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### JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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1 Niarchos' ship captains named Katopodes brought a libel action 2 I believe it was, against Onassis for some letter he had written 3 about some activities of Katapodes, I can't remember the 4 details now.

5 We didn't know where this was leading. So this was in 6 the Supreme Court of New York State, and so I went to a fellow 7 I knew in the U.S. Attorney's office and asked him if he 8 could keep track of how this suite was developing to see if 9 it was leading into some of the connections we had, particularly with Niarchos. 10

11 And he got some of the pleadings and some of the pretrial evidence --12

Mr. Wides. But you don't recall any contacts between 13 the Agency and the Justice Department resulting in Mr. Yeagley 14 going up to try and halt some aspects of the grand jury 15 proceedings in New York growing out --16

Mr. Houston. It strikes no valve.

Mr. Wides. Let me ask just one more question in this 18 area and then we will move on to the document I asked you to 19 look at before we started. 20

> I have just one other question. Mr. Maxwell. Mr. Wides

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
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
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
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1	kind of cases which CIA had with Justice, and the referrals,
2	and you had gone through one. And I wondered if you wanted
3	to go through the other two.
4	Mr. Houston. All right.
5	The second one was quite an interesting one. If I give
6	it in too much detail, excuse me.
7	Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.
8	(Discussion off the record.)
9	Mr. Maxwell. Back on therecord.
10	Mr. Houston. all of a
11	sudden disappeared from his post, and there was indication
12	that he had with him a considerable sum of money, something
13	in the nature of \$30,000, I can't remember the exact amount.
14	This was promptly reported, and he disappeared into the blue.
15	The started looking into it. And I believe we
16	sent people over to try and look into it, and found that
17	there had been a serious family problem between himself and his
18	wife.
19	Finally, in Mexico we got
20	word that this fellow was near Mexico City, and he passed word
21	to the through a lawyer that he had written all the
22	operational details of what he had been engaged in
23	which again were very sensitive, sealed them, and put them
24	in a vault which only thelawyers could get at, with instruc-
25	tions to his lawyers that if anything happened to him, no
Doold	

The SEC, as a result has raised some questions with Justice between our justice and our statutory problems. This is before Justice now.

Mr. Wides. Is there a file in the OGC office generally regarding, not necessarily every one, but many of your -which would contain many or most of OGC contacts with Administrative agencies over the years?

Mr.Houston. No, because they weren't -- there probably is a substantial file on relations with Internal Revenue. But those were to a large part either working out our own tax equations on our own personnel with cover problems which you probably know about, or the CAT situation, or Southern Air Transport, and not interferring with IRS prosecutions, although several times we were involved -- here is the type of case I guess you are talking about.

What is the fellow out in the Philippines -- I think his name is \_\_\_\_\_\_- who had one of the biggest tax assessments made against an individual made against him, I think, \$2 million? And \_\_\_\_\_\_ very definitely tried to involve us in his defense. There was some connection with \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ in the Philippines, you couldn't be in the Philippines without some connection with them. And yet gave IRS the full information, and said, don't bother with us, we are not concerned.

Mr. Wides. What about such things as the contacts with

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
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
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
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
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544-6000	l	Mr. Houston. It was a memo of DITEL's that I saw.
	2	I think it was dated after I left. I saw it in draft after-
, Phone (Area 202)	3	ward. It had to do, I recall, with operations in the Trust
Phone	4	Territories.
	5	Mr. Wides. In other words, the first category of issue
	6	that I mentioned?
	7	Mr. Houston. Yes.
	8	Mr. Wides. With regard to MH MUTUAL, which is a topic
	9 :	that we obviously don't have time to discuss fully today, and
. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	10	we have not yet seen the files, I wonder and Mr. Maxwell
,	11	was going to pursue this, and I may be back if you could
	12	give me a rough idea during the period when it was under your
A A	13	stewardship of the organizational chart, as it were, for the
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like that. 1 Wides. Up until then as far as you know there Mr 2 was no investment of Agency funds that were made as a fesult 3 of any decisions or implications within the CIA which might 4 then have been run by him for his independent advice but might 5 have originated or prompted within the Agency? 6 There may have been those You see, Mr. Houston. 7 on our Board of Directors to which we referred all basic in-8 vestment decisions we had three of our top economists, and 9 at least one of them was a member of a couple of college 10 investment boards, so that they had the benefit of the advice 11 to those university investment counse 12 Mr. Wides. Was he a consulting economist or a member--13 Mr. Houston. A member of the seaff. 14 Mr. Maxwell. 15 Mr. Houston. Yes. 16 And the relationship with the university Mr. Wides. 17 board was what, as an alumni? 18 Mr. Houston. As an alumni. She was called as a 19 consultant on their investment program. 20 We also had the advice of a couple of friendly banks, 21 and at least a couple of insurance companies would freely 22 give us the benefit of their investment policies. 23 24 25

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Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Houston. To go back to the start -- it may have already been told -- back in the last fifties we found in the OGC office that the hardest thing to cope with were benefits for death or disability insured under covery circumstances, particularly when, as so often happened, no prior planning had been made for this Even the prior planning is difficult, because if you are going to put an agent into certain circumstances, and say you will get him insurance through Mutual of Omaha, if the circumstances of the Department are later known to Mutual of Omaha, they might say, well, that 11 is not a risky cover, and continua you wouldn't have 12 your insurance.

