

HSCA Report, Appendix

Vol. XI

Includes "CIA Support to the Warren Commission"

Critics have repeatedly charged that CIA participated in a conspiracy to suppress information relevant to the assassination.

Church Committee, investigating these assertions, concluded that it had not uncovered evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. But was highly critical of the process by which the intelligence agencies "arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission."

Held that "the investigation of the assassination was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI and the CIA...who were charged with investigating the assassination." (473)

HSCA tried to find out whether anyone from CIA, or with CIA connections, had misinformed or withheld relevant information from the Warren Commission. And if so, whether inadvertently or deliberately.

CIA 1977 Task Force Report, in response to Church Committee findings, was highly critical and defensive--asserting that CIA indeed had not made a limited effort to assist the Warren Commission but had actively sought and collected information in its support.

(In footnote, p.474, refers to **CIA "Soft Files" pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald**).

Certain documents that HSCA requested could not be located. Whether these were merely filed incorrectly or actually destroyed, "gaps in the written record still exist." (474)

Also, CIA refused to make available to HSCA certain records (**files pertaining to A-1 and an Agency employee's personal safe holdings**) only in redacted form. HSCA had no time for lawsuits, didn't pursue matter. (475)

"The evidence collected in this staff report is based on the evidence *available* to the committee, which might not have been all the relevant evidence to which the Agency had access."(475)

Helms (to HSCA): Crime took place on US soil. Primary federal investigating agency therefore the FBI, with CIA playing only supporting role--not initiating any investigations of its own.

Helms called meeting of senior-level CIA officials on Nov. 23, 1963, to outline CIA's investigative responsibility. At that time, Helms placed **John Scelso** (desk officer in WH Division and headquarter's Mexico branch chief) in charge of CIA's initial investigative efforts (**Raymond Rocco**, chief of research and analysis for CI staff, characterized Scelso's responsibility not as a mandate to investigate, but rather to coordinate traffic [code facilitation,

telegram or telegraphic consideration] for working with the DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world. Referred to this phase of CIA activity by a cryptonym.(Footnote, 476)

Sam Papich (FBI liaison with CIA)

Scelso and his branch traced names, analyzed files, were flooded with cable traffic, reports suggestions, allegations from around the world which they had to check out. Key stations were receiving tips, most of which were phony.

S recalled that throughout his tenure as coordinator of CIA's investigation, the Mexican branch was the only CIA unit directly involved in investigatory activities related to the assassination. (CIA does not agree with this statement. According to CIA, all of its branches were tasked immediately after the assassination, and subsequently, 10 of its stations were tasked to pursue investigative leads) (477)

During first half of December, S issued a summary report that described O's activities in Mexico City from September 26 to October 3, 1963. He later described this as incomplete in comparison with assassination-related information then available to the FBI but not provided to CIA until late December 1963.

He also provided a summary report, 2 days after the assassination (which Helms gave LBJ) that stated that O probably was a lone assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban intelligence though such ties could not be excluded from consideration.

Following this (the December) report, Helms shifted responsibility for CIA's investigation to CI Staff (to Special Investigations Group?)--according to Rocca, in part because of establishment of Warren Commission, which meant that all the divisions then involved. A desk officer couldn't handle it all. In first phase, under S, effort to collect information was piecemeal; **with second phase, under CI, Agency shifted its emphasis from exploring O's activities in Mexico City to his residency in USSR and possible association with USSR.**

Although CI did not ignore Cuban aspects of investigations. In fact, **possibility of Cuban involvement source of deep concern with CIA** (Helms, etc.)

But Angleton did not believe CIA had sufficient resources to look into the Cuban aspect.

So, late December 1963 and early January 1964, CI staff (**Special Investigations Group?**) given responsibility for coordinating CIA efforts to assist Warren Commission's investigation. **Ray Rocca designated point of contact with Commission.**

Who were Rocca's assistants in this? (Three Agency employees, one earlier transferred from FBI, another a Soviet expert, and a general research and document search person for the US intelligence community)

Note that Rocca testified that neither CI staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet

Division in its contact with the Commission; nor did CI/research and analysis displace Scelso in his contact with the Commission. Or Helms or other concerned CIA officials.

