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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Secretary, we see there a series of
2 lettered subparagraphs setting out alternatives that the CIA
3 has offered up as potential areas to be pursued, and then
4 some handwritten notes opposite each paragraph apparently in-
5 dicating approval or disapproval of the proposed faction.

6 The Chairman. Is this memorandum a CIA memorandum?

7 Mr. Smothers. It is for the Chief of the Western Hemi-
8 sphere Division.

9 Senator Tower. But who signed off on it? That sig-
10 nature is obscured.

11 Mr. Smothers. The author of this working paper is
12 unknown. It appears to be -- we have an acting chief --

13 Mr. Dennin. The chief at that time was [redacted] and
14 though it is not established, people have said that they
15 believed that it was Mr. Esterline who was the acting chief
16 at that date.

(1) (A)

17 Mr. Smothers. Looking at that memorandum and coming
18 down to subparagraph C under paragraph 1 of the memorandum, we
19 see the statement:

20 "To what extent will the U.S. Government participate
21 in the overthrow of Trujillo".

22 And then in subparagraph C:

23 "Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles
24 or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from
25 the scene?"

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27

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Now if I might put this document in
 2 chronological context for the Committee, the persons in Santo
 3 Domingo are at this point seeking permission to pass machine
 4 guns to the dissidents who they know are seeking those machine
 5 guns in order to assassinate Trujillo, and there is a block
 6 put on this shipment -- rather, to the passage of them; they
 7 had already been shipped to the Dominican Republic -- and a
 8 draft cable was prepared authorizing the passage and then it
 9 was said, no, we've got to go check with State to determine
 10 whether the machine guns should be passed.

11 And this memorandum reflects the checking with State, he
 12 apparently came to see Mr. Berle..

13 Further, as a matter of information, the **Mr. [redacted]** who (1) (A)
 14 was referred to in here, did know that other assassination
 15 weapons had been passed to the dissidents.

16 Now given that background, I will read the memorandum
 17 into the record and I will have one question for the witness. (1) (A)

18 "**Mr. [redacted]** of CIA came in. A local group in the
 19 Dominican government wishes to overthrow Trujillo; wishes arms
 20 for that purpose.

21 "On cross-examination it developed that the real plan was
 22 to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose.

23 **[redacted]** wanted to know what the policy should be.

24 "I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that
 25 this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have

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anything to do with any assassination plots, anywhere, anytime.

[redacted] said he felt the same way."

Now, Mr. Secretary, in the way which your understanding was of the expected degree of candor between CIA and the State Department, would it be your expectation that if Mr. [redacted] had known that other weapons had been passed to the same dissidents and they had stated that they intended to use those other weapons to assassinate Mr. Trujillo, that Mr. [redacted] should have passed that information on to Mr. Berle?

Mr. Rusk. Under those circumstances, I would think the answer is yes.

I mean, one thing I'm sure of, Mr. Schwarz, and that is Mr. Berle did not write this memorandum on May 3rd, 1961 in preparation for a Senate investigation in 1975.

Mr. Schwarz. You believe it to reflect accurately what transpired?

Mr. Rusk. I have no doubt. It was sent to Mr. Coerr, Mr. Owen, Mr. Devine, in the Department of State, and I've known Mr. Berle for quite a long time and I would have predicted this would have been his reaction.

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, just at this point --

The Chairman. Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. It would be interesting to get the Secretary's reflection that if that is the case, as Mr. Berle's memorandum indicates and as the Secretary said, how do you in

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7 June 1961

Desk Exhibit # 4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Record and Related Policy Decisions on Passing Arms to Dominican Dissidents

1. The following is taken from a Memorandum dated 11 May 1960, Subject: Briefing of Ambassador Farland:

"The Ambassador began by saying that according to "Mr. Number One", the leader of the Dominican Dissident princes, (whom he did not identify), the dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights. The Ambassador said that he saw no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question of whether the United States Government wants to engage in this activity."

2. On 21 June 1960 Ambassador Farland told [redacted] that he thought that an air drop would be the best way to deliver the arms to the Dominican dissidents. Ambassador Farland sketched for [redacted] the location of three possible sites for landing a light aircraft near Ciudad Trujillo. (1)(4)

3. In a meeting on 23 June 1960 Assistance Secretary Rubottom told Col. J. C. King that the Government of the United States was prepared to provide the Dominican dissidents with a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene.

4. On 29 December 1960 the Special Group approved a plan of covert action, to be largely effected through former President of Costa Rica, Jose FIGUEROA, and providing for increased propaganda directed against Generalissimo TRUJILLO, and for the financial support of selected exile groups. Additionally this approval included authorization for the CIA to make available to selected exile groups communications equipment and support necessary for them to develop a capability of infiltrating personnel and equipment into the Dominican Republic.

