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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM :  
TO :

TITLE :  
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

DATE : 09/11/75  
PAGES : 71

SUBJECTS :  
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: WITNESS, HELMS, RICHARD  
EXHIBIT: MEMO FOR THE RECORD RE CUBAN OPERATIONS  
CABLES  
EXHIBIT: MEMO FOR RECORD RE SILENCER FOR FAL AUTO RIFLE  
REBELLON, JOSE

[R]  
[R]

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SSCI Box 247, Folder 4

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

**TOP SECRET**

1 really know all of this in detail.

2 Mr. Kelley. Do you know who ~~(ARTIME)~~ was?

3 Mr. Helms. He was a Cuban exile leader, is the best  
4 definition to give to ~~(ARTIME)~~.

5 Mr. Kelley. I am told by a member of our staff who  
6 reviewed these documents in their unsanitized forms that  
7 <sup>(B1</sup> ~~(B-1 was ARTIME and)~~ that L-1 was AMLASH, and that the case  
8 officers whom they have questioned about these documents --

9 Mr. Helms. Wasn't ~~(ARTIME)~~ also a member of the Cuban  
10 Brigade?

11 Mr. Kelley. He was very heavily involved in the Bay of  
12 Pigs. <sup>(B-1</sup> ~~(B-1 was ARTIME)~~ L-1 was AMLASH in the period '64-'65,  
13 and the case officers who were involved in these documents  
14 have testified, they say, that Desmond Fitzgerald knew all  
15 about what they were doing, that he was informed that they  
16 were trying to put AMLASH in touch with our teammate in order  
17 to effect AMLASH's goal of assassinating Castro, and that  
18 the case was a very big one, at least in their view of what  
19 the DDP Directorate was doing at the time.

20 Mr. Helms. Who said Fitzgerald knew all of these things?

21 Mr. Kelley. The case officers that they were working  
22 for Fitzgerald.

23 Now my question is did you know what Fitzgerald was  
24 doing? Did Fitzgerald report to you what he and his case  
25 officers were doing with respect to AMLASH?

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD &amp; PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 this case, I think, two of them out in Europe some place,  
2 handling an asset -- and just how often you put your finger  
3 into the pie, if at all, other than getting yourself routinely  
4 briefed by one of your trusted --

5 Mr. Helms. It would be the latter. Fitzgerald would be  
6 the man who would report to me and tell me what was going on.  
7 Get what authorizations he needed for me, bring me whatever  
8 papers had to be signed in order to carry on his work. Obviously  
9 minutes of 303 Committee meetings would come to me with  
10 regard to participating, whether I did or didn't.

11 In other words, I would keep in the policy line there.  
12 But the actual operational details, day to day, would  
13 be handled by Fitzgerald and his people in these various  
14 stations, Miami, [REDACTED] and so forth. They would come into  
15 him in Washington.

16 What telegrams going back and forth I would see or would  
17 not see, I would not have every single telegram there to  
18 find out, but this was generally, he reported to me. I didn't  
19 go down and talk to individual case officers about these.

20 Mr. Kirbow. One other question.

21 Mr. Helms. Except on rare occasions.

22 Mr. Kirbow. Sure.

23 After Desmond Fitzgerald returned from his trip to meet  
24 with AMLASH, hoding himself forth, apparently properly to be  
25 a representative of the United States government, do you recall

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SECRET

2

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CITE [REDACTED] 3902

SECRET 031240Z

3 MAY 64 IN 74774

REF: DIR 16696

1. AGENT ASSESSMENT SUBJECT PARA TWO REF IS HE INTELLIGENT CLEVER COURAGEOUS PICTURESQUE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS CONFIDENCE OF AGENT-1 AND SUBSTANTIAL KNOWLEDGE LATTER'S ANTI REGIME PLANS INCLUDING DETAILS OF DISPOSAL. ] THOUGH EARLIER NOT INCLINED SHARE AGENT-1 ENTHUSIASM AGENT NOW ENTIRELY CONVINCED BY RECENT TALKS WITH SUBJECT THAT HE WELL MOTIVATED VERY USEFUL COLLABORATOR FOR AGENT-1 PARTICULARLY IN CUBA AND IS NOT PLAYING DOUBLE GAME. IN MAKING HIS ASSESSMENT AGENT OBVIOUSLY ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO FACT AGENT-1 GAVE SUBJECT THE CLOSELY HELD "M" ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS.

2. SUBJECT DOES NOT PLAN STAY EUROPE BUT IN KEEPING RECENT ADVICE BY CHE GUEVARA NOW EXPECTS GO BACK CUBA IN THREE OR FOUR MONTHS. MEANWHILE HIS LODGING BEING PAID BY CARRILLO WHO DURING UPCOMING TRIP CUBA WILL SEE WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE. SUBJECT DOES NOT WANT BE ASSIGNED EMBASSY PARIS AS WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN AT LEAST YEAR AND HALF BEFORE RETURN CUBA. SUBJECT HAS HAD IDEA GO SPAIN IN INTERIM BUT AGENT HAS SOUGHT APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY DISCOURAGE HIM.

3. SUBJECT TOLD AGENT HE REPORTED TO CARRILLO A RECENT APPROACH BY MIGUEL ROCHE IN PARIS ON BEHALF OF AMERICANS. BY SO DOING SUBJECT FEELS HE INCREASED STANDING WITH CARRILLO. IN RE

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CITE [redacted] 9930

SECRET 031220Z 3 MAY 64 IN 74775

REF: DIR 16696

1. MSG WHICH SUBJECT PARA TWO REF HAD FROM AGENT-1 WAS THAT [LATTER WANTS SILENCER FOR THE BELGIAN FAL SUBMACHINEGUN SOONEST.] THIS TO BE DELIVERED TO M FOR J. AGENT NOT ABLE GET BETTER DESCRIPTION WEAPON BUT SAYS IT IS THE NATO WEAPON WHICH MILITIA CUBA CARRY.

