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Box 30  
File # 44  
Doc. 1

SECRET

11112102

Manuel Vega Perez 201-334253

HMMA 21610 22 June 1963

To: C/WHD

Info: COS, WAVE

From: COS, MEXI

Subj: Cuban Diplomatic Personnel in Mx/  
Manuel Vega Perez

Ref: DIR 28865

MEXI	0778
"	1165
"	2947
"	2994
"	3005
"	3419
"	3805
"	4149
"	4270
"	4374

- 1 Diplomatic title: Dipl. attache
- Date/POB - Circa 1912, place unknown
- Passport #: D/167
- Photograph: attached
- Marital Status: single
- Residence in Country: Hotel Agnes  
Sattillo 67

MEXICO D.F Mexico

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Also: Cuban Embassy

- 2 Date of Arrival: April 1962
- 3 Subject is known to be Chief G-2 in Mx
- For further info see cited references, as well as hitamil-7 and hitamil-9 Contact Report signed [William C. Curtis]

10144-10210

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DIR 80191 2 Nov 63

To: MX

Ret: DIR 80192

IDEN A: Manuel (Vega) Perez, 201-33425

IDEN B: Oscar Concepcion Mendoza, 201-729531

Cablesec: Pls use as reference, number assigned to attached cable

DIR 80192 1 Nov 63

To: MX

IDEN A has been assigned crypt (AMPDOW/1)  
" B " " " " (AMSESS/1)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

( Field report  
HMM) 7976 3 Nov 63 TDCS 3/563,88)

Subj: Air travel from Mx Cy to Habana  
travel data shows Vega left for Habana  
from Mx Cy on 3 Nov 63

MEXI<sup>9057</sup> FN 64124 17 April 64

travel data show Vega arrived in Mx Cy  
from Habana by air on 16 April 64

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HMM A-23581 3 June 64

reports photo id of Vega #239  
made by (AMSTET-1) on 22 April 64  
photographic portion of Cuban  
IS mug book furnished by HQ's

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(UFGA) 19162/16 4 Jan 65

Report # CC899 16 Dec 64

To: ?

From: Archive

reports (UFGA) 12827 dealing w/

Vega based on #CC-425 of

13 NOV 63

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201-745394

Mirabal, DIAZ, Alfredo M.

memo for record, 4 March 64 (HMMA)

23018

From: (Lawrence F. Barker)

Subj: Meeting w/ (LITAMIN/9), 30 Jan 64

(L-9) reported: "After Teresa Proenya was seen off at the airport, Oscar Concepcion 'reveler' that she had been fired on order of Pres. Dorticos who got tired of receiving reports that a famous international sex deviate (famous 'tortillera' internacional) was working at the Embassy. Dorticos fired her for 'immoral conduct'."

Excerpt

28 April 64  
IN 71516

Priority ( ) DIR CITE MEXI 9187

KAPOK (DYVOUR ZRKNICK)

REF A. ( ) 1609 (IN 6950F)

B. ( ) 1611 (FN 69843)

C. DIR 17103

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1. Re Ref B: Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, age 40 Cuban consul arrived Mexi
2. Sept 63. Reputedly does not know his job as consul and held in contempt by his staff for incompetence. Knows

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John Rejano and had one known  
social contact Oct 63 w/ Pavel  
Yatskov SW. Consul Meji.

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CIA information report

CSCI - 316/00685-64, 14 Aug 64

info from CUIS officer unt. 1 April 64

Alfredo Merabal Diaz, pseudo -  
"Federico" - chief CUIS in Mex City  
as of Jan. 64.

"  
In Sept 64, it was reported that  
AMD born in 1923 arrived in Mexico  
as the Cuban Consul on 2 Sept 1963.

Reportedly, he did not know his  
job as Consul and was held in  
contempt by his staff for his  
incompetence.

DIR 38947

4 Oct 68

RE: [ ]

0495 (IN 03639)

AMD departed Mex PCS mid-64.

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ULTRAF I

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Rogelio Rodríguez Lopez 201-332665

Vol II

Memo for Record, ~~MEMO~~

From: (Lawrence F. Barker)

Subj: Meeting w/ (LITAMIL-9) 27 Dec 63

"(Litamil-9) reported on the recent firing of Teresa Proenza Proenza and this was made the subject of 2 cables to HQ's in view of the importance in the (AMROD) operation (see MEXI 7613 and MEXI 7625)

MEXI 8982 IN 59445 11 April 64

To: DIR

1. Subj ref, Rogelio Rodríguez Lopez, is one of two top priority Mexi targets for recruitment (other is Code Clerk) Station planning pitch soon)

HR

11112108 Memo for: C/WH/3 Mex

Subj: Rogelio R. Lopez / Debriefing report # 59 of Ammney -1

Ref: [ ] 1611 26 April 64

1. Rogelio Rodríguez Lopez is CUIS office stationer in Mex City. He uses the pseudonyms "Eduardo", "Casamero", + "Jose Antonio"
2. over

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2 Rodriguez has the following description: age approximately 24 years old, 5'8" tall, husky build, blond hair & a reddish complexion.

