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157-10014-10102

## JFK Assassination System Identification Form

Date:

7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY: SSCIA

RECORD NUMBER:

157-10014-10102

RECORD SERIES:

MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

07-M-08

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:

SSCIA

FROM:

TO:

TITLE:

WILLIAM HARVEY

DATE:

00/00/1975

PAGES:

37

SUBJECTS:

**AMLASH** 

HARVEY, WILLIAM

CIA

**ASSASSINATIONS** 

DOCUMENT TYPE:

REPORT

CLASSIFICATION:

Declassified

RESTRICTIONS:

1B; 1C

CURRENT STATUS:

Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

CCBOX 450

Date: 08/06/95

Page : 1

## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

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CIA

AMLASH

ASSASSINATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED

CURRENT STATUS: POSTPONED IN FULL


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
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
COMMENTS: CCBOX 450


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
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

































particular tentative targets. Essentially, he canvassed


NW 50955 DocId:32423490 Page 15
























































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
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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:


SUBJECT: John Rosselli

- 1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.
- 2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.
- 3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

Shelffeld Edwards
Director of Security







K405

SECRET/EYES ONLY

Schwarz

Caje

Review Staff: 1 July 1975

75/1024

Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Fritz:

In response to your telephone call of 27 June 1975, I offer you the following based on my memory of certain events and the atmosphere of the times: (Please note that my records on this era are not all that precise. My memory is vivid and may be biased. However, as a close observer, here is what I recall, for what it is worth.)

You should be aware that this Agency felt itself to be under very strong pressure in the early 1960s to bring about change in the Cuban regime. This pressure was strongest after the Bay of Pigs incident in April 1961 and although it dissipated somewhat after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, it has never really completely disappeared. In any event, when Mr. Robert F. Kennedy accepted the proposals by General Lansdale which led to the formation of the MONGOOSE Project, it was clear to the DCI, Mr. John A. McCone, that the major tasks in this broad covert action program would fall on CIA. McCone in turn made it clear to Agency officials that this task was very much a direct charge on the Agency. It should also be noted that from the beginning, there was little hope that the program as conceived would actually achieve its purpose which was to bring about the removal of the Castro government and to replace it with one whose interests would be more compatible with American interests and the interests of other governments in the Western Hemisphere.

William K. Harvey, who was placed in charge of the Agency's Cuban Task Force, has, as you know, a very special type of personality. Both his manner and his

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Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

method, in my opinion, tend to be thorough, comprehensive, and time-consuming. Because of the nature of his assignment and because of his personality traits, his personal relations, particularly with General Lansdale and with the Attorney General, were never very pleasant to begin with, and tended to deteriorate steadily.

A climax of sorts occurred at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented during which the Chairman asked a specific question, noting that he had ten minutes in which to hear the reply and wanted a crisp answer within that period. Mr. Harvey was not forthcoming, and the Chairman left the meeting after ten minutes expressing strong dissatisfaction with things in general and Harvey in particular.

After this meeting it was clear to McCone that Harvey had broken his lance and would have to be replaced. In due course, he was replaced.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, when it was virtually impossible to get access to top officials in the government and get their guidance on day-to-day affairs; Harvey, who did indeed try to get such guidance, on his own concluded that United States policy was headed toward a full-scale invasion of Cuba. He ordered a number of agent teams to be dispatched to the island for intelligence collection and to be in place as assets to support a conventional military operation. General Lansdale claimed this was done without his knowledge and authorization and there was a confrontation in McCone's office. concluded that unless these teams were being sent to satisfy specific requirements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that they should be recalled. Since there was no such requirement, they were recalled. In a separate meeting, McCone reassured Lansdale that he was in fact Chief of Operations. As a result of this, Harvey earned another black mark as not being fully under control.

I trust the foregoing will be of some value to you.

Sincerely,

Wast Flo

Valter Elder

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