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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM HARVEY

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ZRRIFLE  
CASTRO  
ROSELLI, JOHNNY  
OPERATION MONGOOSE  
BISSELL, RICHARD  
ASSASSINATION  
KENNEDY, JOHN F.  
THE PRESIDENT  
QJWIN  
MAFIA  
SILVER, ARNOLD

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

1 counterespionage for a brief period against the Japanese and  
2 the Italians and the Russians in '41. Then during most of the  
3 War, against the Germans, and then beginning in early '45 until  
4 the middle of '47 against the Soviet service again.

5 Mr. Schwarz. And then in 1947, did you join the CIA as  
6 head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch?

7 Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Is that also counterespionage?

9 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it was.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And then between 1947 and 1952, you worked  
11 on Soviet counterespionage and certain special operations in  
12 the Department for Plans, is that right?

13 Mr. Harvey. Well, that is correct. It was a particular  
14 command and staff responsibility on communications intelligence  
15 and for that period of, I would think probably eight to ten  
16 months, I headed a planning staff, along with that.

17 Mr. Schwarz. In 1952, did you go to Berlin as Chief of  
18 Station for the CIA?

19 Mr. Harvey. I did.

20 Mr. Schwarz. And were you there until 1959?

21 Mr. Harvey. Until the end of 1959.

22 Mr. Schwarz. I understand, Mr. Harvey, that you had some  
23 rather substantial accomplishments there, such as the Berlin

24 Tunnel

25 Could you just very succinctly describe the Berlin Tunnel

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1 operation and then move on?

2 Mr. Harvey. Well, very briefly, that is an operation that

3 [redacted] and I conceived some time before I went to

4 Berlin.

5 Senator Tower. You and who?

6 Mr. Harvey. [redacted] who for many years was one of

7 the, if not the most, knowledgeable senior officer in the

8 [redacted]

9 And one of the reasons I went to Berlin was to attempt to  
10 mount this operation.

11 In substance, what it amounted to was setting up a fairly

12 complex cover within a cover installation in West Berlin and

13 driving a tunnel approximately 500 meters, well underground,

14 across the sector boundary, and tapping into three main

15 telephone, telegraph and teleprinter cables.

16 I think we had a total of around 900 circuits of these,

17 which were, among other things, the main circuit between the

18 command headquarters of the Soviet Group in Bamsdorf, and the

19 outlying commands in Germany and the headquarters in Moscow.

20 We also tapped into a number of Soviet Embassy circuits in

21 Unter den Eichen and Unter den Linden in East Berlin, including

22 a number of intelligence circuits which unfortunately were not

23 really readable.

24 Senator Tower. Were not what?

25 Mr. Harvey. Were not readable.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. I have been told, Mr. Harvey -- is this not  
2 correct -- that you not only conceived the program but **helped**  
3 **to dig the tunnel?**

4 Mr. Harvey. I did.

5 Mr. Schwarz. In 1959, did you become Chief of the Foreign  
6 Intelligence Staff Division D?

7 Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Now is Division D a division of the CIA which  
9 is responsible for **communications intelligence?**

10 Mr. Harvey. That is also correct.

11 Mr. Schwarz. But part --

12 Mr. Harvey. But I would like to clarify it, if I may,

13 Mr. Schwarz. It was the division of the clandestine services,  
14 which was the focal point and was responsible for primarily two  
15 things:

16 [Redacted]  
17 [Redacted]  
18 [Redacted]

19 We had nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of  
20 research and analysis use which was handled in **a separate**  
21 **in the** what I believe was the DDI, Deputy Director  
22 Intelligence.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Did Staff D include within its responsibili-  
24 ties **the surreptitious obtaining of code information?**

25 Mr. Harvey. Yes, in two ways: complete control and

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1 coordination of any such efforts, approval and assessment of the  
2 security risk, and also in the direct procurement through  
3 operational means abroad, but not in this country.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And by operational, you mean entering into  
5 buildings?

6 Mr. Harvey. Surreptitious entry, intercepting couriers  
7 monitoring of \_\_\_\_\_ from

8 microwave that type of thing. Clandestine monitoring would  
9 be covered as well.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Now, did a man call Justin O'Donnell work  
11 for you in Staff D?

12 Mr. Harvey. Yes, he did.

13 Mr. Schwarz. At some point, did Mr. O'Donnell recount to  
14 you a conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba?