2. SUBJECT PARA TWO REF LED BY AGENT THINK LATTER WILL TRY GET SILENCER TO CUBA VIA RELATIVES ITALY. [ACTUALLY CIA WOULD HAVE TO DELIVER.] IN IGNORANCE HQS KNOWLEDGE DETAILS CIA OFFICER ASKED TO WHAT ADDRESS ITEM COULD BE DELIVERED IF DESIRED DO SO. AGENT GAVE IDENS A AND B ON AUPN. "NICK" HAS BACKGROUND.

3. JOSE ALBERTO IBARRA MARTIN HAS NOT COME TO [redacted] AND PROBABLY WILL NOT ACC SUBJECT PARA TWO REF. BASIC REASON IS HE TURNED DOWN REQUEST BY [redacted] HE WORK FOR [redacted] IN INTERNATIONAL FIELD WHILE ABROAD. DID SO BECAUSE HE BASICALLY FRIEND OF [redacted] AND DID NOT WANT BETRAY HIM.

4. NO INFO ON SUBJECTS PARA THREE REF. <sup>AGENT</sup> THINKS MAY LEARN ABOUT THEM GENEVA WHERE GOES 3 MAY. ADDITIONAL RESPONSE TO REF FOLLOWS SEPARATELY.

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4

S E C R E T 041736Z

4-MAY 64  
IN 75524

DIR CITE [ ] 3946

1. MEDICAL DOCTOR(SOURCE) SPANISH CITIZEN WHO WENT CUBA LATE OCTOBER 1963 AS FOREIGN TECHNICIAN, RETURNED [ ] 15 APRIL, DISILLUSIONED WITH CONDITIONS AND TREATMENT CUBA. SUBJECT IS FAMILY FRIEND AGENT-9.

2. WHILE WORKING IN HOSPITAL IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA SUBJ SAW AGENT-1 TOLD SUBJ HE WANTS LEAVE CUBA WITH MOTHER AND SON AND OBTAIN SCHOLARSHIP IN [ ]. SOURCE STATES DEPRESSED AND HAS MANY ENEMIES IN CUBAN GOVT.

3. SOURCE STATES THAT, SHORTLY BEFORE LEAVING CUBA, CUBAN DOCTORS AT HOSPITAL TOLD HIM "SOMETHING BIG" GOING TO HAPPEN CUBA WITHIN "NEXT FEW WEEKS" AND ADVISED SOURCE TO LEAVE ASAP. ACCORDING SOURCE DOCTORS IMPLYING THIS "SOMETHING" WILL BE ATTEMPT OVERTHROW CASTRO REGIME AND DOCTORS ANTICIPATING THIS WITH PLEASURE. SOURCE STATES AGENT-1 LIFE IN DANGER AND HE WILL BE KILLED IF OVERTHROW ATTEMPT FAILS.

4. RELATED ABOVE IS ANOTHER AGENT'S STATEMENT TO SECOND AGENT [ THAT AGENT ONE THREE OR FOUR WEEKS AGO WAS PLANNING ASSASSINATION ] ATTEMPT. IMPLICATION WAS IT DELAYED FOR REASONS WHICH AGENT-1 APPEARED NOT TO HAVE LEARNED.

5. NO INDEX.

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FROM:

15

73 Dec 64

TO: PRIORITY [ ]

INFO: [ ]

CITE DIR 73048

REF: [ ] 2635 (IN 47894)

1. AT MEETING 22 DEC ~~W-1~~ CONFIRMED L-1 PLANS TRAVEL MADR WITH ~~U-19~~ 26 DEC. PRIMARY REASON HIS MADR TRIP IS TALK WITH ~~L-2~~ IN ORDER DETERMINE EXTENT AND DEPTH ~~L-2~~ CONVERSATIONS WITH B-1 REPS MADR. ALTHOUGH FROM PERSONAL SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, SINCE HE RETURNING CUBA, L-1 DISINCLINED MEET PERSONALLY WITH B-1, HE INTERESTED DETERMINING FROM ~~L-2~~ WHAT CAN BE GAINED TO ADVANCE STRUGGLE AGAINST CASTRO BY JOINING FORCES WITH B-1 AND HIS GROUP.

2. ~~L-1~~ WAS INFORMED BY CIA AT MEETING IN PARI EARLY DEC 64 THAT U.S.G. CANNOT RENDER ANY KIND OF SUPPORT AND WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN HIS PLAN NEUTRALIZE CASTRO. L-1 CLAIMS TO UNDERSTAND U.S.G. POSITION BUT SINCE HE SEES NO OTHER SOLUTION TO CUBAN PROBLEM HE PLANS CONTINUE HIS OWN EFFORTS AND ATTEMPT IGNITE INTERNAL COUP AGAINST CASTRO REGIME. SINCE L-1 AWARE HE CANNOT GET SUPPORT FROM U.S.G. HE MAY TRY B-1. WHILE HQS WOULD LIKE SEE L-1 AND B-1 GET TOGETHER, IT IS NOT DESIRED CIA BE INTERMEDIARY. WE CAN ONLY ENCOURAGE INDIRECTLY AND PERMIT THEM REACH OWN DECISIONS. L-1 WAS TOLD U.S.G. HAS NO

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PAGE 2

CONTROL OVER *B-1* SINCE HE OPERATES FROM OUTSIDE *U.S.*  
TERRITORY BUT IT FACT *B-1* MOST ACTIVE LEADER WORKING  
FOR LIBERATION HIS COUNTRY.

