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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10017

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD BISSELL

DATE : 07/22/75
PAGES : 239

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT, RICHARD BISSELL
PARTICIPANTS: SENATORS CHURCH, HUDDLESTON, MORGAN, HART
PARTICIPANTS: SENATORS TOWER, BAKER, GOLDWATER, SCHWEIKER

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 231, Folder 4, Testimony of Bissell

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

37

1 '61.

2 The questioning goes as follows: "What instructions were
3 you given by Mr. Bissell at the meeting?"

4 Answer, from Mr. Halpern. "Mr. Bissell said that he had
5 recently, and he didn't specify the date or the time, he had
6 recently been chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House
7 by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it,
8 sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of
9 Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both [redacted] and
10 to me were to plan for an operation to accomplish that end."

11 Then at page 36 and 37, Mr. Smothers returned to the same
12 meeting. Mr. Smothers, at page 37, asked the question of Mr.
13 Halpern as follows:

14 Question, "Let me ask you it another way. What was your
15 understanding of what Mr. Bissell had been told to do by the
16 President and the Attorney General?"

17 Answer, "To get rid of Castro and the Castro regime on the
18 island of Cuba."

19 Now, in substance, did you have such a conversation with
20 Mr. Halpern?

21 Mr. Bissell. I assume his testimony is correct. I don't
22 happen to remember the meeting.

23 Mr. Schwarz.. All right.

24 And did you have some conversation with the President and
25 the Attorney General in which they told you in effect, in

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23 June 1975

SUBJECT: Question 3 of 4 Questions Developed during SSC
Hearing of Mr. Richard Bissell on 12 June 1975:

"A CIA cable (OUT 51708, dated 1 May 1961) contains a paragraph that certain information from another cable or report was to be withheld from the Department of State. The Committee question is, What is it that was to be withheld? Why? Was it actually withheld and for how long?"

RESPONSE TO QUESTION 3:

This answer is based on our assumption that the Committee's query concerns paragraph two, OUT 51708. The background is this. Consul General Dearborn had instructed the Chief of Station to determine from CIA whether or not detailed information on plans of the dissidents to undertake the assassination of Trujillo which the Consul General had acquired and reported to CIA (IN 44067, 30 April 1961) had been given to the Department of State. CIA Headquarters replied (OUT 51708) that the substantive intelligence concerning the plans and identities of those who, according to the report, would participate had been passed to the Department of State on 1 May 1961.

In its reply (OUT 51708), CIA Headquarters appended as paragraph two a query of its own. With parenthetical

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Reviewed on

S E C R E T

The Department of State postpones the release of
this document under the provisions of the JFK
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(PL 102-526)

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clarifications added to permit easier understanding, it was:

"[] a Foreign Service Officer who was then assigned to the Consulate) IS NOW HQS AREA (meaning in Washington, D.C.). PLEASE ADVISE PRIORITY IF HE WITTING (that [] [] POUCHED TO STATION AND IF HE AWARE THIS MATTER NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE."

The Chief of Station replied (IN 44957, 2 May 1961) that Consul General Dearborn had informed him that [] was aware of the presence in the Consulate of the [] [] but that the Consul General, in a note sent via another Consulate employee who was traveling to Washington at the same time, had asked [] not to talk about them to Department of State personnel unless queried (presumably by authorized officials). The cable included the suggestion that CIA Headquarters ask [] to plead ignorance if asked about the presence of the [] and to refer any inquiries in the Department of State to CIA.

The exchange evidently reflected the intent of Consul General Dearborn - and CIA Headquarters - to limit knowledgeability of sensitive details to those officials of the Department of State who were already aware. It is noted that Mr. [] was in 1961 the target of tendentious regime-inspired radio commentary in the Dominican Republic. Further allegations could have impaired his ability to serve in that country.

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Vol. 3 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

Bissell 7/22

R566

The United States Senate

INVENTORIED

ON 5/17/77

BY RS

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED

ON 2/16/77

BY BC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

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SSCI Box 231, Folder 4

Record Number 157-10011-10017

10 May 74

(1) (A)
(1) (B)
(1) (C)

FBI info

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE

ON 11/15/93

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☐ RELEASE IN PART

☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Tuesday, July 22, 1973

Washington, D. C.

0.17, 39, 51, 52

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. There's one case officer I think we need for
2 about twenty minutss on the Cubella thing, and I think his name
3 is ~~Nestor Sanchez~~.

4 Senator Schweiker. I don't think that was the name.

5 The Chairman. Well, let's see if we can get ~~Sanchez~~ and
6 then there was ~~Pedro San Juan~~ who can be deposed. It is a very
7 small item, but we should track it down.

8 If there are any other loose ends, let's tie them up just
9 as quickly as we can.

10 Mr. Smothers. Senator, we are now trying to track down
11 the other addressees on the 13 August memorandum. We have
12 heard from three of them, and one of them is the Ambassador to
13 Santo Domingo, and we are sending written interrogatories.
14 Another one, Mr. Wilson, is in today, and we have still another
15 one who is in South Carolina, and we will be talking with him.

16 After some further inquiry, it may be necessary, we will
17 probably have to make a decision whether we will need to talk
18 to General Lansdale again. I believe we are already planning
19 for Mr. Maheu and if we are, we should certainly have that
20 picture clear in about another week.

21 The Chairman. Last night, Senator Tower and I met with
22 the leadership relative to the problem that the Committee faces
23 with finishing up its work on the assassination issue. It was
24 the strong feeling of the leadeership that the Committee should
25 issue a united report and that we should make every effort to

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1 Mr. Bissell. Well, [] at that time, I think was
2 ~~the Station Chief~~ in [] Roberts was a Marine, a retired
3 Marine officer who was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation.

4 The Chairman. Well, wasn't the other man then brought
5 over to also be in this project as well? He was, initially.

6 Mr. Bissell. I don't believe [] was ever involved
7 in it. I could be wrong about that, but I am almost certain
8 that he was not.

9 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read
10 the whole paragraph so that nobody accuses me of excerpting
11 part or parcel of the paragraph. It tells a package, but it
12 has some names I'd like to ask the witness about. It says,
13 "Whether or not the zealots received direct orders from the
14 President or the Attorney General, they did receive orders to
15 eliminate Castro from power in Cuba. The secret war was a
16 result of that policy, and Castro's assassination, if not
17 specified, was a logical objective of that war. Acting on the
18 President's authority, JMWAVE trained several thousand Cubans
19 in guerrilla tactics, armed then with weapons and explosives
20 and sent them down to the Caribbean with hopes of glory. All
21 of them sought to end Castro's hold on Cuba, and many of them
22 made attempts on Castro's life in the impromptu tradition in
23 the attack on the Laquina Hotel which is referred to above.
24 By the end of 1961" -- I believe this is in your timeframe,
25 Mr. Bissell -- "several men affiliated with the CIA had already

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1 Mr. Dennin. Now, in Paragraph 2 of the same memorandum,
2 it is stated that these arms would presumably be used against
3 key members of the Trujillo regime?

4 Mr. Bissell. That's right.

5 Mr. Dennin. That's the last sentence of Paragraph 2.
6 And you are aware, are you not, sir, that this memorandum was
7 concurred in by your Deputy that would be at the time Mr. Helms,
8 where it says, concurred, Deputy Director of Plans? And from
9 your review of the IG report, I take it that you did not concur
10 in it, but that Mr. Helms did in your absence?

11 Mr. Bissell. I believe that is the case. This copy
12 doesn't show it.

13 Mr. Dennin. We have requested, and I heard again on this
14 from Mr. Elder yesterday, that there is no copy extant which
15 would show who actually signed, on behalf of the Chief, Western
16 Hemisphere Division, and I can inform you sir, that
17 that was not again, according to the IG report, Colonel King,
18 but apparently in his absence, his deputy, was not
19 you as DDP, but it was your deputy who concurred in that, and
20 further that it was not the Director of Central Intelligence
21 which approved it, but his Deputy, at the time General Cabell.

