he believed to be agents to the 6th floor of the building.

P. 413: Bledsoe (witnessed Oswald's movements after the assassination): testifies that an agent had shown her a shirt after the assassination that the Comm'n was showing her then.

Volume 7, p. 91: Applin (witnessed the apprehension of Oswald): mentions a discussion with an agent in passing.

P. 128: Boyd (Dallas police officer investigating the assassination): states that there were agents present during the interrogation of Oswald.

Pp. 505-06: Markham (witnessed Tippit murder): discusses Secret Service connection with an USIA television report on Comm'n findings.

P. 575: Zapruder: states that Agent Sorrels helped him develop his film and that he gave a copy to Sorrels.

P. 590: Agent Kelley: an affidavit stating that he and Sorrels were present at the interrogation of Oswald on November 24, 1963. Swears that Oswald made no mention of Cuba or Mexico.

P. 592: Agent Sorrels: same as above with Kelley.

Volume 8, p. 342: Bates (copied notes for Oswald): states that an agent brought her to testify before the Comm'n.

Volume 9, p. 159: Gregory (acquaintance of Oswald): discusses a conversation he had with an agent on November 23, 1963 regarding Oswald.

Pp. 390-94: R. Paine: states that the Secret Service relayed messages from her to Marina Oswald. Also states that agents showed her a note allegedly written by Oswald on the murder attempt on General Walker.

Volume 10, pp. 41, 44, 46: Bringuier: Comm'n counsel states that he will request the Secret Service to search for a photo Bringuier referred to. Bringuier said he gave agents a copy of a Fair Play for Cuba application Oswald had given to a friend of Bringuier.

Gave agents a copy of an August 21, 1963 press release he issued requesting the reader to write his Congressman requesting an investigation of Oswald. Also refers to more documents he gave to agents regarding Mexican associates of Oswald.

P. 70: Steele (New Orleans associate of Oswald): mentions photos that he was shown by agents showing him passing out literature.

Pp. 171-74: Stovall (owner of mapping company where Oswald briefly worked): says that agents took Oswald's employee information card and application from him.

P. 225: Alba (New Orleans acquaintance of Oswald; owned garage Oswald often visited): says that agents took the shooting magazines Oswald had looked through in his garage.

P. 281: Hulen (associate director of Dallas YMCA): says that agents requested him to inspect guest record to determine if Oswald had stayed there.

P. 377: Price (claims to have seen Oswald at a Dallas rifle range): states that agents had shown him photos of people and the rifle to identify.

Volume 11, pp 206-07: Brennan (saw Oswald shooting from 6th floor window): states that he could always contact the Secret Service if he changed his mind about identifying Oswald.

P. 226: Ryder (clerk at Irving Sporting Goods that allegedly worked on the rifle): states that he was interviewed by agents after the assassination.

P. 339: Dean Andrews (New Orleans attorney): affirms that agents had shown him photos.

Volume 12, p. 413: Clardy (Dallas detective): states that Sorrels had spoken to Ruby after he shot Oswald.

Pp. 431-42: Dean (Dallas police officer that had attended to Ruby): discusses Sorrels questioning of Ruby and states that agents escorted Marguerite Oswald in Parkland.

Volume 13, pp. 62-81: Agent Sorrels: testimony on his questioning of Ruby and his connection with Ruby's trial.

### Agents Reported Shot

Volume 5, p. 214: Wade (Dallas D.A.): discusses report he heard that two agents had been killed.

Volume 15, p. 574: Rea: testifying as to Ruby's whereabouts on November 22-23, 1963. States that he heard that agents had been shot during the assassination.

P. 583: Saunders: discussing a rumor among the media that an agent was shot along with JFK.

### Investigative Work After Assassination: At the Scene

Volume 5, p. 181: Rowland (present at Dealey): says her husband saw a man with a rifle in a window of the Texas School Book Depository and figured that it was an agent protecting the motorcade.

P. 196: Fischer (witness): states that he saw agents running to the top of the grassy knoll right after the shooting and then, twenty minutes later, saw investigators in the windows of the Texas School Book Depository.

P. 221: J. Hill (witness): recounts a conversation with an agent insisting that she was wrong in claiming that there were more than three shots. Also, discusses how agents confiscated her friend's camera.

P. 283: Romack (witness): agents called him requesting a deposition.

P. 312: Harkness (Dallas police officer on duty in Dealey): when he investigated the rear of the Texas School Book Depository, he encountered men claiming to be Secret Service agents.