3. WHILE PROBABLY SUSPECTED, NEITHER *L-1* NOR *B-1*  
KNOW THAT *CIA* IN UNILATERAL CONTACT WITH OTHER. *CIA* DOES NOT  
PLAN REVEAL THIS FACT OR CONFIRM IT IF THEY MEET AND REVEAL CASE  
TO EACH OTHER. ALTHOUGH *ANOTHER* AGENT HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN PAST, PLEASE  
REMINDE HIM HE SHOULD NOT REVEAL HIS KNOWLEDGE *L-1* CONTACT  
WITH *CIA* TO ANYONE.

4. IF *L-1* TAKES INITIATIVE CONTACT *OTHER* AGENT WHILE IN  
MADRID, SUGGEST CONTACT BE PERMITTED SINCE THEY PERSONAL FRIENDS.\*  
HQS INTERESTED RECEIVING ANYTHING *L-1* MAY TELL *OTHER* AGENT.

*L-1* DID NOT ASK FOR *CIA* CONTACT IN MADRID AND NONE REQUIRED.

*L-1* MAY ASK FOR *DCOS* ON PERSONAL BASIS BUT CONTACT UNNECESSARY.

END OF MESSAGE

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INFO

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SECRET 050836

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO IMMEDIATE WAVE (PAR) CITE

5 Oct 64 0836836

1. (S-2) REQUESTED URGENT MTE WITH CASE OFFICER 4 OCT. SAID MET WITH A SOURCE 3 OCT WHICH TIME SOURCE REVEALED SOME DETAILS RE PLAN OF ACTION AIMED AT OVERTHROW CASTRO GOVT. FOLL GIST SOURCE REMARKS:

PRESENT MISSION IS MAKE CONTACTS AMONG MILITARY LEADERS OUTSIDE CUBA. SOURCE GOING PARIS 5 OCT UNDER MEET WITH (FRU) ANOTHER PERSON WHO IS (CHIEF ASST TO B-1) AT GRAN HOTEL. PLANS TAKE (S-3) WITH HIM. (S-2) ALSO INVOLVED BUT UNKNOWN IF HE GOING PARIS. SOURCE AND (S-3) WILL RETURN MADRID 9 OCT. GROUP AWAITING UNIDENTIFIED HIGH MIL OFFICER LEAVE CUBA ORDER TRAVEL PARIS FOR "SUMMIT MEETING" WITH B-1, WHICH HOPEFULLY TO OCCUR BY MID-NOVEMBER. PURPOSE WOULD BE COORDINATE ACTION, INCLUDING ASSASSINATION CASTRO FOLLOWED BY MIL COUP TO TAKE PLACE SOMETIME DEC 64. (STATION COMMENT: PRESUME MIL LEADER (S-1)). (S-3) HAS AGREED ACCEPT ASSASSIN ROLE. SOURCE HIMSELF PLANNING BLACK ENTRY CUBA TO MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. ADDED THAT ABOVE MIL OFFICER MAY NOT BE ABLE RETURN

2. SOURCE SAID HE ACTING UNDER CIA INSTRUCTIONS. SAID

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AND Asst to B-1 RECEIVED ORDERS FROM CIA MEET WITH HIM IN PARIS, AND NOT MADRID, DUE PUBLICITY GIVEN MRR FOLLOWING SIERRA ARANZAZU INCIDENT. **Q-57** IMPRESSION IS SOURCE'S MISSION POSSIBLY NOT CIA V-SPONSORED SINCE SOURCE HAD ASKED **Q-57** FOR LOAN TO PAY AIR FARES TO PARIS WHICH **Q-57** REFUSED "FOR LACK FUNDS." SOURCE FINALLY GOT HELP FROM "G" THIS REGARD.

3. SOURCE HAS ASKED **Q-3** (HIGHLY RESPECTED MRR MEMBER) SERVE AS HIS LOCAL CONTACT, HOWEVER **SAL** STALLING HIM UNTIL STATION APPROVAL GIVEN. SOURCE STRESSED HE DID NOT WANT ENRIQUE TOUS (CHIEF MRR REP SPAIN) BECOME WITTING ANY ASPECTS ABOVE PLAN. **Q-3** MEETING WITH SOURCE TODAY AND WILL PROVIDE STATION FULL REPORT 5 OCT.

4. SOURCE TOLD **Q-3** CONFIDENTIALLY THAT MOST MIL LEADERS INSIDE CUBA "WANT NO PART OF AMERICANS SAID THEY SUPPORTING ABOVE ACTION AS MEANS PRECLUDE **MINUG** PLAN PURGE MIL OFFICERS NEAR FUTURE.

5. STATION HAS NOT CONTACTED **Q-3** SINCE <sup>8</sup> POLYGAM<sup>8</sup> MEET 27 SEPT ATTEMPTING REACH HIM PRIOR 5 OCT TRIP, OBSTENSIBLY OBTAIN HIS PHOTOGRAPH WHICH HE PROMISED PROVIDE, AND TRY ELICIT INFO HIS TRAVEL AND GROUP'S PLANS.

