

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

Box 22
7 13
item
1-6

Berk-Write-Ups

~~CIA HAS NO CONNECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

I. Purpose and Scope of Study

The Central Intelligence Agency's performance in its role of support to the Warren Commission has been a source of controversy since the inception of the Warren Commission. Critics have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated in a conspiracy designed to suppress information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy.

During 1976 the critic's assertions were the subject of official inquiry by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC). The SSC, in its report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies" reached the following conclusion:

The Committee emphasizes that it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

The Committee has, however, developed evidence which impeaches the process

**THIS COPY IS NOT
FOR RELEASE.**

**THIS COPY IS NOT
FOR RELEASE.**

by which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission. This evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassination was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI and the CIA, as well as other agencies of Government, who were charged with investigating the assassination. (SSC, Book X, p 6)

This Committee has sought to examine in greater detail the general findings of the SSC. The Committee has particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed, or withheld information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee has attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission was misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, whether the misinforming or withholding of evidence from the Warren Commission was the

result of a conscious intent to do so by the Agency or its employees.

The Committee has sought to examine the issue detailed above in both an objective and disciplined manner. In order to accomplish this goal the Committee has utilized a 1977 Report by the CIA's Inspector General (hereinafter 77 IGR). This Report was highly critical of the SSC findings and asserted that the SSC Final Report conveyed an impression of limited effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission in its work. The 77 IGR was in fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect information in support of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports." (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.)

In order to demonstrate further the scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 77 IGR contained a comprehensive listing of CIA generated material made available

to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. In this respect, the Committee agrees with the 77 IGR wherein it is stated that "This compilation (of CIA generated material) is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort." (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E)

In examining the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA generated material referenced above, the Committee has paralled its review to the structure given to these material by the 77 IGR. In this regard the 77 IGR detail four inter-related compilations of Kennedy assassination material. These four compilations are:

- 1) Agency dissemination of information to the Intelligence Community (Formal and Informal Disseminations)
- 2) Dissemination of material to the Warren Commission

- 3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al regarding rumors and allegations regarding President Kennedy's assassination
- 4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the Warren Commission on Rumors and Allegations Relating to the President's Assassination (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.)

These compilations were reviewed by a staff member of the Committee who focused upon those CIA materials which the 77 IGR documented as having made available in written form to the Warren Commission.

During the course of this study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the review of the Agency's compilations discussed in this report. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive

issues have arisen related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising an approximate total of ninety volumes of material have been examined and analyzed by a staff member of this Committee in preparation of this report.

The findings set forth herein are subject to modification due to the following considerations. During the course of the past fifteen years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency's sophisticated document retrieval system, certain documents requested by this Committee for study and analysis have not been located. Whether these documents merely have been filed incorrectly or destroyed, gaps in the written record still do exist.

Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of

relevancy adopted by the CIA and this Committee, certain files requested by the Committee for review have either not been made available to the Committee or have been made available to the Committee in a sanitized fashion. Therefore, to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial of access and/or sanitization of certain materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the best evidence available to the Committee though this may not be all relevant evidence to which the Agency has access.

One must, moreover, give due consideration to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings, and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and substance of these discussions, briefings, and meetings may not always be reflected by the written record made the subject of this study. Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews, depositions and executive session hearings with

key Warren Commission staff and members and former or present CIA representatives in an effort to resolve questions that are not addressed by the written record. The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject for discussion herein.

II. A Insert section on Org. of CIA investigation

(subsequent sections to be reworked)

II. Warren Commission Relationship With CIA Regarding Information Made Available By CIA To Warren Commission

B. Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA Representative Regarding Warren Commission - CIA Relationship
The Committee has contacted both representatives of

this report

In addition, [redacted] will examine the following subjects generated by the Committee's study as outlined above, in the following ^{general} order of discussion:

- 1) the organization of the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination;
- 2) the working relationship of the Warren Commission staff and those CIA representatives concerned with the Warren Commission inquiry;
- 3) the standards of investigative cooperation which the Warren Commission staff believed to govern the quality and quantity of information supplied by the CIA to the Warren Commission;
- 4) the CIA's concern for protection of its sensitive sources and methods and the consequent effects of this concern upon the Warren Commission investigation and;
- 5) the substance and quality of information ^{concerning this} passed to the Warren Commission and the results of this Committee's investigation of Calderon and her significance to the events of November 22, 1963.

the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA generated information to the Warren Commission. The general consensus of ~~opinions of~~ these representatives is that the Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the Commission's investigation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18.) (See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 24.) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel for the Warren Commission, who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent. (See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman, 8/2/78.) Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality of work. (Executive Session Testimony of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17, see also JFK exh, 23.)