15 Mr. Harvey. Yes.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Would you state what he said to you?

17 Mr. Harvey. Briefly, Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said  
18 that he had been approached by Richard Bissell, who was then  
19 Deputy Director for Plans, to undertake an operation in the  
20 Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of  
21 Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to  
22 undertake this assignment.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr Bissell subsequently have a conversa-  
24 tion with you in which he also recounted the fact that he had  
25 requested Mr. O'Donnell to undertake such an operation?

*He Plans in Fall  
1962*

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1 of assassination is obviously a two-pronged subject, ours and  
2 theirs. We spent countless hours over the years trying to  
3 determine the parameters of how far the Soviet service was  
4 willing to go. This was partly a question of assessment,  
5 this was partly a question, to put it just as bluntly,  
6 of self-protection.

7 I will try to summarize what I think are fair conclusions.  
8 In the field of political assassination, although I cannot  
9 document this by evidence, I have no question but what the  
10 Soviet service has, does, and will continue to use the tool of  
11 assassination to accomplish political gains inside and outside  
12 of the USSR. In the intelligence field, I think you have to  
13 make a distinction, the distinction roughly -- and I'm over-  
14 simplifying this slightly -- but a distinction into perhaps  
15 three classes.

16 One, their own ethnics or nationals. Secondly, indigenous  
17 agents of third countries. And thirdly, the recognized official  
18 staff officers of other intelligence services.

19 During the seven years that I spent in Berlin, which was  
20 the longest continuous period that I was exposed in depth to  
21 Soviet Executive Action, we lost a great many Russians, a great  
22 many Germans, a certain number of Czechs, Poles and other  
23 nationalities.

24 Mr. Schwarz. When you say you lost Russians, you mean  
25 Russians who were working with the United States?

1 Mr. Schwarz. Anyway, it exists, as a combination.

2 Mr. Harvey. In other words, if you want to put it in just  
3 these blunt terms, it would have been a lot easier for the KGB  
4 to assassinate me ~~in West Berlin~~ than it would have been for  
5 me to assassinate my opposite number ~~in East Berlin~~, in the  
6 Soviet Embassy ~~across the border.~~

7 Mr. Schwarz. In describing the Soviets, you distinguish  
8 between political assassination, direct agents of the United  
9 States, and finally the emigres and foreign nationals.

10 Mr. Harvey. And also -- well, not foreign nationals, but  
11 emigres and Soviet nationals.

12 Mr. Schwarz. That's what I meant. Soviet nationals.

13 Mr. Harvey. The most merciless, the field where they are  
14 the most merciless are their own defected agents, of course.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, to your knowledge, has the United States  
16 ever assassinated a defected agent or a third country?

17 Mr. Harvey. You mean an American agent who has defected  
18 or doubled?

19 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

20 Mr. Harvey. To my personal knowledge, no.

21 Mr. Schwarz. What about persons who are third country  
22 enemies of the United States?

23 Mr. Harvey. No.

24 Mr. Schwarz. You don't know any instance of the United  
25 States assassinating any person who is in the non-political

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1 Eyes Only basis, and the first part of this was the necessary  
2 documentation for the authority which was later signed off on  
3 by Dick Helms as Deputy Director.

4 Beginning on my page 4, your middle of page 3 --

5 Mr. Schwarz. Well, just a moment. Page 1 is a cover story,  
6 not the real story, the objectives --

7 Mr. Harvey. It is both.

8 Mr. Schwarz. But it does not recite as an objective, a  
9 assassination or assassination capability.

10 Mr. Harvey. No, it does not.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Instead, it cites the obtaining of code  
12 and cypher materials.

13 Mr. Harvey. Which, I would like to point out, was a  
14 perfectly legitimate objective and was not in a sense, a cover  
15 story except that if this project had gone so far as to the  
16 actual recruitment of any agent for assassination or the target-  
17 ting of any target or the mounting of any operation, it would  
18 have been under this as a cover. But, those assets that were  
19 spotted by QJWINN, for instance, under ZRRIFLE were also  
20 honestly considered for possible clandestine procurement of

21 [Redacted]

22 So it's -- maybe I'm not making this clear, it's a cover  
23 in a sense, but it's not a phony cover, in other words.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Dual purpose.

25 Mr. Harvey. It was a dual purpose.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned QJWINN. Was QJWINN an agent  
2 who you did hold in reserve for possible use in connection  
3 with the Executive Action program?