22 Mr. Bissell. Right.

23 Mr. Dennin. Everybody was apparently out of town at that
24 particular point.

25 (The document referred

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1 the outgoing the same.

2 Mr. Dennin. The Deputy being the COP?

3 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

4 Mr. Dennin. And the C/CA, that was the individual in the
5 office charged with what?

6 Mr. Bissell. Covert action.

7 Mr. Dennin. Specifically that would include provision of
8 things and getting advice on things like placing bombs?

9 Mr. Bissell. I suppose it would, although most of its
10 efforts had to do with political action.

11 Mr. Dennin. Turning to Tab K, that being a memorandum for
12 the record of the February 15 meeting in New York, the memorandum
13 of February 16, you will note on page 5 that that memoranda
14 describes a meeting held between the Chief, WH3, that branch
15 of the CIA having direct line responsibility for the Dominican
16 Republic.

17 Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

18 Mr. Dennin. And the Chief at that time would have been a

19 ~~Mr.~~ [redacted]

20 Mr. Bissell. I believe that's right.

21 Mr. Dennin. And this memorandum represents the meeting

22 ~~Mr.~~ [redacted] had in New York City with ~~EMDECK-4~~ and his cousin.

23 And in Paragraph 2 of that memorandum it is stated that U.S.

24 Consul Dearborn has given the opinion that ~~EMDECK-4~~ is

25 "the king pin in the plot of the Dominican Republic." Do you

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1 see that, sir?

2 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do.

3 Mr. Dennin. Now let me point out a couple of things
4 raised in this memorandum. Once again there is very specific
5 discussion of assassination, a method of assassinating Mr.
6 Trujillo which is discussed as using a powerful bomb. A
7 further method is putting poison in Trujillo's food or alter-
8 natively in his medicine, and finally, possible methods of
9 delivering arms and materials to the dissidents are discussed.
10 Specifically at the end of that Paragraph 3 you will note that
11 [] reports that ~~EMDECK~~ turned his attention away from arms
12 and started talking about delivery of other types of materials,
13 exotic materials, powerful bombs,

14 Mr. Bissell. I am not finding that particular paragraph.

15 Mr. Dennin. Say the beginning of Paragraph 4. Let me
16 just read you the first sentence of Paragraph 4.

17 "~~EMDECK~~ 4 said the object of obtaining this kind of help
18 anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using
19 arms or grenades, he began to speak of more exotic materials
20 and methods." And then it goes on to talk about the powerful
21 bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's
22 evening walk.

23 Do you see that, sir?

24 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do.

25 Mr. Dennin. Would you agree with me that there is no

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1 question whatsoever that based upon this memorandum for the
2 record, if it accurately describes the conversation which the
3 Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division-3 participated, that
4 assassination was being discussed, that it was being discussed
5 in a very specific sense, and that it was made perfectly clear,
6 as the first sentence in Paragraph 4 indicates, that the purpose
7 to which the exotic materials sought by the dissidents would be
8 put was the assassination of Mr. Trujillo?

9 Mr. Bissell. I do.

10 Mr. Dennin. ^XWould you feel that this memorandum would have
11 come to your attention, either directly from ~~Mr.~~ or
12 from his immediate superior, Colonel King?

13 Mr. Bissell. ^XI would guess this or a summary, and
14 conceivably it could have come to my attention, again in the
15 form of an outgoing cable or something of that sort. (96) ^X

16 Mr. Dennin. Now having taken some time to go over this,
17 sir, and the reason I do, I would like you now to turn to and
18 consider the memorandum from you which is under Exhibit L
19 in the Senator's bill -- and Curt, you have in your book, on
20 top of that, the minutes of this Special Group meeting, on
21 February 14th, '61.

22 (The document referred to
23 was marked as Bissell
24 Exhibit No. 9 for identifica-
25 tion.)

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1 The Chairman. Why didn't you include that in the memor-
2 andum?

3 Mr. Bissell. ^A I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not
4 remember what considerations moved me. I don't know whether
5 it was because this was common knowledge and it seemed to me
6 unnecessary to include it, or as you are implying, there was
7 an element of concealment here. I would be very surprised if
8 it were the latter, in this case. (103) A

9 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, if Counsel will yield? Since
10 I was originally asked to join Counsel to do work up on the
11 Trujillo program, and I think he knows this too, it appears in
12 the record before the Committee out of the '67 Inspector
13 General's report and all of the cable traffic which was directed
14 from the Consul General to the State Department through the
15 CIA channels that this plan of the high explosive device was
16 transmitted to Consul General Dearborn, ~~the Station Chief~~, who
17 promptly classified it as an insane idea, which, if they try
18 to do this, because of the heavy guard, they're going to all
19 get themselves killed.

20 And it would appear to me that if that transpired before
21 the memorandum, the memorandum standing on its own looks very
22 bad, but with this other information having been transmitted
23 back to the that it was a foolish plan, it
24 would appear that there was no plan that they thought was
25 workable in the United States government.

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1 Mr. Dennin. Among other things, that advises -- well,
2 that our position, our being the Agency, is that you should
3 attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents
4 to the opposition groups until headquarters, by that you mean
5 CIA headquarters, are better prepared to support assassination
6 and assassination is added in, I believe the original word is
7 the code, ~~EMSTLEW~~ effect a change in the regime and to cope
8 with the aftermath.

9 On page 2, it indicates that "Headquarters is prepared to
10 take the following actions: [REDACTED]

11 as soon as the capability to receive those was developed" and it
12 *B it* was always the understanding and knowledge of Headquarters at
13 that time and specifically your understanding and knowledge when
14 you received and reviewed this cable, that those sought after
15 [REDACTED] were to be used specifically in connection with
16 an assassination attempt on Trujillo, wasn't that so?

17 Mr. Bissell. It probably was. I don't remember whether
18 there was any other use, possible use of them, but I'm going
19 to let that stand. (107) *B*

20 Mr. Dennin. Well, going back to just those, there is no
21 doubt on that, to the document at Tab M, M as in Mary --

22 (The document referred
23 to was marked Bissell
24 Exhibit No. 11 for
25 identification.)

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1 Mr. Dennin. Going into April, sir, now, trying to move
2 somewhat quickly, in April of 1961, Mr. [redacted] returned from the
3 [redacted] and, as reflected in the document under Tab
4 O which is an April 11, '61 memorandum, that reflects an
5 April 6, '61 with Mr. [redacted] and he was the Chief of Station in
6 the [redacted] was he not, sir?

7 (The document referred
8 to was marked Bissell
9 Exhibit No. 14 for
10 identification.)

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1 signed this cable, which was not sent, approving the passage
2 of the [redacted] a Mr. [redacted] representing the Agency,
3 went and saw Mr. Burlew at the State Department, and this would
4 be under Tab V, as in Victor.

(The document referred
to was marked Bissell
Exhibit No. 16 for
identification.)

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7 June 1961

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10 MAY 94

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Record and Related Policy Decisions on []
[] to Dominican Dissidents

(1) (A)
(1) (B)
(1) (C)

1. The following is taken from a Memorandum dated 11 May 1960, Subject: Briefing of Ambassador Farland:

"The Ambassador began by saying that according to 'Mr. Number One', the leader of the Dominican Dissident princes, (whom he did not identify), the dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United States. In particular they need a []

[] The Ambassador said that he saw no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question of whether the United States Government wants to engage in this activity."

2. On 21 June 1960 Ambassador Farland told [] that he thought that an [] to the Dominican dissidents. Ambassador Farland sketched for [] the location of three possible sites for landing a light aircraft near Ciudad Trujillo.

3. In a meeting on 23 June 1960 Assistance Secretary Rubottom told Col. J. C. King that the Government of the United States was prepared to provide the Dominican dissidents with a [] for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene.

