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Mem 1. a.

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OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

DATE Jan 10, 1978 TIME 2:30

I. Identifying Information:

Name Central Intelligence Agency Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

Address Langley, VA

Type of Contact: Telephone  
X Person

II. Summary of Contact:

Reviewed the 1967 IG Report. See attached memorandum. It should be  
noted that I reviewed the Report on Jan 5 but I did not receive  
my notes until Jan 10.

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FOR RELEASE.**

III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):

Obtain and Review an undeleted version of the report and, if possib.

obtain and review the memoranda referred to in the report which are underlined in the  
attached memorandum.

Signature: Leslie Wyelman

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Form #5

To: G.B. Blakey  
From: Leslie Wizelman  
Date: 1/10/78  
Re: Notes from the 1967 IG Report

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NO DISSEMINATION  
EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY  
OF THE DIRECTOR  
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The 1967 Inspector General's Report begins with the statement

This Reconstruction of Agency involvement in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operations being discussed or attempted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main events or were put on paper from memory years afterward...

The Report states that "We can identify five separate phases in Agency assass-  
planning.."(p2) and "Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing  
Government attitude toward the Cuban regime."(p3).

The Five phases are:

- 1- Prior to August 1960 during which all "identifiable schemes" with the possible exception of onere, were aimed at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behavior or altering his appearance.
- 2-August 1960 to April 1961-plots were "aggressively pursued."
- 3-April 1961 to late 1961- a major scheme begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and remained dormant for several months, "as did most other Agency operational activity related to Cuba."
- 4-Late 1961 to Late 1962- The August 1960 scheme was reactivated
- 5-"Late 1962 until well into 1963"- Aug 1960 scheme was terminated  
Two other plots originated but impractical and "nothing ever came of them."

On page 4 the Report makes 3 points:

- 1- The elimination of a dominant figure may not change the government. This point was stressed by an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961.
- 2- The bringing about the downfall of a government always risks the resort to assassination.
- 3- Synecdoche- the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa, meaning when "the getting rid of Castro" statement is made, the speaker may not mean the assassination of Castro, but may mean a change in the government of Cuba. Semantics. The report implies this has led to some misunderstandings.

Page 6 discusses the delivery of the pen to Cubela.  
Page 7 discussess a meeting of the Special Group (augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on August 10, 1962 when McNamera brought up the "liquidation of Cuban leaders. Followed by the preparation of the Project Mongoose Action memo prepared by Lansdale.

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Another meeting was held on July 31, 1964 to discuss a Cuban exile plot. The Report states that the CIA refused funds and had no involvement.

On page 7 the report states that the CIA twice (early 1961, early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members. When the plot was aborted in 1961 the pills recovered. In 1962 the pills were passed by a gambling syndicate representative to a Cuban exile leader in Florida, who had been them sent to Cuba in May 1962.

In June 1962 the exile leader (Verona??) reported that a team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

#### Miscellaneous Schemes Prior to August 1960

- A. March to August 1960- During this period there were three or four schemes. The Report states that "None of those we interviewed who was first assigned at the Cuban task force after the Bay of Pigs knows of any of these schemes." The Report does not specifically state who was interviewed. J. D. (Jake) Esterline was the head of the Cuban task force prior to the Bay of Pigs. One project discussed was an aerosol attack on a radio station, but nothing came of it. Consideration was also given to "psychic energizers." The contaminated cigars project was never carried out, according to Esterline, because of the "danger of blowback on the Agency." The use of a dipilatory was also considered.
- B. Gambling Syndicate operations- The Report states that "The first seriously pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had its inception in August 1960" and involved the gambling syndicate. There were two phases: August 1960 to late April or early May 1961 and April 1962 to February 1963.

