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FOR RELEASE.

December, 1963. Le Corterts & de resege were not brown.

[DAVIDSON BACKOPOUND]

Lende Intelligence Committee Final Report, reference is made to a registed five have oblaying a Cubona flight from Mours City to Novana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, as Herenter 1763. The Senite Intelligence Committee Regist disaster the delay as being from 6:00 PM EST to 11:0 PM EST. The most integring assert of the regist was that the registed delay was to award arrival at 10:30 PM EST of a great them engined arrival at 10:30 PM. EST of a great them engined arrival at 10:30 PM. EST of a great them engined arrival at 10:30 PM. EST of a great them of the Culous arrival without customs cleaning and treveled to Harana in the Energy who beauted the Culous arrival Regist pulat's cubin. The senite Intelligence Fixed Regist emphrasized to the senite Intelligence Fixed Regist emphrasized to CIA's apparent falure to feeler up by ingining further into the matter. East.

Book I & the Sente intelligence Committee Finish Regard states that the CIA could not explain at the time of the writing of the regard, why there was no record of a following.

The Sential satisfyince agency of 1977. Staff report explains that the Sente Intelligence Committee was alread that the sente Intelligence Committee was alread that the regard of the the Mexican authorities were asked about the regard flight the Mexican authorities were asked about the regard flight delay, although these was me recorded response. Letter from CIA to Sente delay, although these was me recorded response. Letter from CIA to Sente.

The Central Intelligence Agency, conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable regards to Headquarters. There was come undited of CIA purveillance team (JiFIRE) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights, regarding any unusual incidents and grinding copies of Jelight manifest. The Mexican authorities 25 That a

purceillners. team [ 25 ] It the airgoit, which granded of thoughts of present and cogies of presenger lists. additionally [a teleghne tag operation (Lienvor)]

[ against the Culan Embaray privaled Itansingto of convertions with the Culana office and the Mixican digort Control Office (1.6d)

The [ LIENVOY Itanscripto people a series of discussions about the platter of the 22 threater flight -
when it was to arrive and when it digorted.

[ the seconds show that the flight arrived at the arriver of the prival of the arriver city time; presumably it landed a few minutes earlier. At one great great to arrive of the arriver of the arrival of the arriver, one person [ squaking on the ]

[ telephne ] attend that the arriver was due to 1030 hours and "it will go at 1730, pagesting a quick trummend that would have reduced unlooking and forward. Therefore, we arrive of the country of the arrivery to a mercy plant grain of the key right on the departure of the arrivery was a statement.

The following facts stand not, in content to the growtherm in the denote hitelligence Committee Final Regort.

a) The Cabana flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes, It was not delayed fine hours, as regorted in Book I.

b) The Cabana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico.

City time, 55 minutes ahead of the "alleged" arrival at the Arrival at 2130 of a grivale flight with a secret gassinger. 2035 hours also contents further with the alleged degrature.

at 20.40 hand that the aircraft had taken gg fine minutes

earlier, 1. e., 2025 Louis [[14 d., Nov. 71, 1965]]

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time of the Cubana flight, which the senate Intelligence right stated to be 2200. The actual degraline grended substantially the righted annual of the ancraft for which it allegedly was delayed

In view of the survielence Jensenge of the Culour flight, it is very doubtful that the alleged attenty involving the griente twee engued arrange and gassinger would have gone untitled or unighted had 'it occurred. Personnel in Mexico acty at the time were owere 2 these somes and may have know the above facts, feeling is need to follow further

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## The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight

At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in considerable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the SSC Final Report state that:

one source alleged that the Cuban-American was 'involved'

in the assassination"."

The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI "almost immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investigation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission." Further down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investigate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC) certainly should have prompted a far more thourough and timely investigation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau did in thsi respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the results of FBI inquiries.

While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting about

man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will be noted. Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement at page 104, in the chronology section:

"December 5- Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported that 'looked suspicious'..."

At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed-up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"), 15 except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban-American's activities." (sic.)

The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable, (Mexi-7253, IN74227, 12/5/63) dated 5 December 1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on 23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at a certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana Flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of him taken at the airport. This was followed by a dispatch (HMMA-22579), 12/5/63) the same date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the photograph, and containing the following cryptic statement:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious." This comment is cryptic, at least, and-given that dramatic moment in history --doubless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as possibly unusual. above quotation was the Station's actual report of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI; it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal memo (See Memorandum for the Record, 3 December 1963) in the Station that was even more cryptic, but

which was in the nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported/ to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way into the more careful statements that usually characterize official re-j porting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impresionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic activity or final conclusions.

There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, [IN 43193, 3/19/64] [IN 4319

There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the presentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrrey report contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of Station replied (MEXI-8740, IN 43940, 3/20/64) that the information in the report "jibes fully with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63." It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how it shouls be considered responsibly.

Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became available with such information he was queried and the results were provided the authorities.

## CUBAH AMERICAN FOOTHOTES

1. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John
F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies,
Book V, Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations,
4/23/76, P. 61. Senete Report No. 94-755.

2. ld.

3. Classified Attest Survivory of Review of CTA Documents,
MARKDONAPPER.

4. ld.

5. CIA Downert Mexi In 72829 3 Dec 1963

6. Classified CIA Document 4 Dec 1963

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Classifier CIA Downert 9. Mexi 7253, IN 74227, 12/5/63

10. ld.

11. Classified CIA Document Mentileta, Extentes 12/5/63

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13. ld.	
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14. Classified CIA Document	5 Dec 1963
15. ld.	
16 Classified CIA Downert 1143194,	19 May 1964
18. la.	
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18. ld.	
19. la.	
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Mila.	
Classified Mexi 8740, IN 43940 22. CIA Document 20 Mar 196	<del>5</del> 4
Peacesa Classified CIA Document, Personality	File Action Rea
16 December 1963, #201-741600.	

257 FBI Beport, ABMAN, Serial 105-126109-12, p.

29, Ibia. ex

28. Ibid. at

25. la.

30. Ibid at

31. Ibia. at

32.15 id. ox

33. 16.id. ex

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According to Lopez's F.B.I. file, he registered with the Selective Service at Key west on July 29, 1960 and was classified 4-F on February 23, 1962 due to a language barrier.

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52. FBI Report, 3/31/64, Serial 105-126109-9

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54. 1612

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62. FBI Report, 10/26/64, Serial 105-126/09-13

63. Senate Report, The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennewy, Book V, p. 63.

64. ld.

15. See Senate Report, p. 104

bb. CIA Classified Dowment, 1977 Inspector General's Report,

Tab B, p. 16.

67. BARRAGE

68. la.

69. Ibid. at 17