4. On 29 December 1960 the Special Group approved a plan of covert action, to be largely effected through [] and providing for increased propaganda directed against Generalissimo TRUJILLO, and for the financial support of selected exile groups. Additionally this approval included authorization for the CIA to make available to selected exile groups communications equipment and support necessary for them to develop a capability of infiltrating personnel and equipment into the Dominican Republic.

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5. At 12 January 1961 meeting of this Special Group, Mr. Livingston Merchant stated that the Department of State felt that a [redacted] other materials should be made available for the dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Thomas Parrott of the CIA said that he believed that this could be accomplished securely by the CIA and that the plan would stipulate that the actual introduction of the materials into the Dominican Republic would be the responsibility of the Dominican dissidents themselves. The decision of the Special Group was communicated to Consul Dearborn in Ciudad Trujillo, and in a letter dated 31 January 1961 to Mr. Frank Devine of the State Department, Consul Dearborn made the following remark: "With regard to the delivery of the exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision has been made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too long the question of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and a too great tardiness on our part would only lead them to question our sincerity."

6. In [redacted] 0462, dated 15 March 1961, [redacted] made the following request: "1. For issue to several dissident people Consul Dearborn requests three [redacted] or similar and three small boxes cartridges. If sending [redacted] complicates problems, advise and we will try to get it from the Marines." The Deputy Director of Plans on 23 March 1961 approved this request and the CIA immediately provided the requested material to the Station. One of these weapons was given to [redacted] a dissident leader, by Consul Dearborn, and the other two were passed by the Station to [redacted] in direct touch with the action element of the dissident organization.

7. On 26 March 1961 in [redacted] 0486 [redacted] requested permission to pass three M-1 Carabines, Cal 30 and supply of ammunition which was available in the Comandante General's U. S. Naval personnel to be passed to the dissidents. This message [redacted] 0486 was concurred in by Consul Dearborn and [redacted] 497, dated 31 March, which stated Consul Dearborn also concurred in stated: "We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of support and goodwill to [redacted] dissident leader, [redacted]. These items (carabines and ammunition) are not what he asked for but they are an investment in operational continuity. The Agency in DIR 32143 of 31 March 1961 approved [redacted] passing the carabines and ammunition and the material was passed to the dissident group over a period of several days in early April 1961 by secure means through the Station cut-out to the dissident, [redacted]"

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15 FEBRUARY 61

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 16 21 34 '61

REC'D CABLE SECT.

R O U T I N E

IN 46419

DIRECTOR

CIUDAD TRUJILLO

C/WH 2

COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

DIR

INFO

CITE TRUJ 0398

RYBAT ENDEED

RE: DIR 25039 (OUT 73178)

1. WILL GET REF INFO SOON POSSIBLE BUT CIA officer THINKS ORIGINAL ~~EMOTH~~ PLAN FOR ACTION AT CORNERS MAXIMO GOMEZ AND GEORGE WASHINGTON USING HIGH EXPLOSIVE UTTERLY OUT OF QUESTION DUE CONSTANT GUARD THAT POINT. CIA officer VIEW SOME REMOTE CHANCE PLACE CHARGE IN STORM SEWER DRAINING TO SEA ON GEORGE WASHINGTON OPPOSITE JARAGUA BUNGALOWS. THIS MEANS PUT RADIO DEVICE UNDER AIR CONDITIONER IN BUNGALOW. IF THICKNESS GREATER THAN 3 INCHES THIS PLACEMENT TO BE EXCLUDED. GOOD CHANCE DISCOVERY DEVICE AND OR CHARGE IN THIS SITUATION BUT WILL POUCH PHOTOS PENDING RECEIPT ~~EMOTH~~ OFFICIAL PLAN.

2. NO DEVICE HERE TO MONITOR PARA 1 E REF FREQS.

END OF MESSAGE

*C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED INFO RE ~~EMOTH~~ PLAN.

DIPIER
EXHIBIT 5
7/8/75
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S E C R E T

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EYES ONLY

16 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with [] and his Cousin

1. On 15 February I went to the Biltmore Plaza Hotel in New York registering under the name of [] and met with [] and his cousin [] for approximately 5 hours during which we discussed activities and support of the opposition in the Dominican Republic.

2. I might mention that we have recently been informed by U.S. Consul [] that in his opinion [] is the king pin of the plot in the Dominican Republic. I would like to say that after this and previous meetings with [] I am strongly inclined to concur in the U.S. Consul's opinion.

3. First off, I explained the authorization for the [] [] under certain conditions and suggested that we go into the details of how such delivery might be effected. I said that it had been suggested that an island cache near the Dominican Republic could be picked up by the internal action groups, but the cousin and [] ruled out this possibility saying that all these islands, although sparsely populated, are regularly patrolled by Dominican guards. They did not agree that a boat-to-boat delivery could be made off the coast of the Dominican Republic from vessels under our control to fishing vessels owned by younger members of the internal front. They said however that the delivery would have to be made near the mouth of a river since the botlers would not be able to unload on patrolled beaches but would have to sail up some river for some distance before the material could be securely unloaded. [] played down somewhat the necessity for delivery of [] although he did say that it is desirable and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quantities of arms from Army contacts from Dominican Army munitions depots but that any arms so obtained would have to be used very quickly before their loss is discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desirable to have [] that could be stored for use at any moment desired.

4. [] said that the object of obtaining this kind of help anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms or grenades he began to speak of more exotic materials and methods which he thought could be more easily adapted. First of all he came up with the idea of a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a near by electronic device. He

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DIDIER
EXHIBIT 4
2/18/75
RPS

EYES ONLY

SECRET

EYES ONLY

-2-

seemed to think that this would be a very easy thing to do, and I had a difficult time explaining to him that we are advised by experts that such a device is very delicate and uncertain. Another method that he brought up would be the possibility of poisoning the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take regularly. Cousin said that he would explore the latter possibility and try to determine whether Trujillo buys his medicine locally or whether they are flown in from the United States. They seem to believe that one or two poison pills could be put into a bottle of medicine and that eventually the dictator would work himself down to one of these pills.

5. A less exotic and more practical plan that they put forward was one that they said had already been planned at one time before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a given intersection at which time young men who belong to the action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and grenades to finish off the dictator.

6. At this point [redacted] said that a large percentage of the military are most anxious for a change in government and that if the old man were erased there would be no difficulty setting up a provisional government along the lines that the internal front has expressed to us before. I pushed this point and asked him if he did not think he would have to call for help in the event certain Trujillo officers did not quit and attempted to set up a continuist government. [redacted] felt so certain that everything would be all right once Trujillo was eliminated that it took some time to even get him to consider that a possibility of immediate trouble after Trujillo's elimination might exist. The cousin said at this point that he had been told that if the internal front could set up a small group as a provisional government at this time and this group broadcast an appeal for help, U.S. troops would move in in response to maintain order. I pointed out that whoever had told him this did not understand that legally U.S. forces cannot under the present rules enter in such form to support a government that is not in control of the country. I then put forth the proposition that if such a situation did come about, why Balaguer as constitutional president of the country could not be forced or persuaded to issue such an appeal. Both agreed that Balaguer

[redacted] could be easily made to do this. However, [redacted] expressed the opinion that if the U.S. sent troops in in response to an appeal from Balaguer it would appear to the populace that the U.S. is supporting the successor of Trujillo. He seemed quite relieved when I told him that I did not believe the U.S. would offer any support to a continuist government.

