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of the U.S. Intelligence Community.*

As a visual aid to the analysis of the materials contained in the four compilations discussed above, a chart has been prepared which illustrates the flow of written information from the CIA to the Warren Commission and the U.S. Intelligence Community concerning President Kennedy's assassination. This chart sets forth the CIA's designation for each document listed and lists the subject matter of each document and the date of each document's dissemination. The chart also indicates whether the document was made available to the Warren Commission, the U.S. Intelligence community or both. A secondary purpose of this chart is to indicate for selected subjects the volume of information provided to the U.S. Intelligence Community as opposed to the Warren Commission.

During the course of this study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the review of the Agency's compilations discussed herein. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive issues have arisen related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and

Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms' orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees. (Ibid. p. 24.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis: "the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." (Ibid., p. 26.)

A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation was directly responsible for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Ibid. p. 23.) He testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Commission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.)

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under

[cite supra McCone + Rankin testimony]

effect. The following exchange between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the acute ~~lack~~ ^{laxity} of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith: If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees to to anyplace else without the Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall.

~~_____~~ Mr. McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (McCone deposition, p.13)

however, when asked [redacted] whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he responded:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me. (McCone deposition, p.16)

Thus, the evidence indicates that ^{had} Helms ~~to have~~ approached McCone ^{to discuss informing the} Warren Commission ^{of past and ongoing CIA} anti-Castro assassination plots ^{it} might have ^{cost} Helms ~~his job~~ ^{Todo so would have meant} ~~informing~~ McCone that plots were still being considered by the Agency ^{But see Helms testimony —}

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work, ^{Warren Commission counsellors Rankin, Slawson and} [redacted]

^{Spector} [redacted] were in agreement (Slawson dep., p.27) that such information should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (See also Spector, p.46) (But see Liebeler, depo. p.171) ^{From the CIA's perspective} Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated:

"...in light of what has happened a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken. I mean, there are any number of things that one can say in

the light of history.

What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately or otherwise ignored. (Rocca dep., p.45)

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (Scelso dep., p.153)

III. Introductory Section/SS+M

The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information has been shown to have been dependent upon 1) the availability of information, and 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request. On this point, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (Helms Exec. Session hearing, p.25)

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Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

However, ~~in some instances, risking the CIA's~~ ^{at times} ~~concern for protecting its~~ the CIA's sensitive sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting ~~relevant~~ ^{relevant} information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's ~~effort~~ ^{effort} to protect its sensitive sources and methods did ~~not~~ ^{not} have ~~any~~ ^{which} effect ~~on~~ the quality of the information to ~~be~~ ^{which} the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

(Rankin at p.23) ~~In some instances~~ ^{As a result} the Agency ~~made the~~ ^{made the} unilateral decisions ~~regarding the~~ ^{to withhold or limit} ~~access to CIA~~ ^{access to CIA} materials ~~to be~~ ^{by} the Commission. (Scetso dep. p.158)

~~Two areas of concern of this Committee in which the protection of agency sources and methods were an issue during the Warren Commission investigation involved and impeded the Warren Commission investigation to some degree:~~

- 1) ~~Withholding information from the Warren Commission Staff~~ ^{withholding information from the Warren Commission Staff} pertaining to the photosurveillance and ~~of the CIA's Mexico City Station~~ ^{of the CIA's Mexico City Station} effects of the ~~controversy sur-~~ ^{controversy sur-}
- 2) As a related consideration, the ~~controversy sur-~~ ^{controversy sur-}

This Committee has identified two areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren Commission investigation. These are:

as redacted

rounding ^{the} photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined [redacted] herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the ⁱⁿception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep. p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including ^{technical} sources, including the () and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the () (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. ^{31 Jan memo} (Cite.) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The ^{CIA} policy [redacted] limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of ()

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() in order to protect your continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave () *State* (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29Jan1964) -

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, [] of the CIA Counterintelligence *Special Investigations Group* Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison ~~man~~ to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided [] with this report which indicated that some United States Agency () in Mexico. Papich queried [] whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with ^{the} source of ()

() (The FBI had knowledge of CIA () in Mexico City, see CIA SOCI-3/779/510) ()

[] ^{shows} memorandum ~~that~~ that he discussed this matter with Scelso who in turn, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms. to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. [] wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI-sensitive information which could relate to () Memo for File, (20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

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memorandum and its characterization