#### Phase I

- a- In August 1960 Richard Bissell- DDP- asked Edwards, Director of Security if he could "establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. " The objective was stated as "clearly the assassination of Castro."
- b- the idea originated with J.C. King
- c- Maheu, Robert- contacted by Edwards. Maheu was described as a "private investigator who had done sensitive work for the Agency." He opened a private office in D.C. in 1956 after being a special agent for the FBI. \_\_\_\_\_ arranged to subsidize Mahue to the extent of \$500/month. The report states that "Over the years he has been intimately involved in providing support for some of the Agency's more sensitive operations."

At this point the report notes that they are "struck" by the fact that many of the names appearing in this report once worked for the FBI and lists \_\_\_\_\_, Maheu, Harvey, O'Connell, and E. Morgan.

The Report states that "Maheu was authorized to tell Roselli that his 'clients' were willing to pay \$150,000 for Castro's removal." (p16)

d- September 1960- O'Connell was Roselli's case officer and met with Roselli and Maheu in New York City on September 14. Roselli agree to introduce Maheu to "Sam Gold." At this point the Report refers to a memorandum prepared by Edwards, dated 14 May 1962, re money not paid to Giancana or Roselli. As of late September, 1960, Edwards, O'Connell, and Bissell were the only ones in the Agency who knew of plan against Castro involving the Mafia. Edwards briefed Allen Dulles and General Cabell. Bissell committed \$150,000 for the support of the operation. On September 25, 1960, O'Connell and Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana at the Fountainbleau. O'Connell never met Joe (Trafficante) or Sam. The Report referes to an Office of Security Memorandum to the DDCI, dated 24 June 1966 which contains a summary of the operation. This memo is also referred to on pages 28 and 29.

e- Key dates- Jan. 7 1959- Casinos closed  
Jan.13 1959- Casinos opened for tourists  
Feb.17 1959- Cabinet (Cuban) authorized reopening  
Sept. 30, 1961- New York Times announces the last of the casinos were closed.

f- Fall and Early Winter 1960- On August 16, 1960 the Chief of OD- Office of Medical Services received box of Cuban cigars to treat. \_\_\_\_\_ reported the cigars were ready for delivery on October 7, 1960. His notes show delivery on Feb. 13, 1961 (p22)

g-January-February 1961- Pills were chosen to kill Castro. The Report states that "Trafficante was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as \_\_\_\_\_ who was then \_\_\_\_\_ of the prime minister (Castro). The gangsters said that (Orta) had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income, and needed money."

(Page 25)

Page 27 is missing

On page 28 the report states

(Comment: \_\_\_\_\_ lost his position in the Prime Minister's office on \_\_\_\_\_, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington. He took refuge in the \_\_\_\_\_ Embassy on \_\_\_\_\_ and became the responsibility of the \_\_\_\_\_ Embassy when \_\_\_\_\_ broke relations with Cuba in \_\_\_\_\_. Castro refused to give him a safe conduct pass until \_\_\_\_\_ when he was allowed to leave for Mexico City. He arrived in Miami in early \_\_\_\_\_.

Page four

"It appears that Edwards and O'Connell did not know at the time of \_\_\_\_\_'s fall from favor..... It seems, though, that the gangsters did know that \_\_\_\_\_ had already lost his access to Castro."

The June 24, 1966 summary memorandum, referred to on page three of this memorandum, states that "when \_\_\_\_\_ asked out of the assignment he suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success." Edwards and O'Connell do not know the replacement.

h- March-April 1961

The Report states

"Following the collapse of the \_\_\_\_\_ channel, Roselli told O'Connell that Trafficante knew of a man higher up in the Cuban exile movement who might do the job. He identified him as \_\_\_\_\_ was \_\_\_\_\_ of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, a group supported by the Agency as part of the larger Cuban operation. O'Connell understood that \_\_\_\_\_ was dissatisfied with the nature and the extent of this support and that JM/WAVE suspected that \_\_\_\_\_ was not keeping his bargain with the Agency." ( p29)

This statement is followed by a lengthy comment.

