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Mickey Goldsmith opened the interview by explaining the release letter and the mandate of the House Select Committee on Assassinations to [Dillinger, James [Westerner.]

Mr [Westerner] said that he had been the head of the Soviet Section of the Mexico City Station in 1963. His main duty was to get information on Soviet personnel and their activities for recognition purposes and espionage/counter-espionage activities. In line with these goals Mr [Westerner] was responsible for processing the product of [telephone,] [photographic and physical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and Soviet personnel. Mr [Westerner] was also responsible for obtaining information through direct contacts with Soviet personnel and thorough agents who were in contact with Soviet personnel.

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1 Mrs [Dillenger's] main duty was reading the transcripts of the telephone tap operation. She received these transcripts once a day and would review them. Anything of importance or interest would be brought to [Mr. Westetner's] attention. Both [Mr. Westetner] and Mrs [Dillenger] remembered that they received all the transcripts [from all the] taps on the Soviet Embassy. [This included the Spanish and the English transcripts although the English] were usually received later than the Spanish ones. Mrs [Dillenger] indicated that she had a "working knowledge" of Spanish. [

[Mr. Westetner] was responsible for reporting the information he developed. He indicated that a report would either be written by himself, Mrs Dillenger or a reports officer.

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In 1963 Mrs. [Dillenger] was working on a part-time, contract basis. She indicated that the transcripts were read daily as a matter of routine. The photo production was not reviewed unless Anne Goodpasture referred it to them.

[Gentner ^{+ DILLINGER}] received ~~copy~~ carbon copies of the transcripts on yellow paper. Extracts from the transcripts were put into appropriate subject or "P" files. Both were sure that a chronological file ~~was~~ of transcripts was kept. They were less sure but thought that such a file was also kept on the production of the photo operation. Mrs. [Dillenger] remembered that they did keep a subject file on Soviet contacts. Subject files were designated by a four part number, (ex: 00-00-0-0)

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Both [Dillinger & Bestetner] indicated that nothing was destroyed while Jim Scott was Chief of Station. They indicated that materials were probably destroyed after he left in 1969.

They reviewed the transcripts from either Anne Goodpasture or [Frank Estancona] some of the transcripts were in Spanish and some were in English. Mr. Bestetner indicated that he had a close working relationship with [Boris Tarasoff] and relied on him for personality assessments on Soviet personnel. He said that he had nothing to do with getting the [tapes and/or] transcripts to or from [Tarasoff] except in those rare instances when there was no one else to do it.

[Dillinger] and [Bestetner] remembered that information from the tapes would usually

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have been reported within a day or two of receipt of the transcripts.

They remembered that the tap surveillance was constant. They also remembered that the photo surveillance was constant except for instances where it would be down for security reasons or equipment malfunction. They said that the photo operation attempted to get a picture of every foreigner in contact with the Embassy. They said that the photographers had an "uncanny ability" to pick out foreigners.

The transcripts that they remembered receiving were literal transcriptions. They had never heard of summaries of the conversations being prepared.

Mr. Tarasoff gave his personality assessments orally

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or in writing separate from the transcripts. [Mr]
[Westtner] does not remember marginal notations but did indicate that [Mr. Parasoff] had made the note about Oswald speaking broken Russian.

[Dillenger and Westtner] indicated that they did, on occasion, work closely with Anne Goodpasture on things of interest. There was not close contact between the Cuban and Soviet Operations.

[Dillenger] and [Westtner] indicated that they routinely saw all the transcripts from the Soviet operations. They indicated that [Parasoff] did not, as a rule, make notations on the transcripts. As a rule he made his notations in a separate note or report. [Mr. Westtner] did indicate that [Parasoff] did make ~~the~~ notation

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
about Oswald's Russian.

He said that he had never ~~ordered~~ ordered [Tarasoff] not to make marginal comments.

[Mr. Bestetner] said that

[Tarasoff] was an exact transcript, he never determined on his own as to whether something was relevant to counter-intelligence, counter-espionage, etc.

They indicated that every conversation was transcribed. They could not recall the notation "(previously transcribed)".

They said that [the ] taps were not directed at the Soviet Embassy but at the private residences of Soviet officials.

Mr. Bestetner said that there were no penetration agents in either the Soviet Consulate or Military Attaché's office.

