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Appendix J

THE MIAMI STATION

In March 1960, President Eisenhower approved the project later to become known as the Bay of Pigs. In April 1960 a Western Hemisphere Division Forward Operations Base (FOB) was established in South Miami, Florida, for the purpose of coordinating all support, training, and preparatory activities for operations against Cuba. The FOB simultaneously supported our busy Havana Station which was operating under difficult circumstances, including inhibiting surveillance of our officers by Castro security services. After the Station was closed in Havana when US diplomatic relations were broken with Castro's government in January 1961, it was envisioned that selected personnel assigned to the Miami Base would, upon the overthrow of the Castro government, become a nucleus to reopen the Havana Station. During the Bay of Pigs landing, the FOB provided support for the operation.

In September 1961, the Miami Station was established at a new location, replacing the FOB. About 300 persons were assigned to the Station at one time; Headquarters responsibility was in an autonomous group until 1965, when the Western Hemisphere Division resumed charge.

Utilizing former Cuban assets in Havana who had fled to the United States, indigenous Cuban organizations were formed to continue the overt struggle against the Castro government. In addition, a Cuban Intelligence Organization in exile was formed to collect information on the activities of militant autonomous Cuban exile groups in the United States who were not affiliated with the US Government effort against the Cuban regime. The Cuban intelligence organization in exile participated in a number of activities including the issuance of anti-Castro publications, maintaining relations with anti-Castro governments and groups in the Caribbean and Latin American countries, and debriefing Cuban exiles arriving in the United States for positive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to identify Cuban agents being infiltrated into the United States via the Cuban Freedom Flights and small boats. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which was manned by indigenous Cuban exiles. Close working relations were maintained with US Government agencies in the Miami area such as the FBI, INS, Coast Guard, Customs, Navy, Air Force, etc., to coordinate activities. A small support base was established in Key West.

During the period 1962-66 the Miami Station engaged in classical intelligence operations directed against the Cuban regime. Radio Americas was established and broadcast daily from Swan Island in the Caribbean. Psychological, economic, and political activities were undertaken in an effort to undermine confidence in the Castro government and underscore the Soviet presence and total Cuban dependence on the USSR. Maritime operations were also undertaken. Among other missions, Cubans who desired to escape from the Cuban mainland were assisted.

In late 1966 a substantial cutback in the pace of operations began and a reorganization of the Station was undertaken as a result of a review by higher authority (303 Committee). Many cover entities were terminated and personnel reassigned. Increased emphasis on the collection of intelligence and counterintelligence through operations in other foreign areas, limitation on maritime activities, and consolidation of written and radio output achieved considerable savings in money and manpower.

In early 1968 it became apparent that as a result of sustained operational activity in the Miami area over a period of years the cover of the Miami Station had eroded to a point that the security of our operations was increasingly jeopardized. This erosion was more significant following the *Ramparts* exposure of CIA operations and the possibility that the location of our Station on property

[redacted] At the same time, it became apparent that activities would have to be reduced drastically for policy, budgetary, and operational reasons. It was decided to deactivate the Miami Station and replace it with a smaller Station which would be better able to respond to current needs. Security had deteriorated seriously at the large Station (then 150 persons) which was under commercial cover near Homestead; the new Station of about 50 persons had good official cover on a government-controlled area in a run-down part of Miami Beach. It was felt, also, that the new Station could facilitate adjustments in the objectives and targets of Miami-based operations and enable the new Station to reduce our dependence on those Cuban exiles who were no longer in tune with current or future needs.

In August 1968 the new, smaller Miami Station was activated, and during the ensuing months the maritime activities were terminated; a new and much smaller media operation was activated, and intelligence collection was expanded to include [redacted] Increased emphasis was given to third-country Cuban operations (agent recruitment and technical operations against Cuban Embassies abroad) under the guidance of the new Station. The Cuban emigre organizations supported by the Station were drastically reduced and activities were

phased down. In 1974, responsibility for the residue Cuban operations was transferred to Headquarters and the remaining Cuban emigre organizations were terminated.



Support Activities
in the Miami Area

Communications

Prior to 1968.

From the late 1950s through 1968, CIA communications activities in the Miami area supported DDO covert action against the Cuban government.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Apart from Cuban operations, some high frequency Morse and teletype messages were exchanged between the Miami radio base station and selected CIA field stations in Latin America. In 1964 the CIA Latin American area electronic equipment repair facility was relocated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Miami-based CIA communications personnel were responsible to the DDO for training staff and agent personnel and for equipping teams and boats with the means of maintaining communications during operations directed against Cuba.


Liaison was conducted with the FCC, the FBI, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

Other non-communications liaison existed between the Miami communications facilities and various organizations: [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]


From 1968 to Present.

The focus was on communicating with CIA agents in-place on the island of Cuba or in Latin America. Communications links were established with foreign police authorities in several countries during this period.




Provisions were made to provide the Secret Service with name trace information on foreign nationals on a timely basis during the 1968 Republican National Convention and the 1972 Democratic and Republican National Conventions. In the latter instance, requests were made by Secret Service Headquarters to CIA Headquarters and communicated to CIA/DDO, Miami, for action.



Liaison was conducted with the FCC, the GSA, and the Army for purposes  and with the Armed Forces Courier Service.

Although very little communications support for Cuban operations was provided after 1968, on one occasion an anti-Castro group was given support in the form of radio signal plans and technical guidance on how to best install radios in small boats.





Medical Services

"Bay of Pigs" Project.

The Project Medical Advisor made two TDY trips to Miami prior to the Bay of Pigs to discuss medical training plans with Cuban medical personnel.

A four-man evaluation team from OMS made at least two TDY trips to the Miami area to medically evaluate Cubans as cadre personnel for the invasion brigade.

The Assessment and Evaluation Staff (A&ES) sent teams to Miami during the same period for psychological evaluations.

A Medical Technician from the OMS was also temporarily assigned to Miami for first aid and medical training for the project activities in the Miami area.

Post-Invasion.

A Medical Technician from OMS was assigned PCS to JMWAVE in Miami from September 1963 to June 1966.

During this same period the A&ES (by then part of the OMS) would, on request, occasionally send a psychologist to Miami for psychological evaluation for these continuing WH operational activities.

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OMS support of the type mentioned above was phased out about 1964. Since that time, OMS relationship to any Agency activity in Miami has been rare.



Personnel

The Office of Personnel conducts or has conducted normal personnel activities including: recruiting, position surveys, and contract preparation. Correspondence is carried out with personnel in the Miami area relative to: retirement benefits, insurance, disability and casualty claims, and the shipment of employee household effects and automobiles.

Security