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

-3-

7. With regard to the all important point as to support the opposition might expect from the military, neither [redacted] or the cousin would or could name any officers on whom they could count; however, it was clear that the key man in their planning is retired General Juan Tomas Diaz. I asked specifically how he could be of any immediate assistance when he doesn't have an active command, to which they replied that Diaz is still the most highly respected army officer in the country. Not only that, they said he may be able to influence the course of action of General Roman, the present Chief of Staff of the Army, even though Roman has made his fortune as a close collaborator of Trujillo and his family. They maintain that as a matter of fact Diaz has already been in contact with Roman and that Diaz can count on Roman obeying his orders at the proper time. They said that Roman cannot be bought off at this time because he is amassing a tidy fortune from his salary and the graft allowed him. However, they maintain that Roman, as are many other people close to Trujillo, is aware that Trujillo's days are numbered and Roman would be tremendously interested in collaborating with the right people in the opposition for the purpose of insuring his own security as well as that of his family. [redacted] seemed firm in his opinion that various people who are now or have been close to Trujillo are prepared to collaborate with the opposition at the right moment because of fear for their own personal security and that of their families.

8. It was obvious that the cousin and [redacted] set great store by Diaz and it also seems clear that the cousin is the contact of the opposition leadership with Diaz. To [redacted] suggestion that it would strengthen Diaz tremendously if he could be contacted directly or through his wife officially by an American to let him know that he and the opposition can count on U.S. support against the dictatorship, I expressed the opinion that such action might be highly desirable and asked how such contact would be made. Since neither [redacted] or cousin could offer any suggestions, I will ask for [redacted] comments on the feasibility and desirability of such contact.

9. At this point [redacted] went off on the Subject of help from Botancourt and asked why it would not be feasible for the Venezuelans to bomb several targets in the Dominican Republic. I told him that discussions of such a course of action came up some months ago but had not been followed up on for reasons that I cannot now recall offhand. At this point [redacted] showed the highest point of enthusiasm that I have seen him reach and he said that if the Venezuelans would carry out a bombing raid with four or five planes aiming at such targets as San Isidro Airbase and one or two other targets, the Trujillo government would collapse and a change would be made immediately. He said that the military as a whole is completely fed up and is ready for a change and that such action as the bombings, showing how really defenseless the Dominican Republic is, would galvanize them immediately into action with the encouragement of the Cuban internal opposition. While I cannot say he convinced me that the

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EYES ONLY

bombings would bring about a successful revolution, it is certainly evident that he is convinced in his own mind that this single action would bring about immediately the downfall of Trujillo and a change to a moderate government led by members of the internal opposition. He strongly urged that such action be planned and carried out immediately and seemed disappointed briefly, at least, when I told him that no authority existed for such action concerned and that in any event the planned and carrying out of such action would take some time.

10. [] strongly urged that we build up better capabilities for producing anti-Trujillo propaganda into the Dominican Republic and again urged us to use the medium and short waves of radio station. After some conversation he agreed that people like Jimenez, Rafael Bonilla, and Homero Hernandez would be good people to plan and cooperate in such a program but he emphasized that these men should not be publicly identified with the program and that the broadcasts themselves should, for maximum effect, be made by professional newscasters. He said that such propaganda should be directed at irritating and upsetting Trujillo as much as possible.

11. In regard to the exiles, he agreed that Juan Isidro Jimenez, although he has been gone a long while from the Dominican Republic, is still a man highly respected for his intelligence and culture and he seemed receptive to the idea put forth that Jimenez should be occupying an important position in the post-Trujillo government. In discussing other exiles I managed to work in the name of Horacio Ornes. Both he and his cousin aware he is engaged in anti-Trujillo exile activity in Puerto Rico both said that they had no objection to coordinating their activity with those of Ornes and his group. [] said that he could set up a channel of communication to Fidelio Despradel, who will be a member in Puerto Rico of the Jimenez group and he said he would do so when requested.

12. On the subject of the exiles, [] said that it was some time before the leaders of internal opposition learned that we had let relations die with such people as other opposition leaders. He said that on this trip he has talked to [] and asked why he had not been receiving messages from him, whereupon [] replied that we no longer had relations with him. (This is the first I knew that [] had communications with [] specifically.) [] pleaded that we resumed contact with such people as other opposition leaders, because he said that it was important that he maintain friendly relationships with exiles wherever possible. He also suggested that we furnish the internal opposition with the identities of those exiles of whom we have a bad opinion and they would see to it that through family connections these people would be straightened out and developed so as to become of assistance to a future government and not bitter against members of the internal opposition of the U.S. I agreed with [] in principle and said that we would try to do

other opposition leader

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
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EYES ONLY

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as he asked but at the same time I pointed out that there were not many of the Dominican exiles that set in this category as far as we know and that if we had dropped some of them it was not because of anything we have against them but would be due to the fact that with limited time and personnel we can only afford to work with those who hold out some prospect of eventual help.

13. As a last point, I emphasized to [redacted] and his cousin the necessity for the development of stay behind communication facilities and asked them to try to locate some communicators who we could give instructions and equipment to in the Dominican Republic. Both the men were quite pleased to learn that we are interested in setting up alternate channels of communication.

The

14. cousin whose New York address and phone number are on file, will go into a New York hospital for a serious operation in the next few days and will be in New York probably for several months. [redacted] will return to the Dominican Republic on or about 23 February and in the meantime can be reached by me using the name of [redacted] at [redacted] in New York.

C/MH/3

THE WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY

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23

SECRET

PREFACE PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Situation

Following the break in diplomatic relations in August 1960 U.S./Dominican relations have worsened steadily, and the anti-U. S. sentiment of the CODR was brought sharply into focus by the appearance of pickets outside our consulate on 5 January in protest against the OAS vote to extend trade sanctions against the Dominican Republic. The pickets bore signs condemning the interventionist policy of the U. S. and calling for the expulsion of Consul General Dearborn, whom they labeled a spy. The Dominican radio and press continued to censure President Eisenhower as being responsible for the present state of affairs, while maintaining a reserve concerning President Kennedy, apparently adopting a "wait and see" attitude, although it has previously expressed some reservations regarding the President's choice of advisers on Latin America.

On 26 January the CODR ordered the expulsion of U. S. Vice Consul James A. McManara on the ground that he was making derogatory remarks about the country; however, it is probable that this expulsion was in retaliation and anger over the belief that the U. S. had provided information to Venezuela on Trujillo's efforts to overthrow or assassinate President Balvencourt.

It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U. S. Congress in March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U. S./Dominican relations. Some say that the Trujillo government cannot last another six months if they do not get their share of the Cuban windfall sugar; and rumors are circulating in Ciudad Trujillo that if they are deprived of the windfall the CODR plans to expropriate American properties and terminate U. S. consular relations.

II. Operational Summary

A. General It will be recalled that on 24 January 1961 the Special Group authorized the Agency to provide dissident exiled Dominican groups with [redacted] provided their delivery to elements within the Dominican Republic was effected by Dominicans. Immediately following this decision we indicated to vitting leaders of the VAB (PETANCOURT - FIGUERES - ORN'S Group) and the FCR (Internal Dissident Group with whom DEMACORE is in touch) that we were prepared to provide them a limited supply of [redacted] provided they developed the capability to introduce same into the Dominican Republic.

On 27 January [redacted] was authorized to inform President PETANCOURT the U. S. is now providing financial support and technical guidance to VAB activities directed by Horacio ORNES,

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4-33

specifically for ship repairs, recruiting and training crews, locating sites and facilities for future PM activities, strengthening the political organization of the VPD and propaganda. On 30 January [redacted] is authorized to inform ESTANCOURT that Headquarters was prepared to consider providing [redacted] to any bona fide resistance element with whom adequate contact can be established. ESTANCOURT was to be encouraged to recommend any new individuals or groups he considered useful to further objectives of the project. [redacted] reported that President ESTANCOURT was gratified to receive the above information.

In Headquarters contact with FCR exiled leaders, they disclosed their plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation devices. They also claimed to have a small boat infil-exfil capability. On the other hand the VRD, while claiming no internal organization, claimed a sea and air capability and are the chosen instruments of President ESTANCOURT and Jose FIGUEROES.