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured ^{by the CIA} that the Agency would cooperate in the Commission's work. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/7/78, p. 4.)
" " " " John McCone, 8/17/78 p 9)

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during

the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis a vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5.) Mr. McCone was responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission. (Ibid. pp. 5-6.) In this regard Mr. McCone testified that:

Handwritten notes:
 m...
 H...
 C...
 (Rope)

The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him--giving his staff everything that we had, and I think he was quite satisfied. (Ibid. p. 9.)

C. Warren Commission Belief that All Relevant Materials Were to Be Made Promptly Available by CIA to Warren Commission CIA

Mr. Raymond Rocca, *(one of the CIA's key representatives)* to the Warren Commission during its investigation, ~~also~~ characterized the Agency's role as one of full support to the Warren Commission. Mr. Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and Analysis Division for the Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA, ^{stated} recalled under oath that Richard Helms had given the following directive:

All material bearing in any way that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission should be seen by CIA staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded indications--they were verbal in so far as I know--that we were to leave no stone unturned. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 24)

(Rocca, et. Helms, is FAAR)

Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms' orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees. (Ibid. p. 24.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis: "the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." (Ibid., p. 26.)

A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation, was directly responsible for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Ibid., p. 23.) He testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Commission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.)

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily

on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under oath he supported this proposition:

Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to specific requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms: That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallable. There may have been times or circumstances under which something different might have occurred, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to them.

As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not.
(Ibid., p. 34.)

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as follows:

Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission communicate with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p. 4)

Mr. Slawson added support to Rankin's position testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." (Exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29)

II. ^F ~~B~~

^{"request merits response" Policy}
Effect of CIA's Information-Supply Policy on Warren Commission knowledge of and access to CIA supported ^{information relevant to} Warren Commission Inquiry operations.

The unfortunate consequences of not asking the CIA the right questions were graphically illustrated by the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots [(SSC Book V) see also (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, SSC, 11/20/75)]. Paradoxically, even if the Warren

Commission had requested information on such plots, the CIA's ^{point of contact with the Warren Commission would not have been able to} ~~provide the Commission with information so requested.~~ ^{provide the Commission with information so requested.}

~~existence~~. As Mr. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

(HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 50.)

Had Rocca, as the CIA's working level representative to the Warren Commission, been requested by the Commission to research and report on any and all CIA anti-Castro assassination operations, Rocca's efforts would have produced no substantive information. (Ibid., p. 49)

The record also reflects that the CIA desk officer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr. Helms to investigate for the CIA Lee Harvey Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy had no knowledge of such plots during his investigation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 73, 111-112) Mr. Scelso testified that had he known of such assassination plots the following action would have been taken:

"we would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best operative security had to see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. I would have had all our Cuban sources queried about it." (Ibid., p. 166)

As the record reflects, these plots were known by few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding

these plots reveals that the Agency compromised its promise to supply all relevant information to the Warren Commission. The following exchange between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the acute laxity of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith: If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall.
(HSCA Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard
Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 30-31.)

Mr. McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 13) When asked whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he gave the following response:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me. (Ibid., p. 16)

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels Rankin, Slawson and Spector were in agreement that such information should have been reported to the

Warren Commission. (Exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test. of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec. Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71 where he states that possible withholding of information by CIA about Agency attempts to assassinate Castro did not significantly affect Warren Commission investigation)

From the CIA's perspective, Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated that: " a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca 7/17/78, p. 45)

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78)

III. Introductory Section/Agency Concern for the Sanctity of Sensitive Sources and Methods

The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information was dependent upon 1) the availability of information; and 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request and 3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve

checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 25)

At times the CIA's concern for protecting its sensitive sources and methods caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting relevant information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods did effect the quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78, p. 23) As a result of the CIA's concern, in some instances the Agency made the unilateral decision to limit access to CIA materials by the Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 158)

The Committee has identified two areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren Commission's investigation. These are:

- 1) Withholding information from the Warren Commission pertaining to the photo-surveillance and telephonic surveillance operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station
- 2) As a related consideration, the Agency's reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations."

(Ibid., p. 158) But Scelso did testify that:

We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including the telephone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the telephone intercepts.

Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding

Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (CIA DOC. FOIA #509-803, 1/31/64, Memorandum for J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA Doc. FOIA #420-757, 12/20/63, Dir 90466)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth as it specifically concerned the CIA's relations with the FBI in a CIA memorandum of December 10, 1963. (CIA Memorandum for File, 12/20/63, [redacted] included in with Soft file materials) In that memorandum, [redacted] of the CIA Counterintelligence/Special Investigations Group Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam

Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 that had been submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided [] with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico and asked him whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with the source of the telephone taps. [] memorandum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. [] wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps. (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, by included in Soft File materials)*

* The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized fashion. When Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already:

called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information (as determined from Agency sources) coinciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area.
(CIA dissemination to FBI, 1/14/64,
CIA # CSCI-3/779/510.

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA might be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively with the Commission in a manner which would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two which Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originated information. In this way the CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertently. The policies articulated were:

The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. (CIA Doc. FOIA #398-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) This cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being withheld from the Warren Commission, and stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission which would be in a form

protective of the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques (Ibid.) (See also Angleton Deposition.)

(Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.)

- 1) Your Bureau not disseminate information received from this Agency without prior concurrence
- 2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments (sic) or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible future interest of the Commission and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (Ibid.)

IV. Telephone Taps

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the Commission's work, of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City.

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the Mexican authorities and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 51-52)

The CIA's unwillingness to inform the Warren Commission in the early stages of its investigation of the above-described surveillance operations is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew in its favor the form and substance of information the CIA felt uncomfortable providing the Warren Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/6/78, p. 158) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in

its investigation with all the facts before it.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963.[↑] (CIA Doc. FOIA #509-803 1/31/64) That memorandum did not mention that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and subsequently transcribed.[↑] by the Agency's Mexico City Station Furthermore, that memorandum did not mention that the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Armas which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #498-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. (JFK Doc. No. 3872) A review of Rankin's letter

indicates that as of his writing, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephonic surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph 1 of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, had the Warren Commission been informed of the telephonic surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make

this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission first learned of these operations. (Ibid.)

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency neither revealed the source of this information in its response to the Commission nor indicated that this source would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). (Ibid.)

IV. A Warren Commission Knowledge of CIA Telephonic Surveillance

During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and

and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephonic surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. On that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, who provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to Mexico City)

Prior to April 9, it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephonic surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives).

Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that the Warren Commission had learned that the CIA possessed transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. The Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren

Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, 45-46) Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, stating that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to review this material. (Slawson Memorandum of March 12, 1964, p. 6)

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. In that memo Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip, were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, (Slawson Memorandum of March 25, 1964, p. 20) and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary of interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. (Ibid.)

These comments indicate that Slawson placed qualified reliance upon the Mexican police summary.

Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephonic intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Silvia Duran. As Slawson reveals, the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations, and a summary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.
(CIA Doc. FOIA #420-757, Dec. 20, 1964,
CIA p. 2144, DIR 90466)

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (CD 692) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. (Ibid, p. 2) This conclusion, ^{again} he wrote, was based upon an analysis of Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears no indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, had Slawson been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis would have reflected the fact of his review either by its corroboration or criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report.

Logically, access to the CIA's telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. (Slawson Memorandum of April 21, 1964, Subj: Intercepts from Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico, p. 2) *put fin. at end of sentence*

Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was later determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, subsequently identified by CIA analysts as Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy. (Ibid. p. 4) Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of telephonic intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they posed one question to the CIA and made two requests for information from the Agency. (Slawson - Coleman Memorandum of April 2, 1964, Subj: Questions Raised by the Ambassador Mann File) Coleman and Slawson wrote:

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that

Oswald intended to settle down in
Odessa;

- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts refer to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed (Ibid.)

The question initially posed by (Item I) in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephonic intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson Memorandum of April 21, 1964, p. 1) Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary to request the source of the information, he had not as yet been provided access to the original material by the CIA.

Item Number Two of the above listing tends to show that the Commission had not been giving access to the intercept concerning the assassination.

Item number three of the above listing reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Armas conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies was discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts at a March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Conference with CIA on March 12, 1964)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip:

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

...In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or

possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must become familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investigatory agencies there have done. This means reading their reports, after translation, if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves.

(Slawson and Coleman Memorandum, April 13, 1964, Subj: Additional lines of Investigation in Mexico Which May Prove Worthwhile, p. 11.)

