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# The United States Senate 3 OF 6

R173

Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

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Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

COMMITTEE MEETING

Record Number 157-10011-10026

SSCI Box 239, Folder 16

Wednesday, June 4, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

1	inga special group meeting. And it was left that that was on the
2	record vague. After the special group meeting, did the CIA
3	station in push further for the
4	as a gesture of U.S. support of dissidents?
5	Mr. Colby. Yes, there was considerable discussion with
6	a dissident group down there. And the question they made
7	a particularpoint out of needing some warrant of our serious
8	interest in supporting it. And the station was urging that
9	this be done through the provision
10	Mr. Schwarz. And did the station indicate that the
11	persons who wanted the had stated that the object of cb-
12	taining this kind of help is the elimination of Trujillo?
13	Mr. Colby. Yes. And two of the individuals on the 15th
14	of February said that the object was the elimination of
15	Trujillo. Instead of using arms or grenades, he began to
16	speak of a bomb and of poisoning.
17	Senator Baker. That is quoting the man requesting it?
18	Mr. Colby. Yes, the requestor.
19	He also described a possible ambush.
20	Mr. Schwarz. Now, who was the chief of station in
21	in 1961?
22	Mr. Colby 5 Mg (A)
23	Mr. Schwarz. Did the Chief of Station on March 17, 1961
24	cable the CIA headquarters reiterating his suggestion to
25	send in diplomatic pouches
	hogging Mr. Doorbown the Ambassaday

1	Mr. Schwarz. And the CIA headquarters told him that no
2	authorization exists to suspend the pouching regulations
3	against shipment of articles on March 20, 1961, is that right?
4	Mr. Colby. Right.
5	Mr. Schwarz. Did the Chief of Station reply on March 22
6 -	that "he knew that at last two posts by a pouch
7	for worthy purposes"?
8	Mr. Colby. Yes.
9	I think we are talking about pouch as a term of art here.
10	I think there are obviously ways to ship to an embassy,
11	we need them for our Marine guards among other things. And
12	I think the question here was whether they would use the
13	diplomatic pouch in concealing the fact that they were
14	and that there was no opposition for that.
15	Mr. Schwarz. And there were some regulations against using
16	the diplomatic pouch for that purpose?
17	Mr. Colby. The standing regulation does say, you shall
18	not ship in pouches.
19	Mr.Schwarz. What had been the two posts that 4 (A)
20	had prior to?
21	Mr. Breckinridge. Mr. Schwarz told me this morning to find
22	out. He was in - and these dates are subject to
23	correction, but I believe they are correct - he was there
24	in from April 1951 to July 1954. A showt inferim
25/	period on leave and at headquarters. Which them from November Qf

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Mr. Schwarz. stated to headquarters that in response to their comment that you shouldn't send through the diplomatic pouch, he had at his last two posts, AB which were through the

diplomatic pouch for "worthy purposes."

What were those purposes?

Mr. Colby. I don't know.

Mr. Breckinridge. We don't know.

Mr. Colby. I might add one comment here, that headquarters cabled to station on the 20th of March "Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of articles".

Now, the way many of these messages leave our heaquarters is that they are signed off at the division level. And that could have reflected the division's communicating with the station, saying, I haven't gotten an exception from our normal rules for you yet, really, that the exception might be granted further up in the approval chain, but that as of this day, in response to the station's cable, they had not gotten the exception.

In other words, if we had a good reason to send to a certain station, I am sure we could find a way to do it today.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you find out what the "worthy purposes"

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	were pursuant to which needed those ?
	Mr. Colby. We can ask Mr. yes.
	Mr Schwarz. Is the reference to W.H. in the March 22 ca
	cable, which states "WH not prepared take this step" and the
	step being through the pouch to the

White House, or to the CIA's WH Division?

Mr. Colby. That is the division I am on.

Mr. Chairman. Senator Baker.

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The Chairman. Senator Baker.

