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16/11
7/26/98



Date:10/07/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10211

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U/12/98

SEE ATTACHED DOCS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R772

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO : MILLER, WILLIAM, ATTN: MR. BARON

TITLE :
LETTER W/ATTACHMENTS

DATE : 08/15/75
PAGES : 53

SUBJECTS :
SANITIZED COPIES OF 21 DOCUMENTS FROM VOL I - IV OF THE
AMLASH/1 FILE.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
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COMMENTS :
BOX 408-79

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/2376

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

R 772 10211
408-79

15 August 1975

SSCI BOX # 408-79

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Washington, D. C.

Attn: Mr. Frederick Baron

Dear Mr. Miller:

As you requested, attached are sanitized copies of
21 documents from Volumes I through IV of the AMLASH/1
file.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
AS SANITIZED
(1)(B)
(1)(C) J 24 Mar 94

Sincerely,

Seymour Bolten
Assistant to the Director

Attachments:

1. HKH-1385, dtd 30 Nov 56
2. TDCSDB-3/650,097 dtd 2 May 62
3. [redacted] 1609 (In 39865), dtd 4 Aug 62
4. [redacted] 2629 (In 47183), dtd 17 Aug 62
5. Director 30778, dtd 18 Aug 62
6. Summary Contacts AMWHIP/1 and AMLASH/1, dtd Sep 62
7. [redacted] 7818, dtd 29 Jan 63
8. Summary Info Persons in State Memo, dtd 3 Sep 63
9. [redacted] 0704 (In 15210), dtd 17 Sep 63
10. [redacted] 1006 (In 38361), dtd 11 Oct 63
11. [redacted] 5224, dtd 15 Oct 63
12. [redacted] 3399 (In 50855), dtd 30 Oct 63
13. Memo..Record AMLASH/1 Mtg, [redacted] 29 Oct 63, dtd 13 Nov 63
14. Contact Plan C/SAS Mtg AMLASH/1 in [redacted] undated
15. Cover for C/SAS for AMLASH/1 Mtg in [redacted] undated
16. Scenario for C/SAS Mtg with AMLASH/1 in [redacted] undated
17. Fall Back Position re AMLASH/1, undated
18. Memo..Record Plans for AMLASH/1 Contact, dtd 19 Nov 63
19. Contact Report AMLASH/1, 22 Nov 63 in [redacted], dtd 25 Nov 63
20. Director 87980, dtd 18 Dec 63
21. JMWAVE 8660 (In 75929), dtd 7 Dec 63

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
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Date impossible to Determine



3 AUG 62

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DIRECTOR

[Redacted] 14-1

C/TFW 5 (C/TFW TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2215, 3 AUG)

DD/P, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/WE 2, S/C 2

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PRIORITY	
IN 39865	

PPITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE HELS 1609

REF ¹⁴⁻¹ (IN 38396) &
¹⁴⁻¹ (IN 39589)

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FPOY FALLUCCI

1. IN LENGTHY MTGS 1 AND 2 AUG WITH CASE OFFICER AND AMVHIP/1, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE

IDEA COLLECTIVE EFFORT GIVES BEST RESULTS BUT ALREADY [Redacted]

[Redacted]

2. TWO PRINCIPAL CONCERNS SUBJ ARE SOV EXPLOITATION CUBA FOR OWN ENDS
LATIN AMERICA AND GROWING CONSOLIDATION CASTRO POSITION CUBAN PEOPLE THEM
" EDUCATION" OF YOUTH AND MASSIVE PROPAGANDA EFFORT ON PEOPLE. ALSO
FEARS IN EVENT AGGRESSIVE ANTI- REGIME ACTION SERIOUSLY THREATENING HIS
POSITION. U.S. WILL YIELD EXTREME SOV PRESSURE CUBAN STATUS Q. ^{FROM}
FEELS ANY EFFORT MUST COME SOON IF TO BE SUCCESS. ALSO RELUCTANTLY

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Copy No [Redacted]

[]