Manifestly, Coleman's and Slawson's desire for a thorough investigation had been thwarted by the CIA's concern lest its sources and methods, however relevant to the Commission's investigation, be exposed. Considering the gravity and significance of the Warren Commission's investigation

the

Agency's withholding of material from the Commission staff was clearly improper.

1964

On April 8, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. (Slawson Memorandum, April 22, 1964, Subj: Trip to Mexico City, p. 1) Prior to their departure, they met with Thomas Mann, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid.) Ambassador Mann told the Warren Commission representatives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Ibid., p. 3)

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA (Ibid. pp. 9-10)

That same day, during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the CIA's telephonic surveillance operations accompanied with English translations of the transcripts. In addition,

he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Ibid.)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination, indicating that his staff immediately began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (Ibid.) Scott revealed that all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had quickly been put under surveillance following the assassination. Slawson concluded :

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the

distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close notes as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit." (Ibid, p. 24)*

* A separate Slawson memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining to the Duran and Oswald conversations for the period Sept. 27 - Oct. 1, 1963. (Slawson Memorandum, April 21, 1964 Subj: Intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's ability to draw accurately reasoned conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City. It meant that as of April 10, 1964,

nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise materials could have been made available for analysis by the Commission. (Ibid.) Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation e.g., Cuban involvement, that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided.

VI. Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, FBI Special Agent Odum showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son (Warren

Commission Report p. 364) This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald. ^{Ibid.} (CIA Doc. DDP4-1555, 3/25/64, Warren Commission Doc. 67)⁵; This photograph which was one in a series resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. Prior to the assassination, had been linked by the Mexico City Station to Lee Harvey Oswald. (Ibid.) Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. (Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms 8/7/54, Vol. XI, pp. 469-470)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. (Warren Commission Report Vol I 153) Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (Ibid., Vol. I)

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, Assistant DDP requesting both the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph and an explanation of the circumstances by which this photograph was obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc. #3872)

On that same day, in a separate letter, Rankin wrote to DCI McCone regarding materials that the CIA had disseminated since November 22, 1963 to the Secret Service but not to the Warren Commission. Rankin requested copies of these materials which included three CIA cables. The cables concerned the photograph subsequently shown by the FBI to Oswald's mother of the individual originally identified by the Mexico City Station as Lee Harvey Oswald. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc. #3872)

Among the materials disseminated by the CIA to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination. (CIA Doc DIR 85177, 11/26/64) That cable concerned

the Dorticos-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. As a result the CIA was reluctant to make the material disseminated to the Secret Service available to the Warren Commission for in so doing the Agency would have necessarily exposed its telephonic surveillance operations to the Commission.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission recounting the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.
(HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso 5/16/78, p. 150)

In summary the records shows that

By February 12, 1964 the Warren Commission had inadvertently requested access to telephonic surveillance production, a cause for concern within the

due to the sensitivity of Agency sources and methods. Similarly the disclosure of the photosurveillance operations to the Warren Commission had also begun to cause concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone requesting JFK Doc. 3982) If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies or the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..." (CIA Doc. FOIA

#579-250, 3/5/64) *see also HSCA classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, pp. wherein it ~~is stated~~ states that the only reason for not providing the Warren Commission with access to CIA surveillance materials was due to the Agency's concern for protection of its sources and methods)*

access to CIA reports provided the Secret Service after Nov. 22, 1963,

On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA conferred regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin March 16, 1964, JFK Doc. # 3872, Slawson Memorandum, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrases are complete." (Letter of J. Lee Rankin, March 16, 1964, paragraph 2, JFK Doc. No. 3872)

Rankin further indicated that the same procedure was to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22,

1963 which had not as yet been furnished because it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (Ibid., par. 3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (FOIA # 622-258) by two separate communications. (CIA Doc. DDP4-1554, hereinafter CD 631, 3/24/64, CIA Doc., DDP4-1555, 3/24/64, CD 674 hereinafter) CD 631 provided the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (and to the Secret Service on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated, though it did not indicate when, that it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Agency explained that it had checked the photograph against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963,

CD 674 reveals that on Nov. 22, 1963 immediately followi

the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The Agency wrote that the subject of the photo referenced in these cables was not Oswald. It was further stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the original copies of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA Doc. DDP4-1555 CD634,24 March 1964)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24, 1964 (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested." (Memorandum of William Coleman, March 24, 1964)

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the

assassination." I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry." (Ibid.)