4 Mr. Harvey. No, QJWINN is an agent that I considered for  
5 possible use and used for a limited period through Arnold Silver  
6 for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld  
7 connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use, none of  
8 whom were ever advised of the use, none of whom, as far as I  
9 personally know, were ever used.

10 Mr. Schwarz. But the multi-purpose use included as one  
11 purpose the possible use in assassination?

12 Mr. Harvey. Only <sup>in</sup> the sense that had we ever been saddled  
13 with a flat, if you will, command performance on assassination.  
14 I might have considered the people spotted by WINN as possibil-  
15 ities.

16 But, you see, before anybody that is ever spotted is  
17 approached for any operation and particularly -- and please, I  
18 don't mean to sound pedantic on this, ~~I don't mean to~~ -- is  
19 actually approached, there <sup>should be</sup> ~~is~~ a long period of assessment,  
20 crosschecks, so on and so forth. This particular spotting  
21 mechanism never actually went that far, as far as I know.

22 I only know of one use made by QJWINN until we terminated  
23 him some months later, I don't remember the exact date. It was  
24 before I went to Rome. I know it was in connection with an  
25 operation in the Congo that was not an assassination operation.

1 and had, as far as I know, personally, at least, nothing to do  
2 with assassination.

3 I have checked pages 1 and 2 and 3 and my page 4.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 4 through 7, in your judgment,  
5 pages that were written by ~~Mr. Arnold Silver~~?

6 Mr. Harvey. As a guess, I'd say they appear to be in the  
7 same writing as these first three pages.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 8 and 9 pages that are written by  
9 you?

10 Mr. Harvey. Well, just a moment, let me get to those.

11 I would also like to point out that from page 4 that --  
12 that is page 4, as long as it continues in the same handwriting  
13 was not a part of this so-called Project Outline, these I  
14 would guess were probably ~~Arnold Silver~~'s notes and probably  
15 based, at least to an extent, on discussions he had with me,  
16 and certain sort of problems and questions and principles that  
17 I tossed out to be considered and cares to be exercised.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Then pages 8 and 9 are in your handwriting,  
19 is that right?

20 Mr. Harvey. Pages 8 and 9 are in my handwriting.

21 Mr. Schwarz... And at the bottom of page 8, does that  
22 indicate that you had a conversation with ~~Mr. Silver~~ on January  
23 26th?

24 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And is it your judgment that that is January

1 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?

2 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it is.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And it followed your conversation with Mr.  
4 Bissell that you have recounted?

5 Mr. Harvey. I think probably that might be -- well, when  
6 I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to  
7 be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this  
8 is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with  
9 Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint  
10 because there were several such discussions in varying degrees  
11 of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in  
12 '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early  
13 on that Silver had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question  
14 of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion at  
15 the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already  
16 had discussed the matter with Silver.

17 Now, these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of  
18 paper, what they are from -- they are in my handwriting. It's  
19 from a yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used  
20 to keep on my desk and just make rough notes of conversations  
21 that I had, telephone and otherwise, with various people.

22 Once a week I would go through them and either destroy them,  
23 classified trash, dictate from them, or occasionally save  
24 them. There is no relationship between the material that  
25 appears after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just

1 before the 26/1-AS, and the material which appears above  
2 it which is tabbed SID G, tab 21.

3 Mr. Schwarz. That would be Sid Gottlieb?

4 Mr. Harvey. Sid Gottlieb.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb  
6 on the 25th of January indicate you had discussion which included  
7 the word bankruptcy and you felt assassination was --

8 Mr. Harvey. There was a general philosophic discussion of  
9 assassination and assassination techniques. There was also a  
10 discussion on a number of other things that were of particular  
11 and specific interest to the communications intelligence field  
12 and the clandestine service's responsibilities aspects, if you  
13 will, and as best I can recall this conversation, this was a  
14 sort of an exchange of ideas and briefing session, probably  
15 held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after  
16 he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual  
17 Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the  
18 clandestine services.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Now the reference in the middle of that  
20 conversation with Mr. Gottlieb to "Last resort beyond last  
21 resort and a confession of weakness." That's referring to  
22 assassination?

23 Mr. Harvey. That's obviously referring to assassination.  
24 That's probably what I told Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the  
25 use and propriety of assassination as a technique was.

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1 of operational philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb, that  
2 the question then came in pure theory as to -- as in such cases  
3 as, now assumptions, the example of 3 wrong, I am not really  
4 sure. But the closest that I can come is that the assumptions --  
5 it might be desirable in a purely theoretical discussion and in  
6 my opinion we were wrong. Whether I said that to Gottlieb in  
7 the words that are here, I just don't know.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Who were the two besides Mr. Trujillo that  
9 make up the examples of 3?