3. DURING MTGS SUBJ EXTREMELY INTENSE AND OBVIOUSLY UNDER HIGH EMOTIONAL STRAIN. APPEARS CAPABLE PASH VIOLENT ACTIONS UNDER PROVOCATION, FRUSTRATION, OR TENSE SITUATION. CONSIDER [] [] YET. CONTEMPLATED SUICIDE LAST YEAR. TALKS WENT WELL BUT OBVIOUS [] STATE REPEATEDLY HE NOT TYPE SIT TIGHT BUT PREFER VIOLENT ACTION. SAID HE AGREED WITH ARGUMENT MUST COLLECT INFO, COORDINATE^E, ETC., BEFORE HIS TYPE ACTION PAYS, BUT ^F NOT CONVINCED HE BUYS IT. SUBJ SHOW STRAIN NOT BEING ¹ ABLE TRUST ANYONE. STATED AMWHIP HIS ONLY TRUE CONFIDANT AMWHIP DID GOOD JOB CONVINCING SUBJ HE SAFELY TALK [↑]. [] [] PROMISED MAX SECURITY THIS AREA.

4. NO DISCUSSIONS YET ANY FINANCIAL AID OR OTHER COMMITMENTS. []

5. SUBJ MOST WILLING BE DEBRIEFED ALL FIELDS. ^{CASE OFFICER} A FEELS THIS AND FUTURE HANDLING BEST DONE BY U.S. SPANISH SPEAKING C/O WHO INTIMATELY FAMILIAR CUBAN SCENE AND LATIN PERSONALITY. TYPE FELT MOST EFFECTIVE WITH SUBJ IS IDEN; ALSO RECOMMEND POLYGRAPH BEFORE USING SUBJ IF COMPATIBLE HIS PERSONALITY. FEEL [] BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR ABOVE.

6. SUBJ PLANS REMAIN [] END FESTIVAL FOR COVER SAKE, AIR TRAVEL STCC 7 AUG FOR TWO DAYS, AIR TO PRAGUE FOR TWO DAYS RECOVER LUGGAGE, AIR PART ABOUT 14 AUG WHERE WILL SPEND AT LEAST ONE WEEK. THIS []

[] SUBJ ALSO CONTEMPLATES []

[] GETTING NAME FROM AMWHIP.

7. ^{WIM} HAVING DECIDED RETURN CUBA SUBJ ANXIOUS SPEND MINIMUM TIME EUROPE.

AUG 15 1975 [] WILL ENROLL OFFICER REFRESHER COURSE TO RENEW ARMY CONTACTS

LA

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AND ATTEMPT RE-ESTABLISH SOME FOLLOWING THESE AND GOVT CIRCLES.
8. AMWHIP PRECEDING SUBJ STCC FOR HANDHOLDING. FEEL ADVISABLE A ALSO
PRESENT STCC AMWHIP AND CHANNEL CIA IF NEEDED. REMAINING HELD
AS CONTACT IF NEEDED BY SUBJ, THEN FOLLOW HIM STCC 7 AUG. MAKING PARI
CONTACT PLANS WILL ADVISE.

CASE OFFICER
14-1

WORLD
VISIT

9. SUBJ'S REVIEW CUBAN FESTIVAL LEADERS AND DELEGATES SHOW [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OTHER NOTABLES [REDACTED] WHO LEADERS IN "YOUNG COMMUNISTS"
ARE GIRALDO MAZCLA, ALSO ALVAREZ, PRISCO BARROSO. SUBJ CONTINUE LIVING
COMMON DELEGATE QUARTERS. HE NOT DELEGATION LEADER AS AGENT
REPORTED, BUT "SPECIAL DELEGATE" BY FIDEL'S OK. PLOY GIVEN WAS THAT SUBJ
FATIGUED AND SICK, NEEDED REST, THUS GOT CHANCE TRAVEL TO MEET AMWHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *AMWHIP/1 FIRST CONTACTED AMASH/1 1 AUG. OUTCOME NOT YET KNOWN.