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 17, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized fashion. ~~_____~~

~~_____~~

all information deemed significant as received by CIA (or found in CIA files, irrespective of the nature, sensitivity or reliability of sources, therefor, was promptly relayed to your Bureau. (Jan, 1964 CIA dissem to FBI, CSC1-3/779/510)

when Helms, ~~_____~~, expressed his concern regarding exposure of Agency sources by the FBI to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already:

called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information (as determined from Agency sources) coinciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (CSCI-3/779/510)

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA ~~_____~~ might be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He ~~_____~~ suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work with the Commission and with the Commission's cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated ~~_____~~ were two which Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of information originated by it. ~~_____~~ In this way ~~_____~~ + no CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertently. The policies articulated were:

- 1) Your Bureau not disseminat^e~~ing~~ information received from this Agency without prior concurrence
- 2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission and initiate certain preparatory^(?) to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710)

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
This CIA^a policy ~~_____~~ eliminating ~~_____~~ reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. That cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was on that date still being withheld from the Warren Commission. Therein, it ~~was~~ stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, CIA ~~was~~ to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission. However,

as redacted

was to be in a form that would

the form of this presentation ~~should be~~ protect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

IV and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the CIA ^{of the Commission's work} and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City, ~~...~~

~~...~~ Helms testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these ~~...~~ and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but ~~...~~ it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session hearing, pp.51-52, ~~...~~)

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period ~~...~~ (CIA 3/779/518 1/14/64) Furthermore, as of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council Director McGeorge Bundy, ^{had been made} aware that the CIA ~~...~~ against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates and that through these ~~...~~ Oswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. [cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy]

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unwillingness

The CIA's ~~unwillingness~~ to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ in the early stages of ^{its} ~~the~~ investigation, the ~~transcript of conversations and~~

those of certain Soviet and Cuban ~~_____~~ is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an ^{Agency} ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ on the Agency's part to ~~_____~~ ^{policy designed to skew in its favor the form and}

substance ~~of CIA-generated~~ information ~~_____~~ ^{the CIA felt uncomfortable} provided

the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep. ^{P-7}) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, even those ^{facts} which might have meant exposing certain sensitive operations to the Commission.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum

~~did~~ ^{did} not mention ~~_____~~ ^{that} Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Sovieti Embassy/Consulates had

and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memorandum ~~did~~ ^{did} not mention ~~_____~~ that the CIA

and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico which ^{Armas} ~~_____~~ and transcribed.

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On February 1, 1964 Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that ~~at least~~ as of ^{his writing} ~~the date~~, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of () or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in # ___ of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of () Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA () in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission learned of these operations.

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On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission ~~or~~ indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

V. During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA () in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willens did not obtain access to CIA () materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City. ^{Scott} provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from () of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: _____ P)

However, ~~P~~ Prior to ~~April 9~~ it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

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1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain [redacted] of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals ~~that~~ the Warren Commission had learned that CIA ~~had~~ in its possession transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. **Dorticos-Armas** These conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, ~~and~~ concerned Silvia Durfa's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police ^{memo} (cite?). ~~On that date~~ Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, ^{stating} ~~that~~ that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives' to review this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas [redacted]. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's [redacted] in Mexico City. ^{supra} (Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocca's testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

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Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated that the tentative conclusions ~~concerning~~ ^{concerns} Oswald's Mexico trip, that he had reached were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary of interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that Slawson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. * insert p 28

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion he wrote was based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears ~~no~~ ^{no} ~~substantive~~ ^{substantive} information

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indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, Slawson had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis ~~should~~ have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or criticism of the Mexican police summary report.

above cited

* Insert p29

Insert from p27

As of March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its efforts to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City had not been given access to the Duran transcripts. The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operation, and a summary police report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

As Slawson reveals,

suspect of a

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of () in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave here.

state

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)

On March 27, 1964 Slawson wrote that he had determined that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three

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times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican police.

(Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA p. 1872) However, Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations. Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning is ambiguous regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the

(production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as Oswald ^{was} at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, ~~on two occasions~~ ^{the CIA had twice} definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions.

Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence in the Cuban Embassy ^{were} established as the result of the

(Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

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could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception but as the record indicates they were not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of

In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they articulated one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency. (Ambassador

Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) *Coleman and Slawson wrote:*

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;
- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts translated if possible, in all cases where the ~~info~~ ^{refer} to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed

(Item I)
The question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CI of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Necessarily, if Slawson ~~found it~~

necessary to request
~~MM~~ the source of the information, he had not been

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provided that source ^{by the CIA} which in this ~~_____~~

(Item Number Two] the above-
listing)

The first Coleman-Slawson request ~~_____~~ tends to show ~~_____~~ the Commission that they ~~_____~~ had ^{not been}

given access, ~~_____~~ to ~~_____~~

concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated ^{Agency transcripts} indicates the Commission had not been given complete access to the relevant by the question set forth above). Moreover, this request could well be interpreted to mean that they had not been given access to any of the subject materials.

The second request, [item number three of the above listing] reveals that () the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies ~~was~~ discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. ^{the name of} at the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Cite.) ^{of the meeting}

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving complete access to all material relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote:

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

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...In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must become familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investigatory agencies there have done. This means reading their reports, after translation, if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves.

The thoroughness of investigation which Coleman and Slawson articulated as a vital concern to the Commission's work had been ~~thwarted~~ thwarted by the CIA's ~~concern~~ concern ~~that~~ ^{lest its} ~~sources and methods~~ ^{however} relevant to the Commission's investigation, ^{be exposed} the limited number of persons engaged in an investigation of a gravity and historical significance unprecedented in this nation's history, ^{withholding of} ~~from the Warren Commission staff~~ ^{this material} was inexcusable.

On April 9, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. Prior to their departure, they met with Thomas Mann, ^{the} U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. Ambassador Mann ^{told} ~~informed~~ the Warren Commission representatives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p.)

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Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the () operations and English translations of the same. In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination. Scott indicated that his staff ~~at that point~~ ^{immediately} began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22). Scott revealed ^{that} all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. () Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Governacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded ~~in~~

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"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time (p.24)

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 of the notetaking from original source material following Scott's disclosures. These notes, with the telephonic intercepts pertaining to the Duran and Oswald conversations *Sort the period Sept 27 - Oct 1, 1963.*

*Delete
Tel in intercepts*

It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired ability to draw *accurately reasoned* conclusions regarding Oswald's activities in Mexico City, *delete*

*delete
"Tel" intercepts 116*

delete of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Commission investigation, the Commission was unable to follow the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise materials *could have been made* were available for analysis by the Commission.

Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with the vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement.)

VI. Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son. This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald. This photograph was one in a series [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. It had been linked by the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination, to Lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. (cite Helms affidavit in WCR)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (p. 153) WCR II?

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as redacted

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas Karamessinis Assistant DDP [redacted], regarding the circumstances of [redacted] *by which* this photograph *was obtained* by the Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin [redacted] requested that the Commission be *told* of the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph if that information *was* available.

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone, Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret Service that the CIA had disseminated *since November 22, 1963* several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret Service *since November 22, 1963*. Rankin requested copies of these reports and other materials. *These materials included* three *CIA* cables *which* *originally identified* concerned [redacted] the photograph of the individual [redacted] *by the Mexico City Station as* [redacted] Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother.

by the CIA [redacted] *by the CIA* [redacted] among the materials disseminated to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination (DIR85177), a *copy of which was transmitted to the Secret Service.* That cable concerned the Dori *+icos*-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA [redacted] *(* [redacted] *)* in Mexico City at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

as redacted

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition, p. 150)

By February 12, 1964.

~~the~~ ~~which~~ the Warren Commission ~~had~~ ~~unknowingly~~ ~~requested~~ ~~access~~ ~~to~~ ~~a~~ ~~source~~ ~~of~~ ~~concern~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~CIA~~.
production' (as discussed in the preceding section), the ~~disclosure~~ ^{Similar disclosure} of the photosurveillance operations, ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~Warren~~ ~~Commission~~ ~~had~~ ~~begun~~ ~~to~~ ~~cause~~ ~~concern~~ ~~within~~ the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..."
(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)

CIA HAS NO PRESENT OR
FUTURE INTEREST IN
RELEASING THIS DOCUMENT

On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA conferred regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (See Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 and Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrase are complete." (Rankin letter of March 16, 1964, #2)

Rankin further indicated that the same procedure ^{was} to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22, 1963 which had not yet been furnished because it ^{concerned} sensitive sources and methods. (Rankin letter of March 16, #3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (DDP4-1554, CD631 and DDP4-1555, CD 674) by two separate communications. CD631 provided the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (SS on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had

requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated that it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald. *THIS* *was done* by checking the photograph against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963.

