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Mickey Goldsmith opened the interview by explaining the release letter and the mandate of the House Select Committee on Assassinations to Dillinger and Westtner.

Mr. Westtner said that he had been the head of the Soviet Section of the Mexico City Station in 1963. His main duty was to get information on Soviet personnel and their activities for recognition purposes and espionage/counter-espionage activities. In line with these goals Mr. Westtner was responsible for processing the product of telephone, photographic and physical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and Soviet personnel. Mr. Westtner was also responsible for obtaining information through direct contacts with Soviet personnel and through agents who were in contact with Soviet personnel.

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1 Mrs Dillenger's main duty was reading the transcripts of the telephone tap operation. She received these transcripts once a day and would review them. Anything of importance or interest would be brought to Mr. Bestetner's attention. Both Mr. Bestetner and Mrs Dillenger remembered that they received all the transcripts from all the taps on the Soviet Embassy. This included the Spanish and the English Transcripts although the English " were usually received later than the Spanish ones. Mrs. Dillenger indicated that she had a "working knowledge" of Spanish. 1

Mr. Bestetner was responsible for reporting the information he developed. He indicated that a report would either be written by himself, Mrs Dillenger or a reports officer.

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In 1963 Mrs Dillenger was working on a part-time, contract basis. She indicated that the transcripts were read daily as a matter of routine. The photo production was not reviewed unless [redacted]

Employee [redacted] referred it to them.

+ DILLINGER
Bestman received ~~copy~~ carbon copies of the transcripts on yellow paper. Extracts from the transcripts were put into appropriate subject or "P" files. Both were sure that a chronological file ~~was~~ of transcripts was kept. They were less sure but thought that such a file was also kept on the production of the photo operation. Mrs. Dillenger remembered that they did keep a subject file on Soviet contacts. Subject files were designated by a four part number, (ex: 00-00-0-0)

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Both Dillenger & Bestetner indicated that nothing was destroyed while Jim Scott was Chief of Station. They indicated that materials were probably destroyed after he left in 1969.

They reviewed the transcripts from either [redacted]

or [redacted] some of the transcripts were in Spanish and some were in English. Mr. Bestetner indicated that he had a close working relationship with [redacted] and relied on him for personality assessments on Soviet personnel. He said that he had nothing to do with getting the tapes and/or transcripts to or from [redacted]

except in those rare instances when there was no one else to do it.

Dillenger and Bestetner remembered that information from the tapes would usually

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have been reported within a day or two of receipt of the transcripts.

They remembered that the tap surveillance was constant. They also remembered that the photo surveillance was constant except for instances where it would be slowed for security reasons or equipment malfunction. They said that the photo operation attempted to get a picture of every foreigner in contact with the Embassy. They said that the photographers had an "uncanny ability" to pick out foreigners.

The transcripts that they remembered receiving were literal transcriptions. They had never heard of summaries of the conversations being prepared.

Mr. [REDACTED] gave his personality assessments orally.

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or in writing separate from the transcripts. Mr. Westtner does not remember marginal notations but did indicate that [redacted]

AGENT

[redacted] had made the note about Oswald speaking broken Russian

Dillenger and Westtner indicated that they did, on occasion, work closely with [redacted] on things of interest. There was not close contact between the Cuban and Soviet Operations. Encl. 1/2/68

Dillenger and Westtner indicated that they routinely saw all the transcripts from the Soviet operations. They indicated that [redacted] did not, as a rule, make notations on the transcripts. As a rule he made his notations in a separate note or report. Mr. Westtner did indicate that [redacted] did make the notation

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about Oswald's Russian.
He said that he had never
~~ordered~~ ordered [redacted] not to
make marginal comments.

Mr. Bestetner said that

Ascar [redacted] was an exact
transcript, he never determi-
nations on his own as to
whether something was
relevant to counter-intelli-
gence, counter-espionage, etc.

They indicated that every
conversation was transcribed.
They could not recall the
notation " (previously
transcribed) "

²⁴ They said that the
unilateral taps were not
directed at the Soviet
Embassy but at the private
residences of Soviet officials.

Mr. Bestetner said that
there were no penetration
agents in either the Soviet
Consulate or Military
Attaché's office.

