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Box 30
File 7
Doc 1SECRET

C. Berk

IGR 1967

1 4/25/67 Memorandum - re: plans to assassinate Castro. Because of extreme sensitivity of operations, "as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approval, or of implementation."

W. Harvey retained skeletal notes of his activities during years in? - these are the best source of data

most info given has come orally

2 everyone deemed knowledgeable interviewed except Dulles and Cabell

"If there are significant inaccuracies in the report, they are more likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events."

3 5 separate phases in Agency assass. planning the transitions from one to another not always sharply defined. Each phase reflects the prevailing Gov. attitude to Cuban regime

a) prior to 8/60: all actions identified except one intended to discredit Castro's regime

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3 day influencing his behavior & altering his appearance

b) 8/60 - 4)61; ^{the plots} viewed by some ^{participants} as merely one aspect of overall active effort to overthrow Castro regime - culminated in Bay of Pigs

c) 4/61 - late/61; major scheme begun in 8/60 called off after Bay of Pigs - ~~was~~ dormant for several months and was most of the operational activity related to Cuba

d) late/61 - late/62; scheme in c) reactivated in ~~late~~ early '62, pushed vigorously in era of Project MONSOON and in climate of intense admin. pressure on CIA to do something about CASTRO and his regime

e) late/62 until well into 1963; post-Cuba missile crisis 10/62 and collapse of Project MONSOON,

4 aggressive scheme begun in 8/60, renewed in 4/62, terminated in early '63. 2 other plots originated in 1963 but both deemed impracticable and did not come to fruition

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fruitless and unrealistic plots influenced by severe pressure from Kennedy admin.

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4

2 points of importance: 1) eliminates a leader will not

5 2) Warnings about downfall necessary cause
of a gov't require removal downfall of gov't

of leaders from positions re: internal CIA
7 power - always a draft paper of 10/61
risk that participants indicated in response
will result to assass. to Gen'l M. Taylor
desire for contingency
plan

A third point: frequent resort to synecdoches
i.e. reference to a part when the whole
is to be understood e.g. use of
phrase disarming of CASTRO which read
narrowly + liberally means to assassinate
him but which is intended to be read in
broader, figurative sense of dislodging
CASTRO regime

Can also be read from other side of coin -
i.e. doing something about CASTRO meaning
killing CASTRO

6

IFR concludes that no reason to believe
that operators ^{was unduly influenced by} intelligence publications
contents

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reference to D. P. SECRET 1/7/67 column re
16430 slot and use of poison pills by team

SECRET

6

ISK concludes that there is a base in

from Pearson's reporting

a) CIA officer passed assassin weapon
to Agency Cuban asset at Paris

meeting on 11/22/63. The weapon was a
ballpoint pen rigged w/ hypodermic

syringe. Poison suggested for use was

Black Leaf 40.

7

b) Aug 10, 1962 meeting of S6 (augmented)
at Dean Rusk's conference room. At

meeting Robert McNamara raised subject
of liquidation of Cuban leaders. As a

result Edward Janzale prepared a

Project MONGOOSE action memorandum

On 7/31/64 - another S6 meeting -

discussed clandestine service info

report on Cuban exile plot to assassinate

CASTRO. CIA refused the request for

funds and had no involvement in the plot

c) On 2 occasions, early '61, early '62

CIA supplied poison pills to crime

syndicate members to assassinate

CASTRO. '61 plot aborted, pills received

'62 plot pills passed to Cuban exile

leader in Fla., then sent to Cuba in

May 1962. June 1962 - exile leader

reported that three man team dispatched
to CUBA to recruit for the operation

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7. if oppy arose, the three men would attempt to kill CASTRO perhaps w/ the upell

8. Implication of D. Pearson story of direct, executive relationship among various plots is unfounded

9. Miscellaneous Schemes from to 8/60
March to August '60

3-4 schemes considered well - before B. of P.
time frame is speculative - good guess is 1959 - 1961

J. D. (Jake) Esterline, head of Cuba task force pre-B. of P., - most reliable witness on gen'l timing - all schemes under consideration while Esterline had direct respons. for CUBA operation

10. Esterline estimates March 1960 as time when planning would have progressed to consideration of means - by end of third quarter of '60, task force energies concentrated on "main - thrust effort" & thereafter no interest in pursuing other schemes

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no evidence that schemes approved at any high level than division **SECRET** OR believed no higher-level approvals were sought because in scheme progressed to point where approval to launch needed

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10

Aerosol attack on Radio Station
(Ray Trechler), TSP, scheme discussed
to spray LSD like substance on radio
studio where CASTRO did broadcasts -
nothing came of idea - discouraged
because chemical was not really effective

[redacted] TSP

11

resulted experiment w/ psychiatric cases
but not related to CASTRO as a target

Contaminated Cigars

pre B. of Pigs possessing contam. cigars
by Esterline. Cigars would produce
temporary personality disorientation.
Wanted to have CASTRO smoke one before speech
Might have been prepared by (Ray Trechler)
Esterline might have confused the chemical
agent in that cigars might have been
intended to make CASTRO's beard fall
out, Esterline positive cigars were
not lethal

12

Cigars not used because wth/y couldn't
figure out how to safely deliver them
Esterline said he destroyed them before
he left ^{wth/y} ~~agency~~ in ^{June} 1961. 11111887

may indicate
2 separate
schemes
didn't get
DP/p's approval
and [unclear]

Sidney Gottlieb of TSP believes cigars
were intended for ~~stepping~~ ^{SECRET} - but Gottlieb
believes ~~the~~ ^{scheme} didn't get beyond talk (3/11/61)

SECRET

13 Depilatory
(R. B. [unclear]) recalls scheme to use depilatory
to destroy CASTRO'S image by making
his beard fall out. Idea was to dust
thallium powder (the depilatory) in
CASTRO'S shoes. Scheme got only so far as
procurement of chemical and testing on
animals. But scheme fell through
because trip outside CUBA by CASTRO
at which time powder was to be used fell thru