CD 674 reveals that on November 22, 1963, immediately following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The Agency further stated that the subject of the photo referenced in these cables was not Oswald. It ~~is~~ *was* further stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the regional copies of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA, p. 116444 of notes)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24, 1964 (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested."

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry."

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Sterns' memorandum ^{of his visit} reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. The file also contained:

~~11~~ Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photograph of the unidentified individual mistakenly believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to the Secret Service by the CIA."

Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren Commission on March 24, 1964.

~~11~~ Stern also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to the CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background information on Oswald.

Stern noted that these messages were also paraphrased accurately as ~~mentioned~~ ^{set forth} in the CIA's January 31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip.

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald ~~related~~ documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated "there is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full text or paraphrased."

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.

VII. Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission Relationship

It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence and one of the seven members of the Warren Commission, concealed crucial information from the Warren Commission. Specifically, the Senate Select Committee concluded:

"With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place during his tenure at the Agency." (SSC, Book V, pp. 67-68)

However, the SSC did not explore further the relationship and allegiance of Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles as a former DCI of the CIA. The Committee has consequently reviewed files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles'

service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review, a memorandum was uncovered which indicates Dulles ~~was~~ provided ^{ed} information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission activities and investigative policies. ~~_____~~ ^{This memorandum tends to show} ~~_____~~ ^{at least one} that Dulles acted as an informant on occasion for the CIA. ^{is memorandum} ~~_____~~ concerned in ~~_____~~ the controversial case of the Russian defector Nosenko. The memorandum was written by David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division who was ^{particularly concerned with} ~~_____~~ ^{Nosenko's} ~~_____~~ the defector's interrogation.

David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964 concerned his discussions with Allan Dulles ~~_____~~ ^{about} Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. This memorandum was prepared for DDP Helms.

Murphy wrote:

"Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission Report."

Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would be to use language "which would allude to the existence of other, unverified information on the Oswald case." This language, Murphy contended, would permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko information.

Murphy continued:

"It was agreed an effort would be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the Nosenko information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know precisely in what context the Warren Commission intended to make use of the Nosenko information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the information he needs from Mr. Rankin."

Whether by design or as an unintended result, the quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the Warren Commission, was prepared to compromise his position with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information ~~concerning~~ ^{about} the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko case. It also appears that the AGENCY had communicated to Dulles the information it desired regarding the Commission position on Nosenko, and that Dulles was prepared to act in this regard as a high level and very well placed informant for the CIA.

Murphy prepared a second memorandum dated 28 July 1964. The subject of this memorandum concerned use of Nosenko's information in the Warren Commission's report. Participants in the discussion upon which the memorandum was based included Allan Dulles, Lee Rankin, David Slawson of the Commission, and Richard Helms, David Murphy and Tennant Bagley of the CIA.

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RELEASED UNDER THE
As redacted

VIII. Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attachment) This call had been () by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its () operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The caller went on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination, that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented:

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As reflected

We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, for ~~_____~~ ¹⁵

for ~~_____~~ in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item (~~_____~~) of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments do not merit serious attention. Her words may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may also ~~_____~~ be interpreted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assassination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

CIA WAS NOT ADVISED
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In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable sent by ~~WH~~ Ambassador Mann to the State Department. (DIR 85573

WH, FBI and CIA). ~~In that cable Mann, urgently requested that the State Dept initiate actions that would enable the Mexican govt.~~

after
D-446

Information was reported to the CIA during May 1964, ~~from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence operations. Calderon's ties to Cuban~~

~~Calderon~~
~~connected with~~
~~Alfredo~~
~~Mirabal~~
~~Eusebio~~
~~Azcue~~
~~at the~~
~~Cuban~~
~~consulate~~

Intelligence were reported to the Warren Commission ~~on June 18, 1964~~ (Calk Dooley memo)

(Did the State Department supply the cable to the Warren Commission? Have we reviewed their Mann file?) However, the Committee has determined that the CIA did not provide

from its file review

Calderon's conversation to the Warren Commission. ~~As a result~~

~~even though~~ ^{although} the Warren Commission was ^{made} aware that Calderon had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Commission by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this regard may have foreclosed ~~the~~ Commission from actively pursuing a lead of great significance.

→ *

In that cable Mann stated:

...Washington should urgently consider feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban

Consulate here."