[Allenger] and [Bestetner] said that the ~~SECRET~~ had no

contact with anyone involved in the outside operation other than

[Boris Tarasoff] These contacts were restricted to social meetings, discussion of personality evaluations, and on rare occasions transmittal of the tapes or transcripts [Mr. Westether indicated that he involved [Tarasoff] more than any other translator and that he ~~was~~ was more than adequately competent, reliable and honest.

They both said that they knew Dave Phillips and that he was Chief of Covert Action at the time. They remembered that he had ~~been~~ replaced [Robert] [Shaw as Chief of Cuban operations but were unsure of the time. They described Phillips as an aggressive, active, successful person. They said that he

would have had access to everything about Oswald if he had been interested because he was close to Jim Scott.

They said that [Robert] Zambreski was professionally qualified for photography. He did not run the photo operation. His job was processing and printing the photos in the Embassy.

[Dillinger and] [Besten] said that [Jack] Whitten was the head of the Mexico desk and that [Charlotte Bustos] to the best of their recollection also worked on the Mexico desk. They said that the info they usually reported would go to CIS or SR. All info reported would have gone to the Mexico desk. The information/cable would not have gone higher unless there was some controversy or higher interest involved. A report of a foreigner visiting a foreign embassy would not,

in [Mr. Bestetner's] opinion, flag higher interest or create the controversy necessary to attract higher attention [Mr. Bestetner] indicated that such a report was almost mundanely routine, especially in late summer.

[They said that [Charles Flick] was responsible for repairing and maintaining the audio equipment.]

[They remembered [Thomas McKay] as an analyst in the Cuban section.]

[Melvin Beck was an outside agent involved in the recruitment and running of agents. He worked for Bestetner.]

[[Thomas Keenan] was part, as was Goodpasture, of the "clicks" that enjoyed Scott's absolute confidence and was involved in running the sensitive surveillance operations.]

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[Luis D Puckett] was also in this group [Bestetner] thinks he may have seen the photo surveillance of the Soviet compound.

[R. H. Feldman] ran the physical surveillance team

[Glen Midden] was a technician involved in most of the operations, if not all of them

[Mr. Bestetner] said that the only time he saw the actual reels of tape was when he was interested in hearing one of the conversations. He said that the tapes were not kept very long before re-use.

[Mr. Bestetner] said that [Farasoff] would routinely identify participants in a conversation if he could and would indicate the ID in the transcript. He does not recall ever instructing [Farasoff] not to make marginal comments.

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[Dillenger + Westetner] said, In preparing reports, other sources of info would be routinely checked due to their training as intelligence officers.

[Westetner and Dillenger were asked if they had any independent recollection of how Oswald first came to their attention.] Dillenger indicated that her ~~her~~ memory was that the first information that she had received about Oswald was that he was seeking a visa. [Mr. Westetner] indicated that he had reviewed the file prior to our interview and his recollection was that the first notice that they had was from a transcript of Oswald's conversation with a guard on October 15th about a visa. They were then shown the October 15th transcript.

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[Dillinger] did not recall this transcript as the first one she saw. After seeing the cable she sent to HQ on 10/8 she said that this transcript must have been the one because of the similarity of the info. When asked whether there was a reference to a visa in the conversation, she acknowledged that there was not such a reference. When asked to explain her memory she said that the reference to a telegram to Washington and the fact that he was talking to the consulate had made it obvious to her that he was seeking a visa.

[Dillinger] was asked what action she took after receiving this transcript. She said that she would have had already seen the prior transcripts and may have rechecked them. Because of the absence of

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info from prior transcripts in the cable
[Bestetner] suggested that some of the prior transcripts may have been unavailable because they were being routed around the station. An examination of some of the prior transcripts revealed routing indications that [Dillenger] acknowledged writing.
[Dillenger] had no recollection of checking the photos. After checking the Station's files for further info on Oswald, she said, she wrote the cable (MEXI 6453) and, at the same time, wrote a memo to the Legat [Dillenger] acknowledging that the routing notations would have been written on the transcripts when she first received them.