FROM

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

428

17 AUG 62

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DIRECTOR

AUG 17 1942Z 62

ION: C/WE 2 (WE & TFW NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1540, 17 AUG)

O : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI, C/TFW 2, S/C 2

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 47183

CPM DIR INFO WAVE [] CITE [] 2629

IN 47183

DL-- 19-1

RFF A [] 1629

(IN 39865)

B DIR 27924

Covt 62687)

C DIR 23521

Covt 63601)

D DIR 29295

Covt 64493) &

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24 Mar 94

FROM Case officer

ALTHOUGH LASH OBVIOUS UNDER CONSIDERABLE MENTAL STRAIN HE WAS FAIRLY
 RELAXED AT BOTH SESSIONS AND ENTERED FREELY ALL DISCUSSIONS. HE
 IS SUPER SENSITIVE ABOUT SECURITY AND OWN PERSONAL SAFETY.
 CONCERNED ABOUT CARELESS TALK BY LUCIA ECHEVARRIA AND EXPRESSED
 DEFINITE WISH HIS GOOD BUT INSECURE FRIEND PONCHO VERONA REMAIN
 UNWITTING HIS COOPERATION. HE APPEARS SINCERE AND HONEST IN HIS
 EXPRESSED DESIRE RETURN [] REMAIN IN PLACE AND COOPERATE.
 HE NEITHER ASKED FOR NOR WAS OFFERED ANY FINANCIAL OR OTHER
 CONSIDERATIONS.

*NOT LASH
HE WHO SAID
THIS!*

VED FROM

CUBA

HE HAS

AUG 15 1962

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HE CLAIMS

HE CAN COLLECT INTEL IN ALL FIELDS BUT STRONG POINTS ARE THE UNIVERSITY, ONE ANTI AIRCRAFT BATTALION IN SANTA CLARA AND THE AIR FORCE. HE SAYS HE HAS TWO PERSONAL FRIENDS IN WHOM HE HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE BUT CAN CIRCULATE FREELY AND OBTAIN INFO FROM MANY SOURCES, INCLUDING TOP GOVT LEADERS. HE FURTHER PLANS, AS MENTIONED REF A, ENTER MILITARY COURSE FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AT MATANZAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON RETURN BUT DOES NOT KNOW DATE NEXT COURSE WILL BEGIN.

HIS ONLY RESERVATION WAS THAT NO ONE KNEW OF HIS RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE OR AFTER ACT. ALSO EXHIBITED WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION

ARRANGE THIS.

CAN ARRANGE EXPLOSIVES

INSTRUCTION, WITH FIELD DEMONSTRATION IN SECLUDED AREA, VIA TECHNICAL OFFICER WHO WOULD BRING OFFICER FROM SITE FOR PURPOSE.)

4. HE SAYS HE CAN DO NOTHING AT THIS STAGE TO BUILD UP CONSPIRACY WITHIN ARMED FORCES OR ELSEWHERE IN [REDACTED] BECAUSE OF TIGHT SECURITY

CONTROL REFERRED TO HIS FORMER GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE ON THE SOUTH COAST AND [REDACTED]

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PER INSTRUCTIONS PARA 3 REF C

6. BECAUSE APPARENT FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE DETECTED 15 TO 16 AUG LASH STATION HAS INFORMED LIAISON CIA HAS INTEREST IN LASH AS POTENTIAL DEFFCTOR AND IN CONTACT WITH HIM. LIAISON COOPERATIVE.

7. IN SUMMARY

HE ALSO HAS ABILITY AND COURAGE PREPARE VIOLENT ACTION TO ELIMINATE PRESENT LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS ACTS SABOTAGE. CONTROL PROBLEMS POSSIBLE DUE ISOLATION AND LACK PERSONAL DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE ONCE HE JJTURNS

DEPRIEFING 17 AUG ON POINTS OUTLINED REF D PRODUCED LITTLE BUT HE HAD AGREED ACCEPT THESE REQUIREMENTS AS WELL AS ANY OTHERS WE CHOOSE LEVY AND FULFILL THEM ON RETURN

7. NEED FOLLOWING OPIM:

A.

CIA

This not seen according to [unclear] [unclear]



END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *FELT THAT USE OF U.S. DROP FOR COMMO FROM CUBA NOT WORTH RISK.

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Sept 62

Summary of Contacts with
AMWHIP/1 and AMLASH/1

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AS SANITIZED (1)(b)

24 Mar 74 *ew*

HELSINKI:

[Redacted]

AMWHIP arrived in Helsinki on 30 July 1962. He called according to plan, and after his second call (due to his hotel porter's abysmal understanding of English), Case Officer established contact with AMWHIP without further difficulty. The meeting took place in the restaurant of his hotel, [Redacted] and later in his room. We had not at this time located AMLASH, so the time was spent briefing AMWHIP on the local scene, and on his conduct with AMLASH when they met. The meeting lasted about one and a half hours.

where did they stay?