This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann ^{for} ~~see~~ Rusk re: ...persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy.

Mann went on to state in urgent terms:

"They may quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican government could use them as witnesses."

According to CIA files, Calderon returned to Havana on December 16, 1963, less than four weeks after the assassination.

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions (Cites). During her reinterrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her association with Calderon. ^{basis} No ~~explanation~~ is given in ~~this report~~ ^{the summary of this interrogation} for the questions concerning Calderon (Cites). The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964 (DDP4-0940), more than two months after Calderon had returned to Cuba.

as redacted

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch, 21612) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City ~~Station~~ and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's Commercial Office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of the Station in Mexico City (Dispatch 11935). *insect*

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first ~~reported~~ *recorded by* the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time (~~Joseph Langosch~~ *Joseph Langosch*), Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, ~~reported~~ *reported* the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that AMMUG had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

** This dispatch reported that (cover)*

as reflected

telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~has~~ asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told ^(Langosch) as ~~recorded in the May 5 memorandum~~ that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." ^(cite Mays memo)

^(Langosch) thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure ^{during January 1963} ~~for Cuba~~ ^{shortly after the assassination (cite Mays memo)}

On May 7, 1964, ^(Langosch) recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

as indicated
On May 8 ^(Langosch) further disclosed AMMUG's know-
ledge of the Oswald case. ^(Langosch) paraphrased AMMUG's
knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information () had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/] situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

As redacted, takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing." (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of *(Langosch's)* May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez *were* ~~are~~ set forth. However, that attachment *made* ~~makes~~ no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, *access to* ~~write~~ the questions used in *(Langosch)* interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's Counterintelligence Research and Analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Willens saw *(Langosch's)* May 5 memorandum. The only mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." However, Willens was not shown the *(Langosch)* memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

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association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American intel-
ligence. (cite Dooley memo) *

* f.n.
It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,
7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not referenced
in the Calderon 201 file. Their existence was determined
by the Committee's independent review of other agency
files.

The Warren Commission as of 19 June 64, had
little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead.
It had effectively been denied significant background
information. This denial may have impeded or prevented the Commission's
pursuit of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald and
the assassination of President Kennedy. But

~~even if the Warren Com-
mission had been apprised of Calderon's background and
possible contact with Oswald it still denied the one
significant piece of information that might have raised
its interest in Calderon its investigative efforts to a more serious level. The
Warren Commission never was told about Calderon's conver-
sation of November 22, 1964. This conversation is not referenced
in the Calderon 201 file. Its existence was determined by the Com-
mittee's independent review of other Agency files.
(Give details of how we know not reported cite~~

testimony of Rankin, Slawson; give section ? possible
motive for not telling of detailed information on Luisa
(mentions CIA association; site the dispatch close out with
Rankin quotes.)

Committee staff

Scelso testified that Helms
did not ~~pressure~~ ^{pressure} him ~~to~~ ^{about any} ~~conduct~~ ^{to conduct} his
~~particular~~ ^{particular} ~~investigative~~ ^{investigative} ~~tasks~~ ^{tasks}
~~within a set period of time.~~ ^{within a set period of time.}

~~Scelso~~
~~was~~
~~not~~
~~pressured~~
~~to~~
~~conduct~~
~~his~~
~~particular~~
~~investigative~~
~~tasks~~
~~within~~
~~a~~
~~set~~
~~period~~
~~of~~
~~time.~~

sey 7
During the latter half of December,
Scelso issued a summary report
which describes Oswald's activities
in Mexico City ~~from Sept 26, 1963 -~~ ^{from Sept 26, 1963 -} Oct 3, 1963.

[CIA Doc. Report by John Scelso to C/CI, 24 Dec 63]

Scelso described ^{in detail} to the Committee
the manner in which he conducted
the Agency's investigation:

... practically my whole Branch
participated in the thing. We

dropped almost everything else
and I put a lot of my officers
to work on tracing names,
analyzing files.

We were flooded with cable
traffic, with reports, sug-
gestion, allegation from all
over the world, and these
things had to be checked
out. We were checking out
just dozen and dozens of people
all the time. [HSCA Class. Repts.
of John Seelso, 5/16/70, p 131.]

Seelso testified further that CIA
field stations ^{worldwide} were alerted to the
Agency's investigation "and the key
stations were receiving tips on the
case, most of which were phony. We
did not send out instructions saying
everybody participate in the investigation.