P. 330: Shelley (employee of Texas School Book Depository): says he directed men he believed to be agents to the 6th floor of the building.

Volume 7, p. 107: Weitzman (worked on the investigation): says agents were with him when he scaled the wall near the overpass immediately after the shots were fired. Also says he found a piece of JFK's skull in the street and turned it over to agents.

Pp. 332-60: Sorrels: told Dallas police to take him to the Texas School Book Depository right after leaving Parkland.

Discusses preliminary fact-finding at Texas School Book Depository  
Discusses statements made by witnesses  
Discusses his questioning of Oswald and observing police lineups  
Discusses his interaction with Oswald and law enforcement personnel. Also  
discusses Ruby

P. 479: Cabell (Dallas Mayor): noticed agent with a submachine gun focusing on the Texas School Book Depository after shots were fired.

P. 535, 537: Smith (Dallas police officer): encountered man purporting to be an agent behind the bushes on the grassy knoll immediately after the shooting. Also states that he did not see anyone he knew to be agents at the Texas School Book Depository around twenty minutes after the shooting.

### Part III: Warren Commission Exhibits

#### Advance Preparation Dallas Trip

CE 767: Preliminary Survey Report prepared by Agent Lawson on November 19, 1963 concerning the trip to Dallas.

CE 768: Final Survey Report prepared by Lawson dated November 30, 1963.

CE 769: statement by Lawson concerning his official duties from November 4-22, 1963 in preparation for the trip to Dallas.

CE 770: "Wanted for Treason" circular.

CE 876: Aerial view of Dealey Plaza.

CE 1022: Letter from the Secret Service to the Comm'n dated March 26, 1964 regarding the release of the motorcade route to the press.

CE 2114: Photographic views of highway markings in the vicinity of Dealey Plaza.

CE 2116: Aerial view of freeway convergence west of the triple underpass.

CE 2188: History of Elm Street and the formation of the triple underpass.

CE 2967: Photo of a sign on Main Street in Dallas directing westbound traffic to turn

right on Houston Street to access the Dallas-Fort Worth turnpike.

### Motorcade, Participation in

CE 768: same as CE 768 above.

CE 1024: Letter from the Secret Service to the Comm'n dated June 11, 1964 with attached statements of Secret Service personnel concerning the events surrounding the assassination.

### Agents Reported Shot

CE 1974: FBI report dated August 1, 1964, on transcripts of Dallas police radio transmissions on November 22-24, 1963.

### Security Measures Parkland Hospital

CE 772: Statement of Agent Lawson concerning his activities and official duties on November 22 and 23.

CE 1024: see CE 772.

CE 1026: Secret Service memorandum dated March 19, 1964, regarding "Secret Service Report on the Assassination of President Kennedy."

### Preventative Intelligence and Protective Measures

CE 761: Chart showing the staff of PRS on November 22, 1963.

CE 762: Document prepared by Agent Bouck entitled "Protective Research Cases, November 1961 through November 1963."

CE 763: Document listing the criteria used by the PRS in screening White House mail.

CE 765: Secret Service form 1609 used in requesting information from mental institutions concerning inmates of interest to the Secret Service.

CE 766: Document setting forth sample cases illustrating several phases of the PRS process.



CE 836: Letter from FBI to the Comm'n dated March 31, 1964 furnishing the criteria employed in determining what information should be supplied to the Secret Service.

CE 1021: Letter from Secret Service to Comm'n dated April 9, 1964, answering questions contained the Comm'n letter dated March 24, 1964.

### **Violation of Regulations (The Cellar)**

CE 1018: Excerpt from the United States Secret Service Manual § 10, ch. I, p.7.

CE 1019: Letter from Secret Service to Comm'n dated May 5, 1964.

CE 1020: Secret Service report dated December 10, 1963.

CE 1021: see CE 1020.

### **Investigative Work After the Assassination: Other**

CE 875: Album of photos taken by the Secret Service from the 6th floor window of the Texas School Book Depository on December 5, 1963.

CE 2578: FBI report dated May 28, 1964 on an interview of a Secret Service Agent James M. Howard in Washington, DC.

CE 2579: FBI reports dated June 2, 1964, on interviews of Thayer Waldo (agents are mentioned in the interview).

CE 3119: Secret Service Report dated December 3, 1963 on the investigation concerning Oswald's activities in New Orleans.