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. The file also contained:

"Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photograph of the unidentified individual mistakenly believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to the Secret Service by the CIA." (Memorandum of Samuel Stern, March 27, 1964)

Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the

Warren Commission on March 24, 1964. He also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. In addition, Stern examined the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background information on Oswald." (Ibid.) Stern recorded that these messages were paraphrased accurately as set forth in the CIA's January 31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip.

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated "there is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full text or paraphrased." (Ibid.)

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.

VII. Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission Relationship

It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence and one of the seven members of the Warren Commission, did not report crucial information to the Warren Commission.

Specifically, the Senate Select Committee concluded:

"With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place during his tenure at the Agency."
(SCC, Book V, pp. 67-68)

However, the SSC did not explore further the relationship and allegiances of Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles as a former Director of the CIA. The Committee has consequently reviewed files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles' service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review, a memorandum was uncovered which suggests that Dulles^{on at least one occasion} provided information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission activities and investigative policies.

This memorandum which was written by David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, concerned the controversial case of the Russian defector Nosenko.

David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964 prepared for DDP Helms concerned Murphy's discussions with Allan Dulles about Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. In relevant part Murphy wrote:

"Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission Report. " (CIA Doc. Memorandum of David Murphy of July 8, 1964, Subj: Discussion with Dulles re Nosenko, p. 3)

Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would be to use language "which would allude to the existence

of other, unverified information on the Oswald case." (Ibid.) This language, Murphy contended, would permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko information.

Murphy continued:

"It was agreed an effort would be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the Nosenko information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know precisely in what context the Warren Commission intended to make use of the Nosenko information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the information he needs from Mr. Rankin. (Ibid., p. 2)

Whether by design or as an unintended result, the quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the Warren Commission, at the very least contemplated compromising his position with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information about the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko case. (Add short section giving Helms and Angleton's views)

VIII. Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish.

(CIA Doc. FOIA MEXI 7105, 11/27/63, 173-615, attachment)

This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (Ibid.) The Mexico City Station, as subsequently reported to CIA headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate. (Ibid.)

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard
(of the assassination)
the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

(Ibid.)

CIA's
Paraphrasing the telephone intercept transcript,
it states that the caller told Luisa the person

apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she also knew this. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a "gringo." The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination and that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented:

We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened... who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.) (Ibid, p. 2)

Raymond Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

*The memo is
order comment
by Rocco to do
contrast to the
important of Calderon
easily brushed aside, as
the two
CIA recall*

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation. (CIA Doc., Memorandum of Raymond Rocca for DC/OPS, 5/23/75, p. 15) *

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments do not merit serious attention. Her words may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may equally be interpreted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case ^{should} merit serious attention in the months following the assassination.

In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable sent by then Ambassador Mann to the State Department (CIA Doc. DIR 85573 11/27/63).

In that cable Mann stated:

...Washington should urgently consider feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban Consulate here." (Ibid.)

* Regarding the issue of whether Calderon's comments could reasonably be interpreted to indicate possible foreknowledge the CIA position is as follows:

During the Rockefeller Commission inquiry, Calderon's conversation was identified as a possible item of information from the Agency's Cuban and Soviet telephone intercepts that might ~~have~~ suggest foreknowledge of a plot (over)

This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon. ~~★~~ However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann for Sec Rusk re: ...persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy. Mann went on to state in urgent terms: "They may quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican government could use them as witnesses." (Ibid.)

According to CIA files, Calderon made reservations to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on December 11, 1963, less than four weeks after the assassination. (CIA Doc. CSCI-316/01783-65, 4/26/63)

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions. (CIA Doc. DIR 84950, 11/23/63, CIA Doc. DIR 85471, 11/27/63)

★ It is the Committee's belief that Mann was prompted to request the arrest of Calderon on the basis of Gilberto Alvarado Ortega's allegation that Calderon was present at the Cuban Embassy when Oswald was allegedly given a sum of money presumably to carry out the assassination of President Kennedy.
[CIA Doc. DDP4-2741, 1 June 1964, Attachment]

During her ^{second} interrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her association with Calderon. There is no indication in this ^{of the CIA interrogation accounting} report for the questioning^{of} Duran about Calderon.

(CIA Doc. DDP4-0940, 2/21/64) The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964 more than two months after Calderon had returned to Cuba. (Ibid.)

Information was reported to the CIA during May 1964, from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence operations.