[Ibid p 133]. It was his recollection,
however, that during his tenure as
coordinator of the Agency's investigation,

The Mexico City Station was the only CIA field station directly involved in investigatory activities related to President Kennedy's assassination.

[HSCA 133]

~~During~~ During the course of the Agency's investigation ~~work~~ work with the FBI was handled for the CIA by ^{at the time of the} _{afans FBI agent} was Chief of ^{the} Special Investigations Group of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. [HSCA Class. Report 6/20/78, P 7, 52] Mr. characterized his function

as follows:

I knew that we (at CIA) did not have the basic responsibility for investigating the assassination of the President. If there

was a crime committed in the course of this activity, that [sic] it belonged to the FBI.

I recognized that it was our responsibility to give the fullest cooperation to the FBI and to protect the Agency with regard to any aspects of our operations, you understand, and at the same time giving them cooperation, and I was in close contact with Mr. Sam Papich ^(of the FBI) and always fully cooperated, and he always fully cooperated with me. [sic] PS2

[redacted] noted that his office ~~is~~ at the direction of the Chief of Counterintelligence, James (angelin) (C1/S16) became the central point at which information to be ~~made~~ available to the FBI was collected.

[sic] 7/52-53

Put in
Performance
Insurance
6/1/53

~~During late December 1963~~ → Helms shifted responsibility for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's

assassination to the Counterintelligence Staff. [sic] HSCA classified deposition of ~~James~~ John Scales, 5/16/78, 7136 ~~to~~ CF HSCA Classified

as related

deposition of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p15
wherein Rocca states that responsibility
shifted from Scelso to CI staff on January
12, 1964). Helms testified that the
shift in responsibility was a logical
development because the investigation
had begun to ~~take~~^{take} on broader tone.

[Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,
p14, see also HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso,
5/16/78, p138]

Raymond Rocca expanded on Helms
reasoning when he testified before the
Committee that the shift in responsibility
was partially ~~caused by~~^{caused by} the establishment
of the Warren Commission. [HSCA Class.

Depo. of Raymond Rocca, pp12-13], Rocca
added to his reasoning:

OSWALD it was entirely appropriate in the
I place that he (Scelso) would
have that responsibility for the Agency
investigation. But the minute
you had a Commission set up
outside the line obviously had to
(over)

be the Director, and from the Director
to his Chief of Operations overseas,
because the spread involved them all
of the divisions. There you had Mr.
being asked to sign off
on calls that had to do with the
Netherlands, with U.K., with
Australia, and it would have seemed
to me utterly administratively
simply a hybrid monster.
712

HSCA Staff. Fed. Dep. of
Rocca 7/17/78

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In his testimony before this Committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during 1963 described the CIA's role in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination as follows:

This crime was committed on United States soil. Therefore, as far as the Federal government was concerned, the primary investigating agency would have been the Federal Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of the CIA would have been entirely supportive and it would have been supportive in the sense of what material we are able to acquire outside the limits of the United States with reference to the investigation.

... For investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role inside the United States at all. So when I used here the word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the term. We are (sic) trying to support the FBI and support the Warren
(over)

Commission and be responsive to their
requests, but we were not initiating
any investigations of our own or, to my
recollection, were we ever asked to. 2 Exec
Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,
pp 17-18]

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On November 23 Helms outlined
the Agency's ~~investigative~~ ^{investigative} responsi-
bility [SSC, Book I, p 25]. At that
time, Helms placed John Scelso,
Branch Chief for CIA operations in Mexico,
Central America, and Panama, in charge
of the Agency's initial investigative
efforts. [HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp 111-
112, Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,
p 10]. Scelso asserted that he was charged
with the investigation ~~and~~ ^{on the basis of two factors.}
~~First, he had prior~~ ^{First, he had prior}
~~experience in conducting~~ ^{experience in conducting} ~~security~~ ^{CIA}
investigations and secondly, Oswald
had ~~been~~ ^{recently observed}
in Mexico by CIA surveillance, ~~and~~
already ^{Scelso's} operational concern. [SSC Book I, p 25,
HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp 111-112] *
Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp 9-10)

* Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research
& Analysis for the CIA's Counterintelligence
Staff ^{characterize} ~~Scelso's~~ ^{responsibility}
~~Rocca's~~ ^{not as a} ~~primary~~ ^{mandate}
~~to investigate~~ ^{rather} ~~but~~ ^{to} "coordinate
traffic (code facilitation, telegram &
telegraphic consideration) for working
with the DDP with respect to what
was being done over the whole world ..."
[HSCA Class. Depo of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p 9]