B. Frente Civica Revolucionaria (FCR)

(1) We have recently been in touch with key exiled leaders of the FCR and they have expressed a willingness to assemble a small cadre in Puerto Rico. It is contemplated that they will develop maritime capability, be in touch with their internal counterparts through W/T facilities, and develop plans for implementing the internal group's plan of action. In view of their reluctance to deal directly with the OEHAS Group (VRD) and in the interests of security we plan to keep them compartmented for the time being.

(2) Through [redacted] in Ciudad Trujillo we are attempting to ascertain the details of the FCR's plan of action and develop a stay-behind communication capability.

C. Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD)

(1) We are actively supporting the VRD (the OEHAS group) in repairing and outfitting their yacht so as to develop an [redacted] capability. It is estimated that it will take from 45 to 60 days to complete this work. Additional time may be needed to recruit and train a crew.

(2) Support is also being given to the VRD's propaganda and organizational activities. A program is being developed with the hope that the VRD can develop their own contacts and sources of information within the Dominican Republic.

D. Possibility of Developing a Boycott Capability

(1) During the summer of 1960 VII Division made use of Fernando MUNIZ Silva, Dominican exile in Puerto Rico and at the time head of the

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22-12609

001

DATE 20 MARCH 1961

SECRET

DIRECTOR

FROM: (C) PRADO TRUJILLO

ACTION: CASH 2 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR WH AT 2320, 19 MAR) , WH NOTIFIED AT 2320, 19 MAR)

INFO: DCL, D/DCI, DD/P, COP, ADDP/A, S/C, 2 S/C, 2 S/C, 2 S/C

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RECORDABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 21455

IN 21455

TO DIR

INFO

CITE

(C) PRADO 471

WRB:AT:EMDEED

1

OFFICER opposition leader

1. STATION/ "SAW" an/ - AND an/ ABOUT TWO HOURS 18 MAR AT PRADO

PRADO APARTMENT. SECURITY PRESUMABLY MAINTAINED BUT SIM CARS IN RELATIVE ABUNDANCE IN NEIGHBORHOOD AFTER MEET WHICH NOT SURPRISING AS IT END TRUJILLO STROLL TIME.

opposition leader

2. An/

PROVED BE DOUR NOT PARTICULARLY OPEN INDIVIDUAL

opposition member

WHO HAD TO BE COAXED AT TIMES BY an/ WHO MUCH BETTER MOTIVATED AND PROBABLY MORE DYNAMIC. NOTE HOWEVER an/ HAD LITTLE WARNING MEET AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT OR WHOM EXPECT. NEVERTHELESS PAST AMERICAN RECORD DOMREP AND WIDESPREAD ASSUMPTION TRUJILLO HAS MANY KEY AMERICANS IN POCKET OBVIOUSLY MAKE FOR DIFFICULT ATMOSPHERE FOR WORK WITH an/ ONE RESULT IS HE SEEMS VERY HESITANT NOW REVEAL MORE NAMES OR MINUTE DETAILS. DOUBT WILL AGREE TO MORE MEETS SOON FOR UNDERSTANDABLE SECURITY REASONS.

assassination

3. HIS GROUP

PLAN NOW THIS.

GROUP KNOWS IDENTITY Trujillo MISTRESS IN CAPITAL. HE VISITS HER ONCE WEEK OR ONCE IN TWO WEEKS. GOES HER APARTMENT INCOGNITO AND LIGHTLY GUARDED. GROUP APPARENTLY HAS SOMEONE IN BUILDING WHO CAN ALERT THEM TO VISIT. DRESSED AS ARMY OFFICERS SMALL GROUP WILL GO TO ENTRANCE, DISTRACT GUARD WITH

SECRET

28 MARCH 1961

S E C R E T

ROUTING

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PAGE 2

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

0471 IN 21455

INFO

CITE

PRETEXT, DISPATCH HIM OR THEM IN SILENCE, ENTER APARTMENT AND TRY assassination POSSIBLY INCLUDING MISTRESS, IN SILENCE.

4. TO DO THEY NEED [REDACTED] AND

[REDACTED] FOR PERSONAL DEFENSE IN EVENT FIRE FIGHT. WILL USE QUIET WEAPONS FOR BASIC JOB. An/ ^{opposition leader} EVEN TURNED DOWN TENTATIVE

OFFICER OFFER MARINE CONCUSSION GRENADES AVAILABLE HERE. SAYS ALL IN GROUP EXCEPT HIM ACQUAINTED RAPID FIRE WEAPONS.

5. MUCH FUTILE SPARRING ON USE AIR OR SEA DROPS. An/ ^{opposition lead} FINAL

POSITION WAS US Govt GET ITEMS HERE SOONEST VIA POUCH OR SIMILAR MEANS. EVIDENT HE ACTUALLY WORRIED THAT DELIVERY BY OTHER MEANS WOULD COMPROMISE ENTIRE PROJECT! OBVIOUS HE CAN COUNT ON ONLY ONE GROUP BOTH [REDACTED] AND DO / ^{assassination} APPARENT THAT TO INSIST ON WAYS WHICH MORE SECURE FOR US Govt WOULD TAX HIS RESOURCES TO SUCH EXTENT THAT HE INSISTS THAT AFTER / ^{Assassination} AIR DROPS WILL BE FEASIBLE AS PART EFFORT CONTROL SITUATION HE MIGHT DECIDE DROP PLAN.

OFFICER EMPHASIZED THAT IF HQS WILL NOT POUCH ITEMS THIS DOES NOT MEAN NO US Govt INTEREST IN PLAN. THIS THOUGHT EASIER SELL ^{opposition mt} THAN ^{opposition leader} an/ BUT BOTH OBVIOUSLY FIGURE THEIR DAYS NUMBERED AND WANT TO STRIKE NOW.

S E C R E T

DATE 20 MARCH 1961

S E C R E T

ROUTING

TO

FROM

ACTION

INFO

PAGE 3

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

0471 IN 21455

TO INFO CITE

and an opposition member

6. An opposition leader / CATEGORICALLY EXCLUDE APPEAL BY

BALAGUER AFTER ^{assassination} MAINTAIN IT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO INTERNAL OR
EXTERNAL OPPOSITION AS WOULD LINK PAST WITH FUTURE. ^{opposition leader} AN / EXPEC

AND WILLING RISK CHAOS FOR PERIOD OF UNDETERMINED LENGTH AFTER

assassination MAINLY BECAUSE FOR SECURITY REASONS HIS GROUP CANNOT

APPROACH MILITARY AND HOPE TO GET DECISIVE AGREEMENT SUPPORT BEFORE

assassination. ¹ OFFICER ^{assassination} TOOK LIBERTY SAY US Govt CANNOT PERMIT ANOTHER CEVOLVE FROM CHAOS. BOTH DISSIDENTS INSISTED NO COMMUNIST STRENGTH
AND NO CHANCE CASTRO WAVE HERE. ^{opposition} AN / SAID NOT EVEN CONVINCED A

REAL VALUE IN PRESENCE AMERICAN NAVY IN AREA, WHICH APPARENTLY SOME

ONE ELSE'S IDEA, EXCEPT FEELS MIGHT MAKE MILITARY MORE AMENDABLE

COOPERATE. PLACES MORE VALUE ON AUDRA TYPE ACTIVITY AND MORALE

VALUE INVASION BY EXILES WHEN ^{assassination} / ^{opposition leader} DONE. AN / CLEARLY

RECOGNIZES MILITARY ONLY PEOPLE WITH REAL POWER IN CHAOS.