6. STATION UNABLE EVALUATE ANY ABOVE INFO, HOWEVER WILL ATTEMPT DISCREETLY MONITOR THESE ACTIVITIES.

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FROM: [REDACTED]

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY [REDACTED] WAVE CITE [REDACTED] 1926

8 OCT 64 IN 89419

REF [REDACTED] 1916

1. CO MET WITH <sup>(64-3)</sup> SOURCE 5 OCT. SAID GOING PARIS SAME DAY 2000 HOURS ON AIR FRANCE FLT WITH FRIEND HE REFUSED IDENTIFY, SAYING "I'M NOT WORKING FOR YOU YET RPT YET." PROMISED PROVIDE FULL DETAILS HIS TRIP ON RETURN [REDACTED] 9/10 OCT. DID SAY HE WOULD CONTACT <sup>U-19</sup> THERE.

2. SPOKE IN VAGUE TERMS RE "BIG PLAN" AIMED AT DISCREDITING CUBAN OFFICIALS IN EUROPE, INCLUDING POSSIBILITY BREAK IN RELATIONS SPAIN/ CUBA LATER SAID MIGHT NEED OUR HELP OBTAIN A VISA FOR SELF. IN REPLY TO QUERY WHETHER HIS PROPOSED TRAVEL CONNECTED ANY WAY WITH "CIS MISSION," SAID HIS OBJECTIVE TO KILL CASTRO AND OVERTHROW HIS GOVT.

3. SAID PLANS MEET PARIS WITH PERSON WHO "ARRANGED" SIERRA ARANZAZU ATTACK BY PAYING OFF RADIO OPERATOR TO SEND POSITION TO ATTACKING CRAFT. SAID R/O HAS TOLD WHOLE STORY TO SPANISH POLICE.

4. ACCORDING SUBJ, (FNU) MORALES OF CUBAN EMB PARI WORKING FOR ANOTHER SERVICE. JOKINGLY COMMENTED MANY CUBAN OFFICIALS COLLABORATING WITH HOST GOVT SERVICES IN MOST COUNTRIES AND CASTRO WOULD PAY HIGH PRICE

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FOR SUCH INFO, HOWEVER SUBJ "NOT INTERESTED."

5. ~~237~~ RECD TELEGRAM 5 OCT FROM TWO CIS AGENTS ABROAD SHIP CIENFUEGOS IN BILBAO. MSG CONTAINED GREETING FOR *SOURCE* ~~(S)~~ HE IDENTIFIED THEM AS: ALBERTO ORIA (AKA: JIMMY WINDOW) AND "MONGO FAMILIA." SAID ORIA ON OSTENSIBLE SIX MONTHS LEAVE FROM UNIV POST. BELIEVES THEY PLANNING OPERATE SPAIN AND FRANCE.

6. ~~STATION~~ WILL RECONTACT SUBJ ON RETURN  PLS ASSIGN CRYPT FOR SUBJ.

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10 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Officer

SUBJECT: Last Meet with L-1 and Case Officer

1. U-19, according to his wife who spoke to him by telephone 10 December, hopes to return Tuesday, 15 December. L-1 will debrief him as soon as he returns on the situation in Havana, and as agreed, pass all information he collects through you. L-1 has no phone but will contact you through U-9. You can call him at the residence at telephone number.

2. W-1 returned from Madrid on 9 December with the information from L-2 regarding the meeting with B-1. L-1 may meet with B-1 later but is not prepared to meet with him until after he talks with L-2 and finds out the details of the arrangements. L-1 is also concerned over his own security and that of the people inside Cuba whom he would be committing once he ties in with B-1.

3. Our official line to take with regard to B-1 is that he is operating from outside the United States, is doing what he can for his country, and is highly thought of. Although we would like to see B-1 and L-1 get together, we do not want to be the brokers in the union. All we can do is encourage it indirectly and permit them to make their own decisions. FYI: B-1 is in full agreement with L-1 line of thinking regarding solution in Cuba and is the reason he would like to join forces. B-1 does not know and we do not plan to tell him that we are in direct contact with L-1 nor does L-1 know and we do not desire he know that we are in direct contact with B-1.

4. L-1 was told and fully understands that the United States Government cannot become involved to any degree in the "first step" of his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he would request.

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B-1 ORG Meeting in West Palm Beach, Florida, 3 Jan 1965

SUBJECT: Second Meeting Between B-1 and L-1  
in Madrid on 30 December 1964

1. B-1 returned to Madrid on 30 December 1964. He arrived at 1500 hours and by 1600 hours was in his second meeting with L-1. The meeting lasted until 2200 hours and took place in an apartment on the top floor of the highest commercial building in Madrid. The apartment was rented the night before by L-2 and L-3. They rented the apartment and spent the night, one remained in the apartment until the conference took place. B-1 arrived with OTHER PERSON and L-2 who met him. In the apartment when B-1 arrived with PERSON and L-2 were L-1 and L-3. While B-1 was saying his hellos to L-3 and L-1, OTHER PERSON looked around the apartment for any concealed tape recorders. He used the pretext of looking for something that the Spanish security service may have planted in the apartment but was also checking on his brothers. Before leaving L-3 ordered three bottles of cider and four cans of beer. This was delivered and everybody except L-1 and B-1 left the apartment. They promised to call at 2000 hours to find out when they should come and pick them up.

2. They started the conversation discussing mutual acquaintances and friends in Cuba. L-1 does not think much of the DRE boys, especially Salvat, who is in Miami at this time, but he does respect Alberto Muller who is in prison. He stated that Muller is having troubles in the Isle of Pines but he is demonstrating his determination to resist any kind of indoctrination which is forced upon him. B-1 had a long list of government personalities which he had hidden in his coat. When he extracted the list from its hiding place, L-1 started to laugh. L-1 asked whether B-1 was also going to ask him about all these different people because the Americans had also presented him with a long list asking about the same people. He said the Americans always ask him about these people and also about the new arms that Fidel may have in Cuba.