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5. At 12 January 1961 meeting of this Special Group, Mr. Livingston Merchant stated that the Department of State felt that a limited number of small arms and other materials should be made available for the dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Thomas Parrott of the CIA said that he believed that this could be accomplished securely by the CIA and that the plan would stipulate that the actual introduction of the materials into the Dominican Republic would be the responsibility of the Dominican dissidents themselves. The decision of the Special Group was communicated to Consul Dearborn in Ciudad Trujillo, and in a letter dated 31 January 1961 to Mr. Frank Devine of the State Department, Consul Dearborn made the following remark: "With regard to the delivery of the exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision has been made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too long the question of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and a too great tardiness on our part would only lead them to question our sincerity."

6. In [redacted] dated 15 March 1961, [redacted] (1)(A)(B) made the following request: "1. For issue to several dissident people Consul Dearborn requests three thirty-eight caliber Smith & Wesson special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges. If sending ammunition complicates problems, advice and we will try to get it from the Marines." The Deputy Director of Plans on 23 March 1961 approved this request and the CIA immediately provided the requested material [redacted]. One of these weapons was given to Jordi BRICSA, a dissident leader, by Consul Dearborn, and the other two were passed [redacted] to [redacted] (1)(A)(B) [redacted] in direct touch with the action element of the dissident organization.

7. On 28 March 1961 in [redacted] the [redacted] requested (1)(A)(B) permission to pass three M-1 Carbines, Cal 30 and supply of ammunition which was available in the Comalata Camp deserted U. S. Naval personnel to be passed to the dissidents. This message [redacted] was concurred in by Consul Dearborn and [redacted] dated 31 March, which stated Consul Dearborn also concurred in stated: "We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of support and goodwill to Severo OBRAL, dissident leader, etc. These items (carbines and ammunition) are not what he asked for but they are an investment in operational continuity. The Agency in DIR 32473 of 31 March 1961 approved the [redacted] passing the carbines and ammunition and the material was passed to the dissident group over a period of several days in early April 1961 by secure means through [redacted] (1)(A)(B) to the dissident, [redacted]

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RUSK EX 7

7 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT : CIA Involvement in Cuban Counter-
revolutionary Activities--Arrest of
Rolando CUBELA Secades and
Ramon Tomas GUIN Diaz

1. With reference to the Habana Prensa Latina news release of 5 March 1966, alleging CIA involvement with Rolando CUBELA Secades and Ramon Tomas GUIN Diaz in counterrevolutionary activities, the following outlines ~~the Agency's contact with~~ these two persons.

2. ~~GUIN was recruited by a CIA agent in August 1963 inside Cuba as a Principal Agent to recruit high-level military leaders.~~ He has had no contact with CIA staff personnel.

3. CUBELA, the more important of the two men, has been in contact with this Agency during the period 1961-1965. The last Agency contact with CUBELA was in February 1965. He has had direct contact with several Agency officials and, in addition, is known to have been in contact with Cuban exiles, including Manuel ARTIME. ~~CIA's contact and relationship with both CUBELA and GUIN was for the express purpose of using them to collect intelligence on military activities and objectives in Cuba.~~ The Agency was not involved with either of these two men in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro, as claimed in the Prensa Latina news release, nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act.

4. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ mentioned in the press release, is a CIA official stationed in ~~[redacted]~~ both Odon Alvarez de la CAMPA and Jose Luis

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CONZALEZ Callarretta, as noted in the press release. The purpose of this contact was limited specifically to obtaining intelligence information. There is no truth to the allegation that CIA paid \$100,000 or any other sizeable sum of money to either of these individuals.

5. The Agency has also had limited direct and indirect contact with Jorge ROBRENO, Alberto BLANCO Ramirez, and Carlos TEPELINO, noted in the press release. Again, these contacts were restricted to obtaining intelligence.

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director

Signature Recommended:

/s/ Thomas H. Karamessinas 7 - MAD 1955
Deputy Director for Plans

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(Waiting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET

(39) Buck Eshel
#11 Memorandum of Conversation

Mat f
Buck Ship Destroyer
8/31/65-100

DATE: May 3, 1961

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Herbert, CIA
Mr. Berle

EX-9 1961

C-IX-29

COPIES TO: ARA: Mr. Coerr - 1
Mr. Owen - 2
Mr. Devine - 3

Mr. [redacted] CIA - 4

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(4)

(1)(A)

[redacted] of CIA came in. A local group in the Dominican government wishes to overthrow Trujillo; wishes arms for that purpose.

On cross-examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. [redacted] wanted to know what the policy should be.

I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time.

[redacted] said he felt the same way.

- Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
 - With concurrence of _____
 - Declassify on _____ and excise as shown
- EO 12858 - 1.3 (a) (1)
 PREPARED BY AW 6/24/93

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