TOP SECRET

Senator Baker. As the Director knows, this caused us great grief at one time.

Mr. Colby. We have charged the name of that since, Senator.

Senator Baker. Could you, for the sake and the gratification of my longstanding concern in that respect, supply for the record a further identification for that as Western Hemisphere instead of White House?

Mr. Colby. I want to make sure that this is what this says. This is a reply from the station. And it sounds to me like in this case that he really means Western Hemisphere Division.

Senator Baker. Is there some way we can determine whether he is talking about White House or Western Hemisphere?

Mr. Colby. This supports my previous comment about the level of approval and authorization. In other words, the Chief of Station normally deals with his division. He thinks of his division as his headquarters, the chain of command for him, with the realization that there are levels of approval above the division which can get exemption to certain regulations if it were appropriate. And from my reading of many cables over the years, I can smell this one pretty clearly as a communication between station and division, talking about A Western Hemisphere Division. We can check with

1	it comes out pretty clearly.
2	Senator Tower. Still employed by the Agency?
3	Mr. Colby. Yes.
4	Mr. Schwarz. Following the initial turndown of delivery
5	by the pouch, did the Agency in fact some-
6	time after March 25th and were authorized by Mr. Bissell to do
7	so?
8	Mr. Colby. I don't think we Wha
9	we shipped; were carbines.
10	Mr. Breckinridge. I think that we
11	
12	Mr. Schwarz. If you look at the record for March 25,
13	1961, it states in a cable authorized by Mr. Bissell, "We
14	support a program to replace the Trujillo regime. We wish to
15	avoid precipitated action if planning is not well organized,
16	as appears to be the case.
17	supplied to demonstrate good will to the dissidents who
18	requested and are being pouched."
19	Mr. Colby. But I think elsewhere in the record it is
20	indicated that we could look back on page 39 we find
21	notations that thewere actually pouched. We are
22	just not very clear on that.
23	Mr. Schwarz. The first instance where this document
24	admits that were in fact sent and delivered is under
25	the heading "March 26, 1961." And it refers to three

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Then in March the approval of the passage, I think, without any substantial difference in policy, expressed in the Probably that is a formal approval. It would be considered adequate for the actual passage in March. Now, I imagine, however, that there was a certain amount of preexchange of information with the Embassy in Dominican Republic and also with the State Department here. Mr. Schwarz. On March 31, 1961 the actual passing of the carbines was approved in a cable released by Mr. Bissell, is that right? Mr. Colby. It was approved, yes, in a cable 31 March. Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Bissell released the cable, is that right? Mr. Colby. Yes. continued The Chief of Station, Mr. Mr. Schwarz. to ask for more through the pouch. Mr. Colby. Right. Mr. Schwarz. And there is an indication that some approval of pouching more was granted by Headquarters in April 1961, is that right, April 12, 1961? Mr. Breckinridge. They sent more but never did have authority to Mr. Colby. They did approve the but these were never -- the Station was never authorized

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#### TOP SECRET

to release those to the dissidents.

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The Chairman. From the State Department to the Charge, on what we have speculated must be the instructions of the President. And that remains to be determined positively.

Now, two days later we get this cable from the Chief of Station to the CIA. And those words are quoted in the record: "Assume the 29 May policy cable form State to Dearborn is final word on present policy on which CIA

be based. This for practical purposes retreats from previous policy. However, Headquarters is aware extent to which US Government already associates with an assassination. If we are to at least try to cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in an assassination preparation must be withdrawn now. If an assassination tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of Chief of Station, the operations 1(B)

officer, and the administrative assistant mandatory."

Now, we must have the full cables of course in this case

But I really believe that some very serious questions

are left unanswered by this record.

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I might recall that Shakespeare anticipated this situation when he said, when you strike a king you must kill him.

Mr. Colby. There was also a companion cable from the Charge to the Department making moreorless the same problem, that there was substantial proof of US involvement in these matters. That cable was dated on 31 May. It was actually