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Target Personality Data Form  
opened on Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Loose Docs / RRL

HMMA-18861, Dispatch 17 Apr. 1962

To: C/WHD

From: COS/Molly

Subj: Operational (Linkluck) relation-  
ship w/ Osmin Fernandez Concepcion  
aka "Oswaldo", concerning  
Guatemalan guerrilla activities.

at P6 under COMMENTS

2. (Linkluck) has been cautioned to be extremely careful in his approach to and departure from the safehouse & to double check himself carefully en-route. He is well aware of the need for such precautions and has assured his Case Officer that he is observing all precautions possible. (A new safehouse has just been obtained for this phase of the operation.) (Linkluck) also has been instructed again to stop seeing June Cobb

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since she has proved a definite danger to the operation especially since Gutierrez, according to (Kerluck's) version has dodged responsibility for failing to properly support the Moreno 13 November group by implying that "infiltration" of the Party was responsible for the capture of that group and that June Cobb knows too many Party secrets through her association w/ Kerluck. Kerluck once again has promised to stop seeing her and has admitted the validity of our past attempts to get him to stop his affair w/ her. He also has been cautioned against letting this relationship w/ Cobb alienate Gutierrez.

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AMOOHIP/-201-(267956)

Eyes Only  
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Memo for: C/WHP for Cuba  
Subject: Espinosa Allegations

1. Sensitivity: Regardless of accuracy, they
  - A. present a problem because of their having been presented to other govt agencies;
  - B. in view of matters touching on U.S. security, are delicate and could have unfavorable repercussions if repeated to newsmen by the complainant or his associates (whose independent, previous threats were of greater potential embarrassment);
  - C. affect the reputations and the security of our personnel at

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2. Action: In view of the foregoing, the allegations

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A. should be put in proper perspective i.e. not ignored because of the potential embarrassment but considered in the light of what we already know (Almost all of them are repetitions of previous charges and reports. known well to both the

[redacted] Ha's officers

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Concerned w/ the AMHASTH group,  
whose members' reliability, repu-  
tation and good faith are  
questionable. (Two of the charges -  
about Earle and "Tota" and  
about AMWHIP-1 and Carrillo -  
are new.)

B. should be treated so as to protect  
us against any charge of inequity  
and so as to establish the  
facts but, at the same time,  
treated so as to avoid attributing  
to them more importance than  
they deserve.

C. should be kept in mind as  
example of other charges which  
may be bandied about and  
reported by the AMHASTH group to  
other governmental agencies or to  
other governments or to news  
media (In the last connection  
recall the implied threat of  
publishing (ODYOKK) <sup>USG</sup> responsibility  
as reported previously by                      <sup>3716</sup>  
IN                      <sup>3/8634</sup>);

D. should be examined together  
with all the other available reports  
so that we may

(1) clarify our own objectives and  
work w/ respect to all the  
AMHASTH group (and this includes

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AMWHIP).

- 2) sort out which people, if any, are worth our time in the future;
- 3) take appropriate measures, including interrogation and polygraphing, to clarify doubts and then, when necessary, terminate those who are working ~~for us~~ for us but are not worthwhile;
- 4) tighten up our own operational and security procedures in connection w/ the AMLAASH group

3. Preliminary Analysis: As pointed out in a preliminary analysis of the AMLAASH complex, made in March 1965 when I was preparing for travel  in connection w/ the (OAHOPS-1) case: "... There is no convincing evidence that the group is working either for or against the regime of Fidel Castro. Reports on their contacts w/ us and their discussions among themselves are at variance. In 1962 Fidel Castro, reportedly knowing that they were plotting against him, talked to AMLAASH and seven members of his group

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To enlist their support against Anibal Escalante Dellunde and the communists in Cuba. Possibly they are playing both ends against the middle. They certainly have been and are in contact with the two ends." The following comments are key to matter raised by Espinosa:\*

A. The AMKASH conspiracy - As detailed by [ ] 3716 (IN 28634) on 6 April 65, (QUSPORT-1) reporting on a meeting of the AMKASH group, including AMWHIP-1 mentioned

the following significant points:

1) Dulbach was criticized for "fooling around for years" w/out helping and for jeopardizing the operation.

2) The group was to be prepared to denounce (ODYOK<sup>USG</sup>E) as responsible if the operation fails and be - lieved that the resulting scandal would make the Bay

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of Pigs seem insignificant, and 3) (AMKASH(-3)) was in touch w/ Cuban Intelligence as established by code messages which he exhibited.