[Bestetner] acknowledged that a filing instruction directing one of the 9/27 conversations to the Oswald

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"P" file was in his hand-writing. He indicated that this notation would have been made at the time that the "P" file was opened. Both [Westtner and Dillenger] acknowledged that the connection between the conversations was noted prior to the assassination.

When [Dillenger] was asked about the paragraph in Mexi 645-3 about the photo she said that she must have checked the photos. She was shown a photo of the MMM and said she thought that that was the man she was trying to describe. She could not explain why a photo was chosen from October first but was sure, since Oswald had indicated previous visits [in the] [intercepted conversation,] that the photo production from earlier days would

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also have been reviewed. She also said that Anne Goodpasture may have added this paragraph.

They were then shown the HQ response to Mexi 645-3 (DIR 74830). They speculated that Scott had written "sic" after "Henry" to indicate that his name should be noted as "Lee Henry Oswald" as well as "Lee Oswald". They said that they could tell by the nature of the notations that they were made when the cable was received and not after the assassination. They acknowledged that Scott had ordered the opening of a "P" file on the routing slip and that such a file would have been opened near the time of that instruction [Dillinger] acknowledged writing the notation that the dissemination requested had been done.

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[Dillinger] said that the memo from Scott to the Ambassador dated 10/16/63 was the dissemination she had written. When asked how she had "determined" that ~~she~~ Oswald had spoken to Kostikov she said that she could not remember but she was sure she must have rechecked it and had proof as otherwise she would not have used such certain language. When asked why ~~they~~ the memo said that there was no clarifying info on Oswald's "request" [Webster] said that it was clear that they had only seen the one October transcript. When reminded that they had routinely seen all transcripts and had made filing and routing instructions on some of them prior to the date of this memo

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they were unable to explain this assertion in the memo [Dillenger] did say that "They had no need to know all those other details."

Both [Dillenger] and [Bestetner] said that it was very unlikely that this had been discussed with Dave Phillips.

[Bestetner] acknowledged sending Mexi 6534 requesting a photo of Oswald. He does not recall receiving a response to this cable. When asked whether he had ever heard that, or any rumors to the effect that, HQ had a photo of Oswald [Bestetner] first answered in the positive. He then retracted his answer and denied ever knowing, or hearing a rumor, that HQ had had a photo [Bestetner] said that if HQ had a photo of Oswald taken by a tourist in Russia

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and obtained by OCO that he would expect it to be in the 201 file.

[Gestetner] acknowledged writing MEXI 7014. He explained giving the date of the photo as October 28 by saying that there can be errors. He noted that the inference was that the date was September 28.

Neither [Gestetner] nor [Dillenger] could recall specific details about the post-assassination review of the surveillance materials. They said that the review of the photos would have been done by Anne Goodpasture.

They were asked about the reference in MEXI 7023 about the tape of the first conversation being reported erased before the second one was received. They said that they would not find this unusual.

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[Gestetner] said that he did not know whether the conversation of 9/28 was reported before or after the Station learned that this conversation had been connected to Oswald

[Gestetner] could not explain why Mexi 7033 ~~which~~ which he acknowledged writing said that all info available had been reported when the 9/27 conversations, the ~~visit~~ had not been reported. He can not explain why Mexi 7034, written by [Allen White,] says that the only known visit by LHO to an embassy was to the Cuban one on 9/28/63.

[Gestetner] acknowledge that it would have been very unusual for LHO to have visited the Embassies at least 5 times and not have been picked up by the photo

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operation.

[Gestetner] continually reemphasized that HHO's visit & the report was a routine matter. He said that it was never considered as anything other than routine prior to the assassination. Hence, it was not surprising to him that HQ did not respond to his request for a photo.

[Gestetner] said that the nature of Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassy alone is enough to rule out the possibility of a foreign conspiracy involving either the USSR or Cuba.

When shown the "previously transcribed" notations on the 10/1 transcript [Gestetner] said that it meant they were in Spanish.

[Mr. Gestetner] said that it would be

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Very unusual that Karamessines released the 10/10 DIR.

As to the possibility of conspiracy he said that we could rule out a foreign one. He assured us that he was aware of no "hanky-panky" in Mexico. He said that he had never seen any indication of Agency involvement but he had never heard of Karamessines involvement @ the 10/10 cable before.

We asked them not to discuss any of what we had covered with them with anyone other than HSCA staff members.

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