3. L-1 mentioned that the first thing that may interest B-1 before they started to talk about any personalities was that all the SAM sites were in Cuban hands and not in Soviet hands. He also mentioned there were two groups with whom he was in contact besides his own group of the Directorio Revolucionario, one led by Cmdte. Efigenio Ameijeiras from the 26th of July group and a second group

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also from the 26th of July. The latter is opposed to the regime, but a prerequisite to joining in the coup is the elimination of Castro. The following officers are members of this group: Cmdtes. Sergio del Valle, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army; Antonio Lusson y Batlle; Guillermo Garcia Frias, Commander of the Western Army; and Victor Bordon Machado, Chief of Artillery, Western Army. L-1 was not too laudatory concerning this group. He feels they want to reap the fruit after the big job has been performed. On the other hand, regarding Ameijeiras, he claims that he has the courage and determination to proceed with what has to be done under any and all circumstances.

5. B-1 asked the following question of L-1: If Fidel Castro should be eliminated, what officers would join a group which would oppose the Communist Party, Raul Castro, Che Guevara and company. L-1 mentioned Sergio del Valle. L-1 claims that he has already talked to del Valle but the condition placed by him is the death of Fidel Castro or he is unwilling to participate in any kind of coup. According to L-1 he has already spoken with del Valle, Lusson, Guillermo Garcia Frias, and Victor Bordon Machado. All of these people are in the same position as del Valle; they are not willing to participate in anything until Fidel Castro is eliminated. In B-1 opinion, the following would also join the anti-Communist forces once Fidel Castro is eliminated: Juan Almeida Bosque, Delarmino Castilla Mas and Pedro Miret. Another man who may also join them is "El Gallego" Fernandez, but he has no troops with him. The troops are very much opposed to him because he was a member of Batista's old army. He was then made a comandante in the new rebel army. L-1 feels that Cmdte. Manuel Cespedes Fernandez, the deputy commander of the Eastern Army in Oriente, will probably join an anti-Communist group. L-1 is not certain of Cespedes but does know his brother is anti-Communist. L-1 has not yet spoken with or talked with Cmdte. Oscar Fernandez Mel who is the deputy commander in the Western Army. L-1 is relatively sure Fernandez will join them since Fernandez is against Castro since Fidel is living with Fernandez's wife. L-1 is also certain that the members of the old army and the old navy will also join them although he has not had direct contact with these people. He is sure of this because Fidel at every opportunity warns Ramiro Valdes to check these people out and keep a careful watch on them. This group consists of Cmdte. Juan Ignarra Matarran, Chief of the Eastern Naval District in Banos, whom L-1 claims is a homosexual; Capt. Juan Valdez Reyes, member of PURS; Capt. Juan Valdez Carrion, Naval Base Commander, Cienfuegos; and Capt. Bonacio Porrata Nieves, Commanding Officer

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southern Sector of Eastern Naval District. Fidel has no confidence in these people and has placed below them people of confidence to watch over them. L-1 is not certain, but feels that Juan Almeida Bosque will probably join forces with the anti-Castro, anti-Communist group, also Cmdte. Raul Mendez Tomashevich, Chief Operations of Central Army. L-1 claimed he didn't know the rest of the list ~~AMBIDDY-1~~ had with him.

*Mendez*

6. Another man with whom L-1 is also in contact is Cmdte. Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, the Minister of Public Health. Machado and Cmdte. Raul Vallejo Ortiz are in the midst of a dispute since Vallejo is desirous of getting Machado's ministry. L-1 gave B-1 the details and the exact locations where Fidel spends every Saturday and Sunday and specifically every Sunday at Varadero. B-1 will take maps with him the next time he travels to Europe to see L-1 so he can pinpoint on the maps the exact locations where Fidel stays. B-1 is hoping that with these details he can prepare an operation against that point. Faure Chomon Mediavilla, Minister of Transport, is 100 percent Communist. (FNU) Garcia is also very close to Chomon and they are both completely enchanted with Marxism and Marxist theories.

7. After discussing the different personalities, B-1 and L-1 started talking about other matters. L-1 informed B-1 that the first Cuban exile leader with whom he had talked was B-1. L-1 decided to make this contact because he felt it necessary to develop a concrete plan they could proceed to work on. L-1 claims he was convinced that B-1 actually has something because of the way Fidel talks against him and is opposed to him even in private conversations. L-1 claims that the commando raids raise the morale and spirit of resistance of the people in Cuba. L-1 had one piece of advice for B-1, that is, B-1 must concentrate his commando attacks on two targets. He was very insistent to forget military targets but to concentrate on economic targets, specifically sugar and POL. He said these two items are in short supply and it infuriates Fidel every time he loses one drop of oil or one pound of sugar. The other piece of advice L-1 had for B-1 was that the frequency of the attacks should be stepped up. He felt there was too much time between operations. In order to heat up the target, L-1 also suggested that one month before the attempt on Fidel Castro as many targets as possible should be hit in order to prepare the public and raise the morale and resistance spirit of the people. L-1 told B-1 that the militiamen or the army will do nothing once Fidel is dead. They will sit back and wait to see what the Cuban public will do. If the Cuban public takes to the street, they will do nothing to suppress these people.

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CIA

8. On this chord they started to reach a series of agreements. L-1 at this point stated, "Now let's see what I have. I have what I told you, my group from the DR, which I have again reactivated, and also the contacts with these other people that I have mentioned to you. I have also been in contact with the Americans since before the Bay of Pigs. I have been out just about every year and every year I have had contact with the Americans." He again repeated the fact that he had requested a silencer for the FAL from the Americans which they had not been able to provide. He said, "The Americans tried to give me a radio to take to Cuba."