14 Gambling Syndicate

2 phase operation

a) from 8/60 - 4/ or 5/61

b) from 4/62 - 2/63 (renewal of 1st phase)

Phase I

August 1960

DDP Bissel asked Sheffield Edwards, Director
of Security of Edwards could establish
contact w/ U.S. gambling syndicate
active in CUBA - objective was to
assassinate CASTRO then Edwards said
term was avoided in convers. w/ Bissel
Bissel says idea originated w/ J.C. King,
then Chief of WH Division

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(1/11)

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15 Edwards contacted Robert Mabeu.
Mabeu had been an SA for FBI.
Mabeu had provided in the past
support to CIA in some of its more
sensitive operations

CIA people in FOR report who worked for FBI
Mabeu, ^{Robert} Cunningham, William Hawley, James
O'Connell, Edward Morgan

16 Mabeu told Edwards he had contacts
U.S. crime syndicate. Mabeu agreed to
participate only after being pressured by
Edwards. Mabeu's contact was Johnny
Roselli. Edwards and Mabeu agreed
Mabeu would approach Roselli as
representative of businessmen w/ interests in
CUBA who needed CASTRO eliminated.
\$150,000 authorized to pay for CASTRO's removal

11111889
September 1960 - case officer for operation
was James P. O'Connell, Chief, Oper-
ational Support Division, Office of Security.
9/14/60 - O'Connell + Mabeu meet
Roselli in NYC - Mabeu makes the pitch
Roselli agrees + says will introduce Mabeu
to "Sam Gold" who could arrange it + had
syndicate contacts in ~~SECRET~~

SECRET

17 Roselli declines payment, believed Dole would
feel the same way
Memo for Record prepared by Staff. Edwards
5/14/62: no money ever paid to Roselli
or Duncan. (Duncan is "Gold")

CIA emp in office of Security
Only O'Connell was made witness of operation
at the time. Edwards didn't meet Roselli
till summer of '62

Bissell informed of contact w/ syndicate
by Edwards during ~~summer~~ late fall
of Sept 1960. Only Bissell, Edwards,
& O'Connell ^{at CIA} knew of the plan. Edwards
stated that Helms was not informed
of the plan because Bissell was handling
CUBA at the time.

18 Edwards briefed Dulles and Cabell on
the syndicate plan. Bissell was
present at briefing. Edwards avoided
use of "bad words" - descriptive
term used was "an intelligence opera-
tion" but Edwards said that Dulles and
Cabell knew what the nature of the operation
discussion was

11111890
Edwards described the channel as A (Mabea)
to B (Roselli) to C (the principle in CUBA)
The formal approval given - Edwards believes
he had ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~approve~~ ^{approve} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~operation~~ ^{operation}
Bissell committed \$50,000

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19

week of 9/25/60 - O'Connell, Mabeu
go to Miami where Mabeu intro-
duced to Sam "Gold" at Fontainebleau
Hotel - "Gold" said he had a
man "Joe" (Santos Trafficante) who
would be courier to CUBA and make
arrangements there

O'Connell never met "Gold" or "Joe"

O'Connell learned their true identities
after ^{several weeks later} from Parade Magazine supplement

see office of Security Memo to DDCI 6/24/6

At time of Miami meeting Trafficante was
making regular trips between Miami
and Havana on syndicate business

20

"Trafficante was to make the arrange-
ments (for CASTRO's assets) with one of
his contacts inside CUBA on regular
trips to Havana."

11111891

Fall and Winter 1960

Plan to first contact w/ Roselli, machinery
for readying assets was set in motion

21

Not unusual for Chief of TSD to be by-passed
in operations involving his people. Such practices
and procedures may account for differences in recollection
of what did happen SECRET significance

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- 21 ⁰³ (Reichle) recalls treating a full box
of cigars w/ bacterial toxin - similar poison
which is fatal a few hours after ingestion
- 22 ⁰³ (Reichle) kept one of the experimental cigars
Had it as of 1967.

Dr. Edward Glenn got the cigars and
kept them in his safe - destroyed
them w/in a month of Shuf Edwards retirement
in June 1963

- 23 Roosevelt, Chief of TSD remembers
speaking to Shuf Edwards after
Bissel discussed it w/ Edwards
Roosevelt recalls 4 possible approaches;
- a) something highly toxic e.g. shellfish
poison administered by a pin
 - b) bacterial material in liquid form
 - c) bacterial treatment of cigar or cigarette
 - d) handkerchief treated w/ bacteria
- Bissel and Roosevelt both recall that
discussion was for bacteria in liquid form

- 24 January - February 1961 11111892
Solid in form of pills (size of saccharine
tablets) was actually prepared and delivered
Pill form chosen because of ease and safety of
hand line

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11/16

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25. Hancock against use of firearms -
would have been a suicide mission -
he preferred a lethal pill. Inside
man for ~~the~~ syndicate was Juan Ortiz,
off. Chief ~~of~~ + Director General of the Office
of the Prime Minister (CASTRO) - Ortiz needed
money

2/6/61 - ^{ready} conversation between Gurn and
(~~Trickle~~) - Gurn had tested pills on
Guinea pigs + found them to be ineffective
K 2.1's had high resistance to bovine

26. when tested on monkeys the pills worked
O'Connell eventually received the pills.
He recalls dealing w/ (~~Trickle~~) but
(~~Trickle~~) has no record of delivering
pills but he doesn't ordinarily keep
detailed records of such things

27. O'Connell believes there were 6 pills - gave 3 of
them to Roselle - passed sometime
after 2/10/61

11111893

Gurn was approached about the
operation by William Harvey in Feb 61
Harvey was briefed on the operation
J.C. King also briefed ^{then} although King
denies learning of the operation till much later

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3/1/61

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Late Feb - March 1961

27

Roselli passed pills to Trafficante
Roselli told O'Connell that pills
delivered to Orta in Cuba

Orta kept pills for couple weeks
and then returned them - syndicate

28

said he got cold feet. By the time Orta
had lost his position in the Prime Minister's
office