(CIA Doc., Memorandum of Joseph Langosch to Chief, Office of Security, 6/23/64) Caldron's ties to Cuban intelligence were reported to the Warren Commission on June 18, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #739-319 6/19/64) However, the Committee has determined from its review that the CIA did not provide Calderon's conversation^{of November 22} to the Warren Commission. ^{put in quote at p 65 a} Consequently, even though the Warren Commission was aware that

* A CIA memorandum, in response to an HSCA request letter of August 28, 1978, states in part: concerning Calderon's conversation

" Although the (Mexico City) Station considered the conversation of sufficient possible interest to send a copy to headquarter's, the latter (over)

Calderon had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Commission by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this regard may have foreclosed the Commission from actively pursuing a lead of great significance.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA Doc. Dispatch HMMA21612, no date given) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City station and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). (CIA Doc. Dispatch JFCA-10095, 7/15/63) That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The

notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. (Ibid., p. 3 of attachment) No such report is present in Calderon's 201 File. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first recorded by the CIA on May 5, 1964. (CIA Doc. Blind Memorandum of Harold Swenson, FOIA 68-290 5/5/64) At that time, Joseph Langosch, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, reported the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban Intelligence Service officers. (Ibid.) Specifically, AMMUG-1 was asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Langosch "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion

General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." (Ibid.)

Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure for Cuba within one month after the assassination. (Ibid.)

On May 7, 1964, Langosch recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. (CIA Doc FOIA 687-295, attach. 3, 5/7/64) Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence. (Ibid.)

On May 8 Langosch further disclosed AMMUG's knowledge of the Oswald case. (Ibid, attach. 5)

Langosch paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...(Ibid.)

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUG (CIA Doc. FOIA 687-295, 5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum) Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG-1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing." (Ibid. p. 2)

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. (CIA Doc. FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64, Helms Memorandum) Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of Langosch's May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.) In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forth. However, that attachment made no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum,

access to the questions used in Langosch's
interrogation of AMUG^{p1}. (CIA Doc. FOIA 739-316, 6/19/64,
Memorandum) On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of
Rocca's Counterintelligence Research and Analysis
Group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to
the Warren Commission's offices for Willens's review.
Willens saw Langosch's May 5 memorandum. The only
mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise
relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not
clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from
which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." (Ibid.)
However, Willens was not shown Langosch's
memoranda of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained
much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon,
including her possible association with Lee Harvey
Oswald and/or American intelligence. (Ibid.)*

The Warren Commission as of June 19, 1964,
had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon
lead. It had effectively been denied significant

* It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,
7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not
referenced in the Calderon 201 file. (See CIA
Computer printout of Calderon 201 file) Their
existence was determined by the Committee's
independent review of other agency files.

background information. This denial may have impeded or prevented the Commission's pursuit of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. But even if the Warren Commission had learned of Calderon's background and possible contact with Oswald it still had been denied the one significant piece of information that might have raised its interest in Calderon to a more serious level. The Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's conversation of November 22, 1964.

The Committee has contacted former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine whether a transcript of the Calderon conversation was ever shown to the Warren Commission. The response has uniformly been that the Calderon conversation was never made available to the Commission nor was its existence ever made known to the Commission.

HSCA Interview of W. David Slawson, 8/17/78, p.5;
Willens response to letter of HSCA Class. Exec.
Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 132; CF
deposition of Raymond Rocca, p. 156 wherein he
states that he is sure the Commission knew of it,)
In addition, the Calderon 201 file bears no
reference to the conversation nor does it indicate
that it was ever made known to or provided the
Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Computer
print-out of Calderon 201 file)

In an effort to determine the manner in which the CIA
treated the Calderon conversation this Committee
posed the following questions to the CIA:

1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever given access to the transcript of a telephone conversation, dated November 22, 1963, between a female employee of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City, identified as Luisa, and an unidentified male speaking from outside the Cuban Embassy/Consulate? If so, please indicate when this transcript was provided to the Warren Commission or its staff, which CIA official provided it, and which Warren Commission members or staff reviewed it.
2. Was the Warren Commission or any member of the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever informed

orally or in writing of the substance of the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so, please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which CIA official provided it. (HSCA request letter of August 28, 1976)

by a memorandum dated ~~September 21~~, 1978, The

CIA responded:

See quote * p 57

The available evidence thus supports the conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information nor the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's significance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and her comment ~~S~~ following the assassination, it may well have given more serious investigative consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald and the Cuban government's possible involvement in

*Cite Board
have - the
Cuban possibility
was in fact
never fully
investigated!*

a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

Two difficult issues remain which are raised by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus.