L-1 was against taking the risks of operating a radio in Cuba. L-1 said, "The other things the Americans want me to do is to organize a coup, to organize a group of officers, battalions and regiments in order to carry out a coup against Fidel. But what the Americans fail to realize is that they are not faced with another regular Latin American government in Cuba. So long as Fidel Castro is around, this is impossible. When people from Washington come to talk with me, they talk with a police mentality, not with a political mentality, recognizing the situation in Cuba." He said "W" comes to talk to him from Washington. He fails to believe now whether W is even from Washington since he has asked him for a silencer and he won't even give him a silencer.

9. L-1 claims the only thing that he is capable of doing is trying to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is able either to shoot him with a silencer or place a bomb in some place where Fidel will be. He might use, for example, a small bomb that he can carry and place, or with his group attack, the residence where Fidel lives when he goes to Varadero. These are the only things he can do. After that he has to pray and hope he isn't caught. He also stated he does not want to become a martyr and does not want to exchange his life for Fidel's. He confirms he is not a hero, he wants to live and see what happens after Fidel. He says he is not opposed to risking his life providing he has some assurance or some possibility of getting out and also of assuring himself that he will accomplish his mission. He claims that once he eliminates Fidel, the comandantes that he has mentioned before will join him. At this particular time, it is necessary for B-1 to appear on the scene because this will convince everybody that the Americans are also backing the coup. He also claims that if he is unsuccessful in his attempt against Fidel, it is the same comandantes who will slit his throat in order to keep him from talking.

L-1 claims this is the reason he needs B-1. If the attempt fails, he will have a place to go. If it is successful, he will also have B-1 to guarantee U. S. support.

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10. L-1, in discussing the political set up after Fidel, claims he is not opposed to B-1 being president of the junta, provided there is an equal number of representatives on the junta from the internal group. Those from B-1's group should be selected from the prisoners in Cuba. For example, if there are six people on the junta, three would be from L-1's and Ameijeiras's groups and B-1 plus two of his group from inside Cuba.

11. L-1 asked that the other members of the junta be revolutionary members who are presently in jail on the Isle of Pines, that they not be old Batistianos or from the exile community. L-1 claims it has to be the former revolutionaries who have now served time on the Isle of Pines in order to help cleanse the ones who have collaborated with the regime all this time. L-1 feels they will need the influence the boys in prison can bring to bear on the masses. The other point that L-1 insisted upon was that in the first three months after a coup the Cuban exiles not be permitted to return to Cuba. The only ones who would be permitted to return, in a non-political and strictly technical fashion, would be the doctors and the engineers, and only to work, not to engage in politics.

12. L-1 asked, "First, what do I need?" The first thing he claims he needs is a means of escape. L-1 said he needed escape routes provided by B-1 not those belonging to the Americans. "If you fail me, then L-2 will kill you and he is unable to kill the Americans."

B-1 is going to provide L-1 with escape routes and places where B-1 is able to pick him up. He will memorize these points and escape routes. He will not take anything back in writing.

13. L-1 also asked that B-1 do everything possible to organize one of the western provinces, either Pinar del Rio or Havana, where they could have a fall back position or where, once Fidel is eliminated, L-1 can go in order to take refuge during the period of chaos which may follow.

14. Next, B-1 is to provide L-1 either a silencer for a FAL or a rifle with a silencer. B-1 told L-1 he did not know since he was not a technician, if it is possible to make a silencer for the FAL. L-1 stated that the Americans also told him it was technically impossible because it would reduce the effective range of the FAL, but he wasn't sure this was the case. If B-1 can give L-1 a silencer, he will personally take the silencer back with him. If it is a rifle with a silencer then B-1 will put a cache for L-1 in Cuba.

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15. The other thing L-1 requested of B-1 was a bomb inside a suitcase, a cake, a lamp or any concealed bomb that he could place at Fidel's side without being stopped and searched before getting there. He said, "Don't send me any radios, don't expect me to operate any radios inside Cuba."

16. B-1 offered L-1 contacts inside Cuba. L-1 thought about it and then stated he would accept these contacts, but he would establish the contact after having checked them out; he did not want the contacts coming to him or knowing who he was. B-1 agreed and stated this was perfectly satisfactory.

17. L-1 also would like to know the exact location of the cache before he returns so he can memorize this information. After the cache is in place, L-1 asked B-1 to write him a letter in French mailed in Paris, purporting to be from a French girl friend whom he had met there, talking about their love affairs in Paris. He will know when he receives this letter the cache is in place and he will go pick it up. L-1 requested several letters be written to him in case one of the letters should get lost. Another thing he requested was that the cache be placed in a location where he could go with relative ease without causing suspicion.

B-1 was unable to remember but L-1 did mention that the Americans had either given him a cache or had promised him a cache. However, it was placed in such a location that it was impossible for him to go recover it.

18. L-1 also requested that once Fidel was eliminated and the new government formed, they would have the recognition of at least five Latin American governments. B-1 had already offered this and L-1 approved of it.

19. L-1 also requested that after every commando attack the propaganda reaching Cuba would state that his attack was made possible because of the intelligence received from the chief of the underground inside Cuba. Thanks to "P" who is the leader of the underground this attack was made possible. L-1 hopes that after Fidel Castro is eliminated, he will be able to disclose that he was "P". He also authorized B-1 to disclose that if something happens to L-1 during this period, B-1 is authorized to disclose that "P" was in fact L-1. B-1 agreed to this because he is aware of the complex which L-1 has because of the time he has spent inside doing nothing, going along with the Castro regime.