" It seems likely that, while the
Agency thought the gangsters had
a man in Cuba with easy access
to Castro, what they actually had
was a man disgruntled at
having lost access "

29

Orta suggested replacement who made
several unsuccessful attempts. Neither
Edwards nor O'Connell know who she was

March - April 1961

11111894

Roselli tells O'Connell the Trafficante
knows man in Cuban Exile movement
who might do the job - Tony Varona
(Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona y Loreda)
Varona headed Democratic Revolutionary
Front - agency supported group

Varona was associated by 1/18/61 FBI report
~~with~~ w/ financial ~~link~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~syndicate~~ ~~to~~ ~~over-~~
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- 30 P.R. man for Varona was Edward K. Moss who had significant ties in Cuba thru his mistress' brother (Celleni)
- 31 Trafficante approached Varona about killing CASTRO, Varona is receptive because its by money for ships, ammo etc

Roselli
knows
O'Connell
is CIA agent

O'Connell informs Robert Bannerman, Edwards deputy of the operation
Bannerman communicates with the
Sue Edwards out of town, Bannerman authorizes passing money (25 or 50 thou) to Varona
office of Secy memo to DDXI 6/24/66 sets figure at \$10,000 cost

- 32 ~~Roselli~~ O'Connell delivers money and pills to Roselli; Roselli gives money and pills to Varona.
Little is known of the delivery channels beyond Varona

April - May 1961

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- 33 Soon after Bay of Pigs Edwards sends word to Roselli thru O'Connell that the operation is off.
O'Connell believes Sturdevant was not firm and final and that something was going on between 4/61 and 4/62 but can't recall what
He agrees w/ Hawes that when Hawes took over in 4/62 it was a "going operation"

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34

O'Connell believes he recovered the pills and destroyed them

5/14/62 memo by S. Edwards state that 6 persons had knowledge of the operation but ISR identifies

13 people who knew in late '60 or in early '61 of ^{the} plan to assass. Castro

- 1) Allen Dulles
- 2) Gen. Cabell
- 3) Richard Bissell
- 4) Sheffield Edwards
- 5) James O'Connell
- 6) J. D. Esterline
- 7) Cornelius Roosevelt
- 8) ~~(Ray Treichel)~~
- 9) Edward Gunn
- 10) William Hawley
- 11) Sidney Gottlieb
- 12) Robert Bannerman
- 13) J. C. King

35

4 persons outside got known to be writers of the operation and the Agency connection

- 1) Robert Mabeu
- 2) John Roselli
- 3) Sam Giancana
- 4) Santos Trafficante

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1/M

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- 35 other aware but whose knowledge of
C, A connection is speculative
- 1) Juan Orta
 - 2) Antonio Varona
 - 3) Varona's son-in-law

- 36 RFK and Lawrence Huston learned
full details in May 1962
as for ^{see report} Drew Pearson's ~~article~~ ^{has} if
it approximates the TGR then
the following might be knowledgeable
- 1) Edward P. Morgan
 - 2) Drew Pearson & Jack Anderson
 - 3) Earl Warren
 - 4) James Rowley
 - 5) Pat Coyne
 - 6) Atty Gen'l Ramsey Clark
 - 7) Various members of the FBI

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- 37
4 Feb. 61 Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2
Bissel assigned sensitive ~~mission~~ operation
to Harvey - referred to as Executive
Action Capabilities - standard capabilities
to carry out assassinations when required
Bissel recalls discussing development
gen 1 capabilities - this is why Harvey
was briefed by Edwards re gambling
syndicate operation

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38

Bissell had discussed certain aspects quite problem w/ (Kinsler Silver) and Sidney Gottlieb - Harvey uses (Silver) in development Execution capabilities but not w/ respect to CASTRO.

Nelms was briefed ^{on Harvey} on general concept of E. A but did not mention the the then ongoing plot to assassinate Castro

Exec Acton - known as ZRRIFLE

Programmer - QJWIN - ^{recruited for} use ⁱⁿ

^{as part of} ~~Patrol~~ ~~number~~ ~~2~~ - recruited by (Silver) ⁰³

was to be run by Justice O'Donnell - (he asked to be released - didn't want party etc - Bissell granted the request)

ZRRIFLE - first appears in file in 5/61 - first recorded approval 2/19/62 on 2/19/62 - DPP Nelms authorized

39

Harvey, by memo, to handle project on special basis

QJWIN gets annual salary of ¹¹¹¹¹⁸⁹⁸ 7200

+ 7500 for operational expenses

cover for ZRRIFLE was ^{as} an FI/D operation

11/15/61 - Harvey discusses w/ Bissell

use of ZRRIFLE program in CUBA -

Bissell told Harvey to take over ~~of~~ Edwards contact w/ syndicate and run the operation

against CUBA

Nelms ^{SECRET} after word placed # HARVEY in charge of CIA Cuba task force

3/11

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Late 1961 - Early 1962

39 Hawley busy ~~with~~ following discussion
w/ Bissell re the ^{Edward's} ~~entire~~ CASTRO
operation

40 Feb - March 1962

Hawley 1st meets w Edwards re CASTRO
operation in Feb 1962

Hawley ran Castro operation as one
aspect of ZRRIFLE - but Hawley personally
handled the Castro operation and
did not use any of the assets
developed in ZRRIFLE. Hawley
treated Exec. Action program as
synonymous w/ QJWIN

Hawley said when he wrote ZRRIFLE/QJWIN
the reference was to Executive Action
Capability; when he used the cryptonym
ZRRIFLE alone, he was referring to
CASTRO. Hawley said his correspondence
would disclose this distinction. FGR
reviewed the correspondence & for
most part found it unrevealing

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41

QJWIN terminated by [redacted]

[redacted] at 4/21/64. No indication
file that Exec Action Capability of ZRRIFLE/
QJWIN was ever used

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41

April 1962

Edwards w/ Helms approval arrange for Harvey to be put in touch w/ Roselli. Harvey briefed Helms prior to ^{first} meeting w/ Roselli in its purpose & reported to Helms results of meeting w/ Roselli.