10 Mr. Harvey. I presume -- I have no idea, but I presume  
11 that the logical candidates at that point would have been  
12 Lumumba and Castro. By logical candidates, I mean not that  
13 we were considering them in this discussion as logical targets  
14 for assassination, but that these were sort of the three  
15 people that would come to mind; if you are going to go into this,  
16 these are three to be considered.

tape 2b

17 But you will notice, if I may, Mr. Schwarz, "Framework of  
18 Sid's job. [redacted] - Memo." [redacted] is the name of the staff  
19 officer who worked for me in Division D at that time.

20 This "translating machine" was an experimental device,  
21 done under -- hoped for development [redacted] that I was most  
22 interested in, because of the serious translation problem that  
23 we had [redacted].

24 So you see this was not a discussion strictly within the  
25 framework of either assassination as a specific, or assassination

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1 as a general problem.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Now, the material commencing on handwritten  
3 page 4 and commencing in the middle of page 3 of the Senator's  
4 notes, reflects in your judgment the conversation that you had  
5 with ~~Mr. Silver~~ and it is his notes about that conversation, is  
6 that right?

7 Mr. Harvey. That is my best guess.

8 It may also, however, include his own thinking and so forth.  
9 I doubt if it includes -- it certainly would not include any  
10 specific discussions, I don't think, with other officers,  
11 because ~~Arnold Silver~~ was under specific instructions not to  
12 discuss this as such with anybody else, at least without clearing  
13 it with me first.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And he starts, for example, by talking about  
15 "Legal, ethical, morale, operational problems" and so forth,  
16 and that reflects the conversation you had with ~~Mr. Silver~~?

17 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Down toward the end of entry 3b -- and 3 has  
19 the heading "Maximum security" -- do you see that on page  
20 4?

21 Mr. Harvey. Yes, I see it.

22 Mr. Schwarz. There is a sentence which reads as follows --  
23 two sentences, which I should read into the record, three  
24 sentences.

25 "Within Kubark" -- now, is that the CIA?

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1 crossed in this document.

2 Mr. Schwarz. One way or the other?

3 Mr. Harvey. That's right. One way or the other.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Your note has a report to the DCI, the  
5 January 26th reference, which reads in the first line **AS**.

6 That is **Arnold Silver**, I take it?

7 Mr. Harvey. Yes, I'm sure that's **Arnold Silver**.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI  
9 matter. What does that mean?

10 Mr. Harvey. I am not sure. The closest I could come to  
11 that is a fairly illogical Fanfani, and Fanfani was never  
12 even dreamed of, as far as I know, in any such context.

13 Fanform -- Burton Wides raised that with me, and I just had to  
14 throw up my hands. I just don't know.

15 Mr. Schwarz. And you don't know what the reference to DCI  
16 in the notes means?

17 Mr. Harvey. No, I am sorry, I do not, at this point, Mr.  
18 Schwarz.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

20 Mr. Harvey. Are you asking me to try to interpret the  
21 portion of this that is in my handwriting, or are you satisfied  
22 at this point?

23 Mr. Schwarz. Well, the other items, it seems to me, are  
24 either not important or are understandable. Maybe some of the  
25 members have questions.

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end of - 25/1 - eyes (stain)  
"The Magic Button"

8

Narcotics Büro ~~✗~~ ~~→~~ ~~→~~ ~~→~~  
"for a living" - RIS 201 cover

Combos - Bankruptcy - no stars  
eyes - Jim A. / Contradict /  
not a TSO problem ~~✗~~ from U-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &  
a confession of weakness -

- El Benefactor - assumptions -

Example 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted]

job

Memo

[Large redacted block]

[redacted] Year

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CIA

Anesthesia -

26/1 - ~~AS~~ Farfan-2001 - matter -

no file Review - [redacted]

1. Select proper open to run -

2. [redacted]

May 12

3. Security Rules

B-WHM-AS-3

4. ~~Trust~~ levels

[redacted]

6. No [redacted]

9

7. no projects or papers except per cones.

8. Principal Agent - [redacted] ?

[redacted] Project Draft LCH -

Acct 1500 - from NB.

mark spot again. Still [redacted]

project - de Diako


9. Disposal -

10. 7 targets who's names - must know before we can spot -

11. Case officering

12.

13.



FdJ list - Remember

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