"(Comment: Reports from the FBI suggest how Trafficante may have known of \_\_\_\_\_. On 21 December 1960 the Bureau forwarded to the Agency a memorandum reporting that efforts were being made by U.S. racketeers to finance anti-Castro activities in hopes of securing the gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies in Cuba in the event Castro was overthrown. A later report of \_\_\_\_\_ associates \_\_\_\_\_ with those schemes. \_\_\_\_\_ had hired Edward K. Moss, a Washington public relations counselor, as a fund raiser and public relations adviser. Bureau Report alleged that Moss' Mistress was Julia Cellini, whose brothers represented two of the largest gambling casinos in Cuba. The Cellini brothers were believed to be in touch with \_\_\_\_\_ through Moss and were reported to have offered \_\_\_\_\_ large sums of money for his operations against Castro, with the understanding they would receive privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the Future."  
(p30)

Page five

<sup>03</sup>  
[ ] was granted covert security clearance in March 1959 for use by NE Division in his role as consultant to [ ] and In November 1962 for use by CA staff under Project [ZR/MAJOR] program for exploitation of political consultants.  
of

The report states that Trafficante approached \_\_\_\_\_ and told them that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and they would pay big money. \_\_\_\_\_ was very receptive. Roselli was to deliver money to \_\_\_\_\_ for expenses. According to O'Connell it was \$50,000. (p31)

The Report adds a Comment.

(Comment: As a sidelight, Esterline says that, when he learned of the intended use of \_\_\_\_\_, steps were taken to cancel the plan. \_\_\_\_\_ was one of the \_\_\_\_\_ key figures in the Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in support of the approaching Bay of Pigs operation. If steps were in fact taken to end participation in the syndicate plan, they were ineffective. It is clear that he continued as an integral part of the syndicate scheme.) (p32)

The Report states that "Little is known of the delivery channels beyond \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ was believed to have an asset inside Cuba....."(p32)

i- April-May 1961- The operation was called off after the Bay of Pigs, and remained dormant until April 1962.

Page 34 of the Report refers to a memorandum of 14 May 1962 in which Edwards states that knowledge of the operation was limited to six people.

Dulles, Cabell, Bissell, Edwards, O'Connell, Esterline, \_\_\_\_\_ Chief TSD, \_\_\_\_\_, Chemical Division, TSD, \_\_\_\_\_ Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services, William Harvey, Chief, FI/D, and \_\_\_\_\_ Special Assistant to the DDP. (\_\_\_\_\_ name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the Operation in 1960-61.), Bannerman, DDS, J.C. King, Robert Maheu, Roselli, Giancana, Trafficante., \_\_\_\_\_ the man originally selected to poison Castro, \_\_\_\_\_ Cuban exile leader, the \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ who is known to have been involved with him closely during this time. (p35)  
In May 1962 R.Kennedy and Lawrence Huston learned of the operation. Those now knowledgeable- Edward P. Morgan, Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, C.J. Warren, Rowley, Pat Coyne, executive secretary of PFIAB, Ramsey Clark and various members of the FBI .

#### PHASE II

a- Harvey was briefed in Feb. 1961 and placed in charge of developing an Executive Action capability- ZR/RIFLE. The asset was QJ/WIN who had been recruited earlier by \_\_\_\_\_ for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.)

b- On November 15, 1961, Harvey has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba. Harvey took over Cuba task force. (p

3/PV

c- February-March 1962- Harvey recalls first meeting with Edwards on subject of Castro operation. (After Harvey left Task Force W and was winding up he wrote a memo to Chief, FI staff, dated June 27, 1963 stating that the original justification for employing QJ/WIN no longer existed and raising the question of QJ/Win's termination. QJ/WIN was terminated 21 April 1964) (p40, 41)

d-April 1962

Harvey briefed Helms on meetings with Roselli.(p41) "Edward's records show that on 14 May 1962 Harvey called Edwards and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Roselli for the future." (p42) Harvey believes he took over "a going operation." O'Connell now believes there must have been "something going on between april 1961 and April 1962." (p43). On April 8 and 9, 1962 O'Connell and Harvey met Roselli at the Savoy Plaza Hotel in NYC. O'Connell says Maheu was present but Harvey disagrees. (p44) There is a large deletion on page 45 following the statement mentioning Phyllis McGuire, Dorothy Kilgallen, and Liberace at the Copacabana.