Thereafter, Harvey states he regularly briefed Helms on status of CASTRO operation

April '62 - Edwards statement that the "verified Helms approval" is earliest indication of Helms writing on gambling syndicate operation

and that Helms approved that Harvey not brief the Director (McCone) on the meeting

42

Edwards believes that the operation was called off completely after Bay of Pigs and no further operational activity until Harvey met Roselli & reactivated the operation in 4/62

Harvey's recollection is supportive of Edwards except Harvey says he took over going operation

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43 O'Connell also believes there was something going on between 4/61 after B Pugs and 4/62 but can't remember particulars

4/8 - 4/9 - Hawley + O'Connell in NYC to meet Roselli

44 Hawley + O'Connell dispute whether Mahan was present at meetings bears upon whether Mahan knew the operation continued under Hawley

45 ~~Mahan~~, Hawley, Roselli, O'Connell + maybe Mahan go to Copacabana see Phyllis McGuire there - Roselli attempts to avoid her

Edwards says that when he briefed Hawley on takeover he did not mention Mahan so that he could screen Mahan out of the operation

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46 O'Connell carryover into Phasett for purposes of continuity - appears to be a few weeks - his role in the operation ended by June 1962 when he was assigned PCS to (okunawa)

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47 ~~§~~ Hawey arrives in Miami on 4/21/62 - finds Roselli in truck w/ Tony Varona. Hawey reports to TSK how he took over a "going operation" O'Connell concurs.

48 Hawey didn't want Guncannain or reactivation of the operation - Hawey believes Roselli honored the request. Trafficante no longer involved. Roselli ~~know~~ had man known to

Hawey as Maceo - also used name Garcia - Gomez and Today

Hawey describe Maceo as "a Cuban who spoke Italian"

Roselli remained prominent in the operation but he worked directly w/ Cuban exile and directly on behalf of CIA

not likely to be Antonio Maceo Muck & associate of Varona because Muck well-known w/ Cuban exiles and Hawey would have had knowledge of him

1111902

49 "It would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing high-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate"

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49

After Pills given by Roselli to Varona, Varona requested arms and equipment for support of his operation. Harwey was ~~also~~ informed of this by Roselli. Harwey and JMWAVE station chief Ted Shackley procured the material at cost of \$85000 was T/Aid to Headquarters

Harwey + Shackley loaded equip into a U-Haul and parked it in parking lot at a drive-in restaurant. Roselli given the car keys

50

Delivery to Maceo, Varona, or Varona's son-in-law. Harwey + Roselli did not trust each other yet. Each placed a double-cross. ~~The~~ Each party surveilled the site (O'Connell was w/Roselli, Shackley w/Harwey - The truck was picked up + returned empty w/keys under the seat as prearranged. Harwey says Shackley never knew to whom delivery was made or for what purpose - he merely was called upon to furnish support for HQ operation from which he was otherwise excluded

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P
50

May 1962

Harvey and Roselli communicated telephonically by prearranged system
Roselli reported that pills in Cuba at restaurant where Castro eats regularly

51

June 1962

June 21 - Roselli reports to Harvey that Varma has dispatched 3 man team into Cuba; Harvey says 3 men has no specific plan for killing Castro. The 3 men would accept orders to kill C. If ops presented they would kill C, maybe using pills
Harvey never knew their names

Sept 1962

Harvey and Roselli meet in Miami on 9/7 + 9/11
"Medusa" reports in place, 3 man team safe + Varma ready to start another 3 man team to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard

52

Sept 1962 - Jan '63

11111904

3 man team down + leave - Oct missile crisis develops, Between 12/22 + 1/6/63
Harvey sees Roselli + Maces in Miami
Pays Roselli \$2700 for Varma for 3rd man team expense. Harvey + Roselli talk by phone 1/11 + 1/16
Roselli + Harvey agree ~~SECRET~~ ^{SECRET} must happen, new
- future

P
52Feb 63

Harvey in Miami 2/11-2/14 leaves word
for Marco that it looks like it all
over 2/15 - Harvey leaves Miami for
L. A. to meet Roselli. At L. A. meeting
Harvey & Roselli agree to close off the operation
but that Roselli would continue to see Garma,
gradually reducing frequency until no contact

53

April - May 1963

Harvey says gets 2 phone calls from Roselli
Harvey wants one last meeting w/ Roselli before
Harvey leaves for Rome. Helms informed of same
by Harvey. Helms gives approval

June 1963

Roselli in Wash. mid-June to meet w/ Harvey
Sam Paput calls Harvey while Harvey & Roselli
are dining out who asks Harvey if he knows
the dinner guest identity. Harvey says he does

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54

Harvey meets Paput next morning. Explains
that he is terminating an operational association
w/ Roselli. Paput says he must report
this to J. Edgar Hoover. Harvey does not object
Harvey ^{says he} asked Paput to inform him in advance
if it appeared that Hoover might call Mc Cone -
because Mc Cone should be approached before receiving
Hoover's call, Paput agrees.

P
54

Harvey says he then told Helms of the incident & Helms agreed that there was no need to brief Mc Lane unless Hoover's calls to be expected.

55

This was Harvey's last factoface meeting w/ Roselli

2nd phase writing persons

Richard Helms

William Harvey

James O'Connell

Sheffield Edwards

Jo C. King

(Bruce Cheever)

Fred Shackley

(Ray Treickle)

Antonio Varona

Varona's son-in-law

Maceo, Roselli's "man"

56

San Juanito may have been informed of 2nd phase by Roselli, ditto Santos Trafficante
O'Connell believes Maken knew,

Possible leaks:

Roselli to Maken

11111906

Maken to Edward P. Morgan (Maken's Wash
Laugh)

Morgan to D. Pearson

Pearson to Chief Justice President

Warren to Rowley (Chief of Sec. Service)

Rowley to 7th Colonel of the FBI, the FBI to Atty Gen's Clerk

SMC

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P

The Wiretapping Incident

57

Late '61 - Early '62

Garcara's private life ^{caused} incident that made FBI aware of Agency's relationship w/ syndicate - requested briefs of a.o.b. on details of assassination plot

Phyllis Mc Gure - Garcia's mistress
Garcara thought she was having affair w/ Dan Rowan - Garcia wanted Mc Gure's Las Vegas hotel room bugged. Mc Gure, reluctantly, agreed to bug room for Garcia.

