MEMORANDUM

June 18, 1996

To: Jeremy Gunn
            Mary McAuliffe

From: Joe Freeman

Subject: CIA-referred records in the HSCA collection

Per your directive, I've been giving some thought as to how to best utilize CIA team resources in identifying easily-cleared CIA-referred HSCA documents.   I don't know if the window of opportunity for utilizing these resources has already passed, or when it may open again, but my current thoughts, transmitted for discussion purposes, are contained herein, grouped according to core tasks and the organizational issues they raise.

A. <u>Defining the Universe of CIA-referred HSCA Documents for Purposes of This Project</u>

The most reasonable course, it seems to me, is to define the universe as those HSCA documents for which we have NARA-referral sheets indicating a referral to the CIA.   As you know, we have a copied set of these sheets (corresponding to Matt/Kris's referral notebooks at NARA I).   Our set is organized in ascending numerical record order, enabling CIA team members (or, more appropriately, me: see Note below) to use the set to simply go through the HSCA boxes.   According to a quick computer database search, this gives us a universe of approximately 975 documents.   This number includes not only the HSCA Numbered Files record series, but also the Security Classified Files and Security Classified Testimony record series.   Subtracting the fifty or so CIA-referred documents already processed or in the pipeline, this leaves approximately 925 records to be scanned by CIA team members. (In some cases -- probably 75-100 records -- there will be referral sheets for documents whose RIFs state that the record is already open in full.   These should be treated as referred documents until such time as a physical verification takes place at NARA II.)

As you know, there is some indeterminate number of documents which may in fact be "referred" (i.e., if one looks for them in the public collection at NARA II, one finds a withdrawal slip marked "CIA") but for which there is no withdrawal sheet in Matt/Kris's notebooks (and, more often or not, such documents would not have actually been sent to the CIA with the first above-referenced category of documents).   These documents will be "missed" if we define the universe as I propose.   But the only way to definitively "catch" this second category of documents -- and thus define the entire "true" universe of "referred" documents, is to do an exhaustive box-at-a-time, folder-by-folder review of the

NARA II version of the HSCA collection, noting any instance where a withdrawal slip citing the CIA appears.   This seems to me to be beyond the scope of what you have in mind, as well as beyond the likely physical and mental endurance of the CIA team members themselves.

A reasonable middle approach might be the following: in addition to the referred documents identified via NARA's referral notebook, I could also mark for CIA-team review any HSCA/CIA documents which are not in the former universe but which are marked in the boxes with NARA-generated paper tabs marked "CIA".   In my experience these tabs are also relatively accurate indicators of which documents are actually withdrawn out at NARA II.   I'm not certain at this point how much this would expand the universe of approximately 925 documents cited above, but I believe the increase would be one of degree, not of an order of magnitude.

> NOTE.   Since the CIA team members are being employed in this task because they possess special knowledge, and because it makes sense to maximize the amount of time they spend directly utilizing that knowledge (as opposed to being involved with clerical tasks that can be accomplished without special knowledge), I would be prepared to take the NARA referral sheets and go through the boxes ahead of time tagging the documents we want CIA team members to look at (including, if we so decide, the NARA-tabbed documents for which there are no referral sheets).   I could even pull them from the boxes and place them in segregated piles.   This way the CIA team members won't waste their time and expertise pulling boxes and searching through folders for the records they're supposed to be scanning.   Moreover, if we're successful in eventually getting CIA staff to come review records on-site, these records will presumably have to be pulled and segregated for them anyway.

B. Verification of the Status of HSCA Records Culled by the CIA Team for Expedited
      Processing and CIA Review

After the CIA team has sifted through the marked HSCA records in our SCIF and found documents already reviewed during the processing of the Oswald file, or documents not already processed but containing minimal CIA equities, we will have to verify the records' referred status through a physical inspection of the public boxes at NARA II -- before we ask the CIA to review them.   Since this step is clerical in nature, it is one I could perform, thereby husbanding the CIA team members' time for the task which only they can perform: the identification of records ripe for processing.   This verification step will involve compiling a list of the documents the CIA team have identified and checking the

boxes at NARA II -- on a document-by-document basis -- to verify that they are in fact not already present in the public collection.   This step is necessary because of the unreliability of the databases (referral notebooks and tabs) utilized earlier in the process.

C.   <u>Preparation of Designated Documents for CIA Review</u>

Once the universe of CIA Team-selected records has been verified (and presumably culled somewhat) against the public collection at NARA II, we are ready to ask CIA to review them.   Because of the large number of records involved, we would presumably ask CIA to send their people here, rather than copy the records for transmittal to CIA.   As indicated earlier, these records could be physically segregated in our SCIF from the rest of the HSCA collection and thus be available to CIA personnel without their having to dig through the HSCA boxes themselves.   Anything OK'd for release by CIA could then be cleared as consent releases.

Freeman e:\wp-docs\060696
Files 4.20.7 and 4.21.7