Harvey recalls another meeting of O'Connell and Roselli in D. C. in April 14. O'Connell was in Miami with Roselli and Harvey as late maybe as April 27.

O'Connell was assigned on June 1962 PCS to [redacted] 13-17

Harvey says he arrived in Miami on 21 April 1962 and found Roselli already in touch with \_\_\_\_\_, the Cuban exile leader who had participated in phase one. (p47). Santos and Giancana were no longer involved. "Roselli now had a man known to Harvey as Maceo, who also used the names Garcia-Gomez and Godoy." He was a Cuban who spoke Italian. (p48)

When the pills were given to \_\_\_\_\_ through Roselli, \_\_\_\_\_ requested arms and equipment needed for support. Harvey with the help of \_\_\_\_\_, the chief of the JM/WAVE station, procured explosives, detonators, 20 .30 caliber rifles, 20 .45 caliber hand guns, 2 radios, and one boat radar. (p49) Harvey and \_\_\_\_\_ rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name, loaded it with arms and equipment, and parked it in the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant. Keys given to Roselli for delivery to Maceo, to \_\_\_\_\_, or to \_\_\_\_\_. "Evidently Harvey and Roselli had not yet come to trust each other. Perhaps fearing a double-cross, each set about independently to assure himself that the equipment reached the proper hands. After parking the truck, Harvey and \_\_\_\_\_ kept the parking lot under surveillance until the pass was completed. Roselli, accompanied by O'Connell, did the same. Neither pair knew that the other was watching. Eventually the truck was picked up and driven away. (Does not say by whom). It was returned later, empty, and with the keys under the seat as prearranged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency. Harvey says that \_\_\_\_\_ never knew to whom delivery was made nor for what purpose. \_\_\_\_\_ was merely called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded." (p 50)

e- May 1962- Roselli reports pills were in place.

f- June 1962- Roselli reports to Harvey on 21 June that \_\_\_\_\_ had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba.

V/PJ



- g-September 1962- Harvey says Roselli was in Miami on September 7th and 11th. \_\_\_\_\_ ready to send in another three man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard.
- h- Sept. 1962- Jan 1963- Harvey was in Miami between 22 Dec and 6 Jan. Says Roselli and Maceo met with him many times. Harvey and Roselli had telephone discussions of operations between January 11 and 16th. The Report states that "AS far as Harvey knows, three Militia men never did leave for Cuba. He knows nothing of what may have happened to the three reported to have been sent to Cuba." (p52)
- i-February 1963- Harvey in Miami Feb 11-14. Left word for Maceo that there was nothing new and it looked like it was all over. Feb 15 Harvey left Miami to meet Roselli in L.A. Roselli agreed that he would continue to see \_\_\_\_\_, gradually reducing the frequency of contact until there was none.
- j-June 1963- Roselli met with Harvey in D.C.-Dulles Airport. Stayed with Harvey.
- k- People knowledgeable of Phase II;  
Helms, Harvey, O'Connell, Edwards, King, Harvey's deputy in 1962, Chief of JM/WAVE, \_\_\_\_\_ TSD, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, Maceo.
- l- Operation linked perhaps through:  
Roselli to Maheu; Maheu to Morgan; Morgan to Pearson; Pearson to Warren to President; Warren to Rowley; Rowley to Pat Coyne; FBI to Ramsey Clark (p56)
- m- Late 1961- Early 1962- Wiretapping incident.
- n- May- June 1966- Long Committee

Page 72 is missing or deleted-can't tell.

Page 71- Maheu's background- he was hired in 1954 and 55 by Greek shipping magnate, Niarchos to help in a "financial tussle" with Onassis.  
Page 72-"O'Connell stated that at one point in the negotiations with the Long Committee Maheu indicated that he might brief his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, fully about his past activities so that Morgan would be able to decide how best to represent him."