58

Date of incident is uncertain - could have been 1961 - after Bay of Pigs, maybe early 1962 but before 2/7/62 on which date Director of Security told FBI that CIA would object to prosecution

Edward & DuBois handles request for Makeu. DuBois assigns Arthur J. Bulletti & J. W. Harrison to do the job

1111907

59

O'Connell says telephone tap used instead of planting bug in the room. Bulletti's equip. found by the maid + local sheriff called in. Bulletti arrested Harrison in Room 2006. He called Makeu in presence of state atty. gen.

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59 Guy, case reaches the FBI, ~~FBI~~ FBI
wanted to press for prosecution under
Wiretapping statute. Maken on being
approached by FBI referred then to
60 ^{Edward's say,} ~~Edward's~~ Edward at CIA. Maken told
FBI that the tap was for an operation
working on for Edward. FBI memo
of 3/23/62 indicates that FBI ^{now} knew
of ~~the~~ Cuban intelligence information
operation and believed wiring of
Rowan's room done for the purpose -
but doesn't indicate FBI knew it ~~was~~
~~was~~. The intelligence operation was
assass. plot

March 1962

The memo of 3/23 confirms 2/7
meetings between Edwards and FBI rep.
2/7 meeting - Edwards says Maken involved
in sensitive operation w/ Agency - Agency
objects to prosecution

61 3/28 or 3/29 Edwards and FBI ¹¹¹¹¹⁹⁰⁸ ~~Edson~~
San Papich meet. Edwards reiterates
his position re prosecution. Edwards
makes record of meetings in 4/4/62 memo
Dulles and Bessell gone by the time, Helms
didn't know of the operation - Edwards dealt
w/ Papich w/out reference to anyone else at
CIA

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7
62

April 1962

4/16 - Lawrence Houston, CIA Gen'l Counsel meets w/ Herbert J. Miller, Justice Dept (Criminal Division) and indicates Agency involvement w/out revealing details of assas. operation. Houston makes memo 4/26 of meeting, indicates Miller will cooperate but might mention it to Atty Gen'l

4/20 - Houston meets w/ Foley, Miller's asst - indicates that prosecution for other matters not related to bugging flap is OK. ~~is~~

62a

Because A.G. might be informed, Houston briefs DDCI Gen'l Carter who said he might at some time brief McCon. Not known if Carter briefed McCon. No indication that Carter briefed further on full details of assas. operation

May 1962

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A.G. informed because he requested a briefing 5/7/62 - Houston and Edwards brief A.G. RFR "all the way" (Edwards words). A.G. indicates he would not prosecute on the ~~work~~ ^{SECRET} ~~work~~. A.G. said that he expected to be informed in future if so ~~Quanso~~ w/ original crime again

SECRET

63 At A.G.'s request memorandum
rec'd of meeting prepared
Edwards & Houston both helped write it
RFK request on 5/11, memo dated 5/14
2 copies ~~to~~ - original to RFK, other to
Shel Edwards - Dir of Sec'y -
true purpose of operation may be
inferred from the memo
McCore, Edwards says was not
briefed on Carter & Helms

64 "From reports of the briefers, it is
reasonable to assume that Kennedy
believed he had such a commitment
(to be told in advance of CIA involve-
ment w/ Osgangster elements) from
Agency representatives
But at this very time that RFK
briefed on Phase I, Phase II under Hawey
was under way - as far as I know
Kennedy was never told of Phase II

65 5/14 - Hawey says he briefed Helms
on meeting. Hawey advised against
briefing ~~the~~ McCore + Carter + Helms con-
curred.

66 It appears that FBI was not given
a briefing of operation in anything like
the detail given to Kennedy

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67

ISR characterizes Agency as
first unwitting and then
reluctant accessory after the fact
in the wiretapping flap

August 1963

Chicago Sun-Time article 8/16/63 -

"CIA sought Giancana help for Cuba
spies"

68

69

8/20/63 Chicago Sun-Time article

8/16/63 - DDP Helms memo to McConne
forwarding a copy of 5/14/62 memo for
record to RFK following 5/7/62

briefing of RFK on phase I operation

70

ISR - earliest date 8/16/63 - that
have evidence of McConne's awareness
of scheme to assassinate Castro using syndicate
ISR says its not new knowledge that
CIA allied w/ gangsters to collect info -
what is new is that memo advised
CIA + gangsters to ^{assassinate} plot re Castro

1111911

May - July 1966 - McConne Committee

71

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71

72

Maken worked for Marcho against
Orassis - Maken received support
thru State Dept request from CIA
in 1954-1955 period

73

73

Maken has been used over the years in a
number of sensitive CIA operations.
CIA didn't want him to testify before
Long Committee

74

Maken may have told his atty - Edward
P. Morgan the details of the plan to
assassinate CASTRO using gangster
CIA has interviewed 3 times ^{that} Maken ~~was~~
1 - Marcho
2 - Maken

Seters in Early 1963

75

Skinner Dwyer Suter

11111912

76

Sydney Goltz, Samuel Halperin,
William Hawley, + Fitzgerald knew
of it - maybe (Mike Muskovsky)
also Hawley says he mentioned it
to (George McManus) special asst
to DDP Helms - (McManus) told Halperin
that he mentioned it to Helms
Hawley denies any knowledge

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1/M

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7
77

Booby-Trapped San Stell

Dr Fitzgerald, Chief SAS
scheme deemed impracticable
Fitzgerald, Halpern, + ~~Bruce~~⁰³
Cheever knew of it. Halpern believes
he contacted TSD on this

MS

Tab A Source of Info

file furnished by:

- 1) Div. of Security
- 2) Dep. Dir. for Support
- 3) Gen'l Counsel
- 4) Asst. Counsel
- 5) Chief of W. H. Division
- 6) Col F. L. King, former chief of
W. H. Division

biographic file + intell. pubs
furnished by Director of Central Reference

1111913

List of those interviewed re Castro Assoc. Plots
Donald Fitzgerald, Samuel Halpern, ~~Bruce~~⁰³
~~Cheever~~, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez,
J. D. Estature, Edward Gunn, Howard
Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney
Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard
Brossel, Lawrence Austin, ~~Ray~~
John Warner, Nestor Sanchez, William
Hawes, Cornelius ~~Rosenfeld~~, Robert Barrerman,
(check over)

03

27
M

(Secade)

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Project Amalash - Rolando Cubela

78

3/9/61

officer meets ⁰³ Cubela to get his views on Cuba. Cubela non-committal meeting arranged by AAUWHIP1, (Carlos Tepedino) - Cubela's friend

79

Cubela held rank of major in Cuban military - the highest rank

Project AMLAASH grew out of initial meeting between [redacted] and Cubela. The March 61 meeting ⁰³ was inconclusive. Cubela said that 1st step to overthrow regime is to eliminate CASTRO which Cubela would do. He requested repeatedly that CIA furnish him equipment to do the job.

80

Nestor Sanchez was Cubela's case officer. "The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubela's plotting."

3/28/61

11111914

José Onta x Cubela wanted to defect. CIA was for the exfiltration but called off because of report that Cuban police knew of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans. SECRET

Of Cubela was a garbage asset in Cuba it was known to CIA officers handling operations.

SECRET

P
81

8/14/61

Cubela sends message to (Nepedino) that he wants to talk to a "friend" of [redacted] in Paris if possible. [redacted] OK'd to approach Cubela but no indication from files that actually contacted.

6/15/62

JMWAVE station cable-station asset (AMCONCERT) told by Lucia Echevarria Blanco that Cubela left for Helsinki on 6/10/62.

82

6/27/62 FBI forwards to CIA report of meeting w/ FBI informant on 6/11 in Miami. Informant states Cubela wants to defect. FBI informant was (Nepedino). Bureau informed of [redacted] meeting w/ Cubela

03

7/8/62

1111915

(Nepedino) talks to JMWAVE station officer. (Nepedino) verifies this info source re Cubela is the Echevarria. (Nepedino) dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "planned defection" in Paris on 8/61.

2/PJ

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83

7/13 - 14/62

(William Wainwright)⁰³ of HQ meets
(Depeding) in New York. (Depeding)
will assist Cubela defection

7/30 - 8/6/62

(Depeding) in Helsinki on 7/30 -
Cubela meets w/ [redacted]
on 8/1 - first of a series of
meetings
original objective of defection
Cubela changed to recruiting him
in place

84

[redacted]⁰³ notes - Cubela also wanted
to assassinate Carlos Rodriguez (top-
ranking CASTRO subordinate) and the
Soviet Ambassador & also FIDEL,
by execution, if necessary

[redacted] said CIA could make no
⁰³ commitments or plans

Cubela stated he would only involve himself
in a plan of significant action, and which
was designed to achieve rapidly. He de-
scribed to help Cuba

8/7 - 8/9/62

further meetings agreed to in Stockholm
& Copenhagen - nothing signif.
in Stockholm meetings except that

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84

he had told among his Cuban associates
of his meetings in Habana w/ (Pepe) (Pepe)

85

8/10 - 8/11/62

([redacted])⁰³ (Pepe) + Cudela in
Copenhagen for further meetings

([redacted]) wrote that he used the
term assassin in letters
Cudela. Cudela found the term
objectionable (as reported by (Pepe))
The fact he did not object to (but the
term)

" It is worth noting here that
(Pepe), a Cuban jeweler
(New York), was present at a series
of meetings at which the assas-
sination of Castro was discussed
between ~~Pepe~~ Cudela and ([redacted])
whom (Pepe) knew to be a CIA⁰³
officer.

8/14 - 8/23/62⁰³

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([redacted]) Spanish speaking
case officer ([redacted]) meets

Cudela, (Pepe), + ([redacted])
Paris ([redacted])⁰³ planned to polygraph

Cudela - Cudela refused **SECRET**

Cudela given S/W + demolition training TPI

03
8/17/62 cable by [redacted] re: mission but
re: mission phys; elim mission but
only something on Cudela's own initiative
Cudela's delimiting not
to give Cudela any physical
delimitation mission 8/18/62 cable

SECRET

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86

8/29/62 - Cubela leaves Prague for Havana

9/5-9/8/63⁰² - Cubela ret in Brazil

([redacted]) Repetino, & Nestor Sanchez - Messengers Cubela's case officer

Cubela reluctant to use S/W messages because he feared efficiency of Cuban Postal Censorship

Cubela wanted to approach (Ramon) Juan Diaz (AMTRUNK-1⁰¹) who was of hiding (Miguel) Diaz Osalque (AMICE-14) (Diaz) had recruited⁰⁴ (Juan) for CIA & had done so

Cubela told to assist (Juan) in his intelligence assignment - Cubela concerned about (Juan) drinking and "neurosis condition"

87

9/14/63

Cubela to Paris for extended vacation - to inform Castro afterwards

9/16/63

Cubela write (Repetino) - he want remove politics & doesn't want to be your friend again

11111918

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87

10/3/63
~~10/10/63~~

Sanchez in Paris to see Cubela
also present were (John (Ted) Stent +
Richard Long. [redacted] keeping
Cubela under surveillance. [redacted]
[redacted] (that Cubela intended to defect from)

88

10/14/63

Cubela cable wants to meet senior U.S. official
preferably RFK for assurance of U.S.
moral support for his actions in Cuba
Sanchez felt strongly that contact
should be made

10/13/63

(Paris cable re Sanchez's return
to HA via AMKASIT)

10/17/63

Cubela meets w/ (Stent + Terpeding)
reiterates his desire for high-level U.S.
reassurance

89

10/29/63

11111919

Des Fitzgerald, Chief SAs, arranges
to meet Cubela in Paris to give him the
assurances he sought. Fitzgerald,
according to AMKASH file represented
self as personal rep of RFK who
was in Paris specifically to give Cubela assurances
he wanted. Fitzgerald said he discussed plan
w/ DDP Helms who said **SECRET** need to have
approved by RFK

SECRET

7
89

meeting held on 10/29 ^{in Paris} at (Ken Stent's) house
Fitzgerald used alias (Jane Clark)
(Nestor Sanchez) was the interpreter
Stent not present at the meeting
(Sanchez) made memo of meeting on 11/13/63

"Fitzgerald informed Cubela that the United States is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and assumes sufficient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it is prepared to give. It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only after a real coup has been effected and the group involved is in a position to request U.S. (probably under OAS auspices) recognition and support."