20. L-1 also requested that B-1 be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel. B-1 agreed to this provided no one, including L-1 know where he was hiding. At the time the elimination of Fidel takes place, L-1 insists that B-1 must be in Cuba. L-1 according to B-1 has two complexes. One is from the fact that he has been with Fidel and the present regime for such a long time and no one realizes that, although he has been in contact with the Americans, he is unable to publicize the fact that he has been working against Fidel for over three years. The second complex, and a very personal fear, is the fact that he may be left hanging by himself. He lacks confidence in everybody outside Cuba. The other consideration that L-1 raised with B-1 was, upon his return to Paris, he would type an original and one copy of the agreements. When they meet the next time, both B-1 and L-1 would sign both copies, B-1 would keep one of the copies of the agreement, and the second copy would be placed in a safe deposit box to which L-1 would give the combination to a trusted person whom he did not identify. If B-1 betrayed L-1 or did not live up to the agreement, his confidant could publish the agreement. B-1 would have the same privilege if L-1 does not live up to his part of the agreement. B-1 considers the request ridiculous since no purpose can possibly be served by publishing such a document, but realizes this is also a part of L-1's complex and will give L-1 the feeling of some control over B-1 and his part of the agreement.

C/O  
WH/SA B-1 ORG.

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17

B-1 <sup>026</sup> Meeting in West Palm Beach, Florida, 3 Jan 1965

SUBJECT: Points of Agreement Reached Between B-1  
and L-1

Following are the points on which an agreement was reached:

1. B-1 is to provide L-1 with a silencer for the FAL; if this is impossible, B-1 is to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment device which he would be able to carry and place next to Fidel Castro.
2. B-1 is to provide L-1 with escape routes controlled by B-1 and not by the Americans. The lack of confidence built up by the Bay of Pigs looms large.
3. B-1 is to prepare one of the western provinces, either Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandestine underground mechanism. This would be a fall back position and a safe area where men and weapons are available to the group.
4. B-1 is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no one, including L-1 will know B-1's location.
5. B-1 is to arrange for recognition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed. This junta will be established even though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in control of the part of the country. This is the reason L-1 requested that B-1 be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the junta can be formed in that location.
6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel, B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid was possible thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P". This will be L-1's war name.

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7. B-1 will give L-1 several contacts inside Cuba but will not disclose L-1's identity to the contacts, therefore leaving the initiative for contact with L-1. These contacts L-1 will use in case he has to send an urgent message to B-1 outside Cuba. He will utilize the clandestine pseudonym "P" in these messages. This will also serve as bona fides and identification.

8. All these points will be committed to writing, a copy of which will be given to B-1 and a copy of which will be deposited in a safe deposit box in a bank to which L-1 will give the combination to a trusted friend. In case B-1 betrays any part of the agreement, his confidant will be authorized to publish this agreement. The same would pertain to B-1 if L-1 betrays any part of the agreement. This in general was the essence of the meeting. B-1 plans to return to Paris the end of January before L-1's return to Havana. At that time they will formalize their previous agreements and B-1 will give L-1 what he has requested.

C/O  
WH/SA/

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MESSAGE FORM

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16/FEB/1965

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DIRECTOR

DC/WA/SA3 INFO DDP, UR, FILE, C/WE 23  
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INFO.

CITE DIR

85502

REF: [redacted] 9300 (IN 81436)

1. L-1 REQUEST FOR MEETING AND MONEY APPROVED. FYI, FEEL THIS JUSTIFIED AS "LIVING" EXPENSES AND NOT CONNECTED WITH REQUEST FOR 10,000 DOLLARS FOR OPS, WHICH, AS [redacted] AWARE, WAS REFUSED. ALSO INTERESTING NOTE TO CONSIDER IS FACT THIS REQUEST APPARENTLY REPRESENTS SWALLOWING OF PRIDE BY L-1 AND ALSO PERHAPS TEST BY HIM WHETHER 10,000 DOLLAR TURN DOWN WAS ACTUALLY FOR OPS CONSIDERATIONS AS EXPLAINED TO HIM AT TIME, OR WHETHER IT INDICATION CIA DOUBTING HIS INTEGRITY AND ABILITY SERVE AS USEFUL ALLY.

2. REQUEST [redacted] OFFICE DEBRIEF IN DEPTH FOR REMAINDER UNANSWERED L-1 RQMS, OF WHICH COPY LEFT [redacted] BY C/O ALSO MOST INTERESTED FOLL: ALL DETAILS CUBAN AMBASSADORS RECENT MEETING MADRID; REASONS FOR CHE'S TRIP TO CHINA AND PURPOSE HIS FORTHCOMING EAST AFRICAN TRIP; ALL DETAILS OF CLOSELY-HELD MEETING LATIN AMERICA CP'S IN HAVANA LAST WEEK NOV 64, PARTICULARLY WHAT WAS OUTCOME DECISIONS REACHED, POINTS OF CONTENTION, AND HOW MUCH DID IT CONTRIBUTE TO RESOLUTION CUBA'S PREDICAMENT MIS-A-VIS SOVIET-CHICOM SPLIT; IS CARILLO GOING ALGIERS SOON TO MEET CHE AND IF SO, WHY?

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

27/1/94



MESSAGE FORM

ROUTING

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

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INFO

CITE DIR

*85502*

3. SUGGEST MONEY PAID AFTER DEBRIEF.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: PLS GIVE ONE COPY THIS CABLE AND REPLY TO C/WE.