7. HE AGREED CIA OFFICE SUGGESTION US Govt TRY REACH OTHER
MILITARY THRU OTHER CHANNELS. AGREED GIVE US LIST NAMES TO ASSIST
EFFORT AND AVOID CROSSED WIRES. AGAIN EVIDENT HIS ONLY MILITARY
ASSET IS a high ^{military leader} / BOTH DISSIDENTS CONCERNED THAT PROCESS OF OUR
GETTING AT MILITARY TOO SLOW BUT CIA OFFICE SOUGHT EXPLAIN ADVANTAGE

S E C R E T

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE

28 MARCH 1961

S E C R E T

ROUTING

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FROM

ACTION

INFO

PAGE 4

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

[] 0171 IN 21455

TO

INFO

CITE

member 1
an opposition / IS OFFICER'S CANDIDATE FOR THIS JOB. OFFICER HOPES
SEE HIM ABOUT 22 MARCH.

8. BOTH APPROVED OFFICER LEAFLET, TEXT DRAFTS WHICH POUCHING
opposition leader
22 MARCH AS HDCA 244. An / HAD VOLUNTARILY CITED RADIO
PROPAGANDA FROM VENEZUELA AS MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR YET IN
ENCOURAGING DISSIDENTS AND AWAKENING OTHERS. AGREED TO TREMENDOUS
VALUE SIMILAR BROADCASTS FROM AMERICA AND GREAT DESIRABILITY
LEAFLET DROPS. PLEASE ALERT press and propaganda section.

9. WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY CABLES LATER FULL CIRCLE FROM
opposition member
ORIGINAL an / PLEA FOR [] VIA POUCH. PERHAPS HQS NOW
ABLE COPE POLITICALLY THIS PROBLEM. BE ASSURED ATTITUDE OF
AND PRESUMABLY OF HIS GROUP IS THAT OF DROWNING MAN REACHING FOR
STRAW. HE WANTS STRAW AND NOT OFFERS OF SWIMMING LESSONS. HAVING
BEEN GIVE BAREST DETAILS LATEST / assassination 1 OFFICER
PLAN CIA / CAN VENTURE
ONLY THAT IT SOUNDS MORE INTELLIGENT THAN CITED [] 0446 (IN 15268
US Govt RISKS LITTLE AND COULD GAIN FROM THIS GROUP'S FEAR. THUS
REQUEST HQS STUDY POUCHING AND ADVISE SOONEST. (END OF MESSAGE)

S E C R E T

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25 MAR 61

21 MARCH 1961

(OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

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EDF, COP, S/C

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ROUTINE

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00 87 35

TRUJ (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

CITE DIR

31 39

31 59

REF: A. DIR 30613 (OUT 85044)*

B. [] 0430 (IN 22720)**

C. [] 0471 (IN 21455)***

*See
signature*

*not
US Govt*

1. FOR YOUR ORIENTATION AS TO CIA OBJECTIVES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE D.R., OUR ASSESSMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: IT IS OUR OBJECTIVE TO UNDERTAKE AND SUPPORT PROGRAM TO REPLACE THE PRESENT REGIME WITH A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BEST OF THE INTERNAL DISSIDENTS AND RESPONSIVE TO THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG RANGE INTERESTS OF U.S. / WE RECOGNIZE THAT PRECIPITOUS, UNCOORDINATED ACTION BY INTERNAL DISSIDENTS COULD LEAD TO THE EMERGENCE OF A LEFTIST-CASTRO TYPE REGIME. IN THE ABSENCE OF A WELL DEVELOPED PROGRAM TO COPE WITH THE AFTERMATH, THE MERE DISPOSAL OF TRUJILLO MAY CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN SOLUTIONS. IT IS OUR OPINION THAT ANY FAVORABLE REPLACEMENT OF THE CURRENT REGIME WILL HAVE TO DRAW UPON THE INITIAL SUPPORT AND SUBSEQUENT COOPERATION OF KEY FIGURES IN THE MILITARY. OUR POSITION IS THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO AVOID PRECIPITOUS ACTION BY THE INTERNAL DISSIDENTS UNTIL Opposition Groups AND HQS ARE BETTER PREPARED TO SUPPORT / , EFFECT A CHANGE IN THE REGIME, AND COPE WITH THE AFTERMATH. IN THE MEANTIME WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE COCMILL AND PROVIDE SUPPORT TO Opposition/ ~~IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR JOINT~~ PLANNING AND OPERATIONS. THIS ~~SHOULD BE~~ SUPPORT / ~~VIEWED AS~~ ESSENTIAL MAINTAIN RAPPORT

RELEASING OFFICE

SECRET

(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

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[REDACTED] (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

TO: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

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ROUTINE

(PAGE TWO)

OUT 87855

DIR 31569

TO: [REDACTED] (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

CITE DIR

AND CONFIDENCE NECESSARY INFLUENCE THESE PEOPLE IN THE EVENT THEY SHOULD BRING ABOUT EFFECTIVE CHANGE IN REGIME PRIOR TO DATE FIXED BY CIA. DURING THIS PERIOD WE SHOULD CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Groups

- A. INTENSE DEVELOPMENT OF Opposition/ WITH EMPHASIS ON THEIR DEVELOPING CONTROLLED ASSETS WITHIN THE MILITARY.

Groups

- B. DEVELOPMENT WITHIN Opposition/ TO RECEIVE [REDACTED] WITH EMPHASIS ON SEA RENDEZVOUS. (FYI: OPS LEAD FROM [REDACTED] Contact an MINIMUM RQMS PLAN OPS BY SEPARATE CABLE.)

2. HQS IS PREPARED TAKE FOLLOW ACTIONS:

Opposition Leader

- A. [REDACTED] TO / WHEN HE DEVELOPS CAPABILITY TO RECEIVE INFO. DUE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS CANNOT USE U.S.

Government FACILITIES AS CARRIER. (FYI: HQS PLANNING DELIVERY BY SEA THROUGH

[REDACTED] Contact OF ARMS TO BE CACHED ON DCUREP COAST IN ABSENCE ANY Opposition

Opposition Leader

Leader CAPABILITY FOR ACCEPTING AT SEA. / WILL BE INFORMED OF LOCATION

ONLY AFTER CACHE MADE. REQUEST STATION COLLECT INFO ON BEACH LOCATIONS

WHICH DISSIDENTS HAVE ACCESS TO WHERE HQS MAY DEVELOP CAPABILITY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

(CONTINUED ON PAGE THREE)

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DATE

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TO: [REDACTED] (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

(PAGE THREE)

OUR 87865
DIR 3136

YO: [REDACTED] (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

CITE DIR

ESTABLISH FIELD CACHE SHALLOW WATER OR BEACH.

B. AIR DROP LEAFLETS ON CAPITOL AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES PROVIDED ⁸ contact AND CIA OFFICER CONSIDER ADVISABLE. (FYI: ONE HQS DEVELOPED LEAFLET SHOWING / ⁸ Trujillo WHIPPING CHURCH AND MURDERING PEOPLE NOW IN PRODUCTION WILL BEGIN PRODUCTION REF C LEAFLETS UPON RECEIPT.)

C. [REDACTED] REQUESTED [REDACTED] 0462 (IN 20040) ON 28 DO NOT ADVISE / THIS MATERIAL BEING FOUCHE. EXPLANATION FOLLOWS.

Department

3. HQS HAS INITIATED PLANNING WITH State/ MEET CONTINGENCY THAT SUDDEN BY DISSIDENTS MAY PRECIPITATE CHANGE OF GOVT WITH VIEW DETERMINE WHAT OVERT U. Gov't. ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

4. IF ABOVE CLARIFIES HQS POSITION, CIA OFFICER SHOULD PROCEED ACCORDINGLY. ⁸ Department
EVEN MAJOR POINTS REMAIN UNCLEAR, State/ PREPARING ORDERS PERMIT RETURN FOR CONSULTATIONS. IF CONSULTATION STILL DESIRED, REQUEST CIA OFFICER DISCUSS POSSIBILITY HE MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY LEAVING AND RETURNING DR WITH / ⁸ contact AND ADVISE PRICE DEPARTURE.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

(CONTINUED ON PAGE FOUR)

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EXT
DATE

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TO [REDACTED] (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

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ROUTINE

OUT 87835
DIR 31569

(PAGE FOUR)

TO

[REDACTED] (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

CITE DIR

Opposition group
W/Comment: *UNDERSCORES LACK OF / CAPABILITIES AND ADVISES NO AUTHORIZATION FOR [REDACTED]

*URGES USE OF PUGH FOR DELIVERY [REDACTED] AND ASKS HQS REQUEST AUTHORIZATION FOR AIR DROP OF [REDACTED] LEAFLETS.