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As reported by ( ) 1532 (IW  
8 2939) on 4 June 65, based on  
meetings w/ Espinoza, the  
problem seen by ( ) is that  
"The AMRASH circle is wide and  
each ~~new~~ friend, whom we  
learn seems to have knowledge  
of the plan." I believe that  
the problem is a more serious  
and basic one. As indicated  
in paragraph 3 of the present  
memorandum Fidel Castro  
himself reportedly knew as  
far back as 1962 that the  
group was plotting against  
him and knewing it, enlisted  
its support. Hence we cannot rule  
out the possibility of provocation.  
Assassination, obviously, is a  
dangerous game, not merely to  
the plotters in a physical  
sense, but to a sponsoring  
government which may  
suffer severe political reper-  
cussions at home and abroad  
if its involvement is made  
known. In the instant case,  
the risks of exposure of the  
(ODYORF) hand would appear high,  
whether there is a provocation or

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not. Considering the individuals who are involved directly, their contacts w/ KUBARK officer, and their reported plan to expose (ODYOKF)<sup>USG</sup>, persisting in the plan could be highly embarrassing to KUBARK. (This is even more the case now that Espirasa has talked to (ODENVY)<sup>FBI</sup> and (ODURGE)<sup>INS</sup> although fortunately the tenor of his complaint was that KUBARK had not given adequate support to the plan.

B. The contacts at [redacted] about the matters affecting the [redacted] the "recruitment" of Maureen had been the subject of a change of cable between [redacted] and HQS and of discussions at HQS between WH/C and WE (See [redacted] 1071 (IN 6055) and DIR-16955). The annoying thing in this connection now is that Espirasa has talked about it to (ODENVY & ODURGE)<sup>FBI INS</sup> and the danger that, if he is indiscreet, his story about this (and the other matters) could reach some curious newspaperman. (On this connection, it appears

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That the questionable decision to put Maurice in touch w/ the AMKASH group was made w/out the knowledge of [redacted] Espinosa did not report any criticism of the KUBARKERS at [redacted] but it is evident that the AMKASH group knows more about them than we might wish. What is new and of concern from Espinosa about matters in [redacted] is his story of AMWHIP-1 and (UNSNAFU-19) dealings. The questions raised about AMWHIP-1 are of mutual concern also to HQ's which has been running him and [redacted] which he has visited often, (On the occasion of my previous trip to [redacted] on the (QUHOPS-1) case, (Gowen) had voiced his doubts about the whole group and specifically about AMWHIP-1 and his connection w/ UNSNAFU-19.) At issue are two basic points, (the knowledge on the part of (UNSNAFU-19) about KUBARK'S connection w/ AMWHIP-1 and the charge that AMWHIP-1 has been

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defrauding KUBARK in the (jewelry) transaction. Also to be kept in mind is the fact that (ODENVY) <sup>FBI</sup> has an office in [redacted] which well might have been informed of the allegations and which might have been asked for comments - although (OPENVY) <sup>FBI</sup> policy always has been to stay away from any investigation of other government agencies unless specifically directed by the Attorney General to investigate.

C. Criticism of the [redacted] Criticism of the [redacted] by the AMKASH group is not new. (Amlesh 2 and 3) were in [redacted] and wanted direct contact, but the [redacted] (Station) has had reservations about seeing them. The (Station) has been involved indirectly because of reporting by its sources about and involvement of (Station) targets w/ both the AMKASH and (AMWOPKA) operation (both handled from HAS) (See [redacted] 2982 (QW72256) and [redacted] 2998 (FN 73094) (both KYBAT).) Meetings among (QUSFORT), (QUSWIFT), AMWHIP-1 and AMKASH

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figures produced conflicting reports which previously were discussed at [redacted] and at H.A.S. Insofar as (GROVER) himself is concerned, it must be kept in mind that he is a natural target in whom the AMWASH group would be inclined to focus its complaints. With regard to the specific complaint about "Tota", (Grover) has identified her as (QU SWIFT-7) and has reported that no staffer from the (Station) ever had contact w/ her.

4. Further involvement of ESPINO SA:

On 10 June (ODENVY) notified KUBARK at [redacted] that


(AMWASH-2) had telephoned ESPINO SA to ask whether he had succeeded in contacting "the proper people" i.e., responsible KUBARK representatives - and to request notice of the resulting arrangements.

5. AMWHIP-1: Our plan calls for meeting him next week to obtain PRO information and to obtain clarification of the roles played by those involved w/

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him in the AMKASH operation.  
His dealings w/ (UNSWAFU-19)  
also will be covered. Following  
this, and LCFIUTTER examina-  
tion is planned. This may help  
to determine whether he has  
been truthful in his reporting.

  
WH/c/SP

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