Later the same day we called AMWHIP at his hotel to report no progress in locating AMLASH. Feeling it advisable to keep AMWHIP occupied, we took him out to dinner at Fisketorpet, located in the suburbs of Helsinki. The evening lasted until 1200, terminating with a drink at the roof bar of the Vaakuna. During the six hours, we had an opportunity to explain carefully to AMWHIP that in order for us to help his friend, AMLASH must be willing to follow our directions and agree to certain conditions (already agreed upon by interested Hqs. parties). AMWHIP realized that this was necessary, and agreed with our ideas. However, he is attached to AMLASH, and will continue to look upon him in the most

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benevolent and subjective manner. This being rather far removed from our intended approach to, and opinion of AMLASH. AMWHIP will require handling on a close nature in order that he fully understands and is aware of our

[Redacted]

[redacted] talked to AMZLASH for at least seven hours, from about 1000 in the morning until approximately 1700 the same evening. When AMZHIP called us at 1730, he presented us with the fact that he had [redacted]

[redacted] would have preferred to talk longer with AMZHIP about AMZLASH's reactions, but time did not permit. We arranged a dinner for 2100 at "The White Lady", a restaurant some way from the center of town, and succeeded in obtaining a private dining room, a practice not uncommon in this [redacted] recommended restaurant, as it is often used by businessmen to have private dinners and afterwards, business discussions.

We arrived at the White Lady first, arranged for the dinner, and awaited AMZHIP and AMZLASH, who arrived at 2110 by taxi. Although AMZHIP had suggested to us that the discussions should be merely devoted to getting acquainted the first evening, [redacted]

[redacted]
As reported in our cable [redacted]

[redacted]
under emotional strain, [redacted]

[redacted]
Although obviously [redacted]

[redacted]
He said he [redacted]
was considering not going back to Cuba, [redacted]

He said he [redacted]

He said he was not interested in risking his life for any small undertaking, but that if he could be given a really large part to play, he would use himself and several others in Cuba whom he could rely upon. These he said

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-4-

included two majors (one of which AMSHIP later reported was a militia commander in the center part of the island), two captains, and several others whom AMLASH said he could trust, but whom he would not name.

[REDACTED]

He feels that if Fidel is eliminated, it would be much easier to effect a take-over. (We listened for the most part, but at this point tried to explain to AMLASH that men like Rodriguez could easily be replaced by Moscow, and that the killing of the Soviet Ambassador, would have only the briefest effect on the Soviet control of Cuba.)

[REDACTED]

is arguments and plans had

many flaws, but

[REDACTED]

we were making no

commitments or plans, we pointed out to AMLASH that schemes like he envisioned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information-collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans. AMLASH said he agreed with this, but we weren't too sure just

RECEIVED FROM how much this argument AMLASH was willing, or would be willing, to buy.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

As a matter of record, AMLASH stated during the evening that he had met Algeria's Ben Bella at one time and knows him more than casually. He felt that the man bears strict watching by the West as a measure of protecting its interests in developments in Algeria. AMLASH thought Ben Bella was a clever man, devious, and ambitious, and not to be taken too literally at his word.

[REDACTED]

For example, at one time when we were

[REDACTED]

It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely the choice of word used to describe it.

[REDACTED]

From

discussions with AMWHIP, this label of

[REDACTED]

Another example, which AMWHIP discussed with us, occurred during a meeting

[REDACTED]

According

to AMWHIP,

[REDACTED]

These examples are pointed out here in order to indicate the degree of pride and sensitivity one finds in AMLASH, and to note that

[REDACTED]

R:

AUG 15 1975
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-19-

SECRET

3 Sept 63

DC/SAS

1. The following is a summary of information on the persons mentioned in the attached memorandum from THE STATE DEPARTMENT

A. Jose de Jesus JINJARA

A Castro bodyguard who is described as a gangster interested in financial gain.

B. (Osvaldo) Antonio CASTELL Valdes

An [redacted] and old friend of Rolando CUBELA (more commonly known as [redacted]). CASTELL was reportedly with the Cuban Security Department and is a cousin of Ramiro Valdes, the Interior Minister. CASTELL is anti-regime and CUBELA believes that he will "fall in line" if there is a successful coup.