*STATED [REDACTED] FORWARDING DRAFT LEAFLETS.

*DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO CSSOP 210-311.

1/10/11
RICHARD M. BELSELL, JR.
DDP
RELEASING OFFICER

C/CA/

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

C/CA/1
AUTHENTICATING OFF

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Co

SECRET

11 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Project [redacted]

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

13 MAY 94
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

1. This was a general meeting which took place in the office of C/CA on 6 April 1961 from 1630 to 1830 hours. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss [redacted] with the [redacted] who was temporarily at Headquarters on consultation. Participants included: [redacted] three employees of the CA Staff; and an employee of WH/3.

2. [redacted] gave a review of [redacted] operational activities in [redacted] dwelling particularly on [redacted] relations with the [redacted] and especially on the insistence of the [redacted] leaders that they be provided with a [redacted] for their own protection (specifically five M3 caliber .45 S&W's), and that they be given tangible evidence in the form of a leaflet drop that [redacted] is in sympathy with their objectives. U.S. Govt.

3. Discussion of the feasibility, ways and means of providing [redacted] and conducting a leaflet drop, gave rise to the following questions:

a. The extent of coordination with higher authority required to conduct the leaflet drop; i.e., whether this required the approval of State, or whether it required both the approval of State and of the Special Group.

b. Whether [redacted] could be sent to [redacted] via the pouch ---which was considered the only feasible means of getting [redacted] to [redacted] at this time.

c. The means of getting these [redacted] into the hands of the [redacted] without running the risk that they could be traced to [redacted] U.S. personnel.

4. On the question of the leaflet drop it was agreed that [redacted] would take up this matter with the appropriate State officials on 7 April; and on the question of using the pouch it was agreed that this should be done, and that WH/3 should request a waiver of the Pouch Regulations for this purpose.

7 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, RI

SUBJECT : Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification

REFERENCE : HSCW-582

1. It is requested that the provisions of CSI No. 110-2 be waived and that the referenced dispatch number and its attachments and separate cover attachments be forwarded to the field via diplomatic air pouch.

2. The above request is submitted for the following reasons:

A. [] Ciudad Trujillo has requested that Headquarters provide [] on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection. During a recent visit by [] to Headquarters, secure means of passing this equipment to the action group was discussed with the appropriate Headquarters staff elements.

B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took the form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited arms and assistance to them provided they developed the capability to receive it. Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels such as air drops or sea infiltration.

C. It is contemplated that the [] will be forwarded as a separate cover attachment to the referenced dispatch which will forward the []

3. I certify that all other transmission facilities listed in CSI No. 110-2 have been considered and found inappropriate.

Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Approved:

(S) []

Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET

SECRET

5. Regarding the transfer of [] to [], after considerable discussion of alternative means, it was recommended that when these arms arrive in [] they be cached by [] Station personnel, who later then, at the discretion of the COS, could notify [] through cutouts of their location. [] COS said that prior to his departure, he would prepare a memorandum setting out alternate methods of getting the arms securely into the hands of []. This has since been done, and a copy is herewith attached. It is recommended that further action by Headquarters be deferred pending receipt of [] firm recommendation, as noted in paragraph 10. of his memo.

CA/RMG

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

00011

1994
 APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
 AS SANITIZED

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 RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
 AS SANITIZED

13 May 94
 (1) (A)
 (1) (B)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	C/DRUM	<i>[Signature]</i>	2 MAY 1961
2	C/WH/3	<i>[Signature]</i>	
3	DDP	<i>[Signature]</i>	
4	C/WED	<i>[Signature]</i>	2 May
5	DCI		
6	CABLE SECRETARIAT		
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO			DATE
WH/3, [Redacted]			2056 2 May
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	

FORM NO. 237
 1 APR 55

Replaces Form 30-4
 which may be used.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-O-342531 (40)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

RIG
UNIT: WH/3/DIR
EXT: 2056
DATE: 2 MAY 1961

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: [REDACTED] (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

1974
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
AS SANITIZED

13 MAY 94

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO: [REDACTED] (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

CITE DIR

RE: A. [REDACTED] 0538 (IN 38742)*

B. [REDACTED] 0564 (IN 44067)**

C. DIR 32773 (OUT 90833)***

(1)(A)
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

Not Sent
But signed

1. HQS EARLIER RESERVATIONS CONCERNING ADVISABILITY DELIVERING REF A ITEMS
NOW MET IN SOME DEGREE BY PLANNING FOR SUCCESSOR GOVT AND CONTROL MEASURES ON
opposition
PART / GROUP AS EVIDENCED IN REF B. SINCE IT APPEARS THAT / GROUP HAS
COMMITTED ITSELF TO ACTION WITH OR WITHOUT ADDITIONAL SUPPORT, COUPLED WITH FACT
REF C ITEMS ALREADY MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM FOR PERSONAL DEFENSE; [REDACTED] AUTHORI-
opposition member
ZED PASS REF A ITEMS TO / FOR THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTECTION ON THEIR PROPOSED
ENDEAVOR. HQS LEAVES TO STATION JUDGMENT MOST SECURE MEANS OF DELIVERY WHICH WILL
AFFORD MAXIMUM ROOM FOR PLAUSIBLE DENIAL.

2. ADVISE [REDACTED] WHEN REF A ITEMS DELIVERED AND THEIR DISPOSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment:

C/WH/3

DDP

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

ALLEN W. DULLES, DCI
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
AS SANITIZED

13 May 94
(1)(B)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE		
1					
2	C/USN				
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
<p>See General Cabello's note below.</p> <p>Post: File with [redacted]</p> <p>Back slip in [redacted]</p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE
C/USN - 203 Admin					4/6/61
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	

FORM NO. 237
1 APR 55

Replaces Form 20-4
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-O-342531

(10)

been able to develop this capability, nor have they been able to nominate training candidates for code radio operators or saboteurs. This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of Trujillo's security services, the understandable fear that prevails throughout the Republic of being caught or suspected of anti-Trujillo activities, and the fact that the organized internal opposition apparently consists of only a few individuals with no real underground structure. CIA has had in the direct custody of ~~the Station~~ in Ciudad Trujillo a very limited supply of [redacted] In response to the urgent requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three [redacted] [redacted] have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional [redacted] support.

B. CIA has established working relationships with selected exile groups. These relationships have taken into account that prominent Caribbean political leaders in effect designated former prominent Caribbean political leader as his emissary and representative to work with Dominican exile groups. Through / prominent Caribbean political leader and with the knowledge of a prominent Caribbean political leader

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leader

an Opposition/ , Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana

(VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as the voice

of the organization.

(3)

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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SECRET

-5-

E. CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets throughout the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo.

III.

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SECRET

ORIG: W3/3/DR&H
AT
DATE: 29 MAY 1961 1580

TOP SECRET

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3		6

29 MAY 61 20 27z

OM: DIRECTOR

ONF: C/WH 1-5

INFO: DCI 6, D/DCI 7, DDP 8, COP 9, ADDP/A 10, C/CA 11, S/C 11-12

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET OUT 606

CITE DIR

TOP SECRET INFO

REF: 0609 (IN 13990) *

42443

42443

Officer
FOR CIA/ FROM STATE

1. PRESIDENT HAS NOW APPROVED CONTINGENCY PLANS DISCUSSED DURING YOUR STAY HERE WITH ONE MAJOR EXCEPTION: YOU ARE NOT TO REQUEST A PRE-SIGNED REQUEST FOR HELP FROM DOMINICAN DISSIDENT GROUPS.

2. WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT YOU CONTINUE TO WORK TO STRENGTHEN PRO-U.S. SENTIMENT AMONG DISSIDENT GROUPS. YOUR WORK ALONG THIS LINE HAS BEEN INVALUABLE. HOWEVER, WE MUST NOT RUN RISK OF U.S. ASSOCIATION WITH POLITICAL ASSASSINATION, SINCE U.S. AS MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY CANNOT COMDONE ASSASSINATION. THIS LAST PRINCIPLE IS OVERRIDING AND MUST PREVAIL IN DOUBTFUL SITUATION. HOWEVER, THERE IS MUCH YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF POLICY, INCLUDING MOST OF THE MEASURES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW ENGAGED. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW.

3. CONTINUE TO INFORM DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION. IN CASE OF OVERTHROW OF TRUJILLO--WHETHER OR NOT INITIATED BY PRO-U.S. GROUP--THE PRO-U.S. GROUP SHOULD PROMPTLY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONSTITUTE ITSELF AS REASONABLE AND PLAUSIBLE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. IT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DECLARE ITSELF SUCH AND REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM U.S., PANAMA, COLOMBIA AND CUBA.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

(CONTINUED)

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ROUTING

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DATE:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

PAGE TWO

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ROUTINE

OUT 60694

TO: [REDACTED] TOP SECRET INFO

CITE DIR

42443

IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT DISSIDENTS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE, DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF SUCH A REQUEST AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING IT. ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE SHORT OF ACTUAL FORMULATION IN WRITING OF A REQUEST IN ADVANCE OF THE EVENT. UNDERLYING THIS PROCEDURE IS THE POLICY THAT, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN WE TAKE THE CHANCE OF A COMMUNIST TYPE TAKEOVER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC EVEN IF WE MUST INTERVENE WITHOUT A REQUEST. THIS LAST POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE DISSIDENTS.

4. REFERENCE TO MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RECORD OF ACTIONS MEANS ONLY THAT FURTHER OPEN SANCTIONS WILL BE MULTILATERAL: AND THAT IN THE CASE OF DIRECT INTERVENTION IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR FORCES TO BE MULTILATERAL. NO BROADER INTERPRETATION IS JUSTIFIED. ALL OTHER U.S. ACTIONS--WHETHER PROPAGANDA OR COVERT ACTIVITIES--WILL BE CONTINUED ON A BILATERAL BASIS.

5. COVERT ACTIVITIES ARE, AS YOU KNOW, VERY SMALL DUE TO INABILITY OF DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOP A METHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES WHICH WILL EFFECTIVELY DISASSOCIATE U.S., AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS OR SABOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES--PROVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITY AND EFFECT COVERT--REMAINS OPEN. HOWEVER, YOU MUST REQUEST AND RECEIVE FURTHER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANY SPECIFIC COVERT ACTIVITY. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE UNABLE TO TRANSFER ARMS TO DISSIDENTS. TELL THEM THAT THIS IS BECAUSE OF

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TO

DIRECTOR

CONF

INFO

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ROUTINE

OUT 60694

PAGE THREE

TO [REDACTED] TOP SECRET INFO

CITE DIR. 42443

OUR SUSPICION THAT METHOD OF TRANSFER MAY BE UNSAFE. IN ACTUAL FACT WE FEEL THAT THE TRANSFER OF ARMS WOULD SERVE VERY LITTLE PURPOSE AND EXPOSE THE UNITED STATES TO GREAT DANGER OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. THE BASIC POLICY IS TO CONTINUE TO HOLD OPEN OFFER OF COVERT HELP, WHILE CAREFULLY EXAMINING AND CLEARING THE SPECIFIC HELP REQUESTED. THIS IS FEASIBLE BECAUSE, IN ACTUAL FACT, THE COVERT HELP IS VERY SLIGHT EXCEPT FOR VERBAL ENCOURAGEMENT AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

6. WE INTEND TO KEEP UP ANTI-ARJILLO PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND OTHER EXTERNAL PRESSURES.

7. FYI, IN EVENT OVERTHROW OF TELJILLO MILITARY FORCES WILL BE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY TO STAND-BY POSITIONS. ON RECEIPT OF REQUEST FROM PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND YOUR CONCURRENCE, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO IN IMMEDIATELY. IF NO REQUEST IS RECEIVED AND THERE APPEARS TO BE ANY DANGER OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER THEN DECISION WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON WHETHER TO INTERVENE REGARDLESS. THIS MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT A REQUEST BE OBTAINED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. END FYI.

8. BEGIN CONVERSATIONS IMMEDIATELY WITH DISSIDENTS INFORMING THEM OF U.S. POSITION AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST. IF THEY ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO ACCELERATE FOR THE IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL OF SUCH A REQUEST PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL PREPARATION OF A WRITTEN DOCUMENT FOR ADVANCE

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ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

OUT 60694

TOP SECRET INFO

CITE DIR 42443

TO YOU.

END OF MESSAGE
officer

WH/Comment: Ref was message from CIA/ to State in which he asked what guidance and encouragement he could give dissidents, if he could provide dissidents with draft document request U.S./O.S. assistance in event TRUJILLO overthrown, and asked clarification of President's statement that any action against TRUJILLO should be multilateral.

CS COMMENT: **DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION.

C/MD

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C/H/3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET

(39)

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: May 3, 1961

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. [redacted] CIA
Mr. Berle

May 9 1961

C-1X-29

COPIES TO:

ARA: Mr. Coerr - 1

Mr. Devine - 3

Mr. [redacted] CIA - 4

TOP SECRET

(4)

Mr. [redacted] of CIA came in. A local group in the Dominican government wishes to overthrow Trujillo; wishes arms for that purpose.

On cross-examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. [redacted] wanted to know what the policy should be.

I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. [redacted] said he felt the same way.

A.A.B:mp

02101

TOP SECRET

MAI 10 1961

FILED

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13 May 84

(1)(A)

406347

S E C R E T

23 June 1975

SUBJECT: Question 1 of 4 Questions Developed during
SSC Hearing of Mr. Richard Bissell on 12
June 1975:

"Was the transfer of [redacted]
to the dissidents in the Dominican
Republic approved by the Department
of State or the Special Group?"

RESPONSE TO QUESTION 1:

No specific documentation to show that the Department
of State or the Special Group approved the transfer of [redacted]
[redacted] to dissidents in the Dominican Republic has been
located. It is possible that approval was considered implicit
in the 12 January 1961 Special Group decision that limited
supplies of [redacted] other material should be made
available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic, in
consonance with the feeling of the Department of State, as
expressed by its representative at the 12 January meeting.
In this context, we note that CIA Headquarters instructed
~~the Chief of Station~~ to obtain Consul General Dearborn's
concurrence in the passage of the [redacted]. ~~The~~
~~Chief of Station~~ replied that the Consul General concurred.
Pertinent messages are OUT 89222, 29 March 1961 and IN
28146, 31 March 1961. Both have been made available to the
Committee.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 056759

S E C R E T

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13 May 94
(C)(e)

S E C R E T

They have decided to give up the plan and disperse." (Attachment E, HDCA 2464, 3 May 1961 and IN 47319, sent 4 May but received by Cable Secretariat 7 May 1961)

(f) In a special briefing paper prepared for Mr. Richard Goodwin of the White House, CIA noted that "for personal defense" [redacted]

[redacted] had been passed to internal opposition leaders. (Attachment to memorandum, dated 13 May 1961, probably sent to Special Group members)

S E C R E T