Schemes in Early 1963- Fitzgerald took over Cuban Task Force- Jan 1963  
skin-diving suit  
booby trapped sea shell  
Amlash - March 9, 1961 and March 28, 1961

The Report states

An asset of the Miami Station reported that \_\_\_\_\_ a and \_\_\_\_\_ a wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. (\_\_\_\_\_ was the gangster's 'man inside Cuba' with access to Castro in lethal pill operation- Phase One.) Headquarters expressed interest in exfiltrating \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. Called off because of report that Cuban police knew. ( This is one of three name-links found in AMLASH file between \_\_\_\_\_ and persons involved in gambling syndicate episodes.....If \_\_\_\_\_ was in fact one of the gangsters' assets inside Cuba, that fact was unknown to either the CIA officers running the gangster episodes or to hose handling \_\_\_\_\_.)  
(p80)

On Page 91 of the Report in states that under the date Nov 20, 1963 Thus far, this account of the \_\_\_\_\_ project has been based almost wholly on documents found in the project file. Beginning here is an account of an episode in the \_\_\_\_\_ operation on which there is no documentary evidence. \_\_\_\_\_ has a record of nine contacts and their dates; otherwise, this summary is drawn from the recollections of those involved.

Amlashes case officer, Sanchez, distinctly recalls that \_\_\_\_\_ didn't think much of the device. (p93a)

On December 27, 1964 (ARtime) and Noel) or (Cubela) met for the first time in Madrid. On Dec. 30, 1964 they met again. On March 15, 1965 The [redacted] cabled that one \_\_\_\_\_ had arrived in Madrid from Cuba on March 15 and had been introduced to a [redacted] officer. \_\_\_\_\_ claimed to be in contact with a group of Cuban military leaders who were planning to eliminate Castro and take over the government. It quickly became clear that he was referring to \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ said that he had always been publicly identified as a close friend of \_\_\_\_\_, whom he last saw in Havana on March 9. \_\_\_\_\_ said that he had been the lawyer for the Capri Hotel in Havana. He was jailed for 75 days in July 1962 for defending \_\_\_\_\_, a U.S. citizen and ex-manager of the \_\_\_\_\_ gambling casino who was kicked out of Cuba.  
(Comment: This is another name-link between Cubela and the gambling syndicate plots reported upon earlier in this report. \_\_\_\_\_ was one of the principals in Shef Edwards' phase one of the Operation. He presumably was not involved in Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, \_\_\_\_\_ was the man who brought \_\_\_\_\_ into the operation late in Phase 1, and \_\_\_\_\_ was one of the main players in Phase 2.)

2/PW

Page nine

People involved in plot to kill Castro as reported from first day trial proceedings and dispositions;

Ramon Guin Diaz-25 years  
Rolando Cubela Secades-25 years  
Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta- 20 years  
Alberto Blanco Romariz- 20 years  
Juan Alsina Navarro- 10 years  
Guillermo Cunill Alvarez- free  
Angel Herrero Veliz- free

Page 111-entitled "Discussion of Assassination at High-level meetings"  
DELETED

P120- O'Connell briefed CIA on source of Pearson's story.

- 1- Maheu briefed Edward p. Morgan on Maheu's participation in phase one
- 2- Maheu knew nothing of Phase 2
- 3- Morgan and Roselli were acquainted. Roselli was steered to Morgan by H.M Green spun, editor and publisher of Sun
- 4- Garrison, Morgan and Roselli were all in Las Vegas at the same time March 1967. O'Connell stated "It is our impression that Greenspun was also involved in the conversations."

The Report blames Roselli for the leak.

The Report concludes with a discussion of what should be done. One question is asked- "Should we try to silence those who are talking or might later talk?"

The answer begins "It appears to us that this tactic offers little chance of success. For one thing, the story is already out and probably in about as full detail as it ever will be." (128)