Dillenger and Bestetner
said that they had no

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contact with anyone involved in the outside operation other than

AGENT [redacted] These contacts were restricted to special meetings, discussion of personality evaluations, and on rare occasions transmittal of the tapes or transcripts. Mr. [redacted] indicated that he involved

AGENT [redacted] more than any other translator and that he was more than adequately competent, reliable and honest.

They both said that they knew Dave Phillips and that he was Chief of Covert Action at the time. They remembered that he had been replaced [redacted]

Employee [redacted] as Chief of Cuban Operations but were unsure of the time. They described Phillips as an aggressive, active, successful person. They said that he

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would have had access to everything about Oswald if he had been interested because he was close to Kim Scott.

They said that [redacted]

EM 1/4/68

[redacted] was professionally qualified for photography. He did not run the photo operation. His job was processing and printing the photos in the Embassy.

Dillenger and Bestetier said that Jack Whitten was the head of the Mexico desk and that [redacted] to the best of their recollection also worked on the Mexico desk. They said that the info they usually reported would go to CIS or SR. All info reported would have gone to the Mexico desk. The information/cable would not have gone higher unless there was some controversy or higher interest involved. A report of a foreigner visiting a foreign embassy would not,

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in Mr Gestetner's opinion, flag higher interest or create the controversy necessary to attract higher attention. Mr Gestetner indicated that such a report was almost mundanely routine, especially in late summer.

They said that [redacted]

Employee [redacted]

was responsible for repairing and maintaining the audio equipment.

They remembered [redacted]

Employee [redacted]

as an analyst in the Cuban section.

[redacted] was an outside agent involved in the recruitment and running of agents. He worked for Gestetner.

TED WALSH [redacted]

was part, as was [redacted] of the "clicks" that enjoyed Scott's absolute confidence and was involved in running the sensitive surveillance operations.

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Employee

[redacted] was also in this group. Bestetner thinks he may have ran the photo surveillance of the Soviet compound.

Employee

[redacted] ran the physical surveillance team.

Employee

[redacted] was a technician involved in most of the operations, if not all of them.

Mr. Bestetner said that the only time he saw the actual reels of tape was when he was interested in hearing one of the conversations. He said that the tapes were not kept very long before re-use.

Agent

Mr. Bestetner said that [redacted] would routinely identify participants in a conversation if he could and would indicate the ID in the transcript. He does not recall ever instructing [redacted] not to make marginal comments.

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In preparing reports, Dillenger & Hestetner said, other sources of info would be routinely checked due to their training as intelligence officers.

Hestetner and Dillenger were asked if they had any independent recollection of how Oswald first came to their attention. Dillenger indicated that her memory was that the first information that she had received about Oswald was that he was seeking a visa. Mr. Hestetner indicated that he had reviewed the file prior to our interview and his recollection was that the first notice that they had was from a transcript of Oswald's conversation with a guard on October 15th about a visa. They were then shown the October 1st transcript.

Contradicts
later

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Oct 1 Dillenger did not recall this transcript as the first one she saw. After seeing the cable she sent to HQ on 10/8 she said that this transcript must have been the one because of the similarity of the info. When asked whether there was a reference to a visa in the conversation, she acknowledged that there was not such a reference. When asked to explain her memory she said that the reference to a telegram to Washington and the fact that he was talking to the consulate had made it obvious to her that he was seeking a visa.

Oct 1 Dillenger was asked what action she took after receiving this transcript. She said that she would have had already seen the prior transcripts and may have rechecked them. Because of the absence of

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but no name on previous ones

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info from prior transcripts in the cable.

Hestetner suggested that some of the prior transcripts may have been unavailable because they were being routed around the station. An examination of some of the prior transcripts revealed routing indications that Dillenger acknowledged writing.

Dillenger had no recollection of checking the photos. After checking the Station's files for further info on Oswald, she said, she wrote the cable (Mexi 8453) and, at the same time, wrote a memo to the Legat. Dillenger acknowledged that the routing notations would have been written on the transcripts when she first received them.

Hestetner acknowledged that a filing instruction directing one of the 9/27 conversations to the Oswald

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"P" file was in his hand-writing. He indicated that this notation would have been made at the time that the "P" file was opened. Both Westerman and Dillenger acknowledged that the connection between the conversations was noted prior to the assassination.