11111920

90

"Those involved now recall the purpose of the meeting as being something quite different from that appearing in written records prepared at about the time of the meeting." Fitzgerald recalls that Cubela spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. Fitzgerald ~~wants no part of such~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

7

90

Fitzgerald says he told Cubela that U.S. govt would have no part of an attempt on Castro's life.

(Sandoz) memo states that Cubela wanted to know what technical support we could provide him

91

11/14/63 - ⁰³ [redacted] meets (repeated) in N.Y.C. [redacted] contact report reveals Cubela's reaction to meeting w/ Fitzgerald:

Cubela satisfied w/ far policy concerned but not happy about not being given technical assistance for the operation. (Repeating) said that Cubela dwelt constantly on this point."

11/19/63 - (Sandoz) memo for record:

Fitzgerald approved telling Cubela he would be given a cache inside Cuba - cache could

"include high powered rifle w/ scope
C/SAs requested written reports on AMLAASH operation be kept to a minimum"

92

11/20/63 - follows summary is

based on recollections of those involved
Cubela didn't want to sacrifice his life for that of Castro - says the high powered rifle

SECRET

SECRET

7
92

Gunn, Halpern, (Sanchez) settled
in use of Black Leaf 40, common insecticide
as poison that could be used to kill
CASTRO

93

Plan at action stage on 11/20 -
Halpern (Sanchez) contacted Gunn
when say ~~needed~~ a ball point pen hypo-
dermic that (Sanchez) could take up
him the following day. Gunn
then made it up & delivered it
to (Sanchez) & returned two proto-
types - as of 1967 still in Gunn's
safe - doesn't remember (Sanchez)
returning the device to him - he
believes he was told Cubela would not
accept the device

11/22/63

(Sanchez) in Paris - meets Cubela in the
afternoon

93a (Sanchez) showed pen to Cubela & believes
he accepted it but said he would not
take it to Cuba. ~~He~~ Cubela not impres-
sion w/ the device. Gunn (Sanchez) says it
was not loaded. Cubela was expected to
supply his own poison

11111922

(Sanchez's) contact party meeting does
not mention pen or poison

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96

3/7/64 - Ho cable that high powered
rifleman main item requested by
AMLAASH

3/13/64 JMWAVE can break rifle
down so must omit from the
cache

3/17-3/21/64 - 1 Amlesh cache
explosion

4/24/64 - (Depedina) briefed to meet
Carlos Jorge Robreno Marquez
who has imp't message from Cuba

97

5/3/64 Cuba wants silence for
for Belgian FAH submarine
gun coast

5/5/64 TSP makes the silence

6/9-6/11/64

2nd Amlesh cache put down
with the FAH automatic rifle
but silence not included

98

8/4/64 - ~~AMTRUNK~~ S/W message from
(AMTRUNK) re recovery of caches

8/30/64 Manuel Antune ~~associate~~
goes to France on 10/7/64 to
meet with dissident members of
Castro regime -
1111924
(Alberto Blanco Romay)

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98

11/12/64

Cubela in Prague for meetings

99

11/13/64

- Artime reports that will talk to Amlesh if he is contact man for dissidents. Artime thinks if Amlesh is the chief dissident we can forget about the operation

11/25/64 Cubela in Paris

12/4/64 - (Sanchez) request money \$4500

~~to pay~~ for Artime for travel to meet w/ dissidents.

Artime did travel to Europe

and meet the dissidents

12/6 - 12/7/64 (Sanchez) & Cubela meet in Paris

100

Cubela wants to continue. w/ his plans told that U.S. would not get involved in his plan. Cubela said if he needed help he would look elsewhere

12/10/64

- (Sanchez) memo indicates that Agency wants to put Artime & Cubela together w/out their knowing it had been engineered by CIA. But CIA didn't intend to furnish Artime assets w/plan to give Cubela

101

12/17/64

- Cubela & (AMTRUNK) did not go to Cuba site personally - HQ cables to fishman used to receive ~~SECRET~~ ^{Paris} not 1000 101A REU

11111925

13-4

4PV

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101

12/27/64 Artime + Cubela meet in Madrid
for first time

102

12/30/64 - Cubela + Artime meet
again in Madrid
Artime reports meeting to
Sanchez in Fla. on 1/3/65
Cubela told Artime he hadn't
been provided silence - If
Artime could get Cubela silence
he would take it back to Cuba
If one could get another silenced
rifle, Artime would cache it
in Cuba for Cubela

1/28/65 (Sanchez) ^{in Paris to meet} ~~Cubela~~ ~~mission~~
PMM

2/2/65 - (Sanchez) meets Cubela +
(Pepedim) - Cubela says
reached agreement w/ Artime
Artime to provide package in Mexico
Cubela to take back ~~to~~ in personal
luggage

11111926

103

2/11/65 -
2/12/65 ~~Artime~~ reports from
 on Artime's final meeting w/ Cubela
Artime delivered 3 packages to Cubela in
Madrid. Cubela satisfied

16-7

17N

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SECRET

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3/4/65 -

15-2

103

3/15/65 -

[redacted]

cables that

Rafael Garcia-Banzo Durube in Madrid

from Cuba - (contact to [redacted])

104

claimed to be in contact w/ dissident

Cuban military leaders - he was referring

to Cubela - Garcia-Banzo ^{Garcia} had

defended Santos Trufficante who was kicked
out of Cuba

- name-link between Cubela & the
gambling-syndicate plot

6/65 - HA decides to term all contacts
w/ key members of Cubela group

" It had become increasingly apparent
that the circle of Cubans who knew
of Cubela's plans and of CIA's
association w/ them was ever widen-

105

ing.