Rocca did not serve as Agency's point of contact on certain issues of particular sensitivity, such as **Nosenko**. This went to Chief, Sov Russian Division, and Helms. Another such case was **HTLingual** (although individual in CI who was repository of HTLingual intercepts testified to Select Committee that he did not know whether the Commission knew of HTLingual because it was not his responsibility to provide it with material derived from the program).

In fact, Helms seems to have been the senior official in charge of the overall investigation, with CI Staff acting as a coordinator and repository of information collected. (479)

Warren Commission created on November 29, 1963.

CIA has testified that CIA turned over all materials bearing on the assassination.

But Helms significantly recalls that CIA provided information primarily on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. (on case by case, piecemeal basis).

Didn't volunteer anything. (What they didn't specifically request, they didn't get) (481)

Nor did Helms discuss with McCone whether or not Commission should receive information on anti-Castro plots.(483)

Rocca himself had no knowledge at this time of Agency's efforts to assassinate Castro; said he would have proceeded differently had he known, intensifying his efforts in exploring possibility of retaliatory assassination.

Scelso didn't know, either. Scelso himself says that had he known, he would have interviewed Cubela, polygraphed him, to see if he had been a double agent, informing Castro over everything. (Also says Helms committed a morally reprehensible act in not telling the Commission about these plots) (484)

Warren Commission, for its part, believed its requests were rarely specific and were for all pertinent information. (482) But, reliant on CIA to provide it with this material.

Thus, Commission did not receive information on anti-Castro plots.

Did McCone know? Stated that he first became aware of these assassination plots in August 1963. (Following Chicago Sun Times article, requested report from Helms, who simply handed on copy of May 1962 memo following Edwards/Houston meeting, which described the CIA-Giancana connection as having been terminated prior to McCone becoming DCI. McCone later said he had no reason to think the assassination activity was continuing.)(483)

CIA also initially limited access by the Commission to CIA original source materials.(484) To protect sensitive sources and methods.

Initially did not provide Commission with original source materials pertaining to O's trip to Mexico.

Also, was reluctant to reveal origin of a photo of an unidentified man mistakenly linked to Oswald. (485)

Instead, provided Commission with reports derived from these sensitive sources. But with identification of these sources deleted. (Such as first major report CIA furnished the Commission, dated Jan. 31, 1964, on O's trip to Mexico City). Instead relied on statements of Silvia Duran on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave State. Led to distortions in Commission's initial understanding of events there, especially regarding O's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban embassies.(490)

At some time (April 9, 1964 at the earliest?), the Commission became aware of the sources and methods used, but not clear when.

"Oswald" photograph (unknown man): because CIA decided this not relevant (since not O), and because it involved sensitive methods, CIA did not explain origin of the photo to the Commission.(491)

Reference to a computer printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. (as of 1964) (493)

Foreknowledge of the event by **Luisa Calderon Carralero**? (That she knew about JFK assassination almost before Kennedy). CIA says, no--her remarks mistranslated or misunderstood. HSCA's comment: "The interpretation, in any event, should have been left to the judgment of the Warren Commission, not the CIA." (494)

She was also allegedly present at the Cuban Embassy when O allegedly given sum of money, presumably to carry out JFK assassination (495)

A-1: a Cuban defector, Cuban intelligence officer, who supplied valuable and highly reliable info. to CIA regarding Cuban intell. ops.

Special Affairs Staff, CI--concerned with Cuban operations.

Joseph Langosch, Chief of Counterintelligence for Special Affairs Staff. Debriefed Cuban defector, A-1, May 1964. A-1 supplied information tying Calderon to Oswald--before, during and after O's visits to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Said O in contact with the DGI, specifically with Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez (496) Reported not only her possible association with O, but also with US intelligence.(497) (A-1 believed her to be a CIA operative) (498)

Vital link between Calderon's comments and her possible intelligence background never established by CIA for Warren Commission (497). Nor did it even supply Commission with Calderon's comment.

Had the Commission been expeditiously provided with the evidence of her intelligence

background, association with Silvia Duran, and her comments following the assassination, the Commission may well have given more serious investigative consideration to her potential knowledge of O and the Cuban Government's possible involvement in a conspiracy to kill JFK. (498)