WH/SA/EOB *[Signature]*

WH/SA/ *[Signature]*

WE/3 *[Signature]*

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AUG 30 1975

C/WE/IND *[Signature]*

AC/WIID *[Signature]*

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING

**S E C R E T /**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and

AUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

SECRET

18 March 1965

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Proposal to Exploit L-1 and Jose Rebellon in AN Operation

1. It is proposed that at the next meeting with we pass a message as follows:

"A big comandante or capitan who used to be a leader of the university students opened a numbered (secret) account in Switzerland through Colombian Suarez (my successor). He was traveling in Europe at that time, roughly December 1964-January 1965. The deposit was in the amount of \$10,000."

The message is purposely so phrased that it could apply to both L-1 and Jose Rebellon. Both are past presidents of the FEU (Federation of University Students), one is a comandante and the other a captain, and both were traveling in Europe in December 1964-January 1965.

2. Subject proposal has taken the following information into consideration.

L-1:

a. The record: The file shows that since April 1959 and repeatedly since then L-1 has threatened to eliminate CASTRO, but has not done so. He also was reportedly on the verge several times of defecting but never did. There are numerous reports of varying credibility that he has been and is a Castro agent. His character is such that he has been described in a report as "a probable thief, a possible user of narcotics, a homosexual or a friend of homosexuals," but also "an exceedingly brave man." Various reports indicate that he is a heavy drinker and a party lover. Thus a person with such traits could reasonably be believed to be involved in irregular financial transactions.

*Rec'd 28 Aug 65*

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b. Favorable factors (from OPS standpoint): In the summer of 1962 L-1 gave [redacted] \$500 in Helsinki to be deposited for L-1 in a European bank "for a rainy day." In March 1961 L-1 showed great sensitivity on the subject of bank accounts in Europe by Cuban officials, indicating that he might shoot any official so involved.

c. Conclusion: While it cannot be discounted that L-1 may be a Castro agent, it may be that he has been sincere in his dealings with CIA. Resolution of doubts through an POLYGRAPH interview has been impossible since L-1 hit the ceiling when the matter was first mentioned.

Presumably CIA'S interest in L-1 is to see him carry out his mission to eliminate CASTRO. The above proposal may actually stimulate the desired action. If L-1 is questioned by the regime in connection with this charge, and should the investigation involve a certain amount of harassment and unpleasantness, he might well reach the conclusion that the time to take matters into his own hands (which he has threatened to do for several years) has at last arrived.

If L-1 is a Castro agent and Castro should be aware of L-1's relationship with CIA, Castro might conclude that L-1 received the money from CIA banked it without reporting it, and was in fact working with CIA against Castro. (At the recent meetings [redacted] L-1 asked us for \$10,000. We did not give him this sum, though [redacted] gave him \$7,000.)

If for any reason the regime should do away with L-1, his alleged sympathizers in the Armed Forces might feel they must react at once to save their own skins. Given the tense political situation in Cuba today, this is not out of the question and certainly this proposal could split the regime more.

*and how is he going to get out of jail to do so?*

*Which we had once told him he could have*

*L-1 himself told that*

*B-1 the last thing any of his friends would do would be to help him out here*

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Jose Rebellon

Rebellon is a non-controversial good target for inclusion in this OPS play for the following reasons:

a. He is close to Castro, as well as to L-1, and has a Communist background.

b. He is familiar with the \$80,000 account opened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador Carrillo in the fall of 1964. Rebellon has been authorized by Castro to draw on that fund for purchases related to Castro's pet projects. Castro might think that Rebellon had raided Castro's own official fund.

As with L-1, any action by the regime against Rebellon might widen splits in Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness and tensions in interpersonal relationships that we desire.

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29 March 1965



MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

TO: C/PI

From: C/RE

Subject: L-1

Reference: DIR 96056 - H-1's TRAINING AND L-1

*c/o*  
*the thermo copy*  
*has been*  
*redrawn*  
*you have it*  
*anyway in*  
*the L-1*  
*file*  
*8-11*

In view of the fact that it was a policy of the ~~(B-1/CAS)~~ complex not to disseminate any of the information, inclusive of the L-1 connection, outside of the B-1 office and that of the C/PI, it may be possible that your office has not seen the attached Memorandum of conversations between L-1 and B-1. In it, L-1 explains and cites the military connections he has, their conditions for helping him, their positions, et cetera. This may be of interest to your office.

In addition, L-1 has made it clear that he has no materiel needs, other than the \$10,000 which he requested [redacted] (which was not made available). The money was needed to keep certain people in certain positions, if necessary; for bribes under some circumstances; for his escape, if possible, et cetera. When CIA refused to give him the money, ~~(B-1)~~ gave him \$7,000. L-1 himself is trying separately to raise \$3,000 (Cuban pesos) inside Cuba.

FYI: Although C/SAS and C/O assured L-1 on 22 November 1963 that CIA would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted) the situation changed when C/O and C/SAS left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with L-1 changed and it was decided that we could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and would not aid L-1 in this attempt. This included the following: We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help L-1 escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.

L-1 was not informed of the information in the preceding paragraph until he was seen by C/O in November 1964. L-1 understood this. However, we attempted to have the same ends accomplished for L-1 via B-1. B-1 furnished him with the silencer which he carried in on 23 February 1965, has made some plans for his escape if L-1 has the opportunity, and told him he could count on his help. L-1 made B-1 put this in writing - to clear his own part in it - but since then appears to have decided that he neither likes B-1 nor trusts him. He refused to accept the \$10,000 from him since he had just recently met him and, in addition, did not want to be obligated to him.

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