Rocca referred to this phase of ~~the~~ CIA
activity as the ~~phase~~ ^{phase}. [Ibid?]

called a meeting of officials
seven-level at which he

On November 23 Helms outlined
the Agency's ~~investigative~~ responsi-
bility [SSC, Book I, p25]. At that
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efforts. [HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp 111-
112, Exec Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p 107. Scelso asserted that he was charged
with the investigation ~~of the assassination of~~
~~Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.~~ ~~on the basis of two factors.~~
First, he had prior
experience in conducting ~~investigative~~ CIA security
investigations and secondly, Oswald
had ~~been~~ ~~recently~~ ~~observed~~
in Mexico by CIA surveillance, ~~which~~
~~was~~ ~~already~~ ~~Scelso's~~ operational concern. [SSC Book I, p25,
HSCA Class. Depo of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp 111-112]* -
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Staff ~~in charge of~~ Scelso's responsibility
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was being done over the whole world ..."

James Angleton supported the character-
ization offered ^{above} by Rocca. Angleton
testified to this Committee that
the Agency's effort to gather and
coordinate information related to the
assassination ~~involved~~ evolved from the
Directa, Deputy Directa, division chief,
and case officers ~~approaching~~ ~~the~~ Warren
Commission requirement in a piecemeal
fashion to ~~the~~ ~~Agency~~ focusing ^{combined} Agency
resources in order to avoid duplication
of efforts and provide a system for the
central referencing of information devel-
oped. [HSCA Class Depo. - ~~James Angleton~~ ^{James Angleton} 10/5/78
pp 76-77, see also HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond
Rocca, 8/17/78 p 23] * see also star

As noted earlier, ^{in late December 1964} the CI Staff
assumed responsibility for coordination
of CIA efforts vis a vis the assassination.
At that time, Raymond Rocca, Chief of
Research and Analysis for CI Staff,
was designated point of contact with
the Warren Commission. [HSCA Class. Depo.
of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78, p 11, HSCA Class Depo.
of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p 77]. The R+A
component was concerned with ~~analytical~~
~~intelligence~~ "analytical intelligence,
analytical brainpower, which
meant all source, all over source
comprehension; a study of cases
that had ceased to occupy operational
significance, that is, closed ~~the~~ cases;
to maintain the ongoing record
of overall quality and quantity
of counterintelligence being performed
by the entire DDP operational component;
~~the~~ ... The Deputy Directa
for Plans. [Rocca dep p 7] see also
Angleton Dep p 77

Mr. Rocca's ~~report~~ testified that a ^{designated} point of contact with the Commission, information generated by CIA components was brought to his staff in the normal flow of day to day work (Rocca pp 16-17). This information was then reviewed by Rocca or his assistants who included ~~Mr.~~ Thomas Hall, (Soviet Expert, Paul Hartman (general research and search man for the Intelligence Community and its resources), and Arthur Dooley (~~former FBI~~ agent who had transferred to CIA from the FBI a number of years prior to the assassination (Rocca p 17). ~~Mr. Rocca's~~ assistants ~~used~~ (CIA) Hall, Hartman and Dooley were the persons ~~who~~ ~~were~~ concerned during the course of the Warren Commission investigation with the various CIA divisions that produced substantive information relative to the assassination (Ibid)

However, Mr. Rocca testified that even though CI/R+A was the Agency's point of reference with regard to the Warren Commission, ^{with} his staff nor the CI staff in general ~~did~~ ~~not~~ displayed the direct relation of Mr. Helms with the Warren Commission. (Rocca p 16) nor did

Purposes

- I To evaluate CIA's scope & quality of support to the WC
- A. Review of written record prepared by CIA for passage to WC (vis a vis assass)
 - B. Review of written record prepared by CIA for passage to Intel Community (vis a vis assass)
 - C. Comparison of CIA materials in Items A & B to determine if relevant info not passed or inexpeditiously passed to WC
 - 1. Determination of ~~reason~~ motive or other circumstances resulting in non-passage of material
- II To investigate and evaluate developing information derived from (I) evaluation study
- A. Determine relevancy to HSCA investigation
 - 1. ~~Record~~ Record results of HSCA follow-up
 - B. Determine relevancy to WC investigation
 - 1. Evaluate substance of info & effect of non passage