When Dillenger was asked about the paragraph in Mexi 645-3 about the photo she said that she must have checked the photos. She was shown a photo of the MMM and said she thought that that was the man she was trying to describe. She could not explain why a photo was chosen from October first but was sure, since Oswald had indicated previous visits in the intercepted conversation, that the photo production from earlier days would

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also have been reviewed.
She also said that [redacted]

Employee

[redacted] may have
added this paragraph

They were then shown
the HQ response to Mexi 645-3
(DIR 74830). They speculated
that Scott had written
"sic" after "Henry" to indicate
that his name should be
noted as "Lee Henry Oswald"
as well as "Lee Oswald". They
said that they could tell
by the nature of the
notations that they were
made when the cable was
received and not after
the assassination. They
acknowledged that Scott
had ordered the opening
of a "P" file on the
slip and that such a
file would have been
opened at the time of
that instruction. Dillenger
acknowledged writing the
notation that the dissemi-
nation requested had been done.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for dissemination
being done
instructions that
+ file was
spec at
JFK before
this
time
verification
+ [unclear]

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Dillenger said that the memo from Scott to the Ambassador dated 10/16/63 was the dissemination she had written. When asked how she had "determined" that ~~she~~ Oswald had spoken to Kostikov she said that she could not remember but she was sure she must have rechecked it and had proof, as otherwise she would not have used such certain language. When asked why they the memo said that there was no clarifying info on Oswald's "request" Webster said that it was clear that they had only seen the one October transcript. When reminded that they had routinely seen all transcripts and had made filing and routing instructions on some of them prior to the date of this memo

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they were unable to explain this assertion in the memo. Dillenger did say that "They had no need to know all those other details."

Both Dillenger and Gestetner said that it was very unlikely that this had been discussed with Dave Phillips.

Gestetner acknowledged sending Mexi 6534 requesting a photo of Oswald. He does not recall receiving a response to this cable. When asked whether he had ever heard that, or any rumors to the effect that, HQ had a photo of Oswald, Gestetner first answered in the positive. He then retracted his answer and denied ever knowing, or hearing a rumor, that HQ had had a photo. Gestetner said that if HQ had a photo of Oswald, taken by a tourist in Russia

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and obtained by DCD that he would expect it to be in the 201 file. No

Gestetner acknowledged visiting MEXI 7014. He explained giving the date of the photo as October 28 by saying that there can be errors. He noted that the inference was that the date was September 28.

Neither Gestetner nor Dillenger could recall specific details about the post-assassination review of the surveillance materials. They said that the review of the photos would have been done by [redacted] Employee [redacted]

They were asked about the reference in MEXI 7023 about the type of the first conversation being reported erased before the second one was received. They said that they would not find this unusual.

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Gestetner said that he did not know whether the conversation of 9/28 was reported before or after the Station learned that this conversation had been connected to Oswald by the Mexicans.

Gestetner could not explain why Mexi 7033 ~~which~~ which he acknowledged writing said that all info available had been reported when the 9/27 conversations, the ~~visit~~ had not been reported. He can not explain why Mexi 7034, written by Allen White, says that the only known visit by LHO to an embassy was to the Cuban one on 9/28/63.

Gestetner acknowledge that it would have been very unusual for LHO to have visited the Embassies at least 5 times and not have been picked up by the photo

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operation

Gestetner continually reemphasized that H.Q.'s visit & the report was a routine matter. He said that it was never considered as anything other than routine prior to the assassination. Hence, it was not surprising to him that HQ did not respond to his request for a photo.

Gestetner said that the nature of Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassy alone is enough to rule out the possibility of a foreign conspiracy involving either the USSR or Cuba.

When shown the "previously transcribed" notations on the 10/1 transcript Gestetner said that it meant they were in Spanish.

Mr. Gestetner said that it would be

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Very unusual that Karamessines released the 10/10 DIR.

As to the possibility of conspiracy, he said that we could rule out a foreign one. He assured us that he was aware of no "hanky - panky" in Mexico. He said that he had never seen any indication of Agency involvement but he had never heard of Karamessines involvement @ the 10/10 cable before.

It is asked them not to discuss any of what we had covered with them with anyone other than HSCA staff members.

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