C. Rolando CUBELA

A medical doctor at Manuel Fajardo Hospital in Havana. He's determined to kill Castro.

D. Marcos [redacted]

A negro, about 40, who is described as a communist opportunist. He was formerly a National Police Chief in Havana.

E. Luis FERNANDEZ de la Canas

Reportedly an undercover agent for Castro and member of of the G-2. As of July 64 he was a Castro bodyguard.

F. Faure CHOMON

An old friend of Cubela's and Castell's. All fought together against Batista and all were members of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a leftist student organization. CHOMON was the Cuban Ambassador to the USSR and is presently the Transportation Minister.

2. Cubela, as you know, has frequently expressed his desire to kill Fidel Castro, in fact, some officers in WH/SA believe that if anyone would attempt such a feat it would be Cubela. Cubela's concern, however, seems to be one of assurance and certainly not cowardness. He wants U. S. assurance of immediate intervention should he be successful in disposing of Castro and other leaders. Perhaps this is the "personal Safety" [redacted] refers to in his letter to Zarraga.

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3. The presence of two bodyguards in this group indicates the :
accessibility to their target, a significant factor in a plot of this
type, especially since Castro is so obsely guarded.

4. Finally, it is not extraordinary that ~~JINJAWA~~ should direct his
letter to a JURE member, namely Zarraga. In his talks with ~~CASE~~
~~OFFICER~~, Cubela has clearly stated that of all the exile leaders in the
United States, he considers Manuel Ray as the only person who would be
permitted to return to Cuba, if Cubela is successful in a coup against
Castro. Cubela realizes, of course, that Ray is not a politician nor
a good organizer, but as an engineer, Ray has the qualities that would
be extremely useful in Cuba's reconstruction.

5. If you desire to have this information sent to *STATE DEPT.*,
we would like to include a few questions on Zarraga; viz his knowledge of
several individuals mentioned, on whom there is obscure information.

A1

Addendum:

[Redacted]

^{ob}
ARTIME has been a cutout between Cubela and (AMWHIP).
Like AMWHIP [Redacted] Learning that
ARTIME is close [Redacted] WHIP supports
the belief that the group is tightly knit.

I have learned too, that the information we have received
regarding a possible assassination of Fidel Castro has,
in nearly every case, originated from a member of this
group, which again indicates that this group is united
and they each understand that one miscue will destroy
all of them.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

COPY (Original copy cannot be reproduced)

TO : DIRECTOR 14-6
FROM : [REDACTED]
ACTION : C/WE 2
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR (SUSPENSE DO/

SECRET 301530Z

30 OCT 63 IN 50855

19-6

[REDACTED] INFO DIR [REDACTED] 399

19-6
REF [REDACTED] 386 (NOT SENT PARI)

1.

[REDACTED] AND ANGEL QUEVEDO

AN OFFICIAL OF THE CUBAN STUDENTS ORGANIZATION, FEU, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE DIFFI-

CULTIES OCCURRED AFTER BOTH HAD COMPLETED A SENIOR ARMY TRAINING COURSE AND INSTEAD OF RECEIVING THE RANK OF COMMANDER WHICH THEY HAD HELD DURING THE REVOLUTION, THEY WERE TOLD BY RAUL CASTRO THEY WERE BEING DEMOTED TO CAPT. BOTH THEN RESIGNED.

2. AGENT ALSO REPORTS THAT CARLOS FRANQUI HAS BEEN FIRED FROM HIS POSITION AS EDITOR OF REVOLUCION. THE NEWS WAS PASSED TO KFRANQUI'S DEPUTY SARUSKY WHO IS PRESENTLY OSLO BY CUBAN PRESS ATTACHE LOND PABLO ARMANDO FERNANDEZ. AST STATES THAT HE HAS HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT FRANQUI HAS BEEN A PROBLEM TO CASTRO FOR SOME TIME AND THE LATTER HAS OFTEN COMPLAINED TO

RECEIVED FROM CESAR ESCOBAR, CUBAN PROPAGANDA CHIEF THAT FRANQUI WAS TOO

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IN 50855 PAGE 2

INDEPENDENT IN HIS WRITING, THINKING. ESCALANTE USUALLY
DISMISSED COMPLAINTS BY SAYING HE HAD NO CONTROL OVER FRANQUI.

3. NO INDEX.

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