Rocca advised that
in some instances of disloyalty,
the WC would be directed to
Helm with respect
and in other instances David Slawson
engaged directly with Tom, Helms
of Rocca's staff (Rocca 736)

As stated
displace the relations of the Soviet ^{CIA's}
Division in the person of David
Murphy, Chief of the SR Division &
his assistant, Tennant Bagley with
the Commission; nor with John Sechen

Rather Rocca characterized the
organization of this second phase
of investigation as a decentralized
approach. (Rocca p10, Angleton p75, 82)

See also CIA Doc Rocca Memo, ^{for Record} 1 Apr. 1975,
Subj: Conversation

In which Helms remained ^{person in charge} of the overall investigation,
with CI staff acting as a ^{global coordinator} and repository of
information collected

Although James Angleton functioned
as Rocca's direct superior during the
course of the Warren Commission
investigation, he did not participate
on a regular basis in the Agency's efforts
~~to supply~~ to supply substantial

information to the Warren Commission
nor did he deal on a direct basis

with Warren Commission represen-
tatives, (excepting Allandulla on an unofficial basis)
(Rocca p 17-18) (Angleton p 78)

However, Angleton ^{attempt} ~~did~~ keep apprised of
developments ^{through consultation with Rocca} as the investigation progressed.
(Angleton p 81)
~~7/28/68~~

~~On matters of particular sensitivity~~

~~ROCCA~~ The record reveals that

on certain issues of particular sensitivity

ROCCA ~~was~~ ^{was} not permitted to ^{act as the} coordinate

Agency in point of contact w/ the WC
the ~~investigative~~ effort. He testified

that "ROCCA's ~~to~~ compartmentalization

was observed, notwithstanding the fact

that it was the working level point of

contact. (Rocca p 18) Rocca cited

()

by way of example the ^{case of the Soviet defects} Rosenbergs.

Rocca was not cleared for the Rosenbergs

case. He did not attend any of the

~~was~~ discussions that pertained

to the case (Rocca p 18) Rather,

in this instance David Murphy,

Chief of SR Division, ^{were} ~~was~~ responsible,

along with Richard Helms

for the Warren Commission's knowledge

in the matter.

Rocca also cited the C1 staff

mail intercept program, HTHLINGUAL

as ^{several} ~~an~~ example of matters about which

he had no knowledge ^{was not the} or input. (Rocca pp 19-20)

Ralph Angelton + ~~had~~

~~cases~~ ~~was~~ handled the particular

material (like Angelton + ~~deals~~)

Following the lead

It should be noted that during the second phase of CIA information collection ^{efforts} concerning the assassination of President Kennedy the concentration of agency resources shifted in emphasis from explanation of Oswald's activities ~~in~~ in Mexico City to his ^{residence in the Soviet Union during 1959-1962} possible association with Soviet intelligence apparatus. ^(Scells, p 136-137, HWS, p 25) Rocca commented that his primary interest in support of the Warren Commission was to follow-up on Soviet lead: on the assumption that a person who spends four years* in the Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific interest to Soviet State security and other collateral authorities. (Rocca, pp 32-33)

Therefore, Rocca concluded that the areas the CIA tends to concentrate on ~~are~~ concern the Soviets:

Because the people he was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB people. They were under considerable cover and obviously could have been doing, and were undoubtedly doing a considerable job in those earlier contacts. (Ibid, p 33)

Angleton was in agreement with Poccas' analysis that during the second phase of the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission, the CIA concentrated its resources on ^{upholding} ~~the~~ possible Soviet influence on Oswald. (p 86 ^{Angleton}). He stated for the record with regard to the ~~Warren~~ ^{Warren} Commission's investigation (with CIA's support) of ~~the~~ possible Cuban involvement in the assassination:

I personally believe that the United States intelligence services did not have the capabilities to ever come to an adjudication (of the Cuban aspect). I don't think the capabilities were there (Angleton, p 93)

[Handwritten signature]

~~1~~
I. Immediate persons and components reporting + to whom

A. Requirements

1. at MxKy

2. at HQ's

B. Results

II. Advent of WC + CIA org visavis

A - Helms designation

B - Role of Seals + background to his investigation - Role of WTT/3

C. Changeover to CI - Role of CI

1. persons incl

2. Rocca - Hartman

D. Nosenko

1. Sr Division,

E. Cuban Ops

1. Lack of Reporting to WC