So, we came to the conclusion that we needed our own in-14 surance business, and we started by buying two very small 15 off-shore insurance companyes, and started writing death and 16 health policies. Now, the business grew quite rapidly to 17 cover all sorts of covert operations. And we went to two 18 large outside insurance companies and asked if they would 19 · cooperate and take some of the policies either on a fully pro-20 tected basis from us, or if they saw fit, for their own account. 21 And both of them did both. They would take some risks for 22 their own account, and the only thing we would ask is that 23 they protect the investigation in case it got into sensitive 24 field 25

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in others they would ostensibly take the risk and we would stand behind them.

Mr. Wikes. So that was indemnification? Complete indemnification. And by and Mr. Houston. large this arrangement worked extremely well.

Mr. Wikes. Southose were the kinds of Ansurance companies were were talking about that would give us the benefit of their investment?

Mr. Houston. Both of them had large investment portfolios of their own, and feel I gave us access to their investment 10 manager, who were most cooperative in what they were invest-11 ing. 12

Mr. Wikes. And what was the point of contact in the 13 Agency during that period for the insurance companies? 14 Mr. Houston. I went in both cases to set up the ori-15 ginal contact, and then this project officer W the 16 primary.

Mr. Wikes. And he would have been the point of contact for receiving their investment views? Mr. Houston. He or his office.

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Mr. Wides. And you mentioned also a bank as abyoutside source.

Mr. Houston. There were a couple of banks, but one particularly. We kept some of the money on deposit with the

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The bank at our 1 request gave us a flat guarantee of repayment no matter what 2 on these assets. So, we felt well protected on this. And also, 3 when we deposited with them the certificates of deposit we 4 got the normal grime rate on our deposits. And here again 5 they particularly in the field of Eurobonds had some good 6 advice, and we also went to another brokerage house in 7 New York who had investment advisory staff that specialized in 8 So far as I know, they did not know the Agency Eurobonds. 9 was involved, but they gave advice on the best interest rates 10 in Eurobonds and certificates. It was a highly specialized 11 field. 12 Mr. Maxwell. Who was going to the investment house, the 13

project officer?

Mr. Houston. The project officer. Mr. Wides. Do you recall any dealings with Suydam and Company?

17 Mr. Houston.No I have been asked time and time again 18 about Suydam Company, and the only thing I knew was from 19 personal knowledge going back to a trust my sister has an 20 interest in in the Guaranty Trust. They had one of these hold-21 ing companies which I think was called Suydam and Company. But 22 you never heard -- who was it? I know. One of our directors 23 of Southern Air Transport told me that he was continually 24 being asked by contact with Suydam and Company. And he sati 25

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that is the only one he knows, was the Guaranty Trust. There was someone else, I don't know about it.

Mr. Wides. GEtting back to the question I alluded to while we were off the record, did any questions arise about whether the people on the board, the investment board, or managing board of Mutual, who were from within the Agency, would have access to economic intelligence or political intelligence relevant to their own thinking on investments, and

Mr. Houston. The members of the board were always free to bring up their ideas for investments, particularly in the stock field, until more recent years. But mainly we were consulting the economic experts for their general economic knowledge on trends and any input they could give on basic investment policies.

Mr. Wides. That would include, I assume, economic in-16 telligence regarding, for example, the trend of whether there 17 was likely to be a copper shortage, or the trend of 18 whether there was likely to be more nationalization of rubber 19 plantations or foil? 20 How would you differentiate that from economic intelli-21 gence except that it would be --22 Because our investments, except for the F. Houston. 23 Eurobonds, were almost entirely in U.S.investments. And 24 Male these were trained economists, their main professional

SECD.

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interest was in the foreign field. And I don't remember them staying, for instance, let's get into copper, it is going to be in very short supply in Peru or whatever. I don't remember any discussion of that sort.

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Mr. Wides. Do you recall any policy papers or reviews generally as to theruse of Agency knowledge in the broadest sense of its intelligence fund in regard to the investment decisions as distinct from decisions that were generated wholly by outside?

Mr. Houston. There were various basic general policy papers -- usually I would prepare them and put them before the board -- in which this may have been touched on. I don't recall it specifically.

Mr. Maxwell. The source of funds invested under the auspices of the board were what?

In other words, all these companies that we had in this insurance complex appeared to have the substance and insraance company would be expected to have. Actually, the whole fund for all of them was managed as a central fund under this one project officer. On the design and organizational

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chart it looked very complicated. In operation it was quite 1 simple. It was handled really as one entity with various faces 2 appearing. And the complications of those whereby maintaining 3 your directors, who took no part in the operation, your companies 4 directors, and things, and keeping your letterhead straight 5 for your writing for the different companies. 6 Mr. Maxwell. Were there other sources of funds, 7 in stock or bond transactions that profits 8 went back into the investment fund? 9 They would all go into the central in-Mr. Houston. 10 vestment fund, and in the initial stages, particularly where 11 there was income from funds and dividends -- until the stock 12 market broke there were some capital gains registered. Then 13 the investment policy went more and more, particularly as 14 the interest rate went up, in the Eurobonds and certificates 15 of deposit, where for a whyle you were getting -- I think we 16 got a weighted average of over 11 percent. Wand then those 17 would go back into the fund against the insurance loss account-18 The most difficult thing we had was trying to ability. 19 decide what was enough, because there was no actuarial exper-20 ience such as in a nominal insurance company. 21 You mean the capitalization of particular Mr. Wides. 22 companies against insurance? 23 . Houston. Exactly. 24 Mr. Wides. 25

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