Last straw - June '65 -

Victor Espinosa Hernandez Tell

story to CIA about contact w/

Cubela friend in Paris who

relayed Cubela message for

CIA that in a position to kill

Castro & others but wanted

assurance of U.S. government

support

From his story it

was obvious that Espinosa knew

the full details of the Cubela ^{SEC} ~~treason~~

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P
106 CIA files don't indicate what kind of "help" Cubela wanted from the CIA!

6/23/65 HQ cable to stations concerned re termination of contact w/members of the Cubela group.

107 Reuter's reports Cuban security police arrested Cubela & Guin who conspired w/ CIA

3/7/65 - Cubela & Guin on trial


3/8/65 excerpts from trial

108

109 Castro sends letter to court suggesting no death sentences for the accused

3/10/66 at transcript

110 Cubela & Guin get 25 years



Q - where is the sentence
Cubela: I throw the sentence away because it was burning my hands

Discussion of Assoc. at High-level govt meeting

11111928

111 None of ~~Cuba's~~ Cubela's dealings w/ CIA from 3/61 - 11/64 mentioned in the trial proceedings. 1st assoc of Cubela w/ CIA was in connection w/ trip to Europe in late 64. Not even a hint of the Ball Point Pen episode

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129 —

130 —

131 —

132

"Phase Two is associated ~~by~~ ⁱⁿ Howe's mind w/ the Executive Action Capabilities, which reportedly was developed in response to White House urgings."

133

"When Robert Kennedy was briefed on Phase One in May 1962, he strongly admonished Houston and Edwards to check w/ the Attorney General in advance of any future intended use of U.S. criminal elements. This was not done w/ respect to Phase Two, which was already well under way at the time Kennedy was briefed."

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111

ISK speculate on reason for w/idea evidence at trial

"Castro may have thought it politically imprudent to allow the expectation of someone so close to his inner circle, who had merely plotted w/out acting. If the full details of Cubella's involvement w/ CIA had come out in court, Castro might have had little excuse for asking for leniency

112

2 high-level interagency meetings at which aspects of CASTRO raised

- 1) meeting of S5(A)
- 2) held on 7/30/64 - 303 Committee probably at White House Situation Room

113

8/10/62

S5(A) meeting

Tom Parrott's minutes of the meeting make no mention of the subject of assassination.

The Comex Harvey recall McNamara raised the subject - also Harvey notes show it was mentioned by Thurrow

11111930

The Comex 4/14/67 memo recalls meeting on 8/9 or 8/8 /62 meeting at SCS operations Room in Pentagon where suggestion made that top people including Castro, of Cuban regime be liquidated

ISK says
McCombs
probably faulty

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113

McCone took immediate exception to the discussion & after meeting with McNamara & McNamara agreed. McCone says SICA never gave suggestion serious consideration.

114

McCone said that term such as "knock off Castro" & "dispose of Castro" were used but always construed to mean overthrow the Communist gov't in Cuba.

8/13/memo from Sandale to Hawley, Robert Hurwicz at State, Gen'l. Harries at Defense & Gen'l. W. Idem at OSA. memo assigned resp. for drafting paper on various subjects relate to Cuban operation.

Hawley's assignment had one portion deleted.

Hawley sent memo to DDP Nelson on 8/14 saying Lytchen portion said "including elimination of leaders". Hawley had protested use of phrase to Sandale's assistant 7 rank Harries. ^{Hawley} said should be phrase from all copies.

115

"Hawley told us that Sandale repeatedly tried to raise the matter of assassinating Castro w/ Hawley in the next several weeks." Hawley said he always avoided such discussions. Hawley believes that 5 people inside of CIA knew sensitive details of Project MONTAGNE. ~~SECRET~~ Sandale's intent is assassinate as an aspect of it.

'SECRET

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115

7/30/64

303 committee meeting - Peter Jessup was secretary

116

reference in minutes to 6/10/64 memo info report from DDP to Director. Also to other "elite" including Special Asst to Pres. for Nat. Sec'y Affairs, A. G. report related proposal for Castro assass. model prominent Cuban exile. Mafu appeared to be involved - also Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch, Pres. of Bacardi Rum Int'l. Record shows CIA only involvement in plot was the report info on its existence

117

only other evd. of the discussion is a 8/17/64 memo from DCI (McCone) to Beards reporting results of FBI interview w/ alleged participants

118

The Drew Pearson Story

119

The Possible Complications of the Gambling Syndicate Operation

O'Connell wrote report submitted ^{directly} to DDP

120

- 1) Makeu did brief his atty, Edward P. Morgan on Makeu's participation in Phase I
- 2) Makeu didn't know of Phase II - never heard of it from Roselli
- 3) Makeu ~~is~~ suspects Roselli + Morgan have a relationship

121

List of who knows what

11111932

122

IGR points finger at Roselli as ultimate source of info on gambling syndicate plot and Morgan as Pearson's source

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122 —

123 —

124 —

125 —

126

"In learning of the Roselli-Morgan link, we are relieved of the need for speculation as to how the story had gotten out. It is quite likely that Roselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients reason for leaking:

... "Roselli is drinking too much and talking and that Morgan is also drinking and talking to a newspaperman friend."

127

The Philippine National Bureau of Investigation has a Puerto Rican in custody who claims he participated in Castro-inspired assassin plot in Dallas. He also claims Castro made 7/62 speech threatening to assassinate Kennedy in retaliation for 2 Kennedy attempts on Castro's life. "We have found no record nor recollection of Castro having made such a speech."

128

The Puerto Rican is probably going to be deported to U.S. —

"We may expect the FBI to take him over and wrap him dry. We face the likelihood that things will get worse before they begin to get better."

SECRET

1111933