The first question can be explained in benign terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation and published its report. (See above CIA explanation)

As for the Agency's withholding of information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (CIA Doc. 5/5/64, Swenson Memorandum) The memoranda which provided more extensive examination of her intelligence background were not made

available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum written by Joseph Langosch following his debriefing of AMMUG-1 indicated that AMMUG-1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (CIA Doc. FOIA 687-295, attach 5, 5/8/64) It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because the allegation was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. It would have demonstrated that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed information prior to the assassination regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to the Cuban Intelligence Service, and that Services' possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

Regarding Calderon's possible association with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA.

However, there are indications that such contact between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City states in part:

...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic exploitation section might be in a position to follow up on this lead...Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity. (CIA Doc. HMMW-1935, 9/1/63)

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details not clear (CIA Doc. HMMA 21849, July 31, 1965)

At the very least, the above dispatches evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon and her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

The Committee has queried David Ronis, the author of the above cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section." (HSCA Class. Staff Interview of David Ronis, 8/31/78) Ronis was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection of intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. Often he would receive no response to these requests, which normally indicated that no follow-up had either been attempted or successfully conducted. It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division

might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sister. Ronis told the Committee that he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (Ibid.)

Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 136; HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148; HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78, Piccolo, Interview of _____)

Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete: the

most glaring omission being the absence from
her 201 file, of ^{Calderon's} cryptic remarks
following the assassination of President Kennedy.

AMMUG-1

This Committee's investigation of Luisa Calderon has revealed that a defector from the Cuban Intelligence Services provided the CIA with significant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter).*

CIA files reveal that A-1 defected from the DGI on April 21, 1964 in [REDACTED]. When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned over to the CIA. (CIA Doc. [REDACTED] IN 68894, 4/24/64) Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H. Langosch, went to [REDACTED] to meet A-1, debrief him, and arrange for A-1's travel into the United States.

(Ibid.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's

*It is now known that A-1 did provide significant leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon. It is further apparent that little of this information was made available by the CIA to the Warren Commission. Therefore, the possibility exists that A-1 had provided other information to the CIA relevant to the Warren Commission's work which was not properly reported to the Commission.

debriefing of A-1 were forwarded to the Chief of Station in [] (CIA Doc. Dispatch [] 7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, A-1 was under contract with the CIA for operational purposes. (CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64) By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1 would be of great value to the Agency. He stated:

There is no question in my mind that AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to Director of Security, 6/23/64)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal Section B (CIA Doc. [] IN 68894 4/24/64) which was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record Questionnaire 6/4/64; CIA Doc. [] In 68894 4/24/64)

A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelligence officers assigned to Mexico City. Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64)

Thus, A-1 was able to provide the CIA soon after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in Mexico City.

The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files concerning A-1. This examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided any valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2) whether, if such leads were provided, these leads and/or other significant information were made available to the Warren Commission.

The Committee's initial review of the materials provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission did not disclose the existence of the AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during the course of its review examine a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file made reference to A-1. Included in this file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-1 provided about the Oswald case. (CIA Doc. FOIA 68-290 Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within this file were the A-1 debriefing memoranda of May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOIA #687-295, attach's 3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the Committee requested access to all CIA files ^{or} concerning referring to A-1.

From review of these materials the Committee has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.

Prior to learning of Oswald's probable contact with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter-intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that the Director consent to an interview before the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964. (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McCone's appearance. Warren Commission Report, ^{Vol. II} Pp. 11-129) (CIA Doc. FOIA 689-298, Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton also wrote:

I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this carefully and made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.)

Undoubtedly the White House source referred to in Angleton's memo was A-1. This conclusion is based in part upon the date of this memo which was quite close in time to A-1's defection. In addition, Rocca's staff prepared prior to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren Commission a "Brief Presentation to the Warren Commission" outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (CIA Doc. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64)

At Tab E of this brief it states:

Within the past week, significant information has been developed by the CIA regarding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban aspect. (Ibid., Tab E)

On May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-1. (CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64) However, the Agency did not at that time identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information

was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. (Ibid.) The May 15 communication did state that the Agency had established contact "with a well-placed individual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Intelligencia." (Ibid.)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's probable contact with the DGI in Mexico City. The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid., attachment)

As set forth in the section of this report concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the information set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the questions nor the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector collaborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOIA 739-319, 6/19/ 64).

Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon, specifically of Nov. 22 details of her her conversation and association with Cuban Intelligence were withheld from the Warren Commission. This information as described above, was derived from debriefings of A-1. However, from the Committee's review of the A-1 file provided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible evidence indicating that other information provided by A-1 to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that a specific document ^{as} referenced in the A-1 file is not present in that file.

The missing item is of considerable concern to the Committee. It is a debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case." (CIA Doc Dispatch UFGW-5035, 3/23/65) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Ibid.) Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee who has worked extensively with the Agency files

system told a Committee Staff member that this notation was the symbol for the CIA component known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated ^{September 27, 1978} _____, the CIA has adopted the

following position ~~in that~~ ^{that} debriefing Report No. 40. is a duplication of the original Langosch memorandum ~~(~~_____~~)~~ of May 5, 1964, concerning AMMUS's knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald's possible contact with the PSI.*

FW * The CIA memorandum states ^{in part} as follows:
When CI Staff learned of Ammug-1's defection and considered the possibility that he might have some knowledge of the Oswald case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing Ammug-1. ... WH desk records reflect that Ammug-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding this questionnaire ... FBI because the debriefing on the Oswald case was handled as a sensitive matter, it was (over)
The Committee has questioned A-1's case officers

regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-1's debriefings was supplied to the Warren Commission.

(HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also Interviews of Hildago & Piccolo) He also stated that he does not recall that A-1 provided any other information

on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 as discussed herein. (Ibid.)

In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that A-1 provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted to locate A-1. The CIA has also attempted to locate A-1, whose ^{present relationship} ~~relationship~~ with the Agency ^{is ambiguous} ~~was terminated~~ ~~WFP7~~, but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts. [★] The CIA's inability to locate A-1 has been a source of concern to this Committee particularly in light of his long association with the Agency.

Thus, gaps do exist regarding information A-1 may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. However, with the exception of the Calderon episode and on the basis of the CIA's written record it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1 information of investigative significance.

A separate question remains however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the Washington, D.C. area and, under controlled

★ A April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding A-1 states in pertinent part:
Since 1971 [redacted] (A-1) has not been involved in any CIA operation in Miami or elsewhere. Joseph Norris is the alias of a CIA representative who periodically debriefs (A-1) on personalities and methods of the DGI. There is no other CIA involvement with [redacted] (CIA Doc 0807602 CIA 202417) Vol 4 A-1 file 201-749651 over

conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-1's status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option.

In light of the establishment of A-1's bona fides, his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission.

The AMLASH Operation

During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an

Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967 pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). As a result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid., pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks. (Ibid. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid. pp. 107-110).

In its examination of the AMLASH operation the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. 80)

The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (Ibid.)

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The 1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was tried in Havana, press reports of Cuban knowledge of AMLASH's association with the CIA were dated from November 1964, approximately one year after President Kennedy's assassination) (Ibid. p. 111)

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. (SSC, Book V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) The Church Committee concluded:

The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots, the AMLASH

operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to the CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of the AMLASH operation. No one investigated a connection between the AMLASH operation and President Kennedy's assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct a thorough investigation of questions of Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination. (Ibid. p. 5)

In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspector General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot.

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

It would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission) its efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (of normal avenue of investigation). The CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most then saw in general terms-- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of the tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point

to erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (Ibid. p. 11)

Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation was relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-27).

A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963 was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff. The Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch,

Staff

Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1). The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald and was responsible for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79)

Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit of Joseph Langosh, 9/14/78, p. 3) It was Langosch's recollection that:

that the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA (Ibid. p. 4)

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials including Desmond Fitzgerald. (Ibid., p. 4) *★ over*

However, the issue before this Committee is not simply whether the AMLASH operation was an

assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

In the case of the AMLASH operation this determination is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operational objectives.

Based upon the presently available evidence it is the Committee's position that such information, if made available to the Warren Commission, might have stimulated the Commission's investigative concern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin commented before this Committee:

...when I read...the Church Committee's report--it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to be met and then either blame the rest of it on somebody else or not tell any more or polish it off. I don't think that

could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better chance of getting to the heart of it. It might have only revealed that we are involved in it and who approved it and all that. But I think that would have at least come out. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91)

The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to the Warren Commission, the Commission might have been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture that has surrounded the AMLASH operation during the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH operation remains a footnote to the turbulent relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States.